participated in development of divine excellence. we know that works. but design excellence. >> your microphone. >> sorry. >> move that microphone up closer. >> i'm sorry. >> the foun daedation of the excellence it nesh tinitiative. base statement. we are not changing security standards. period. i have been in discussions with my colleagues and diplomating security at the highest levels and working level and made that assurance. i think that -- that is what is most important to them. and they have every reason to insist that that still be the case. >> did they clear -- on design excellence? >> they claeeared on our proces yes. >> who cleared? >> i would have to get back to you on the clearances. but again. how we put those buildings

together, is in the responsibilities of the bureau of overseas buildings operations. to the degree that we continue to build facilities that meet all diplomating securities concerns, that's what they need to soon off. in addition to understanding that, we not add cost or add time to schedules in a way that would also jeopardize security. and we have committed to not doing that. >> but they haven't signed off yet or have signed off? >> we have the support at the highest levels of dip le mlomat securi -- diplomatic security. they have signed off on our documents describing the process and how we are going to go about it. >> could you get those documents to us? could i give you that assignment to get those documents to us. >> yes. i would also like, if i've could, a number of members mentioned the document request. i would look to convey, both

personally and professionally, that i take seriously the role of this committee and of congressional committee. it was a vast request. we are working to collect the information. >> even the information in al-jazeera didn't come to us. >> i understand. >> i appreciate your emotion on that. i appreciate your promise, your intentions. but we really need the documents. mr. green -- the panel on diplomatic security and management, a group which you chaired. says in its final report, and i quote, it understand the desire to have embassies and kong lcons to be welcoming and reflect openness of american society and quote, o.b.o. is convinced that design excellence has widespread support within the department.

however, the report also mentions that from a diplomating security standpoint, there are questions raised by the changes under way in the, in the embassy construction program. the question is can you explain what those concerns are from a security perspective? >> sure. and we, outline them in the report. and i leave that to the committee to read at your leisure. another one that came up later, and it goes to -- an earlier discussion here about the flexibility, the design excellence provides. in real estate in smaller places. that is one of the areas that ds really objected to in our discussions with them. both urban sites and smaller areas. will we have more waivers for

the 100 foot set back. i know the difficulty in transitting if you are out in the boondocks some where. but there has got to be some accommodation, if security in fact is our most important issue -- then, and let me quote from an o.b.o. document here. it says whenever possible, sites will be selected in urban areas. allowing u.s. embassies and consulates to contribute to the civic and urban fab rek ric of host cities. special attention paid to the general ensemble of surrounding building, streets, and public spaces which embassies, consulates will form apart. what ds doesn't want is something on the street that, that a car bomb can drive up to and -- and blow a hole in the wall.

i agree with flexibility and co cost issues. and some way in our report. the demepartment has got to do indepth analysis of the security implications before you start building downtown. >> appreciate that. the time is expired. >> i recognize the gentleman from illinois. >> thank you, mr. chair. the independent ben gghazi made recommendati recommendations. mr. green, you led this panel, which issued a report last year raising concerns with the design excellence program. this report stated, and i quote. while the panel agrees a special considerations are warranted,

other posts deserve consideration. the report also found, i quote, no evidence of a business case or cost benefit analysis supporting this initiative. mr. green is that correct? >> that's correct. >> why was such a study worthwhile? >> why is such, the stud yy tha we did worthwhile? this was only one recommendation of 35. there were 34 other recommendations that dealt with ds management and, and operations and organizations and training. so this was only one which came to light as we began to talk to ds people. that expressed concern about security. has the department respond tupd this finding? >> no. the department hats not

responded to any of the recommendations. and very informally they have accepted in part, whole, 30 of 35. i frankly was not expecting them to respond. this was a report that was -- asked for by the undersecretary for management based on the -- the arb recommendation. we did the report, we turned it in. and went home. >> so you are saying there is no cost benefit study on the new initiative? >> not that i know of. >> director, i gather the department has not dismissed mr. green's panel. and its finding as irrelirrelev. what has the department done in response to the report? tichically typically a cost benefit analysis before we go into a scenario where there is additional cost to mack sure it is warranted. as i explained and assured the committee, there is no

additional cost under the excellence initiative. we are setting budgets based on standard embassy design budgets. if anything, we are hoping that costs will go down as we are able to look at longer term operating costs and make decisions that allow us to affect that. the recommendation was that we ensure, look at what the impact was on security. again as i have explained to the committee and members. there is no impact on security. we will meet all of the security standards. two of the standard adds you know are in law. set back and co-location. so as mr. green describes, the concern about being on urban plots. we will always meet that set back that is required in law. regardless of being in a smaller plot. it is simply that, ability to have a building go up rather than be horizontal. not have the warehouse in a

place where we are able to get materials in real time and build one would be wasteful. we are able to take those into consideration and, and build on smaller pieces of, of property. >> would my, my friend yield for a second. >> would you please tell us, remind us what the setback requirement is? >> the set back requirement is 100 feet. >> mr. green any other comment about the director's response? >> no. >> okay. well i would look to thank you and your committee for the work on the panel. >> will the gentlewoman yield for a moment. >> yes. >> on the one hand, ms. muniz, you are confident it is going to come in under budget. at the same time, we don't have a cost benefit analysis. it hasn't been done, correct? >> i have not said under budget. on budget. >> you were hoping it would come under budget.

>> the department sets budgets. obo sets budgets based on number of desks and on program for facility. we use historical data accumulated from the construction from standard embassy design to set our budgets. we know. >> you have no complete d desig excellence. you use itted as an example an embassien chad as a success story, correct. one of your examples. if we went to chad and looked at it, what would we see? >> iflt's one of the early projects. >> what would we see if we went to chad? you used it as an example of success. what would we see if we went to chad? >> i'm not certain what we would see. >> do they have a hole in the ground yet? >> i don't have the status of the -- in front of me. >> you came up with the example. i'm telling you, that it's not even scheduled to be completed until, october of 2016.

we're not sure there is a hole in the ground yet. you are using that as a success story. am i wrong? >> i described the projects that were awarded using the excellence principles. to say the projects are awarded is not the same thing as to say that the projects are completed. >> do you have any completed studies? any completed projects under the standard, under the design excellence program. >> as i explained we do not. the first project we awarded as variation on excellence initiative was in 2011. the first real projects that we were awarded will award as i stated are in 2014. this fiscal year. >> so, the success that you have its just the awards, it's not actually achieving. time is expired. i appreciate the gentlewoman from illinois yielding me time. we will now recognize --

the gentleman from michigan. for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you for being here today to testify. the chairman earlier alluded to -- beauty is in the eye of the beholder. i can tell you from experience, the sandbag bunker, looks really good to a soldier under a motor tact, i'm sure we don't want to build the embassies looking like a sandbag bunker. i know we do have a need for curb appeal. if you are going through the reports and talking to other people outside of this hearing, i just have real few simple questions. i want to know, do we have a final number for the baghdad embassy? cost? >> i believe we do. but i don't have it at the top of my head. >> i heard the contractor made over $500 million profit. did you hear the same thing?

$500 million in profit. >> again this was a project that was. >> one of the most expensive embassies ever built. >> years ahead of my time under the bush administration. >> you have access to the numbers? >> yes, we can provide those to you. >> what did we say the london embassy is going to cost? >> the total project cost for london is near $1 billion. >> $1 billion. how many people are going to work in there? >> if you exclude the property price it is under $800 million. the cost to do a major rehabilitation and security upgrades of the existing that would have never met security standards including two in law would have been $730 million. >> i understand a need for $1 billion. i would probably, no we, can't say that. we do need an embassy in london. but $1 billion seems like we should be looking at alternative thousands. i know in places look iraq we

use barriers, concrete -- concrete, prefabricated concrete barriers that are placed relatively quickly. and in times of danger. i have some questions in regards to -- cost lee -- let's see, rap heavy reinforcement standoff distance of 100 feet. steel structures with curtain walls, all kinds of things, that, well, deal with security, but you are putting more emphasis, it seems on curb appeal. i just, i just, few more questions. can you give me a few reinforced concrete examples how moving to the new design strategy enhances security. >> so i think london is a great example. i would look to speak in that context. >> $1 billion worth. you have my -- >> we sold the properties existing in london. a project that did not have to be done. for net zero for the taxpayer.

we are able to 100% replace those facilities for $50 million more than it would have cost to do massive upgrades to the existing facilities that would have left it vulnerable due to set back, no co-location and not meeting other security examples. >> would it hurt to be outside of london? just outside of london where the, where the cost is less expensive? a billion dollars? >> i would argue in london it would hurt to be outside of london. >> do you have a uniform layout for all embassy facilities which could aid security personnel in train during emergencies? you have to go from one embassy to the next. everything is different. design plan is different. everything is, seemed to be tailored at expensive costs. >> our dip le mat ek security staff are incredibly skilled and right now they deal with a wide variety of contexts and of buildings. i would also like to say that if we stayed with the standard

embassy destein which basically had two separate bars of construction it is less efficient, it is harder to get from one bar to the other, than a cube, london is -- is a good example of that. and to build more efficiently, dramatically in terms of cost. >> $1 billion for an embassy. and that's efficient? i just, i just have a real problem with that. because having experienced in iraq and vietnam, i know we build the same bunkers, pretty much the same standard design, a few improvements here and there. but they suffice. i know we could do the same thing with a more modern building. use standard format design. either going up or out. you've could probably have three standard designs that would fit just about anywhere. why do i know that? because i have experience in that business. you know, we build our, military vehicles pretty much the same way. they're compartmentized.

