that's what this commemoration year is about. to tell that story and to lift every voice and to sing. >> a three-day fourth of july weekend starts friday on american history tv, including the 200th anniversary of the star-spangled banner friday at 8:30 p.m. eastern. saturday night at 8:00 visit the college classroom of professor joel howell as he talks about u.s. government human radiation experiments conducted after world war ii through the cold war. and sunday at 8:00 p.m. eastern, a preview of presidential historian jeffrey enangle's manuscript on george h.w. bush and the peaceful end to the cold war. daniel stein of the federation for immigration reform and benjamin johnson of the american immigration council discuss whether immigration to the u.s. hurts or helps the country. after that, charles murray of the american enterprise institute looks at american exceptionalism. plus your phone calls, facebook comments and tweets.

"washington journal" is live at 7:00 a.m. eastern on c-span. next on american history tv, brian craig miller of emporia state university discusses confederate general john bell hood's campaign into tennessee in the fall of 1864, resulting in the almost total destruction of his army. this event is from the gettysburg college civil war institute's annual summer conference that took place in june. it's about an hour and 15 minutes. >> good afternoon. i'm peter carmichael, the director of the civil war institute. also professor of history here at gettysburg college. it's my pleasure to introduce brian craig miller. brian is associate professor and associate chair of history at emporia state university in eastern kansas. he teaches a variety of courses

in 19th century u.s., including the civil war, of course. he is the author of several books. john bell hood and the fight for civil war memory published by the university of tennessee. and he has recently edited "a punishment on the nation: an iowa soldier endures the civil war." this spring his latest book "empty sleeves: amputation in the civil war south" will be released by the university of georgia. he is also the book review editor for one of the main journals in our field, "civil war history." this afternoon he is going to be speaking about "remembering the destruction of an army, john bell hood's tennessee campaign in myth and memory." i welcome brian. john bell hood's tennessee campaign in myth and memory." i welcome brian.: john bell hood's tennessee campaign in myth and memory." i welcome brian.

>> thank you very much. to everyone here at the civil war institute and to my dear friend pete carmichael for that very, very kind introduction. it's very nice to be here this afternoon. and you look like a very happy, vibrant crowd after lunch, which is good. you're probably the army of tennessee at the beginning of this campaign, more so than the end. in january of 1865, john bell hood visited with mary chess chestnut and the family of his recent but fading love interest sally buck preston. as hood sat with the preston family in conversation stories filled the room pertaining to the civil war. hood mourned the loss of so many dead, described battles as defeat and discomfit tour, and bemoaned "my army is destroyed." the conversation quickly changed subjects to add a more jovial aura to the occasion but hood

simply sat, his mind somewhere else, and he did not lesson. jack preston, who offered his residence as a place for hood to stay, pulled mary chestnut aside to have a brief conversation. preston remarked, he didn't even hear a word she was saying, he has forgotten us all, did you notice how he stared into the fire and the livid spots which came out to his face and the huge drops of perspiration that stood out on his forehead? yes, chestnut replied, he is going over some bitter hours. he feels the panic at nashville and its shame. jack preston pushed further, and the dead at the battlefield of franklin, they say that was a dreadful tight. and the agony on his face comes again and again. i can't keep him out of those absent fits. it is pretty trying to anyone who looks on. when he looks in the fire and f forgets me and seems going through in his own mind the torture of the damned i get out and come out as i did just now. what had happened to john bell

hood, who has certainly been described by many historians as not the brightest bulb in the confederate chandelier of high command. as an officer, hood showed an enormous amount of promise as he effectively led his beloved texas brigade into action under robert e. lee's at pivotal moments during the seven days, antietam, briefly at gettysburg before wounds removed him from the field. now roughly six months after receiving command of the army of tennessee, hood rested on his crutches and stood amongst his friends that day as a battered, defeated, and emotionally broken man. my talk today will try to chronicle the history but more importantly the memories of hood's ill-fated tennessee campaign in the fall of 1864. i come to you today not as a military expert of these campaigns but as a hood biographer, particularly one who is interested in how we as generations of americans have remembered this complicated

figure. while hood formulated a campaign plan that lifted the spirits of the confederacy and generated a wealth of excitement in the midst of devastating defeats around atlanta, hood lacked the luck, the resources and the manpower to achieve one last standing victory in the midst of so many ruinous military failures. after he lost his leg at chick awalking ga, john bell hood returned to military command as a core commander in the army of tennessee in 1864. from the moment of hood's arrival in north georgia, drama emerged between the diva triumvirates of confederate leadership. jefferson davis, who many don't know was voted most likely to secede in high school -- that's an old joke, old as jefferson davis, probably -- john bell hood and everyone's favorite general, joseph johnston, ultimately leading to johnston's removal and hood being named as commander of the army of tennessee. davis decided that johnson had

receded just too much ground to sherman in front of the city of atlanta, that now holding that community proved tenable at best. hood faced a precarious situation as a newly appointed commander and thus decided to throw his army at cher pan in a series of battles around atlanta only a few days after ascending up the chain of command. the blood-letting did not deter sherman who now worked to encircle the city which forced hood to flee atlanta six weeks later. although the army of tennessee had lost over 30,000 men in the course of four months, they still remained a formidable force at roughly about 39,000 strong. according to the new orleans daily pick aunion, when we come to georgia where we are told hood's army is only a debris of the past, a demoralized mob, we actually find a large, compact, tried and patriotic army which despite all its misfortunes is still game. in the days following atlanta, john bell hood stood at a

