of the newer generation doesn't know what it takes because they see it all within the twinkle of an eye. music being played, heard and written, what would be the most important lelement congress should look at if we were to look at an omnibus approach. >> thank you for the question. and i want to take a moment to thank you for your performance rights issue, which is critical to us as i indicated in my opening remarks. i think it's really about fair markt value. if we can get our heads and arms around a fair market approach to all contism wents here, that's going to rise all votes. we all have the producer, the engineer, those behind the scenes that are the background of musicians all of them have a

stake here. so we have to address this in a way that each one of them winds up with fair market compensation. >> thank you. may i ask mr. o'neil, what would be the most important element? >> i would agree with the fair market concept. i believe that the fair market aspect of an omnibus bill would be beneficial to all parties. >> if i pressed you a little

further and indicate that had there's this vast market of broadcast media that is not the internet, youtube, how would they play into an omnibus approach so we wouldn't have to go back down a journey of no return, as we've done in times passed? >> i think they'd be opposed to it. i think you're tied to some legacy industries that don't want to change the value of copy right going forward. they all know the value of their own copyright. i think it comes down to the question of what are the scales, what are the balance of payments for those copy rights. >> and you don't think a deliberative approach would draw in those different element sns i'm going to call them different lmts as opposed to labelings, could bring in to the table because if you construct a bill

that just develops a fight, you haven't advanced yourselves. and do you think there is something that would draw more persons to the table? >> i do think that a bill -- yes, i do. i do think it would be beneficial. again, when we started this, i prefer to keep it simple. something focusing on the song writers. or making it broader. it gets a little muddier, if you will. so my official thought was let's protect what we have, but you also have to look at the greater good. >> you might have to come out on the other side in a better perspective. >>. >> i don't think there is any broadcaster in the world who doesn't want to operate in a competitive environment. for instance, the one things

that local television stations would benefit from would be somehow getting the copyright holder to have to clear the performance right at the time the movie is made. not say you have to pay the performance rights even though you didn't have a choice as to what music was used nor can you get it out of the program. so you're kind of stuck with a no-control and you still have to pay for it. it's a pure television problem. >> the gentle lady's time has expired. >> let me, mr. chairman, and the ranking member, thank you very much and just put a comment on the record as i close, mr. chairman. my time is expired but if you'll

just yield me. i do want to say i was fascinated, mr. griffin's comment about the registry and what would trigger it. hopefully, we'll have an opportunity to dialogue. if mr. chairman will give me 30 seconds to hear mr. griffin's answer? >> grabted. >> i'll just say it couldn't be more important than your priority. we call her the register of copyrights. that's her prime function. you've got to win this bill. empower her. give her the resources she needs to revamp that office such that they can properly record and enumerate the rights, such that they can be properly licensed, properly paid, that there can be proper moral attribution of those who did these things such that the history of our culture and our heritage are properly recorded and e newspaper rated. the rest, in some ways, can take care of itself if we do that.

but we do not do that at all. >> i thank you. >> thank you,chairman. we're not going to take the time with each one of you answering. if you care to answer this question, would you put it in writing and get it to me? tell me what your interpretation is of a fair market compared to a free market. >> gentlemen, this concludes today's hearing. i thank the panelists and i thank those in the audience. this standing room-only audience indicates to me that this issue 1 not an insignificant issue and it will be visited and revisited time and again, i promise you. without objection, all legislative will have five additional days to submit materials for the record. this hearing stands adjourned. >> here's a look at our line-up tonight in prime time. coming up on c-span, a look

at the origins in the universe and the search for professional life. on "book tv," hillary clinton. and right here on c-span3, it's a look at the civil war in 1864. a recent conference at the gettysburg conference zichl war institute. >> thank you very much. i'd really like to thank the center for population health and

the professor, woody carlson. i'm. >> reporter: pro . >> i'm very proud to be here. i've said that fertility crime is here and this is one of the key issues of our contemporary times. the point is where do we go from there? >> i grew up not far away from the theater in milal. maybe i developed a bit of a voice. >> so i will make my key point

first and start developing elements and then i will go on and talk about happiness. i will try to tie up my discussion with policy issues and then glad to take some questions. first, some apologies. i would rather be eurocentrick in my presentation. >> the easiest thing is how does

it work? if you are in a society that is doing well, we tend to do better. there are some challenges and maybe the u.s. is one of the societies where we have some challenges and maybe that's tied to, say, the same issue that i'm going to discuss today. but, usually, what we know is that within a society, the better off. it's relatively straight forward. in my grags, i have a simpbl definition of demography. so i start with that. migration usually works this way i won't discuss that too much. this is a representation of what

usually happens with fertility. so this is fertility rate. in the past, some soets were around agt or so, maybe lower. as societies develop, this fertility rate drops. they go down because we assume with something called the demographic consumption, family size is associated with low levels of development. when we go through higher level of develop. ment, we tend to have fewer kids of higher quality.

