to cite within the rules a point of order as to whether rules are being properly adhered to. congresswoman spear did a very good job of citing a point of order, and i would ask all folks to please use the parliamentarians before the cite a point of order. we now go to the gentleman from florida, mr. sanchez, for five minutes. >> commissioner, have reviewed dave kamp's letter he sent to the irs. >> i have not. i only saw it this afternoon briefly. >> this is -- so he writes a letter, lois lerner's hard drive crashes ten days later, you're in charge of ther is and is you haven't reviewed that letter? >> i scanned that letter. i'm not doing the investigation of what happened around -- >> that letter requested that e-mail records be preserved, and turned over to the committee, the ways and means committee, and according to your testimony, when her hard drive crashed they never went to the backup servers to retrieve her e-mails.

>> they never went to the backup tapes. >> exactly. >> the backup server is different. there's no backup server. there's a serve that operates the e-mail. >> and the tapes they're stored on offsite, they never got the e-mails back. even though congress requestedded it, the irs didn't care and didn't go the extra mile to get thosement you testified last week that you knew there was a problem, february 2014 with lois lerner's e-mails. >> i was advised there was an issue. >> in mid-march, the irs, according to your testimony, learned additional facts about her mysterious computer crash. >> that's correct. >> then you testified at this committee at the end of march, and you promised this committee, dowdy, gordon issa, everyone, get us lois lerner e-mails, you said, yes, we'll do it. you never mention, you never disclose that there were real problems about whether you were in fact going to be able to turn

over those e-mails. correct. >> at that time i did not know there were real problems -- >> meet what you told dave camp. in february -- this is page six of your testimony last week -- in february, what we knew was there was a problem because we were looking at it from the standpoint of where, what time frame her e-mails appeared and it appeared there were not enough e-mails in that time frame. so, in mid-february, you had reason to believe that you were short of e-mails, and that critical time frame, per your testimony last week. correct? >> when i say, we, the review team did that. i knew simply there was a problem in the way the e-mails were spread throughout the time frame. did not know the details of it. >> your testimony said, we, meaning the irs. >> the irs. >> now you're saying you did not know that so you were -- even though you're the commissioner you're not in the loop. here's the issue. >> good. >> going back and forth with you at the march hearing and you basically told him, we will get

leadershipper's e-mails they're stored in servers -- what you said -- now, my question for you is, why say that if you knew, one there was a problem with lerner e-mails and, two, you knew the backup tapes were only saved for six months. why tell chafen you could retrieve it. >> at that time we had pulled all of the e-mails from her hard drive and put them in a server system known as clearwell; it's pool. it has -- >> i understand that. your testimony -- there was reason in mid-february there were not enough e-mails so whatever pool you head, the time period in question of the computer crash, you testified there was a possibility that this was coming up short. so the question is, you made a choice that you testified not disclose this back to congress. you have been asked, when did you know for sure there were

e-mails. you said april. when in april, you said, april, and wouldn't get anymore definitive. and you were advised not to disclose it -- >> did not say i was not -- >> why didn't you disclose. >> we needed to find out the facts and the details and when we found those we would give you all the information. my experience, acomplained last month, we did provide information that we had just learned that day. our staff did. that we have custodians who had lost -- hard drive crashes -- >> i understand that -- >> -- immediately thereafter people leaped to conclusions in the press released that turned out to be wrong. >> i think you have a duty of candor to congress and the american people and you had some reason to believe there would be issues with producing her e-mails in your march testimony. you have admitted it with ways and means there were issues. now, either you -- maybe you weren't kept up or maybe you weren't following closely enough. i don't know. but i think this is very important because the average taxpayer looks at this and if

they're in a situation where they can't produce documents, they are presumed guilty, period, end of story. it's not even a question. and yet the irs is in a situation where they can say, well, we had a computer crash, the probability of that is very small, as mr. massey indicated. just so happened to happened ten days after dave camp asked for information. and so i don't think that the american people are satisfied with this and with all due respect i don't think your testimony will be satisfactory to those who have real concerns about whether we're going to get to the bottom of what happened with the irs. i yield back. >> can i make just one point? >> it's the practice of the committee to always let a witness answer a question if there's a question penning. the gentleman may answer. >> i appreciate. this is just a statement i want the public to be confident about and that its when we're dealing with taxpayers and if they can't produce a record, we are open to their producing other evidence that would be consistent with that. so if somebody said we lost e-mails, we reconstructed 24,000 of them, we would take that into

consideration and there's a legal precedent that says if your actions and the evidence generally produces support for what you say happened, even if you don't have the documents, that's acceptable. so the idea that if you have lost the document it means you have lost the case with the irs, that is incorrect. we actually will work with taxpayers, trying to make sure that they have supporting information of any kind. our notices out to corporations say, here's what we like in documents but if you haven't got them all, you have something close to that, give us other inflammation, we'll take that. i just want the record to be clear. >> we reside be happy to accept whatever alternatives you can produce to show what -- >> the gentleman's time is expired. commissioner, the good news is there aren't too many members left for the second round. so, this should be fairly brief. >> i liked it in the old days where you only had one round. >> how old is that. >> must be very old. >> well, we'll try to be fairly short. mr. cummings. >> let me say this.

i really thank you. i thank you from the depths of my heart. for taking on this task. i cannot begin to tell you how pained i feel listening to all of this. you know, when you got up first and has given what you have given, and have been brought into difficult circumstances, and i don't know how old you are, but you know, at my age i began to stop and think about my own mortality. and think about my reputation. first of all, i want to thank you for being who you are.

i want too thank you for giving a damn. and caring about our country. some of the statements made here today make it look like you just coming up here, trying to fool people. when under republican and democratic administrations, you have been highly regarded. i've said it before and i'll say it again, we're better than that. we're a better country than that and we're a better committee than that. you know, when i read -- reviewed the irs employees interviews, you know what they said? very interesting. they said something similar to what you said. they said, they were constantly

asked about their party affiliation and that kind of thing. some of them were republican, some were democrats, one even described himself as a very conservative republican. but you know what they said? they said they left their party hat at the door. you know why? because they wanted to make sure when they went in there, and did their jobs, that they did it in a way that was fair to all americans. and so, yeah, there are issues, but sometimes i sit here and listen to all of this, and somebody asked me about this committee the other day. they said if you were to leave the committee today, what would

you most regret? i said i would mourn for what could have been. i would mourn for what could have been. we are a committee of oversight and government reform. and i'm glad that the irs took the nonrecommendations of the ig, who, by the way, was appointed by republicans -- the same ig that said, no white house involvement. but we just push the facts over there and let's get to -- he's coming up here, let's see what we can do to him. but you know what? after the hearing is over, i care about your reputation. i care about what people think of you and i really mean that.