crossroads. this fighting general needed a plan. he needed to orchestrate a military maneuver so bold it could eradicate the failure at atlanta, not only from the minds of confederate citizens but also alleviate pressure that lee felt as he stood trapped within the city limits of petersburg. hood's force was simply not strong enough to stay in atlanta and attack sherman so he decided to leave atlanta to sherman and turn his eyes northward toward tennessee with hopes of defeating the union force stationed within the city of nashville. then he wanted to continue northward through kentucky, drive across the ohio river, and reunite with lee in order to drive grant out of the trenches at petersburg. he thought that the very threat of his presence in the region would force grant to leave lee alone. although many historians have called this plan pure fantasy, scripted in never neverland, and the delusions of a drug-addicted buffoon, the confederate populace at the time had a very different reaction. one newspaper wrote, in either

event hood's movement is as promising as it is bold and daring. actually, hood had conceived part of this plan as far back as the spring of 1864. in a letter to jefferson davis he wrote, my heart was fixed upon our going to the front and regaining tennessee and kentucky, to regain tennessee would be of more value to us than half a dozen victories in virginia. if hood had found the success that he wanted, the confederacy might achieve a series of stunning victories to prolong the war to the point of northern disillusionment. yet if hood failed any hopes of confederate success in the west would likely dissipate forever. hood's plan got quite a bit of accolade from the confederate civilians. george pfeiffer irwin remembered in a letter to his sister, everybody seems to be taking the movement of hood very quietly. though it appears to me it is one of the most important movements that has been made since the war. ella thomas residing in georgia

wrote in her diary, the deep gloom which hung over us just after the fall of atlanta has been lifted from our midst and the movement of general hood has brightened both the army and the people. the rank and file soldiers exhibited the same optimism as the confederate populace. one soldier wrote, now we are living fine and expect better times when we get into tennessee. hood worked to gather shoes and clothing throughout september resulting in the state of the army to be according to the soldiers in excellent spirits. alex spence reported to his parents, i am pretty well fixed for the trip. a new pair of boots and a good suit of clothes. general hood has got the army in good fighting trim, marching trim. despite this optimism from the civilians and the rank and file, jefferson davis remained concerned and decided to pay hood's army a visit. on his way he stopped at macon, georgia, where he found himself having to defend putting hood in command as a ceo has to listen

to irate shareholders. if i knew that a general did not possess the right qualities to command, davis declared to the irate crowd, would i not be wrong if he were not removed? i thus put a man in command who i knew would strike an honest and manly blow and many a yankee's blood was made to nourish the soil before the prize was won. after rallying the folks in macon or attempting to davis then spoke to the soldiers who were less than thrilled to see him but he told them, be of good cheer for within a short while your faces will be turned homeward and your feet pressing the soil of tennessee. with the visit concluded hood's men prepared to disembark within the next few weeks. captain george irwin, an assistant quarter master, described spirits at buoyant. samuel t. foster said, the whole army right now is in hey spirits as the troops began moving in mid-october. reports came of one continued shout for miles. the men cheered general hood

when he comes about them and say, if he will only take them back to tennessee, they will be perfectly satisfied and fair well on one ear of corn apiece per day. that's a lot of optimism on one ear of corn. as hood departed he issued some orders to his troops which got a hearty response. william barry hill remembered and general hood issued an order to these troops when we started on this raid saying that he would not force them to ever charge any strongly fortified positions. time would surely tell if hood could live up to this promise. when hood moved northward he started retracing the steps of previous months of campaigning. demanded the union forces there immediately surrender. hood fervently declared to the federal ouchts, if the place is carried by assault no prisoners will be taken. the union troops though refused to capitulate. clark weaver, the union commander there, replied back to

hood, in my opinion i could hold this post. if you want it, come and take it. hood decided to follow his promise to his soldiers and not attack this garrison. in his memoir he explained, in officer should allow his soldiers to burn and pillage after victory has been secured. instead of recklessly hurling his troops against the garrison, hood decided simply to observe the enemy and move northward, destroying the railroad between rosaka and tunnel hill throughout mid-october. the army of tennessee prepared to cross the tennessee river at guntersville in late october. however, without nathan bedford forrest's cavalry, as well as a lack of provisions for the army to move on their own, hood moved further west to decatur, alabama, to cross the river there. private coleman said, they looked sad and low-spirited. some of the men were nearly barefoot. had few clothes. but the weather being warm, they seemed that they could stand it.

rations were scarce also but they were ready to do or die in the attempt. the charleston mercury at the time reported whole regiments are barefooted while blankets with any of the men are rather the exception to the rule and there are some regiments who have not been paid in 15 months. the waning support for the war effort throughout the confederacy hampered supplies yet the paper hoped that the country promptly could forward any supplies that they had or general hood goes into kentucky and tennessee and captures them there or there would be great suffering amongst his troops. delays and dwindling supplies sapped the enthusiasm that had been exhibited by the soldiers. robert patrick wrote, i have no confidence in hood's abilities. he is a good, rough fighter. when that is said, all is said. he hasn't the knowledge of military affairs that joseph johnston possesses. champion duke in a letter to his wife predicted that hood will fail in his object inject, in my opinion. another soldier explained

