got $4 million in the first week or so. we don't think that's particularly true but they are a self-sustaining organization and flush with resources, cash and equipment. no question. >> i'm out of time. i'll go to mr. engel. on the one hand when you look at some of these borders in the middle east, they were all done by the colonialists and i've often felt why should we be obligated to maintain those borders? iraq is not a real state. it was slapped together. you've got the kurds. you've got the shia and the sunni who really don't want to be part of each other. and so particularly the kurds, who have autonomy now, practically have their own

nation and probably will proclaim it very shortly. so, my sympathies would be to say to the kurds, well, why should we suck you back into iraq? you have the right to your own nation. frankly, nobody has ever explained to me why the palestinians are entitled to self determination but somehow the kurds are not. i don't think that's fair, quite frankly. on the other hand, we're told that if the kurds break off, there's practically no way that you could stop the radicals from dominating what's left of iraq and that the kurds provide some kind of counterbalance to prevent the radicals from gaining control. i would like to hear from both of you, what your views are on keeping iraq intact or not.

>> as i described in testimony, it's a concept that is under the iraqi constitution that would recognize a very substantial devolution of powers. there's a recognition in iraq that from the center out you're never going to fully control all of these areas, particularly given the capacity of isol. and locals and tribal forces alone cannot defeat isol. they need the support of the central state. functioning federalism concept is really the model that is an emerging consensus within iraq. the kurdish region shares a border with what is effectively isis. more active conversations with with the kurdish regional government to make sure they're able to manage that problem. they also face a very serious strategic -- geostrategic environment, given the geography of the region. we're in a very active

conversation with the kurdistan region. 13 million iraqis voted in a national election, 60% turnout. 328 member parliament that has just convened. today was the first session with the new speaker of parliament, very moderate, pragmatic and emerging sunni leader who secured the support of all political blocks. first session of parliament today they all stood together, all groups to denounce the very horrific tragedy inflicted by isol against christians in mosul. the country, overall, the people do not want to divide into three different countries, three different states. there is no easy solution for that. when you game it out, actually, the consequences are quite serious. >> mr. mcgurk, it's my feeling, correct me if i'm wrong, that the kurds consensus among the

kurds is that they want to separate from iraq. >> the kurds -- a lot of kurds say -- at the hard of every kurd, wants an independent state. there's no question. we have to recognize that. they're also among our closest friends in the region. there's also a pragmatic element given the realities, economics and other things in that we want to work with the kurds in the future. they're choosing their nominee to be the next president of iraq. we hope to have that sorted out over the coming days. within the constitutional framework -- we've had conversations over the last week with the leadership of the patriotic union of kurdistan about their future, and about a future within the constitutional framework. at least in the near term, i think that's the best way to go. >> i just don't feel that it's

fair to hold the kurds hostage because, unfortunately, we have screwed up things in iraq and everything is falling to pieces. we're essentially saying to the kurds, you know what? you have to be the glue that keeps iraq together and, therefore, we're going to deny you your aspirations. i'm not quite sure that's fair. >> strong, capable federal government in iraq that's actually able to exert control and influence to push back on that threat. and while i guess it is sort of a -- there has long been this idea that iraq can split into three pieces, i ask the question, who is in charge of that western and north central part of iraq in that model? while i think, as described,

there are folks in the kurdish region who have as entirations of independence. if you don't have a strong, capable government in baghdad that's able to blunt those threats. syria, the situation on their southern border right there. iran on the other side. that is a tough neighborhood. from a security point of view, the single best blunt, frankly, to isil and a strong iranian influence in iraq is a strong federal government based in baghdad. >> i see my time is up. let me just very quickly say that i hope the you state does not think it can be luled into some kind of partnership with iran in iraq. there are some people who feel that because our interests may come together, converge, that maybe we should partner with

iran. i couldn't disagree more. i think that iran is major of terrorism in the world. we look what's happening with israel, gaza and all the weapon s of hamas, which is a terrorist organization, provided by iran. and i just think it would be a tragic error if we somehow thought iran was a viable partner in iraq. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you. ileana ros-lehthinen of florida. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. to make sure isil can't gain safe haven in western iraq and you were confident that iran -- iraq will deny them this. we all know how that turned out. just a few months later isil took over most of western iraq. how could your assessment have been so far off?