i don't want a moment to go by without you knowing that i appreciate you coming into this institution, giving it the best you got, and then having to come in here and go through this hell. and next i would say everything was done perfectly. i don't think anybody up here is perfect. all of us have had problems. as i say to my constituents, all of us are the walking wounded and if we aren't the walking wounded we just keep on living. and so, i want to thank you very much, and by the way, if there was any kind of inappropriate criteria, i have said it before, i have a problem with that, with regard to conservatives. i also have a problem with regard to progressives and

anybody else. and i'm sure i speak for all our members when i say -- i really do thank you. with that yield back. >> thank the gentleman. the gentleman from ohio is next in seniority. >> i thank the chairman. look, i agree with the ranking member. we're all imperfect. we all are in need of god's grace, and we do appreciate the public servants who work hard every day on behalf of the american people. but i will tell you something. i also care about the thousands of people who were denied their first amendment rights when this targeting scheme took place. i care about people like katherine ingle brat arebrat who was visited six times by the fbi after she applied for tax exempt status, had her personal and business finances audited by ther is are for previous two years, got visited by osha and

we're concerned about getting to the truth. mr. koskinen you testified several times tonight, you knew there were problems in march, came in front of this committee, didn't disclose to us, then someone -- the reason you said you didn't disclose is because this was so important, so critical, that you get all the information, get all the facts, all the information, and then give it to us. correct? you wanted to get the full story before you went public with this. >> i remind you when i testified here in march i had no idea whether there was a serious problem or not. i knew there was an issue jew you now there had been a crash of her computer. it's in your testimony. but your testimony is you wanted to get all the facts before you went public. right. >> yes. >> you thought that was important. >> yes. >> gift all the information. >> yet. >> and yet, one of your believe employees told the treasury and the white house in early april -- >> i'm -- >> whoa, whoa. if it was so important, so

critical to get the full picture before this information got out, why didn't you tell all the people who work in your agency, we're not going to say anything, we're not going to communicate about this, until we get the full picture. why didn't you give that instruction to -- if it's so critical you can't share with congress, you waited two months after you knew in april there were lost e-mails, if it's that important, why didn't you tell your employees, don't talk about this, don't tell the white house counsel, don't tell the treasury counsel. why didn't you give that instruction? >> because i didn't think that if somebody actually told anyone -- i didn't tell them they shouldn't tell this committee. i set forward a program in which i said we need to find all of the facts, pull it together and make a public disclosure, which is what we did. >> that's not what happened, mr. koskinen. the chief counsel of treesry knew about it and talked to the

chief counsel at the white house in april, right after you found out about it. that's what we're concerned about. all i'm saying is if it's so important i think pro-active leader, good manager, would say, hey, let's get to the truth first, get all this. let's not communicate this. let's tell everyone at the same time. let's tell congress -- if it's okay to tell the white house, whew isn't it okay to tell the people's house? >> the white house is not going to do what -- the ways and means committee did with the information with gave them piecemeal, they're not going to make a big issue until the facts are out. >> maybe because the white house is the same party? right? could that have anything to do with it. >> i have no idea but i stress again -- >> the facts are the facts. >> the facts -- >> treasury knew, white house knew in april, we didn't know until late june. >> no one at the irs talked to the white house. >> how did they find out? >> pardon. >> how did they find out? >> i'm told by the people who read the white house letter, the

white house found out from treasury. nobody from the irs talked to the white house. >> someone from the irs talked to treasury, then. >> that's what i understand. >> as i said before, we'd like to know who that person is. i hope you'll find out. can you make a commitment you will find out who those individuals were work who talked to the treasury, chief counsel, who then talked to the white house two months before the people's house got the same information? can you make that commitment? >> i'll do my best. >> well. i yield back. >> will the gentleman yield? >> i yield. >> i appreciate you finding out. it would save us the trouble of going to through all the people you. said, and i'm paraphrasing, maybe the white house wouldn't release it the way ways and means released a document. is that right? >> yes. in other words, my experience has been, in this issue, that any information that comes out piecemeal immediately gets an overreaction to it. >> so -- well, your overreaction

is your statement. the i if have is, hasn't the white house selectively leaked documents in the past. >> i'm not involved in those issues. >> probably read "the wall street journal" and "new york times" or the "washington post." isn't it true the white house does put out piecemeal documents that favor them when they get them, and hold back ones when they don't? >> i'm not familiar with what the white house activities are. >> i guess i'll wait for my own time but i must admit i'm a little insulted to hear the white house is trustworthy and congress isn't in your opinion. the gentleman from nevada is recognized. >> thank you, mr. chairman. it's kind of interesting how positions change over time because looking back on some of the records, it appears that when the bush white house lost millions of e-mails related to the leak of covert cia agent

valerie plame's identity, and the u.s. attorney firing this same committee held a hearing in 2008. at that hearing chairman issa said this, and i quote: i think it is fair that we recognize that software moves on and that our cifing in -- archiving in the digitat aim is not as easy at as it may seem to the congress. at the same hearing chairman issa talked about how congress needs to provide more funding to agencies can improve their archiving and says the house of representatives needs to make sure you are funded and that is part of what we do in oversight. funded to deal with ever-evolving technologies where archiving isn't just putting them away, it is being able to retrieve it. now it appears that chairman issa's perspective has changed. with respect to the loss of miss

lerner's e-mails he believes the loss of her e-mail is evidence of, quote, nefarious conduct. chairman issa has repeatedly stated this assertion, but yet said something completely different in a previous hearing. commissioner, as far as you can tell, the only difference between the statements chairman issa made in 2008 and the statements he made now, is that there was a republican administration then, and that there's a democratic administration now. the fact is that the irs and many other federal agencies have struggled to improve their electronic record retention for years. gao, the national archivists, and others, have been reporting on these problems repeatedly. so, i have a main question that

i'd like to ask, commissioner, and that's, what can you do to explain to this committee the steps that are being taken to restore the public's trust in the irs and the functions that it provides to the american people in this regard to the data and the protection of that data. >> we are reviewing all of our activities. i've asked for this sometime ago to see if at a minimum we couldn't create an electronic record system that would be more searchable, we have spent close to $18 million and $20 million trying to produce documents as quickly as we can and e-mails as quickly as we can because of the archaic system that requires to us go to 90,000 individual hard drives or in this case 83 custodian individual hard drives. we're going to continue to do that. the archivists last year made a recommendation that as a way to begin to do this we take the top

35, called the capstone proposal. i'm sure you'll testify tomorrow about it. that is a start, recognizing the costs that we delve systems with the top 35 people in the agency, where they're records are automatically electronically put into a records system as the first step, and we're going to take a look at that, which would obviously be less expensive than trying to archive the entire agency's records. but i do think it's important for us to preserve official records, it's important for history, it's important for people to understand the basis on which we make decisions, and we're going to continue to do that. we are constrained. the issue is, how we spend our money is an important issue, but it is in a situation where we have substantially fewer funds than we had four years ago, 10,000 fewer employees, and substantially increased responsibilities, but it is an important issue for us to consider and we're going to do that. >> thank you, commissioner. again, i want to commend you.

i say often on this committee, we are the oversight committee and also the government reform committee. and i would like to hear your recommendations as we move forward on how we put those recommendations in place, and what this committee can do to support you in those endeavors. it's one thing to have as many hearings as we have had without any substantiated evidence to suggest continuing, but to not have one hearing on how we can implement any of the recommendations to improve the system, i think is a flaw in the way this committee is managed, and, mr. chairman, i know my time is up but under rule nine, sub a., i think that the chairman needs to ensure that there is equal time given to each side and that members should not have their mics cut off and then members in the majority allowed to speak well over their permitted time.

