who are victimized by that. >> i want you to focus in on another member of the task force pointed out that law enforcement prosecutors can choose the communities in which they go into and look for crime and prosecute crime. talk about some of those communities that you have been a part of going into and trying to eradicate drug trafficking. >> the congressman asked me a question and i didn't get to finish. one community, we had a man who was selling drugs for years. he had a fence around his yard,

he had high dollar vehicles. he had four of them. he had built an addition on his house. and there was a photo of one of my agents driving one of these high dollar vehicles out of the driveway, and he said, eric see that picture? i said, yeah. do you know what happened when i drove it down the street? i said, no. he said, the neighborhood came out on the street and they were clapping. this is a high volume drug dealer. that's the kind of people we represent. >> that's when the agent drove down the street? >> he took the corvette out of the driveway, and they were lined up clapping. we represent some of the most vulnerable people, the poor, the elderly, the young, the addicted, and they have no voice. they have no way to sell their home and move away when a drug dealer sets up shop in a neighborhood and the property values drop. so, quite frankly, i am personally offended when i hear charges of racism.

the laws are race neutral. we go where the battle is hottest. we represent people who are victimized by this activity. it doesn't make any difference what neighborhood it is. i've never prosecuted anybody on the basis of race and neither has any ausa. the department of justice does not prosecute anybody on the basis of race. we have to go where the evidence leads us, and that's where we go. >> thank you. mr. chairman, i yield back. >> the chair recognizes the gentleman from tennessee, mr. colin, for five minutes. >> thank you, i appreciate the opportunity. i apologize for being late. a couple post-midnight sessions, whatever. i walked in, mr. evans, to hear you say something that was in kr incredulous, that there's not a war on drugs, there is a war on drug dealers. >> yes, sir, i did say that. >> you said the laws are race

neutral. >> yes, sir, they are. >> nobody denies that the laws are race neutral. but the fact is the implementation of the laws is not race neutral and it is racial profiling. all laws are race neutral since 1865 except in the south, which went to 1963. then they were not race neutral. but the implementation by people under color of law who arrest eight times more african-americans for possession of marijuana than whites is not race neutral. is that not a reality? >> congressman, i understand there are a lot of statistics being thrown around -- >> like 99% of the people who believe in climate change and some of the people go with the 1%. we'll go back with the statistics. >> sir, i cannot argue the statistics. all i can tell you is on a daily basis i deal with drug agents that are black, white, indian. i have drug dealers who are black, white, indian in our district. we have prosecuted wherever the

evidence led us -- >> i don't deny you prosecute them, i'm just saying arrests. a lot of it is street level arrests. you're a federal prosecutor, are you not? >> yes, sir, and uniformed patrol is unable to stop this problem. it has to be investigators. they can't do anything with uniform patrol, they just pick up the person and it ends there. >> do you believe that marijuana is less dangerous to our society than meth, heroin, crack and cocaine? >> well, the laws indicate that, yes, sir. meth is highly addictive. >> the laws don't indicate that. marijuana law is the same as heroin and lsd. >> methamphetamine is instantly addictive. >> i glagree with you, that's right. you might be the best in your courtroom -- i hope you are. but you're right, you need to go after meth, heroin, crack and cocaine. >> we do that, sir. >> how about marijuana, though? >> marijuana, some of the most violent dealers that i have experienced were marijuana

growers. >> because it's illegal and they're violent when the police come in or the dea to try to bust them. it's not that they are just, you know, just violent in say. they are violent because of the laws. >> i have been threatened by marijuana growers. >> if it was legal, do you think they would threaten you? they threaten you because it's illegal. >> that's a different question, congressman. i'm just telling you my experience. >> i got you. when alcohol was illegal, al capone and frank nitty, all the people we watched on "the untouch ablz able untouchables," they're nice guys. it just depends how you flip it. you support mandatory minimums, as i understand? >> yes, sir, we need those. >> do you think there are mistakes with mandatory minimums sometimes when the judge tells us so many times that there are

situations where they didn't want to sentence this person to life when maybe the third offense that was triggered was there was some nice woman involved by a man who led her astray like ms. smith, who wrote a book? she served six and a half years, got commuted by president clinton. she's a wonderful woman, her son is at washington lee. six and a half years. >> congressman, as long as we have human beings, there are going to be mistakes, but i can tell you our system now is so regulated with -- from the time they appear before a magistrate to a federal judge to the appeal process that every case is scrutinized. i would say those kind of cases are rare. every defendant is given a chance, in my experience, to provide assistance so i can go to bat and tell the judge -- >> she provided assistance and the guy who led her into it was out in northwest washington state and he was murdered. so she couldn't provide

assistance any more, so they put her in jail. they put her in prison for a long time. if it weren't for president clinton, she might still be there. because she can't provide assistance doesn't make your incarceration more just. >> there may be a case like that, but there is an old saying in law school that hard cases make bad law. and right now the law works. it's worked to remove a lot of drug organizations in america. >> well, how do you think that the experiment in colorado and washington is going? >> i don't know, sir. >> mr. stevenson, do you have anything you want to add? >> i just want to emphasize that these exceptions, these extreme bad cases, i think, should not inform what a committee task force does. we have a lot of data to tell us how to look at the system. and the truth of it is, communities of color are not celebrating mandatory minimums. i think we really need to be sober about the impact of these laws on vulnerable populations. i'm not suggesting that individual officers go out with racist intent, but there is a

real difference in how easy it is to prosecute people in communities where you have to do your drug dealing on the streets as opposed to communities where you actually have the resources to do it covertly. i think if we don't acknowledge that, we're going to contribute to this problem of extreme racial disparity. and i think you're right to emphasize that the way in which our system demonstrates who is bad, who is violent is going to be shaped by the way we characterize and direct these laws. if we eliminate mandatory minimums, it will not, in my judgment, eliminate or even restrict our ability to go after bad kingpins. we can still do that. nobody is talking about shielding drug dealers or drug traffickers from arrest and prosecution. what we're talking about doing is protecting people who are sometimes caught in the web and sometimes end up with these very unjust sentences. >> thank you, and i yield back the time i have left. >> mr. colin, most drug dealers are not violent unless provoked.

>> the chair is recognized for five minutes, thank you. really appreciate the level of commitment here. obviously we've got people that are quite familiar with the system. i'm also pleased that we have such an experienced group on this task force, people that have dealt with the law in so many respects. having been a state judge and a chief justice at a state court of appeals, we used different terminology, and so when -- here's an immediate adverse reaction to mandatory minimums, in the state we called it a range of punishment, and it seemed perfectly appropriate for the legislature to say, you know, for these crimes, state jail felony -- and that was a felony court -- this is the minimum, zero to two years for state jail felonies, two years to 10 years for third-degree, 2

to 20, but you add that bottom level. first degree 99 to life, and if you enhanced it up with prior convictions, you could -- i think there was a guy arrested for stealing a snickers at one point, and that runs into strange facts when you got a guy looking at maybe mandatory 25 years because of the enhancements. but it seems like we could deal with the areas in which there are great injustices without totally eliminating floors, although most judges i know would be fair and try to act fairly within a proper range. i'm old enough to remember before the sentencing guidelines back when federal judges

actually got mad that they were having discretion taken away, i was shocked when i started having more federal judges say, we kind of like it. we don't have to make such tough decisions. the sentencing guidelines tell us more what we want to do. but, mr. evanson, i cut you off twice when you seemed to be ready to proceed further, and i've got time. anything that you were wishing to illustrate that you didn't have time to do earlier? >> thank you, your honor. i just want to emphasize on behalf of the over 5,000 assisting united states attorneys that i read the comments that they provided on this legislation. we had a survey. and i read it again this morning. and if you could hear and see those statements, i think you would be amazed at how profound

reducing the minimum mandatories would be on our ability to do our job. we will not be able to go after the biggest drug dealers unless we have witnesses. and as i said, this is hard, mean business we're in. we need the inducement to allow conspirators to testify, and they do that. they have to make a decision. it's a go or no-go situation. and there with their lawyer they decide, all right, my drug days are over. we build a rapport with them and they tell us everybody they've been getting their drugs from and they testify. oftentimes they don't have to testify, but they're told, we don't care what you tell us as long as you tell us the truth. most of them do, and those who don't go off to prison. i had a lawyer one time tell me,

you know who is in prison? those who cooperated and those who wish they had cooperated. those are the two people in federal prison. we need the ability to negotiate. the sentences are fair. we're not prosecuting users. we're not prosecuting marijuana users. it's a myth. we are prosecuting people, for the most part, who have prior convictions and are dealing in significant quantities over a long period of time. that's why we have conspiracies that run one, two, three and five years. that was the thing that amazed me when i went to federal court. you could actually charge somebody with an agreement that lasted that long period of time. but the jury gets to see the whole story, then. it's not just a search on a drug house. so that would be our statement, congressman. i appreciate the time. >> anybody else wish to comment on mr. evenson's reflection? go ahead, mr. otis. >> thank you. i have two comments on it.

