at least the more militant factions? >> yeah. well, the question of the united states and the muslim brotherhood is a little bit complex because the united states's support for israel against the palestinians they had a negative view and were quite critical of it. in 2005 there were 88 muslim brothers were elected to the parliament. their parliament visits. they became junior members of the egyptian establishment. they began to develop american contacts so when mohammed morsi, was president of egypt, he had correct relations with the u.s.

it wasn't a complete representure. i think there was a certain amount of pragmatism in the group despite its basic. because they were excluded from the public sector, a lot were free enterprise and they liked so part of america. morsi, you know, he has a degree from the university of southern california. he was an assistant professor at the cal state north ridge. he was involved in as in aa contract. one egypt shawns before the election said why wouldn't egypt need dr. morsi. so there were all of these contracts with the united states that were self evident. we have to leave it there. thank you everybody. we will see you next time. [ applause ]

on wednesday, american history t.v. in prime time marks the 50th anniversary of 1964 civil rights act. at 8:00 p.m. remarks by president linden johnson. at 8:30 the congressional gold medal ceremony honoring martin luther king jr. and 9:45 on congressional debate and at 9:45 eastern, a talk with todd purdam, the author of two parties. and the battle of the civil rights act of 1964. now you can keep in touch with current events from the nation's capital using any phone any time

simply call 2026268888 to hear congressional coverage, public affairs programs. everyday listen to ai recap of the day's events at 5:00 p.m. eastern on washington today. you can also hear audio beginning sunday at noon. call 202-626-8888. long distance or phone charges may apply. >> wednesday, two representatives of the kurdistan region government discuss the ongoing conflict in iraq and the potential for an independent kurdistan. we'll be live at 12:30 eastern on cspan. >> my first reaction was surprise because i had worked for mr. sterling. i coached the clippers in the year 2000.

he invited me to his daughter's wedding. i had no idea exactly what was going on. but i also -- because of my association, i know algin bailor. i know what he was complaining about. i was confused not knowing exactly what set of facts mr. sterling stood behind. when his words came out it was so obvious and shocking. just disgusting. all of these things wrapped in one. the surprise on that sentiment who relies on back americans for so much of his success and public profile, it was amazing. i couldn't believe it that someone could have that much bigotry inside and think that it was okay. >> july 4th on cspan a look at racism and sports just after 11:00 a.m. eastern.

later exploring the red planet beginning at 3:40. later at 8:30 p.m. eastern discussion on gun rights and the personal recovery of arizona congresswoman gabby gifforda. >> now on american mystery tv, this is part of a course called history of genocide taught by john young in saint augustin florida. this is two hours. so, i mean as a kind of overview just to refresh everyone's memory here, we started with an overview of the history of it.

rwanda. this tension was precipitated by the withdrawal of the colonial powers in the 1950s and 1960s such that there was tension for the next 20 and 30 years erupting into violence. becoming pretty severe starting in 1990 with the invasion of uganda of the rwanda patriotic front. this violence escalated through the early 1990s. there were preprisal killings i r rwanda. that brings us to our topic of

genocide and the u.s. and international response to the genocide. we will talk tonight about the kind of narrative of the genocide itself. what happened between late 1993 and the middle of 1994. the genocide itself taking place over 100 days between april 6, 1994 and mid-july -- early to mird july of 1994. we do this through a number of books that our students have been exposed to. maybe we should talk about them. so we have sam ana powers, a problem from hell which is an interview of the u.s. response to genocide beginning with arm evenia and nazi genocide. we've also read for tonight romio de laris and his account

in the piece keeping force in the united nation's force in rwanda. a canadian general, never saw combat from before this time. accepted this command in late 1993. found himself in a genocide of epic proportions in 1994 and a unique witness to this whole thing. we've read power and de laris and writings from sources. victims and perpetrators the genocide. that's where we're left tonight. we've also encountered on on an aesthetic level through film and other things. i think this leaves us to talk about from an intellectual and emotional standpoint, the u.s. response and international response. >> one thing i would just add to