we can walk, go into a, drive an a brams tank and change the engine out in a matter of hours. mr. chairman, i have a real problem with -- with a billion dollar designs. and costs. when contractors are making $500 million profit on some of our most expensive embassies. thank you very much. i yield back. >> i thank the gentleman. i recognize the gentleman from vermont. for five minutes. off awe thank you, mr. chairman. thank you, you have got a pretty hard job. it really is. but, two things. one, mr. lynch indicated gratitude for your cooperation in turning around a co-del. secondly, i know the chairman of the subcommittee sent requests for information. it is helpful to the committee. it is a burden on you. but of it really makes for better life all around if there can be a, as much cooperation as possible. in a timely way.

but i do want to acknowledge the hard work that you have how to do. the one question i have, how much, the costs are high. how much of the complications that you face day-to-day in making decision as but an embassy, wherever it may be have to do with -- the enormous security requirements that now seem to be part of everything? i will ask you, ms. minoz? >> i think the security requirements clearly significantly add to the expense. but i don't know that anybody in the state department on this committee would call into question the need for those security measures. both operational during building and -- and the measures physically that are put in place. but it does, when you look at, the average cost of an embassy, as compared to -- an office building on the market. those costs are very different. but they are really driven by --

what are some of the safest facilities in the world. >> mr. green, you know, one of the, of the things i find a little bit troubling. when i visit embassies. they're, the remote in many cases. and -- and, difficult working circumstances. it seems for some of the embassy personnel. as a result of this security requirements. and, it its, is there some indication that -- that there is a -- there are some cases where too much security actually interferes with the ability of the embassy personnel to do their job effectively? >> i -- i would say generally no. but -- if you -- if you -- talk about access for example for employees, par fk laerl nonu.s. employees who are held up going through various security check points. possibly there is. but i think generally -- ds is

not going to spend money to oversecure a place. if anything, we prob blow have some that are, that are undersecured. >> okay, that's helpful. and mr. chairman, i, am prepared to yield the balance of my time. >> would my colleague yield his time. mr. welch? >> yeah. >> to mr. kyl. >> i yield my time to -- >> go ahead. >> i yield my time. >> to more connally. >> i thank my friend. i am sorry for the misunderstanding. you know this it not a theoretical discussion. i was in the senate. i went to beirut. before the embassy bombing. no set back. right on the -- the main thoroughfare. and i had a friend killed, bill mcintyre in the bombing embassy. of course our embassy was bombed

again in beirut. to say nothing of the marine barracks at the beirut airport. kenya, tanzania. some of the loudest critics of the cost of security and securing our embassies, of course are the first to talk about the lack of security in benghazi. it is a balance. but security, we have learned all too painfully, is, is a very important component in making decisions about fortifying set backs and the like. is that true mr. green? >> it it the most important decision. >> now, let me ask -- how do we balance though the need for accessibility, the need for visibility, the need for convenience in another country. we got to forget, we cannot forget it isn't just about us. and our security and convenience. it's also about the population. our embassy consulate is serving. lots of people want to get visas, do business, so forth.

help us understand a little built, from your poent of view, with your commission, how do we strike the right balance? >> that's probably the toughest question that anyone here has asked today. i don't know that there is a magic bullet to do that. but you have got to manage risk. and people have different opinions of how you do that. whether it its security, security takes precedent or access takes precedent. i remember when, when i was still at the state department. there was a big battle between those who -- those who in the old usia who wanted more access for the local populous to go to the libraries. and then on the flip side of that was, were the security people that said, we can't afford to have a library hanging out there in some commercial building. so -- we haven't solved it.

i think it's -- you have to manage risk based on the situation. based on the threat. and if you need more security, or less security than that's what you do. i mean, we, we -- we can adjust. >> based, and probably just based on what you just said. you can't just have a cookie cutter approach. because the situation is going to be different everywhere. >> that's right. >> thank you. >> mr. welch. thank you for your courtesy. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you. the gent lman's time has expired. now we'll recognize the gentleman from fla fl, mr. mica, for five minutes. >> thank you. i think this is a very important hearing. sometimes it doesn't get the attention others do. but it is a -- an important meat and potatoes hearing that -- that talks about our embassy's security. a lot of that was highlighted by the events at benghazi.

and -- also our vulnerability with our various posts around the world. now, kind of interesting, my brother was a member of congress, chaired the -- the subcommittee, i think it was, international operations that did the enman buildings when they were looking at secure facilities. >> mr. mica, if i may, that was your democrating brother. >> yes, if he got it right, we wouldn't be here today with the hearing. but, touche, mr. connelly. in any event, you can do just about everything, mr. green said, it is almost impossible to protect every -- our employees are at risk around -- around the world. they, they, can't all be confined in the compound. but some things can be done.

and we have -- we have two lists i understand. one is prepared by o.b.o. and another one is by the security folks, diplomatic security folks, on the risk level. i just saw a copy of one of those which you all have not provided to us, but we have gotten a copy of it. and for obvious reasons, we don't publicize that, we don't want -- our enemies to know where our emphasis is. but there are just some common sense things that need to be done and some posts are more at risk than others. right? ms. muniz? >> yes. that's absolutely right. >> okay. mr. jones, you would agree? and mr. green? one of the problems we have is there's a security list i have seen and it differs from the obo list.

can you tell me about the differences, ms. muniz? >> yes, i can and i appreciate the opportunity. ds assesses every facility worldwide on -- >> right. >> on an annual basis for the risk. that's the vulnerability list. >> right. >> that list is very, very extensive because it -- spread around the town. we take that information -- >> but it does rank them? >> it does rank them. >> absolutely. >> your list is different than their list, is that correct? >> we basically translate their list into the highest risk posts. we pull up, in other words, if they're assessing 12 facilities, we pull up the highest at risk. >> yeah. >> and put it on the -- our vulnerable list on capital -- >> they don't match, i'm told. >> they can't match exactly because for their ten entries we would have one. >> well, again, this started out

as looking at design excellence and choosing design as opposed to security. you have diplomatic security that is directed to make certain that our folks are protected and then you have your organization overseas building and you're making your determinations but they don't mesh and that may leave some of our facilities at risk. for example, benghazi. i was told was high on a list but actually didn't get the attention. either from reinforcement after a number of requests of security personnel and other skaf safeguards and that some of the attention that should have been focused there and that would be the secretary of state's ultimate responsibility? is that correct? would the secretary of state make a determination there or is

this -- >> we -- the department obo and ds basically decide on that capital security construction schedule so the list that -- >> does the secretary review the list? >> not to my knowledge. >> not to your knowledge? that's something we might need to change in the law. but again, i would think that the secretary of state charged with safety and security of our embassy would at least look at the list. and you don't think like the former secretary when benghazi occurred even looked at a list or was given the list? >> i -- i can't speak to that but i can assure you that working with diplomatic security which we do every year on that list that diplomatic security signs off on the order of that list and that it is based on the rankings of -- >> someone failed in benghazi and i'm told that it was high on the list. that the proper attention was not paid to making certain it had the protections because, i

mean, even a high school -- high schooler could look at the list and libya, benghazi, and pick that as a top priority. wouldn't you say that would be a top priority if you were looking at a list a year ago or whenever? >> the capital security construction program provides us funding to build embassies and consulates. benghazi was neither an embassy nor a consulate and was not on the list. >> it had american personnel and it also posed a risk, diplomatic security was also responsible for the security of the personnel there. and they contracted also for services. is that correct? >> i can make a general statement about benghazi and about obo's role but i think beyond that i didn't come today prepared nor was obo -- >> i just want to know the procedure. mr. issa and i visited post

benghazi, some of the different posts. we saw some simple common sense things that needed to be done. improvements in video capability. improvements in a whole host of areas. are you aware that those improvements that had been identified by the different groups and congress have been made so that our personnel are not at risk? final question. >> if -- you're talking about improvements in benghazi. we no longer -- >> security improvements in our diplomatic posts. have been a host of groups investigating, reporting and they have said that certain things to be -- need to be done. i cited one as video capability. there are many others. but maybe we don't want to discuss it in an open forum. but can you tell the committee from your position have those improvements been made and addressed? >> so let me respond on two