so what is the point? when i started working on this data, we had some observation of the lowest point up to the time. so in the mid '90s, italy and spain reached a minimum of 1.2 children and was unknown for maximum size population. it had been unserved, previously, in some cities, but not a big population. using my comparative advantage, i start to study this fell father or mother non, and, of course, the question was, will we stop there?

so this fertility relationship will go request forward. and within societies, usually, fewer kids. this is a little bit the opposite of the health. okay. so here i have a little quiz for you. where do family haves more kids now. we have a bunch of countries and the last one, the united states. on the left, louisiana. here, we have the united states. australia. massachusetts. where do people have more kids, in brazil or the u.s.

whether people have more kids, is it iran or no? thailand or australia. louisiana or massachusetts. >> you were right only on the last one. so you can work on different kinds of data. you say i'd like to specify that low numbers matter a lot here. so for fertility rate, it's a little bit like inflation.

thailand, australia is the striking one. that's tied to my point that there's a level of development. it is one of the biggest countries, if not the biggest country, china. so my key point is at the end of this process, we'll be in a new regime where in societies that are better off they will be higher than lower.

within societies that are better off in terms of achieving their family. so my colleague here, starting from the u.s., i'm assuming that societies are officially home mo gene yous. they discuss converging destinies of social grounds and that may be something that is explained the last line there. but i will stop there to discuss the demock ra fill of the united states. so the key point is that in the end, is there will be a situation in which we don't associate low fertility with low being but we do associate with social problems.

so how can we deal with that? usually, these ys come from different fields. so we tend to emphasize with compliance and let's say allegiance to religion, and that's a big value shift. it's according to the

performance spreading all over the world. and the last boints is changing institutio institutions and policies. and institutions and policy that is matter for family and fertility choices are not simply there, but they change over time. and that's crucial for this reasoning. and it's a little bit less discussed in the literature. where we tend to take these factors. some of these changes are universal. so we have to cope with that. so the value in the family life is something that is unlikely to be reversed.

it's unlikely that we go back to traditional values on family, if we see from this long term process. so we basically have to adapt to that change. it's unlikely that we go back to a situation where there is more gender inequality. i think we can take this to irreversible changes. meaning, if we want to take this to public policy, it's hard to see policies that aim to go back to when that era and people put an emphasis on traditional knowledge or where they put marriage -- i'm so far ri, emphasis on a traditional house of laborware.

only when this kind of change is aligned with something that is closer to the new edition. and we will get back to that. do we have data on this? first of all, these are basically trying to work with commerce and the school of economics. basically, i'm not showing you data but stylized facts. so in a paper published in 2009, we publish this shift.

this relation that seems to be important, but problematic. this relationship is basically inverlted. so at certain levels of development, and that can be shown with some care. and they have replications and challenges to the findings, i think, the findings are still solid. but at a high level of development is fertility reversal. when we get to extremely wealthy societies, among these soets, the better off the higher fertility rates. so the relationship between societal level will be, as measured by something that is called human development index

or a combination of economic well being, health and education. and fertility becomes positive. it's not a big surprise who for some of the fertilities problem to see the relationship between fertility and other factors. but it's, i would say, it's a surprise about development because the idea that the family is tied to high development is such an entrenched in soet. >> so this is the development on the total fertility rate on the vertical access. there are some changes to emphasize lower perspective.

if we look at the '70s up there, the necktive lelation ship is there. >> if we look at the '80s, if negative relationship is there. if we look at the '90s, the negative relationship is there. so my point is if you look at the end of 2000, the first time you will observe a clear reversal is the need to touch. so the emergence of something that indicates in your regime is pretty recent. it corresponds also to a wellness of demographic change.

