of what i call -- what the next war might look like and this is the explosion of the atomic bomb in new mexico. and i always like to feel when i show these pictures that, perhaps, it will remind people that we ought to remember what world war ii is like and that world war iii would be like. and i want to say what one scientist aptly put it. he said the atomic bomb is here to stay. the question is, are we? and that brings us to the end of our film and thank you very much.

in the summer of 1864, general sherman marched south from chattanooga into georgia with the goal of capturing atlanta. after a series of battles andity siege of the city, atlanta fell to the yun i know on september 2nd, 1864. setting up sherman's march to the sea later in the year. this was part of the gettysburg college civil war institute's annual summer conference. it's about an hour. >> before we get started, the map you see up here is a campaign map on the left side insert there is are the smaller maps indicate the main battles. i know it's probably difficult for those of you in the back of the room to see the small details and maybe read the print and so, what we did or actually what pete's staff did was included in this -- your so

hopefully, most of you have this. if you turn the page 9, you'll see this map in there. you might waptd to refer to this. this is probably a little easier to read. but we'll be making frequent or i'll be making frequent reference to the campaign map that will help us understand the course of the come pain. as general and chief of all union military forces in the spring of 1864, u.s. grant devised a grand strategy involving coordinated offenses by a number of union armies stretching from louisiana all the way to virginia. as you know already, the two most important of these offensives were those of the army, the potomac, here or in virginia, rather and that of william t. sherman who commanded the military division of the my

opinion. grant's orders for sher man is for the campaign dated april 4th, 1864, were pretty straight forward. grant told sherman to move against the confederate army of tennessee, commanded by general joseph e. johnston and to break it up. and then get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can. inflicting all the damages you can against their war resources. at the same time, sherman was supposed to prevent 'johnson from detaching elements of his army to re-enforce either lee's army in virginia or confederate forces out in louisiana. and that is sherman's objective then in the atlanta campaign. if you look at sherman's record during the civil war up until the spring of 1864, in many ways

it not that impressive, particularly if you look at his performance on the battlefield. if you look at chickasaw bluffs during the vicksburg campaign in december of 1862. if you look at chattanooga and missionary ridge, sherman's -- the attacks that sherman has launched in those battles have been piecemeal. they've been repulsed and he doesn't have a particularly impressive record on the battlefield. sherman's reputation then today rests primarily on what he did in 1864 and 1865, to implement grant's grand strategy. sherman targeted not only the army of tennessee, but, also, the ability of the southern confederacy to wage war and this is part of grant's larger strategy, too. during the campaign in the spring and summer of 1864, the

city of atlanta symbolizes the way that the confederacy waged war. the city was a vital rail center in the deep south and was filled with important war industries. factories and mills turning out uniforms and shelves for the confederate army. sherman also sought to demoralize the confederacy soldiers and to these people that their government could no longer defend them. sherman said, war is cruelty and you cannot refine it. sherman is eminently quotable individual as many of you know. in his letters are absolutely superb. i would highly recommend sherman's civil war, the selected correspondents of william t. sherman. one of the ems important edited volumes in many decades. brook simpson, on the faculty

here is one of the co-editors of that. throughout the atlanta campaign, sherman largely avoided launching frontal attacks against his entrenched opponent. instead, what he repeatedly did was utilize maneuver, flanking movements to rest the confederates from strong defensive positions. i think sherman's greatness also derives from his mastery of logistic. keeping an enormous field army supplied day after day after day, very deep innen deep innen territory. sherman's army numbered over 100,000 men and had 28,000 horses. 33,000 mules. imagine trying to supply an army of that size, day after day after day. the only way to do us, of course, was via railroads.

sherman in the months leading up to the campaign which began in may of 1864, had hundreds and hundreds of trains moving down a rail system through kentucky and tennessee, stockpiling supplies in nashville and chattanooga. in chattanooga alone between the months of march and may of 1864, there's 145 rail cars unleading on a daily basis there. so he's building supply bases that he'll need as he advances into georgia during the campaign he had about 5,000 wagons that were constantly on the move from the railroad to the army and the field. as richard mcmurray, the foremost scholars of the atlanta campaign writes in what is one of the best overviews of the campaign and like some other speakers you heard, i'll throw out some titles.