nothing seems to work right here anymore. the trains are all mixed pell mell, nobody knows where to find anything or anybody, there are no bread rations. the problem here with food rations led private e.g. littlejohn from texas to write, we have suffered more for the want of something to eat on this campaign than on any previous one. having been compelled to eat parched corn right ahead. north alabama left no breakfast of champions for the soldiers to munch on other than animal, corn, and acorns as hood kept waiting for godot, i mean nathan bedford forrest, to ever show up. although crowds of women came to see the army as they passed through florence, alabama, the southern populace had no food to distribute. the crowds of confederate spectators that did come out could not alter mother nature's grip on the region, particularly the tennessee river. the roads were described by brigadier general tyree bell as

the worst roads on earth. rain swelled the rivers and horses drowned amidst the speeding current. forrest did not arrive until november the 16th which resulted in hood having spent weeks trying to get into tennessee. he explained this to jefferson davis that high water and the fact that i had to draw supplies from through a department not under my command involving delay in their reaching me have retarded my operations. but due to the delay, hood wrote beauregard on november the 17th stating, i have now seven days' rations on hand and need 13 days additional. please use every effort to have these supplies passed forward. the army finally crossed on november the 20th as the river levels fell and moved the army ahead. as hood prepared to fight and face off against union commander john scofield near columbia, tennessee, whom cher han had detached from atlanta to deal with hood's invasion. the enemy must give fight or i'll be in nashville before

tomorrow night. hood even sent a telegram to jefferson davis on november the 28th stating, the enemy evacuated columbia last night and are retreating towards nashville. our army is again moving forward. i have no difficulty about supplies and anticipate none in the future. the optimism had certainly returned. as scofield pulled out of columbia and moved north ward, hood continued his pursuit. he told his army after they crossed the tennessee river, you march today to redeem your valor and your arms, one of fairest portions of our confederacy. this can only be achieved by battle and by victory. sum it up in behalf of a consummation so glorious all the elements of soldiership and all the instincts of manhood and you will will render the campaign full of awe pishs fruit to your country and lasting renown to yourselves. at spring hill, tennessee, on november the 29th, 1864, hood had the opportunity to outflank the union army and trap john

scofield. if hood could eliminate scofield's army, he would have a clear path into nashville and prevent additional troops on the union side from arriving to further solidify the city's defenses. but in order to catch scofield, someone had to block the main pike in order to trap him. hood ordered benjamin cheatham to attack and block the pike, supported by alexander stewart's corps. however, cheatham's men, especially those led by patrick clay burn, did not know where the union defensive position was located due to the fact that forrest's cavalry had never even scouted the ground. when cheatham rode to meet with hood he found the general quite irritated. hood remarked, general, why in the name of god have you not attacked the enemy and taken possession of that pike? cleatham explained that he did not act because he was waiting for stewart, who was supposed to assist him, who in turn never arrived because hood had told him, stewart, to stay at rutherford creek.

hood remarked, the men have had a hard day's march and i do not you wish you, stewart, to march your whole corps up to the right. it will be too far for the men to march. thus, with the men being shuffled about in a confusing fashion with little knowledge of the precise location of the union force, no one attacked or moved to block the pike. the opportunity to capture scofield slipped away into the night. the next day, november the 30th, 1864, hood, who was quite disappointed with the missed opportunity at spring hill, attended a very tense breakfast of fried ham, hot biscuits, and steaming coffee. where the accusations over the failure at spring hill flew faster than morning than the biscuits did. hood alleviated the blame from stewart telling him, i wish you and your people to understand that i attach no blame to you for the failure at spring hill. on the contrary, i know if i had you there, the attack would have been made. but despite his own mistakes hood decided to blame cheatham and his attitude according to

cheatham at breakfast was wrathy as a rattlesnake. a few days following spring hill hood will rescind his recommendation to the confederate government to promote cheatham. hood had every right to be angry because he realized scofield had escaped making this campaign plan now ten times harder. but at the same time he clearly erred, hood did, not making his instructions increase call clear to both cheatham and stewart. furthermore, the soldiers in the army realized a tactical error had been committed, which reflected poorly on hood's command ability. j.p. cannon wrote, every private was impressed with the idea that a fearful blunder had been made and many remarks were made uncomplimentary to those in command. of course we were not in position to know who was responsible for this failure. the lack of clear communication between hood and his core commanders has prompted some historians to claim that hood had been drugged up on laudanum

or drunk at spring hill. historians look at confederate scout john gregory's claim a few hours before the spring hill engagement, there had been a good deal of drinking among the officers. gregory claimed that cheatham had been drunk and other support nate officers also had reached the point of intexas case. john johnson, a soldier with nathan bedford forrest, claimed whiskey was the true root of the failure at spring hill. other historians have suggested since hood had been strapped to his horse since 3:00 a.m., it may have placed the general in a state of utter physical exhaustion resulting in him taking painkillers, especially if hood's horse had taken a fall on a muddy, badly rutted davis ferry road they were on. now, any analysis that bases failure at spring hill on alcohol or drug usage is problematic, particularly with the limited amount of evidence, and of course in the 19th century there wasn't a walgreens on every corner open 24 hours for hot to get more painkillers. while it is documented that

drinking took place among the officers there are no specific references that day to hood being drunk. furthermore, there are no sources indicating that hood had taken any painkillers to alleviate his constant pain from the injuries that he had suffered earlier in the war. until evidence appears directly indicating that hood had been drunk or under the influence of narcotics, they cannot be included in the analysis of why the army of tennessee failed at spring hill. the failure to know the precise location of union forces, coupled with hood's inability to effectively communicate with his officers, result in a failure that really did not destroy this campaign. flanking scofield at spring hill would have certainly helped hood in his ambitious plan but the incident here is nothing more than a missed opportunity. even with the mishap at spring hill, hood later remembered, i hereupon decided before the enemy would be able to reach a stronghold at nashville to overtake and rout him, since i