that is obviously during the course of the semester we've confronted you with quite a few different texts, ideas, themes, issues and challenges. obviously some of them have been quite difficult and quite wrenching but really, i think, we've seen the course progressing to the time where we would spend, you know, two solid weeks on the rwanda genocide because of its implications for policy in the 21st century because so many of the issues we've confronted crystallize here. there's obviously no sense in weighing one genocide as more significant than the other. but the growing role of the united states as a world power, and the way the genocide in rwanda unfolds have put us in a situation where many of the issues we've grappled with during the semester we have really been in front of you. >> in a way, the rwanda genocide

is the climax of this source. this is the most obvious genocide since the nazi genocide. it's an obvious case. it fits the definition. people were singled out, targeted. there was an attempted exterminati extermination. if they had not been successful in their military endeavors to retake the country in 1994, this might have led ult naetly to full extermination. in a way it's the most complete of all of the genocides. the pace of genocide is frigh n frightening that in 100 days, 800,000 is kind of the official toll or the toll that is accepted. maybe more than a million. it's uncertain exactly how many people were killed but a

frightening number of people were killed. this genocide also produces some serious emotional residents as we've seen also already. we've all felt the emotions of this topic. i think rwanda brings a lot of this to the floor particularly the role of frustration as we counter the international and u.s. soresponse so to this. we stood helplessly by. as you've read de lare and these authors. as you read power. how have you experienced this frustration. what has been your experience as students with this. tiffany. >> de lare, every time he says we could have done this but we didn't do this. every time he mentioned i tried

to get this through. nobody reacted. the reaction was we're not going to worry about it. we won't have the resources. we can't let you do that. it's so frustrating. they had one opportunity after the next to intervene and they never did. >> okay. other responses. yeah, eddie. >> half measures like -- they didn't make true on their promises. especially the international community when it came in regard to mid-may when he called for reenforcements around 5,000. the un agreed on it but none of the countries sent men. they all argued who should sent the men. when it came down to just logistics. it wasn't even about the lives, it was the logistics. the money and resources they koe

allocate to the problem. gentleman i think that's an excellent point. we're talking about resources that -- given the collective resources that could be martialed by the united states, by france, by really any european country that might have had a stake in this. of course belgium sent some people. what was actually sent, what was actually provided by a pittance. that was exaggerating it really. they sent damage vehicles that showed up not in working order with manuals in the wrong languages without parts needed to repair the vehicles needed to be repaired. of course, the number of people and what should have been sent. >>. david. >> for me the most difficult aspect of everything. as you mentioned there were so many logistical and technical

problem that's weren't addressed by anyone at all until they were notified -- until they realized there was a problem. the most difficult thing for me was the empty leadership that came from the supposed leaders. >> right. >> they seemed to be only basing their mission on this symbol of international intervention and the principal that we're going to be monitoring and see what we can do but there was no wait. there was no practically applied leadership to those promises. ultimately when you have that comes is that you need to do something about this. it can't just be words. you can't base anything in symbolism because it means nothing when it comes to the actual ground affects. >> who in particular would you call out for this or the force behind the rhetoric. >> it was the john -- not john but bobo -- >> right dr. bubu.

the cameroon guy who was the original -- >> the one who was really in charge of the entire mission. >> de lare's contacts in new york. their response was always whenever he would give them a report from the field and typically with political leadership is you want to trust the people in the field giving feedback because they are the ones that are actually in the physical situation but they didn't regard anything he had to say. their response was no, you're straying from the bounds of your mission. i think ultimately that was -- to me, it was the most concerning. >> it's so striking to de lare how frequently people he's appealing to are playing defense. they seem to be looking for ways to actively avoid what he's calling for or what seems to be compelling based on the