so around the year 2000, people start to talk about low fertility and governments. so there has been something that is potentially explained in this change. it's a new phenomenon. one of the consequence social security that we have to be careful when we speak about demography. sometimes, demographic relationship changes quicker than we can expect. i assure you if i continue this graph, it will still look like it doesn't feel it, actually.

so these are united states, netherlands, france, italy and spain. basically, here, we are tracking the evolution of time and fertility and development for confidence. there are exceptions. the most interesting one here is japan. the most important one is japan because it's also consistent with observation on south korea. basically, there seems to be no sign of reversal.

that's very important. and, actually, even if i started low fertility in an era where people are in southern europe and eastern europe as the low fertility count. here, we see some diverse jens between the plan and japan and korea. so the reversal is there it's consistent that we may go with a new regime. contrary to our standard knowledge. of course, in the u.s., maybe

it's too early to see that. i'm not having an idea that is applicable to this conference. something that is interesting goes on if we want to start a more careful relationship. the reversal let's say some additional reserve, and i'm not showing you too many numbers. i mean, i will show you more later, but i can discuss them later. so additional reverse show that is the reversal is due to fertility about page 13. okay. 13, as a kind of -- we should not take this as a religious structure. it's basically one way to divide fertility in the '20s or earlier and fertilities 234 the '30s or later. so it's due to what we would call older age fertility.

so fertility and why that it's not reversal if you take fertility up to age 30. it's keeping ontowards the diminishing direction. so something that was very clear from the starting of the emergence of low fertility was that the postponement of fertility was generalized everywhere in wealthy society. there was the exception of eastern european. and it's consistent with one of the chiefs that are unlikely to change. we cannot easily come to a situation where people have voluntarily.

there is instance with an earlier fertility. so the key is fertility about ange 30 and education specially fertility. in a low-per tillty society, having children is still the most universal phenomenon. so there is a part in the low fertility society, we have fewer charges for the soits with higher fertility. so gender is the postponement. the second issue is about gender. so with saw japan as an example

with a little bit more refined analysis. what we could show is all societies characterized by the society with gender relationship were symmetrical. again, nothing may not be a surprise for starting this topic. but it's something that goes along the old and new regime. so the new regime is only emerging in gender equal rights. in a study of confidence at the yuchbt of pa par and myself, we basically could show that both intentions of higher order, let's said two and the child went, and you already have one, are higher where in societies

where men contribute more to house work. and when there is more work. the way is to have men become fathers, more. of course, there is a way which was pioneered in the west, but now it's the chinese, japanese way. you can understand that family life may be challenged.

here i show you some reserves. this is just fathers. here, i'm arguing with fathers of children. so, in this case, it would be

the u.s. in societies where high fertility, and fathers with no college degrees, bassically, there has been a convergence. educated fatherings become fathers in a full sense. there is a general plan. in the meanwhile, the time has been a little bit constant. so no women have indicated sfaurs with that increase. but there is a convergence across society. that's probably part of the date of the emergence of the change we have seen.

we don't have data on society's where gender is inconsistent. this is a gender situation moving up. but, unfortunately, we have to stop looking at data for other counts. but it will be interesting in the future to see what happens to fathers 234 countries where a substantial number of volumes use data report zero times so this reversal is consistent with other reversals. in the audience, one of the

first to discuss when known in fertility with encounters and women work on the labor markets it is a bit of a reversal, a strange reversal. other reversals showing in societies where we have traditional family behavior. so lower emergence of rep ewe tagsz. actually, one of the challenges that that has now been taken by several papers is divorce rates tend to be positively affected. so that could be expla naxs of that. you can have one child per couple.

but if everyone has one child per couple, the only way to get to two kids is to have two couples. the point here is that this reversal is situations where fertility behavior is something that in the past was considered anti-fertility. so in the new regime, if there is anything like that, i would say fertility and looking at the decision, i've no longer set up against society. they may get alompk. happiness.