could no longer hope to get between him and nashville. the afternoon following the tense breakfast, hood decided to send his nearly 20,000 man army forward against an entrenched position over a stretch of field at the small town of franklin, tennessee. thus, in many ways, breaking his earlier campaign pie crust promises of not attacking against entrenched positions. formulating a plan from the william harrison house outside of franklin, hood surveyed the field and announced, we will make this fight. moreover, the highest perfection in the education of troops well disciplined can only be attained through continued appeals to their pride and through incitement to make known their prowess by the substantial test of guns and colors captured upon the field of battle. soldiers thus educated will ever prove a terror to their foe. hood planned for this newfound military higher education to take place that afternoon around 4:00 p.m. thus, the battle of franklin

commenced. one union siege commented, it was worth a year of one's lifetime to witness the marshaling in advance of the rebel line of battle. emerging from the woods in the most perfect order, two corps in front and one division in reserve. nothing could be more suggestive of strength and discipline and resistless power than was this long, great line advancing over the plain. the grand scene of the soldiers marching in line in that late afternoon turned chaotic as the confederates attacked again and again to the point where blood actually ran in the ditch and in places saturated our clothing where we were lying down, remembered one confederate soldier. bullets shot across the landscape, according to another, with one unceasing volley. confederate general patrick clay burn personally led an assault that briefly broke the union position in the fight near the gin house near the easternmost point of the union position. hood ordered clayburn at the

start of the battle, commanding him, general, form your division to the right of the pike. i wish you to move on the enemy. give orders to your men not to fire a gun until you run the yankee skirmish line from behind the first line of works in your front, then press them and shoot them in their backs as they run to their main line. then charge the enemy works. hood spoke that day of the importance of the task placed before clayburn by emphasizing, franklin is the key to nashvi e nashville, and nashville is the key to our independence. now, even though he thought the charge was a mistake, clayburn remarked, general, i will take the works or fall in an attempt. union reinforcements under general emerson updike halted the confederate advance, resulting in the death of clayburn in the midst of trying to achieve this victory. the continual two-mile frontal assaults against the union army failed to dislodge scofield from his entrenchments. the confederate army did have early success in smashing a hole in the center of the line, but

union troops rushed forward quickly to close the gap. in the attempts to break the union line the confederate dead and wounded piled up quickly. sergeant major arthur falkerson of the 19th tennessee had his body torn by 16 different bullets during the battle. private walshham also in that same regiment declared, oh, this one scene of butchery will go down the ages in history as a blank page in the memory of our lost cause. amongst clayburn's man, general hyrum grandberry who led texas soldiers forward only to be struck in the cheek with a mini ball. another eyewitness remembered throwing both hands to his face as in the impulse of the instant to find where the pain was, he sank forward on his knees and there half sitting, half crouching with his hands over his face, he remained rigid in the attitude in which the bullet with its flow and its swift coming of death had left him. general henry clayton commanding

his division came later to the field and recalled, moving rapidly up the road to franklin we came up the balance of the army at spring hill and all soon moved onwards to franklin. we found that bloody and disastrous engagement begun and were put in positions to attack. but night mercifully interposed to save us from the terrible scourge which our brave companions had suffered. the brutal fighting moved a private in the 11th tennessee to recall, two men on each side of me and one behind me were shot dead. we would drop and load and rise and fire. the second man on my right while i was down was shot through the head and fell dead across my body. one of abraham brewford's men, part of the confederate cavalry, remembered, our whole line would have been swept away had we not been ordered to throw ourselves on the ground, not daring to raise our heads nor crawl forward even a new rods to give succor to the wounded and dying. during the battle general hood decided not to use his artillery

to its fullest capacity. because of the women and children remaining in town. a few months earlier, hood had engaged in a very tense debate through correspondence with william tecumseh sherman over the killing of civilians with artillery shells during military campaigns. while hood understood that casualties can come with any war, he did not appreciate how sherman had fired on civilian populations for weeks. according to hood, well beyond the defensive positions of the confederate army. the correspondence with sherman must have influenced hood's decisions that day in regards to his own batteries and firing on civilian populations. hood did later recall that he planned to use artillery if needed the following day, but that battle never game. w.l. truman, a member of the 1st missouri field battery, wrote, general hood gave orders that not a cannon should be fired. we cannoneers begged our officers to let us go into battery. they told us they wanted to do it as bad as we did but could not disobey orders.