>> we now go to mr. massey for five minutes, or such time, subless he may consume. >> thank you. >> not required to use the full five minutes. >> is not required but seldom yielded back. >> really depends on the answers. i'm going to try and be short, and i really appreciate your patience and your stamina here tonight. so i'll be short with this question. on june 3, 2011, ways and means chairman dave camp, sent the irs a letter demanding to explain the allegations of targeting tea party and other conservative groups. he also requested that the e-mails be provided or preserved. within ten days lois lerner's hard drive crashed. we know her hard drive crashed because we know this for sure because it was a ticket filed with the i.t. department. is that correct? for a repair? >> that's correct. >> could you provide us with all of the tickets filed in the

month of june, 2011, at the irs for failed hard drives? >> yes. >> thank you very much. i yield back. >> would the gentleman yield? >> yes. >> i thank the gentleman. we are nearing the end but there will be -- i'll need a few more minutes to so i want to be brief but i want to be thorough. miss lerner you didn't know, you say you never met her. my understanding from the reports the hard drive that failed was on her laptop. is that correct? >> i'm not familiar. i know nicole flax's travel computer is where the hard drive failed north her office computer. i'm assuming in light of where the archives went it was her office computer where the hard drive failed. >> i want to understand from to a procedural standpoint, employees of the irs download e-mails which may include 6103 information, to their laptops and leave the building with them. that's correct.

>> a number of employees, their office commuter is in fact a laptop. >> and as a result, when they leave the office, they take with them e-mails that may include 61 other 3 information. -- 6103 information. >> that's possible, yes. >> to your knowledge are laptops, in the irs, universally limited so they may not employ usb drives? >> they are now. there was -- as i understand the situation some years ago, in which they were -- well, guess what i should say is years ago usb drives, thumb drives, were usable that were not encrepted and there was an issue that came to my attention where fortunately no information was misused by the public. since that time, which is several years ago, all thumb drives are encrypted, so that if a thumb drive is lost, nobody can access the data. >> i appreciate that, congress has implemented a similar thing. but we also can go by a best buy

normal thumb drive. so if lois lerner's laptop was in tact -- or other laptops or office computers -- had the usb on any of them that downloaded information, including 6103 information to their local drives could have in fact moved them to usb based external drives or thumb drives of their own purchase. , that? >> that sounds right. i don't know what the equipment looked like three years ago but i assume that sounds right. >> so, for the american people, it is very possible, and in fact probable, that every day, individuals leave the irs with personally final information covered under 6103 on their hard drives, inside laptops that they take home, on trips to conferences and the like. >> that's correct, to the extend of my knowledge. i may be creeked when i get

back -- may be corrected when i get back. >> that means in fact, lois lerner, an attorney, may have made a copy of information on her hard drive that died and she could have it on a usb product or any kind of product, but normally a ubs based thumb drive or external hard drive you have no reason to know she couldn't have done that. >> that's correct. >> so, in fact, lois lerner may have made copies of this before the failure of her computer to your knowledge, when the department of justice questioned lois lerner was she asked any of those questions. >> i have no idea. >> to your knowledge, did she have a ubs or any other product that could have taken copies off of her computer? >> i have no knowledge she did. >> to your knowledge, did she also have a laptop or dual purpose computer she took home with her or left the building with. >> i don't know.

>> okay. i would now ask unanimous -- let me rephrase that. one more. you have 90,000 computers that basically use their local hard drives to store information, e-mails, instead of on the server, because after so many days it disappears off of -- after half a year they disappear off the server. is that right. >> no. no. the server will keep your e-mails until you get to 6,000 and then you get a notice saying you have to either archive them or delete them. the backup tapes that preserve information for six months are separate. the server, you may have e-mails on your server for five years if you don't -- >> if you don't let the number. >> don't hit the 6,000. >> obviously lois lerner with tens of thousands did. i now recognize myself for my own time. continuing on, i spend a lot time in the electronics industry

so i have a bit of a passion for this. are you aware that if you back up your systems every six months, that the cost that we would be looking at for what it would have cost to have backed them up, essentially once a month, would be cost of the tape drive that in fact those tapes or cartridges that would be retained and my understanding is that wouldn't be 10 million...

>> i served on this committee and this room in that position. when henry waxman because the bush white house conversion from lotus notes to windows exchange server microsoft exchange server failed to have good backups and they used their image backups at a cost of a great deal of money to restore countless e-mails so that the presidential records act, the federal records act would be fully maintained. do you have any recollection of those those those hearings about activity? >> i do not. >> to this committee's briefings mr. waxman did not care that cost an estimated $24 million to recover every single one of

those e-mails. this committee aggressively said they had to do it and they did image backing restorations. had you done image backups and retain them prior to your arrival but had the irs done it would have cost probably tens of thousands of dollars to maintain six or seven years worth of those and we wouldn't be having this same discussion today would we? >> it costs a lot of money to get the e-mails off of those recovery tapes that that's right. if we had family could then spend the millions of dollars it would take to pull it off the disaster recovery tapes that is not what the disaster cover recovery tapes are meant to do. >> what is interesting is the disaster recovery tapes, the reason they cost so much to the white house is they wanted every e-mail retained a recovery. we only wanted lowest learners. i would like to enter into the record now a document given must do by the national archives and i will show it because it's a little hard to see but there we

go. it's a little hard to read from here. >> i will read you just a piece of it. andrew jackson of the state of tennessee, the first day of december 1799 is still complaining through congress and this is from essentially a congressional record where he petitions united states congress in 1803 to recover and it started in 1801 with an affidavit for his loss of revenues paid in 1799 because the stills burned after they collected a revenue in advance for his hundreds of gallons of liquor. i only put that in the record for one reason. the national archives and

archivists will be with us tomorrow, and maintains an amazing amount of documents and recovers documents. now andy jackson, general jackson's still may not be anything but humorous this late at night but it's part of a wealth of information that the american people have access to just across the street. your agency came here and said on a $1.8 billion budget you do this tonight and that in fact he needed more money if you were going to maintain records. i would certainly hope that we would go back and scrub that $10 million in order to do x and in order to do y that you go back and you really ask within the best practices whether or not for your cio to meet the requirement of the national archives having access to the kind of information, the wealth

of information they need, working with the national archives you could do it for a reasonable price. mr. worse for it was correct, i've been a big believer that in fact maintaining for the american people the transparency not just what's mr. cummings and i are doing here tonight but for the next generation and generations beyond as much information as we possibly can as an obligation. earlier mr. desjarlais -- desjarlais essentially doing arithmetic looked at that printout and later turned over to the national archives paper. i strongly suggest that this committee and hugh, you for your agency in this committee for all of the government really take a look at how much less expensive it is to maintain it digitally too delivered digitally so that it can be machine searchable for the next generation and in fact be of benefit to all of us.