circumstances. >> often this is out of self-interest. one has to of course analyze motives and take a lot of things into account here but it seems that at times people who should be in sight site 20 clsh 20. we look back and at blatant self interest that seems to be happening or the careerism is particularly concerning. >> to build off of your points and david's points how out of touch everybody seems to be. he acknowledges that in the beginning when he talks about the peace keeping manual is written for a post world war ii manual. i think when you see the inaction but completely out of

touch with what's going on on the ground. even in cambodia, there was the disbelief because that's was not what the modern world was supposed to be. >> right. so what they do -- david raised this point and you raised it again. they do this kind of symbolic show of aide, right? >> never is this more striking than, i think, mad el inn's statement after the pull-out where they reduce the size off troops opt ground somewhere from 4,000 to somewhere around 270 people in the country of rwanda which is the size of maryland with a population of 10 million people or something like that. 270 peace keepers. she says this is a quote that they are to have a quote they

have to have a small skeletal operation to quote show the will of the international community. we're not going to tolerate the killing of civilians so we are going to leave people in the country to show that we have a will. it comes across as completely empty rhetoric. andrew. >> speaking on leadership, what really bugged me was the fact that they always said that even any real force would take time like with the bombing. we had to find the plane and then we had to fine the clearance but when france decided to send in the turquoise -- operation turquoise they were there like that, you know? so that was very frufrustrating they had the capability and there was this bureaucratic paper work to go through. >> or even more frustrating, once the ut decided to get

involved to aid the refugee crisis, 1.7 million fleeing into zyere. at that point, you know, all sorts of aid was marshals. i guess this was a band-aid on the aorta. we're going to do something at this point but in de lair's words. what's the title. >> too much too late. >> too much and far too late. it really lynnings rings very hallow. >> one of the most interehinder things was the fact that you only had a very fall number of

leaders -- de lair was the force commander and he had no poll -- before that the political commander got sick owe he couldn't couldn't come in. you had this unexperienced jep who was supposed to deal with ground work and deal with -- one of the quotes was -- >> what page are you on? >> 106. >> of power or de lair. >> de lair. this writing i think goes with the conversation we're having where he says i also thought that planting the flag would serve the same symbolic purpose was my flag rising. in kanere. he says we were still having endless administration and resource problems. later he says colonel did not

have paper to write with. they had been denied for budgetary reasons. it is maddening i was forced to fight a war over office supplies. it was a struggle to get soldiers in the first place. the fact that they don't have resources to maintain a decent living style. these are failures. >> accept for the belgians. how did they get nice quarters and end up in the situation that they were in. >> it was written in their contract. >> yes. their contact with the united nations that they had to be housed in brick and mortar buildings. this was not for the comfort or the soldiers. it was to put on a good show in

front of africans who were inferior people in their eyes t. was a blatant show of colonialism. that hadn't disappeared in the 1990s even though they had been gone for 35 years. >> i think what'sfru frustrating about this is the denying to resources. all they had to do is sign off on them. when it comes down to where de lair is going to be housed he wants him to be in this nice mansion because he is the force commander and has to keep up appearance. it's ridiculous that he's willing to spend those resources to keep up appearances but not on the resources that they need to be effective in rwanda. >> when we're talking about the

bul belgium -- i struggled on how they wanted to partake with the un just to help out rwanda because they said up the political landscape that allowed this genocide occurred. as i'm reading the book they want to have their own houses spread throughout the town which is a logicalal nightmare. you'd rather have all of your soldiers defenning each other. i don't understand what he were doing back in ree wawanda. they didn't seem like they had a moral reason to be here. they just wanted to come and cause a problem. i think it's also striking coord

the sense of superiority they had and if not a blank check, but the ability to resort to violence. his ability to sort of negotiate in this delicate moment and again, right, the legacy of all of this just weighs so heavily on the circumstances. >> matt raises a very important point here. that is this legacy that the belling yons has makes it puzzling. they instituted the system of identity cards. once they left and rwanda people had to register.

