state university. positionsd teaching at west virginia university and the university of north carolina, greensboro. is a popular presenter for teacher workshops under the auspices of the lerman attitude of american history. in addition to dozens of articles and chapters in books, he is the author of the last generation, young virginians in peace, war, and reunion, editor of " audacity personified." he is currently at work on his next book," the war for the common soldier." please welcome peter carmichael. [applause] >> good morning. when we get into this business writing books, we hope that our that have a lasting impact

in the long march of history, we keep moving along, keeping pace with new scholarships. that's what reality is. most of our books fall by the wayside. i had that realization at a recent book signing in which i did not have to strain my eyes very much to see the end of the line. as people made their way up, a honey,d to his wife -- this is the author of the book that i have been reading every evening. she said, the book you falsely to every night. [laughter] -- the book you fall asleep to every night. [laughter] in this photograph, there is no risk of his work falling by the wayside. for freeman was the bag or -- the biographer and wrote for albums on robert e lee. he did three volumes on the army

of northern virginia entitled " these lieutenants." all good work beautifully written. tohad froze that is equal british cadence. he did great original research. he was very much enamored with the general. he admitted to this. every morning as he walked to work, he would salute the statue of robert e lee in richmond. that's a little odd but nonetheless, he had great admiration for the general. and he was a professional historian. freeman grew up in virginia. his undergraduate at university of richmond and went on to johns hopkins where he got his phd. did not enter the academy. he decides to work for a living was a journalist with two different papers in richmond. his historical output alone is amazing. this should remind you of our

conversation with gordon wright yesterday who has a real job as a lawyer and also got a historical scholarship. friedman also maintained an incredible work ethic. he got up every morning at 2:00. this is a picture of him in his office. 6:00 ord work from 2:00- 7:00 in the morning. in the photograph, you can see there's a microphone where he did a daily radio show. then he went off to the newspaper office and was a full-time editor. his output was quite remarkable and his scholarship was deeply influential but it has taken some hits. his foundation is there. there is a lot of rubble because of the revisionist scholars. their critique of freeman is that he simply presented a sanitized lee. he was very selective in the evidence he used in his presentation of lee.

ar one example, he spoke to group talking about leadership and he made an observation about what constitutes good generalship during the civil war. he said a great general must recognize between what was profitable from what was desirable. a soldier who cannot make that distinction, friedman declared, will never get anywhere. freeman was referring to confederate general beauregard. he had fantasies about joining with lee's forces around richmond and walking on washington, d.c. and then on to philadelphia and then on to philadelphia in their final destination would be new york city. that would mean giving up richmond and petersburg. a withamboyance beauregard is understandable. if your parents name you

beauregard, it you will be a little grandiose. [laughter] freeman should have applied this e, and if he had he would've come up with a more critical and decisive and lasting interpretation of the general. my argument is very straightforward -- i have just changed the slide to distract you as i tell you my argument -- it is simply this -- by the fall of 1863, lee's expectations of his army had far exceeded what it could actually accomplish. during the preceding 24 months before june 1, 1864, before the fighting at cold harbor am a lee had lost roughly 100,000 men. of course, he was keenly aware of this diminished strength. but at the start of the overland was stillr.e. lee

searching for that elusive victory of annihilation or you can call it an american waterloo. what's odd is that lee's thinking on the subject after 1863 in no way involved were changed. many of his peers especially on the union side had adjusted to the reality of several war warfare. they recognize the civil war armies were virtually indestructible and the battlefield almost never resulted in decisive strategic results. lee as these grandiose plans in 1864 and the expect tatian that grants would be destroyed in a single battle. what's surprising is that the southern press and the southern people were modest and realistic in their expectations. this is not the case in the north. greatsimpson wrote a these called "great

expectations." this is a fine volume of essays of the wilderness campaign. it is edited by gary gallagher. finds that northern editors promised their readers that grant would deliver a knockout blow in the overland campaign. lee never faced this same kind of pressure that grant did. he had the political clout in to take, the latitude, a more strategically conservative approach. grant simply did not have that option. finally, i would suggest that lee should have abandoned his spotsylvania line. he should have retreated across central love it -- central, virginia which was barren and he could consolidate his forces around richmond and petersburg, something we can discuss during the question and answers. there is a perception that once