with the confederate artillery remaining silent truman saw the impact of union shells stating, i saw one shell from the battery explode immediately in front of our advancing line and at least ten men fell in a heap and never rose again, but the line never lost step. firing slowly died off in the late evening hours and scofield decided that evening to retreat to nashville, giving the confederates control of field and therefore a technical victory. but it was one that came at a bloody price. hood claimed that the loss in killed, wounded and prisoners was 4,500 and that the number of dead left by the enemy on the field indicated that his loss was equal or near our own. in reality, hood lost nearly 7,000 irreplaceable soldiers compared to about 2,300 for the united states, and among the officers lost 14 confederate generals and 55 regimental commanders, either dead or wounded. his battlefield report stated,

about 4:00 p.m. november the 30th we attacked the enemy at franklin and drove them from their center line of temporary work into their inner lines which they evacuated during the night leaving their dead and wounded in our possession and retired to nashville closely pursued by our cavalry. hood concluded his field report to secretary of war stating, our troops fought with real gallantry. we have to lament the loss of so many gallant officers and brave men. at the same time, though, hood justified this attack, explaining how he had no other choice with that lost opportunity back at spring hill. he later remembered the attack which entailed so great sacrifice of life had for reasons already stated become a necessity as imperative as that which impelled general lee to order the assault against mill when our troops charged across an open space. as the smoke eventually cleared from the field of battle, the grim reality of death and destruction began to settle into the hearts and minds of the

soldiers. the scene of so much human ruination left impressions for years after the war. the scene allowed one confederate to recall, the crimson from chivalrous sons simply stain the field with color so heart-rending it can never be forgotten by those present. william barry hill recalled, they say that it is horrible to behold. they are laying, men in piles, some across others, in some places the yankees and confederates are piled up together. bowers, a member of ferguson's battery, said, general hood stopped close to where i was standing and took a long view of the arena of that awful contest. his sturdy visage assumed a melancholy appearance and for considerable time he sat on his horse and wept like a child. when hood received word reporting the death of clayburn, he took the cigar out of his mouth, according to an eyewitness, lowered his head, and wept for half an hour.

as the residents of franklin began to clean up the mess of war, 8-year-old alice macphail nichol said, we saw a man sitting in a chair in our yard. he looked so sad. and grandpa told me that was general hood. moss cal carter, resident of franklin, recalled that although hood was said to be a rash fighter it was hardly thought he would be so reckless enough to make a determined assault on the formidable works in front of him. immediately after the battle, captain samuel t. foster gave vent to frustration and anger. on december the 1st he wrote, general hood has betrayed us. this is not the kind of fighting he promised. this was not a fight with equal numbers. even though it kind of was. and choice of the ground by no means. now, foster, who was an ardent supporter of joseph johnson, criticized hood's inability to fulfill those campaign promises. but his most telling words about

hood followed. he wrote, the wails and cries of the widows and orphans made at franklin, tennessee, on november the 30th, 1864, will heat up with fires of the bottomless pit to burn the soul of general j.b. hood for murdering their husbands and fathers at that place that day. it can't be called anything else but cold-blooded murder. and the word murder was capitalized in both instances. reverberating the deadly effects of casualties on the heart and soul of an already shaky army. foster concluded that hood had sacrificed those men to make the name hood famous. in the end, however, foster concluded, it will make him infamous. now, since hood called this battle a victory, many of the soldiers stood dumbfounded on how a victory could be declared because they were so focused on the thousands of horrific

casualties. one mississippi soldier recalled, god grant i may never again behold our victorious van so deeply dyed in blood, the blood of the noblest and bravest men who battled in freedom's cause. the bodies on the field held a look with ghastly faces and glassy eyes, remembered another soldier. the dead, according to one mississippian, expressed supreme fear and terror now frozen on their countenances. he described the mental agony they had been enduring before death had released them. fred hughes, another mississippi soldier, recalled, we had so many wounded that all could not be removed and an intelligent humanity now became necessary. when the search party reached a friend of hughes' who had been hit by a grape shot, a blanket was drawn over him and he was left in his broad alone to die. not one word of spiritual comfort, not even a friendly touch to ease his pain. the only sounds, the groans of the wounded and the murmurs of the dying.

as his friend perished from the earth, hughes noted that the temperature dropped that evening and declared, the blessed merciful god sent the cold to freeze his blood that his pains might cease and he passed into peace. by dislodging the union army, hood moved forward towards nashville. he issued words to his soldiers and officers offering them congratulations on their big success that had been achieved through heroic and determined courage. hood acknowledged that although the soldiers would lament the fall of many gallant officers and brave men, his army still had sent the union forces in disorder and confusion into nashville. the confederate force, despite some misgivings, regroup asked now marched to nashville. joseph cumming remembered, we had an abundance of good food. beef, mutton, pork, flour, and potatoes. but despite this new influx of food rations franklin weighed heavily still on the minds of the men as they trumged northward.

one missouri captain remarked, our army was a wreck. i can safely say that just two such victories will wipe out any army the power of man can organize. as they filed out of franklin one soldier recalled, nothing better calculated to afright and demoralize an army could have been devised than the exhibition of the dead as they appeared to those who viewed them there in marching past the gin house that morning. captain henry clay weaver, a member of the 16th kentucky, wrote a letter to his sweetheart in which he said, franklin taught me the horrors of war. and remember, darling that while i cannot consent to call myself a base coward, i cannot even yet think of some incidents witnessed on that bloody field without a cold chill running over me. as the remnants of the army of tennessee moved into position around nashville, hood decided to order his men to throw up earth works and await attack as he told one chaplain that he planned to force the enemy this time to do the attacking.