this was -- this identification card the people had to carry was really a signal for persecution. the government placed quotas on certain professions, teachers, government ministers, physicians and people in other professions could not be -- only a certain percentage of them could be tutsi. they kept in place this relic but at the same time, when people find out the belgians are coming in, they are concerned because this is the entrance of their old depressor. there are strange motivations going on all over the place. de lair talks about that. how concerned he is they would react inside the country. what i was going to say is i think it's important to note

that the un when we say this was a un kind of mission, that almost sounds like the whole weight of the un member state was behind it but that's not obviously the case. he writes here when he sent -- >> there are more more obstructionists than there are those aiding. >> when he dinsends it in, he s most countries didn't have positives or negatives or any comments. they probably didn't even read it accept the countries he points out is belgian, canada had concerns about using their own troops so it was almost as if the un were kind of seeing -- you could imagine them saying we are going to go to rue oned r wand rwanda. it has the un name on it so being part of that organization, a total failure and void of

leadership. >> elizabeth sorry we passed you over. >> that actually brought me to another question. how convince are they in the global complacency and the french's idea to remove the upper echelons of the government. >> the local community has been so complacent up to this point. the frechbl see this was a green flag. we can go in. we have this contract. we need to appear superior. >> it was rally disturbing how the colonial legacy has maintained in africa through global complacency that has been there for generations, years, hundreds if of years and how it's not looked at as such in a modern era because we see

ourselves as a modern people. the leg acies of slavery in a modern time and how reluctant we are to face that:the frenchs were getting their old friends out. >> right, exactly. the french are constantly supplying the rgf and supplying that government in the first place. they are getting supplies in. they are getting weapons in. part of the story that is not well known about you. >> aub salubsolutely. that's created tension between rwanda and france. >> it's interesting. in the context of french politics at the time the decision to intervene takes off. you know, there's a couple of

key events. one is when nelson mandela sortly after being elected as president of south africa begins to urge that there needs to be action and intervention. we know that internal french government sources are anxious at that point that the that part of the continent will now demonstrate leadership and they see it as they need to step in and intervene. in the french system you have a president and prime minister. at this moe moment, a got a internal discussions mon the leadership that hey, we're the party with the heart and this is an opportunity to demonstrate that they are, again, cost

calculating and aggressionive action at this moment can demonstrate that we have these moral commitments. it's interesting too. some of this taps into comments that professor young made and david and andrew refers to. when the scope of the genocide becomes increasingly clear by early june that is when you start to get a constituency in the developed world for intervention. one of the real tragic dimensions of this ends up being that significant ben efisharyies of this. consequences of this lead to the displaced camps in ziere at the time the legacy of that continuesed to destabilize the entire region. >> as he says about this and this is in the power book where he is quoted.

my mission was to save rewounda. their mission -- he is speaking about the international mission. their mission was to put on a show at no risk. right? unfortunately, i fear this is actual too often the case with international aid in general. >> uh-huh. >> but particularly in this case, right? these are not oe opportunities nor so many people in the international community that we are doing something about the tragedies that are occurring in africa. let's send diplomats and political figures. president clinton makes it there a few weeks aof the genocide has stopped. these are photo ops but there's no risk involved in any of these things. delair and very few others are left with the entire burden of risk through this entire story. >> drawing from this idea sort of in ters of the intervention i

found myself by his colleagues constantly bring up the fact that there are so many other issues going on in terms of the global community trying to face former oyugoslavia in particula. it was so hard to read that and think what were they doing in the former yugoslavia and bosnia amounted to nothing de lair says i can't help that yugoslavia maybe somebody outside of rwanda would have cared. there's almost this sense that it came to nothing. rwanda got so little attention from the global community and meanwhile the global community and people from the un are saying yeah but we're doing all of this great stuff in the former yugoslavia and we know, of course, that wasn't the case.

