out the air bags had any connection to the power mode status of the car. then it took another four years to link that finding to one of the components that determines the power mode. the ignition switch. and that discovery was not a result of gm's own investigative work but raised in the course of a lawsuit brought by the family of a young woman who died behind the wheel of a cobalt. how was this discovered? an investigator for the families took two ignition switches apart and compared them. something gm failed to do over seven years of investigations. ms. barra, you sought this internal investigation and you have publicly acknowledged how troubling its findings are. your company has cooperated with this committee investigation and i thank you for that. you have taken corrective action by changing procedures and trying to remove road blocks to make sure safety concerns come to light. based on this report, though, there are no easy fixes for the kind of systemic kultsureal

breakdowns and fundamental misunderstandings that permitted gm engineers not to suspect a safety problem when cobalts were stalling due to a faulty switch. the possibility these problems are pervasive and cultural deeply concerns me. concerns us all. we learn machine that gm has announced yet another recall. 39th since january. this one is hauntingly similar to the cobalt ignition switch recall. the ignition switch in certain buicks, chevys and cadillacs moves out to the run position -- moves out of the run position if the key has too much weight on it causing the car to lose power and stall. the model years goes back to the year 2000. your report tells us about the engineering and legal findings of gm but what it doesn't divulge is weather gm attorneys made conscious decisions during discovery and prevented the truth from coming out sooner and potentially saving lives. that kind of malfeasance should be the crux of a cover-up.

i want to delve deeper into that issue n find out if that occurred. a harder question to answer for you to solve is to why this happened. we know engineers approved a part that did not meet gm specifications. why? a cost concern? was it a rush to get a car off the road? was it just sloppy? when complaints were raised about cobalt's ignition switch almost as soon as the car was on the road why did the engineers not diagnose stalling as a safety problem? again, was this a lack of basic education about how the car worked or something less specific but more difficult to address? a culture that does not respect accountability and that does not take responsibility for problems? when investigations drifted for years, there seems to be little or no evidence to suggest that this troubled anyone. some of this is undoubtedly poor information sharing and silose and a failure to document change orders. why didn't anyone at gm ask, we have known for years, we have an air bag system that isn't working when it should. when are we going to do something about it. ms. barra and mr. valukas, thank

you for being here. >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. chairman, we're still trying to unravel the facts that led to one of the worst auto motive tradition of the last decade. and that is the installation of these faulty ignition switches in gm vehicles that we now have caused -- know has caused over a dozen deaths. these switches were bad from the start. they should have never been installed. and once they were installed, it became quickly clear to gm officials that something was very, very wrong with them. disturbingly, the company left these unsafe vehicles on the road for over a decade. mr. volukas, you've done important work describing how a defect known to gm employees for over a decade went unaddressed for so long. this report paints a troubling picture of gm's culture and commitment to safety that allowed this tragedy to take place. it describes engineering and

investigative failures, a lack of urgency in addressing issues, poor communication within the company and numerous other systemic problems. and in the end, the company failed to inform customers and federal regulators of the deadly problem. but the report unfortunately does not answer all of the key questions. it does not fully explain how the ignition switches approves without meeting specifications and then how it was redesigned in 2006. it does not fully explain why stalling was not considered a safety issue within gm. and most trouble, as the chairman alluded to, the report does not fully explain how this dysfunctional company culture took root and persisted. the report singles out many individuals at gm who made poor decisions or failed to act. but it doesn't identify one individual in a position of high leadership who was responsible for these systemic failures. the report absolves previous

ceos the legal document. and the gm board who knew about it before the tragedy beforehand. this is nothing to be proud of that the most jeern gm executives may not have known about a defects that caused more than a dozen deaths is frankly alarming and does not absolve them of responsibility for this tragedy. ms. barra, while you are a new ceo, you have a decades-long history with gm. from 2011, you were executive vice president of global product development and the gm staff responsible for vehicle safety reported either directly or through a chain of command to you. at least one high level executive who was working on solutions to the ignition switch problem reported directly to you. so while you may not have known about this defect, many people who worked for you did. the culture of a company is shaped by its senior leadership. they set the tone and shape the attitudes of the employees.

they are also responsible for putting in place systems to foster transparency and ensure that safety issues are taken seriously. those systems failed at gm. today, what i want to know are specific answers to how the culture of secrecy at gm can be changed to encourage reporting of problems, not just structural management changes. i appreciate ms. barra the changes you've made at gm so far, but i think the jury is still out on whether we can have success in changing the culture. last week as the chairman mentioned, gm announced the recall of over 500,000 late model chevy camaros, including 2014 model year vehicles because of ignition switch problems. and monday evening, just a couple days ago, another 3.3 million cars with ignition switch and engine shutoff issues were recalled. including chevy impalas that are

currently in production. this means that this year alone, gm has announced 44 recalls affecting more than 20 million vehicles worldwide. ms. barra, this record reinforces the notion that the safety problems with the cobalt and ion were not unique at gm and that the senior executives at the company, including you, should have acted sooner to resolve the company's culture. so now we need to see -- we need to show the american public that the changes that have been announced will really address the longstanding problems at gm. mr. chairman, ms. barra is not the only one with work to do. this committee should get to work on tlogs address the findings of our investigation. and in these last few minutes, i also want to acknowledge the families who are here in the hearing room today and their beloved loved ones with the pictures on the back wall there. i know it's not easy for you to learn about so many things that

went wrong at gm. you have my word that we'll do our best to make sure that this kind of tragedy will never, never happen again. and mr. chairman, i know that we can work together in a bipartisan way to do that. thank you. >> thank you. time has expird. i recognize mr. upton for five minutes. >> ms. barra, we all thank you for returning to the committee today as you said you would. three months another s ago we first hearing. we asked a lot of tough questions but got only a few answers. i expect things to go differently today. we had the volukas report in hand and words seared in our minds. our investigation tracks with the findings of the report. a maddening and deadly breakdown plagued by missed opportunities and disconnects. engineers didn't comprehend how their cars operated or how vehicle systems were linked together. the company believed the car that stalled while driving wasn't necessarily a safety

concern. investigators let investigations drift for years, despite having proof right before their eyes that an air bag system wasn't deploying when it should have. and all of this existed in a bureaucratic culture where employees avoided taking responsibility with a nod of the head. you have said you found the report deeply troubling as well. i find it very disturbing and downright devastating to you, to gm, to folks in michigan who live and breathe pride in the auto industry but mostly to the families of the victims. the recall announced on monday this week makes it painfully clear that this is not just a cobalt problem. a new set of vehicles including multiple chevrolet, cadillac, buick models are facing an ignition switch recall for the very same kind of torque problem that lurked for over a tickade in the cobalt and similar small vehicles with fatal consequences for unsuspecting drivers,

including two teens from my own community. many questions today will focus on how and why this happened. i intend to focus on how we can make sure it never happens again. a culture that allowed safety problems to fester for years will be hard to change. but if gm is going to recover and regain the public's it has to learn from this report and break the patterns that led to this unimaginable systematic breakdown. i want specifics on whether the changes you've already put in place really have made a difference. with the volukas report, gm provided an assessment of what went wrong. i want to be clear that our investigation does continue. this committee has reviewed over 1 million pages of documents and interviewed key personnel from gm and ntsa. while addressing their response, we'll address ntsa's part of the story. we don't yet have all the

answers about what changes in our laws, the regulators practices or the company's culture would have prevented this safety defects from lingering so long or harming so many but we're going to find out. yes, we will. the system failed and people died and it could have been prevented. i yield the balance of my time to dr. burgess. >> i thank the chairman of the full committee for yielding. we now know this is not an evidence problem. the evidence is simply overwhelming. it's an analysis problem. general motors still needs to answer the fundamental question of how it missed all of these glaring signs. indeed, failure to recognize the problems in a timely fashion may well have cost 13 people their lives. this report is deeply troubling. maybe the most concerning aspect of the report is the simple recognition that everyone at general motors had responsibility to fix the problem. no one took responsibility.