lee's army fell back from petersburg and richmond, it was simply a matter of time. left the spotsylvania line after may 10, eight probably would have saved himself, according to my estimates, about 20,000 men. of course, grant would have been obliged to attack them. -- to attack him. the victory should not have been an online -- a victory of the mileage and, it should have been a stalemate. atlanta was not threatened. was grinding down sherman's army. lee could have done the same. in price for these campaigns 1864 is defeated abraham lincoln. in fact, it is the defeat of abraham lincoln that is the confederacy's last best hope for southern independence. before we dive into the details, we need to do a littleo

historygraphy. the word does not settle well with audiences but i will make this succinct. this falls in line with many historians who critique the excessive attacking. they say the attacking or commitment to the offense ultimately brought confederate defeat. the idea that many scholars maintain today has its our engines on the work of many of these peers including edward alexander. he described lee as audacity personified. james long street, alexander superior after the war said it encourageup and adam that would not let him rest. these two examples, and there met are many others, infuse the writing of early scholarship on lee.

one example is george bruce in 1913 who concluded that the aggressive warfare was congenial to lee's impulsive nature. lee had a peculiar lust for combat. illustrateslamn this position and his 2000 biography of lee and titled," the making of robert e lee." these adventures on the battlefield served as a relief for pent up sexual frustrations that lee had suppressed throughout his adult life. [laughter] " at the moment, what was most needed, aggressiveness rest up through the past 70 of lee. in a sense, the most approximate

simile for this was the sexual energy that rushed up to the carefully controlled text. or that lee had shown the world in his relationships with young women. lee found greater release of making war, conscious act. given the choice, he would attack, not wait. " the observations got a nice chuckle from the audience and some of you might find it disturbing. if you read his biography, is beautifully written, it is what sychobabble but p you will reach a conclusion at the end that if the confederacy wouldad prozac, r.e. lee have been a successful general. [laughter] when douglas freeman wrote the following description in his 1934 pulitzer prize biography of

no one had a problem with his biological theories as long this purported to explain greatness. at the battle of fredericksburg, freeman writes," these eyes flashed as he watches men counterattack and the blood of throughrse harry kirsch his veins with a calmer strain of the peaceloving carters. turning to long street, lee revealed the whole man in the presentence -- it is well that war is so terrible, we should row too fond of it." the feldman and friedman examples remind us of the dangers of conflicting culture with biology. any historical interpretation that suggests that historical people were governed by animalistic impulses served to legitimate violence and oppression against people in contemporary society. " the birth of a nation"

released in 1915 is a classic example. it shows african-americans as free people taking over political governments and the south and running roughshod over whites and the greatest threat of all, not just lust for power but lust for -- white women. you think about early turn-of-the-century especially in the south, we have on the rise, lynchings. the factors that explain the rise of lynchings are complex but the point is this -- the historical interpretations are very much critical to the legitimization of social relations and unequal power than any society has. to anmove back explanation of aggressiveness that has a cultural foundation. if we think about aggressiveness and the 19th century, men certainly write it but that did not pride in its raw form.

they thought the courage of something that was harnessed and they should be refined. emotional equilibrium was the goal of most 19th century men. i'm not suggesting that all achieved it in a probably most did not. priorsd elizabeth biography of lee, the best book we have in terms of looking at the inner lee and she does it by drilling down in research. it is just a fiend when comes to primary sources and she gets into them. it's a brilliant and brutally -- and beautifully written book that one a lincoln prize. it is superb. in it she makes a compelling case thqat lee's engineering background flowed into his victorian sensibility of self-denial and control. lee was always worried about mastering himself and we should

note that he also wanted to master those people whom he deemed inferior whether it be women, native americans or slaves. learn hishe commitment to the offense in a military he probably got some of that schooling at west point. i suspect he read all about napoleon's campaigns. somertainly had appreciation of the offense. this on the ground -- where did it play out with tremendous success but the mexican war? that is where he learned how to do had worked. getting on the ground and making reconnaissance -- it resulted in mindedc, offensive victories. this is not about an analyst --

an endless impulse. give his army the best chance for success. cometen look at gettysburg up tickets charge as an anomaly 's chargeburg, pickett as an anomaly. plays a very somber lead. i don't think that captures lee's speaking at that time. we get to pickett's charge and we say, what was the general thinking? lee was so depressed that he suddenly lost all of his imagination and creativity and marched these men across an open field. this overlooks the strategic possibilities of 1863. ee to douired that l

what? there are so many possibilities that can be gained politically through attacking. --e his army was engaged july 1 stands as one of the most complete victories that the army in northern virginia ever achieved. it was a day of impressive assault that nearly cracked the union line in a number of places. it makes no sense why he would suddenly relinquish the offens s ive. it is not in sync with the realities of what was on the ground. you stand in front of the lee monument and the next thing you the to do is -- interpretive markers don't really explain where the troops