the whole idea is that becoming a father or a mother is something that we do for life. it's one of the few things that you cannot easily unmangle. of course, you can do that if you want to give up kids for adoption. so if i use my basic wife to have a child now, so there are two points one here is that contraception is as smooth as before. let's say the new regime is

that. of course, when that doesn't work, there's a sign. akd r and, yit, the point is about will i feel better. if i have a child. it's projected happiness. it's something that is difficult. it's something with decisions. so what happens if we look at the individual well being? i can show you some evidence to this. fertility is snou positively related. ovk, that's a very debatable

measure. here are the data. basically, some questions and so much happiness where other serves are compliant: and you can see with the exception of turkey, the highest happiness and the highest total fertility rate up there for the u.s. the lowest happiness includes the lowest fertility rate for bulgaria. so at the cross country level, there is an association. not a very strong one. but there is an association between subjective well being and fertility. there's a kuch 8 of french

notorious for the lower efl of happiness chlts and there is a whole literature on why on surveys people don't capture extremely well. it also depends on whether we're in difficult situations reich encounters that come from italy. when when you have this nice lunch, dinner and good time. >> the other point is think about the projection of, well, while being in the future, we could have started the actual projection and this can be done in specific service. and will can show that people who project their life would be

enhanced by having them actually intend to have kids. there seems to be something like that.

here, if you were melting technicalities, i would just illustrate the results. basically, what we show here is that people who are happy here tend to have a higher ability while having a first child or a second child. when you get to two kids, your happiness doesn't matter any longer. so we cannot predict intentions by using happiness. but let's go back to the numbers. so we stopped it with itly. here, the economics is really the first and, more so, the second. so, of course, it does not

matter whether someone has a larger family, whether many people have larger families. it's not something that we could say isly in the past. so happiness is a prerequisite of fertility. and we could show that in other ways. for instance, on a couple level, it's been shown where there is a more equal division of labor or a higher satisfaction of

division of labor will intend to have a next child compare to couples where there is a lower satisfaction. so a little bit about data. the new issue is how does this new fertility regime emerge i'm

thinking of the possibility to metrics and this is the single cause for the big changes that we are going to serve. there has been cultural change and maybe there are some aspects of killture that are not changing. so cultural change is there. everyone wants autonomy. there are some cultural things that change much less. do you trust other people? or do you only trust people within your family? and some of the results are

showing that the reversal or the change is presenting high levels of trust. and a brilliant doctoral student of mine is looking at trust in child care. basically, if you think about that, it takes a lot of trust to get your kids to school. there is a big emphasis on families. so low, generalized trust. and even an extremely good child care facility in japan are not changing. so some of these long standing and more stable, cultural factors may explain why some societies go fast er or they don't even go to the newer issue. and it's also the case that

families is in soet where there is low gender. so it's difficult to separate the two aspects. oh, there is also economic change when times are getting better. of course, it's easier to think about increasing development. the other is changinger in tillty. institutional change and not touching that explicit ly expli instance, there has been another pension reforms. what do pension reforms do to

the emergence of the new regime. anyway, many changes are going simultaneously. and what is the cause? also, because it's she can enact problem. a nice example is father's leaving. you probably know the skand knave yan countries kind of like policies that sometimes actually force behavioral changes and so some of the reforms were aimed towards forcing to take leave around the birth of a child. and we're speaking of the maternal leave is taken for granted.

both have the nice effect of attachment. and having people that have to go to work the day after the birth of their child is something that may have an effect. and, of course, in that case, it may change. on the other hand, how do people come to accept this kind of policy changes. there is something called elections, where, again, we are in the u.s. family-related issues are very much debated. but they can change.

people can change ideas on issues around marriage, for instance. and that may change actually policies and constraints for individuals. so it's very difficult to say whether policies are changing culture, or culture is changing policies. there is probably a common trend, if you ask me, what's the silver bullet, i would say probably educational expansion is something that is a common trend in this place. and the educational expansion is not discriminating between genders, it's making it so that women are catching up, and in most cases having higher education than men. and that is driving many of these changes. what's the problem there? why do we get into the thailand situation, or the japan situation? sometimes we are caught in the

middle. so there is an old regime which is working, couples are specialized. they have fertility relatively early, stable family life, no cohabitation, very traditional. and you get in the end point, there's no specialization. there is cohabitation. there is more participation of fathers. and maybe you get two kids. again, when we're caught in the middle, this is a graph from a paper from barcelona. so here the development i mention is the women revolution. so again, it's difficult to separate development and gender equality. at least looking at some