>> if you go on in that passage, i mean this comes directly to the united states. i certainly remember 1994 exactly what i was doing at this time. it was a pivotal moment in my life. i personally was preparing to go to africa at that point. i was a freshman in college. i was exactly where some of you are, you know? declare says as it happened, the ree wand rue and y rue and youa was having a hard time knocking the south african elections and american figure skater tonya hearting's criminal charges off the front pages. it struck me that this is the 20th anniversary year and there have been multiple specials on

tonya hearting and nancy karrigan this year, too. i don't watch a whole lot of television but when i turn on the bbc, i see stuff with rwanda. when i turn on american television, i don't see anything. this is terribly concerning, i think, that 20 years on something as big and fundamental to international identity is this still takes a backseat to the tonya hearting/nancy kerrigan soap opera that happened 20 years ago. another story that received attention is curt cobain's death. that also was on too. in the film he may have caught that reference. june twelfth is the murder of nicole brown simpson so the o.j. simpson saga. >> well, nothing will displace

that. >> internationally, too, i was in africa during the trial of o.j. simpson. it was all over the news in south afr aicca the entire time it wad going on. even there people talked about rwanda more than in the u.s. >> it was our oscar apestorius. >> yeah, i guess so. >> i think power encapsulates that really well. he mentioned that one of his main missions was to get media feedback on the crisisesicrisis >> he had mark doil sending out stories on his satellite feed. >> we really gave no attention

to this whatsoever. it's also interesting because our interest was reflected in our government so powers mentioned if we would have put up more of a flight about going over to rwanda our government would have followed what we wanted. >> at this point i was really struck in the power -- in hear n -- her analysis. it ties into something that there's a recognition on the very top members of the american government in materials of policy making that there will be no costs for failure to take action. one of the things that becomes so central to american policy and the way it develops and unfolds and failed to intervene in any meaningful way at all is the calculations that are ultimately made and the way the policy process unfolds. it gets dominated primarily in

the white house. it gets -- they don't defer to the pentagon. they give the pentagon's voice on the danger of any intervention. some of that is a legacy of s m somalia or back to vietnam. >> the way that process unfolds, you know, in essence, the sort of silence of the american people and american interest groups looms so hard. it's interesting compare this to the dar 4 for example, a decade later, even though it is not getting massive amounts of attention across the news, where it is getting attention is among certain key political constituency in congress, in the african-american community that begin to exert pressure on the

state department and white house and just as critically in congress. there you end up with pressure effectively opt government to take a more forth right posture. i don't know if aggressive is the right word. so there we get the united states government in september of 2004, identifying the events in dar four as genocide calling it unequivocally in fact even before the united nations does so. i this it goes to the lack of political will that there is no -- there is no political pressure mobilized really in any way. now, h now, i think one of her main points leadership could have mobilized. that presidents don't have responsibility simply to be buffered in the wind by sentiment on the ground. >> i think it was de lair mentioned or power that the only

rwanda historian in the united states who actually was able to know what was going on was a private party person. a quote from power on this. just to show that they there was no will on the part -- of course congress will respond to constituents. on page 375 of power, we have patricia shrader, a democrat of colorado saying there are some groups terribly concerned about the gorillas. this, of course, is a reference to the gorillas in the mist. the movie that came out in the 80s. this was film partially in rwanda. this is the heartland. there are some groups typically worried about gorillas that

something will happen to them. it sounds terrible, she says but people just don't know what can be done did the people. right? so, i mean, it's just horribly brutally tragically ironic that we have these interest groups in the united states in 1994 who were calling their congressmen and saying please proteblgt tct silver back gorillas but 800,000 people are killed by mashety at the same time anyway. >> one thing that stood out to me was 1994 when they first got reports that cia intelligence predicted the ability of a genocide happened. it talks about how they didn't encourage him to study rwanda and how it mentions -- >> they couldn't find