that's unacceptable for one of america's flagship companies and one that millions of us rely upon every day. now according to the report, he offers 90 recommendations as to the problems and their failures that led to the ignition recall. i'm certain all 90 are crucial, but, really, only one accountability and accountability that is not transferrable, is crucial. if personal accountability is missing, as the report here suggests, then disasterous consequences will not only occur, they will reoccur and reoccur. ms. barra, mr. volukas, thank you for being here. the report is a start with the first step to solving a problem by identifying it. i hope also there are some answers for many of us as to the affect of now the understanding of the problem and when the understanding occurred. will this affect those cases that have already been

litigated? how does general motors' bankruptcy affect its position on those cases that were previously litigated and perhaps we can even touch on mr. fein berg's employment. is he an employee of gm or is he working for the crash victims. all of these questions need to be answered today. and i look forward to your testimony and thank you. >> i thank you, mr. chairman for holding this hearing. the secretary on the failure to recall defective gm vehicles in a timely manner. i thank our witnesses for being here. as i said at our first hearing, the families of the victims of gm's defective vehicles deserved better. gm failed you. we're looking at those pictures in the back of the room, and they need more than an apology. on june 5th, mr. volukas, well

known in chicago where i come from and well respected there, reviewed gm's ignition switch failures and his report was released on june 5th. the report characterized gm as a company with a convoluted structure and very little accountability. a place where there was an institutional failure to communicate and coordinate both within and between different apart -- departments. there's a story today in bloomberg business week about a whistleblower who apparently tried to bring these problems to the attention of the company and lost his job as a result. during her previous appearance before the subcommittee, ms. barra repeatedly pointed to the importance of the volukas report in addressing the many questions she was not able to answer. i look forward to getting answers to those questions today. a question i raised in our last hearing has yet to be answered to my satisfaction. that's how gm will compensate those who were injured or who

lost loved ones in crashes prior to gm's bankruptcy in 2009. ms. barra said it would take her and kenneth feinberg who was selected to advise gm on options of how to establish a victim's compensation fund, up to 60 days. from 30 to 60 days from the time of the first hearing to determine how to proceed with those claims. that first was april 1st. it's now been 79 days. so i hope we'll get the answers today. as ms. barra said when the volukas report came public. we failed these customers and must face up to it and must learn from it. while 15 gm employees have been dismissed, it's not clear to me that any senior level manager has been held responsible for the gm corporate culture that allowed the ignition switch defect to go unaddressed for years after it was first discovered in 2001. the question now is how far accountability extends at gm.

ms. barra, my understanding is was responsible for safety issues at the company. the volukas report suggests the senior management at gm was unaware until 2013 the serious questions should have been asked about the ignition switch defect. however, two newspapers, including "the new york times" addressed the ignition switch defect in 2005. if i were a senior level executive that read about those problems in the newspaper, i would want answers and action. seems gm executives demanded neither. they make several changes on changing the corporate climate at gm to respond faster and better to safety issues and that includes improving communications with the national highway traffic safety administration, ntsa, and i look forward to hearing from ms. barra about the changes the company has already made and its plan for future improvements in the future. gm paid the maximum penalty for

failing to inform ntsa about the ignition switch defect. that was $35 million. to me, it sounds like a lot of money, but that's not enough of a deterrent for a company with over $150 billion in revenue. sounds to me more like a slap on the wrist. i'm an original co-sponsor of ranking member henry waxman's motor vehicle safety act, hr-4364, which would increase the maximum penalties for failing to inform ntsa and the public of potentially deadly auto defectss. as the ranking member of the commerce manufacturing and trade subcommittee, i'm working on legislation that would do the same while also addressing several other issues raised by the gm ignition switch defect, including requires the public disclosure of technical service bulletins. those are the bulletins which provide information to dealerships about how to repair vehicles experiencing a widespread problem kept from the public. in gm's case, tcbs were issued

for the faulty ignition switch. in 2005. almost ten years before a recall was issued. those tsbs instructed dealerships to replace the defective part. i hope today's hearing will allow us to consider additional actions that might be needed in improving auto recalls, and i look forward to hearing from our witnesses. i yield back. i would like to introduce the witnesses on the panel. mary barra is the chief executive officeror general motors and has been in this role since january 15th, 2014 when she became a member of its board of directors. she's been with the company over 30 years and has held a number of positions, including vice president of global manufacturing engineering from 2008 to 2009.

and executive director of vehicle manufacturing engineering from 2005 to 2008. mr. abton valukas is a former u.s. attorney and fellow of the american college of trial lawyers. he was hired by the general motors corporation to conduct the internal investigation into the faulty ignition switch and he's the author of the report on the findings released two weeks ago. i'll now swear in the witness. you are both aware the committee is holding an investigative hearing and when doing so has the practice of taking testimony under oath. do you have any objections to testifying under oath? both witnesses say they do not. the chair then advises you that under the rules of the house and the rules of the committee, you are entitled to be advised by counsel. do either of you advise to be advised by counsel? both declined. thank you. in that case if you'll please rise, raise your right hand i'll swear you in. do you swear the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the whole truths and nothing but

the truth? thank you. both witnesses answered in the affirmative. you are now under oath and subject to the penalties set forth in title 18, section 1001 of the united states code. you may now each give a five-minute summary of your written statement. ms. barra, would you like to open? please pull the microphone close to you. thank you. you have to turn it on as well. thank you. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i appreciate the chance to appear before you again today on the ignition switch issue. before i proceed with my brief remarks, i want to again express my sympathies to the families that lost loved ones and those who suffered physical injury. i am ever mindful that we have a special responsibility to them and to those families and the best way to fulfill that responsibility is to fix the problem by putting in place the

needed changes to prevent this from ever happening again. when i was here 11 weeks ago, i told you how we intended to proceed with this matter. i promised we would conduct a comprehensive and transparent investigation into the causes of the ignition switch problem. i promised we would share the findings of mr. volukas' report. i promised we would hold people accountable and make substantial and rapid changes in our approach to recalls. finally, i promise we would engage ken fineberg to develop a just and timely program for compensating families who lost loved ones and those who suffered serious physical injury. we have done all of these things and more. and i welcome the opportunity to discuss them with you further. the volukas report is extremely thorough, brutally tough and deeply troubling. it paints a picture of an organization that failed to

handle a complex safety issue in a responsible way. i was deeply saddened and disturbed as i read the report. for those of white house have dedicated our lives to this company it is enormously painful to have our shortcomings laid out so vividly. there is no way to minimize the seriousness of what mr. volukas and his investigators uncovered. on june 2nd, he presented the findings of his investigation to the board of directors of general motors. i will leave it to him to comment on his report. but for my part, i want you to know my reaction to the report and some of the actions i have taken since reviewing it. first, we have made a number of personnel decisions. 15 individuals identified in the report are no longer with the company. we have restructured our safety decision-making process to raise it to the highest levels of the company. addressing a key point in the volukas report that critical information was kept from senior management. under the new system, this should never happen again.

we are currently conducting, and i believe -- what i believe is the most exhaustive, comprehensive safety review in the history of our company. we are leaving no stone unturned in devoting whatever resources it takes to identify potential safety issues and all of our current vehicles and on vehicles no longer in production. our responsibility is to set a new norm and a new industry standard on safety and quality. i have told our employees it's not enough to simply fix this problem. we need to create a new standard and we will create a new norm. we have announced the creation of and have implemented a new global product integrity that is already enhancing the overall safety and quality of our products. and we are taking a very aggressive approach on recalls and bringing greater rigor and discipline to our analysis and decision-making process regarding these recalls and other potential safety related matters. it's difficult to announce so many recalls, but it's absolu

absolutely the right thing to do. as we discussed last time, we've engaged kenneth feinberg to review options for stab stake -- establishing a compensation program. he can establish eligibility criteria for victims and establish the compensation levels. he'll share his final criteria with us by the end of this month and we expect to begin processing claims by august 1st. we created a new position of vice president of global vehicle safety and appointed jeff boyer who is a highly respected expert in the field to this position. i have personally told jeff that he will have whatever resources he needs to do the job, and he has many already. in fact, we've also named a senior attorney to support him and facilitate rapid information sharing across the organization. in addition, we've added 35 safety investigators that are already allowing us to identify and address safety issues much more quickly. and finally, we've instituted a

speak up for safety program, encouraging employees to report potential safety issues quickly and we are recognizing them when they do so. this is more than a campaign or a program. it's the start of changing the way we think and act at general motors. two weeks ago, i addressed the entire global workforce about the report. i told our team as bluntly as i knew how that the series of questionable actions and inactions uncovered in the investigation were inexcusable. i also told them that while i want to solve the problems as quickly as possible, i never want anyone associated with gm to forget what happened. i want this terrible experience permanently etched in our collective memories. this is not another business challenge. this is a tragic problem that should never have happened and must never happen again. the report makes a series of recommendations in eight major areas. i have committed the company to act on all of the

recommendations and many of which we had started before and are already implementing. finally, mr. chairman and members of the committee, i know some of you are wondering about my commitment to solve deep underlying kultsureal problems that were uncovered in the report. the answer is simple. i will not rest until these problems are resolved. as i told our employees, i'm not afraid of the truth, and i'm not going to accept business as usual at gm. it's time, in fact, it's past time, to insist on total accountability and to make sure vital information is shared across all functions of the company. so we can unleash the full power of our 2 helped,000,000 employe dealers and 23,000 suppliers. we are a good company, but we can and must be much, much better. this is my focus and this is my promise to you, our employees, our customers, our shareholders and the american people. thank you again for having me

here today. i'm pleased to take your questions. >> thank you. mr. volukas, you're recognized for five minutes. >> you have to bring that very close to your mouth and lift it up. >> all right. thank you, mr. chairman. >> even closer, if you would, sir. >> even closer? >> yes. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. in march of this year, general motors asked me to determine why it took so long to recall the cobalt and other vehicles that contained this faulty defective switch which has resulted in such disast er for general motos and for the families involved in this matter. my explicit mandate from the general motors board of directors was to promote and provide an unvarnished report as to how and why this occurred. to pursue the facts wherever they took us and to report those facts in a report. general motors board also