mcmurray's atlanta 1864 is a very, very good overview. if you're looking for one book that gives you an overview decision in the west by albert kass castille is an great book. sherman had a couple of big advantages over his opponent at the start of the atlanta campaign. first sherman had command of a vast apartment stretch from the appalachian mountains from the east to the mississippi river. he had command of the troops within the vast military division in the mississippi. johnson, on the other hand, commanded a much smaller department. he had no authority, johnson, that is, over the states of alabama and mississippi. he couldn't order fighting in georgia. and he had the strong support of his military and civilian

superiors. sherman and grant had a close relationship and the lincoln administration was also very supportive of sherman's campaigns. lastly, sherman had an army that on average, during the campaign it was 40% larger than that of the army of tennessee. the start of the campaign, around 110,000 men. sherman okay mabded what i believe today, would be called an army group. that term didn't exist in the 1860's. he commanded three separate arms. the largest of these was the army of the cumberland. numbered close to 73,000 men at the start of the campaign commanded by general george h. thomas, a professional soldier and if you look again at the performance on the battlefield, thomas had a for more impressive record than william tooer t. sh. he won the first major military victory in the west up in

kentucky in 1862. he performed sue bevly and saved the union army. as many of you probably know. they had smaerted the kochb fed rat lines at missionary ridge. thomas was an impressive soldier. and some historians argued that thomas would have made a better commander of the federal armies during the atlanta campaign than sherman but thomas did not have a very good working relationship and he alluded to this yesterday in his talk when he was talking about the campaign of 1864 and come mass had a reputation as being a very slow, methodical soldier and that caused sherman frustration during the atlanta campaign, actually. thomas is a very, very important

subordinate but he's an army during the campaign under sherman. the second largest of sherman's armies, was his old command, sherman's old command, the army of the tennessee. it was his favorite army. and it was also the most successful union army of the civil war. the recent book of the army of tennessee by ven woodworth is entitled nothing but victory. that army never knew defeat on the be the battlefield. its commandser during the atlanta campaign was james b. macpherson. a west point graduate and he served on grant's staff earlier in the civil war and he was a great, great favorite of both grant and both men wrote that they they could see macpherson

commanding all the union armies. sherman writes a letter he predicted that if something happention to him, if something happens to grant he feels confident that macpherson can take command of the union armies and win ultimate victory. the smallest of sherman's armies the core of the army of ohio. west pointer and someone who and who performs very well during the campaign and it has three divisions of calvary numbering about 8900 men. although sherman doesn't think very much of his of his calvary generals or that branch of the service, i think you can rightfully criticize and his poor employment of calvary during the atlanta campaign.

he thinks, in fact, that the confederate and he's particularly worried about the campaign about the he's worried about the campaign under nathan b. forest. the close relationship that existed between sherman and his civilian superiors stood in start contrast. and johnston and confederate president, jefferson davis. and the strange relationship between the two dated back to the earliest days of the war and there was wrangling over the issue of rank. which general should have the highest rank in the confederate

army. a superb essay about this with about joe johnson. so the relationship between the two men is very, very strange during the atlanta campaign, too. in the months prior to the advent of the campaign, march, april of 1864, jefferson davis repeatedly asked johnson on the maps if you look in the corner up there, it would be your upper left-hand corner, you can see the red lines on the map up here indicate the confederate positions taken during the campaign. the blue lines are the federal positions. during the first few months of 1864, the confederates are encamped around the town of dalton, in extreme northwest georgia and the army had been shattered to battle missionary ridge in november 1864 under the

command of bragg. it had been a humiliating disastrous defeat for the army and johnston is brought in and johnston, in some ways like george mcclellan. he's a superb organizer and motivator of men. he boosts the morale of the soldiers and the confederate soldiers many the army of tennessee love joe johnson. and they respect him. they know he cares about their welfare. so that's really one of johnson's great strong points as a general. but while he's rebuilding the army of tennessee in its winter camps, jefferson davis repeatedly asked johnson to take the offensive against the federals who recant not all that far north of dalton in the vicinity of chattanooga, tennessee. so davis wants johnson to march up into east tennessee. but johnson claims his army is outnumbered by the yankees.