lastly i'm going to guess that out of the $111 per employee's computer because that's what $10 million is, you could easily have covered that expense, that 10 million-dollar expense by simply downgrading those local drives because in fact there's very little reason for them to have large local drives. lastly and i'm going to close with this. you are familiar with the interrogatories we sent some 50 questions. >> saturday afternoon. >> 48 hours before the hearing. you are aware for the most part there was no response other than a short oral briefing this afternoon in which presentations were made that were not part of the interrogatories. >> it's a little hard to get everybody together on sunday even though it is counted as the

48 hours. >> we got your request at 4:30. >> understand that but there were eight hours. the question we have for the most part in the questions we should have asked them they should have been answerable immediately there will be some additional questions that i will send interrogatories to you. they will ask you in the agency if he can figure out whether was the first of april that you learned about the real loss of documents for seven days after you testified or 30 days after two narrow down april and to narrow down who told you about it. there obviously is the question of how the white house came to know why congress was never informed about these losses of documents until your seven page letter. for that purpose we will now recess. if unable to get the interrogatories interrogatories

in the follow-up calls done in a timely fashion and will be pleased to adjourn this but for now we are recessing subject to recall. we stand in recess. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] scree-

testifies about missing irs e-mails and treasury secretary jack lew announces measures aimed at promoting affordable housing. every four years the department of homeland security publishes the quadrennial homeland security review a document outlining the agency's goals. today the center for strategic and international studies hosted a discussion about the 2014 qhsr which was recently released. this is two hours.

good morning, everyone. i'm kathleen hicks, i run the international security program and our international security program includes the homeland security program. security is as one and i'm very pleased today to be able to introduce and then follow on in a conversation with assistant secretary alan cohn from the department of homeland security. alan's relatively new expanded title of responsibilities is for strategy, planning, analysis and risk so i'm not sure what's left out of there but there are other people at dhs so presumably he's keeping other people employed beyond those areas. in addition to leading the qhsr, both the last one and this one,

the first was the last one, he's also critically important for what comes after the qhsr and what hopefully we'll talk about that today in terms of linking strategy and the department's processes for executing strategy. alan and i have known each other quite a long time. we're follow travelers on quadrennial reviews. mine are the quadrennial defense reviews of the past but also we've worked together on interagency reform efforts both here at csis and through the project on national security reform. alan is a member of the career executive senior executive service and he had been since 2007 and of note he has also served plenty of volunteer time as a first responder. he responded to the 2005 hurricane season, september 11, 2001 attacks and the 1993 world trade center attacks. so with that let me turn the mic over to alan and let him provide us an overview of the qhsr and

then we'll have some conversation. thanks very much. [ applause ] >> thank you so much, i appreciate that. thank you for coming today. it's a privilege to be here. as kat noted, we have worked together on many different issues and it's nice to be here to be able to talk to all of you in this environment and in this forum about the review that we released. so what i wanted to do was take the opportunity today to talk to all of you about the review itself, some of the findings, and also how it fits into the larger initiative on unity of effort within the department of homeland security that secretary johnson initiated soon after he arrived at the department. so for those who don't know what

the quadrennial homeland security review is, it is a mandated review that the department undertakes every four years and it really has two dual purposes. number someone to make recommendations regarding the strategy, long term priorities of the nation for homeland security. so looking out nationally across homeland security. second second is to articulate into gye dance on the programs, assets, capabilities, budget, policies and authorities of the department of homeland security. the department of homeland security has one part of the larger enterprise of federal and state, local, territorial and tribal private sector international partners of all types as well as individual ly - individuals, families and communities that have a place in keeping the american homeland safe and secure the first qhsr we delivered to congress and

that first qhsr really answered the question what is homeland security it establishes key concepts, laid out a vision and a set of goals and objectives for homeland security. some of the key things that were articulated in that first review were that, number one, homeland security has a forward-looking vision and mission and responsibility. it's not a question of sitting and waiting for the next bad thing to happen. it's ensuring a safe, secure, and resilient american homeland and doing that together partners and stakeholders of all types. the department of homeland security is just one piece of the larger national puzzle looking at responsibilities and authorities, competencies and

effective actions of a wide variety. organizations and individuals. third was that homeland security is deeply rooted in american history. we think about homeland security, we think about the attacks of september 11. but the concept of homeland security is really about the government and civil responsibilities with new and emerging threats and challenges. and we think about things with civil defense, custom, border responsibilities, law enforcement. these are things that go back in many instances, decades if not all the way back to the founding of all republic and they are the foundations to keep the population safe and secure and resilient. we articulated in the first review, and i want to talk a little bit more about how we furthered this in the second review that homeland security is essentially about managing risks

to the nation that -- and every secretary from secretary ridge, sk tear chertoff, secretary napolitano and now secretary johnson have highlighted that we face a range of threats and hazards. that they pose different degrees of risk and that we need to look a managing that risk to a level that is accept to believe the nation that's our charge as homeland security. fifth, that domestic security is part of the overall national security establishment. this was something that president obama articulated in his first national security strategy and has been a theme and that you see echoed in quadrennial reviews. and the last thing to know was the articulation of cyber security and national resilience, including all hazards, emergency management, as core homeland security

mission missions all of these foundational elements and key concepts carry over to the second review and carry over to today's conception of homeland security. the purpose of the second is different. it's not to repeat the exercise but build upon these key concepts, these key principles and look deeper and more extensively at challenges first we described change the overall security environment that have occurred since the last review. that's looking extensively at the strategic environment trends and through the lens of risk trarks strategic national level homeland security risk second is to update the goals and objectives that sit underneath the five homeland security missions. those five homeland security missions endure but, of course,

changes over the last four years as well as changes that we can anticipate in the future advice us to update and renew that framework. third this review takes the opportunity to articulate strategic shifts necessary to n key specific areas to best address the changed security environment again, in doing that the review reflects a more focused, more collaborative departmental strategy planning and analytic effort so a moment, just a word on that. secretary johnson saw very quickly that enhancing departmental unity of effort was going to be a key element of the success of our department and needed a key element of his time as the leader of the department