fronts. >> could you -- excuse me, could you please speak into your microphone? pull it -- thank you. >> sorry. as the committee knows, the secretary in the wake of benghazi appointed an accountability review board. that review board made 29 recommendations. the department accepted all of those recommendations and implementing the recommendations and reported to congress on the implementation. obo is involved in -- >> can i -- >> participates -- >> right there. because part of that accountability review process was the development of the report by mr. green and you had secretary -- undersecretary kennedy go on cbs news and say they don't accept it. so how do you represent that the state department accepted all the recommendations when the work of mr. green was accepted? >> also, mr. chairman, if they could for the record, i think

all the members would want this, can you also give us for the record what has been implemented? if some of those recommendations have to remain not public, that's fine. but give them to the committee. so can you answer the two questions? >> i could certainly take that back to the department and we could reply to that request. >> you didn't answer mr. chaffetz. >> if you could repeat the question. >> well, we are going to recognize mr. connolly now and come back to this. we'll recognize -- representative from virginia, mr. connolly. >> don't repeat the question, ms. muniz. the assertion is made that patrick kennedy made -- contradicted the secretary of state. and i don't believe that's true. i believe that's inaccurate and for the record i would ask you to go back and have mr. kennedy clarify but i'm quite confident knowing mr. kennedy he was not contradicting the secretary of

state who said she accepted all recommendationss as you said and if there's any daylight, come back and clarify. but i didn't hear mr. kennedy say any such thing. >> i think -- >> i'm sorry. thank you. i also find it interesting that in hindsight we have perfect understanding of the security needs in benghazi and you should have understood that benghazi of all of the posts in the world was number one. shame on you for not understanding that. how many posts do we have in the state department around the world, ms. muniz? >> we have roughly 270. >> i'm sorry? >> we have roughly 270. >> you really don't like that microphone, did you? you need to -- >> we have roughly 270. >> perfect. 270. is that right? >> yes. >> so, we have lots of security challenges. and benghazi as you point out was neither a consulate nor an embassy. that doesn't mean it's unimportant. we want to protect all american

personnel. we don't want anyone at risk but unfortunately we live in a dangerous imperfect world. here's the same crowd complaining about you're spending too much money which, well, you know, in any security situation you've got to do some triage in terms of where you put your money and prioritize it. is that not correct? >> i think that's absolutely right. >> right. and obviously, you wish all 270 posts including benghazi were perfectly secure with the perfect setbacks and in the right location that met all of the demands, the functionality of the state department, the needs of the host country, accessibility for everybody but security, that's impregnable. is that not correct? >> i think that's accurate. >> that would be called a perfect world. would that be fair, ms. muniz? >> yes, that would. >> yeah. i'm not quite sure how much that perfect world would cost but ab saent perfect world, the question is, can we do better? can we make better decisions?

better informed decisions. as mr. green and i were talking about earlier, that clearly understand that in the world we live in right now security and some ways it is going to dominate some decisions or at least take preponderance of the weight as we consider all of the factors. it's -- but it can never be the only consideration because what's the point of having a state department facility, an embassy, a consulate if it can't function? you know? and that's the dilemma and what mr. green and i were talking about earlier. that balance. i assume that's something that bedevils you, too, ms. muniz, and your colleague, mr. jones. >> i would say that i'm naturally optimistic and i really do believe that with great architects, great engineers, great builders that we can crack that nut. that we can build buildings that are secure. we can make them as efficient as possible but i really do think

that we could do everything humanly possible and have those buildings do the maximum they should do. i think the standard embassy design taught us a lot. i think we were able to take a lot of those lessons and help inform how we do it and i think we'll continue to learn and make these facilities better and better and faster and economical and efficient but i really believe that we're going to get there and i'm dedicated to getting us there. >> i want to pick up on mr. bentivolio's point, however. while i do -- i am bothered by sort of a double standard some seem to have about this whole issue of security, you should have known, but don't spend so much money and cooker cutter approach will do fine and as mr. green said, it won't do fine. we have to take cognizant of the variation of the overseas and the cultures and threat assessments and so forth but a billion dollars is a lot of

money. first of all, it was not clear, hard to follow your math. were you telling us that all but 15 million of that $1 billion is recovered by the sale of other property we own in london and vicinity. there's the microphone again, ms. muniz. >> let me go over it briefly. >> really briefly. i have 19 second. >> we sold all of our current properties in london. the proceeds of the sale of the properties are paying for the project. there's likely a small amount of money left in reserve at the end of the london project. the comparison is the bureau before my time there and i believe at the time mr. green was at the department assessed whether it would be better to fix the current chancellory and cost $730 million or build a new one and when you compare the cost excludeing the site in

london, it's under $800 million so for a difference of $50 million, we're able to build a facility that meets setback, co-locates staff, meets all of the security requirement and doesn't require any new appropriated funds. >> thank you for that clarify. mr. chairman, thank you. >> thank the gentleman. we'll now recognize the gentleman from north carolina, mr. meadows for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank each of you for your testimony. i want before mr. connolly leaves and may need to comment, the gentleman from virginia sitting on the foreign affairs committee with me and i guess i'm troubled this is the first time that we're really hearing about design excellence in terms of the re-off and the way it's gone. and i'm -- i'm a passionate about foreign affairs and i attend the majority of those hearings, and so, i think the

gentleman from virginia would say that this is the first time he's heard but i'd yield for a couple of seconds to -- >> can i just say to my friend from north carolina, i'm simp thet toik the challenge we face and it's real and as i said i think maybe before you arrived, for me this is not some political ball. >> right. >> i had a friend killed in one of our embassies in a terrorist attack because there was no setback. and because we weren't diligent, frankly, about the threat assessment at the time. >> is this the first time you've heard of design excellence? >> it is and i want to tell you this issue of building security, when i worked in the senate, 30 years ago we were talking about this. and it seems to bedevil the state department in part because it's not their expertise. >> well, that's where i want to follow up. >> i thank the gentleman. >> i thank the gentleman from virginia. it is troubling when i sit on an authorizing committee and now an oversight committee and probably

even more difficult for me because i've built million-dollar buildings. i have worked with architects. i know design bid build very well that how do we have a set of standards for as ample -- let's talk about security because all of us in a bipartisan manner here agree on security, what diplomatic security standards do we have for this design excellence component? who's weighed in on that? or are you just counting on architects and engineers? >> so, all of the standards are established by diplomatic security and in law. setback and coe-location and law. >> i'm talking about the actual design of it. setbacks is easy. we talked about that today. so you have a set of standards by diplomatic security that are published that i can find today? >> i know -- >> because i couldn't find them. >> i know that some of the

standards are classified so -- >> i've got security clearance. i'd be glad to go look at it. you are saying if i go in a classified setting, i can find that today? because making sure you're under oath. you know? you have got some staff behind you. are you sure about that? >> let me put this way. we meet all of the security standards established by diplomatic security for every new consulate and embassy -- >> how do you that when -- >> as you might also know, diplomatic security certifies that the buildings meet not only their requirements and their standards established by the ospb but also those standards set in law, all of the standards that are established by ds and by obo to the degree that we're responsible for life safety standards, fire, all of those are met. nothing will be changed with respect to those security standards going from the standard embassy design to the excellence -- >> so what does change? >> i think the way i would

explain it is that we took what was a fixed module, a fixed solution to building. we deckoconstructed to be assemd in different ways. >> why? to make it look better? >> no. to make it cost less. less in environments we don't need a warehouse. where we don't need ten acres and to make sure that -- >> let me say this. >> crafted to maintain low -- >> i understand that. that was the goal. where do we have any example where that's actually really happened? to date. to date. today. >> i think it's a fair question but it's a relatively recent initiative so while there shall dr. >> is the answer yes or no? do we have any example? one? one example. >> the examples that we consider early examples are in the pipeline and -- >> do we have one completed example? yes or no? >> no, we don't.

>> so how can you say definitively that it's costing the taxpayers less, that it's secure, that it meets the standards, it does all of that? how can you say that? >> we know -- >> are you projecting it? >> no. we know that the designs are certified by diplomatic security. we know the costs because we set the budget and we know what the schedules are because that -- those are the schedule that is we set to build those facilities overseas. >> so why wouldn't we have heard about this in foreign affairs? >> so, i'd like to go back and answer that question. we have briefed this program and there have been numerous settings on the hill where this program has been discussed since 2011. >> yeah. so when was the major initiative briefed to -- >> the first time it was briefed to the hill was in march of -- >> no. to foreign affairs. i zit on that committee, too. so -- i'm not aware you ever briefed us. when did you brief us that major

initiative? ever? >> we offered briefings. i'd have to go back to my staff to -- >> they're behind you. just turn around and ask them. when did you brief us? i have my calendar. i'll be glad to check. i'm talking about the major initiative here. i'm not talking about some little teeny component. >> no, i understand. it's my understanding we offered briefings when we went up and briefed in march of 2011. we offered all committees the opportunity to be briefed in this program. >> is it a house foreign affairs turned you down? >> my understanding is that, yes, it is. yes, they did. i'd like to go back and put together the schedule but we offered briefings to our authorizers. >> okay. let me just tell you i sit on that committee. it hadn't been authorized. you had new budget requirements.