the army of tennessee doesn't have the adequate supplies or logistical capability of marmging marmg ing marching up from east tennessee. and the davis administration the getting a very different report concerning the army of tennessee from some of johnson's subordinates so is core commanders and calvary commanders. they are sending back reports that the army is in great shape and should take the offensive. so the davis administration is unsure who to believe, although davis is more inclined to the core commanders, i think, than johnson. during the campaign, then, up until the time of his removal, one of joe johnson's chief weaknesses is his continual failure, day after day, week after week, to provide davis and his administration with detailed regular reports of what's going on. if you look in the correspondent section of the official records

and compare lee's correspondence with davis during the overland campaign with what joe johnson was saying, there's a stark contrast. johnson's wife, in late may, 1864, suggested to her husband that it might be a good idea for him to keep the government better informed of what his plans are. and johnson says, replied to her that her suggestion was that a judicious one but that, quote, the people in richmond take no interest in any partial affairs that may occur in this quarter. suggesting, obviously, that what jefferson davis is really concerned about are events in virginia. johnson's strategy then in the spring of 1864, was to remain in a strong defensive position around dalton behind a high ridgeline west of the town calls rockface ridge.

you can see it on your maps there. and awaits an attack by the federals. and when the federals attack the confederates would defeat them after gaining a victory johnson would then move probably west into alabama and then north up into tennessee. johnson's army at its peak strength, a few weeks into the campaign, the atlanta campaign when he receives reinforcements about 69,000, close to 70,000 men under the command of william jaerks hardy, john bell hood and the bishop general, polk. he could command a separate army that was brought called the army of mississippi and it became a core in johnson's army. johnson had a calvary core that numbered between 7 and 8,000 men under the did minimumive joseph

wheeler. the campaign began from the first week of may of 1964. and sherman's plan that george thomas original ly with some modification, sherman modified what thomas had envisioned. sherman's plan is over the the army of to demonstrate against the confederate position north and west of dalton. so to keep johnson's attention focused in the immediate vicinity of dalton. macpherson's army then would and west of rockface ridge and you can see on the map up here, again in the upper left-hand corner, the movements of the three armies or you can look on your map there. macpherson was to march 12 miles south of dalton and west of rockface ridge and cross through

a narrow passage called snake creep gap and come out on the eastern side of the ridge line and on the western atlantic railroad in the vicinity of dalton. the western atlantic is the supply for both armition during the atlanta campaign. it was a railroad to stretched from chattanooga in the far upper left-hand corner of you're map which is in the bottom center of your map. it was a good plan. it was a very good plan. it unfolded just as sherman 40e7ed it would on may 8th, the thomas' troops and they demonstrated against and he gets

through snake creep gap which the confederates left unguarded. one of johnson's one of the criticisms you can level with johnson and for many months he really hadn't studied the geography closely south of the town. and they that you about snake creep gap. wheeler didn't have any pickets and johnson's men are able to march through through without a fight and then when they come out of the eastern end of the gap, of the gap and then they see some earth works around the town. clearly some confederate there is. and he didn't have calvary with him. it was a terrible mistake on the part of the federals.

and macpherson is worried. he doesn't know how many confederates are in front of him and the confederates might march down from dalton and strike him in the flank and instead of pushing forward and seizing the western in atlanta and cutting johnson's supply line this holds his army back to snake creep gap. when johnson learns of this, the confederates had a small contingent of calvary, johnson orders a retreat, a very well-organized retreat of his troops from the of the vicinity southward. macpherson had lost an enormous opportunity to strike a crippling blow at the

confederates. >> i regret beyond measure you did not break the railroad. the first major battle of the campaign is fought. and the battlefield is beautifully preserved. both armies are fortified there like during the overland campaign, these armies are constructing log and dirt works whenever they halt. both armies launch attacks. >> and at the operational level, sherman scores a victory by getting up to the south and he gets one division.