information. >> how his knowledge of rwanda was a small back that she picked up and gave to him. the whole concept bf colonialism to take the time to slightly understand what they were going into. by the time he got there it was like oh, crap, this is a lot more serious than everyone else is. even off the fact he came back b -- my feeling was the disbelief that how -- the circulation of no desire or interest because of proximity. >> it builds upon itself. it's this vicious circle for sure. >> i was going to talk about constituency groups. what i got from powers was that the u.s. leaders use what she calls micro victories by focusing on people like the rue

and youa academic. it was kind of weird to see how -- >> metaphor of a doll that a child protects its doll. it doesn't have this global vision of everything that is going on around. >> it was frustrating to use these micro victories to validate their semi inaction in there. >> the physical isolation of the country, the un and isolation of his troops in the field and other groups within there. i thought it might have contributed to the lack of will. nobody wanted to listen to him. he couldn't communicate.

>> at one point he couldn't get through the airports. lonl i logistics do not allow him to travel around without serious danger. he cannot contribute to anyone without access to a phone. isolation a very important theme here. >> i think it is ironic. he is sitting here with one satellite phone. he gives it to the bbc guy, get the story out. you would think with all of the foreign countries not wanting to send troops in there in fear of something happening to them, you would think the outside countries are trying to get to him and make contact but it's like people are saying, yeah, he's over there. they don't seem too worried about him. >> here is his wife and children stuck in canada in québec city desperate to find out. this is one of the haunting

things about the de lair book is this -- it's not frequent but sporadic attention to his situation at home. it's never fully resolved. i mean, psychologically this destroyed de lair. these regretted about his family and about the hell he put them through, right, over and over again here just bleeds through at times into the narrative in a way, some of the most hart breaking stuff because it's so readily identifiable, i think. >> there was that one government figure that went to de lair's wife just the way he started the senten sentence. it was almost as if he died nobody would have noticed almost. it was like oh, that problem is done. >> i fear that's all too accurate. at least that's the per spespec.

power backs him up. i think it's probably true. >> another frustration with this is one of the excuses that the american government gives for not being involved but they don't want another mogadishu. they lost what, 14 men? >> 18 marines. >> they lose 18 marines in mogadishu but in rwanda they lose 14 men. >> is this the same phenomenon repeated in rwanda really? of course there's the intervention. this is a chapter 7 intervention in somalia. they break out into anarchy fighting between war worlds in

the early 1990s and interventional aid marshals itself to try to diffuse the crisis to get aid to the people who need it. we have almost street to street or neighborhood fighting in mogadishu between war lords. the international community rallies. the united states gets involved. i think i was a senior at the time when this was happening. >> it was december of 1992. >> that's exactly what i would have been. it date me. >> not as much as it dates me. >> i remember better than i do. i remember my u.s. history teacher in high school had this political cartoon that showed sapt a

santa claus on a sled with his elves having machine guns. that's kind of the international perspective on somalia that this place is worth -- if santa claus is going to pay attention to this, right, than we should, too. there was actually a will there until the tragic events of which -- >> october of 1993 in an effort to relief another part of the fint vengs forces f the pakistanis who were there. u.s. forces get into a fight with forces in mogadishu. 18 get killed ultimately.

this had repercussions unfortunately that they stripped these bodies and desecrated them. mutilated them. dragged them behind vehicles through the streets of modadishu with the cameras of the internainte international community rolling. this became a paradigm of course, for what happens or a lesson for what happens when the international community tries to intervene in the developing world or more specifically in africa, right? this becomes a caricature of africa. of course the chapter seven intervention is going on in the former yugoslavia as well. as we talked about this this

class is a different situation. >> just about to finish the point how this is related to 9/11. people like osama bin laden were watching the events unfold in mogodishu and the perspective was the western world does not have the will to fight. when they are punched in the mouth, they will turn around and walk away. so the idea was if they punch them in the mouth they will not retaliate. the punch in the mouth ultimately was 9:0011. >> that message was perceived. >> that was part the plan. he knew about this via intelligen intelligence. >> the political context about somalia is also very important. november, 1992, president bush loses the intersection to if