i would suggest as part of the normal order to go before that committee, as well. don't you think? >> i would be more than happy to brief any committee that's interested in the program and to answer any of the questions. i know that we have invited staff to -- >> i'm -- >> provided materials but i would be more than happy to go to any committee and have a discussion -- >> before you put out anymore bids and award anymore contracts, would you be willing to commit to that? >> no. >> all right. i yield back. >> now recognize the gentle woman from illinois, ms. duckworth for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. so i understand the tension between making sure our embassies are accessible to the host nation, citizens who want to do business with the united states as well as to allow our embassy personnel to do the jobs that they need to do. but also, the need for security and we could focus on the past all we want and who voted for

what, who voted for funding, who didn't vote for funding, folks now seeing there's not enough security and the same folks who voted to cut funding to the state department. i wasn't here then. i'm here now and my focus is moving forward, and in looking at the design excellence program, as i have so far, i do applaud its modularity concept that you have the components that help with security and put them in together different ways as appropriate to the nation, the security risk, the available land, all of those things as opposed to a simg l monolithic embassy design that's the single embassy design because there's a security issue with that, as well. we don't want single embassy design and every embassy is exactly the same because if i were a terrorist, i have to figure out one and then know the weaknesses for all of our embassies so i do understand

that but i still have a concern with the design excellence program and that is the involvement of security experts in development of the design excellence program. i know there were some who were on the commission to develop it. but ms. muniz and mr. green, if you could each address this issue of the actual input of security experts into the program, into setting the standards that are in the program, and whether that is -- there's an ongoing effort to keep the security experts involved beyond what the state department comes up with on its own. because one of the criticisms that's happened is the state department has underestimated the security needs and security threats and i want to make sure as we move forward and build the embassies that security considerations are part of that ongoing process of assessment. so ms. muniz, if you could sort of address that, starting with

who was on the initial commission and whether that involvement in security continues and, mr. green, if you could give us your assessment as a security expert yourself. >> i'm not really a security -- you led the committee as -- that was asked by the arb and i think that you have some very valid comments and i would like to hear about in terms of security in the design excellence program but i'd like ms. muniz to start if you don't mind. >> as i mentioned earlier, the founding commitment with this program as with any other programs that would evolve over time relating to embassy and consulate construction is that we meet all of the security standards established by ds. they increase them. they change them over time. whatever they throw at us, we're going to implement because that's our responsibility. so, i want to make that point very clear. our goal with this process is

also to improve our coordination with diplomatic security so to have them more involved with us and to have them more involved earlier to make sure that they see everything that we're doing throughout the development of the project. so, i would argue that their involvement is going to increase and that the key commitment that i know is important to them is that we continue to meet all of the security standards and i have assured -- i have assured the department, i assure this committee we'll continue to do that. >> okay. mr. green? >> i don't know what the interaction today is between ds and obo as they develop new plans for embassies and consulates. what i do know is -- and recognize this report was done now more than a year ago. maybe they're all joining hands and singing kumbaya now. but when we interviewed people

who were concerned with security, not just ds but people are other parts of the government, also, they were not happy, the people we talked to, were not happy in their role, with their role in the selection process and felt very strongly that the pendulum had shifted from security to design. i mentioned -- and there are several examples of our observations as i said before. didn't come from the six of us. these were based on the interviews that we did with more than 100 people. not all of them, obviously, opined on obo and security but many did. and so those observations are in there. it's not my opinion. it's what we got from people who work on a daily basis or

hopefully work on a daily basis with obo. >> thank you. i'm out of time, mr. chairman. >> okay. if the gentle woman will yield to reclaim sometime and respond to this. >> yes, i'll yield. >> mr. green spearheads this effort, puts together this report, which was an offshoot and started because of the accountability review board. ms. muniz, has the state department accepted this? has this been approved? is there anything under your mind that has been -- did they disagree with it? >> as mr. green pointed out, the ds management review board really looked at ds's organization so i don't know the status of the response or the implementation of those recommendations. i could take that back to my -- >> that's one of the -- >> let me finish. with respect to the questions of

obo, there was one recommendation we look at the cost implications or the security implications of this program and we have affirmed time and again that there will be no security implications to this program. we are dedicated to meeting all of the security requirements that ds establishes, that are established in law, and in working with ds to innovate better and better products, every year that better meet those security standards. >> so if it takes longer to build something, do you consider that a security implication? >> as i explained to the committee, from the time of award which is how obo receives its funding annually, the time to build the facility because we'll be doing construction only will be the same or shorter which means that we will have people in safer facilities faster than using the design build methodology in particular when we have advance time to plan.

>> and i hope and ranking member, my colleagues on both sides of the aisle, this report was done. wefr asked for a copy. state department has thus far refused to give us a copy. al jazeera has it. they print it out on their website. we don't have one here in the united states congress but i'm holding one i got off of al jazeera. you have patrick kennedy in a significant post go on cbs news saying he disagrees with this report. i think it's part of our business to understand what does he disagree with, what does he agree with? and if the person who's implementing this office isn't totally familiar with it, isn't necessarily implementing it, there's a problem. there's a problem. >> again, i -- >> sure. >> i would like to restate, it was a ds management report. it hit and touched on ds

diplomatic security would be better positioned to answer that question. >> i think they would be in a great position to answer it. i think next time we have this panel, we should include diplomatic security. if i had to do it over, i would include diplomatic security in the future. >> would the gentle lady continue to yield to me? thanks. just one question, mr. green. again, trying to get to the bottom line. security. when you did your survey, what exactly -- you said you talked to 100 people. surveyed 100 people. can you tell us a little bit about that process so we can fully, fully understand and appreciate what it was that you did and what you were telling these people and why you were asking? because that's significant. you went to people whose interests -- whose interests

would be to make sure that they were secure. am i right? >> well, yes. we interviewed more than 100 people. we had them come in and they spread across the -- all the bureaus and the state department and some from outside state. we interviewed some of the people there were on the accountability review board. we asked different questions of different people. some were organizational questions. does the assistant secretary for diplomatic security have enough of a role within the running the organization? there was a lot of emphasis on high threat posts, post-benghazi to establish a special self or high threat post. not all of the people that we talked to did we ask about the relationship with obo and others. but many of them we did ask that

question to. and out of those questions came these observations that we laid out in our report. and the final recommendation as i said before we didn't make a determination that design excellence should be tossed out the window. all we said was before you go a lot further with this, we recommend that the state department do an in-depth analysis to look at the security implications of this program. >> interesting to me that, you know, a lot of times -- we have departments and individuals disputing issues in government. and the people suffer. during the dispute.

you know? some point we have got to figure this out so that our people are protected. i think members of congress and certainly the public when they hear the debates, they -- you know, they're not necessarily interested in watching the sausage being made. they want to make sure that people are secure, that the costs are reasonable and that the facility is functional. >> yeah. >> and that we're doing whatever we do effectively and efficiently. i just think sometimes, you know, it seems as if we feel like we have got to argue this and argue that but at the same time the people who need what we're supposed to be yielding, they're not getting it or if they get it they're not getting in it a timely fashion. >> well, what our report obviously focused on security. >> i understand. >> and as i said early on, if

someone can show me that we can do it just as inexpensively, just as securely, just as fast using design excellence, i will sign up tomorrow. >> thank you. i thank the gentle lady for yielding. >> thank the gentle woman. i'll now recognize myself but i want to ask unanimous consent to enter into the record it's called the guide to design excellence includes the message from you, ms. muniz. question for -- without hearing any objections, so ordered. will enter into the record. who at state department has approved this? >> the director of obo approved that document before i was director. it was adam namm an i want to make clear this is a document widely briefed within the department with our colleagues

in diplomatic security, briefed on the hill, briefed publicly and provided widely. so, while it's within obo's authority to innovate and to develop programs that help us build the best buildings that we can that are cost effective -- >> okay, okay. i got it. >> -- efficient, that is the construct. >> and the question we have long term is diplomatic security's feeling about that. we'll come back to that. in response to cbs news, state department put out this statement. there's been no evidence that excellence projects take longer to build. in fact, under the excellence initiative, from the fiscal year award to occupancies, facilities will be delivered on the same if not shorter schedule. and as separate part in response to cbs news, all facilities will be delivered on the same if not shorter schedules, there is no evidence to the contrary.

help me understand then why this unclassified document -- help me understand when's going on in maputo. in maputo, it started as a standard embassy design. with an estimated development of 39 months. and yet, now it says that on march 28th of 2014, they were changing to design excellence and that it was going to take 46 months. >> i don't have the document that you have. i'd like to be able to respond to that but i need to be able to go back and look at detailed budgets and schedules. >> but this is something -- this is the frustration. we request this type of document formally. you play hide and seek. you don't provide it to us. you make all these representations that everything's ahead of schedule. in fact, it's probably going to be shorter is what you say. you tell that to the world.