were. it appears that he simply lined them up along one offense of ive front. 90% of the visitors have no idea where the charge was formed. it is off to the right by the house. those troops were relatively concealed for most of the day. lee took great care to ensure that it would succeed. maxim ofed upon the possibility, not probability. there were possibilities. it was not his best decision, but it was not a knee-jerk reaction. his blood wasuse up. it was a decision made after careful calculations. what he did at gettysburg is

perfectly consistent with what he had done up until that point. the big question that revisionists have raised is this -- did the confederates afford ee's daring maneuvers? there is a long casualty list. could the confederacy afford that? that is the question that historian alan nolan raised in his book in 1991. here. a longtime attendee another lawyer who turned the .ivil war historian he did another important book called the iron brigade. lee was very

controversial. did his daring maneuvers -- could the confederacy afford them? absolutely not. no one could not understand why people were so enamored with the individual campaigns of robert e lee. end, he believed that those campaigns, ironically enough, ultimately committed robert e lee to what he feared more than anything else. iege warfare around richmond. read thele never even book and criticized it. one person even suggested a book burning. that promotes healthy discussion in a democracy. [laughter] happens --oar, it so

people that did this with weakness. of nolan'ssness argument. if you apply his question to , ite's operation in 1862 does not make sense to me at all. at a time when he had ample resources and reserve manpower and political opportunities in which offensive strikes could have brought a credible -- brought incredible reward. , it doesthe posture not make any sense to me at all. i think it is important to note here that lee's thinking did not evolve as the war changed. he lamented the fact that his

lopsided victories did not result in the instruction -- the destruction of the enemy. we gave another victory and our people were wild with delight. i was more depressed than after fredericksburg. our losses were severe and we did not gain an inch of ground and the enemy could not be pursued. many union generals had reached a strikingly different conclusion about what they could compass on the battlefield. solve these tactical engagements left both armies bloodied and they would simply retreat to fight again. lee wrotehat w after gettysburg. the government insists on my theuing and destroying -- latter will depend on him as

much as me. -- it isestroy impossible to destroy an army equal to my own. is the hard facts of the situation. it's explained brilliantly by herman hattaway and arthur jones . it's a book that is difficult to find. how the north one. .- how the north won --y make a compelling case were veryarmies maneuverable and could recover quickly. a history of annihilation can find one.u can only

on the battlefield, it is a stalemate. after thean doubted fall of atlanta, there was skepticism -- grant and lincoln were unsure if that was the right policy. sherman said let's not play their game. we will chase them down and get a hold of them and he will escape and the battle and the fighting will keep going on. there was a recognition among the union high command -- lee never had that epiphany. ofstart with the campaign 1860 four. he had defied expectations of his army and subordinates. 1864. campaign of the commander of the third core

initiated the fighting here on july 1 which robert e lee did not want. he mysteriously disappears or the rest of the battle. his soldiers were transferred or given over to the campaign of james. hard to know why they did that. not a vote of confidence. october of 1863, he makes a reckless assault that results in terrible losses. this is one of the few instances on record in which lee rebuked his subordinates. he was very disgusted about what he had seen and told hill to never speak of this again. there is some concern about hill. he had a shaky health. he had shaky health when he was a cadet at west point.

he had some leave in new york city and he appears to have contracted gonorrhea. which was the gift for life for him. he always had to contend with health issues related to that. he was sickly and lee was concern about whether he had the physical wherewithal to keep up. the other corps commander is richard you will. he is the second core -- stonewall jackson's cops. ewell andconcern about his health. he had urged his strikes in the underdoah valley stonewall jackson. he was a superb divisional commander. was wounded severely and it resulted in the amputation of his leg.