directed me to make recommendations based an those factual findings to help them ensure that this did not happen again. my firm was given unfettered access to general motors witnesses and documents. in point of fact, we interviewed in the 70 days or so, 230 witnesses, some of them multiple times so we had approximately 350 interviews. some of them lasting six to eight hours. we reviewed over 41 million documents coming from the files of everybody from the top executives down to the individuals who were involved at the most technical level. that number of documents involved tens of millions of dollars that were personally reviewed by individual reviewers. and all of this was an effort to find out the facts as to why this cobalt recall took over a decade and how -- why that defective switch remained unaccounted for during that period of time. i provided a copy of the report

that was provided to the committee. i am not going to go through the details. but the story of the cobalt is a story of individual and organizational failures that have led to devastating consequences. throughout the decade it took general motors to recall the cobalt there was, as has already been described here by one of the members, lack of accountability, a lack of urgency, and extraordinarily a failure of the company personnel charged with safety issues to understand how this car was manufactured and the interplay between the switch and other aspects of the automobile. in our report, we review these failures and identify cultural issues that may have contributed to this problem. as general motors board recommended, i've provided recommendations to help ensure this problem does not take place in the future. as we note in my written statement to you, that's an

issue which gm must deal. report does not give all of the answers. thank you. >> thank you very much. now i recognize myself for five minutes of questions. your report references such terms as the gm nod and the gm salute where people nod in agreement and do nothing or look to others to do something. but no one accepts responsibility. ms. barra do you agree that the cult surthe problem at gm, that the culture at gm failed to recognize issues? >> i agree there are people involved that did not act appropriately. >> you've been with the company for 30 years, right? >> yeah. >> how does someone who has spent an entire career within the culture of gm change a culture of gm? i believe there's 210,000 employees or so. you mentioned 15 were fired. that's 99.999%, if my math is right, of the people are the

same. if you haven't changed the people, how do you change the culture? >> again, the 15 people that are no longer with the company are the people that either didn't take action they should or didn't work urgently enough to rectify this matter. and they are no longer part of this company. that was a strong signal to send within the company. but again, what's much more important is that we create the right environment where every engineer is able -- everyone in the company is able to come to work every day and do their best work, be supported and that is the culture that we're working to create. that's the programs we've put in place like speak up for safety. and the structural changes we've made. >> the previously referenced article by bloomberg notes that kelly who worked on the cavalier, the predecessor of the cobalt, raised questions about a defectsive fuel line. he had to continue to do that, even threatening in moving forward with whistle blower actions. this was referenced on page 93 of your report which says he

also noticed he was reluctant to push hard on safety issues because of his perception his pred setter had been pushed out of the job for doing just that. i guess this speaks to the question, what is a cover-up? mr. volukas, you concluded there was no experience and no cover-up. does an employee acting alone who hides or doesn't share information a cover-up? >> i'm sorry. >> does an employee who acts alone or hides or doesn't share information a cover-up? >> if the individual knows that the information is a safety information, and understands that and deliberately decides to conceal that, that's a cover-up. yes it is. >> and a corporate culture of carelessness where life-saving information sits in file boxes collecting dust, is that a cover-up? >> what we found in connection with this, mr. chairman, was the following. we found that a large number of

individuals had information that they -- in the first instance they didn't believe was safety related information. clearly up to about 2009. they looked at this as a convenience matter. we did not find evidence that any individual had a piece of evidence in connection with this cobalt recall which they considered to be safety information which they deliberately withheld from somebody else. >> you put in your report that mr. oakley specifically says he's reluctant to push hard on safety issues. >> i'm sorry. >> you put in your report where mr. oakley specifically says on page 93 he was reluctant to push hard on safety issues because of his perception his pred sors pushed out of a job. that implies he withheld safety information. is he still working for you? >> yes, he is. and actually, he's raised issues and we are actively investigating. it's part of our speak up for safety program. >> sound like he decided not to speak up. >> he is now and we're taking it very seriously. >> i just find it hard to

believe that a 210,000 employees, not a single one in that company had the integrity to say, i think we're making a mistake here. not a single one. that's puzzling to me. the v.a. had a lot of whistle blowers. i don't see in gm there's whistle blowers. not a single person you interviewed in this? let me jump to another question. i want to get back to this. there was also a lot of issues about lawsuits. you referenced some of those. what i don't see is questions if you examine if gm responded appropriately to victims' discovery requests in the lawsuits, including what gm understood about the air bag deployment. did you find -- i don't know if you spoke with plaintiffs' attorneys but do you know if information requested of gm was responded to in a timely manner and that the information they've presented to gm was responded to? >> mr. chairman, what we did was

we -- at the very beginning of this investigation, i sent letters and e-mails to the key plaintiffs lawyers who were involved, whether it would be in the most sensitive of these cases. i don't want to mention family names. including the case that resulted in the disclosure of the two switches. inviting them to contact me so that we could talk in the investigation, determine that issue, deal with that issue. not one of those attorneys responded to me. i also interviewed the attorneys who were outside counsel in connection with the gm matters, the particular piece of litigation to determine whether i had any evidence there of something which would indicate that gm had particular facts which they were withholding in order to accomplish something. and i did not find evidence of that in my discussions with outside counsel. i reviewed all of the e-mails relating to the legal department in connection with all of these cases. i say i in general. i didn't do them personally. to determine whether there was

any evidence if there was information they had that they were making a decision to settle a case because they wanted to conceal the safety defect and prevent a recall. i did not find information such as that. >> i'm out of time. but there's a difference between not getting a response and not having the facts. and my assumption is when you tasked mr. volukas with getting the information if you don't have the information, do you still want it? the information with regard to -- if information was not passed on, did plaintiffs' attorneys who had a request, you still want that information? i'm out of time. i'll go to ms. degette. >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. volukas, the chairman just asked ms. barra about this gm nod and gm salute that you talked about in your report on page 255 and 256 where you said, one witness described the gm phenomenon of avoiding responsibility as the gm salute, a cross of the arms and pointing

outward towards other, indicating the responsibility belongs to someone else, not me. and then you said similarly, mary barra describes a phenomenon known as the gm nod. the gm nod barra described is when everyone nods in agreement, a proposed plan of action but then leaves the room with no intention to follow through and the nod is an empty gesture. when the chairman just asked ms. barra about this she said, quote, there were specific people involved that did not act appropriately. do you think this company culture, the gm nod and the gm salute was just limited to those 15 people who have been terminated from gm? yes or no? >> i can't answer that question. >> do you think it was only 15 -- >> no, i think there were

>> gm sienior leadership, including ms. barra was unaware of these issues for years. is that correct? >> these leaders included gm ceos, including rick wagner, mike millican who was then gm's senior council and ms. barra, correct? >> that is correct. >> ms. barra you testified you didn't know about it until december 2013. is that correct? >> i testified i knew there was a problem with the cobalt in december. they were studying. i knew there was an ignition switch issue on january 31st. that's what's i testified. >> december 2013, right? >> january 31st, 2014 was when i knew of the ignition switch issue. >> now gaye cant made decisions in 2004 about the stalling being a safety risk. did she ever share those findings with you? >> no. >> and jim federico, a senior gm executive brought in to find

solutions to the air bag situation in 2012. he knew about the problems. and he reported directly to you. did he ever share his knowledge with you? yes or no? >> well, he reported directly to me at a portion of his time and then no longer -- >> did he ever tell you about these problems? >> no, he didn't. >> you've made a number of structural changes at gm, and i appreciate this. i know you're committed to doing it. but the company culture is what concerns me as well as the chairman. and the problems that i've identified today are not problems about who reports to whom but rather a culture that encourages people not to stick their necks out and report things. and in fact, just yesterday, i learned from a source, a very source very close to gm who has intimate knowledge of the culture there that the results of mr. volukas' investigation and the terminations of these 15 employees have only created more paranoia within the company that people are going to lose their

jobs. and so i want to ask you, ms. barra, what are you doing, not just to change the structure and put these safety programs together and so on but to change the culture of the company so that the company rewards people reporting problems, not sweeping it under the rug? >> we are doing a lot. and it's to your point, it's not done by words. it's not done by slogans. it's done by actions. >> what is it that you are doing? >> so we have put the speak up for safety program and we are getting -- i'm getting personally information from employees. i'm acting on it. we have a regular program. we're going to be recognizing those individuals. i have spoken to all of our employees globally encouraging them. the work we're doing and the actions we're taking with the additional recalls demonstrate how sincere we are to put the customer at the center of all we do. we want to make sure we're doing the right thing as it relates to safety. and quality and our employees are seeing that. >> i would like to see if you

may supplement your answer, with the specifics of how you are rewarding this. i would appreciate that. >> i want to talk to you briefly about this compensation fund. i'm pleased now that you are telling us that mr. feinberg is setting up a compensation fund but we still don't have very many details of it. has the company or mr. feinberg determined the criteria about who will be eligible for payment? yes or no? >> he is developing that. i think the -- >> so we don't have that criteria yet? >> he's got a draft protocol that he's getting input. he's an independent -- >> would you please provide that to this committee? the draft protocol? thank you very much. and -- no, let me ask you this. will mr. feinberg have discretion to make eligible for payment victims beyond those identified by gm to date? we're hearing there may be up to 100 deaths from this. >> we want to capture every single person who suffered physical injury or loss to a love one.