clinton. >> we're in that that it's late november. there are images and the story is coming back that the food aid is simply sitting on the dock in mogodishu are being exploited by criminal gangs and using it for political purposes. what i also vividly member about that and the somalia situation is that u.s. sources came ready for combat. they crawled along the beach. at that point there was no combat but they were filmed up close and personal by cnn cameras. i remember there was this odd moment of cnn showing cameras and people in the faces of u.s. soldiers coming ashore.

it gives it this way strange feeling. i think it becomes -- the perception of the american people is we will be there. we will sort this out. the good guys from the bad guys, deliver the food and this will be easy. of course during the summer of 1993, it becomes increasingly complicated. from a policy making perspective, i think we do ourselves a disservice if we underestimate how many somalia looms in people's minds because what starts to develop within the white house and the policy making process is the notion if there is an insufficiently un effort we will be called to pick up the tabment so that's why you get things like presidential decision directed 25 authored by richard clark that outlines minimum criteria before the united nations will agree to

participate in anything whatsoever. clark says these are the strict guidelines for u.s. participation but in fact until we prove a mission led and funded by others where the united states plays a per peripheral roll, so the hurdle to get over becomes extremely high as we move through the events and string of 1994. yeah, elizabeth. >> just a couple of points. i think the under funding of the un's relief to rwanda is outlined in the beginning of delair when he talks about going to the offices in new york -- they are sexier than the peace keeping effort. the dpko.

the unicef reaches out to children. that's something people are familiar with. when you have these peace keeping efforts that go into rue on , rwanda we know children can be taken and educated in the way we want them to be educated. the second point was we were very much -- the aid there was reflecting a cold war aid mentality where we did the derl berlin air lift and we're not participating the motivations that these people have. i think that that refers back to my point about them being out of touch and knowing what is

happening in developing nations because they have only developed with what's going on in the developed world. >> they don't even know what's happening for de lair. he was down to having a glass of water a day to wash himself. he says there was an odor he had picked up. most of his rations went bad. he didn't even have food t. he would try to get more resources and then be denied. this is like the -- he's expected dwhsh they come in to be all proper and stuff and have this front for it. seep not allocating enough resources in general to him just to actually survive. not even to help out but for them to actually survive in there. the madness where he says we're at the end of our water supply

and he says you need to get three competitive bids to fill those bids. >> in that situation. >> i just need 20,000 liters of water that can be brought in easily. >> i'm not a huge proponent of the un. i don't think they are an extremely effective body but i think that is seen in the inability and give them resources because you need competitive bids. theys peop these people don't have clean drinking water and they have to go through bureaucratic red tape to survive. it's bizarre. >> this is just the disconnect that happens over and over again where the people of new york do not understand or make any effort to understand what's going on in rwanda.

there's being it. >> this is a complete failure of the international community but i think we have this idea that we can blame the un and de lair says this is a failure of the member states, not the un itself. this is uncommitted as dave was saying earlier to an ideal but only going halfway. >> it gets in the way as a result of that. it gets in the way of things that might have been done without -- >> it will always be trouble given the circumstances on the ground. the un becomes an enabler fore the pull out given that belgium, after they lose their soldiers zie to pull out. ins the calculation of the rg

dprks that f, that if they killed a few belgium people they would withdrawal. >> this is one of the most damming peaces fieces for the international community here. she pointed out that belgium didn't want to pull out and be the sole bad guys. what did they do. >> they asked everybody else to leave with them. >> yeah. let's call up the united states and tell them we don't want to be the only ones pulling out the here and turning chicken so to speak, right? so let's put pressure on the entire un, this whole operation is botched and going nowhere and dangerous and so, now, let's pull out -- let's pull everybody out. the u.s. buys this. i mean this is our ally. they don't have a invested