initially, he outlined his priorities for how the department will manage its, how the department will build upon the successes we've had an capabilities and competencies and unique perspectives and authorities of each of our entities to build an organization that's truly greater than the system of its parts. so that unity of efforts initiative takes not only a more disciplined and focused look at the development of policy and strategy but also creates defined linkages in how we drive strategy and policy into execution on the investment side with respect to joint requirements and capabilities, programs and budgets, major investments but also operations. how do we plan jointly for

operations, how do we conduct our operations individually and jointly, ultimately all in the service of effectiveness, of results for the american people. so the quadrennial review provides some of that strategic guidance and the underpinning analysis, a set of clear risk-informed strategic priorities to inform the department's path over the next four years the process of conducting the quadrennial review will look familiar to anyone who's conducted a large scale review or if you've followed large scale reviews conducted across the international security space. but it basically had three phases, first was a prep tra pratory phase where we assessed the environment, assessed rules, responsibilities, and authorities, and got guidance from our senior leadership. we then carried out studies, a

set of study groups and meetings and discussions to evaluate decision analysis and make decisions and ultimately resulted in the document that hopefully all of you have had a chance to see, to download, to look through and we have fact sheets on the table as you exit the room that give you sum reis of the report itself and some of the key findings. so let's talk for a minute about that examination of the strategic environment because this is one of the things that was a priority for the second review. how can we assess the environment from the homeland security perspective and draw conclusions about drivers of change and strategically significant risk? we did a series of examinations of both current and emerging risk, looking at trends, future uncertainties, systemic relationships as well as threat and a current picture of risk

and we synthesized that into a set of risk insights. not just risk insights about today because, of course, looking at risk insights today tempts us to think too much about what has already happened. not enough about what may happen going forward. but to synthesize our current understanding of risk with our view of trends future uncertainties to understand what may the risk picture look like going forward. what might pose the most strategically significant risk? going forward and this resulted in our examination and articulation of the homeland security strategic environment that you see set forth in the report. there's also an important nesting of quadrennial review, the five homeland security missions and the risk priorities in the overall national security

priorities and imperatives of the u.s. government so if yo've red any of the national security strategies going back you see a repeated emphasis on national interest. security and resilience of the u.s. homeland, our economic prosperity, the living and advancement of our values here and abroad and a strong and secure international order. each of these interests is reflected in the activities and mugss of homeland security and each of the mission responsibilities of homeland security ultimately works to advance each of those interests. and that leads to the set of homeland security mission which is, again, were first established in the first quadrennial review and carry over into this review. preventing terrorism and enhancing security is the cornerstone of homeland security. securing and managing our borders, administering our

immigration laws, safeguarding and securing cyberspace and ensuring national preparedness and resilience swems maturing and strengthening the broader homeland security enterprise. these are enduring missions of homeland security. but this review recognizes that there needs to be a deeper look at strategic prior prior toization within the mission. and we're asked from time to time what is the prioritization of the missions but, again, the missions all serve those national interests. so how do we prioritize our activities and create priorities within those missions. and, again, the statements of every secretary going back to the first secretary of homeland security give us the direction on that. we need to look at strategic national level homeland security risk to understand what those strategic priorities, those priorities over time need to be

wham are there threats, the hazards, the challenges that face us as a nation within those mission responsibilities? what are the likelihood and consequences of each of those? and how do the trends and future urn certainties and the systemic causal relationships impact not only the threats and hazards and challenges themselves but the look like hood and the consequences with directionality do those trends, future uncertainties and systemic relationships suggest? . this is my favorite slide. what we've tried to do is to distill down the strategic environment into a set of six key drivers and six threats, hazards, and challenges that pose the most strategically significant risk over the next four years. what are those drivers of change? much of this won't be a

surprise. you can observe many of these things in the strategic environment now and you know there are emerging issues in each of these areas. first, the terrorist threat is evolving. we know that the terrorist threat that we faced on 9/11 is not the same terrorist threat that we face today. the world is changing and the environment in which those who wish to do the united states and its interests harm are changing and so homeland security needs to adjust and adapt to those changes. but there are other drivers of change that are important for consideration in the strategic environment. information and communications technolo technology. when 9/11 occurred there were no iphones. there were no ipads. there were no -- the interconnectivity and the speed of the -- transfer of information were nowhere near

what they are today and the pervasiveness of information and communications technology and the way that it interconnects all things in the world had advanced dramatically at the time of the first quadrennial review and had advanced dramatically again between that review and this and as we look forward into the environment we see more the interconnectedness of machine to machine. of a broader connectivity and automation. we see that change will continue to happen in that area in a rapid pace driving not only threats, hazards, and challenges but their likelihood, consequences, vulnerabilities. natural disasters, pandemics, and climate change. we know that these drivers have great impact on the strategic environment. we can see from events over the last few years the increasing

not only severity of natural disasters but the unpredictability of their consequences. as our world becomes more interconnected as disasters happen in different and unpredictable ways and as they cause cascading impacts through our communities, through our societies, through our infrastructure. if you look at the homeland security strategic risk environment, the risk of pandemic stands out, even among those other risks that we see. and we'll talk about that in a moment. but a key driver of concern about threat and challenge and vulnerability until the strategic environment. interdependent and aging critical infrastructure systems and networks. when 9/11 occurred we thought the primary threat to our infrastructure was kinetic, it was individuals wishing to do us harm, to bring harm to infrastructure through kinetic means. we now know that infrastructure

is just as vulnerable to weather, to cyber intrusion and to its own age and consequence vulnerability. and so both the interdependence and the age of our systems and networks provide questions and challenges for us going forward. they also provide opportunities as that infrastructure is updated and replaced. it gives us the opportunity to build in more resilience, more security, more forward-looking emphasis on the way that we construct and any about our infrastructure base. the volume of people and goods transiting through our -- the flows that come in and out of the united states. if you look at the speed and the volume of flows coming in lawfully through our ports and our borders, that's increased at

a dramatic pace and is only going to continue to increase. so we need to be postured in a way that we can keep up with effectively with that flow of people and goods which is so critical to our economic well-being. at the same time increase flow of people and goods on the lawful side can mean increased flow of people and goods on the unlawful side. as transnational criminal organizations and others seek to exploit lawful pathways and to create their own unlawful pathways for the introduction of dangerous or illegal goods and items. finally budget drivers. fiscal environment, the overall national fiscal environment puts pressure on all elements of the homeland securitier be prize. not only the federal government, state governments, local governments, territorial and tribal governments, most parts of the private sector, many of our international partners and

most individuals, families, and communities all feel the pressure of the current fiscal environment. so how do we effectively ensure the security and resilience of our nation and environment. so those six key drivers that that we've talk about which represent any city, usa, and the key trends and statistics that you see on the slide drive us to a set of strategically significant threats, hazards, and challenges so what are those? first the terrorist threat as we talked about is evolving and remains significant as attack planning and operations become more decentralized. the united states and its stress particularly in the transportation sector remain per sis tent targets. second, growing cyber threats are significantly increasing risk to critical infrastructure and to the greater u.s. economy.

