' sunday affairs programs. c-span radio on audio now. long-distance or phone charges may apply. hosted by the civil war institute at gettysburg address. speakers will focus on the civil war and 1864 and a leaders and campaigns that most impacted the course. each presentation is about one hour. this is american history tv on c-span 3. [applause] >> good morning. when we all get into this business writing books and we hope that our books have a lasting impact. history, wemarch of keep moving along, keeping pace with the scholarship as a reality, most of our books fall

by the wayside. at a had the realization recent book signing in which i did not have to strain my eyes very much to see the end of the line. people made their way up. ,he guy said to his wife, honey this is the author of the book i have been reading every evening. and she said, oh, the book you follow sleep to every night? [laughter] the person this photograph, douglas southall freeman, there is no risk of his work falling by the wayside. he wasn't gotten for of her robert e. lee and wrote 4 volumes on how polish and the 1930's and he received a political price. e lee in the 1930's and he received a pulitzer prize . all of his work is beautifully written. equal to bruce

catton's. he did incredible research. douglas southall freeman was enamored with the general. in fact, he admitted to this. it is not an anecdote. every morning as he walked to work, he would salute the statue of robert e lee and richmond. a little odd i would say. nonetheless, if he had great admiration. a professional historian. he grew up in richmond at his undergraduate at university of richmond and got his phd. he did not enter the academy. he decided to work for a living at was a journalist, 2 different papers. this should remind you of our conversation yesterday was a real job as a lawyer and does historical scholarship. maintained an incredible

work ethic. he got up every morning at 2:00. this is a picture of him in his office. 7:00uld work until 6:00 or in the morning. if you note in the photograph, you can see a photograph where he did a daily radio show and went off to the newspaper office and was a full-time editor. quite remarkable. hits. certainly taken lot of rubble because of the revisionist. in their critique of freeman. leave --s a fantasized he presented a fantasized lee. i will give you one example. he spoke to an audience about the leadership and in this he made an observation about what

constitutes the generalship during the civil war. he said a great general must recognize between what was possible from what was desirable. a soldier who cannot make that distinction, freeman declared, will never get anywhere. freeman was referring to general pierre beauregard. lee's forces with and marching on washington, d.c. and on to philadelphia and the final destination would be new york city. mean giving up richmond and petersburg. this flamboyant see -- flambo yancy is understandable if your name is p.m. beauregard. pierre beauregard.

douglas southall freeman should have applied this rule to robert ely -- robert e lee. my argument is very straightforward. i just change the slide to distract you as i give you my argument. it is simply this. by the fall of 1863, lee's expectations how far exceeded what he could actually accomplish. during the preceding 24 months before june 1, 1864, before the fighting at cold harbor, lee had lost roughly 100,000 men. he was aware of his diminished strength but at the start of the wasaign, r. e. lee searching for that victory of annihilation or american waterloo.

his thinkings only on the subject after 1863 in no of involved or changed many his peers especially the union side, they have adjusted to the reality of warfare and recognize that civil war or means our virtual that our virtual indestructible. -- are virtual indestructible. lee has these grandiose plans. the expectation that grant would be destroyed in a single battle. what is up rising in is the southern press and people were modest and realistic. this is not the case in the north. brooks simpson has written a good piece called "great expectations." fine volume of essays on the wilderness campaign called the wilderness.

that is where brooks' article appears. work sometimes that northern , grant would deliver a knockout blow in the overland campaign. the same kind of pressure that grant the dead. he had the political clout in richmond, the latitude to take a more strategic conservative approach. grant simply do not have that option. i want to suggest this. lee should've abandoned. he should have her treated across virginia, that area was logistically bearing. he could have consolidated his forces around richmond and petersburg. something we can discuss it during the question and answer period. there is a perception once they all back, they were simply matter of time and i do not agree. if he had done that and left the

spot after may 10, he would've probably saved himself or 20,000 men. and of course, grand with been obliged to do what -- grant would have been obliged to do what? it should've been a stalemate. as we know, intimate, atlanta was not threatened. johnston was grinding down sherman's army. lee could have done the same. what a prize for these campaigns and 1864, defeat of abraham lincoln. offact, it is the defeat amber hamel lincoln that is the lincolnacy's -- abraham that is the confederacy's last best hope. we need to do a little his geography. storiography.