and south of and forces johnson to retreat. johnson retreats and you can look in the middle of the map now. and he retreats down to the vicinity of a small town called castle and there he hopes to lay a trap for sherman. the road network is such that sherman ends up dividing his armies as they march south and johnson's plan was to strike one of these wings of sherman's army as it marched south. but unfortunately, for johnson, john bell hood, who has been ordered to launch this attack, doesn't do so. and then, in a conference, a night conference that's held between john and so his core commanders, hood and leon polk argued that they needed to retreat. their line was being infiltrated by union artillery. what happened at this conference

and who said what was a point of bitter contention between joe johnson and john bell hood for many, many many years. and each had a very different version of what happened there that's really impossible to reconcile. and we don't need to go into the details of it now but johnson's version is that he saw that his core commander's didn't have any confidence that they could hold this position so the army retreated yet, again. sherman at this point sherman is pretty optimistic about the campaign. and he said -- he writes -- this is at the beginning -- this is in mid may -- we are now in motion like a vast hive of bees and expect to swarm over the chattahoochee in a few days. the chattahoochee was a river flowing from east to west that would be a last natural barrier

between sherman and atlanta. by the beginning of the third week of may. johnson's army was entrenched in a strong position in the allah toon that mountains. in fact, all of the geography of this entire section of georgia, he had spent time near -- in the 1840's as a young army officer he had been stationed here. sherman knew that it would be foolish to try to attack johnson's position in the alatoona mountains so sherman decides to execute, yet, another flanking march. this one would involve some risk, though, because it would the union army some miles away from the western and atlantic, about 15 miles away. the objective of this march

would be the town of dallas and you can see us there in the lower left-hand corner and they all take different routes to get there. it's about 15 miles west of the alatoona position johnson held and 15 miles e miles west of the railroad. johnson's calorvary informed hi in a timely fashion of this movement towards dallas and johnson shifts away from alatoona west toward try to block sherman once again. what ensued then in the final days last week of may and the first couple of days of june, was some intense skirmishing every day, punctuated by three small battles. two of them involving union attacks against the confederates that failed in the third failed

confederate. new hope church and dallas. the fighting in this densely-wooded region was such that the soldiers on both sides called it the hell hole. when sherman realized that johnson's lines were pretty strong along the dallas pickets mill line and that it would be impractical for him to continue south to go around the western flank of johnson's army because it would keep the union force as way from the railroad for too long he decided to shift back eastward towards the western and atlantic. in fact, for a few days at the very end of may, sherman's army was experiencing some pretty serious supply shortages. they simply had been away from the army too long. and even though 5,000 wagon sounds like a lot, with an army of the size of sherman's it's

not sufficient to supply it day after day, that far from the railroad. so both armies shift back to the railroad. and it starts to rain. and it continues to rain over and over day after day, for the first few weeks days of june. both armies are nearly immobilized. wagon trains down and down wroods that are knee-deep in mud. you can imagine a trench full up to your knees in water and mud. hundreds of men on a men sit in the rear. they're broken down. physically. and this continues throughout

the campaign. and there's constant contact. constant skirmishing day after day. no rest if you're in the trenches on the front line. sherman becomes frustrated and he makes a decision to deviate that the strategy has been successful up to this point. and 1864, i'm now inclined to feign on both flanks and assault and it may cost us dear but the results would get us an attempt to pass around. he defended a mile eight miles long. the rationale was that there had

to be some weak points in that line. and the element of surprise, frontal attacks might succeed and score a great victory. if it doesn't work sherman could have the maneuvers. the personal and official correspondence. like a lot of career officers at the time of the civil war he felt that fighting for he thought this could damage the morale of the men. it could have eighty mid effect. john bell and he claims that lee feels the -- felt the same way.