as the army waited in the entrenchments the weather, which had been reasonably mild for december in tennessee, drastically changed on december the 7th with a blast of cold air followed now by five continuous days of ice and sleet. with several soldiers without shoes, clothing, blankets, and with food rations on the wane, the weather proved a formidable opponent as the soldiers sat, forcing them to now look for sticks, twigs, or even possibly dirt as a means for shelter. hood's men would only have to wait about a week for the attack to commence. mostly due to the enormous amount of pressure union general george "the rock of chickamauga" thomas received from grant. attack hood at once and wait no longer for remount of your cavalry. there is a great danger of delay resulting in a campaign back to the ohio river. grant's panic may have rested on a report from major general george stoneman who told him, bristol papers say hood has

been -- has whipped thomas badly and hood is on his way into kentucky. thomas urged grant to let it go and that he would attack as soon as that frozen region had melted. thomas attacked on december the 15th, 1864, advancing all along the confederate position. soldiers from texas protected the far right on the confederate line. hood declared texans, i want you to hold this hill regardless of what transpires around you. hood trusted in the soldiers to protect the flanks of the line. but the texas trues, sensing hesitation, decided to unleash a volley of lead and then stampeded the union troops, halting any further attacks on the confederate right during the first day. thomas though remained confident after the first day's action and he wrote, our troops behaved splendidly, all taking their share and assaulting and charging the enemy's breastworks. i shall attack the enemy again tomorrow if he stands to fight. and if he retreats during the

night i will pursue him, throwing a heavy cavalry force in his rear to destroy his trains, if possible. during the night, hood ordered his soldiers to dig in a new line two miles backwards towards the south and prepare for the fight the next day. that next morning, joseph cumming had a strange memory of hood. he said, we were in the saddle by daybreak of the 16th. while we waited the house for the general to limp out and mount the ladies started to appear at the upper windows. cumming noticed that the women had recently awoken for he recalled, they held the curtains across their perpendiculars up to their chins and over those breastworks, that's his pun not mine, gave us their wishes and blessings. however, that humor quickly dissipated as the first rays of daylight gave way to war again. when thomas attacked and opened the battle with a two-hour bombardment followed by an assault with heavy double lines against the confederates at

overton hill where thomas believed the confederate line was the most vulnerable. the attack including colonel c.r. thompson's brigade of african-american troops stormed up a slope only to be swept away by musketry and grape shot. the federalists regrouped and charged again 30 miles -- excuse me, 30 yards from the confederate lines, only to be shattered by the confederate defenses. at some locations, dead men in blue lay five deep. 30% of all union casualties occurred at the assault made that day at overton hill. meanwhile, along the rest of the confederate line, matters worsened and quickly. at cha hill union artillery delivered deadly crossfire to the troops. seasonals fr . the heavy numbers of union soldiers overcame the confederate positions and stormed forward. basil duke recalled, a major on

general hood's staff told me after the men commissioned leaving the line of works that every breathing thing -- man, horse, jack, mule and dog -- all turned their faces toward the franklin pike and ran as hard as they could, everything frightened almost to death. william dudley gale, while witnessing the retreat, wrote of a woman named mary bradford who ran out under heavy fire and did all she could to induce the men to stop and fight but her appeals fell on deaf and defeated ears as the day and the dreams of getting into kentucky faded into darkness. with the confederate line broken beyond repair, the union army continued forward and drove hood from the city of nashville, forcing the confederates to leave behind 54 artillery pieces. hood lost about 4,400 men killed, wounded or missing. again, suffering several irreplaceable casualties now in the face of a stunning union victory. as the confederates departed nashville hood called out to his men, boys, the cards were fairly

dealt at nashville and thomas beat the game. sergeant james stevenson of the 19th tennessee quipped back, yes, general, but the cards were damn badly shuffled. the plans that davis and beauregard had approved for the of tennessee and any hopes of success in reviving this confederate independence movement in the western theater collapsed on the frozen ground along the cumberland river. nothing could replace the thousands of dead and now dispirited soldiers who had endured hood's tennessee campaign, resulting in what war clerk john jones called an irretrievable disaster. the army of tennessee had become a ghostly resemblance of its former moments of glory. the horses who had not eaten anything for hours resembled the walking dead as they fairly staggered over the rough roads. finally after these horses rode an additional 52 highs, joseph cumming recalled, we got a scanty supply of forage for them.

the country was desolate and barren and everything near the road in the way of the horse feed had been consumed by our army during the invasion. the army of tennessee now disillusioned to the point of despair complained about their commander and longed for a day back when joseph johnston was in command. john forsythe recalled, hood's army is not worth the value of a regiment if that officer is retained in command. is a shattered debris of an army and needs careful yet vigorous handling to now hold it together. most importantly, hood's plan of reuniting with lee vanished in the midst of all of this fire and destructive lead. as the disasters of franklin and nashville reverberated throughout the south, a cloud of gloom once again settled over that general populace that had been so excited about this campaign. one citizen simply noted, it is a truly gloomy time. henry garadell called the loss at nashville simply very disturbing and with hood beaten

he noted, this miserable war drags on and on. in a letter to his wife melinda, grant taylor wrote, as to going to the cavalry i have no idea if i can get a transfer. i know i cannot get one to go with jack and if i could get one to go with wick i would have to go to the army of tennessee and be under old hood and i do not like that thought. taylor knew that as a member of the cavalry he would not only avoid the bloody engagements the infantry had faced in recent weeks but he would also get to ride a horse, especially after the hard travel many of the soldiers had endured during this campaign. others looked to blame hood not only for the loss in tennessee but also the ease with which sherman ransacked the state of georgia. william pitt chambers stated, the campaign inaugurated by general hood in september has proven the most disastrous of any we have yet sustained. chambers looked at the dual consequences of this campaign recalling, in addition to the loss of an army and its