one is -- i apologize for interrupti interrupting mr. levine, and you'll have your chance. one thing we need to go by is our experience. mr. evenson pointed out there have been experience of 16 or 17 states that over the years have reduced or dunaway with mandatory sentencing and have dunaway wione away with most cr. he talked about california which had premature releases as the rest of the states combined. the reason is california is acting under a plea decision that was required to reduce the prison population to make prison decisions constitutional. what has happened in california, which has many premature releases than the rest of the states combined, is that crime

has gone up. the other thing i want to say is we can look beyond several states over a few years and look at the experience of 50 states over 50 years. we know what works and we know what fails. what fails is what we had in the 1960s and '70s when we had an effectless and unrealistic belief in expectation and not a belief in incarceration. >> my time is well expired. let me recognize the gentleman from virginia. >> can i briefly respond? first of all, with regard to california, i believe the reason they got into that situation is policymakers failed to act p proactively. that's why we've been working with legislators around the country to deal with prison overcrowding so you don't invite federal court supervision. i think california illustrates why we need to tackle this federal prison overcrowding issue up front rather than leaving it to unelected supreme court or other judges. i would also say one of the

reasons i think we've seen the experience with the rockefeller drug laws, as you mentioned, the drug law in california and other states leading to more crime is that the research shows staying longer in prison does not reduce recidivism. prison should do one thing, which is rehabilitate. but many people who have a drug problem, and those dealing drugs on street corners often have a problem themselves. if we can correct that habit and get them into being a law-abiding citizen, i think then we can continue to drive down the crime rates in this country. >> thank you. at this time we recognize mr. scott for five minutes. >> thank you, and i think aank f our witnesses. mr. evenson, you indicated that penalties do not indicate drug use. is there anything that says the five-year mandatory minimum for

crack encouraged people to then use powder where they could have 10 times more powder. are there any cases where people said, i'm not going to use the crack, i'm going to use the powder? >> no, i think many people know they are driven by an addiction, a disorder, that are actually shaping their choices. they're not worried about tomorrow, they're not worried about next week. most of them couldn't even tell you what the penalties are. i think until we recognize we're going to be actually misdirecting some of our resources. >> if your goal is to reduce drug use, you mentioned a public health approach? >> no question. a lot of countries have actually invested in interventions, and many states have also used drug courts where they authorize treatment and sprvrupervision. i just want to emphasize this point about supervision which has proven to be very effective. if you spend $50,000 a year to keep someone in prison, that money doesn't accomplish very much. if you spend $10,000 a year and

take someone just released from prison and make sure they're complying with strict guidelines around treatment and services, allowing them to move forward and get a job, et cetera, not only are you spending less money on that person, you're dramatically increasing the chances that they're actually not going to repeat and be a drug offender. we have proof that people have kicked drug addiction and helped the communities. the interventions that are around health care models are the interventions that have had the biggest impact on the health of those places. >> i understand the organization on crime takes the position there are more cost-effective ways of reducing crime than waiting for people to get arrested and get into a bidding war as to how much time they're going to serve. you've seen the research that incarceration rates for 500,

over 100,000, are nonproductive. >> you reduce the rate of returns when it comes to incarceration rates because you're sweeping low violent crimes into prison and people are serving longer than necessary. >> let me ask you a question on that point, then. if anything over 500 per 100,000 is counterproductive and ten states are locking up african-americans at the rate of 400,000, if in a community of 100,000 with that kind of lockup rate you reduced it to the 500 at which you stopped getting any kind of rate of return, you would have 3500 fewer people in prison at, say, 20,000 each. that's $70 million. are you suggesting that that community could actually reduce crime more by spending that $70 million productively in a public health model, education, after-school programs, getting young people on the right track, keeping them on the right track than they could just locking up

3500 extra people? >> well, i think -- it's difficult to look at kind of setting arbitrary rates or c cutoffs. obviously different states have different crime rates, et cetera, but i would say certainly once you do -- professor steve levitt who has written freakonomics has looked at it, and we had one of the biggest backers of crime and violence a few years ago, and they said they've looked at reducing terms, and in some places negative terms in the sense you could be using that money to put another police officer on the street doing things they've done in new york city and other places where they're actually able to deter crime through a greater presence of officers in the right places targeting those hot spots. so i think -- and as you've said, you talked about problem-solving courts, a whole range of other approaches, electronic monitoring and so forth. so i think that without necessarily getting into

arbitrary cash, 90% of the budget are going to state corrections. il it's a matter of seeing that people don't go to prison simply because we haven't provided the alternatives. >> we've heard you need these bizarre sentences to fight the war on drugs. how is imposing sentences that violate common sense helpful to the war on drugs? >> well, i think, as you said, half of our high school students have tried illegal drugs. we've got to have a broader approach that looks at prevention, that looks at substance abuse treatment where there are many advances being made. and i really think that certainly we know that undoubtedly drug dealers replace one another, so simply -- the problem is too broad to solve just by taking what are, unfortunately, a small number of the total people dealing drugs and putting them in prison for incredibly long sentences.

as we've said, these people are still going to be going to prison. 97 months of the crack cases even after the disparity was narrowed. >> mr. evenson says he can't deal with these people. these people are not -- he makes it sound like he doesn't have any leverage over the people. these people are going to jail, just not on bizarre sentences, they would be going to jail on fair sentences. >> right, and the question is in the last year or two or eight years or ten years, is the last year getting us much mileage relative to what else we could be doing with those resources? >> thank you. >> thank you. let me just comment, and we had submitted chairman brenner's statement for the record. he does point out things in which i would hope we would all agree, that this task force has taken up, rather unusual to see aclu heritage foundation,

liberal and conservative groups joining together, but we have a lot of agreement with regard to issue of mens rea's requirement for offenses. and it was mentioned earlier, we really should have these caudified into one code instead of having these four or five thousand federal crimes where a prison sentence was added just to show congress was tough on some issue, when maybe it was a clerical error and it shouldn't have gone that route. there are many things we agree on that we really need to deal with, and we really appreciate all of your input on this issue of mandatory minimums or what i might call range of punishment. and you may have other thoughts as you leave. i know i always do. gee, i wish i had said this, that or the other. and so if you wish to have -- we

provide members five legislative days to submit additional written questions for the witnesses or additional materials for the record -- yes? >> let me just say, if you have additional information that you think of as you walk out, i wish i had said that, we would welcome that being submitted in writing for our review, and it will certainly be reviewed. the ranking member has a comment. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i would ask to present letters and testimony from the u.s. sentencing commission, justice strategies, families against mandatory minimums, the leadership conference on civil rights, civil and human rights, the center for justice, the judicial conference that often reminds us that judges are often required to impose sentences that violate common sense, the human rights watch, the aclu and

the sentencing project, the article on the hill all to be entered into the record. >> without objection, that will be done. again, if you have additional materials, any of you, that you feel would be helpful to this task force, we would welcome those, and that record will be open five days. >> if i could just ask one other question. would you mind? >> without objection. >> thank you. i'm just guessing, mr. otis, i think you've got the most experience here. i think you're maybe the only person here older than me. i think 1968 is when you graduated? >> you look like a youngster to me. more and more people do these days. >> it's all relative. you've been doing this for a long time and you were a dea. if i'm wrong in my opinion, tell me. but from what i see, the drug war over all those years hasn't changed at all as far as the american appetite for drugs, american appetite for marijuana, for crack, cocaine, meth,

whatever, ecstasy, oxycontin, whatever. and our process has been the same. arrest people, mandatory minimums, flip them, put them in jail, put them in jail for a long time. it hasn't worked. is the system basically in the same place it's been? do you feel like a rat going along in a cylinder there? don't you think we ought to just kind of come out of it and go, this happened 40 years? don't we need a new theory or new way to do this? >> what the statistics show is that drug crimes are intimately related with other kinds of crimes, property crimes and crimes of violence. and we know from the statistic that those crimes have gone down substantially. so i don't think it's correct to say that it hasn't worked. in addition to that, in order to know whether specifically drug laws have worked, we would need to know what the state of play would be if they had not been enforced. and the great likelihood, because the drug business, i

think, has been misapprehended in some of what's going on today. the drug business, unlike other kinds of crime, the drug business is consensual. so there is not a crime scene and a victim in the same sense that there is in other kinds of crime. we've talked a lot today, and you have talked, and correctly so, about violence and whether we're seeing an increase or decrease in violence when some states have released drug defendants early. but violence is not the only thing we need to care about when we're talking about drugs. we need to care also about harmfulness. because the drug business is consensual, for example, the actor philip seymour hoffman who recently died of an overdose, he died as a result of the consensual drug transactions as almost all drug transactions are. but he and the other 13,000 heroin addicts who die each year are equally dead, whether it's

consensual or whether there has been violence. we need to stomp out the harm that comes from the drug trade, a harm that is one of the most destructive, particularly in minority communities, that's going on in the united states today. >> would you mind if i just added one thing? >> go ahead. >> with regard to heroin, the purity has gone up 60%, the price has dropped. it does say what we're doing about heroin as not working. kingpins dealing heroin and other hard drugs should go to prison. but what we need to do is, as i said, take a broader approach. there is pharmaceutical advances that are treating heroin addiction and also recognize prescription drugs. even with this increase in heroin recently, prescription drugs is far more common than heroin abuse, so i hope we can also focus on that as well. >> mr. chairman, thank you.