i will make us a synced. it falls in line with many historians who critique lee. attacking or commitment to the broughtthat ultimately to defeat. this idea that many scholars maintain today has the origins in the works of edward alexander, the confederate first core. he described only as personified. xander's superior said it was lee's courage that would not let him rest. these two examples and there are many others, they confuse the scholarship ony leave. george bruce in 1913 concluded that the aggressive warfare was congenial to lee's impulsive

nature. it does not remove itself entirely from the idea that lee had up until your last -- had a --uliar lust for what affair for warfare. "the making our robert e lee," he explains this aggressiveness on the battlefield served as a release for pent up sexual frustrations that only had suppressed throughout his adult life. feldman "when it was most needed, aggressiveness and deep reserve of lee. -- itense, the presidents was the erotic energy that had forced its way through the carefully controlled exterior normallyg lee had

shown the world in his relations with young women. he found a great release and making the war. a conscious act if given the choice, he would attack, not wait." his observations got a nice chuckle from the audience. some of you might find it disturbing. autobiography, it is what many will call -- i do not like using this term, psychobabble. you will reach the conclusion at the end, there are these explanations for confederate defeat. we have a new one at three feldman's book. if they only have prozac, lee would've been successful. i want to remind you. when douglas southall freeman wrote the following description in his 1934 autobiography -- had aphy of lee, nobody problem of his biological

descriptions as long as the described lee's greatness. eyes flashed and the blood in his veins with the calmer strain. turning to long streak, lee roosevelt debris -- lee revealed a brief sentence, is war so terrible we should grow fond of it?" it reminds of the danger of nature with biology. it should suggest that his storable people -- his storable people -- historical is a classication" example. it shows african-americans as

taking over political governments in the south and running over whites. and black men not just lust for power but lust for white women and everything of early terms of the century especially in the south, we have on the rise lynching. the factor that explains the rise of lynching is complex. interpretation is their best critical to the legitimization of social relations of unequal power in any society. what i am back to most comfortable with and as the nation of aggressiveness that has a cultural foundation. if we think about aggressiveness in the 19th century, they do not pride it in its raw form. courage of something that was harnessed and they should be refined. emotional equilibrium was the

goal of most 19th century men. i'm not suggesting that all achieved it in a probably most did not. priorsd elizabeth biography of lee, the best book we have in terms of looking at the inner lee and she does it by drilling down in research. it is just a fiend when comes to primary sources and she gets into them. it's a brilliant and brutally -- and beautifully written book that one a lincoln prize. it is superb. in it she makes a compelling case thqat lee's engineering background flowed into his victorian sensibility of self-denial and control. lee was always worried about mastering himself and we should note that he also wanted to master those people whom he deemed inferior whether it be women, native americans or slaves.

learn hishe commitment to the offense in a military he probably got some of that schooling at west point. i suspect he read all about napoleon's campaigns. somertainly had appreciation of the offense. this on the ground -- where did it play out with tremendous success but the mexican war? that is where he learned how to do had worked. getting on the ground and making reconnaissance -- it resulted in mindedc, offensive victories. this is not about an analyst -- an endless impulse. give his army the best chance for success. cometen look at gettysburg

up tickets charge as an anomaly 's chargeburg, pickett as an anomaly. plays a very somber lead. i don't think that captures lee's speaking at that time. we get to pickett's charge and we say, what was the general thinking? lee was so depressed that he suddenly lost all of his imagination and creativity and marched these men across an open field. this overlooks the strategic possibilities of 1863. ee to douired that l what? there are so many possibilities

that can be gained politically through attacking. --e his army was engaged july 1 stands as one of the most complete victories that the army in northern virginia ever achieved. it was a day of impressive assault that nearly cracked the union line in a number of places. it makes no sense why he would suddenly relinquish the offens s ive. it is not in sync with the realities of what was on the ground. you stand in front of the lee monument and the next thing you the to do is -- interpretive markers don't really explain where the troops were. it appears that he simply lined them up along one offense of

ive front. 90% of the visitors have no idea where the charge was formed. it is off to the right by the house. those troops were relatively concealed for most of the day. lee took great care to ensure that it would succeed. maxim ofed upon the possibility, not probability. there were possibilities. it was not his best decision, but it was not a knee-jerk reaction. his blood wasuse up. it was a decision made after careful calculations. what he did at gettysburg is perfectly consistent with what he had done up until that point.

the big question that revisionists have raised is this -- did the confederates afford ee's daring maneuvers? there is a long casualty list. could the confederacy afford that? that is the question that historian alan nolan raised in his book in 1991. here. a longtime attendee another lawyer who turned the .ivil war historian he did another important book called the iron brigade. lee was very controversial. did his daring maneuvers -- could the confederacy afford them?