why didn't we respond to their calls for help? your testimony from february shows that there was some serious disconnect within the administration on the reality of the threat in iraq. or we've been completely failing in addressing it. some of our military systems and information sharing to get a better intelligence picture of iraq last month, secretary kerry said nobody expected isil to capture mosul. even if our foreign military assistance had not quite kicked in yet, shouldn't our intelligence gathering efforts have been able to get a better assessment, more accurate assessment of samara and mosul? it has been widely reported that while taking control of mosul, isil seized rather large quantities of u.s.-supplied foreign military assistance and

made off with nearly half a billion dollars from the local banks in addition to tanks, humvees that were taken, u.s. officials were quick to deny the claims of isil that they captured advanced weaponry such as blackhawk helicopters. did they capture any caravan aircraft or any other advanced weaponry like man pads, u.s. military equipment and hundreds of millions of dollars? aren't the only items that isil has seized the iraq government confirmed that isil took uranium from mosul university. what is the status of that uranium? what could isil use that for? and on the christian community we've seen that the ancient christian community in iraq is under siege by these islamist militants. once a vibrant, sizeable community now over 1 million christians have been forced to flee their homes and communities

or be killed. their homes are being marked by isil and they are being given an ultimatum, to flee, to convert or to be murdered. mr. mcgurk, in february, you said you were trying to make sure that the christian community was able to protect itself. it's clear we haven't made any progress. we cannot protect them. what are we doing now to help protect the few remaining christians and their religious sites and artifacts? as ranking member engel had pointed out, are we, on any level, directly or indirectly, coordinating with iran on our -- or syria over our iraq policy or isil? and does the administration believe that maliki must go? thank you, sir, and gentle lady.

>> let me to address these in order. i'll bring you up to speed where we are in anbar province. fallujah was in control of isil. fallujah is still in control of isil. our advice was not to move into fallujah but set a cordon and that remains in place, though it is fairly loose. second, we wanted them to hold the proevengs capital of ramadi. so far, they are. what happens changed significantly in anbar is a very sophisticated attack that happened late last month on the strategic border crossing in anbar, which prove that is isil is an army, militarily capable force. multiple-day assault. >> your written testimony, isil also generates $12 million a month through elicit business in mosul. that's a lot of money for terrorists. quite an economic engine.

>> they're a self-sustaining organization. what we have seen in mosul for some time was a modus operandi, the assault in mosul last month did catch everybody off guard. we saw some indications of it coming. we had sources on the ground who told us three days before they were seeing indications of it coming. we did not envision the assault nor the collapse of security forces up there. i will say i've had a number of modistics -- >> i apologize. i threw a lot of questions at you so that you could give me some written responses. thank you, mr. chairman. i apologize. i'm out of time. >> we'll go to the ranking member on the western hemisphere subcommittee. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> i've been here since 2006 and i have come to hate the word assess and train.

we seem to be assessing and traini training iraqi soldiers assessing the situation of iraq and i think the situation is worse than ever. after spending billions of dollars. we train an army. they fire a shot at them, they run for the hills. where did we go wrong that we put in all this money and training and they can't even defend a section of their country? it's mind boggling to me. now we have the situation where we have isis. i'm concerned that in jordan, for example, we have 2 million refugees. if they destabilize jordan, the whole area -- it's just a whole mess. what do we do with all that money that we put to train all these people? where are these trained people?

it's not just this administration. i'm talking from 2006 on. mr. mcgurk, can you also assist me in understanding this? >> let me address the issue of the training. anyone who has watched the news or been part of our efforts in iraq was disappointed by what we saw in mosul. and i think the biggest thing that we looked at and were surprised by is the dissolving of frankly four iraqi divisions up and around that area, and some areas where they did not fight in contrast to western iraq where they were putting up a serious fight. rather than a lack of capability, i think what we believe is that they lacked either the will or the direction to fight. either they, as brett described, saw a snowballing effect and they had a fear stripped off their uniforms and turned, or they waited for direction from baghdad that did not come and, therefore, departed. we don't believe that they

lacked a basic capability. it's that at the end of the day, they did not have the will or direction to fight in that part of the area. that is critical for any future plans we decide to pursue in iraq. we have to understand whether the partner in iraq that we would be working with has the will, the direction, the capacity to fight and that is why we have folks on the ground right now trying to figure that out. it is not that it's not frustrating. it, of course, is. >> we spend billions of dollars on a group of people that are unwilling to fight? >> i don't think we can say that about all the iraqi security forces. we see them attempting to take offensive action in iraq as recently as this week. it's not a blancht statement you can make. in western rack there's still areas -- >> there were four divisions, though. >> there were four divisions. that's correct. >> mr. mcgurk? >> first, the leadership in