i think what i got out of that is huey lewis probably had the answer, a new drug? we need to find a drug that's not addictive, not harmful but still pleasurable. and we need to put ourselves on it tomorrow. >> i always thought that was what we call glazed donuts. mr. bachus, you asked for unanimous consent? >> unanimous consent, and professor otis sort of reminded me of this. i had it, but this is a crime scene. and this is in alabama. these are two young people that overdosed on a synthetic drug earlier this year. so it is a different crime scene. but it looks pretty violent, i'm sure, to their parents and their friends. i would also like to enter --

>> are you offering that for -- >> yes. >> all right. without objection. >> i would also like to introduce a copy of the attorney general's memorandum to u.s. attorneys, and particularly highlighted where the cooperation is no longer included. but third, mr. evenson said something that i think we ought to at least have one panel of people, and that's the health care approach and things that we can do in drug diversion treatment, addiction, addressing it both as a criminal problem and a health care problem. and i would think the u.s. attorneys would probably welcome that more than any one group, because i've had u.s. attorneys

and das that express to me that they wish more was done on addictions and rehabilitation, because they're really the ones that see it every day. >> mr. chairman? >> yes. without objection. >> i just want to make it clear that i think we share the common goal of reducing drug use in america, the question is what the strategy will be. mr. levin and mr. evenson pointed out there is a better, more cost-effective way of actually reducing drug use in america. others suggested the war on drugs is working. i think the war on drugs has been shown to be a complete failure. just wasted money, it hasn't reduced drugs, and there are more cost-effective ways of doing it, and that's what the debate is all about. >> thank you, and you're right. we all agree on that, that we want to reduce the usage of drugs, and there have been data

provided that indicate in some ways it is working. to explain to each of you, we had anticipated having to go vote around 10:00 a.m., so we started out under that -- that's what we were told by the mortal gods from the house floor. while we were proceeding, we got word that the vote that we were told to anticipate around 10:00 was voice voted, thankfully, some cooperation on the floor, and that allowed us to finish without interrupting you and taking more of your time than necessary. so we do thank you, and with that, we are adjourned.

some live events to tell you about on the c-span networks. the international institute for strategic studies is hosting a discussion on the situation in syria and how surt routhe surro region is being affected by things happening there. that's live at 10:00 a.m. on c-span3. and at the wilson center, how

the energy policy is affecting russia and ukraine. that's live at 10:30 a.m. eastern. with live coverage of the u.s. house on c-span and the senate on c-span 2, here on c-span 3, we complement that coverage by showing you hearings and public affairs events. then on weekends, c-span 3 is home to american history tv, including six new series, the civil war's 150th anniversary, visiting battlefields and key event, touring museums and discovering historic sites to tell us what history reveals about the past. the presidency, looking at the policies and legacies of our nation's commanders in chief. top college professors delving into our past. and "reel america," films from the 1930s to the 1970s.

c-span 3 funded by your local cable or satellite provider. watch us on, like us on facebook and follow us on twitter. next up, philip breedlove briefed reporters at the pentagon. he asked questions about the russia-ukraine situation and he asked about syria. this is about 20 minutes. okay, thanks for being here this afternoon, and thanks for giving me the opportunity to be here. it's the first time i've been here in this capacity as the

supreme allied commander of europe and the european commander. i look forward to our conversation today. i really look forward to the questions and answers afterwards. it's a pretty tight schedule. i'm only here for a short time today, but i promise to make this kind of thing available the next time i'm in town as well. i have a short statement, and then we'll get to your questions. as you know, it's a very momentous time in europe, probably the most since the end of the cold war, probably because of the recent changes wrought by russia. i'm very pleased with president obama's announcement of the european reassurance initiative. the $1 billion pledge will help us sustain our presence in europe and assist us in protecting our own national security interests while also reassuring our allies and partners of the u.s. commitment to our article 5. we will work with the president, commerce and the department of defense, to see this effort come to fruition. it's too early to lay out the

details of what we will do, but it will cover increased skpand enhanced training, readiness exercises and facility improvements that we will need in order to conduct quality training and readiness activities with all of our allies and partners. these training efforts all in support of our nato allies and partners in europe now fall under the umbrella of operation atlantic resolve. in this operation, we will continue to demonstrate our continued commitment to the collective security of nato and dedication to the enduring peace and stability in the region in light of the innovation in ukraine, specifically. we will continue to demonstrate the united states' solemn commitment to the collective defense of all nato allies. that has been true since we signed the washington treaty in 1949. we will respond if the security and territorial integrity of our

allies is violated. we will also have built constructive security and defensive cooperation with ukraine and other members of nato's partnership for peace over the past two decades to help build a europe that is whole, free and at peace. our ability to respond quickly to reassure our european allies and partners was enabled by our forward station forces and the force structure we have in place right now. i believe our force levels in europe are about right, even absent the latest developments in ukraine and that we should take a knee and make no permanent restructuring to our present structure. we should sustain the presence that we are now envisioning. there are other issues on the stove as well for ucom. we are supporting other combat ant commands for presence in europe, africom, sent flow in

and out of afghanistan and their monitoring of the action on the ground in iraq and syria. additionally, ucom is supporting u.s. government efforts to assist the ocpw in ridding the world of syrian chemical weapons. a recent highlight in these efforts is that cape ray will be arriving in the port of geotoro tomorrow to transfer chemical weapons from the danish vessel arkvitura, and then therefore it to neutral waters to neutralize the chemical waters in a sound manner. we have been in ongoing operations with nato in defending our partner, turkey, and our commitment to the defense of israel. every soldier and marine i've had the opportunity to meet is

fully up on our mission and eager to do their job. every alliance and partner member i meet on the battlefield is also equally enthusiastic. we are proud carriers of a legacy that began just over 70 years ago on the shores of normandy. that legacy has endowed us with the nato alliance and steadfast relationships with incredible allies and partners who have fought alongside us in almost every conflict. additionally, by hosting our u.s. forces forward, they enable us to be more responsive and ready for issues in and around the continent. it is indeed a moment of time in europe, but with the support of our partners and allies, we will face these challenges like we have in the past, together, and build a safer and more secure europe. so, thank you, and i think, bob, the first question goes to you. >> thank you, general. a question for you on ukraine. i wonder about your assessment of the latest developments there, including the cease fire. do you think the conflict has reached a turning point?