you put that out to the world. you gave that to cbs news. you let everybody know that, oh no, no, no. nothing's behind schedule and yet i go find this document. why is that? >> as i said, i'd like to look at the case and look at the document you're holding to be able to speak knowledgeably about that particular -- >> do you dissput what i'm saying? >> i'm not sure what you're saying. >> i'm saying that in maputo you went from a 39-month project to a 46-month project and if you're in africa and don't have the proper security, you will feel the affects of that. >> again, i'll have do go back and look at the details of that project. >> tell me about -- >> when i talk about -- >> tell me about oslo. is oslo ahead of schedule or behind schedule? >> oslo has a new contractor working on that project. is it -- >> is it behind schedule or ahead of schedule? >> it is at this time behind

schedule. >> and it is a design excellence prosquekt? >> no, it's not. >> what is it? >> oslo was a project that was developed and could not be done as a standard embassy design because many cities in particular in europe have zoning requirements that require us to develop buildings differently. that is the case in oslo. >> it seems very convenient that you toggle between is it design excellence, is it standard embassy design, is it or is it not? we don't have that clear definition. there are a lot of people and i believe some documents out there that say it is design excellence. so, help me what's going on in the hague. is the hague ahead of schedule or behind schedule? >> i'd have to look up details about the hague. again, the hague is like oslo project. the hague was a project developed based on -- it had to be an adjusted design based on city requirements. >> based on design excellence? >> no, not based on design

excellence. >> is it design bid build? >> i believe that the hague is zin bid build because the requirements in those cities force a very extensive development of the project in a way that indicates that design bid build is the better option. that is a condition that we find in very many cities in europe in particular. we have that issue. we had that issue in london. we had it in oslo. we have it in the hague but those are projects that were started before the excellence initiative. why -- while the way in which they were developed i think may very well be responsive to the environment in a way this which the excellence initiative would have -- >> let's go to kiev in the ukraine. what happened there? we needed some more seats, more personnel. what did you do there? >> us aid added an annex in kiev. >> so we added -- how many seats? >> i don't have that --

>> more than 100, right? more than 100 seats. >> i don't have that at my fingertips. >> i do. >> if you do -- >> standard embassy design and added more than 100 additional seats. >> we added an annex. >> yes. well, still seats. >> yes. >> let me go to mr. jones. you've been sitting patiently for a long time. i don't think we've asked you any questions. you were the one in your testimony here -- let me ask you. if it takes longer to build an embassy, we have people in harm's way. and it takes longer to build it, do you think that that puts people in harm's way or not? >> in the case of port morisby? >> yeah. >> is that the question? >> yes. >> we had a significant increase in the number of people who would be located on site and in the addition of u.s. marines.

>> okay. those that aren't as familiar, we had 41 personnel and the number was going to go up to 71 personnel. correct? >> right. but under law, we are required to co-locate the mission and would not have been able to do so had we only built a building for 41 people. >> so, there is a way, though, to build under standard embassy design and increase in the number of personnel. let's go back to why -- why was the number of personnel increased? >> at port morisby we started with a standard embassy design. it was a mini standard design. >> right. >> when we got the increase to add the marines, we were unable to -- >> when did that decision that marines were going in to port morisby? >> i believe in march of 2013. >> and you have documentation for this? can you provide this to the committee? >> yes. when we provide the other

documents that you have request, we'll include that among it. >> okay. so, there are no marines there now. and i think the public in general has a misconception as to what the marines actually do and don't do. they don't go outside. they don't go outside the wall. they're there to protect classified information. in port morisby, there's an exxonmobil project, multibillion dollar project that's being developed to support the chinese. chinese have a 20-year contract and so i still don't fully understand or appreciate and you're not necessarily the right person to answer this question. i don't want to put you on the spot. why we suddenly had to have the surge in the number of personal but nevertheless, the occupancy date for port morisby was going to be may of 2014. correct? >> that is correct. >> and the cost of that embassy was estimated to be what? >> i believe the cost of the -- all-in cost of the original facility was to be somewhere

around 79 million. >> my understanding is less than 50 million. >> okay. the cost to construct the facility itself was 49. >> okay. >> that includes site -- the number i gave you includes site costs and things like that. >> right. so we have the site whether it's standard embassy design or design excellence. i happen to go there in february. the chief of mission has no clue that any of this is going on. none of the discussions, no -- had no idea. he was still anticipating, understood there was a delay but still thought that during his tenure they were going to be able to move into that. when's the new date to move in? >> i believe the that the new date will be in 2018. >> so, and what is the estimated cost? >> we don't have a final cost yet because we don't have a completed design. >> because it's not a standard embassy design. correct?

>> no. that's not the issue. >> are you telling me that this is not design excellence? that this is under standard embassy design? >> what i'm saying is that the compound in port morisby began as a standard facility. it then experienced a significant increase in staffing which prevented us being able to use a standard design. the facility was not capable of being modified because it was so small so it required an annex and it is the addition of the people, the annex and the marines that are now making the delivery date in 2018. that is based on a cost benefit analysis that the department has done, that is the fastest time that we are able to get the folks from that mission co-located on the compound with the marines.

>> this is so amazingly frustrating. estimate -- the paperwork that i have not from you but the pap paperwork i have said this costs now in excess of $200 million. we are going to spend $3 million per seat. per seat. in port morisby, papua new guinea. average per capita income is like $2,500. >> i'd like to take some of these questions. so -- >> well, i'm not asking you. i'm asking mr. jones. so, i'm going to -- i'll come to you and give you plenty of time. so we're going to spend $3 million per seat in there and they're not going to be there for a good four years. you don't have a final design. what are they supposed to do for security there for the next four years while they wait? >> we are attempting to get safe and secure facilities in port

morisby on the fastest time schedule we can. we are doing everything to deliver safe, secure and functional facilities as efficiently and expediently as possible. >> i share this with the ranking member is aided more than 105 desks in the ukraine. here we're talking about 30. it costs us about $24 million. and now we're leeking at a project less than $50 million to build estimated to go north of $200 million. in papua new guinea and the consequence to this is they're going to be in harm's way for a longer period of time. we will have less budget and less money to build other facilities in other parts of the world. it is behind schedule. and these poor people are working in some of the most difficult situations i have seen in a -- when i was there, there

was an attempting carjacking of u.s. diplomatic personnel while i was there. we also had two people who showed up at the door trying to represent themselves as somebody that wanted to come see me and -- this is on a saturday. dressed in garb that represented that they were there to meet people in the embassy because you can walk right up to it. multiple times a year, i mean, very close at the pharmacy there. armed bandits come in and try to rob that place. and there was no communication with that facility there in port morisby. the chief of mission should not have been getting that message from me. that's for sure. ms. muniz, i think you wanted to say something. >> i wanted to point out that as we explained earlier, the forces causing the change to the design are outside of the bureau. we talked about iraq earlier. when you're in any environment

where things are changing rapidly, you have to adjust to the changes. there are costs related to the changes. a decision was made two years into a construction contract to add marines to a facility, to add significantly to the staff, to add classified capacity. that adds an extraordinary amount of expense in an existing contract. i think that when we have detailed information and you have received the detailed information that you have asked, we go over those costs in detail but i think given the location of papua new guinea, given the fact we learned all materials and labor need to be shipped into papua new guinea, given the environment, the discovery of natural resources there have led to greater competition in a small market, those cost increases can be explained when a mission doubles in size.

>> i have gone way over time. i have more on this issue but i'll recognize the ranking member, mr. cummings. >> mr. green, where do we go from here? i mean, really. i mean -- >> i -- you know, i think, unfortunately, where we go is we need to see the dollars and the time that it's going to take to do design excellence. we don't have that. we're comparing apples and oranges. you know? i'm not so concerned personally with the appearance of embassies. the state ig did a report in 2008 and the key findings were essentially that people were happy with the appearance and the host countries of those 12 embassies that they looked at

were happy with the appearance, so that's not what i'm worried about. what i'm worried about and i think what ds is worried about from a security standpoint is can you actually produce these things in the same amount of time with the same security at the same cost? and until we know that, and i don't know how you get to it before you do some of them, but i think the chairman raised an issue. what is cost per desk? you know? what is cost per desk under standard embassy design? we have some good figures on that i'm sure. what is cost per desk under design excellence? i -- until we can compare apples and apples, you know, i think there's going to be -- continue to be a lot of skepticism that you can do this as fast and as

cheap. >> ms. muniz, i have listened carefully. and i -- i am concerned and i think we all should be concerned when we don't get documents. and it becomes very frustrating. time is valuable. and you know, i listen to admiral mullen and ambassador pickering when they talked about the report. the army report. a and, you know, it was some of the most -- i think it was ba r ambassador pickering that said -- i asked him, why was he -- why did he agree to get on that board. and he talked about the fact

that the review board, that he felt that he owed it to his country and to those who died and their families to make things better so it didn't happen to anybody else. and some kind of way -- i mean, when i listen to you, mr. green, it makes sense that if i eve got something that's already designed and -- i mean, i've got something i'm working with and i guess i've -- you have years to make any adjustments you see, right? i mean, is that right? in other words, it's like you have this house, you use a same pretty much same materials, same structure, over and over again, and then -- but in the meantime, if there were problems, you can

make those adjustments. or, and just correct me if i'm wrong, i'm trying to put this in simple language for the american people or if you're in a country where there's a unique situation you need a different kind of door or a height requirement or whatever, but still using the basic same model, is that right? >> yes. that's correct. >> so logic tells me that if i'm using the same model, then it's -- i mean it is just logic that it would be quicker if i didn't go to another country and use that model. is that -- that's basically what you're saying, right? >> that's the logic that makes sense. >> and so, i think for the state department, ms. muniz, it becomes a difficult argument to sell not only to us but to the

american people because the american people they don't know everything that you know. so, you've got -- it's easy for us to -- and i can understand because it's your expertise. it's what you all do. but sometimes you have to break this stuff down so that people get what you're talking about because to them it makes no sense. and i'm not saying -- i'm saying with limited knowledge it makes no sense. but all of your information it probably makes a lot of sense. and so, we find ourselves in a situation where you've got what mr. green's saying, what you're saying but the bottom line is going back to what mr. green has said, if you had the data to show that we could get the same security, costs --