interest in rwanda. they begin to put pressure on the un to put out. they are instrumental on the decision to leave. it's really us pressure that causes that. this is one example how it is the constituent members of the un perhaps -- the organization as i think elizabeth pl puloint that there's this bureaucratic tape that just gets in the way. bureaucracy is the enemy to all progress. leon trotski, i think he's right in this situation. even more, i think jason's point is valid that it's the individual member states. perhaps we need to point the finger most strongly at the united states here and say they are the ones that precipitated

the shameful acts that the international community had. >> it's so striking. we know the belgium prime minister early on appeals to secretary christopher and says exactly what you are saying and a couple of other people noted, we can't be the ones who are seen as leaving rwanda to some fate and we jump right on board and say we will support that to pair down the force and veto any effort to expand it and have any more prominent effect. it is a couple of weeks where de lair is getting signals that belgium is thinking of taking a more aggressive role.

he is completely unaware -- in a series of private conversations and a closed door april 15th meeting, the united states is making it clear that there will be no expansion of the international role. again, it sees in part to reflect the experience of somalia but i think it has more issues than that. >> i think that's probably the most troubling thing with that is that the international community can't agree on aid and supporting it but the only thing they can agree is abandoning the country. that's the only thing that gets their full commitment. >> which is the easiest and most problematic thing to do in the first place. tiffany. >> i did want to talk about what surprised me and stood out to me too was the complacency of canada. its inaction because it volunteered de clair to be part of this mission. >> doesn't send out of their own

troops. >> wouldn't provide any other troop besides him. they forced him to pick through a list of people who had no experience in french or rwanda. >> what does this say? this always struck me. i'm not a military person. i don't perhaps understand the mentality but what does that say about de lair other commendable or critical? what can we say about him given the circumstances that he places himself in here? what's going on with de lair and his own motivations? do you want to comment on that, tiffany? >> well, at the beginning he's hoping this will be really good for his career. it will be the first time he will be on the ground. up to some point his men have been involved in peace keeping but he hasn't exactly been to the different peace keeping missions. for him he sees it as a step forward with his career.

after he is actually involved in this, he decides, he realizes that he has to do this for the ree rwanda, not just myself. it is a mission for rwanda. >> the acronym if you recall, it was una, the united nation's aid mission for rwanda but unfer doesn't really work so he takes the mi in mission and takes out the f. he's really committed to that word for. he is a complex individual. i think having this is very full and very long account is helpful in kind of -- he charted very well the complexities of this thing on the ground and in his

own personal motivations enter into this. i think that is very helpful in envisioning this thing from a holistic perspective. >> you had a comment. >> it kind of goes back to what we were talking about. he says he got a phone call from an american staffer. he doesn't even know who they are and what they do. >> what page are we on. >> 499. >> he tgoes he told me his estimates said it would take the death of rwanda to justify the death of an american soldiers. i mean that's what it is. it puts pedestal higher. that's not the idea behind human rights. that's what the united nations is for. >> this is a very important point. what else is going on there? what really is going on there

that this american bureaucrat calls up de lair with really no clue of what he has faced on the ground. his own skpeer yaenexperience a we're just running some numbers here. we need your opinion or your assessment of things. de lair is really confused by this. well, we're just running some cal laces that risculations tha soldier we lose -- that's the equivalent of losing 885,000 people of rwanda. what does that indicate about attitudes, about bureaucracy, about this whole process that we're studying tonight. elizabeth. you had a pretty passionate response to that. >> sorry. it goes back -- what struck me most is the colonialistic attitude and that superior

attitude that the west has to africa because ait is a developing nation and we didn't see any economic gain from being in rwanda. even the people, we didn't see them as economically worth while to invest in. i think it so plays up on the western ethno sent rix that has permeated for centuries and reinforces that you will get this phone call and say here is what we decided.