>> bob, i think what i would do is allow the actions on the ground to speak for themselves. there is good rhetoric, there are some good words about a cease fire and peace, but what we see is continued conflict, continued support of the conflict from the east side of the border, and until we see those things turn around, i think we need to watch with a wary eye. >> and russian troop levels? do you still have an estimate? >> i think what you've been told is we see about 7-plus ba althou ttalion groups on the south border. that's not a helpful development in what it brings to the problem. >> michael gordon, "new york times." i might follow up on the russian post here. when he was in nato last week, secretary kerry said the ukranian helicopter had been

shut down with a russian weapon, and there have been a number of weapons lost in ukraine. what is the latest information on russian supplies of arms to the separatists, and do they include anti-air weapons? >> to your last specific question, yes, they do include that. what we see in training on the east side of the border is big equipment. tanks, apcs, anti-aircraft capability. and now we see those capabilities being used on the west side of the border. >> so the aircraft that were shot down recently you think were shot down with weapons from the separatists? >> i think we need facts to be sorted out before i report it, so i would say it's a very good likelihood but we haven't tied the string directly together yet. >> sir, if i could change subjects briefly to al qaeda in europe, you have the rise of the fighting in iraq in syria, you have both of those countries,

the al qaeda elements joining together and especially al qaeda in yemen, all of them looking to bring westerners in or visa waiver countries and then potentially send them back out. what are your concerns specifically, if you will, about al qaeda operatives moving through europe, potentially attacking western or u.s. interests there and potentially coming back through europe, especially from yemen, to attack the united states? >> so allow me to speak in a little bit broader terms rather than label just al qaeda fighters in europe. let's use the term foreign fighter flow into europe. that is a great concern to me, and it's a great concern to our european partners. just recently, of course, we've seen a returnee strike a tough attack in belgium and then he was arrested in france. what does this tell us? foreign fighters can return to

these nations. they can effect an attack or some sort of problem for that nation and then move quickly across borders to other nations. i think this worries all the nations of europe about the capability of these foreign fighters returning. so the flow from all of these areas, from yemen, as you talk about, but i think more importantly to the europeans, the flow from western iraq and eastern syria into europe is a very distinct problem, and we are working to address that flow. >> can i very briefly follow up just on the yemen point? that's a country where it's well understood and known that that al qaeda element has the ability to make bombs that can evade airport security and all of that. do you have new concerns about the development of those kinds of weapons and what it could mean about the vulnerability of airport security in europe and in the united states?

>> i wouldn't use the word "new," because this has been a concern for some time. we remain concerned about the capability of some of these elements to develop weapons that could be thwarted by our current security systems. >> what is your assessment of russia's motivation for going into iraq at this point when they're quite busy in the ukraine? is it to help send a signal is to syria? what's your read on that? >> tony, i think that's a little out of my area of operation. >> you follow russia and russia's geopolitical motivations. >> i think what i would say is our concern right now in nato and as a european commander is what is happening along the turkish border. this is an ally that if we have to, we will defend. that has been stated very clearly. and so we are concerned about

all of the operations by all of the players on the south side of that border that would cause anything to cross it or increase the flow of foreign fighters or any of the things that could affect us in europe. >> even though you're ucom, the international authorization of the fight could ripple into your reg, with turkey being an example? >> i am certainly concerned about the spillover into turkey and our european partners. >> given the concerns that you have mentioned, mainly what's going on on the turkish border, do you think nato could play a role in the near future in stabilizing what's going on, say, in syria and iraq? because as you may know, sir, the influence of extremist movement, mainly isis, is growing with time. >> i think nato has been very clear that there is no mission to go into syria for nato forces.

but what it has also made clear is that we will defend turkey. as you know, right now in turkey, we have three nations from nato there with patriot units as a part of defending our ally from the possibility of attack by these intermediate range missiles. so we have been very, very clear that as to defending our ally, that is a nato mission. as far as a nato mission on the other side of the border in syria, there has been no call for that among the nato nations. >> i want to ask you your assessment on russia's strategic forces. specifically, have you seen any money diverted away from them due to their operations around ukraine? >> i have no evidence of that. i see that russia has, for some years now, embarked on a fairly ambitious reinvestment program all across their forces, and to

your question from strategic forces of what they're doing tactically, i have no indication of that. >> go back to your earlier comment you made about rotations of forces. how large of an increase would you kind of look at for that, and what types of forces would you be interested from a ucom perspective? >> i think the most important first part of the question that you didn't ask, i will answer, anyway, and that is that i think first and foremost, we should now pause and determine should we continue with any of the program reductions that are in the plan for europe? as a result of budget and sequester, there are already some reductions that are still on the books. so i think the first step in this process is that we develop a mechanism by which we stop, relook at those planned actions for europe. i have been on record numerous times as saying i believe we have infrastructure that can

come down, and, therefore, i completely support the eic, and i think it's headed in a good direction. but as far as force structure, i do not think we can take any more reductions. then once that question is answered, we would have a better understanding of what we would need as far as rotational forces. as you know, we have forces all over europe now, european command forces, that are a part of our immediate response measures, ground forces in the three baltic nations and poland, air forces in the south, ships in the black sea, et cetera, et cetera. we will need to keep this presence up for some time in the future. to be determined. right now we're tasked to do it through the 31st of december of this year. again, based on what happens to our overall force structure, we would then need to rotate forces, and to be able to do

these missions which are now required in this presence mission in europe. >> your position on ukraine, does that change your equation to what necessarily needs to stay in ucom as well as -- how do you present that? >> i think it's a great question. we have all often worried about what is the force that we should plan for? for the last 12 to 14 years we've been looking at russia as a partner. we've been making decisions about force structure, basing, investments, et cetera, et cetera, looking to russia as a partner. now what we see is a very different situation. so i think it was illustrative to just take, for example, what happened on the ukrainian border just some weeks ago. 28 battalion task groups, a combined arms force there with air and land forces integrated well. that gives us a good idea to think about what we might face

in the future and gives us a baseline for that conversation about what should be our capacity and capability both inside nato and u.s. forces in europe. >> hi. i'm with air force magazine. i just kind of in the same vein wanted to know if you could tell us when we could expect the eic to be completed. and also how much more the air force can expect to be impacted by the consolidation. >> okay. so i -- i wouldn't want to answer when the eic is going to be completed. i think it's relatively soon. and i have seen some of the preliminary plans or results. as far as the changes for europe, as far as the air force, is that what you're asking? i think the budget details have been released, and we're looking at at least reductions of our

f-15s force in europe. and i think that's about as much detail i'd want to go into in this forum. >> "wall street journal." nato released some images of tanks recently going into ukraine. i'm wondering if you have any update on whether you believe they're still operating there, if they've sent any more tanks in and what other kinds of details you may have on specific russia supplies. >> there has been release of nato data on tanks. i believe youtube has other vehicles such as armored personnel carriers. we have not seen any of the air defense vehicles across the border yet. but we've seen them training in the western part of russia, et cetera. so i think that there are several types and capabilities of heavy weaponry that are moving across that border. >> you believe they are moving across the border? >> i do. absolutely.

>> earlier this year there was some -- a handful of incidents where russian warplanes came a little too close for comfort to u.s. warships in the black sea. since those incidents have there been any other kind of engagements like that in that area? and due to those sorts of close calls, have you given any thought to changing the operating procedures or possibly rules of engagement in case, you know, another incident like this happens? >> so there have been at least two incidents in the black sea. one very early on when we went in there where ships maneuvered close to our ships. and there has been an incident of aircraft making low passes, provocative passes on our ships. but what i would say is that while they are not good, and they are not the kind of behavior we would like to see, none of them got outside of sort of the norms of this sort of thing that happens on the sea.

there are other things that are happening, though. i mean, we had an incident with our baltic fleet recently where baltic fleet declared a training zone, was firing at targets, russian ships became involved, got too close to the target. to close to the shooters. and caused those things to be knocked off. we've had a couple of other aerial incidences, both on the west coast and on the east coast in the pacific command region of responsibility. so while -- while i wouldn't characterize any of them as extremely outside of the norm, the frequency of them has certainly picked up. >> has that frequency prompted any possible change in thinks on how -- on possible u.s. responses to these incidents if they occur again? >> we will continue to conduct ourself in a professional manner, in accordance with the way the u.s. navy has always done it at sea and the u.s. air force has always done it in the air. and then we use those venues to

pass our concerns back and forth. nothing has risen to the point where we've made changes to our operating procedures. >> general louie martinez with abc news. a question about the tanks. what impacts you seeing tactically from these vehicles on the western side of the border? when you talk about anti-air, are you talking about med pads? how do you assess that level of training? >> okay. so we haven't seen any huge, drastic tactical impact of these vehicles. clearly, in the situations that -- where they have been used by the separatist forces, they have a very -- what i would call a decided tactical impact right at that moment. but as far as an operational impact to what's happening in the east, nothing to speak of yet. we don't know whether the first

two shootdowns were man pads or vehicle born missiles. again, i like to report when i have facts, so i will just tell you that we're not -- we haven't tied that spring completely together as to which was used in which situation. >> what you're seeing on the eastern side, does that involve man pads or is that vehicle born? >> we have not seen training of man pads but we have seen vehicle born capability being trained. >> andrew tillman with the military times. you said you feel like the force levels in ucom right now, you're relatively happy with that. i'm wondering if you could talk a little bit about how you think the other nato partners are viewing our response to the russian tension and, you know, what might be the value of -- do you see any value in the discussion of raising that -- that current force level in ucomm on a permanent basis? >> so thank you for the