every single person as a result of this. >> so your answer is yes? >> yes. >> and will those people who receive payment through this program be required to release their legal claims? >> i'm sorry, the voluntary program -- >> no, if they get compensated but from mr. feinberg's program, will they have to release their legal claims to go to court? do you know? >> this program is in lieu of taking this to court. >> so your answer is yes. >> i can't say exhaustively but as it relates to the specifics. >> will you submit your answer, please and let me know that. thank you very much. >> now recognize mr. upton for five minutes. >> thank you again. i'm a firm believer that you cannot solve a problem that you don't acknowledge or fully understand. so while i'm going to be -- try to be very interested and forward looking solutions, i want to begin by looking forward and defining key problems we identified from this report. first, a simple yes or no. is it true gm engineers did not

believe the ignition switch moving from run to accessory and causing a stall constituted a safety problem? first, ms. barra? >> yes. >> and mr. volukas? >> yes. >> can you confirm that a gm engineer test driving the cobalt in '05 experienced a shutoff after hitting the key with his knee and that his report on the incident was categorized as an annoyance rather than a safety issue? >> yes. >> so let's continue talking about how gm employee warnings and experiences were handled. i read with a lot of concern this morning's news coverage alleging that employee safety concerns went unheeded. i won't ask you to respond to a particularly newspaper article, but i want to get your reaction to a case uncovered in our investigation about a specific employee concern. i want to know how it was handled at the time and how it would be handled if it was raised today.

you've got a tab on page 83 in your binder. in '05, a gm employee drove an '06 chevy impala home from work. when she hit a bump in the road, the ignition switch fell out of the run position and stalled the car. let me read you from her e-mail which is up on the screen sent in october of '05 after she took the vehicle for repair. quote, i think this is a serious safety problem, especially if this switch is on multiple programs. i'm thinking big recall. i was driving 45 miles per hour when i hit the pot hole and the car shut off. and i had a car driving behind me swerving around me. i don't like to imagine a customer driving with their kids in the back seat on i-75 and hitting a pot hole in rush hour traffic. i think you should seriously consider changing this part to a switch with a stronger detent, end quote. so to reiterate, nearly nine

years ago, a gm employee suggested the stalling of the '06 impala was a serious safety problem and speculated a big recall was coming. so when was the recall for the '06 impala announced? >> i believe that was part of -- >> two days ago. monday. nine years ago. so looking at that case and looking at it as if it happened today, can you tell us specifically how a concern like this would be handled if it was raised today? >> we, as i testified when i was here last time, we consider a stall to be a safety issue. and so when a stall is brought forward, if we then learn and understand it's because of a defect in the way the vehicle, some part or a system in the vehicle is working, we are going to address it. we have to understand stalls also happen when you run out of

gas or pop the clutch, but if we are aware of a stall and we then learn that it's because some part of the vehicle or a system is not operating properly, we'll immediately take action and that's what is represented in what we did on monday. >> mr. volukas, in going through the report, there were some comments made as to the consumer friendliness of the tread act requirements in terms of complaints that were received. what suggestions might you have relating to that? in terms of how we proceed in the future? >> i don't have a specific legislative suggestion for you. i did include in the recommendations something which i think is very important for general motors, which is they need to look at ntsa as a partner in this issue. that's somebody be helid at bay so it's a free flow of information.

it is clear from the earlier aspects of this investigation there were times where it was almost an adversarial relationship rather than a passing information. but i don't have a legislative suggestion for you. >> ms. barra, do you have a comment as relates to the compiling of the information for the tread act, for the complaints? >> i think it's very important that we have a productive relationship with the agency with nts, and i do think there's things that can be done in the national vin database and imflifg search capability to use information -- valuable information that's in the tread database. >> i yield back. >> i have a clarifying question. given that, i think, gm has now recall something like 40 million cars, do you have a revised number on the number of deaths that may be -- crashes that may have been associated with the faulty ignition switch? >> the recall on monday, there's no known. we know of no fatalities. >> but overall related to what

ms. degette was saying. >> the information we have as it relates to the cobalt and the population of those vehicles, the known number we have is still 13. >> thank you. recognize mr. dingell now for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. welcome to ms. barra and to mr. volukas. we appreciate you being here today. you, mr. volukas and your team have compiled a report about serious internal shortcomings at general motors that has contributed to the company's failure to report a safety defect in the chevrolet cobalt. i know that mrs. barra shares my concern about the report finding and i look to her and gm leadership for establishing more responsible and communicative culture at gm. we all recognize your report as not an end to the investigation. it does include a number of

common sense recommendations which i feel gm should commit to implementing in full. my questions to ms. barra today will require simple yes or no answers. now, to ms. barra, we have learned that cobalt's initial -- ignition switch was redesigned, but it was not given a new part number. this obfiscated the company's internal investigation and contributed to a delay in defect reporting and subsequent recalls. mr. volukas suggests in his report that gm adopt procedures that include specific protocol for reviewing authorizations of out of specification parts. tracking unspecification parts, identifying who should be notified of them and identifying and elevating any particular

safety issues, despite being associated with the use of out of specification part. the report goes on to suggest that high level required before approval of use of out of specification part. now, does gm commit to implementing these particular suggestions in full? yes or no? >> yes. >> now, mrs. barra, subsequently, mr. valukas suggests in his report gm make improvements in its problem resolution tracking system, prts. more specifically, his report suggests that the standard for closing prts without action is clearly defined and sufficiently rigorous. he goes on to suggest that prts

should not be closed without action absent clear sign off by named individuals and appropriate levels of review. furthermore, his report suggested gm reaffirm that the lack of an acceptable business case is not an acceptable reason for closing out a prts. if that involves a safety issue does gm commit to implementing all of these suggestions moving forward? yes or no? >> yes. >> now, again mrs. barra, like wise, we agree with mr. valukas gm should develop more robust

training with vehicle and safety matters. at the most basic level, does gm commit to training its employees about the lessons learned from the cobalt investigation, yes or no? >> yes. >> now, again, mrs. barra, will gm train employees to recognize and elevate safety issues, including the emphasis on the need to identify and address safety issues actively regardless of whether the vehicles are in the design or production phase, yes or no? >> yes. >> now, again, mrs. barra, when fostering a culture of safety, i think we all recognize it is very important that employees that recognize and report safety problems in components and

vehicles feel comfortable in so doing. as such does gm commit to promote visibility and enforce rigorously the non-retaliation policy contained in paragraph 19 of the may 16 nhtsa consent order, yes or no? >> yes. >> now, mrs. barra, it's also apparent that all auto makers communicate clearly and promptly with nhtsa. i said all auto makers. will gm create a centralized data base for all communications with nhtsa and train its employee who is use this data

base? yes or no? >> yes. >> now, do you think that that is good for other companies? >> yes, i do. >> gentleman's time is expired. >> i thank you for your court si. >> thank you very much. miss blackburn for five minutes. >> mrs. barra, thank you for coming back. i have a few questions for you and i have to tell you, many of my questions that i asked and couldn't get answers for in april, when you were with us, you said after mr. valukas finished the report you hoped to be able to answer the questions. since that time, i have been able to be on the floor at the spring hill facility, which is in my district. we have 1868 employees that certainly do not want the gm brand to be tarnished by all of this. it's important to me, on behalf

of all those constituents that we get some answers and that we do this very quickly. so we thank you for coming back to us today. i want to go back to something i asked you about in april and you explained that a part that doesn't meet all specifications can still be acceptable for safety and the example you used was with steel. now, we know that the cobalt ignition switch was redesigned in '06, right? and testing documents from that time show that the torque of the redesign switch was still below specifications and yet after this change, the reported incidents of nondeployment in these vehicles dropped dramatically. when we look at that and we read those documents and the chairman mentioned, we have been through a million pages of documents and