command of these units have all been fired. we immediately were in conversations with iraqi leaders, security and political leaders in the wake of mosul and recommended a wholesale change in the command. new commanders have been appointed. those are commanders we know very well. they're also quite effective. iraqis, just in the past month in terms of fighting units, they've suffered almost 1,000 killed in action and they are holding the line and beginning to conduct some very rudimentry operations to clear some highways. i will not underestimate the extreme challenge here. what we saw in mosul was not indicative of a force as a whole. the units, many of them, are balanced. there's about an average -- i was just on the phone to our folks out there today. the composition of the force is about 55% shia, 23% sunni, by and large. within the units there is no

fracturing within the units themselves. now there are very incompetent, incapable units with poor leadership. no question we found those. we also found extremely capable, extremely proficient and dedicated units and it's in our interests, i believe, to invest in those units. we should not write off what happened in mosul and write off the entire security force overall. it would not be an accurate response to the overall picture we're seeing. nor do i think that would be in our long-term interest. >> can you talk about the direction of jordan? what are we doing to offset that? >> so, obviously, particularly the news a couple of weeks ago about isil taking ground near the jordanian border was a -- we all looked at that very closely, particularly the jordanians. i think what's important to remember is that the jordanians are a very solid, capable force that is laser focused on this

issue. they have moved troops to the border in order to reinforce their side of the border and then the united states has a robust relationship with jordan that is only strengthened, frankly, in the wake of everything that's gone on in syria. there's quite a significant amount of interaction on a daily basis with the jordanians. but we obviously watch that with keen interest. >> sorry we're out of time. i wanted to ask you about -- but i ran out of time. >> we'll let the witness respond to your question there. >> can you talk a little bit about iranian use in this situation to attack camp liberty? >> very briefly, we are watching camp liberty very closely. it remains our goal to get all of the members and residents of camp liberty out of iraq. we are working that extremely hard. we have some leads with other countries and third countries.

we also are going to do all that we can to make sure that they remain safe. i can assure you in all my conversations, even in the midst of this very urgent crisis, i raise the issue of camp liberty to make sure that the residents there remain safe. >> thank you for your courtesy, mr. chairman. >> certainly. now we go to the chairman on human rights. >> let me ask you if i could -- some experts argue that 10,000 u.s. counterterrorism forces should have remained in iraq but the president and maliki both chose otherwise. in retrospect, did that contribute in any way to isil's emergence and the current situation on the ground as it exists today? secondly, senator mcgurk -- secretary mcgurk, you said a formal request for assistance was received in may.

were there any informal requests through other avenues, including from the iraqi ambassador to the u.s. made before that? and how do you define formal request? if certain individuals are asking for help, what modeality needs to be employed to say oh, now they've actually asked? third thirdly, el baredai was in u.s. custody and he said i'll see you in new york. we know that he now has emerged as the leader of isil or isis, i should say and obviously has posed an enormous threat to life and liberty of iraqis, christians and perhaps even to the united states. my question is, especially in light of what has happened with

guantanamo, as a result of the 2012 intelligence act, it was required for the administration to tell us how many of those who were released from gitmo went back into battle. and the report suggested that of the 613 released, 104 were confirmed to go back into the battle against americans and our allies, 74 probably went back, but they couldn't confirm it, for a total of 178, which is a huge number of potential american and allies death to service members. and we had them in custody. so the question there with regards to al bagdadi, why was he released to form isis and do the terrible things they're doing today?

>> let me first, on the formal -- i'm not playing with words on formal, informal request. the conversation kind of goes like this. you'll hear from an iraqi official they want direct u.s. air strikes. you talk about this is what this would mean, access to your air space. well, wait, let's find a way for us to do this on our own. access to air space, direct usair support came in may. very clear, unequivocal, that came in may. >> i do not have information on the release of bagdadi. i came into the process extremely late. we had a legal requirement that would have to go through the iraqi parliaments. i can report from my own experience that none of the political blocks in parliament

were going to support that request given our own requirements. therefore, it was just not possible for us to stay. the raise of aqi, as i testified in my last hearing here, it really regenerated in syria and battlefields and battlegrounds of syria. that's where we saw the massive regeneration and massive influx of foreign fighters and we saw it come back into iraq over the course of last spring and summer. that's what led to the regeneration of al qaeda in iraq, which we now know as isis. >> i appreciate that. if you would get back to me on al baghdadi, i would appreciate that. 2013, the request started coming in for assistance. is that true? >> yes, for enhanced assistance in terms of sharing information, in terms of enabling some of their units. yes. >> did we respond to it in an affirm active wa

affirmative way? >> we responded immediately, helping them with the hellfire missile strikes, training forces on the ground. >> because i'm almost out of time, is there -- are there items or requests that went unfulfilled? >> other than the -- again, other than this most recent request in may. we got a list of requirements and things in swran that they wanted. we have fulfilled every single piece of that list. i can answer in writing a very detailed response. >> if you could, i would appreciate it very much. thank you mr. chairman. >> mr. ted deutsch of florida, subcommittee chairman middle east and north africa. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i would like to talk about our regional partners and it's a really simple question. we talk a lot about jordan and the threats that jordan faces.