question. because i'm quite proud of the way european forces reacted when we first decided to do these reassurance measures. i was tasked as a nato commander to develop a series of reassurance measures in the north, in the center and in the south. and in each location to do air, maritime and land capability as applicable. it's hard to get maritime presence in the middle of europe. but in the north and the south, we built those capabilities. and as you saw, the u.s. was the first to respond. less than 24 hours, much less than 24 hours from the go to show, with our fighters in lithuania, ships into the black sea almost immediately. and now you see ship -- i should be correct -- into the black sea very quickly. then now you see ground forces in the three baltic nations and in poland and in romania in the

south. so the point is that i think what we set out to do, which was two things, reassure our allies and also set the example and encourage our nato allies to come alongside of us in those nations, that happened immediately and quickly. second, as you know, with the exception of the ships that were under european control at the time, all of the forces on the ground and the air that have immediately responded into these nations come from the european command. later in october, forces from the united states will begin to rotate in and be a part of this presence mission in europe. but right now it was those forward-based european forces, ucomm forces, that were first to the situation. and so i think that's one of the enduring reasons why we need to make sure we have the right force structure in europe, so

that we can respond at speed when required. >> you talked about some of the heavy equipment going over the border from russia into ukraine. what about russia special forces? in the past you mentioned it was quite evident that some of the separatists, whether in crimea or elsewhere weren't really separatists but were acting more like special forces and russian operatives. >> so i think you have heard me say before the following litany which i believe remains today. russian regular forces are very active along the border of ukraine. facilitating the movement of forces, equipment and finances across that border. russian irregular forces are very active inside eastern ukrai ukraine. russian-backed forces are active inside eastern ukraine. and russian financing is very active inside eastern ukraine.

thank you all. so i tell the story about how i, whose every aspect of whose identity is in one way or another a threat to israel, my gender is male, my religion is muslim, my citizenship is american, but my nationality is iranian, my ethnicity is persian, my culture is middle eastern, everything about me is -- sends off, you know, all the warning signals for israel. and so the experience of an iranian-american single man trying to get through bengurhi on airport in the 21st century

is a reminder to everyone that despite the way that globalization has brought us closer and has d diminished the boundaries that separate us as nations, as ethnicities, as people, as cultures, despite all of that, all you got to do is spend a few minutes trying to get through bengurian airport to remember that those divisions, those things that separate us are very much alive. >> best selling author and professor rezas alan will take your phone calls, e-mails and tweets on islamic fubdmentallism, war on terror and current instability in the middle east live for three hours on sunday at noon eastern on book tv's in-depth. part of a three-day holiday weekend of nonfiction books and authors starting this friday on c-span 2. book tv. television for serious readers. author allen huffman shares a tale of two mississippis as we visit prospect hill in jackson.

>> prospect hill was founded by isaac ross who's a revolutionary war veteran from south carolina. and when we realized that he was going to die and the slaves would -- would end up being sold or we'd just become common slaves, he wrote in his will that at the time of his daughter's death, the plantation would be sold and the money used to pay the way for those slaves to immigrate to liberia, where a freed slave colony had been established by the american colonization society. they call it repatriation. they talk about them going back to africa. but you have to understand, those people, most of them, they were americans. they had been here for three, four, five generations. so it wasn't like they were just going home. they were going back to the continent that their ancestors originally inhabited. but they -- it was quite the risk. and so they took their culture, what they knew here, there. of course, some of them took the

bad aspects, too. the savory. but that was all they had ever known. and they built houses like this one because, after all, they're the ones who built this house. there were a lot of basically greek revival houses that the freed slaves built in mississippi and africa. and across the river was louisiana in liberia. which was settled by freed slaves from louisiana. there was a georgia. there was a virginia, a kentucky, a maryland county. and all -- all of those people came from those states in the u.s. >> explore the history and literary life of jackson this weekend, saturday at noon eastern on c-span 2's book tv. and sunday at 2:00 p.m. on american history tv on c-span 3. and we're live this morning on c-span 3 at the international institute for strategic studies for a discussion on the syrian conflict. speaking now is the moderator,

bryce campbell. he is also the managing director of iiss u.s. this is live coverage just getting under way. >> here from the iiss middle east office to share his insights on the tragedy continuing to unfold in syria. before i introduce emile properly, i should also mention the iiss is a membership organization. and that those of you in the audience today who are interested can learn more. there's some fliers on the back table or you can speak with me after the event. those of you following online or on tv can also visit our website, iiss.org to learn more. the structure for today's events will be the following. fairly simple. emile will be providing some remarks for about 15 to 20 minutes. then i will be turning to you to moderate a question and answer session. prior to joining the institute, emile was the political editor

and international affairs columnist for the abu dabhi based english newspaper "the national." from 2004 to 2008 he served as resident fellow at the stimpson center here in washington. he was researching strategic security and political issues in the gulf and the levant. things he still does for us. emile has written extensively on iran gcc relations, regional security in the gulf and levant security. he has testified in front of the u.s. foreign relations committee on syria and lebanon and spoken on gulf affairs in front of various government and nongovernment audiences. emile is embarrassed. he wants to cut to the chase and begin his talk. so i will leave his introduction there and let him take the floor. >> thank you. thank you and good morning to all. it's a pleasure to be back in

d.c. primarily because it gives me an excuse to run away from the horrid wars of the gulf these days. no one wants to be there at this time. but it's also ramadan. so ramadan to anyone, all muslims and people. i can tell you -- i can report there is a new game in town when it comes to syria. it's the search for the new and perhaps more derogatory acronym for isis, daish. if you're on twitter or read arabic, et cetera, that's perhaps the funnest thing happening in the arab world these days. aside from that it's all pretty sad. so i do encourage you, i mean, you know, in arabic d airks s or isis is -- [ speaking in foreign language ] . there are many ways one can play with those letters, put them together to actually find

something that will make them fume a bit more. daish is already pretty extreme and insulting in their perspective. what i'm going to do in this presentation, i expect there will be many questions about isis or is, the islamic state at this point, or the regional fallout and spillover and u.s. policy, i'm going to focus on syria. because, you know, when i look at the current debate, syria has fallen off the radar. iraq has taken prominence in the public and policy debates. and what's happening inside syria is often not -- not well analyzed or, you know, there's not much great interest. just look at the number of journalists who thought about that compared to the coverage of syria. of course, syria is a much more dangerous place. still, on balance, what's happening inside syria is not

getting nearly enough of the coverage and the policy attention it deserves. so i'm going to spend most of my time doing that. because i think it's fundamental to understand what's happening there. because the ingredients for the conflict are there to last many more years. you know, we saw in iraq that the spillover cannot be contained. containment is not a strategy, it's an avoidance strategy, actually. let me start by making a few points of warning, actually. the first one is that there is a tendency to embrace broad narratives when it comes to syria too easily. in late 2012, early 2013, the narrative was that the rebels were winning and the regime was collapsing. in recent months, it's the opposite. the regime is winning and the rebels are collapsing. both are understandable -- understandably tempting narratives. but they're also -- they're also

simplistic. because they ignore a secondary level developments that have a direct impact over time on the big picture. in late 2012, early 2013, when the regime was indeed weakening, it was also reorganizing to push back. and it did so pretty well. two months ago, however, the regime conquered most of yabhud and elamun, the region alongside the border with lebanon and everyone focused on that victory which was a very important victory. secured the highway between damascus and hamos and hamma. it cut rebel supply lines into lebanon, et cetera. but at the same time

and i say this for two reasons. first, there is direct iranian intervention. terminology matters. it's not proxied. there is direct intervention with uniformed iranian personnel fighting on the ground. the second one is there is no denying there is strong regional aspects to the struggle in syria that exacerbates the violence. but to only limit one's analysis to that is in a way satisfying and convenient because it allows us to do what we like to do, which is engage in geopolitical analysis. if only the americans and

russians could get along. if only the saudis and iranians could get along and somehow things will be much better. in reality, the local -- the local and transnational dynamics of the syrian conflict shape events on the dprouground a lot than the regional competition. now, to accept this, once you accept this, you accept the limits of our understanding of a lot of those dynamics. it's very secure, it's much more difficult to understand, research on the ground, it also makes a lot of the tools we have at our disposal much less useful. diplomacy. arming or not arming. sanctions or no sanctions. i mean, that's -- this is a problem. often our analysis is driven by the tools we have at our disposal, other than the other way around. what has happened in three years in syria is the emergence of local and transnational actors

that have their own legitimacy, their own way of mobilizing fighters, mobiling support, building their legitimacy, acquiring resources, developing resources domestically. the conflict today has self-sustaining dynamics. and all the ingredients are there for a long lasting war. of course, one can identify destructive events. and we can go through that later. but, in a way, if one looks at the linear strategy -- trajectory for today, the syrian war has what it takes to last five, ten more years. the war economy has created ample local resources for the various fighting groups, whether they're on the regime's side or the rebels' side on the jihadis' side. transnational mobilization i'll get to in a second.