15,000 pages from ntsa. we are not sitting idly, we are taking action. i want you to go back through this and elaborate that something could still not meet specifications and be acceptable for safety and i'd like to hear from you when it is okay to deviate from specifications and people in the process not be aware of this. >> well, i think when you look, as you start developing something, you have a design specification. what's most important in the testing we are doing now and have done in the past and are doing in a more broad fashion now, relates to the actual performance of the part and how it operates in a subsystem, in a broader system and how it operates in a vehicle. so, as we design now, we are validating that the part level with the new organization put together called the product

integrity organization, they are looking at doing more validation as it relates to subsystems. what you really want to know is if all the parts come together, it's going to operate as a system and perform safely. that's what the new organization accomplished. >> so what you are saying, then, if it doesn't affect safety or effectiveness, it's okay not to meet specifications? >> i'm saying there's times -- it has to meet the performance requirements. >> how should an engineer evaluate the performance, the parts performance against the technical specifications? >> again, you look at performance against requirements. what are the requirements of how that part needs to behave in the system. that's how an engineer evaluates it. what we are doing is taking it more broadly so we are not relying on one person to understand across the whole vehicle. >> in this product integrity system, how does gm track the deviation that is are occurring

from the technical specifications? >> it's captured in, you know, very specific documents. >> how transparent is it? >> it's available to the engineers, to the chief engineers in the organization. >> okay, was this done when the switch was approved in '02 and redesigned in '06? >> no, i'm talking this year. >> this was not done. we have -- there was a glitch in the system and people approved a part that was not okay. >> well, the problem with the specific change you are referring to is that change was made and not documented. >> okay, then how does a gm engineer know when there is a deviation from a specification if it is too much or too little or if it is acceptable or if it is going to pose a safety problem? >> again, there's a couple aspects of this that you have to look at. if you go back to when the

changes were made and it was not documents, the records were not there. that is unacceptable. the individual who did not document it is no longer with the company. i'm telling you, as you do good engineering, you are going to understand the requirements of what you are designing, the part, the subsystem meets it requirements and have full documentation. okay. i will yield back. >> now recognize mr. braley for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. barra welcome back. mr. valukas, welcome to the committee. i have a couple questions i want to talk to you about. you mentioned you promised you would conduct a comprehensive and transparent investigation. do you believe that was accomplish snd. >> i believe the valukas report was comprehensive. it was very far reaching and we have shared that information. >> you also said that you

promised you would share the findings of the report with congress, our regulators ntsa, and the courts. this is a copy of the report that we received. it states on the front page, privileged and confidential protected by attorney-client privilege. you indicated you hired him to do this independent investigation but it's obvious you consider this to be an attorney-client relationship and the report itself has sections blacked out so that we, on this panel, don't know who some of the victims were that are identified in the report. were you aware of that? >> yes. >> you also indicated that you would engage mr. fineburg to develop -- families that lost loved ones and those who suffered a physical, serious

injury, including the families represented here today. there was a recent news report from the detroit news, which indicated mr. fineburg has confirmed that the compensation fund will not, in any way, address people who weren't killed, people who weren't seriously injured whose value of the automobiles they purchased has been diminished because of the controversy of the parts we have been talking about. were you aware of that? >> the compensation program that is administered is for those who lost loved ones or those who suffered serious injury. the issue of the value of the vehicle is in front of the courts. >> that will not be addressed by mr. fineburg? >> that's correct. >> one of the things we know is that this year alone, gm issued 44 recalls covering 17.7 million vehicles in the u.s. and more

than 20 million worldwide. how many of those recalls, to your knowledge, relate to problems that were known to someone in gm before the bankruptcy sale order of july, 2009? >> at the senior level of the company the action would have been taken. >> so, it's your testimony, none of those are covered? >> i'm not sure -- >> you're saying that no one, that none of the recalls that were initiated this year relate to problems known to someone at gm before the bankruptcy sale order in july, 2009? >> i said the senior leadership had no knowledge -- >> that's not my question. you did a very exhaustive investigation into the cultural problems at gm. >> yes, we did. >> as part of that investigation, did you identify anyone working at gm who had knowledge relating to the product recall that is covered products affected by that

bankruptcy discharge order in july, 2009? >> again, if there was a known safety issue, there would have been a recall done. >> did you attempt to determine that? >> i was not involved in that process so i can't comment. >> isn't it possible that discharge order contributed to gms lax approach to safety defects on cars built by the old gm? >> absolutely not. >> we have talked a lot about this culture of irresponsibility at gm. you testified about it. it's covered in mr. valukas' report. how can you say not when you haven't focused on that issue? >> evidence of that is there were many recalls that were conducted during that period of time. i would say now, we have redoubled our efforts and gone back more exhaustively than looking at data from tread, data from customer feedback. with the product integrity, it's

looking at how the vehicle performs to a higher level to ensure we have the safest vehicles. >> mr. valukas, you focussed on the culture of gm. you weren't here when i showed miss barra this screwdriver handed out by general motors that says safety comes first at gm on the screwdriver. as part of your investigation to the history and culture of gm, did you look back as to weather the old gm made safety a priority the way miss barra says they are committed to today? aren't there institutional problem that is are much more far reaching than simply firing 15 employees? >> congressman, good question. we looked back and solicited from everybody interviewed, information about whether something in the culture caused them to do something differently

or if safety was a secondary issue. most people said safety wauz priority. we identified all the instances we were aware where people took a different position so it's there. i would not ascribe to everybody, the people that volunteer. culture had a reason why the recall took so long. >> my time is up. thank you for your testimony. >> mr. barton of texas for five minutes. >> thank you mr. chairman. miss barra, we are glad to have you back. mr. valukas, we are glad to have you before us. our opportunity or responsibility on the committee is to provide for the general welfare and doing that get the facts on the table so that people can have faith at the products your company produces are safe and of course your requirement is to make sure that you do produce a safe product

that hopefully results in a profit for the company and the stockholder. we are both on the same side. we both want products that are safe and let the public be aware of the capabilities and also the short falls. i'm going to ask most of my questions to mr. valukas because we didn't have your report. i will have questions for miss barra at the end of my time. i want to focus on the fact that the part number was not changed back in april of 2006. a gm engineer did approve changes to the ignition switch but did not change the part number and mr. valukas, in your report, you observe that the decision to not change the part number was not properly vetted or scrutinized.

you note that a mr. degiorgio did not recall why he did not change the part number. is that correct? is that what your report says? >> mr. degiorgio told us he did not change the part number and as he looked back at it, he reflected he should have changed the part number. >> okay. apparently, obviously, that is very important. you have a part number change, that creates a paper trail. there was some sort of a problem that had to be corrected. if you are doing an investigation, you can compare from that time forward, see if the problem was fixed. now, i want to direct your attention to the big binder that we have right between you and miss barra. on tab 35 -- >> 35? >> yes, sir, 35. there's a chain of e-mails between mr. degiorgio and

engineers at the switch supplier, delphi and other gm employees. attached to that exchange is a spread sheet of upcoming changes to the delta ignition switch. can you locate that? >> i think i have it, yes. >> okay. now, it's interesting to me that these e-mails, the subject is not anything that is safety related. the subject matter is delta ignition switch changes, tooling tweaks improve process capability. then it goes in the e-mail, it talks about this is a black box design and they want to change the part to increase the process capability. this will improve the fallout rate at the delphi condura plant. first of all, what is a fallout

rate? >> i presume it's the rate in which something fails. >> okay. if you increase, improve the fallout rate, that means you are going to decrease the number of failures. is it important, in your mind, that since they talk about a black box, apparently anything within the black box, they don't have to be too worried about it as long as everything in the black box works as specified? they are apparently in retro spect in common tear because it was all within the black box. >> that's the commentary. whether it's fit, form, function, in the black box or otherwise, the part number should change. in this aspect of it, increasing the torque, that would fall

within one of three categories. i think you can find an explanation, but mr. degiorgio, in his interview with us, it was a change in fit, form and function and would have required a change in the part number. the consequences were devastating over the years. this is not the only time that issue came up, four times, as you properly note where people came back and said did something change? he said no. it's a reason why it took a decade. >> well, do you -- do you think this particular e-mail exchange, they knew they had a safety problem and they were couching their phraseology differently to hide it because they don't really talk about a torque issue or anything, they are talking a fallout rate within the black box. do you think it was intentional? >> no. >> you don't? >> let me put it this way. we have not been given access to the delphi witnesses. we were not permitted to interview them. our documents have been limited

from them. on the gm side of the process, the answer is no. >> okay. miss barra, in the time i don't have anymore, my question to you, miss blackburn tried to get an answer from you about a change in culture and the fact that even when you are making specification changes, they didn't meet the specification, wasn't that a problem and shouldn't you make sure everything meets your specifications. you answer was, well, if the overall system works, it's okay. to me, that doesn't represent a cultural change. i have talked to the general motors engineers and management team in my district in arlington. they are vocally insistent that they are not going to use any part in their plant that doesn't meet the specification and operate just as it's supposed to. >> i totally agree with you, a part needs to operate as it's

supposed to. there's been significant change. everything that is done is documented, gone through a validation process and systems integration. it's much more rigorous knowing the part is good and the vehicle is going to perform safely and with quality. so, as it relates to, you know, making a part change, absolutely acceptable. i ran an assembly plant. i totally agree with the people you talked to at the arlington plant. if you don't have a documented part number, you should not be changing the part. >> i recognize mr. butterfield for five minutes. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. you know, mr. chairman, it's an unspeakable tragedy so many families have suffered as a result of the shortcomings of general motors and some of the families are with us today. as feeble as it may be, i want to offer my condolences to the family that is have been affected.