absolutely not. no one could not understand why people were so enamored with the individual campaigns of robert e lee. end, he believed that those campaigns, ironically enough, ultimately committed robert e lee to what he feared more than anything else. iege warfare around richmond. read thele never even book and criticized it. one person even suggested a book burning. that promotes healthy discussion in a democracy. [laughter] happens --oar, it so people that did this with weakness.

of nolan'ssness argument. if you apply his question to , ite's operation in 1862 does not make sense to me at all. at a time when he had ample resources and reserve manpower and political opportunities in which offensive strikes could have brought a credible -- brought incredible reward. , it doesthe posture not make any sense to me at all. i think it is important to note here that lee's thinking did not evolve as the war changed. he lamented the fact that his lopsided victories did not result in the instruction -- the

destruction of the enemy. we gave another victory and our people were wild with delight. i was more depressed than after fredericksburg. our losses were severe and we did not gain an inch of ground and the enemy could not be pursued. many union generals had reached a strikingly different conclusion about what they could compass on the battlefield. solve these tactical engagements left both armies bloodied and they would simply retreat to fight again. lee wrotehat w after gettysburg. the government insists on my theuing and destroying -- latter will depend on him as much as me. -- it isestroy impossible to destroy an army

equal to my own. is the hard facts of the situation. it's explained brilliantly by herman hattaway and arthur jones . it's a book that is difficult to find. how the north one. .- how the north won --y make a compelling case were veryarmies maneuverable and could recover quickly. a history of annihilation can find one.u can only on the battlefield, it is a stalemate. after thean doubted

fall of atlanta, there was skepticism -- grant and lincoln were unsure if that was the right policy. sherman said let's not play their game. we will chase them down and get a hold of them and he will escape and the battle and the fighting will keep going on. there was a recognition among the union high command -- lee never had that epiphany. ofstart with the campaign 1860 four. he had defied expectations of his army and subordinates. 1864. campaign of the commander of the third core initiated the fighting here on july 1 which robert e lee did not want. he mysteriously disappears or the rest of the battle.

his soldiers were transferred or given over to the campaign of james. hard to know why they did that. not a vote of confidence. october of 1863, he makes a reckless assault that results in terrible losses. this is one of the few instances on record in which lee rebuked his subordinates. he was very disgusted about what he had seen and told hill to never speak of this again. there is some concern about hill. he had a shaky health. he had shaky health when he was a cadet at west point. he had some leave in new york city and he appears to have contracted gonorrhea.

which was the gift for life for him. he always had to contend with health issues related to that. he was sickly and lee was concern about whether he had the physical wherewithal to keep up. the other corps commander is richard you will. he is the second core -- stonewall jackson's cops. ewell andconcern about his health. he had urged his strikes in the underdoah valley stonewall jackson. he was a superb divisional commander. was wounded severely and it resulted in the amputation of his leg. when lee's army was reorganized, ewell got command of the second

corps. he got married to his cousin. one of the wealthiest women in the south. she was from tennessee. her first husband had died because of suicide. he was part of the literary family. rutal,dured a bloomber horrific marriage with this man who paraded his mistresses in public. she has her cousin, richard, who had been in love with her since he was a young child. richard's stepson says that after the war, she married richard because she felt sorry for him. we have all had pity dates. a pity marriage is quite impressive. [laughter] leslie gordon who will be speaking next year, she and

calledad a book "intimate strategy." about marriages between generals and their wives. ande is a piece on ewell his wife. she was considered to be a strong-minded woman. not a compliment back in the day. she made her headquarters with the second corps after gettysburg. many of his officers were living under petticoat government. there was such concern about a man who got married during the assumepeople started to that they lost their fighting hitched.use they got there were articles in the richmond page reflecting upon what confederate men should do

during the war. the answer was, stay single. married men would lose fighting abilities. ewell a lot. he is a curiosity. all of his letters have been donald, whodited by has written so much about gettysburg. ofs a longtime historian gettysburg. wrote a biography about ewell. some great anecdotes about him. pretend when he was wasing in his tent that he a bird. he would chirp to himself and ask his staff to bring him sunflower seeds. pretty sure that did not inspire

a lot of confidence in the troops. [laughter] we will move quickly to one -- i want to give you time for questions and comments. lee had high expectations of confederate forces. this map in front of you is the opening phase on may 3 as the army in the potomac enters the wilderness. it nullified the advantage of the union armies artillery. armyuld have attacked the while they were straddling river . that did not happen and the army at the potomac entered the wilderness. ll's men are on the orange

turnpike. one on the turnpike, one on the plank road. one mile or so between those confederate forces. ewell was all by himself and he did extraordinarily well in --nging the federal army many of you will be going to the wilderness with others on monday. one thing the park service has done brilliantly there is a scene rehabilitation. there are areas that have been restored to their wartime appearance. field and all the you saw were trees everywhere. now you can really take in the ground and appreciate the historic landscape.