and small and light weaponry is available in sufficient quantities. today is not -- it's not about whether this weaponry exists. it's all there. there is, perhaps, game changing weaponry that doesn't necessarily exist in the quantities or in the hands of actors, some of us would want them to be equippeded with. but at that level, all the ingredients are present. finally, a few points here. we also have to resist the temptation of drawing direct links between rebel groups in particular and regional funders or perceived regional funders. i'm going to give you a very specific example. when the islamic front came to the shore, if you look at commentary, everyone said this is a saudi creation.

okay. why is that? because the head of the islam and one of the main leaders of the islamic front has a father who's a syrian cleric and who's lived in saudi arabia for a long time. therefore it was natural that somehow it was saudi creation. except for the father of the -- which is the quasi muslim brotherhood saudi affiliate. which was at odds with the saudi government for a very long time. in fact, it was very difficult to get saudi -- saudi officials and the supporters of alush and the samwa and -- to come together. there was a quid pro quo arrangement over time. there is no direct relationship of control, command, et cetera, between those various groups. now, it makes our analysis easier if you assume that.

but the reality on the ground tells us a pretty different story. another example has to do with harasham and saudi arabia. harasha is an organization. a pretty formidable force. weakening these days. but the fact that the salafi doesn't necessarily mean they report to saudi arabia. those who are familiar with salafi ideology know it can be all over the place. salafi -- you know, monarchical rule because of very specific circumstances. there are many other salafis who actually resist that. and have still an ideology in flux, haven't really decided where they are. again, joining that simple relationship between a state funder or a perceived or assumed or alleged state funder, and a rebel organization, is -- is --

is too -- obscuring more than it helps analysis. so today, and this is going to be the crux of my -- the rest of my presentation, what we're witnessing is the de facto self-partition of syria and iraq. but i'm no iraq specialist, so i'm not going to go there. is going to be -- it is a process of extremely bloody. but over time, it's likely that levels of violence will drop. because enough people will have been killed in the places where, you know, they were present, et cetera, there will be forcible cleansing and movement of people which is already happening. we're talking about iran's p million idp and treatment of refugees plus. but this will make a political settlement much less likely. we will probably see quid pro quos, arrangements, on the sides. but the settlement in and of itself is much less likely to be

than ever before. now, let me turn to the regime a little bit. at present, my assessment is that the regime of bashar al assad is in a better situation than it's been since -- at any point since early 2012. let's be honest about this. its survival is no longer threatened in the medium term. the pressure on damascus is at its lowest in two years. aleppo is being encircled. hamas has been largely reconquered. the june election was assad's political horizon all along. he saw the election as not only a show of defiance and cohesion and legitimacy to fire up his constituency, but also as a way to court but also force the hand of fence sitters. there were many people inside syria who had not necessarily picked sides. we like to think that, you know,

it's a totally polarized environment. but you had many urbanized, many actors and segments of syrian society that were in a state of denial, dejection, despair. didn't really want to be forced to take a stand, be with someone. in fact, the election was -- was useful for assad in a way that it actually put pressure on this constituency. for two months you had a buildup to the elections. visually, banners, it's colorful, people are demonstr e demonstrating, et cetera. there was something to get excited about or be forced to be excited about. and in a way it has worked in the short to medium term. it has allowed assad to begin the process of rebuilding the pretense that he leads the state. and i'll get to this in a second. the reality is that the assad regime has also retained the military edge over its foes inside the country.

it has rebuilt its helicopter force. it has actually adapted militarily. there are downsides to this. i'll talk about this in a second. but today it remains the dominant military actor inside syria. the regime goals were to conquer the areas where it matters. the central corridor. but to conquer territory, not people. and this is a fundamental point and explains the military strategy that it pursued. what assad sought to do was to conquer important territories and push out people of important areas. he didn't want to commit the political, economic resources to regain the loyalty of people. it may have not -- it may have been impossible, to start with. but why spend precious resources at a moment where you're fighting for your survival in trying to -- to win back the

loyalty of people who have suffered so much. and this is a key point. he -- by doing this, he shifted the burden on rebels, on international agencies, on neighboring countries, on, you know, the friends of syria, et cetera, to take care of massive numbers of people and created paralysis on that front. so my point here is that the humanitarian tragedy, rather than being the unfortunate outcome of the fighting, as is often portrayed, is actually the result of a deliberate regime strategy. this is a key point. it is not well understood because we like to see civil wars as gray events where everyone is bad, and let's not take a stand. the reality is the regime has portrayed this as a way to debilitate its foes.

that being said there are challenges ahead for assad. the first set of challenges is the following. a necessary condition for the survival of the assad regime was its transformation from a state into -- into a collection of militias. in fact, assad could not have militarily countered the rebels by just operating as, you know, a conventional military deploying its, you know, fighting conventionally against all these -- all these rebel forces. heed that to build a more loyal, but also less costly, units to support the fight. so he encouraged the government of locally based militias that are loyal to the regime, but have their own behavior. their own set of interests. they develop their own behavior and own set of interests over time. they start differentiating

themselves from the regime over time. some of them are more radical. some of them are less radical. i'll give you very specific examples over time. there's a clash of interest with, you know, regime forces. there's a clash of doctrine, of loyalty, of organization between those various elements. over time, i suspect that this will erode the coherence and sense of purpose of the groups aligned with assad. but this is not a short-term problem for assad. this is -- those frictions are manageable in the long term. i'm going to give you a couple of examples that capture this point. you remember in february there was the u.n. settlement in hamas to get civilians and fighters who had agreed to relinquish their weapons out of the old

city of hamas. under pressure from angry alawites in hamas who felt a deal was uncalled for. the local commander of the national defense force, one of the militias set up, opposing the -- actually they shot at the u.n. mission and it was very difficult to implement. and assad had to send one of his top security officials from damascus to make it happen. and it was actually pretty problematic process in terms of assad showing that he controls the ground an he controls the militias that say that they fight in his name. in the province of latakia the ndf,and another group have operated largely independently from the syrian military. which led to a lot of confusion and military setbacks, including the -- the armenian village of

qasab. the forces supporting assad didn't communicate well, they didn't have a sense of the battlefield, and that was very problematic. in the south, the elements of the national defense force see themselves as a local protection force. they don't want to be involved in the fighting nearby. actually, they've resisted assad orders to go and fight at times. my point is that in the short term, these frictions are manageable. and we shouldn't overstate them. however, this poses a problem as assad tries to rebuild the pretense of the functioning state inside syria. because this is a challenge in the new period. he -- assad has to -- has to engage in some degree of stabilization and reconstruction to show to all those organized

who look at him as a better alternative than the rebels that he can deliver. well, that necessitates a vision. it necessitates will. it necessitates a strategy. and it necessitates resources. and if you believe that the cost of the fighting was already massive in syria, wait until you see the cost of reconstruction. i mean, all of us who have seen civil wars and reconstruction afterwards, et cetera, know that reconstruction can be actually more costly than the fighting in and of itself. lebanon being a great example of that. or iraq, et cetera. who's going to provide that? how do you actually convince the local actors who -- who have risen to support assad in his moment of need to actually accept a centralization strategy here? these are groups that expect revenge, rewards, respect from the central authorities. that are weakened.

another problem here is that assad's dependence on foreign supporters, hezbollah, iranians, et cetera, erodes his claim to actually embody a sovereign, legitimate state. in fact, actually, i was looking at some youtube videos from these shia radical groups, ji d jihadjiha jihadi groups. one of them shows fighters dancing and chanting were we are not here for bashar. our concern is the shias. and these groups need to broadcast their successes, their presence, et cetera, to mobilize a tone to recruit, to build a narrative that they're fighting for the broader good of the shia community. well, that erodes assad's pretense of being a nationalistic center state which is so fundamental. let me quickly touch on two

points. the iss fe no, ma'am no, ma', m and how it plays inside syria. the iss phenomenon is the best example of local and transnational dynamics at play. iss is not a creation of syria despite the wildest conspiracy theories. it is a product of the failing governments and the polarization in iraq and in syria. its growth and its reach were not just predictable, they were predicted. not necessarily surprised by this. today, what we're seeing is the effective merger of western iraq and eastern syria. and the constant movement of money, resources, fighters across this border, this no longer existent border. the real surprise is that isis, which has first pretended to be a vanguard organization, today has announced that -- i put

that, perhaps, too soon -- that it tends to be a state. i think this may actually be the downfall of isis. a state is much more vulnerable to pressure. you tell me you have buildings and you are expected to provide services. you create expectations. and this is actually one of the very contentious points inside the syrian rebellion. does assad benefit from isis's growth and the realization worldwide of the isis threat? i was talking to a few regime associates recently. and they have very mixed views on this. some of them say, yes, it benefits assad. first, it validates the narrative that assad had broadcasted ever since 2011. there is an "i told you so" factor. you know, if only you had listened to us, we could have avoided that. assad welcomes the focus on counterterrorism.