and kennesaw mountain fought on june 27th of 1864. and the troops that launched the attacks were and it was about 3,000 casualties. sherman took a lot of heat from the northern press. and if you look at the losses that sherman's army had sustained up to this point in the campaign including at kennesaw mountain paled in comparison to what was happening in virginia. compare the losses, for instance, in just a single day of and the casualties sustained at kennesaw and sherman is taking a lot of territory.

the only success of the day didn't occur in a flanking many nooufr, launched by the army, against the far southern end of johnson's long line close to the chattahoochee than johnson and this is what forced johnson to abandon to kennesaw and fall back to a line that had been constructed by slaves of the chattahoochee river. it was clearly impression national. it would have been crazy to attack it. one of the most masterful move pass in sherman executes he manages to cross troops troops

north of johnson's position. this was the left flank. by the second week of july, the chattahoochee line falls back and at look at the bottom center of the map you can see the troops crossing the river north of the confederate's river line. and when they retreat across the chattahoochee they are right on the outskirts of the gate city of atlanta. sherman had achieved something pretty remarkable by this point. he had taken all of northwest georgia. a region important of agriculture and industry to the confederacy.

he was on the outskirts of atlanta. he had an army strong in numbers and morale. contrast that to the condition of the army of the potomac. when it gets to the outskirts of petersberg. and the morale of the army is shaky. by this point, jeff er serson d has lost faith. in his ability to hold the city of atlanta. and politicians who visited his headquarters that the best way to force the federals out of north georgia is to strike and strike the supply line and end

up in tennessee. his calvary, joe cheeler's calvary core couldn't do this. because he needed wheeler's horsemen to defend the flanks of the army. johnson didn't have enough men to stretch the line long enough. it was for the davis administration to order forest command to ride east. to break sherman's supply line. and this would involve stripping the state of bam bm and mississippi of all of their 12ke7bders and that's something that davis, i think, wisely refused to do. as richard mcmurray and others pointed out, alabama and mississippi were pretty

important states. this was the time of the river valley. they would have opened up important industrial cities like selma, alabama, columbus, georgia wouldn't have been a smart move. highly debatable, too, whether the men could have created damage in the long term and sherman had to retreat. sherman was acutely aware his supply line was vulnerable and he went to some lengths to try to protect it and don't have time to talk about the ways but we can later if you're interested. on july 17th, 1864, jefferson davis makes the extremely controversial decision, it was controversial in the summer of 1864. it's still controversial today of relieving joe johnson of command. and replacing him with one of

his core commanders, john bell hood. an officer probably all of you know, what had gained a reputation in 1862 and 1863 as one of lee's best brigade and division commanders. he had a reputation of being a bold fighter. of course, he personally sacrificed a lot and you know the natures of his wounds. the loss of a leg. the partial loss of the use of an arm here at gettysburg. if you fail to arrest the advance of the enemy to the city of atlanta far to the interior of georgia and express no confidence that you can defeat you can repel him you are here by relieved. and he has to fight for the city of atlanta. he doesn't have a lot of room to

maneuver. the hood has been angling for this command. sometime prior to he was intensely ambitious officer. johnson then was in retrospect, a general that, quote, lacks the ability to shape campaigns. he reacted to the moves of his opponents rather than seizes the initiative. and the army of tennessee needed but couldn't get is robert e. lee. hood, upon taking command immediately ordered attacks. you can see the first battle fought around the city and the upper, very top, the middle of your map, the battle of peach tree creek, hood's plan was to

attack the union forces advancing against atlanta from the north after they crossed peach tree creek but before they could entrench. he devoted two core of his army to this attack and they were -- his core commanders were supposed to send their units forward an echelon. the attacks, though, ended up being uncoordinated and not very well managed by the core commanders and after hard fighting, the federals managed to hold their lines. the confederate casualties at peach tree creek numbered about 2500 while the federals for about 2100. the book on the battle, a very detailed tactical study by my friend robert jenkins that i recommend. just the study of peach tree creek. we're now getting detailed battle studies of the west. while there have been eastern battles for many decades. the day after the battle of