equipments, a way was opened for general sherman to march through the entire state of georgia, which he promptly did, leaving a broad train of desolation behind him. the same level of criticism came from other soldiers. david pearson wrote a letter to his father william dated january the 11th of 1865. this letter read, i presume you have heard all the bad news that was on hand about a week ago about sherman's taking savannah and hood's defeat in tennessee. it was the worst of the war and spread gloom and dismay here btss. pearson wrote men of sense and position were freely talking on the streets of our being whipped. he concluded, such has never been the case before and it clearly shows the ominous state of affairs. we are in a bad fix and everybody knows it and feels it. if something is not done and that speedily, all must be lost. sarah wadly recalled, hood is defeated, lee threatened, the

yankees are in exexalt. the insurrection they say is about to collapse. writing to his brother asserted that hood has again been badly whipped near nashville. he wrote, i have only hope that we might get his army back again from tennessee. now i very much fear that it will be entirely destroyed. it is simply too bad, he remembered. basil duke recalled, general hood is very unpopular at present but a great many hoff certificates say if his orders had been carried out or even obeyed, tennessee would have been ours today. now, duke pointed the finger of blame at cheatham who he once again returned to the fact that cheatham had disobeyed an order at spring hill. duke proclaimed that cheatham had been ordered to attack at that place and did not do it but let the enemy pass a short distance of him. even though the army failed at nashville, duke observed that the enemy was repulsed several times with great slaughter. robert keane, who had been horrified by the nearly 3,000 wounded confederates who had to

be left behind at nashville, observed that disasters have come thick and fast. he pointed out the fearless loss left hood fleeing with the shattered remains of that unfortunate army which has never yet fought under a general nor gained a victory except the sorrowful one at chick ka walking ga. heavy casualties at franklin and nashville shattered the optimism of robert keane who had been so excited about the campaign in october, now all of that hope seemed to vanish like a flash of gunpowder. james feelen in a letter to jefferson davis in january of 1865 described the present unhappy condition of general hood's army. noting that the physical wants have been satisfied but the emotional state of the army remained in shambles. as feelen noted, its spirit and morale are simply gone. the army of tennessee had been reduced to a mere mob without spirit but out of mute us in anger and without hope or care for the future.

even with this conclusion in regards to the condition of the army, feelen did not take the opportunity though to lash out at hood. instead, he called hood a gallant, true man. deeply do i sympathize with him in his misfortunes and earnestly do i labor to sustain his palsied arm and defend his noble character, remembered feelen. hood, according to him, had continued to believe that the morale of the army had not fallen to devastating levels, as witnessed by feelen. instead of placing the blame on hood for the failure of the campaign, he concluded, hood is only human and we can all well appreciate the causes which prompt him to hope and believe better things than appear to every impartial eye and mind. truth when terrible is hard to bear. but safety abides only in its utterances. with hood's army no longer threatening to prolong the war, abraham lincoln spoke with his cabinet in washington and told a parable about a man named slocum and his bulldog.

slocum was described as a certain rough, rude, and bullying man. and he possessed the same characteristics as his bulldog, or vice versa. the two terrorized a small community in illinois and one day a neighbor came up with a plan. lincoln said, seeing slocum plodding along the road one day, his dog a little ahead, this neighbor took from his pocket a chunk of meat in which he had concealed a big charge of powder to which he had fastened a deadwood slow match. after the match had been lit, the neighbor threw the chunk of meat onto the road. the bulldog saw the meat, licked his lips, and gave one big gulp of it. after enjoying the morsel of meat the dog took a few joyous steps forward and then suddenly blew up into fragments. a four quarter lodging in the neighbor's tree. a hind quarter on the roof of a cabin. his head in one place, his tail in another, and the rest of the

dog scattered all along the dusty road. when the dog's master slocum came to view the remains of his beloved bulldog, he cried out, bill was a good dog, but as a dog i reckon his usefulness is over. heen conthen offered the moral of the story. hood's army was a good army. we have been very much afraid of it. but as an army, i reckon, its usefulness is over. with failure dashing all efforts of the tennessee campaign and a rising sentiment against his ability to command, hood decided to resign his position on january the 23rd of 1865. in his official report to davis, hood noted finding so much dissatisfaction throughout the country. hood asked to be removed with the hope that another might be assigned to command who might do more than i could, hood hoped to accomplish. hood separated from the army of tennessee at tupelo, mississippi, and returned to richmond. he departed with a farewell

address saying, in taking leave of you, accept my thanks for the patience with which you have endured your many hardships during the recent campaign. i am alone responsible for its conception and strived hard to do my duty in its execution. hood returned to richmond and constructed his official report of the campaign. to no surprise, hood's report blamed joseph johnston for his early conduct during the atlanta campaign and he blamed william hardy for the failures in the battles around atlanta once johnston had been removed. hood remembered, i was placed in command under the most trying circumstances which can surround an officer when assigned to a new and most important command. hood maintained that the position through the rest of his life, never letting go of this belief. after hood died in the post-war era an obituary writer re-examined moflt into tennessee and recalled a post-war conversation that he had had with the general. hood explained, do you know what

a for lorn hope and is what the duty and position of the officer who leads it? when the oy bit water writer acknowledged that he knew hood impressively stated, then i have nothing more to say. when word reached confederate military personnel of hood's campaign report a flurry of angry and overly dramatic correspondence erupted. a festivus of airing grievances against general hood. a few anonymous reports appeared in southern papers that blasted the tone and language of hood's official report. joseph johnston wrote to hood, after reading your report as submitted i informed general cooper i should prefer charges against you as soon as i had the leisure to do so and desired him to give you that information. william hardy wrote to john breckenridge to refute the report stating, it is well known that i felt unwilling to serve under general hood upon his accession to the command of the