let me start with you -- >> you can watch this hearing anytime at c-span.org. we breakaway for a briefing by house republicans following leadership elections today. >> i'm going to congratulate the two new members of our team, kevin mccarthy from california is our majority leader and steve is the new majority whip. i want to thank all my colleague who is did participate in this election. competition is a good thing. listen, our job is to stay focused on the american people's priorities. we paid their priorities, our priorities. the american people are still asking, where are the jobs? our job is to ensure we are doing what we can to promote the

economy and create jobs. with that, i'm going to turn it over to kevin mccarthy. >> thank you very much. first and foremost, i want to thank my constituents and colleagues for the trust they have instilled in me. america is struggling. we are struggling with a stagnant economy, a failed health care law and so many are living paycheck-to-paycheck. they are looking for individuals that put people before politics. i want to make one promise, i will work every single day to make sure this conference has the courage to lead with the wisdom to listen. we'll turn this country around. >> thank you. >> thank you. i, too, want to thank my colleagues and my constituents for the honor they have trusted me to be the next majority whip. i look forward to bringing a fresh voice to the table and

joining the team to confront the challenges people across the country are facing. we have solid solution that is are going to solve the problems facing our country. we reached out to the president to join us in solving the problems. we are going to continue to move forward in the house as a united team to address the problems and continue to work to get our country back on track and economy moving again. >> this has been a big day for the republicans. i'm proud to stand with our new leadership team for the 113th congress. congratulations to kevin mccarthy and steve scalise. more than anything, we are united. we are united in our efforts to move america forward and make it strong so moms and dads can provide, bring home higher paychecks to provide for their family. we are united in getting americans back to work. we are united in getting the job

done here on capitol hill. we want to put forwards solutions rather than seeing action out of the senate. we are going continue to work on behalf of the people sent to us here to make them proud and give them more opportunities. >> we'll take a couple questions. >> i have a question for mr. scalise. [ inaudible question ] a lot of people say the test of a whip -- how did you have this number down -- >> we built a strong team that was representative of the entire conference. i'm proud to be part of the chairman study which is 176 members of the conference. i have worked very hard over the year and a half that i have been chairman to build consensus and move forward in a way that

solves problems facing our country. the results i have had brought appeal to the conference including the members that recognize and strengthen the team to address problems. we built a strong team, a team that is very representative of the conference which shows our conference wants to move forward even stronger to do a better job with the problems facing the country and have the white house and senate join us to address the problems as well. [ inaudible question ] >> this is a win for america. we are going to be a more united team. you look at a senate that is dysfunctional. there's so many bills we passed to get the economy moving again. the senate doesn't want to act on. the president doesn't want to engage. he wants to sit in the oval office with a pen acting like there's no legislative branch. people want to see washington solving problems.

the house is united to address those. we'll wait and let the president and senate follow suit. >> a question for mr. mccarthy. sir, there are a lot of grass roots republicans out there, the kind that voted for dave brat against eric cantor saying are you kidding me? we got him out because we want ed -- >> they elected a guy who is a grandson of a cattle rancher, the son of a firefighter, only in america do you get that opportunity. they elected a guy that's only grown up through the grass roots. they elected a guy that spent his time going around recruiting many of these individuals to get the majority. i have always had to struggle for whatever we wanted to overcome. i think that's the greatest part about america, they always give you the privilege and

opportunity. that's what this party brings as well. you get an opportunity, people will be impressed about what we are going to do and where we are going to go. >> thank you. thank you, thank you. house republican leaders following leadership elections today. kevin mccarthy of california elected as the new house majority leader. he will replace eric cantor who is stepping down after the primary election loss last week. elected today is the majority whip, steve scalise of louisiana. you can continue to comment on the gop leadership elections on facebook at facebook.com/c-span or twitter #c-span chat. we are going to rejoin the house

hearing we were showing you before the briefing, the head of general motors appearing before the house panel addressing her company's response to safety defects. we pick it up with congressman michael burgess questioning miss barra. >> that's why we've employed a lot of innovative ways to do that. the dealers are reaching out. >> the story in new york times, yesterday or today, people talk about receiving multiple postcards. they tried to get the car fixed. they tried, but the part is not available. are we going to see less and less of those stories? >> they should. we are starting another line. right now, we have the parts. we have tried to be incredibly fair in a first come first serve basis as customers raise concerns. we are complying with the law. >> thank you. mr. valukas, let me ask you a

couple questions. i think i understood from your introduction, you are a trial attorney, is that correct? >> i am. >> i mean, i have to tell you, at some point were you just pulling your hair out over some of these things as your investigation churned through this information? let me specifically -- you have the binder in front of you. mine is not divided into tabs, but page 119, 118-119 -- >> of the report? >> in your report. >> thank you. >> here is a paragraph, witnesses have inconsistent recklations whether they became involved in the cobalt issues. everest reports april '07, the cobalt air bag mattered to the pi group where it was taken on by an engineer. he wasn't working on the issue.

may 4, 2007, investigation status review presentation planning work sheet state that is he was scheduled to present on an issue described as cobalt air bag discussion item. no recollection of the involvement. they were up to the point where they had an answer, now he doesn't remember working on it. was that frustrating from a trial lawyers perspective? >> one of the key problems we found is the fact -- lack of documentation, which led to the lack of accountability. a classic example of that is what happened in 2005. we went back to see why they closed the investigation in the cobalt issue. we found ourselves in a position where there were no notes with regard to the matter. everybody at the meeting pointed to someone else for having closed the matter. we could not ascertain who had that responsibility or what were the circumstances which caused the closure to take place.

>> right. >> that lack of accountability is reflected in so many areas. when we went back -- >> let me ask, i'm going to run out of time. 15 individuals have been terminated by general motors, is that correct? but we can't know -- as we read through the report, we can't know the names of the 15 individuals because of employee privacy concerns, is that correct? >> it's been submitted to the committee. >> been submitted to the committee? >> we asked that it be confidential to respect the privacy -- >> thank you for that. what was the basis for termination? i go through this, it looks like more than 15 people should have been terminated. >> again, there was a senior group of my leader that is we read the report and we were very thorough in looking at those who we believe didn't take the actions they should and those who didn't move with a sense of urgency. the people closest to us are no

longer with the company. >> thank you. i recognize mr. green for five minutes. >> thank you mr. chairman and thank you for doing the follow up hearing. miss barra, you said you shipped 400,000 parts, was that for the ignition? >> yes -- >> how many were recalled -- >> what? >> how many was recalled? i'm hearing 16 million. >> of the specific ignition switch cylinder, it's a kit we put together. the total number of vehicles was 2.6 million. we know not all of those are still in service today. we have built kits to service the 2.6 population. we are over 400,000 will be complete by october 4th. >> okay. you have been vocal about gms effort to change the corporate culture, which you describe in the last hearing in april.

mr. valukas, can you describe the problems you saw in the culture, the gm nod and the gm salute, what do these refer to? >> well, let me be specific on that. the gm, without using those phrases, you had a situation where it took a plaintiff's lawyer to do a simple thing of comparing to switches, one from 2006 with one from 2009 to fipd out gm manufactured separate switches. no one goes back to revisit previously made decisions. if it's a decision we have made, we don't go back and revisit it. we had silos, people within gm with certain levels of information not shared with other individuals. when the other individuals found that information, for instance, the indiana report, officers young report, that information was supplied by third parties outside of gm. gm did not know they had that

information within their own files, at least some of that information on file. you had circumstances where, among other things, you have a sensitivity to the use of the word stalls. it might create the impression we stay away from using word that is cause people to ask hard questions rather than taking the approach to ask the hard questions. we found instances of that which had a significant impact, at least in terms of finding information, impact on how this investigation, how the investigation of the cobalt switch -- >> sounds like the old gms culture is let's not talk about a problem. is that what it is? without notes, i understand we are both lawyers, you may say i don't want to take notes because somebody can subpoena them. so gm just put them under the rug, now it's coming home to roost. let me -- miss barra, at the

last hearing, referred to the new gm and responses to the question. the culture would change under your leadership. gm created a new vice president of global vehicle safety filled by jeff voyeur and i know you have been with gm a number of years and mr. boyer has been with gm? >> yes. >> you both worked for the old gm. can you tell me what is going to be different in the new gm, even though everybody and the 40 inspectors that connors and butterfield talks abdomen. >> i agree with you. it will be the actions we take. the men and women or general motors, the vast majority come to work and want to do a good job. they heard me talk about the report. they are as deeply troubled as i am. they are taking action. we are create agriculture. i have evidence of it.

employees want to do the right thing and produce high quality, safe vehicles. >> i only have a minute. that needs to continue because, i also know how it works on the shop floor. oh, don't talk about that, just do your job. that's what's got gm into this position. you company set up a compensation fund for victims this fall. in recognizing that no amount of money can replace a lovered one or compensate for someone who is terribly injured, how will that fund be. have you announced a total for that? >> we haven't. it's run by ken fineberg who is an expert in that area. >> i'm familiar with him. >> it's important to note that general motors wants to reach with this compensation program everyone who lost a loved one due to the issue or suffered serious injury. that's what we communicated. >> i'm out of time, but there

are a lot of gm customers out there who are frustrated because the over the decades have been loyal. now, we are seeing 16 million recalls. there's a problem and i hope you have it fixed. mr. chairman, i hope we continue this to make sure it is fixed. >> i recognize dr. gingrey. >> i want to ask about the situation in the cobalt. if one of my twin 16-year-old granddaughters are driving in the cobalt and inadd v vevertene ignition turns to the accessory position, if they, who just got their drivers license three months ago, their initial reaction would be to try to turn the car back on, start the car back, again, although, it's in drive and it's not in neutral.