lee has even more ambitious plans for richard yoewell. turnpike,es on the confederates on the plank road. you can see the gap between the two confederate lines. final day of the wilderness. if you look at the top of the map, you can see where it says, separate and then it says rickett. hoping they would swing around the right plank and cut up the union armies. an ambitious design. designse, an ambitious that would have been realistic prior to gettysburg. they do not have the reserves for that type of attack. it was not within the cards. a lot of delay and controversy. after the war, everyone uses

ewell as a scapegoat. he blew it at gettysburg -- he did not. that is what they claimed. who is above all of these mistakes? robert e lee. ell and gettysburg -- you know the song. the plot line is always the same. we had the right ideas. stumble.rt i subordinates , wehey had followed lee would all be singing dixie today. this was not possible at all. after much delay, he finally launches an assault against the union right flank. the reason he was unable to launch a major attack -- you do not have any reserves. one brigade arrived on may 6.

you're talking about a few thousand men. that's it thir. he was finally able to slam into two brigades. they retreated and he captured a few officers. my point about the indestructible the of civil war armies. ewell and the element of surprise. it's ideal. that's what every officer wants. to pick his situation. dust settled but and you are fighting in the wilderness and the results were limited. , ewell was turned into a scapegoat by lee. in a private conversation in revealed that he was still holding onto that fantasy of annihilation.

this is what he said. ll was prevented from getting all out of his troops that he might. if jackson had been alive and been there, he would have crushed the enemy." the desire to destroy his adversary was persistent. they continued to motivate him throughout the summer of 1864. them a blow and we must never let them pass us again. we must strike them a blow. promiseslater, lee jefferson davis that wherever grant moves, he will promise to be in a position to move against him. and shall engage him while in motion. are bestto me that policy is to unite against the

army and the potomac and endeavor to crush it. of urgency is understandable. his desire to strike is reasonable. werehis overall designs not in alignment with the expectations of the southern people or the southern cause. they measured the success of military operations differently now. early in the war, the southern people wanted officers to gain victories. lee served them up. now, it appears that the satisfiedeople were with a more defensive posture. they were in line with one of lee's maxims that he said early in the war. wanted easy fighting and heavy bakeries. -- easy fighting and heavy victories. it's even more critical that

contemporaries in 1864 started d to applaud lee for his defense of skills. -- defensive skills. lee's confederates equated greatness with desperation. defense became confidence, intelligence, fortitude. i will read you one quote from the editor of the richmond -- don't met, checked -- back on the defensive. search for great safety." satisfying most resumption and it's a review triumph of our arms. it has been achieved with comparatively small sacrifices of life.

here we have it. public so aware of opinion. especially northern public opinion. he always had his strategy into an and in sync with what people wanted. he wassurd to think that so concerned about public opinion as we are today that we can't function now without getting likes and approval of everyone. duringrd to imagine lee the overland campaign -- should i counterattack after spotsylvania? lee's like if you want me to do that. [laughter] please like if you want me to do that. had all theat lee political clout in the world. he could have done one every wanted -- what ever he wanted. everybody knew him well enough and trusted him enough that he could have retreated back to

richmond and raised a few eyebrows, but that's about it. my critique of his generalship -- is this another example of historians who sit on the pedestal of hindsight, making it clear that they are so much smarter than people in the past? scenarios -- they are really troubling. they are troubling because they theure, if not obliterate political and racial realities of a world where slavery and secession would have prevailed. concerns -- what could be gained from this inquiry? in what nation of war

appears to be a never-ending conflict against terrorism. we need to ask ourselves two , but ignored questions. what are the west political goals -- u.s. political goals? are they in harmony with the political strategy abroad? whether you're a hawk or a dove, democrat or republican, civil democracycts us that and war will not succeed unless political and military aims are in harmony with public opinion. militaryd, his stor leadership is of concern. not only to the leader, but also to the followers. to the enemy, to ordinary people, many of whom die or suffered -- in short, military leadership involves responsibility for what