third biological concerns as a whole, including bioterrorism but pandemics, foreign animal diseases and other agricultural concerns on dur as top homeland security risks because of potentially likelihood and their potential impact. nuclear terrorism through the introduction and use of an improvised explosive device while unlikely remains an enduring risk because of its potential consequences. transnational criminal organizations are increasing in strength and capability, driving risk in counterfeit goods, human trafficking, illicit drugs and other illegal flows of people and goods finally natural hazards are becoming more costly to address with increasingly variable consequences driven by trends such as climate changed and aging infrastructure so that

allows us to discern a said of strategically significant risks over the threats and hazards that pose the most strategically significant risk over the next four years. some of the guiding principals that we articulate in this second review. first, again, the cornerstone of homeland security is preventing terrorism but homeland security must be multithreat and all hazard. we talked about in the first review how all hazards emergency management was a fundamental element of homeland security. in this this review we recognize what a reality that everybody who operates in this environment knows is that homeland security is multithreat as well. second something equally apparent on its face to everyone who operates in this area, homeland security supports economic security through

ensuring the safe, efficient movement of people and goods through lawful means across our borders in service of our economic well-being and health as a nation. homeland security and economic security are intertwined. homeland security requires a networked community. we talk about the homeland security enterprise, this review emphasizes we must strive to network that enterprise together to share information share best practices, to build kpas city to that we can all work together towards common ends. fourth, that homeland security relies on upon the use of market-driven solutions in unnovation. we must recognize the market nature of some of the threats and hazards and challenges that we face. and recognize the vast potential of market solutions and partnership across public and private sectors in addressing the threats, hazards and

challenges. fifth, and though it should need know re-emphasis, we do so here, homeland security upholds civil rights and civil liberties. thinking about the national interests that have been articulated in successive national security strategies our homeland security activities serve all those interests including our values here and abroad. and sixth, again, homeland security is national risk management and so this review makes the effort to evaluate the strategic environment, articulate those threats, hazards, and challenges that pose the most strategically significant risk, and articulate strategies, either new or shifts or re-emphasis of things already done to address those most strategically significant threats, hazards and challenges. with apologies for the eye chart, this is, again, the mission framework for homeland security.

the five missions that we've discussed and their subelements and maturing and strengthening the homeland security enterprise. again, this review re-emphasize this is mission framework and structure updates the goals and objectives underneath to reflect changes over the last four years and changes that we foresee going forward. so what did we look at in this review as a result? there were five studies linked to findings in the strategic environment and to guidance from leadership. and then we recount and re-emphasize with the approaches that we are already taking to other pressing challenges, hazards, across the homeland security environment within this review. so this review talks about how we will secure against the evolving terrorism threat. how we will safeguard and secure cyberspace. it articulates the homeland

security strategy for encountering biological threats and hazards, building on all of the work that has been done before but recognizing not only the enduring nature of this risk but the increasing nature of this risk. the review articulates a risk segmentation approach to securing and managing flows of people and goods. what does that mean? it means that the different types of threats and challenges that come -- that face the country through the flow of people and goods are different. that just the volume and speed of lawful goods is different than the profit motivated acts of transnational criminal organizations, is different than the ideologically motivated or naturally occurring challenges that can come through the flows of goods and people entering and exiting our country. and finally the review examined and articulates a basic way of thinking about executing our missions through public/private partnerships. again, building on all of the

work that's been done not only over the last four years but since the inception of the department on public/private partnership? a number of different venues. based on the strategic environment, our mission responsibilities, the review also discusses and re-emphasizes the approaches that we are taking to countering nuclear terrorism using an improvised explosive device, our approaches to managing the challenges and opportunities of immigration. and our approaches to national preparedness and our whole community approach. okay, so what does the review say about each of these things? with respect to the terrorism threat, again, the nature of the terrorist threats to the united states has changed dramatically since the september 11, 2001, attacks. just since 2009 in the publication and the conduct of the first quadrennial review we've seen the rise of al qaeda

affiliates such as al qaeda in the arabian peninsula which has made repeated efforts to export terrorism to our nation. and that is one challenge, the external challenge coming into our homeland. but we also know that we face the threat of domestic-based lone offenders and those who are inspired by extremist ideologies to radicalize to violence and commit acts of terrorist violence against americans and the nation. and so this second quadrennial review outlines an approach to focus on countering violent extremism and help to prevent complex mass casualty attacks, building, again, on the straties and po -- strategies and policies articulated by the president and the department in this area. the approach to counterterrorism and its shifting and evolving approach to preventing terrorist attacks prioritizes identifying, investigating and interdicting threats as soon as possible,

including providing support to international partners to increase their border management customs integrity and law enforcement capabilities and capacities and to use information received in advance that to screen dangerous goods and people abroad based on risk waiting for -- rather than waiting for arrival in the united states. these are concepts that have been instantiated in our approach to terrorism over successive administrations. we re-emphasized these areas and articulate new and evolving ways to use these types of approaches to counter the terrorist threat as we see it today and as we see it evolving in the future. safeguarding and securing cyberspace. each and everyday the united states faces a myriad of threats in cyberspace. from the theft of u.s. international property through cyber intrusions to denial of service attacks against public

facing web sites and attempted intrusions of u.s. critical infrastructure. to address these threats, we've identified four strategic priorities. strengthen the security and resilience of critical infrastructure by leveraging the work being done pursuant to executive orders 13636 on improving cyber security critical infrastructure and presidential policy directive 21 on critical infrastructure security and resilience. each of which build on previous efforts, u.s. government and national efforts to strengthen, safeguard, and secure cyberspace. securing the federal civilian government information technology enterprise by helping federal civilian agencies manage cyber networks, advancing law enforcement incident response and reporting capabilities, close coordination with our partners across the law enforcement incident response and reporting community and strengthening the broader cyber

ecosystem by collaborating with communities domestically and abroad, standardizing information sharing practices and developing a skilled work force. with respect to biological threats and hazards, as we noted, again, the strategic environment assessment, the assessment of strategically significant risk continues to point us towards biological threats and hazards. not just bioterrorism, but emerging infectious disease, foreign animal disease, agricultural concerns. a top risk that we currently face and a risk that's only growing over time. so how can we best build on the work that's been done to date, the lessons that have been learned and implemented from previous events, previous exercises? our approach is to stop incidents involving priority biological threats and hazards before they escalate to

overwhelm state, local, tribal and territorial partners while ensuring those that those partners have the capability and capacity necessary to respond to mid-range biological incidents. so what does that mean? prevent those biological incidents from occurring where possible, improve risk-informed decision making, identify logical events early. improve confidence to act, not just within our department, not just within the federal government, but across the whole homeland security enterprise. respond and recover effectivefully biological incidents and maintain vital services and functions during and after biological incidents. maintain our ability to continue to function not only as a society or infrastructure or critical services should an event of this type occur. with respect to managing flows of people and goods, again, the