would the car start back up? >> well, first of all if they were driving the vehicle with just the key in the ring, it wouldn't happen. >> let's assume it happened. >> you have to restart the car. i guess -- s >> i think the answer is you have to put it in neutral. >> put it in neutral. >> that would be hard for a 16-year-old, inexperienced driver to think of with an 18-wheeler bearing down on them. you know, i just, as i listen and the other hearing you were at several weeks ago, general motors has got to have the best engineers in the world, whether they are electrical engineers or mechanical engineers, probably both. how in the world would they not

know because of the low torque, it shifts to the accessory position, the engine stalls, that would also deactivate the air bags. i would think that kind of testing is done to a fare thee well before a vehicle is approved for sale. how could they not know that? >> i can't speculate why they didn't know. anytime a vehicle stalls, we consider it to be a safety issue. if there's a malfunction in a part, we are going to -- >> i would say a safety issue indeed if the side air bag would not inflate if somebody got t-boned in the middle of an intersection when it happened and a young person. even an experienced driver of 40 years is not going to think that quickly. mr. valukas, i think you alluded this a few minutes ago. if not for the brooke melton lawsuit, i can't see the back of the room, but her picture may be

up there on the wall. she's in my district in georgia. if not for the brooke melton lawsuit and she was killed and her lawyers found out her ignition switch from model year 2008 was different from model years 2005, '06 and '07 in the cobalt, would we know about this switch problem today? would we be aware of it? >> the answer is yes because the -- there was an open and, at that point, significant investigation going on at that particular point. certainly, there was information and evidence that was accumulating as they were going forward pointing to the fact they had non-deployments and fatality. >> that's a big cover up to me. after general motors learned of the change, it took months to

confirm there had been a change. why did this take so long? >> i don't have a good answer for that. i can tell you it did take that long, from the time of april, 2013 when that deposition took place, they knew or should have known or knew at that point they had two different switches. they gave it to the expert and he came back with his confirmation of what they were given in april. that took until almost october. >> yeah, it's amazing. when the issue was presented to decision makers in december, no recall was announced. it took a month and a half before gm decided to recall the cobalt. what information was missing in december that prevented gm from issuing a recall at that time? miss barra, can you tell me? >> i can't talk about the specific information. we do know not all the information was presented at that meeting.

i have said publicly -- >> let me say in my concluding 35 seconds, this whole sequence, this whole sequence from the time the company learned of a potential difference in the parts during the melton litigation to the time the recalls were announced took ten months. miss barra, why the foot dragging? is this typical of gms investigation into a product concern and how do you intend to change this? >> we already have it the way we are working through recalls today. we have changed that process, expedited and the most senior levels of the company are involved. i don't want to do recalls, we are going to do what is right for customers and we are demonstrating it today. >> clarifying question, a number of members have asked with the reference of words cover up. can you define what that means? >> what we looked for was any evidence that individuals knew

they had a safety issue and took steps to conceal the fact they had a safety issue. we interviewed individuals and asked them questions to gather the facts to see if it took place. we tested the facts against the documents we are reviewing. if someone knew something on a given day, we identified that to see if they concealed what they knew. we did not find that. >> does your definition include if people slow walked, moving on safety issues? is that also a cover up? >> pardon me, i don't mean to cover up. >> that's okay. >> if it was deliberately done, it would encompass that. if it was a matter of one of the investigators given the assignment, he was given no deadline, no sense of urgency. he put it in the queue with other investigation. that, i would not call a cover up, i would call that something

other than that. >> thank you. >> thank you. welcome back to the committee. when you were here april 1, i told you a member of my staff has a chevrolet malibu. she inquired at the dealership how to proceed. they said there's no fix. i presented you that dilemma. you said there is a fix, whether it's a check or replacement of the product. a fix does exist for that specific vehicle. i have the recall she received on monday. that's 2 1/2 months after you appeared her notifying her of the recall saying her vehicle may lose steering assist and other language, which could result in an increased risk of a

crash. you informed her the part doesn't exist to fix the product. so, when you consider that situation, a different vehicle, different problem, with the ignition problem that we have focused on and you have already said that many of these vehicles will not be fixed, the ignition problem until october, the parts won't be available. what are consumers supposed to do when they are going a period of up to six months or longer without any way to fix their vehicle? can they assess the risk? i don't know what my staffer should do. i see the pharmaceutical products with a list of the side effects and you have to calculate the risk. would you let your son or daughter drive the vehicles with the level of risk that you may know more about than we do? >> well, on the cobalt

specifically, we have done extensive testing on driving the vehicle with the key in the ring and has validated it is safe. we have reviewed that with the technical experts at ntsa and they concurred. the vehicles are safe to drive. in general, if you have concerns, go to your dealer or call our center. we walk you through specifics of their issue. in many of the recalls we have done, it's not a part replace, it's a visual check and depending on what happens, what needs to be repaired. so, each individual recall has a slightly different look and feel to it. >> so, i know you talked about the possibility of loaner vehicles and rental cars and so forth. i understand the difficulty with a supplier gearing up to produce a part they may not have made in four or five years and they have to come up with several million of them.

we have a part manufacturer in kentucky, in my district that services peterbilt trucks. i have been there and know how much work they have to do. again, is there any alternative to reliable alternative to the consumers who, again, face a very important decision. i don't know what the risk or whether ntsa assessed the risk with regard to power steering or not. there are a lot of consumers wondering if they should be driving or not. >> call the customer engagement center and we can talk about the specific situation. >> okay. i have no other questions -- >> sorry, i yield to the ranking member. >> i want to ask you a question since there's a little time here. so, you testified that out of the roughly 2.6 million of these cars that were recalled, you

guys have sent 400,000 parts out to the dealers, right? >> produced and shipped? >> sorry? >> yes. >> as of monday, only about 177,000 of these vehicles have been repaired. you had testified earlier -- so that's 177,000 vehicles out of 2.6 million vehicles. we talked about this before. this is one of our big concerns in this committee is how do we get those folks to take in those recalled vehicles to be repaired? you said you are looking at some innovative ways to do that. i'm wondering if you could tell us how gm is getting people to take the cars in. >> we are doing a lot with social media. some of the vehicles are older vehicles. we have done research to figure

out what messages are most compelling to get them to come in and get their vehicles fixed. i would say, the dealers are working to do specific arrangements with each vehicle to make it as convenient as possible to reduce the inconvenience. there's a number of steps. >> let me ask you -- can you meet the october 4th ntsa deadline? >> we are on track. i talked to the ceos of the companies making the parts and we monitor it on a daily basis. >> mr. olson, five minutes. >> i thank the chair, welcome miss barra and mr. valukas. i approach this as a naval officer and a pilot. leaders in the navy are called skippers. good skippers give credit to those who do good. bad skippers take -- good

skippers give the credit, take the blame. by that definition, miss barra, you are a decent skipper. but, people have died because of gms defective product. as we knew, and mr. valukas' report shows clearly it happened because our ship, gm, as some problems that can't be fixed overnight. as a gm skipper, the burden to fix these problems is upon you, ma'am, squarely upon you. i think you know that. gm has to rebuild its trust with the american people. part of that trust is being straight forward on the number of deaths that occurred because of these defective cobalts. you testified 13 deaths occurs,

is that right? >> i testified with the information we have, we believe that the ignition switch may have been related to 13. i don't have all the information. >> okay. that's a problem because on the wall behind you, there are 15 photographs of tragedy and loss from cobalt vehicles. >> that's why we are doing the compensation program. it will be administered by mr. fineburg. i can assure you anybody harmed as a result of the ignition switch defect is a part of that prom. >> i'll get that fund later. number of injuries, not deaths, but injuries? any number or ballpark? >> again, i don't have the specific number in front of me. we don't have a complete number because we only have the number available to us. mr. fineberg is an expert doing this. we want everybody who suffered

physical injury or suffered the loss of a loved one, we want them to be part of the program. >> thank you mr. fineburg. restoring the trust of the american people is having a viable trust program for the victim's families. i know you tapped mr. fineberg to evaluate options fwr the trust fund. my question is, from opening statements, it sounds like gm has not put limits on mr. fineburg, is that true? he's got all options out there to determine the compensation fund. >> i didn't hear the beginning of the question, sorry. >> you have this compensation fund. are there limits upon him? he's doing whatever he wants to do? >> he's independent and will determine those who qualify that meet his protocol and the appropriate amounts. >> is there a board to approve the recommendations? >> no. he is independent.