happens to w other persons. if we are to seek a critical assessment of lee, the military and moral consequences of his decisions and the human price of organized killing for ending slavery and secession. thank you. [applause] we have 20 of time for questions -- 20 of time for questions. of time for questions. right in that are -- >> stop right there. that's perfect. [laughter] i think you are right that

had lee prior to the large conflict in spotsylvania gone back to richmond, that would have helped their cause. i have a difficult time believing anything like that could happen because lee is so it'ssive minded -- difficult for me to consider that as something that might have happened because lee is not thinking this way. believe he has it in him to maintain this defensive posture. i agree. it would not have been a wise policy. that crater and that's it. you'll find out there is more to petersburg. the operations into the fall as the union armies make their way to the south of the city, there are open field sites.

s army does extraordinarily well. the officers are wounded or buried in central virginia. .0,000 veteran volunteers the army of the potomac is a green army filled with lots of substitutes and bounty hunters. they are not tested men. it's an offense of minded approach that helps slow down that union advantage. if he had preserved more of those men -- he maybe should have relied more on a rating strategy. where the federals had turned. a crucial element to their old man success. if he had used that as well, not only would he have assisted in areittle victories

amplified in the papers. you want to buck up morale on the homefront, these are fuel for morale. curious how it could have been different for lee to fall back earlier than it eventually was in reality when he fell back later. how do you feel that would have been different for the confederates? great question and an opportunity for me to acknowledge the limits of my knowledge. for me to say, i will look at a map and lee after may 10 could have abandoned that position and headed south. removing one's armies from a position in which grant got a hold of you -- that is easier said than done. we should all be aware of them

-- grant will not allow that to happen. he knew the army would be vulnerable and a long retreat are to richmond -- they're all kinds of difficulties that would present itself. think about antietam. he maintains that position around sharpsburg and many people claim that is the defiant , aggressive lee. pride is in the way. he is risking his entire army. oft overlooks the basic fact what -- you can't get across the potomac overnight. it is a hole in my theory of

lee should have done. it would have been very difficult to pull off. >> grant is my man. grant most all my life. i remember back at the university, they had a visitor and they were discussing the war and this visitor said to general lee, he was a horrible general -- i can understand how can't understand and he looked at him and said, "if i was such a great general, why did general grant defeat me? " he was an enigma. why did grant succeed? we don't know why, but he is the successor. everdon't believe that

happened. he did not believe that he had been defeated by grant. he believed he was treated by superior resources. he was prideful as anybody in that position would be. he had respect for grant, but i shink he would argue that hi army was worn down. the same way felt about lee. he had respect for lee, but he -- wee had out generaled need to think about grant as a mastermind of u.s. strategy. you can focus on just virginia. he orchestrated all the union armies. one reason he relinquished so much control to gordon is because he could not handle those administrating duties.

he had lots of other responsibilities and he did that brilliantly. bringing about simultaneous advances throughout the confederacy was a way to stop the confederacy from shifting troops from various local areas to meet on coordinated union advances. he was able to solve that problem and rely on a rating strategy. certainly grant wore down the confederacy, but he did not do nt by just winding up his me and attacking. i've heard gary point out that lee's actual target was the northern populace morale so they would get depressed and then force the link administration to a negotiate an end to the war.

how would this retreat that you postulate play into that? it seems that would be counterproductive. >> dr. gallagher is right about many things. he is wrong about this. he did a hell of a job training graduate students. he made a couple of mistakes. i think he is flat out wrong there. armies in northern virginia were in retreat. racking up huge casualties. they were in a retreat and that did not appear to affect southern morale. at the same time, northern route is on the brake of what -- we gave up a lot of ground, but he gave up a lot of ground with a high body count. that still hurt nor the morale. -- northern route. that atlanta was going to fall.