this is a language that he masters. he's done so during the iraq war. you know, he thinks he and his intelligence services can do a pretty good job at it. there's an expectation that they will be tactical corporation with some rebel groups that are under pressure from isi sirs. you start by active cooperation then you go to famous truces and cease-fires we've seen left and right. i'm not sure if it's a sustainable strategy or it will happen. and the debate in the west over what to do about isis is a source of delight for a number of assad associates. today there was another op-ed "new york times" arguing for western cooperation -- direct cooperation against assad. this is good for regime morale. others argue it's not good news for assad. that actually assad has failed so far to get westerners to embrace his view of the this threat. and i think here there's a, you

know, we should give credit to john kerry. i have a lot of bad things to say about u.s. policy, but on this specific point i think there's a good con seceptualizi of the problem. when john kerry says assad cannot be a solution against isis because he's a magnet for terrorism, this word "magnet" actually encompasses -- or captures well the dynamics at play. there's a lot of frustration among regime associates that this -- this narrative hasn't really taken hold in the west. there's also strain on alied shia militias that have to fight on several fronts today. iran today has inherited two failing regimes in iraq and syria. a massive investment. can they do it? iraqi militias, they have to decide, do they protect just -- or do they go back to protect

some other in karbala. the news is not necessarily good for assad. but all these are medium to long-term considerations. in the short term, the regime is on solid ground. let me end here. i've spoken for much longer than i should have. sorry, bryce. thanks for your attention. >> thank you, emile. that was fantastic. i'm sure there are a number of questions in the audience. we'll do them one at a time. please wait for the microphone to come your way. and please be sure to identify yourself and your organization. we'll start right here in the middle. the woman. >> i'm a member of new york -- prez beteern church. my question, i want to get some

specifics on syria and the amount of movement of -- of the people who've been kicked out. in terms of the total population, how many are out? i mean, just to kind of get a sense of the specifics on it. that's my question. >> sure. well, the numbers are quite frightening. we're talking about 3 million refugees, 3.5 million refugees, and around 7 million idps. internally displaced people. many of those idps are actually located in refugee camps in the north of syria. and they are difficult to access. there are also another set of dilemmas when it comes to u.n.-provided help. whether to provide help directly across borders with the risk of alienating the assad regime

there, instead of legal considerations, perhaps, you know, considerations that should be overcome according to a number of international humanitarian law experts recently. because the help is not making it this way. the numbers are -- are just -- are beyond frightening. the magnitude of the crisis is stunning. it's much bigger than what we saw in iraq at its worst. there's another related problem which is the housing infrastructure has been very, very badly damaged. i mean, again, it doesn't compare to iraq 2003, 2010, because of the nature of the fighting. entire neighborhoods have been leveled down. the numbers i have are that around 50% of housing infrastructure in hamas, aleppo, et cetera, is totally gone or very heavily damaged. so even if the fighting were to stop tomorrow, we're talking about a five, ten-year process

to rebuild a uniform units that are needed. that's assuming that the money will flow. and where will it flow from? i mean, that's -- and -- look, i mean, it's -- syria is a conflict that has erupted at the worst possible time. you talk to ngos, you know, other people active in providing relief and they basically say they're meeting only 25% of the needs. it's just heartbreaking. but my fundamental point here is the humanitarian tragedy is a deliberate regime strategy. it's not the unfortunate outcome of the fighting. and until we totally accept this, we're not going to make much headway. u.n. resolution 2139 was adopted several months ago. practically nothing has been

implemented. valerie amos and other u.n. officials are despairing about this. and there has been no progress in terms of direct delivery of aid to rebel held areas where you have millions of displaced people. >> what is the total population, then, of syria? >> 22 million. >> 22 million. so weir s're saying. >> 10%. 15%. >> oh, my god. oh, what's going to be left? >> johns hopkins university. at this point, what are the two sides fighting for? in other words, do the sunnis expect to push the alawites to latakia? likewise, to the shia both in syria and iraq expect to retake sunni territory that has been lost? what is the near-term goal? obviously, what should the u.s. hope for as a solution and how should it achieve that? >> i think the various groups

have, you know, adjusted their expectations. i think that assad and his allies don't hope that they can retake all the territory that's been lost. anyway, why waste those resources conquering land that, you know, is barren and where you have, you know, millions of refugees that you would have to take care of, et cetera. so the point is really to secure this area. make it economically viable. because it's -- it's not necessarily economically viable. those who know the geography of syria know that, you know, wheat fields are in one place. oil fields are somewhere else. people talk about the sunni state. in syria, a sunni state was a large sunni city or large city is probably not very viable. it was at the port on the mediterranean. very problematic. it's difficult -- this is why i say what we're witnessing is the soft partition of syria. none of these units are viable

on their own. there will always be a degree of trading, exchange, et cetera, between all of them. i think assad has a pretty realistic vision of what he wants to achieve in the short to medium term. his problem, as i said, is keeping -- maintaining coherence among the various groups that support him. and we cannot take this for a given. we spend our time describing, analyzing and despairing of the fractionallism, the fragmentation of the rebellion. we should spend, you know, an equal amount of time looking actually at the fractionalism inside the regime. i gave you some examples. again, we shouldn't overstate that. but this is a short to medium -- this is a medium-term challenge. the second issue is, look, there is a lot of ebb and flows among rebel groups.

a year ago, i gave a presentation, you know, the two -- the big groups that i was in touch with and described were dahid and haroshem, et cetera. haroshem has had very heavy losses from their fight against i isis. i was talking a few months ago to a harosham official. he told me that in two months of fighting against isis, they took 500 casualties. dead fighters. guess how many people harosham lost in 2 1/2 years fighting against assad forces? around 2,100 to 2,200 fighters. so in two months, you lose 500 fighters. then in 2 1/2 years, you lose 2,000. so the fortunes of these groups vary considerably. based on, you know, battlefield

condition, amount of support, et cetera. and they don't necessarily have a clear angle about what they want. today, they're in a fight for their survival. and they need to secure territory and resources inside that territory so sustain the fight. they become very self-involved. you know, it's all about their own survival. and this is the opportunity that was lost early on. i mean, where there was, you know, a more positive spirit to the rebellion. you know, a forward looking esos. in a way, that has been lost. and this is hugely problematic. because it's very difficult to imagine a coherent rebel entity in syria today. >> gentleman right there. >> thank you very much. my name is edward joseph with johns hopkins science and

medicine. emile, you made the point, it was an excellent one, about the need to be precise. people say loosely it's a proxy war. no. it's direct intervention. what i would like to do is ask you for a bit more precision when you talk about, quote, local character of the conflict. the reason i ask you this is two-fold. first, because of the implications. if it's really so fragmented and local, well then it seems ho hopelessly complex. why would we ever even dare do anything about it when it's fragmenting so much we could have never hoped to understand it? that's the first. the second is, doesn't it also imply, make assad look like -- more attractive? here, all these other things fragmenting around. then you have assad. so i would ask you to just really be precise about that. i mean, isn't the fact that whatever difficulties these local units present to assad,

they don't switch sides. it isn't -- this isn't like somalia or something where you go somewhere, it's one clan here, one clan there. there's still essentially each side knows who is its enemy and they're not jumping sides in an unbelievely fragmented way. there's still a coherence. indeed, to the extent it's sectarian by definition, you're talking about groups. so i would ask you to kind of respond to that. thank you. >> let me start with the policy implications of your question. as someone who's advocated arming since 2012, arming of the rebels, i have to be honest. i mean, today arming comes at a higher cost. comes with a higher risk. it comes with lower returns than it would have had two years ago. so i understand the dilemmas that policymakers are facing. at the same time, these are the same policymakers who two years

ago turned down those opportunities because of faulty assessments or because of, you know, a total reluctance to take the fight seriously. i have many bad things to say about u.s. policy in the past couple of years. but here's the one word. "bankrupt." and so i understand the current dilemma. but it's not -- the current dilemma should not excuse the policy paralysis and the kind of wishful thinking that happened before. yes, it's unbelievably difficult to maneuver, to navigate those dynamics. but guess what? today if you really want to address the isis challenge, and we all realize now how big a challenge it is, the best strategy, the only actually effective strategy, is precisely to work with those local actors. because of the size of the threat, because they have the