army of tennessee because i believed him, though a tried and gallant officer, to be unequal in both experience and natural ability that is so important to command. he questioned hood's failure to be on the field of battle at crucial times during the war and further asserted that hood allowed an enemy superior in numbers to pass unmolested around his flank and that he failed to attack with his whole army. furthermore, he wrote, hood directly, noting, i cannot say that i am much surprised at the character of this report. my question certainly indicated that i at least suspected you to be capable of attempting to thrust another between yourself and responsibility. hardy accused hood of committing slanderous words toward a brother officer. hood replied hardy's correspondence had been filled with insults and imputations and demanded an immediate retraction of that statement. hood's report did receive abundant criticism in the

newspapers. one editor hoped the confederacy could simply forget about the horrific failures at atlanta and tennessee but that was no longer possible. general hood would not have it so, said the editor. a great part of his report consists of controversy against general johnston. it must now be at least admitted that if general hood cannot conduct a campaign, he at least could go write a pamphlet. the editor did not necessarily blame hood for the failures of the campaign, but instead blamed jefferson davis for naming him to the position in the first place. he wrote, i will be admitted further that general hood is a brave and patriotic officer, and in his proper sphere has done good service. in fact, that in all this transaction he was not so much criminal as unfortunate. but then his countrymen were more unfortunate still. while hood's name had been dear to his texas brigade when he led them through storms of fire,

everything changed when he had been named by davis to command the army in an evil hour, according to the editor, who concluded, the country sympathizes with general hood on that sinister present emotion, but desires for future if possible to be permitted to simply forget his name. in a letter to jefferson davis, governor isham harris reflected on hood's career and the reason for failure in tennessee. he wrote, i have been with general hood from the beginning of this campaign and beg to say, as disastrous as it ended, i am not able to see anything that general hood has done that he should not or neglected anything that he should have done which it was possible to do. harris not only justified hood's actions but also justified his inactions as well, commenting, indeed, the more that i have seen and known of him and his policy, the more i have been pleased with him. harris concluded, if all have

performed their parts as well as hood had, the results would have been very different. now, harris in this sort of laudatory memory of general hood here anticipated in the end that there would be a flurry of blame that would be placed on the subordinates of hood and their actions at franklin and nashville in stunning clarity that day. these phases of blame would emerge over the next several decades and even today in the modern era as the war of words began to explode upon the print landscape and the memory wars within the lost cause. thank you very much for your time today. i appreciate it. i will be happy now to as best attempt to answer any questions or thoughts that you may have.

>> on? oh, yeah. would you place address how the new book by steven hood has been received among hood scholars? >> the new book by steven hood. i got a chance to meet steven hood a few years ago. steven hood has written -- i believe it is the rise -- pete so is good at these book titles. the rise, fall, resurrection, something along those lines, of general hood. i think that as a hood scholar, and there are not many of us at all, would say that there is -- it's a big tent, right? hood is a very vibrant, illustrious personality that i think there is room for lots of different assessments. i would encourage you to read steven hood's book. it takes a very different approach to remembering john hood than wily sword has done. most of the book, as hood's medical lawyer is mostly entitled a reply to general johnston, steven hood's book is

mostly a reply to wily sword. he sort of steered clear of me, he leaves me alone for the entire book. i would encourage you to pick it up, to engage it, to see a very different side of what john bell hood is presented. hood -- steven hood is trying to go i think more to a more positive side of general hood, whereas other historians have been more on the negative side. and my belief is probably the real hood falls somewhere in between. yes, sir? >> lee elder from ohio. we are given sort of two different versions of hood early in the war. we hear about some of these sweeping movements that he proposes. he proposed one here at gettysburg. but then the two battles that you were just talking about, in that era he drives them straight ahead. do you have any idea what lengths these two individuals -- was there -- is there a reason for that or was it just the circumstances that had him change his attack? to is on to speak. >> hood always seems in the

positions that he's placed in command, whether -- it always seems to be a heavily offensive maneuver. in fact, robert e. lee calls on him, especially at gains mill, he's forced to do something important at each of these junctures early on in the war under lee's direction that results in horrific numbers of casualties but did in some ways help bring about success or blunt a unioned advancement. i think it's that sort of mantra that's part of hood's fighting dna, if you will. he believes in aggressive military maneuvers for the most part. this is why -- his whole complaint with joseph johnston during the atlanta campaign is johnston is receding ground, he's not fighting. hood claims there were several times he recommended to johnston, this is the time to attack, but johnston wasn't do it. once hood is put in command of the army he immediately attacks and attacks and attacks and this whole campaign is just another series of offensive maneuvers. i don't think hood, even until nashville, until all the

disasters of franklin had happened, does he become into a point of mind where he has to be on the defensive and then he simply has no choice. he is outnumbered 2-1 at nashville. nashville is a heavily fort tied city that has been occupied as you know by union forces since march of 1862. it is a very tough nut to crack. and it certainly wouldn't have been broken open by an offensive maneuver. so maybe it took that reality to actually change hood's sort of very aggressive fighting tactics that had sustained him through the whole war. it brought him accolades. it got him moved up the command structure. but it also led to his ultimate downfall.