miss slotkin, you spoke about that. i was there recently. and appreciate that. i would like to move beyond jordan and talk about our regional partners in the gulf. the question is really simple. who's concerned, what are they doing about it, and who may be concerned but is not helping and perhaps may even be making things more difficult? >> i'll let elissa handle some of this. i'll just say the conversation has shifted over the last 18 months from -- there used to be a conversation when you would talk about this rise of very extreme, al qaeda-type groups that in a second war we'll be able to take care of those groups once assad is gone. now the conversation is obviously these things would have to be done in parallel. there's a renewed focus on isil.

secretary kerry last month immediately went to paris and held a meeting with the foreign ministers of jordan, saudi arabia and went on to rihad. isil took a province, very small town. they don't have any presence there, open highway to saudi arabia, obviously a very significant development. the saudis are very focused on this and certainly as are the jordanians. we work with them every single day on it. the cooperation we've had in terms of iraq, trying to squeeze isil, trying to squeeze its resources, its manpower is at a new level than it was even six to eight weeks ago. >> i'll just add to that that the -- you know, the folks that we have added, the department of defense have added into iraq have come from the setcom

region. we are in regular consultation with all the gulf countries, particularly those who host our troops. kuwait, qatar. i do think people are aware of it. and i think the thing that is critical going forward on all of these questions is that we are going to need a regional approach to this problem. there is no way isil -- the isil threat is like air in a balloon. if you squeeze one part, all the air goes to the other side. you squeeze that one. we will need all of the partners in the region who are under -- who are, like anyone, concerned about this issue, to play a role in countering this threat. >> can i just follow up? if i understood you correctly, just to characterize your comments, the saudis and emeradis are concerned and doing

something about it to be helpful. can we talk more particularly, frankly, in light of -- miss slotkin, i'll direct this to you. a very large arms deal that was announced with much fanfare, tell me what more the qatars are doing other than being aware -- >> i know secretary kerry has had significant amount of phone conversations with all of the gulf allies on how to get more engaged. we're still trying to get a handle on the threat, what to do about it in a more coordinated wa way. >> are there funds coming from the other countries to support isil or any of the other groups?

>> i've been asked this question a couple of times. to our knowledge right now -- again, the intelligence community is assessing that no states, regional states are sponsoring them right now. >> that's what i asked. >> i can't speak in this form to groups within these countries but the states themselves are not supporting isil. >> i yield back, mr. chairman. >> thank you very much. maliki hasn't done a good job, has he? he hasn't done a good job, has he? he has made things worse, hasn't he? >> we have serious concerns with the government of iraq. we had a new election and they're establish ago a new

government. that's where the process stands right now and whether or not the prime minister can achieve a third term is something that remains in question. >> so we have not, however, officially suggested that he leave or have we unofficially suggested to him that it might be time for him to visit some of his money in dubai? >> let me also just back up, in fairness to the government of iraq. they also face a tremendously difficult situation. the 30 days before they had an election in iraq, 53 suicide bombers were in iraq, blowing up mosques, marketplaces, parades, fairgrounds, playgrounds. they're going to face extreme difficult. isil is trying to tear apart the political fabric of the country.

>> he has not provided the leadership that could overcome what could be inherent problems having a country called iraq made up of that territory that -- and those people that now compose that territory. that territory was devised and put together by european imperialists who decided that would be what the country of iraq would look like. let me say that as far as i am concerned the united states should not have to limit itself and limit what solutions we can possibly have based on what the british empire determined 100 years ago.