when lee's army was reorganized, ewell got command of the second corps. he got married to his cousin. one of the wealthiest women in the south. she was from tennessee. her first husband had died because of suicide. he was part of the literary family. rutal,dured a bloomber horrific marriage with this man who paraded his mistresses in public. she has her cousin, richard, who had been in love with her since he was a young child. richard's stepson says that after the war, she married richard because she felt sorry for him. we have all had pity dates. a pity marriage is quite impressive. [laughter]

leslie gordon who will be speaking next year, she and calledad a book "intimate strategy." about marriages between generals and their wives. ande is a piece on ewell his wife. she was considered to be a strong-minded woman. not a compliment back in the day. she made her headquarters with the second corps after gettysburg. many of his officers were living under petticoat government. there was such concern about a man who got married during the assumepeople started to that they lost their fighting hitched.use they got

there were articles in the richmond page reflecting upon what confederate men should do during the war. the answer was, stay single. married men would lose fighting abilities. ewell a lot. he is a curiosity. all of his letters have been donald, whodited by has written so much about gettysburg. ofs a longtime historian gettysburg. wrote a biography about ewell. some great anecdotes about him. pretend when he was wasing in his tent that he

a bird. he would chirp to himself and ask his staff to bring him sunflower seeds. pretty sure that did not inspire a lot of confidence in the troops. [laughter] we will move quickly to one -- i want to give you time for questions and comments. lee had high expectations of confederate forces. this map in front of you is the opening phase on may 3 as the army in the potomac enters the wilderness. it nullified the advantage of the union armies artillery. armyuld have attacked the while they were straddling river . that did not happen and the army at the potomac entered the

wilderness. ll's men are on the orange turnpike. one on the turnpike, one on the plank road. one mile or so between those confederate forces. ewell was all by himself and he did extraordinarily well in --nging the federal army many of you will be going to the wilderness with others on monday. one thing the park service has done brilliantly there is a scene rehabilitation. there are areas that have been restored to their wartime appearance. field and all the you saw were trees everywhere. now you can really take in the

ground and appreciate the historic landscape. lee has even more ambitious plans for richard yoewell. turnpike,es on the confederates on the plank road. you can see the gap between the two confederate lines. final day of the wilderness. if you look at the top of the map, you can see where it says, separate and then it says rickett. hoping they would swing around the right plank and cut up the union armies. an ambitious design. designse, an ambitious that would have been realistic prior to gettysburg. they do not have the reserves for that type of attack. it was not within the cards.

a lot of delay and controversy. after the war, everyone uses ewell as a scapegoat. he blew it at gettysburg -- he did not. that is what they claimed. who is above all of these mistakes? robert e lee. ell and gettysburg -- you know the song. the plot line is always the same. we had the right ideas. stumble.rt i subordinates , wehey had followed lee would all be singing dixie today. this was not possible at all. after much delay, he finally launches an assault against the union right flank.

the reason he was unable to launch a major attack -- you do not have any reserves. one brigade arrived on may 6. you're talking about a few thousand men. that's it thir. he was finally able to slam into two brigades. they retreated and he captured a few officers. my point about the indestructible the of civil war armies. ewell and the element of surprise. it's ideal. that's what every officer wants. to pick his situation. dust settled but and you are fighting in the wilderness and the results were limited. , ewell was turned into a scapegoat by lee. in a private conversation in

revealed that he was still holding onto that fantasy of annihilation. this is what he said. ll was prevented from getting all out of his troops that he might. if jackson had been alive and been there, he would have crushed the enemy." the desire to destroy his adversary was persistent. they continued to motivate him throughout the summer of 1864. them a blow and we must never let them pass us again. we must strike them a blow. promiseslater, lee jefferson davis that wherever grant moves, he will promise to be in a position to move against him. and shall engage him while in

motion. are bestto me that policy is to unite against the army and the potomac and endeavor to crush it. of urgency is understandable. his desire to strike is reasonable. werehis overall designs not in alignment with the expectations of the southern people or the southern cause. they measured the success of military operations differently now. early in the war, the southern people wanted officers to gain victories. lee served them up. now, it appears that the satisfiedeople were with a more defensive posture. they were in line with one of lee's maxims that he said early in the war. wanted easy fighting and

heavy bakeries. -- easy fighting and heavy victories. it's even more critical that contemporaries in 1864 started d to applaud lee for his defense of skills. -- defensive skills. lee's confederates equated greatness with desperation. defense became confidence, intelligence, fortitude. i will read you one quote from the editor of the richmond -- don't met, checked -- back on the defensive. search for great safety." satisfying most

resumption and it's a review triumph of our arms. it has been achieved with comparatively small sacrifices of life. here we have it. public so aware of opinion. especially northern public opinion. he always had his strategy into an and in sync with what people wanted. he wassurd to think that so concerned about public opinion as we are today that we can't function now without getting likes and approval of everyone. duringrd to imagine lee the overland campaign -- should i counterattack after spotsylvania? lee's like if you want me to do that. [laughter] please like if you want me to do that. had all theat lee political clout in the world. he could have done one every wanted -- what ever he wanted.