>> time. >> and time. all of those factors pretty much the same, that he would sign on the dotted line. am i right? >> that's correct. >> so why can't we get the information? there seems to be some reluctance and i don't know why that is. can you help us with that? because, see, one of the things that happens here and i have lived long enough and seen enough and been up here long enough, we can get distracted from the mission by getting caught up in a lot of -- i'm not saying we don't have to deal with those issues but it doesn't allow us to do what we're supposed to be doing and that is providing security. so, we've got -- oh, why didn't i get this report? they're legitimate questions. they really are. but at the same time that's the time that we could be taking our energy and focusing on making sure that our folks are safe. that's what the american people

want. so go ahead. >> i think that's absolutely right. and i'd be happy to explain in more detail why it is that if we award 100% design on the date of award the period of performance is shorter. and we could have people into safer facilities faster. what it means is that if we know that our appropriation is fixed, we know which buildings we're doing, it might take us long tore do the design, we're going to be looking closely at the requirements, what are the materials to work in that environment, how do we put that building together in that environment? but from the date of award, when we award that project, it's not going to include any design time. it will be no longer than it would be with a design build standard embassy design and it will likely be shorter. i could go into more detail. we could provide -- >> there's one little thing -- whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa.

rewind. there's one little thing that bothers me and that is, why? in other words, if i eve got my model. if it's working, i know what it's going to cost. i know how much time it's going to take. am i missing something that then i have to go to something else? so suddenly, okay, oh, let me run and do something else when i have already got this -- i've got it. finally. you follow me? >> yes. i think it's a fair question. and what i've tried to lay out is that the standard embassy design was a fixed solution based on an average hypothetical size embassy or consulate. we build embassies and consulates in every environment. whether that's because it's very hot. whether it's very cold. whether because some systems are going to work there on the sea

front and other systems are not going to work in a completely different environment. we are looking at the real requirements of missions and thinking about how do we build the best buildings for those missions. the standard embassy design was a good fix solution but it also rirled us to build free standing warl houses. regardless of the location. there's some places we don't need a warehouse. why build a warehouse if we could get -- >> then you take it off. am i right? right? i mean, you take it off. if i don't need a garage, if i got a house with a garage and i don't need a garage, i take the garage off. and by the way, it's not just one design, right? there's several designs, right? >> there's one. >> there's one? >> one standard embassy design. >> you take the garage off. >> all of those things taken together, and if i could try to sort of put or describe the excellence initiative in a nutshell, it's really to say that we are taking those lessons learned from the standard embassy design. we are taking those mod lar

pieces of it but providing a lot more flexibility and how those could be put together in a way that's meaningful. again, you build a very large embassy, having the two bars is not efficient. you're cladding two buildings as opposed to one. you're securing two separate building almost an opposed to one so i think using architects, engineers, folks within the department, security experts, we look at each case and come up with the best and most efficient solution. in many ways what the design excellence is doing is what you're saying. it's taking a baseline and modifying that baseline in a way that's sensible for the mission. >> now -- >> right now the standard embassy design or the standard embassy design we are moving forward from was a very fixed solution. horizontal. ten acres. warehouse. that's not always the best solution in all the

environments. and i -- and i'd like to also state that the cost per desk, we use that cost per desk to develop our budget so we have a cost estimating office in our bureau. when we build a budget, whether it's a standard embassy design budget or an excellence initiative project, they tell us, you know what? you have spent historically for this many desks and this many people in this environment, this much. that's what your budget is. we are going to work to that same budget under the excellence initiative or under the standard embassy design. >> ms. muniz, let me tell you something. you just helped me. what you just explained. now i'm finally getting -- so, in other words, you know, what i thought you were going to say is that circumstances change. that we have new technology. i thought that's what i was going to hear. that new technology better use

of certain -- in other words, better materials, all those kind of things might go into -- i'm not -- i don't know anything about building so -- but all those things might go into changing the box. and what you're saying is that you may -- help me if i'm wrong. you may look at the box but you're forever changing the box. not that you don't look at it. you don't take it into consideration. but -- but it may be change substantially. is that -- or are a brand-new b period? >> i would say that it depends. so again, if we're looking at a very large mission, to have these -- the standard embassy design and to put that in place would simply not be efficient. london is a good example in the case that not only are we building a cube which is much more efficient than sort of two

separate boxes that go up which would require twice as much cladding, we're also using materials that make the building significantly lighter, that reduce the size, the weight, and the expense of the foundation that needs to be put down, the curtain wall reduces the weight which also influences the foundation, and it's all able to go up faster than a traditional concrete building would have been able to go up in that place. so i think it's both materials and base building in certain cases. >> last question. is it your -- do you anticipate being able to take, say, that box -- london is i know very unique. but other -- perhaps the creation of another box, something that you can use in more than one place? you follow what i'm saying? as you're developing. how does that play into that? you follow me? >> yes, i think i do. >> in other words, if you

have -- you do all things you just said, okay, now we've got great design, we've got security, we've got -- this is the best -- the best bang for our buck, time, everything is straight. do you anticipate being able to use, say, for example, that -- that model, a model like that, somewhere else? you follow me? >> yes. let me use an example which may be too common but i think it sort of demonstrates the point. there was a time when most people who drove had a model t. it was a great car. it was a simple car. as we evolved, cars got better and better. they evolved and they also sort of separated it out into the different types of cars. so today, rather than going with a model t, you could go with a version that is much more secure, much more safe. but you could also choose to have an austin mini in one case. you could go with an suv. but those things depend on where you are. one, you want to be in a small

urban environment, you're a small mission, you could go with a smaller size and still meet all your requirements and be more efficient to run. but there are those other times you're going to need the larger solution. you're going to need -- you're going to need the suv. and i think that being able to put the appropriate solution with the mission and to consider those things and to make sure that we're appropriately spending the money that the taxpayer gives us and considering not just first costs but long-term costs, i think that's what we're talking about doing. >> thank you very much. thank you. thank you all for being here. >> recognize the chairman of the committee, mr. issa. >> thank you, chairman chafe fits and ranking member cummi s cummings, i appreciate your questioning. and fortunately i came back in just in time to have you talk about automobiles. and i agree that sometimes -- i actually don't think the fiat 500 or the morris mini is ever appropriate from a safety stand

point for our men and women in the state department. but having said that, i certainly understand the difference of size and scale. and some of the urban versus rural considerations. but mr. green, those considerations really aren't what we're asking about today. what we're asking about is, do you to the greatest extent possible use a mass-production concept which is what standard build is, it's about do you build a one-of-a-kind formula race car that's beautiful and fast and has unique characteristics and each one is different, as a matter of fact, the secrets aren't even shared between formula racers, or do you build a toyota camry in order to get a -- or a ford focus or a ford 500, do you build a mass-produced, consistent, reliable, understood, bugs worked out,

repeatable product so that you get a highly reliable product that can be maintained throughout the system, standard windows, standard other character tick istics if possib order to get a good product at a better price? i switched to ford quickly when i realized it is about henry ford's model of greater value for less cost, isn't it, mr. green? >> yes, it is. and i think it's like standard embassy design might be the chevrolet suburban, but when necessary, it becomes the escalade. >> and there are options to further uparmor and so on. >> sure, yeah. >> miss munoz, one of the other questions. inman is all about security, right? the so-called inman designs? >> i'm not as familiar with the inman designs as that program

was over long before i came in. >> let me tell you what i was told 14 years ago when i came in and started going to embassies as a member of foreign affairs. we didn't used to think of embassies in the same security sense as we do now. what we discovered, the beirut barracks and the marine barracks and the beirut embassy bombing and others taught us was there was no substitute for setback. do you understand that as the person making these decisions? >> yes, absolutely. >> so when you talk about urban versus rural and location, and i was just in britain, where setback is highly compromised, and they're compliant, but they made a five-acre decision and went vertical and did the best they could, including the famous moat, part of -- and in fact, some crash considerations. those safety considerations, any time you give up setback, you