peach tree creek. they learns the far left flank of the troops approaching atlanta from the east is vulnerable. it's in the air. and hood decides to try and execute a flanking march to strike this vulnerable portion of sch sherman's line. this is part of the army of the tennessee under macpherson. hood orders a very long flank march to take place during the night of july 21st by the troops under hardy. these are men who had already had an exhausting 48 hours beforehand. they fought heavily east in the city on july 21st. what hood was asking his men to do was simply, unrealistic. in terms of the -- their physical abilities. of these exhausted soldiers. hood was also handicapped by having a core commanders that were pretty inexperienced at that high level of command.

the largest battle of the campaign is fought and this is the one immortalized in the enormous circular painting in atlanta, the map and the upper right-hand corner gives you some sense of the battle. it was, in fact, a single bloodiest day of fighting in the last ten months of the civil war. the confederates did asome temporary success. some of hardy's troops break through the union line and they capture large numbers of prisoners and cannon. they kill general james b. macpherson with one of the highest ranking union generals to die in the war. this was a huge personal blow to sherman. so you could imagine. but at the end of the day, the federals launched counter

attacks. they retake the portions of their lines that the confederates have seized. and they were counting prisoners and this was a battle that cost hood's army very heavily. there's a new book on the battle, fairly new, came out a few years ago called "the day dixie died." another one i would recommend. hood's army lost between 5700 and 6300 men in that single day of fighting. following the battle, sherman decided to change his strategy and reorient his efforts to take the city from the east of atlanta to the west of atlanta. with hopes of cutting the last railroad into the city that led

south out of atlanta. at the same time, sherman tries to launch calvary raids that will rhode island around the eastern and western approaches of the city and wreck the rail li south of the city. hood responds by sending a core out west of atlanta, to block the federal movement south will. this is under the troops that hood sendtion out there under very, very inexperienced core commander. a close friend of hood's. lee gets out to the area where he's supposed to be. he thinks the federals out there aren't -- have just arrived. they aren't entrenched and takes it upon himself to start a battle. he doesn't have orders to do this from hood but lee starts launching frontal attacks. and the men i mention ta who have never known defeat.

and what happens in the battle of the church, is kennesaw mountain in reverse. is the confederates losing attacking fortified federals and t the hood's arm loses about 3,000 men in these attacks and the federals lose about 600. that raid, the church is a great victory for sherman. but the calvary raids he launched proved disastrous. the federal division that rode joe wheeler and the and this lowers sherman's already-poor opinion of his calvary core and convinces him that it will take

more than that. hood had not achieved what he wanted in these three and none of them, incidentally, were intended to be frontal attacks against and in each inanswer the, what hood was trying to execute was a flank attack cumulatively, these battles did have make sherman more cautious than he had been. sherman's two of sherman's core commanders had been classmates of hood. and knew him very well. and they knew his reputation and sherman did, too. so in the first few weeks of august is a semisiege of atlanta. and he seems guns and bombards

the city. sherman is trying to get and to the west, he's having some problems. sherman is facing the discharge of 10,000 of his men at this point in august. and he's too impatient for a siege. sherman is a pretty nervous and he doesn't want a long can be drawn-out affair like what happened petersberg. so he decides to abandon the siege lines east and of amendment. pull his troops out of the trenches. leaving a single core north of the city to hold the point where his supply line, the western atlantic crosses the chattahoochee river. take the rest of the army on a wide to the west and southwest

and south shoenl in the lower right-hand corner of your match. and cut the macon and western railroads south of theity. sherman was convinced by this point that calvaries couldn't do the job when it came to wrecking railroads. the infantrymen pull out of the trenches and they march around and in the last days of august they reach the macon and western. and they did what johnson had not been willing to do. wheeler set off on a a a raid to disrupt sherman's supply lines up into the north georgia and tennessee. wheeler raid is a spectacular failure and he wrecks his calvary core in the process. so at first when hood receivers news that the federal trenches north of the city are vacant what do you think he believes?