everybody knew him well enough and trusted him enough that he could have retreated back to richmond and raised a few eyebrows, but that's about it. my critique of his generalship -- is this another example of historians who sit on the pedestal of hindsight, making it clear that they are so much smarter than people in the past? scenarios -- they are really troubling. they are troubling because they theure, if not obliterate political and racial realities of a world where slavery and secession would have prevailed. concerns -- what

could be gained from this inquiry? in what nation of war appears to be a never-ending conflict against terrorism. we need to ask ourselves two , but ignored questions. what are the west political goals -- u.s. political goals? are they in harmony with the political strategy abroad? whether you're a hawk or a dove, democrat or republican, civil democracycts us that and war will not succeed unless political and military aims are in harmony with public opinion. militaryd, his stor leadership is of concern. not only to the leader, but also to the followers. to the enemy, to ordinary people, many of whom die or suffered -- in

short, military leadership involves responsibility for what happens to w other persons. if we are to seek a critical assessment of lee, the military and moral consequences of his decisions and the human price of organized killing for ending slavery and secession. thank you. [applause] we have 20 of time for questions -- 20 of time for questions. of time for questions. right in that are -- >> stop right there.

that's perfect. [laughter] i think you are right that had lee prior to the large conflict in spotsylvania gone back to richmond, that would have helped their cause. i have a difficult time believing anything like that could happen because lee is so it'ssive minded -- difficult for me to consider that as something that might have happened because lee is not thinking this way. believe he has it in him to maintain this defensive posture. i agree. it would not have been a wise policy. that crater and that's it. you'll find out there is more to

petersburg. the operations into the fall as the union armies make their way to the south of the city, there are open field sites. s army does extraordinarily well. the officers are wounded or buried in central virginia. .0,000 veteran volunteers the army of the potomac is a green army filled with lots of substitutes and bounty hunters. they are not tested men. it's an offense of minded approach that helps slow down that union advantage. if he had preserved more of those men -- he maybe should have relied more on a rating strategy. where the federals had turned. a crucial element to their old man success. if he had used that as well, not

only would he have assisted in areittle victories amplified in the papers. you want to buck up morale on the homefront, these are fuel for morale. curious how it could have been different for lee to fall back earlier than it eventually was in reality when he fell back later. how do you feel that would have been different for the confederates? great question and an opportunity for me to acknowledge the limits of my knowledge. for me to say, i will look at a map and lee after may 10 could have abandoned that position and headed south.

removing one's armies from a position in which grant got a hold of you -- that is easier said than done. we should all be aware of them -- grant will not allow that to happen. he knew the army would be vulnerable and a long retreat are to richmond -- they're all kinds of difficulties that would present itself. think about antietam. he maintains that position around sharpsburg and many people claim that is the defiant , aggressive lee. pride is in the way. he is risking his entire army. oft overlooks the basic fact what -- you can't get across the

potomac overnight. it is a hole in my theory of lee should have done. it would have been very difficult to pull off. >> grant is my man. grant most all my life. i remember back at the university, they had a visitor and they were discussing the war and this visitor said to general lee, he was a horrible general -- i can understand how can't understand and he looked at him and said, "if i was such a great general, why did general grant defeat me? " he was an enigma.

why did grant succeed? we don't know why, but he is the successor. everdon't believe that happened. he did not believe that he had been defeated by grant. he believed he was treated by superior resources. he was prideful as anybody in that position would be. he had respect for grant, but i shink he would argue that hi army was worn down. the same way felt about lee. he had respect for lee, but he -- wee had out generaled need to think about grant as a mastermind of u.s. strategy. you can focus on just virginia. he orchestrated all the union armies.

one reason he relinquished so much control to gordon is because he could not handle those administrating duties. he had lots of other responsibilities and he did that brilliantly. bringing about simultaneous advances throughout the confederacy was a way to stop the confederacy from shifting troops from various local areas to meet on coordinated union advances. he was able to solve that problem and rely on a rating strategy. certainly grant wore down the confederacy, but he did not do nt by just winding up his me and attacking. i've heard gary point out that lee's actual target was the northern populace morale so they would get depressed and then

force the link administration to a negotiate an end to the war. how would this retreat that you postulate play into that? it seems that would be counterproductive. >> dr. gallagher is right about many things. he is wrong about this. he did a hell of a job training graduate students. he made a couple of mistakes. i think he is flat out wrong there. armies in northern virginia were in retreat. racking up huge casualties. they were in a retreat and that did not appear to affect southern morale. at the same time, northern route is on the brake of what -- we gave up a lot of ground, but he gave up a lot of ground with a high body count. that still hurt nor the morale.