countries, we can see that there has been an increase in development without a kind of -- a big change in gender equality. and you have a situation where fertility is high in the traditional situation, with traditional gender roles. the old regime, fertility's high again in the end point. because people can afford to have the new type of two-children family. but in the middle, we go down. and we can potentially be stuck there if there is no movement towards women's revolution. for those of you who like the models, there is one model that you can think of. in the median model you have a tipping point potentially. because assume there is a referendum on voting for some

policies that -- for some market solution that enable more work family -- better work/family combination. more favorable toward working mothers or more favorable toward working fathers. assume 30% of the mothers out in the work force, and the family only on that, basically if it's 30%, the majority will tend to vote for the old regime. because that's in the interest of the majority of voters. so you will stick with the old situation. assume it's 70% working mothers, it's easy to think that the electorate would elect the family work situation. the tipping point is when whenf mothers, or50% of households having voters have mothers who are in the labor force, and that's something that may change

because of pure educational expansion. and that will explain why there may be a tipping point there. the other point i'd like to make is, okay, what about young people. so, one of the interesting things was that in low fertility societies, young people tend to stay in the parental home the longest. coming from the country of the late stayers of the parental home and low number of children, you have a little bit of a competitive advantage in research. and this is the old regime. total fertility rates in '75. and median age leaving the home -- and these are european countries. so what you see here is that fertility is higher in countries where kids are staying home longer.

it doesn't really work particularly well. if you think about the inequality, it seems staying at home will make you having kids. and of course, it has to do with a combination of policies that are favoring youth autonomy, or something that is prone to family life. and in this case, there is a tradeoff between favoring young people and favoring family life. there's good news here. this is the same graph in 2008, and the relationship has reversed. as many of the relationships in the last 20 years. and in countries where young people are not doing well, if you think that leaving home late is a measure of not doing well, fertility is lower. policies that are favorable

towards families are also favorable towards youth autonomy. that's also something relatively new, because we could think that this tradeoff was there. we could either go towards traditional policies aimed at families, or youth policies. now they're part of the same package. so let me sum up. in the old regime, the -- one of the key words was, development is the best contraceptive. that was in the population and development conference in bucharest. i wrote budapest, but it was bucharest. i apologize for that. bucharest, romania, 1974. fertility was downwards, and basically in bucharest, again,

we don't need to have an explicit demographic policy, what we need to have is a development policy, and people will have fewer kids as we develop. in the new regime, if we get to the extreme, but the argument is that we will get to the extreme. so today's china, tomorrow is india. china is now caught in the low fertility situation. tomorrow is india. tomorrow is mexico. today's already brazil, by the way. so not too far away from this kind of thing. in this case, increases in fertility is moved upwards. traditional behaviors were positively related to the old regime. now they are negatively related. so new behaviors are positively related to fertility. there was a crucial role of fertility of younger ages, and now there's a crucial role of

fertility of higher ages. it all ties together. i mean, we are talking about work/family combination. we're not talking about fertility of students. we are talking about fertility. people who have a profession, and something to do with that. in the past there was a crucial role of gender specialization, and deviations from gender specialization were against fertility. now there's a crucial role ofci gender equality and deviations from gender equality are against fertility. one thing that i think is particularly important for people to do research in this area, family related cultural institutions and policies are a given, when we look at the old regimes. but the emergence of the new regime is part of these changes in culture, institutions and

policies. and the adaptation to this cultural change is crucial. and i'm afraid we cannot get away from having political debates on these topics. because, again, to have a better combination of work and family life, to have a happier work and family life, to allow people to choose their own lifestyle, it takes policy changes, and sometimes there are strong views on what is appropriate and what is not appropriate. but policy debates are unavoidable if you want to get to the end point of the new regime. in the old regime, there are traditional values. and in the new regime, happiness and life choices are compatible with individual happiness. so this is the good news. in the old regime, men are breadwinner.

sometimes with zero child care and household task. in the new regime, man can be, and want to be actually, fathers participating to the development of their children. i thank you very much for your attention. [ applause ] coming up tonight on c-span3, panels from the gettysburg college civil war interstuts conference on the war in 1864. next, robert e. lee's strategy guess the union army of the potomac. you lice es s. grant strategy in virginia. later, a look at the sand creek massacre, an attack on an indian village in colorado territory. and after that, a talk on confederate general john bell hood's campaign in tennessee, that resulted in the almost total destruction of his army.