>> families that reach settlements with gm, will they be eligible for the trust fund? >> eligible to apply. >> how about before the bankruptcy? >> eligible. >> eligible as well. >> i can't speculate on that. by the time he shares his protocol, then we will have to take an appropriate estimate. we really won't know until the program is fully administered and we indicated we will share the number of incidents and also the total. >> is there a chance the fund will be capped? a limit? >> no. >> no chance? i yield back. thank you, sir. >> i will. let me ask you, miss barra, do people know how to get in touch with you if they are having trouble getting their car fixed? >> again, in the letters we send, we send to the record we

go to polk and get registration data. that's the best information we have. it would be helpful to have a national vin data base. in the communications we have had, there's information on how to contact us as well as their dealer. >> so, the message should be a person should contact their dealer? >> there's -- they can contact our customer engagement center. there's also a number at the back, a 1-800 number. we know many people will contact their dealer. >> before this concludes, can you provide us with that number? >> sure. >> a lot of people are watching and people want to know how to get their car fixed? you would help us if you did that. >> i recognize you for five minutes. >> the bard's commitment through a bonus plan for employees at

the executive, director and supervisor levels. part of the calculation of whether a bonus is payable is improvement in the quality of gms vehicles. mr. valukas, do you know what that means or how it's quantified for the purpose of the bonus calculation? >> i can't give you the calculati calculation. within the quality calculation is supposed to be safety. the individuals we interviewed identified quality -- improvement in quality as relating to the safety issue. srk safety is supposed to be a quality component. >> yes. >> how is it quantified? >> i don't have an answer. >> did you receive bonuses while the ignition switch issues were ongoing? >> there were many years where there was no bonus paid. some years there was. not all those years there was quality. all the quality components, one

aspect is external surveys. >> how many years did you receive bonuses? >> i'd have to go back and check. >> you will provide those? >> sure. >> will it be revised to include a specific safety component? >> it has quality and safety as part of it. i will make sure it is explicit. mr. valukas reviewed it and he's not certain how expansive it is and what goes into considerations of safety. >> i will make sure it's explicit. it's a good suggestion. >> those below the leadership levels now include a safety component? >> again, there's -- when you speak all employees, 220,000 employees or over 200,000 employees over the world. we sent a strong signal quality

is important. 25% across all levels. >> i would recommend as part of your overhaul for all employees to encourage considerations of safety that is made much more explicit to employees. in the past, gm put in place incentives to make improvements. if gm is serious, there should be stronger incentives in place for executives and other gm employees to identify safety problems and improve the safety of gm vehicles. now, the adequacy of the gm vehicles. the replacement part will fix the defect, low torque that causes the ignition switch to turn too easily from the run position to the off or accessory position. i hope you can assure me this is the case. >> it's been validated

extensively and ntsa reviewed it. >> here is my concern. there seem to be two problems with the vehicles ignition switches. issue number one is the force required to turn the switch is . and issue number two is that a driver's knee can hit the key or key fob and inadvertently turn the switch to the off position because it's placed too low. the -- to the recall is to install a new ignition switch with higher torque, requiring more force to turn off the switch. is that correct? >> right. but if you look at the switch, the cylinder and the key, and then you look at how that works as a system, it's been validated to not only talk about the issue that you're talking about, about turning but also, the need -- potential need, both have been validated. >> what will the torque specification of the new -- >> what? >> the specification is 20 plus or minus five but the more

important thing is to look at the overall prorls of the system and that's what we've done. >> is that 20 centimeters? >> yes. >> and do you know how they arrived at that specification? >> that was a specification but we'd gone back and tested extensively with varying levels of the rings and with varyinging heights of people's sides of people and it's been an exhaustive effort. >> here's our concern. when committee interviewed several gm engineers, they all told us they had no idea of the basis for that specification. and gm had to receive multiple reports indicating policement of the ignition switch could cause if drifr's knee to hit the key or fob and turn off the switch, isn't that right? >> neither of those individuals have been a part of the company as we've been involved in all the extensive testing and validation we've done specifically with the new product integrity organization.

so they're really not in a position to comment. >> but certainly that would raise a concern if your former engineers continue to have concerns over that? >> i don't find him credible. and i personally review the testing that's been done by very experienced seasoned engineers and i'm confident that the right validation has been done of the system in the vehicle. >> thank you. >> recognize mr. griffith for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. ms. vera, we talked about the compensation trust fund and you've indicated that mr. feinberg is going to set parameters but you don't have those yet and he'll derl who's eligible and he's going to make the determination as to how much they're eligible for. is that correct? >> do you know if he's going to determine -- is he looking -- most people have focused on the airbag deployment. and your list of 13 that you

know of at this point, only includes airbag deployment issues. do you know if he's looking at other parameters. >> we wanted to make sure that anybody that suffered or lost a loved one or suffered serious injury because of the defect with the ignition switch they should be a part of the program. >> is you acknowledge what they were getting to earlier and that is, if you're traveling down the highway at a fairly good rate of speed, 48 miles or more or 35 miles an hour and all of the sudden your car goes into a stall or the ignition turns off, you got to put it in neutral and restart it that's going to have been responsible for a number of the accidents that took place, whether or not the airbags were deployed or, in fact, even if the airbag not being deployed didn't cause the death or injury there might still have been a injury as a result of that? >> you acknowledge that. >> the ignition switch was what we wanted in the program and there are other instances. >> i have to question why you have one of the two folks in the

accident that was referred to in mr. young's trooper young's report, did not report, one of those two individuals is on the list of 13. but natasha waggle is not and that raises the question because she was in the back seat so the airbag didn't affect her but clearly that accident may very well have been the result of the fact you had a young driver as opponented out, who suddenly finds themselves in an emergency situation on the highway, going 48 miles an hour and they don't have an engine that works anymore and you would agree that if the engine is working and the power is off you did not have power steering anymore either, do you? >> we were clear about the 13. and again, we want to get everybody w406s affected and that's what we're focused on and so, again -- >> you want to make sure everybody is fully and comparely compensated, is that correct? >> i have to ask you this. why are lawyers still trying to seek protection in the bankruptcy court? >> we are not going to revisit those decisions.

i think what we're doing is going above and beyond with this company satisfaction program the get to the people. this was a unique series of mistakes that was made over a long period of time and we feel it's the right thing to do to compensate -- >> you think it's the right thing for gm to continue to ask your bankruptcy lawyers to defend them and get the shield from the bankruptcy court in the court, and not have to deal with these cases that come up and to only let the only solution be mr. feinberg if there isn't already a settlement, isn't that correct, yes or no? >> mr. feinberg a program is voluntary. otherwise people have the same rights they have today. >> they have the same rights that you're trying to block those rights in the bankruptcy court, yes or no? >> our intent is to do a compensation program is to do the right thing for these individuals. >> but you're not instructing your lawyers to back off the claums that you want to be shielded in the bankruptcy court for any claims that the outside parties might bring so if mr. feinberg's parameters don't fit but a competent court might find

they should fit it won't matter because you have the bankruptcy protection. i'll move on to another question. i'm concerned a little bit about the fact that your legal department didn't pick this up and i want to know, were any of the lawyers fired for not being diligent? >> i have stated that there were four different functions in which viz were fired at all levels of the company. legal being one of them. engineering quality and public policy. >> okay. because it did concern me that the trooper young's report was sitting in the gm files in the legal department for a period of about six years and only one person opened the file during that time period and that was a legal assistant. can the lawyers -- i think they ought to be, can the lawyers start a safety investigations? >> anyone in the company can raise a safety issue. we want them to. and they're more than able to do that. >> and in this case, the lawyers didn't do that. is that why one of them might

have been fired and some of them may have been terminated? >> clearly people didn't share information to put all the pieces together and it's unacceptable and those individuals that were in the best position to share are no longer. company and we're strongly encouraging everybody in the company to raise issues and i'll it will you specifically -- >> i'm about to run out of time. i appreciate that. let me state in closing. if gm really want to compensate everybody that's been harmed fully and fairly they ought to ask their lawyers to skop asking the bankruptcy court for bankruptcy court protection and let these matters work their way out. >> thank you. >> and now for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. the valucas report identified mr. giorgio, who has no credibility. but the gm design, release engineer, his title. is solely responsible for key

decisions to athe deadly ignition switch in 2002 and to modify it in 2006. mr. valucas, your report states that one of the key failures was, quote, the decision by a single engineer who did not advice others of his decision to accept an ignition switch with full knowledge that it fell well below gm's own specifications. is that correct. >> that's correct. but the report is with problems with the ignition switch aside from low torque, many known as early as 2001, the entire electrical concept needed to be redesigned,nd quote and the switch had significant problems that were known to gm. in his interview with the committee and at this point i want to congratulate the staff of our committee for the amazing work that they did independently to investigate all these issues.

that in this interview with the committee he told committee staff that he met with his superiors around february of 2002, to inform them that the ignition switch would be delayed. attending at the meeting including the vehicle's chief engineer, the program engineering manager and electrical directors. it was clear this switch was getting a lot of attention. so, ms. barra, is it your belief that one engineer, mr. degiorgio, unilaterally approved a part plagued by problems from the start? >> >> basic issue is that the switch that he approveding to into production did not meet the performance requirements. that was the first mistake. >> and it was degiorgio's alone? >> he was the one responsible for it. >> knowledge of the problem is important. torque problems playing the switch from the start and the valucas report says in 2006, mr.

degiorgio, again, unilaterally approved changes to the switch to increase the torque. his report note the, quote, there's no evidence that degiorgio told anothers at gm, including ng nears on the cobalt program and the spring change to the ignition switch he authorized in april of 2006. so mr. valucas the report notes that other gm employees had received documents describing the ignition switch change as early as june of 2006 and that these documents clearly indicated that the switch's used in pre-2007 models were not within specifications. is that correct? >> the answer so that question is -- there were e-mails which were forwarded to other individuals which contained within those e-mails after the change was made, information about the fact that the torque had changed. we interviewed those individuals. those individuals by and large, in the