-- northern route. that atlanta was going to fall. we need to reinforce the point here when you look at military campaigns. this is the great pride. make sure lincoln is not reelected. what the confederate administration needed to do was be more patient. keith will probably speak about this when he talks about the atlanta campaign. it's my sense that the army in tennessee had great faith and that johnston's problems were very much with richmond authority. you are looking at it from the confederate perspective, they have been through this dance before with johnston. he nearly gave the keys to richmond. i think they saw the same thing happen. war, the beginning of the

both the union and confederacy were able to wage war. was focused onee the relentless attack in 1864. in 1863, he'd already tried to push into the north with gettysburg. he obviously -- i won't say squandered -- he gave up a lot of resources in that attack, in that advance earlier before lincoln's election. perhaps if he had waited until 1864 to carry on that sort of push into the north with this kind of strategy, would he have had more of a chance? >> good question. he rate into the north -- raid into the north had to be

set up on those victories. it, those moments and opportunities -- who knows when they will present themselves again. to look at the spring of 1863 is a chance to bring the war and to the north, that is something that these forces had to come together and he understood he was not controlling the war as a joystick. here is the moment that he seized upon. terms of awork in military campaign study is joseph harsh. you can look him up on amazon. a number of books on the war in 1862: dating with the raid into antietam. he understood there was only so much sand in the hourglass of the confederacy.

with the limited resources that he knew was at the south's disposal, that is what compelled him to fight. the conflict would ultimately doomed to confederacy. 's argument sees the war from lee's eyes. it is compelling work third time for one more question. wonder, if we had a lee who would rather than being the general he was was a hybrid lee -johnston whether he could have given rise to the lost cause legend and the icon that we now enjoy chipping away at. ,> in terms of the lost cause

let me say this -- white southerners have a unique history and that they faced military defeat. with that, there is a guilt and a burden. having to live up to military defeat into the ownership of and to the ownership of slaves. ultimately, defeated people who believe they were christian people and believe god ultimately decides this conflict in their favor and they wake up , this5 and say, uh oh thing did not turn out as a mansion they had to do a lot of explaining. there is a realism to it. it is very much grounded into the reality of the postwar world

in which the bottom rail is now on top. they will do everything they can to try to regain that authority. thank you very much. [applause] >> you are watching american history tv. every weekend here on c-span3.

coverage will continue after they take this break. this year's conference in keeping with the civil war is the war in 1864. simpson onrooks ulysses s. grant. ari kelmanhat, describes the sand creek of american indians by u.s. soldiers. while we wait for the conference to reconvene, we will take a look at the history of st. louis, missouri. we are highlighting the history of this city.

>> a lot of times, i've asked myself why is it an orton to have a historic structure -- why is it important to have a historic structure? you get that moment where you are thinking, wow, that is this eventing that happened standing. to me, that is what the value of a hit store constructor is. you can get those personal moments of connection. historic structure is. they can jump back into the past mentally and at least have some sort of connection with people from the past.

louis's old. courthouse. a building that is no longer used for the court today. it has not been since 1930. it is a very historic building that has been preserved to try to tell a little bit about st. louis's history. this courthouse is best known as the courthouse where dred and harriet scott sued for their freedom. int freedom sued launched 1846 went all the way to the u.s. supreme court which decided that they would be held as slaves. it was a decision that was very broad. it said that people cannot be restricted from taking their slaves into federal territories any longer. it opened up the western territories to the possibility

of slavery. it was one of the main deciding factors in leading the nation on the path towards civil war. there were a lot of other things that happened. john brown's raid on harpers ferry, the kansas-nebraska act. those, you could say, it's one of the places where the civil war really begin. where the roots of the civil war really are. long before the first gun was fired in south carolina, there were a lot of things that were leading the country on the road towards civil war. one of them was the case that was originally heard in this building. times, an in the case,of the dred scott

the people themselves get lost in the story. came here to st. louis and lived here. he lived many other places. 1790'sborn in the late in virginia. he was born as a slave on a plantation owned by a family named below. they moved to alabama and they took dred scott with them and tried to make a go of it there on another plantation which failed. and moved to st. louis bought a hotel and tried to do a different type of work to try to make their living. that they needed some ready cash and so they sold dred scott after they arrived here in st. louis in 1830. dred was purchased by a man named dr. john