we need to reinforce the point here when you look at military campaigns. this is the great pride. make sure lincoln is not reelected. what the confederate administration needed to do was be more patient. keith will probably speak about this when he talks about the atlanta campaign. it's my sense that the army in tennessee had great faith and that johnston's problems were very much with richmond authority. you are looking at it from the confederate perspective, they have been through this dance before with johnston. he nearly gave the keys to richmond. i think they saw the same thing happen. war, the beginning of the both the union and confederacy were able to wage war. was focused onee

the relentless attack in 1864. in 1863, he'd already tried to push into the north with gettysburg. he obviously -- i won't say squandered -- he gave up a lot of resources in that attack, in that advance earlier before lincoln's election. perhaps if he had waited until 1864 to carry on that sort of push into the north with this kind of strategy, would he have had more of a chance? >> good question. he rate into the north -- raid into the north had to be set up on those victories. it, those moments and opportunities -- who knows when

they will present themselves again. to look at the spring of 1863 is a chance to bring the war and to the north, that is something that these forces had to come together and he understood he was not controlling the war as a joystick. here is the moment that he seized upon. terms of awork in military campaign study is joseph harsh. you can look him up on amazon. a number of books on the war in 1862: dating with the raid into antietam. he understood there was only so much sand in the hourglass of the confederacy. with the limited resources that he knew was at the south's disposal, that is what compelled him to fight.

the conflict would ultimately doomed to confederacy. 's argument sees the war from lee's eyes. it is compelling work third time for one more question. wonder, if we had a lee who would rather than being the general he was was a hybrid lee -johnston whether he could have given rise to the lost cause legend and the icon that we now enjoy chipping away at. ,> in terms of the lost cause let me say this -- white

southerners have a unique history and that they faced military defeat. with that, there is a guilt and a burden. having to live up to military defeat into the ownership of and to the ownership of slaves. ultimately, defeated people who believe they were christian people and believe god ultimately decides this conflict in their favor and they wake up , this5 and say, uh oh thing did not turn out as a mansion they had to do a lot of explaining. there is a realism to it. it is very much grounded into the reality of the postwar world in which the bottom rail is now on top. they will do everything they can to try to regain that authority.

thank you very much. [applause] i am pete carmichael, professor of history here at gettysburg college. i am also the director of the civil war institute. it is my pleasure this morning to introduce brooks simpson, the asu foundation professor of history at arizona state university. he is a historian of 19th century america. the american presidency as well as the civil war and reconstruction. he has written extensively about ulysses s. grant. he is the author of "let us have peace:... s grant and the politics of reconstruction," released in 1991.

he is also the author of "u.s. grant: triumph over adversity. that earned distinction as a new york times notable book of the year. just recently, he has published and edited a boeing by the library of america -- a volume by the library of america, "voices of the civil war." sharesy brooks stephen -- brooks shares. he has given talks focusing on the war and the east and we know he is a superb battlefield guide. many of you will have the leisure on monday of following him around the wilderness. those who have been with brooks before were at antietam, where he managed to get his coat tour co-tour guide to ford

antietam creek. is he going to go bushwhacking in the wilderness this year? take some players. we do not want to lose them. brooks is going to speak to us. contingencies and circumstances, u.s. grant and the problem of virginia in 1864. brooks simpson. >> well, good morning everyone. first thank the team at the civil war institute, especially allison and iron, as well as peter. i must admit that i feel naked up here without a scarf on. know peter's fashion attire will understand that reference. out thatnt to point while peter recognizes that his

advisor, jerry gallagher, made mistakes, my advisor, richard sewall, did no such thing. intrigued byo peter's presentation, which dwell ont -- seemed to the sexual practices and fantasies of confederate generals and their historians. [laughter] i thought i would tell a little story of my own in this regard. not about me. that is a tmi moment. you'll have to join me on facebook for that one. several years ago, my wife cheryl and i went to whitehaven, which is a plantation where ulysses s. grant's in-laws had lived, and later was owned by grant during his presidency. and we went in.

not tosked my wife reveal who i was. i had worked there before, what whenever you go to a place, it is better to try to see it, at least from my point of view, as if you are someone they do not know. it says that way you can see what kind of presentation they give to normal visitors to the area, as opposed to somebody where they say, you know this. cheryl has made it through. it is 14 years and cheryl has made it through exactly five chapters of my grant biography. she says that once they begin firing at each other, she goes to bed. but she had read a certain description of that book. grant's memoirs, she talked about, when her fiancé went to war in mexico, she had, as was the want of many women at the time, name dave that --

named a bedpost after him. the guide looks at my wife and things, women like to look at kitchens to see what modern 1860's. is were in the he says, what room would you like to see? without batting an eye, she says, i want to see the bedroom. i've got to see that bedpost. [laughter] the rest of the trip was marked by that peculiar exchange. what i am here to talk about about the problem of of unionin the minds military strategists, and none more so than ulysses s. grant. virginia was more than ju