sherman is retreating to the north. but then he realizes hood, he knew what was going on and he dispatches to core south to the vicinity of jonesboro. if you look on the map in the lower right you'll see jonesboro, the very bottom. the two cores sent there are given the orders and they protect the vital supply line. on the first day of the battle of jonesboro, the last battle of the campaign the attacks that are repulsed. in the meantime, hood finds out that the rail lines north of jonesboro the have been broken, you can see it on the map with thomas and he abandons the city.

on the night of september 1st, marching the troops south to rejoin throws that had been at jonesboro. during the evacuation of the city, the confederates discover they left a large amount of munitions in the eastern central portion of atlanta that can't get out. and so they set it on fire. this is 28 boxcars full of explosives and you can imagine that the sound that was heard 15 or 20 miles away. this is the depiction of "gone with the wind" and all the sets are burning in the background. and the and they are upset what the settings of if "wizard of

oz" burned in 1939. the destruction of atlanta cannot be atrit bted solery to uncle billy scher man that hood's army began the process with evacuation and the destruction of the firing of this train and sherman took it in the course of before the march. on september 2nd, the mayor of atlanta, james calhoun, surrendered the city. sherman announced to abraham lincoln atlanta is ours and fairly won. sherman told him, i shall not push much farther on this raid which is an interesting word to characterize the campaign. sherman said had exhausted the army and needed rest. so atlanta turned into a

garrison city. news of the fall of the city caused great celebration. and desperatebly needed boost to the fortunes of the republic party and here here is where we get to the significance of the atlanta campaign. what makes it so important. and later in september, it helped tond it was going to win an ultimate victory and the president needed a second term in office. and it offered public affirmation of his war policies. that lincoln gets a popular mandate as you know to continue a war that would end on the

basis of both reunion and emancipation. something that wouldn't have been the and at the same time, the fall of atlanta helped to ensure u.s. grant would remain as general and chief and sherman as his chief lieutenant. and the ultimate union victory in the civil war. thank you. do we have time for a few questions? okay if y'all want to come up to the mics if anyone has any questions. >> was there any thought to put robert e. lee in charge of the confederate armies? >> that ultimately did happen but it was after the atlanta

campaign. davis did reply. the question kwus, if you didn't hear it, was there any thought of putting lee in charge of all confederate armies and it did happen. it was some months after the atlanta campaign. and lee's advice not only on matters pertaining to the eastern theater but also on command matters in the west. when davis was considering he asked he asked lee, who do you think would be a good replacement. lee said hood was a bold fighter on the battlefield. hood -- he said something like hood is a bold on the battlefield but careless off the battlefield. i think what he was saying there was that when it comes to administrative responsibilities,

that hood hood had weaknesses there. >> yes, sir? >> two questions. >> uh-huh. >> let's do one so other folk also get a chance. >> well, on the line, i'm from question is how did sherman come up with the idea for the -- sherman's -- >> okay. the question is how did sherman -- that's a great question. how did sherman come up with the idea for sherman's knots or sherman's bow ties as they were sometimes called. what he's asking about are the twisted rails. when the union troops would wreck rail lines, the confederates, too, for this matter. the confederates employed this prior to the atlanta campaign. you'd get thousands of infantrymen to stand next to a rail line and all at once they would lift up the cross ties, separate with hammers the rail,

the iron rail from the wooden crosses ties. pile up the wooden cross ties in huge heaps and create bondfires, put the iron rails into the bonfires then when the center of the iron rails turns red hot, the union soldiers would grab it. i was re-reading this the other evening and thought, i wonder if they used gloves. those ties must have been pretty damn hot. anyway, they would take the red hot rails -- i think just red hot in the center -- and then twist them around trees which would make it extraordinarily difficult for the confederates to straighten out and reuse. and there's some good photographs taken of this process downtown. but your question was one i really can't answer. my kind of gut feeling is that it wasn't sherman that devised this, but it was something that engineers and soldiers came up with.