movement of people and goods around the world has expanded dramatically in recent years. as the volume of global trade and travel increases, the potential for illegal transport of people and goods across our borders also increases. the department of homeland security and our partners continue to secure and manage flows of people and goods to ensure economic prosperity and minimize risk. it's based on an in-depth look of the flows of people and goods. we see three distinct but interrelated types of flows; each of which requires a different risk-based approach by dhs on our partners. different but inherently interrelated. first the legal flows of people and goods. how do we stay ahead of increasing flows and increasing volumes, increasing demands. not only safeguard but expedite the flow of the lawful -- the lawful flow of people and goods into and out of the united states. second, market or profit-driven illicit flows of people or

goods. transnational criminal organizations and others engage in wide scale activities to bring illicit goods into the united states and republap prof for those activities. they do this for profit so how can we tailor our approaches to best approach those activities which are different than lawful challenges and different than ideologically driven challenges. then third, terrorism and other non-market concerns. ideologically driven threats and challenges or naturally occurring threats and challenges. how do we ensure that these neither disrupt lawful flows of people or goods nor exploit them for ill purposes. segmenting people and goods this way permits more focused strategies and more efficient allocation of resources.

strengthening the execution of our missions through public/private partnerships of you from probably familiar with the national infrastructure protection plan and our overarching framework of cooperation and coordination with our private sector partners through now the 16 critical infrastructure sectors and the network of sector-specific agencies across the federal government and sector coordinating councils made up of our private sector partners across industries. this is a very strong and important set of public/private partnerships for homeland security but it's not the only set. whether it's the coast guard and port relationships with shippers, state and local law enforcement, our partnerships across the movement of people and goods across the u.s. government with the private sector and other partners. there are many examples of government relationships and agreements with private sector partners to enhance security and

safety and ensure national resilience. although each of these partners emerge from specific challenges, there are important commonalties, models, lessons learned and best practices that can be applied to a range of other homeland security challenges. and so the qhsr provides a structured way of thinking about partnerships that focuses on a couple of key things. first of all what is the partnership aimed to do? what are the interests at play? what are the public interests in what are the private interests? how do they align? where are the shared outcomes? what are we together trying to do? whether that's on a day-to-day basis, whether that's in the event of a contingency or crisis or whether that's meant to be a relationship that can span through both. that we use on a day to day basis and ask scale up to work effectively in crisis.

finally thinking about shares outcomes, aligned interests. who are the models, the archety archetypes, the ways we might structure private/public partnerships to do things? obviously information sharing sits at the heart of public/private partnership. but there are other models that go beyond information sharing and in the review and a companion document soon to be release wed talk about the different models and archetypes, the ways of thinking about interests and outcomes and aligning them under common archetypes and models. we do this as a tool to think about public private partnerships most effectively to reach our common ends. in addition to these areas, we also emphasize, again, our

continuing approaches, our renewed emphasis on countering terrorism cruising an improvised explosive device -- improvises nuclear device, on advancing rational, common sense comprehensive immigration reform and advancing national preparedness and resilience. under the mechanisms of the national preparedness system, the post-katrina emergency management reform act, the presidential preparedness directive 8, all of which set up a comprehensive national preparedness system for prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. a key element of the -- this quadrennial review and every quadrennial review is engagement with stakeholders.

we sought to strengthen the engagement with the homeland security committee in informing the studies and conclusions of the review. we conducted a review with three sets of key and critical partners. first we sought to use this exercise as an effort to bring greater unit within the department of homeland security. . . that's only the starting point. we looked all across our federal partners speaking with congress, with entities within the executive office of the president, including the national security council staff and other essential offices within the executive office of the president and, of course, our key and critical partners across the federal interagency. whether that's the departments

of defense and justice, state, health and human services and a wide array of others in discussing and arriving at the conclusions for how we address homeland security threats and challenges. and then beyond that homeland security communities of interest. again, we wanted to deepen our engagement with those communities, those people in the communities of practice, those people on the front lines of conducting homeland security activities day after day to engage and receive their input and advance. we did that primarily through two online venues a platform for submitting ideas called ideal scale. and through all of that not only that enabled us to gain greater

input from the broader homeland security enterprise but it allowed us to ask targeted questions to gain input and provide the opportunity to comment, agree and disagree, add new ideas. through that engagement we had over 2,000 unique registrants on the idea scale and community of practice sites. we had submitted over 200 -- nearly 250 new ideas, again, over 2,500 comments and over 11,000 votes on different targeted questions, issues, comments, and other issues raised on the site. that input, analysis, questions, ideas, and comments tracked, brought back into our studies and incorporated into the analysis that led to the final decision making. so where do we go from here? again, a strategic review an

important thing. . a strategic review allows an organization and its partners to examine its principles, mission and goals to look at the strategic environment, to engage together in a discussion, sometimes difficult, about priorities about approaches and a way to communicate that to the broader community as a whole. in particular to our homeland security communities of interest. but it's only as good as the execution that follows it. again, secretary johnson through his unity of effort initiative has laid out a number of different ways in which the department will be taking steps and is already taking steps to improve our ability to sur stray strategic environment, to set policy to define strategy and then to take policy and strategy and drive it into execution, in the way we do investment. again, the examination of capabilities and requirements through a close examination of

our programs and budgets and the ways and manner in which we invest and make our major investments and also in the ways that we operate. the ways that we communicate and coordinate with our partners and the ways that we plan for operations both individually and together and the way that we execute our operations. because ultimately homeland security is an operational activity. it is about the execution of activities to keep our nations safe, secure, and resilient and so this quadrennial review forms an essential element and an underpinning element of the secretary's unity of effort activities. so in conclusion, let me just say thank you for an opportunity to walk you through what we've done in this review, to talk to you a bit about the findings that we've reached and to open to you the opportunity for dialogue and discussion.

i know that we will have a discussion about questions and then you will hear from an outstanding panel of individuals who have a long history in this area and we'll have deep insights for you on the findings of the review and other thoughts about homeland security. so with that let me conclude my remark remarks [ applause ] >> thank you very much, alan, as you said i neglected to mention at the beginning that we do have a fantastic panel following so we'll try to get you out on time. i know you have to leave here right around 10:00. and i know the audience has some questions i want to raise a few myself. the first is from your perspective having done the first qhsr in 2010 and now this one in 2014 what do you think

has really changed the most or evolved and matured inside the department of homeland security or across the broader homeland security sector that really affected the way in which this review is put together or its implications? >> that's an excellent question and i think this second review reflect asthma which you aring in a number of ways. number one that the homeland security enterprise as a whole has a greater understanding of itself and the threats and hazards and challenges it faces. so as we conducted analysis and evaluation of trends, threat, risk, we were not only able to draw on our expertise across the department and the federal government but reports and studies, data and analysis collected across the homeland security enterprise and that only strengthened our ability to look at ourselves and ask these difficult questions.