have to trade off higher cost for that setback, don't you? >> you do. but we are not suggesting under this program to ever trade setback. >> okay. so when you talk about large footprint which you did and small footprint, the truth is that standard build, and i'll go back to mr. green for part of this, is about starting off with a footprint sufficient for current and future embassy considerations, including possible add-ons, in a country so that we can make a 50-year decision on sovereign u.s. soil, isn't it? >> yes. >> mr. green? i was on this -- i apologize, i was able to take a democratic staffer but none of my counterparts were able to attend because it was short notice. i was struck by something i want to make sure is in the order today. and what was talked about earlier in papua new guinea. changing characteristics. when they were talking about --

they flew in people from our offices to be there when we were in london. they started talking about, well, you know, it's individual. we have to work it out. and i suddenly realized, what you're doing is you're custom-building more and more, you're going into a rut, which is instead of saying, state department will plan, including excess space if appropriate, we will plan for the anticipated 50-year necessary facility and we want to make sure that it's very much understood. instead what they were talking about, well, one group might need a little more here, and somebody may -- which suddenly hit me, what you're talking about is you're talking about the current, according to what i was told, you're talking to the current people in an embassy, the current ambassador, the c t current staff, in order to find out what they want as part of this design characteristic. and that is one of the things that i came back profoundly concerned about from the trip to

london. it wasn't the london facility, because at 500,000 square feet there's a lot of the room. but when you're looking at embassies and starting to ask, well, should it be plussed or minused based on unique -- or current characteristics? aren't you inherently creating that downstream problem that you're designing based on what an ambassador and their staff want, not based on a plan that looks 50 years in the future? and i'd like each of you to answer that to the extent you can. >> i think it's a great question. because it really addresses one of the enduring challenges of the department. we're trying to build buildings for 50, 100 years. and things change over that time period. i think that where we can financially and based on the urban environment or the environment where we're building, we do try to buy larger sites. and we actually make a deliberate effort. and this was not always done with the standard embassy design. we site the building in such a way that we know where a later

annex will go. for years, maybe forever, it will be a lawn. but we know in advance how we might use that space so that it gives us that flexibility. the other thing that we've done under the excellence initiative, and i think this is something that is meaningful and reduces costs in the long term. so we're looking at things like using raised floors, using demountable par tigs, making sure that infrastructure is sized in a way that within a given envelope you could have a significant increase in staff with very little cost. that wasn't true with the older model. again, i think the standard embassy design taught us a lot. but i think we can improve on it. we can improve on it in meaningful ways that give us more flexibility for the long-term. and i think -- >> right. mr. green, as you respond to that question, i just want you to include from your research from your committee's activities, in fact, isn't that what standard build is supposed to do is to include that?

so isn't it mend it, don't end it, rather than saying, standard build didn't include future annexes and expansion in their consideration? >> no, it's -- it's a continuously moving standard that is done. let me just respond to your earlier question, though. you know, what do we need 50 years out? the ambassador wants a bigger latrine in his office, or we want 50 consular windows instead of five. that changes all the time. i mean, we saw it here today. it changed with papua new guinea. you had a plan to do something, all of a sudden the department says, no, we need more, for whatever reason. there's right sizing that goes on constantly within the department. there's the much-publicized but i'm not sure how much it's

occurring, the pivot to asia. what does that mean for those embassies in asia? more people. well, you know, five years from now it might be a pivot somewhere else. i don't know that we're ever going to reach the perfect solution to say that we could build something that's good today and it will be good even ten years from now. >> thank you. and mr. chairman, i think the point that your research and what water hearing today is all about is that as you standardize and drive down the cost per square foot, the ability to build that few extra square feet and the flexibility is inherent in it as you drive up the square foot cost, you inherently are building smaller and tighter. and tight-sizing is not what we need for flexibility, it's right-sizing with a plan to expand or to add in. and hopefully as you continue your research, and we get the numbers, we'll begin seeing how

standard build can be made to do just that. and i thank you for your indulgence and yield back. >> thank you, chairman. we'll now recognize a very patient member from michigan, mr. bent vole i don't, for two minutes. just teasing, five minutes. >> five minutes, good. thank you, mr. chairman. during our last conversation i forgot to ask you a very, very important question when it came time -- when we were discussing london. and you clarified it. it's not going to cost $1 billion, it's going to cost about $800 million. you don't look at how many employees it's going to house, you call them desks. is that correct? okay, so how many desks in the london embassy? how many? >> sorry, i believe 644. >> 644. what does that work out to? how many did you say? >> 644 desks. >> that works out to be what, $1 million a desk?

>> some of our costs can be very high, including -- >> $1 million a desk? okay. but i understand the risk in london and the cost for square -- or is it per meters? what's that cost? do you know the breakdown? how much it costs pier meter or per square foot? i know here in america we look at the square foot cost. >> right, right. for london, i don't have the square foot costs at the top of my head. >> okay. >> i would like to add for london, for those members -- >> i think you already said that you're selling property to cover the costs of the $800 million embas embassy, correct? >> yes. >> you did say that. you're in these old buildings now, is that correct? >> yes, these are old existing buildings at the embassy. >> if it runs over the london building takes lo s longer than expected what's it going to cost to house our employees in the

older buildings? per month? >> we're not expecting that to happen. >> you're not expecting -- have you -- seriously, for the life of me, and i'm sure there probably has been one or two government contracts that didn't go over budget and didn't go over -- or came in on schedule. but -- okay, so let's just ask you this. how many work orders or change orders are pending or are in process in the london embassy new construction? change order dozen delay a project, don't they? or do you add that to the -- it's a change, it's going to take longer, so we'll just move the schedule completion date out? >> as you might imagine, with over 200 projects in construction, i don't have the number of change orders in london. but what i would like to make clear is that while delays pose a -- like on any project, a certain amount of risk, the department made the decision in 2006, many years before i was there, under a different strait

administration, that this was the best value for the taxpayer. and i think it was a great decision. >> okay. >> we, for $50 million more, are getting a brand-new embassy that meets all of the security standards in exchange for property that we had been in for years -- >> so you're going to meet all the security standards in london. >> yes. >> versus -- not in -- nam pen, some of these other countries that, well, seem to be -- look to me maybe in the future, greater threat. let's talk about that threat. awhile back we had some secretary of state people tell us they don't do a risk analysis when it comes to risks in the country that they're housed, thus benghazi, they didn't really read what was happening. and a lot of our americans were killed. so do you do a risk analysis

every day in what the dangers are outside of the embassy? no matter what country you're in? wait a minute, i'm sorry, i just answered my own question. you don't do that, do you? what you do apparently is in places like london, you take every risk imaginable and come up with a building that's worth $800 million at a cost of $1 million per desk. you know, i can't really -- just thinking about the soldiers in iraq, you know, we looked at the risk out there, if we thought the risk was greater. by the way, they shot rockets at us once a week. we put these concrete barriers in front of us, sandbags, and we'd adjust. i'm sure because of curb appeal we can do those things a little nicer, a little fansier, taking every single building, including

a modular, cookie cutter design, and add to that building outside to address any risk that, well -- if you actually looked at the risks outside of your embassies and addressed them, you could take proper precautions. but i will say, i know my time's running out, mr. chairman, but you have always had at every embassy in the world the best security system you could possibly buy. it's called the united states marine. thank you very much, mr. chairman. >> thank the gentleman. now i'm going to recognize myself in consultation with mr. cummings here. just a couple of quick things and then we will -- promise we will end. i do have a question about london. london is unique. beijing was quung. there are some iconic properties, there are some amazing relationships, security

needs. that's understood. there's been a suggestion that you're still on time in london and on budget in london. what is your current assessment of where we're at in london in terms of budget and time? >> that's exactly my assessment, that we're on budget and on schedule. >> what about the vat issue? where are we at with the vat issue? >> i'd like to keep that conversation limited, because our conversations with our counterparts in britain are sensitive. but i would like to say that we're making good progress and we're comfortable that we're within the budget on that. >> and i appreciate that. i see that as a potential threat. they have -- i believe it's a 20% vat which could obviously be a huge and major issue. and something we would appreciate if you'd keep us apprised of. i had an opportunity to visit

dubai which was one of the last standard embassy designs. what do you find wrong with the facility in dubai? >> i don't know that particular facility. so i wouldn't be able to address it. but i would like to say that there are many standard embassy designs that i think work well for their missions. i think there are some that could work better and i think this initiative is about improving on something that was good and that did a lot of good. so i could look at dubai more closely and get back to you with comments, but i don't have any particular, not knowing it in great detail. >> the general concern here is, it just doesn't make common sense to me -- it's just not common sense to suggest that we're going to spent more time on design and ultimately that's going to take a shorter period of time. i just -- i still will follow up -- we've been talking for