legitimacy. because they have the ground and human intelligence to do something about it. these groups are -- there are a lot of very opportunistic way of doing things. two or three years ago, perhaps we could have appealed to their ideals and values and, you know, some meetings. the hearts and, you know, these were revolutionaries. today, you know, there are -- they look at -- at foreign actors, and they say where were you in our moment of need? so, you know, make a case for why we should actually help you? it's become a transactional relationship. and we have to be very honest about this. at the same time, you know, describing this complexity should not lead one to overstate what assad can offer. first, i don't understand why operationally he can offer. i mean, he has also limited

resources. he's focused on his survival. does someone saying that assad will send some of his forces fighting on a faraway battlefield to, you know, rebuild ties with the west, is one really saying he has a much better understanding of those jihadi forces than the rebel forces that have -- that are already fighting isis? so that's on appropriational level. tast political and strategic level. working with assad only validates the suspicions of many sunnis including many moderate sunnis that the reluctance to help the rebels is directly linked to actually preference for assad. for his strong secular dictator. and his secular, you know, let's qualify what secular means here. and it's going to be extremely difficult to undermine isis and other jihadi groups as

legitimacy if we go down this road. this also applies to iran. the notion that in iraq the best ally is iran misses is points this is primarily a political fight. after ten plus years of war and terror if we haven't realized and understood that what matters are the local actors that have the legitimacy, the intelligence, the rationale to stand up to those radical actors, then perhaps, you know, we shouldn't be in that business altogether. because, you know, it's just -- the few successes that were scored in yemen, in iraq, et cetera, are precisely due to local actors taking on that responsibility. so the question here is, can you create a set of incentives and disincentives for these local actors to join the fight. and the reality is that they've done so without the west and

others even asking in the past six months. the level of casualties taken be i the rebels in the north is massive. and there's no recognition by us in the general discourse of that fundamental point. >> from the state department. turning for a moment to isil or isis or iiss, whatever, part of the problem with the name is exactly what do they mean by it? i was wondering if you see at this point any indication of their starting to lay groundwork in places like lebanon, jordan, amongst the palestinians, or do they have their hands full just consolidating what they've got now? >> actually, i was -- it was very interesting to see that groups and salafi jihadi figures

in jordan actually welcomed the call much more than actually syrian rebel factions. the call for the kalafet. in lebanon, you have one group that actually welcomed the call. but aside from that, very few actors, and i'm not sure this group represent much. they actually attacked a couple hezbollah convoys in previous months. look, isis is on the rise in the region because, well, success begets success. you know, it's the brand that's going up. a year ago, a year and a half ago it was a different brand. these are franchises. people announce their allegiance or their loyalty because they're hoping they're going to get something in return. it's sexier to say you're iss today. as i said, it's opportunistic behavior. but precisely because it's opportunistic behavior, the response should be political.

a number of groups have joined last year. precisely because of this perception that they were getting more funding. they were scoring military victories, et cetera. then they left or they, you know, switched to other groups, et cetera. the question is, can you build those incentives and disincentive to combat those groups? look, abu dabhi, it's a huge bet, the announcement of the kalafi. first, he places very high expectations. secondly, it's hedge monic behavior on his part. many other salafi and jihadi groups are resisting that. they're not necessarily convinced about the calafat or modalities or timing or manner it's done. they see it as very vulnerable in some places. i think it's important to be sober about the military capabilities of this group.

i'm not sure they can score sustainable victory. but their point is -- the point is that they can mount spectacular attacks. they've done it in mosul and tikrit. we'll see during the months of ramadan if they're able to pull off something in baghdad. they certainly have missions inside syria and inside lebanon. but, again, i mean, it's -- the debate between -- it was then jihadi and salafi circles is very heated. there's no massive consensus that the kalafait now and under baghdadi's leadership is the right way to go. so i wouldn't espouse or, you know, the most alarmist assessment. but, again, everything depends on the response. if the response is not primarily political, it's a purely counterterrorism one, i think

isis is thrive. because it will present itself as being persecuted by all the right enemies. >> here? thank you for your today. i'm trisha johnson. earlier you talked about how the syrian war does have the possibility of lasting for another five to ten years. isis also operates out of syria with supplies and troops. how do you think that the length of the syrian war will affect isis' activities in iraq? >> as i said, i'm no iraqi expert. this effective merger of those two battlefields, my colleague at iiss has written an excellent

book on iraq. isis has been very good mobilizing local resources, whether it's true extraction, violence, rocketing, all this. it has actually proven also very good at cooperating or entering alliances with some tribes and some elements. it's very difficult to believe the events in iraq owe nothing to local groups. so yes, there is savvy on baghdadi's part. i actually think in the medium term, the backlash against isis

will be massive. will they be able to hold a territory the size of jordan on the border of turkey, on the kurdish areas, jordan, et cetera? i'm doubtful. i'm doubtful about this. i worry much more about the isis. we see this internal discourse with al qaeda and the arabian peninsula saying perhaps that is right. there is a different way of doing business and let's announce things. it's taking a massive risk to announce state. state is something that is recognizable. yes they won't have a world cup

team any time soon, but -- well, who knows, actually? isis. when you look at local media, they organize summer camps for kids. of course, there's always other things but they are savvy at the level of engagement. of course at the same time they nail people on crosses so it's a bit problematic. the point is that it's all about the expectations you set and whether you are able to meet them. yes, they may have half a billion dollars in their coffers, but how do you make sure you get all the amount of food you need or the good for this population. we talk about an area that contains about 8 million people. how do you meet their needs? how do you make sure electricity

and water are still flowing if you're at odds with everyone? are local deals enough? the local deals i refer to are deals with the regime where isis provide crude oil and get products because they need gasoline for their trucks, but i'm not sure it's a very viable model. >> thanks again for the great talk. you spoke earlier about the diminished cost benefit with the u.s. government engaging with the syrian opposition. i was wondering in your opinion from a policy standpoint in terms of moving forward in the best possible of way, how or if the opposition really is, will

play or could play a large part in the u.s. strategy? >> i see mainstream rebel groups as essential element of anti-isis strategy. that also means you have to accept their other priority. you cannot turn to rebel factions. provide weapons if you fight first and foremost isis and forget about assad. most atrocities and displacement, et cetera are still done by assad and his forces. as bad as jihadis are, and they can do worse, the balance of atrocities is still very clearly the doing of fatah.

the rebels are under enormous pressure. when i talk to a few of them just a week ago, and i told them what is your top priority and they said preventing the encirclement of alappo. if the u.s. government and others need to know one thing, it's precisely that. the encirclement of alappo would be another terrible humanitarian tragedy. i don't know the exact numbers. they say between 80,000 and 100,000 civilians are still in that area. it would be a much bigger symbolic blow to the revolution than the loss of hamas, which was the capital of the revolution. alappo is in the place where the rebels hope to gain in 2012. i mean the entry into alappo was

disastrous, to be honest. they need to continue holding it. there was a lot of hype about the south of france that rebels were organizing in jordan and other places, push from the south and conquer territory and add pressure on damascus from the south. this has not materialized for a number of reasons. in a way, it's not necessarily bad that it hasn't materialized because i don't see how it would have been sustainable. without air cover, you cannot make sustainable gains and shift the loyalty or maintain the loyalty of civilians. something that is key and that lesson has been learned a very hard way in aleppo.

policy shouldn't be to encourage rebels to seek massive military victories. it should be about protecting the areas they have, protecting the population against more abuses, about establishing local governments in as many places as possible. it should not be an aggressive offensive strategy because they don't have the means or the strategy to pull it off. i'm not talking on the margins when you have to secure territory. just talking about the more forward strategy. the time for very ambitious adventures is long gone. >> unfortunately, i think we are just about out of time. we had two primary objectives today. one was for emile to share his insights and deal with your questions. i think we achieved our second goal which was to avoid

incriminating the iiss in any rebel activities. i thank you all for your participation in that. i would like to ask you to thank emile for his remarks. [ applause ] and thank you all for coming.

finishing up this conversation on syria, iraq and isis, we expect more discussion during today's pentagon briefing. the decision to send additional troops to iraq. admiral john kirby will take questions starting 2:00 p.m. eastern live on c-span. looking at our primetime lineup on cspan3, american history tv and a look at u.s. foreign policy. we'll examine america's response to totalitarianism, being al qaeda and rwanda genocide. on c-span2, booktv with a focus on