second is the ability of our department. to wrestle with these questions ourselves. this review reflects an enhanced stability of our department to grabble with these issues together. and to look at shared and joint approaches. and you can see the way we can grapple with these issues. obviously as we talked about with the strategic environment, the environment has changed. the threats and hazards and challenges have evolved and so we need to be in constant dialogue with each other about not only what is changing but how we change our approaches with respect to those. >> and i did want to get very directly to the next question which is about the changes and the threat environment, some of which you walked through.

one is the increased emphasis and reframing on the bio threat and i'm interested in how that's evolved, if you think the threat has evolved or just the thinking about how the threat has evolved and more generally given the rapid evolution of the threat environment and the changing nature of how the risks lay out, how -- how challenging do you think that is to have a risk framework tied to an annual budget process but with a rapidly changing environment that's something the entire national security community is grappling with. and if you have lessons learned from the work that you all have done on risk management, it would be great to hear. >> well, i think that using a risk lens and conducting national risk assessment is absolutely essential to thinking about homeland security. again, homeland security is an exercise in national risk management. it's an exercise we all engage in and it's a thought process that we all go through.

conducting that strategic national level risk assessment is one element of that. and we're aided in that by lessons learned from some of our international partners who have been conducting these types of assessments and finding very similar results. in particular finding similar things about the risk of pandemic disease and biological challenges. we're also aided by the growing network and ability of localities and states and regions to conduct threat and hazard identification risk assessment processes on their own with assistance and support through fema as apartment of the department of homeland security. so states conducting their own threats can be married into that strategic look. now risk 1 the only way that we

prioritize our action s actions help us identify strategic national risks. but those aren't the only types of priorities we need to grapple with. there are closer in challenges, emergent issues. but a risk approach allows us to set strategic priorities and to look to reach them over time. now specifically with respect to biological challenges, i do think that the challenges posed by biological threats and hazards as a whole are things that are known by the community. at different times since the inception of the department we've grappled with challenges posed both by bioterrorism event s particularly the malicious use of anthrax but also with a series of different nationally occurring events that had the potential to cause human panic. sars, different varieties of

influenza. we took the opportunity to look from both a risk perspective and strategy perspective at those challenges at a whole because we understand that while the motivations and causes may be different, in many ways not only the ways that we would detect or otherwise know that such an event was occurring and the steps that we would take to address it as a nation are largely the same. and so the quadrennial review gives us the opportunity to do things not only to be able to identify such a risk but to lay out a strategy that we can seek to implement over time as part of a larger set of priorities to address that risk and not have to wait for an event to occur for us to have to -- for us to take action to address the risk. >> okay, thank you. in the interest of time because we are running short what i'm going to do is have a couple people ask questions, we'll

collect those for alan, he can answer them i ask you make it a question because we are short on time and give your name and affiliation and we have folks with microphones. raise your hands if you have questions. >> good morning, ladies and gentlemen. how would looking at that -- how are you working with international republican brand with the government, private sectors and the communities because when it comes to transfer how do we mack this a

prior to of homeland security? >> other questions? one right here. >> thank you,. in your assessment of the threats would you tell us how percent this rises. the state actors and the non-state actors and also have you been able to utilize all our networks, including congress, the department of state, department of defense, all that together to share information and to mitigate the fact to prevent it. prevention is important. and have you seen the relationship between our foreign policy threat inside the country? >> and i have one back here. >> you made mention of our aging infrastructure.

just in case another huge earthquake would happen, especially the pacific side of the country like california all the way up to alaska and because our infrastructure are aging, just how resistant are our infrastructures on that side of the country just in case a strong magnitude earthquake would happen. thank you. >> so the three questions are essentially how well are you partnering internationally to execute the missions at dhs and also in your outreach for stakeholders on the qhsr. the threats of state versus nonstate, the relative threats and also how well are your sharing information on mitigating threats across the interagency and infrastructure? >> those are an excellent set of questions. on our international partners, this was something that was recognized early on and that each of our secretaries has emphasized together with our other partners across the federal government is that -- and at the state and local level as well. engagement with our

international partners 1 critical to addressing these threats and hazards. >> we have a wide range of relationships with entities across the globe as well as relationships with non-governmental organizations and civic organizations aimed at at dressing this wide range of of threats and hazards and challenges so international engagement is extremely important to fulfilling homeland security mission responsibilities and reaching the ends that we really wish to reach. in terms of the percentage of state actors versus non-state actors in our threats, i think it varies across the strategic environment. there may be state actors, non-state actors, transnational

criminalal ogss, organized criminal organizations, natural phenomena. it's difficult to put a percentage on those things. what's most important to recognize is that threats and hazards and challenges emanate from all of those different sources and this can fluctuate over time based on trends and uncertainties and other types of drivers and so it illustrates and highlights the importance of looking across the strategic environment as we think about the range of threats and hazards and challenges. to build on international partners and all of our partners information sharing underpins almost everything we do. information sharing enables vast networks of partners within our department, across the federal interagency within state, local, territorial and tribal

governments, non-governmental organizations, the private sector to act on their own and in concert with each other and other partners no organization, where b it a non-governmental organization, a private sector entity can take on these challenges alone. so we all must work in concert with each other and the sharing of information underpins all of that. the last point and i think it's a good one and one that we highlight in the report on the review itself is that the aging nature of our infrastructure does cause concern i think nationally about its resilience and it's why when the president issued presidential policy directive 21 we evolved our national approach about critical infrastructure protection, to think about critical infrastructure security and

resilience and not only resilience against human cause challenges but resilience across the range of challenges. you mentioned earthquakes, other types of naturally occurring events, other types of vulnerabilities and the vulnerabilities that come just simply from its age. to think about how we drive in security and resilience to our infrastructure as one of the key ways that we will achieve the tune of risk managements that we are trying to achieve and achieve our homeland security goals. >> if i can induj you on one more quick round of questions then we'll wrap up. >> as you know, during the cold war the public didn't have much of a role in deterrence but you mentioned before about the looming threats of new kinds of technologies or synthetic belong and individual actors acting

alone, possibly sometime in the future deploying and making weapons of mass destruction. have you looked at how to engage the public? what is the public's role, pleural? and it would have been international because the u.s. has nothing perfect. it's not enough. so not just nation state but what's the public's role. >> just remember to give your name and affiliation. >> i'm jerry glenn. >> john hurley, i teach at catholic university. in all of the presentations i didn't see any indication at all about religion and certainly extremists, fundamentalist, adherence of religion play a big role in this whole problem as it has develop ed does the department have pa