hours here. ought as a follow-up, this is just conceptually -- i just don't understand it. there have been some suggestions that standard embassy design was just one size fits all. that's not true, that's never been true. we built nearly 90 different buildings. and one of the things that drives me personally, and i shared this with mr. cummings and others, one of the things that drives me on this is you have multiple gao reports and an inspector general report that says, my goodness, standard embassy designs, they're going faster and they're generally coming in under budget. we never get reports like that. and yet i look at the state department and they say, but we're going to totally scrap that, we're going a different design, different way, we're going to focus on architecture. because architecture is diplomacy. you can shake your head no but that's the video that the state department put out. that is the video put out. you're shaking your head. >> because i -- as i explained,

we are committed to being on those same budgets. we're committed to that schedule. we're committed to meeting all the security requirements. i just know that we can build even better buildings, right? what we're doing is what we should be doing, what bureaucrats should be doing. we are trying to improve on a good product. as you rightly pointed out, the standard embassy design did require modifications for different -- we're taking that a step further and making sure that it is not a fixed envelope, that it takes all of the lessons learned from that and allows us to modify the buildings in a way that's smart for the mission, smart for the taxpayer, smart for the long-term. >> i those assumptions. it will play itself out. i don't believe it will be faster. i think we have strong evidence it's taking longer. i think the consequence is it will cost more. i think the other consequence is we're going to have more people in harm's way -- if you brought the people from papua new guinea

here, had them raise their hand and say, which design would you like? they'd just want to be safe. they'd just want to be safe and secure. and it's going to be the most opulent and extravagant building in that country. under the standard embassy design. and those modifications could have been there. i appreciate the dialogue. this is the general concern. you said it in response to mr. cummings. the design portion take longer. again, the consequence i think will be more people in harm's way, it will take longer, it will be more expensive, and we'll have ongoing security concerns. i really do appreciate your participation here. i have no doubt about the sincerity of wanting to come in under budget and on time. i just don't think you can get from here to there. i find very few people that agree that you can get there. that's why we need the documents. that's why we're going to continue to push the inspector general and the gao to continue

to look at this. it's why we're going to continue to have some hearings on this. so i do appreciate all your participation here. i know you care deeply about your country and the work that you do and you're passionate about that. we want people that are passionate about that. but we also have an obligation to have this back and forth. that's what the oversight committee's all about, that's what the congress is all about. it's part of the process that makes this country unique and better and the greatest country on the face of the planet. so i thank you again for your participation. we look forward to getting the documents from the state department sooner rather than later. and this committee stands adjourned.

former new york city police commissioner bear nard kerik. "washington journal" live every day at 7:00 a.m. eastern. you can join the conversation on facebook or twitter. the house energy subcommittee on health examines the patient perspective on the drug development and review process. see it live starting at 9:00 a.m. eastern on c-span2. 40 years ago, the watergate scandal led to the only resignation of an american president. throughout this month and early august, american history tv revisits 1974 and the final weeks of the nixon administration. this weekend, hear the supreme court oral argument, united states v. nixon, as the

watergate special prosecutor contests the president's claim of executive privilege over his oval office recordings. >> now the president may be right in how he reads the constitution, but he may also be wrong. and if he is wrong, who is there to tell him so? and if there's no one, then the president of course is free to pursue his course of erroneous interpretations. what then becomes of our constituti constitutional form of government? >> watergate 40 years later, sunday night at 8:00 eastern on american history tv on c-span3. baseball does strike me, i don't want to get met physical about this, i'm the anti-met physical school of baseball. but it's a good sport to be the

national pastime of a democratic nation because democracy is about compromise and settling. you don't get everything you want. and baseball's like that. there's a lot of losing in baseball. every team that goes to spring training knows it's going to win 60 games, knows it's going to lose 60 games, you play the whole season to sort out the middle 42. if you win 11 of 20 games, 89 game, you've got a good chance to play in october. so it's the sport of the half loaf as is democracy. >> george will on his latest book on "baseball and wrigley f controversy surrounding one of his columns, sunday night at 8:00 eastern and pacific on " a "q&a." next, a hearing examining the impact of federal, state, and private charitable programs on reducing poverty. this house budget committee hearing is about two hours.

>> the committee will come to order. a number of our members on our side of the aisle will be here a little late because their conference is still ongoing. i want in the interests of time to get started. welcome, everybody. it's good to see a great full-capacity crowd. this is our fifth hearing on the war on poverty. over the past year we have heard from a number of voices, policy experts, community groups, federal officials. today we're going to hear from people in the middle. people in the private sector who work with the public sector. people who coordinate state programs with private charity. we're also going to hear from an especially important voice, miss tianna gains turner. first, miss gains turner, i was happy to meet you in the rayburn room off the side of the floor. i'm excited to hear her testimony. in fact i want to quote from her previous written testimony because i think she hits the nail on the head.

"poverty is not just one issue that can be solved at one time. it's not just an issue of jobs or food or housing or energy assistance and safety. it's a people issue. and you can't slice people up into issues. we are whole human beings. poverty has to do with a whole person who is in a family in a neighborhood in a community." i couldn't have said it better myself. i think that's exactly right. for too long the federal government has treated people as numbers. instead of whole people with wholly connected needs. that is why i'm excited to hear from heather reynolds, president of catholic charities of ft. worth. miss reynolds is doing great work in ft. worth. she's putting together a pilot project to test how case management can expand opportunities for working families. and as miss gains turner urges, miss reynolds' program sees people as whole human beings who deserve time and care, not just

another client to usher through the door. and the results speak for themselves. in 2013, 90% of the people in the refugee program became self-sufficient within six months. i'd also like to welcome jennifer tiller from america works. america works has pioneered two key concepts that are crucial to real reform. work first, and accountability. america works gets paid only if they succeed. and i can't find a better definition of success than their own definition. they say success "is an individual moving to employment, maintaining a self-sufficient lifestyle, and progressing in their desired career trajectory." i think we should insist on the same kind of accountability from our federal programs as we do from these community groups. one last thing. at a previous hearing, some of my colleagues kept asking our witnesses if they had received federal aid. ress as if that would undercut their testimony. the point of these hearings is

not to question whether the federal government should help. the point is to figure out the best way it can help. and with that i hope we can listen and learn from our witnesses today because i think each of these three ladies have so much to offer us. i'd like to recognize the ranking member for his opening remarks. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want to thank all the beens for being here today. as the chairman said, this is our fifth hearing on the question of how we can better address poverty in america. and as i have in the past i want to begin on two points of agreement. the first is that the best anti-poverty measure as job, in fact, a job that pays a living wage, a job that can support individuals and a family. and second, if there are better ways to channel resources to get better results in terms of our fight on poverty, we welcome that conversation. and case management may be a

very successful way of doing that. but while it's our fifth hearing, we've still got a huge disconnect between the goal cited by many of our republican colleagues of reducing poverty, and the republican budget that passed out of this committee and passed out of this house that dramatically cuts funding for programs that help people climb out of poverty. and mr. chairman, the fact remains that the budget that you presented would cut areas of the budget that would help provide the kind of case management we're talking about today. dramatic cuts in what we call the discretionary part of the budget funded at lower than two types the sequester cuts. and deep cuts in programs like food and nutrition. so we want to have a discussion here about how to better use existing resources to help people climb out of poverty.

we welcome that conversation. what we don't welcome is using that conversation as a pretext or a means to dramatically cut funding for those programs. whether it's medicaid or food and nutrition programs. and as the chairman indicated, we've had witnesses who have received important federal funding. there's -- apparently there's no disagreement here that the federal government can play an important role in helping people climb out of poverty. but it's hard to do that at the same time that you have a budget that dramatically cuts funding for those programs. so reform, better use of existing resources to help more people and have more effective results, yes. but a conversation that doesn't answer the question about how deep cuts to anti-poverty programs will advance that goal

is something we'll continue to ask about. finally, as i also join the chairman in welcoming all the witnesses, i am pleased that ms. gains turner is here today. i think she's the first witness in the series of five hearings who herself has experienced the struggles of poverty and the effort to climb out of poverty. and so we think your personal testimony's especially important in that regard. and as you state in your testimony, one of the keys there is mag making sure that work pays. that when you have a job you can at least have a job that supports a family. and one of the things we've been trying to do here in the house is at least raise the minimum wage from its current $7.25 an hour, which is lower purchasing power than when harry truman was president. we'd like to raise that to $10.10 an hour, which still doesn't in many cases provide a

living wage, but at least provides greater opportunities for people working to take care of themselves and their families. we're still hoping to have a vote on that and many other issues that support work. but really pleased to have all these witnesses here today to talk about how we can tackle this important challenge that's before us. so thank you, mr. chairman. and look forward to the conversation. >> thank you. to make sure that every witness knows it's against the law to provide false witness to the committee and congress we've begun a new committee practice in all the congressional committees, not just this one, of swearing in all of our witnesses. this does not reflect any distrust of any witness. we've taken this step because of recent legal guidance we've ben given from the department of justice. i'd like to ask the three of you if you wouldn't mind standing so we can swear in our