and it had been employed prior to this time. i mean, sherman had wrecked railroads in eastern mississippi. the meridian expedition. so, but that's a great question. i don't know where it originated. i don't know if we actually know, but it became a pretty common procedure. so, good question. yes, sir? >> i want to get back to the anacona plan. >> are you kidding? okay. >> basically the campaigns in 6 4 '64, grant and sermon the war switched in '61, '62, capturing territories and capital cities to capturing manufacturing and supply centers. sherman was marching toward atlanta. marching toward texas to capture their depots. could you tell us a little bit how important to the war effort and the confederate war effort

were these depots and supply centers? >> sure. atlanta was absolutely vital. georgia had some of the largest manufacturing sencenters in the confederacy, not just atlanta, but augusta, in the eastern part of the state had the largest powder mill in the world. there were quarter master depots in atlanta, columbus, and augusta that produced enormous numbers of uniforms for the army. there were foundries that produced cannon. if you look at the rail network of the deep south, it's evident immediately how important atlanta is for being at the juncture of many railroads. could go on and on about the contractors that were producing pistols and rifle muskets and

akuderments, they're absolutely vital and the confederates realized that. although by the time the siege takes place of atlanta, the city's value as a center of industry has really declined dramatically because the confederates had evacuated so much of the machinery and so many of the workers and sent them south to columbus and macon. so there's only about 3,000 civilians left in atlanta when sherman seizes the city, and when he takes the city, he orders the expulsion of all those civilians which is a fascinating story, too. yes, sir? >> jon lester, chicago, illinois. you mentioned at the beginning of your talk, the mastery of the logistics before the campaign. how much of that did he directly oversee and how much of it was delegated to somebody else? and who for that matter was it delegated to? >> sure. that's a great question. i mean, sherman certainly had

very capable subordinates, staff, that would -- that would look after various logistical concerns. he had authority over the railroads. this had been a controversial matter in the months leading up to the campaign. he had banned all civilian traffic on some of the main railroads leading south out of nashville, and he had planned for the confederates to try and break the railroads by stockpiling rails and ties at various locations. he had crews of civilians, african-americans, who were employed as civilian laborers. engineers that could very quickly rebuild railroads, particularly bridges. as the confederates were treated, if you look on your map you can see confederates were treated across several rivers.

they would always burn these bridges, and it was truly remarkable how quickly sherman's engineers and laborers could rebuild these huge wooden spans. so that's where the real mastery of logistics i think comes into play. one more. one more question over here. >> i'm from mechanicsburg, pennsylvania. general hood has been undergoing a bit of a reevaluation. >> right. >> recently. it seems to me that his plans once he took over as commander in tennessee were fairly good plans on paper, except his army couldn't execute them for one reason or another. >> sure. hood certainly doesn't have the

mastery of logistics that sherman does, and that becomes painfully evident during the tennessee campaign in 1864. but hood's operating under pretty severe handicaps, not only his own physical handicaps, but he also has a lot of command structure with a lot of generals that are woefully inexperienced with their division of corps level and command. they don't execute hood's orders and don't carry out his plans the way he had envisioned it. i think the other important factor is that hood's plans are just unrealistic. given the time constraints that he's working under and the physical conditions of his men. i mean, the -- and the flank march of atlanta is the prime example of that. hood was just asking far too much of men who were already totally exhausted, so that's kind of a short answer. but the renaissance you're talking about -- that's not the right word to use. the reevaluation of hood's

generalship is one that you're right is taking place, authors like richard mcmurray and steve davis and some others. so, thank you. [ applause ] you're watching american history tv. all weekend, every weekend on c-span3. to join the conversation, like us on facebook at c-span history. next on "the civil war." emanuel dabney discusses the role of the u.s. colored troops in the battle of the crater during the siege of petersburg. after weeks of tunnelling on july 30th, 1864, union forces blew up a mind underneath the confederate lines to create a gap in the defenses. mr. dabney discusses why the attack ultimately ended in a failure and why the u.s. color troops were unjustly blamed. this event was part of the gettysburg college civil war institute's annual summer co