with that said, i would hope that we would be open to situations like have iing an acl kurdistan exist. maybe a belujistan as well. there used to be one and the british decided to cut and split that up. the kurds have always deserved to have their own national identity. until we do, i happen to believe that no kind of leadership that we could put into place in iraq is going to be successful. maybe it's too much. even if maliki was the best. it might not be enough that our british friends gave us aas a present when they exited as world leader. one other issue i would like to mention, when you said that we are watching very closely what's going on with the mek in camp

liberty, it's not enough. it's not enough. we watched as they went in and murdered those people. we're looking for someone to take them. why aren't we deciding to take them? they are vulnerable. they are people who we have had to deal with. is it our government -- i know i have a resolution, mr. chairman, suggesting we take these people in. they're going to be murdered otherwise. so why are we just watching? are we not -- why don't we move beyond that and moving them out? >> we're working, our senior adviser for mek resettlement is working -- actually he is on a flight tonight on this issue working to find more third

country settlement opgs. one particularly, we are hoping that a country that has already taken a significant number will take more and perhaps a substantial amount more. we are working these leads very aggressively. i'm happy to follow up with you on a more detailed briefing on where that stands. >> i would be very appreciative if you would follow up on those details with me but also let me, mr. chairman, just for the record again state it would be better -- these people have relied on us. we made a deal with them. they have provided us very important intelligence information and activities over the years. if other countries will not permit them to come in, it might be in our moral interest as well as our interest of having other people trust us in the future just to take them in to the united states as refugees.

if there is any people in the world that are at risk, it would be these folks in camp liberty. thank you very much, mr. chairman. >> thank you very much, mr. rohrbacher. we go now to mr. david sicilini of rhode island. >> thank you, mr. chairman i want to welcome a colleague from across the pond, member of parliament from great britain, who is here today. welcome. he is part of our program shadowing members of congress and we welcome you. thank you to the witnesses for your testimony. i think we must remain mindful of the sacrifice of our brave men and women in uniform, the sacrifice they've made in iraq

but the dangers that surround any further military involvement. it was reported recently that classified military assessment of iraqi security forces show deep infiltration by sunni extremists and shiite informants rely on shiite militia in iran. the situation in iraq is a problem that requires a political solution. and in june, secretary of state john kerry said that the formation of a new government in iraq that is inclusive of all parties and stakeholders is an essential prerequisite to the united states. an active great irresponsibility to order defensive action without a stable government. really, two questions in light of that context and in light of your testimony. first to you, mr. secretary. you spoke about this function of federalism, which has appeal.

what is your assessment of the capacity of the iraqis to proceed with that sort of model, the willingness to proceed, since it involves the devolution of power and what are the key steps that we should be looking for, are we supporting for that to go forward? secondly, would you comment on the humanitarian situation in iraq? we're hearing reports of deliberate targeting of women and girls in iraq, horrific sanitary conditions. and more than 1. million iraqis being displaced. are the organizations or the iraqi government working effectively to mitigate these conditions? if you could, talk about what the current humanitarian situation is. >> happy, to first let me address the humanitarian situation. it gets to the saudis. they put $500 million into the u.n. organizations that are

managing the humanitarian response in iraq. we work very closely with those organizations and that contribution was both welcome and essential. it's a point of how we have some co-lessons. it remains very serious. i can get you all the doings. i don't want to take too much of your time. in terms of a willingness, it's pretty much spelled out in the constitution. i think there's a growing recognition that a model like this is appealing. local, tribal actors will not be able to defeat isil on their own. some tribes have risen up to fight isil and they've responded with tremendous and brutal force, killing sunnis wherever they go where sunnis disagree

with them. one of the oldest mosques in mosul, that was made possible because they killed all the clerics before isil moved in. recognition from the local side that they need support to grow their own security forces and want to be in control of their areas and there's a recognition from the center that the army cannot be reconsequence at a timed. the iraqis are trying, working to and are training about 10,000 of those soldiers who either fled from their post or they were on their r & rs and most of them have come back. they're working to retrain them, put them through a three to four-week training program, something we can help with. everybody recognizes you cannot then reconstitute the. because it is within the constitutional framework, there

can be a fairly broad consensus for that model. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i yield back. >> chairman of the asia subcommittee. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you for holding this very important hearing. great deal of skepticism in how this administration has overseen the unraveling of iraq. really from the start, i think we're all aware that the president was anxious, desperate to reduce our involvement in iraq. i think there was a scramble to the door from the very start. i've been in iraq a number of times and chaired the middle east subcommittee in the previous congress and i think

we've known -- i mean, it was always the plan, it was always assumed that we were going to have a u.s. military presence there following the war for a number of reasons, principally to secure the gang gains that been made at such a high cost of american blood and treasure. there was a failure to reach an agreement on the status of our forces afterwards. a lot of debate on how much of an effort was actually made in securing that agreement. whatever the case is, there was a failure to secure it. virtually all troops were pulled out. some on this committee, some not. many of us predicted exactly not what would happen but pretty much what would happen and the unraveling and the chaos and the

tumultuous situation we see now was predicted by so many people. what difference would a u.s. military presence there have made? and how much confidence can we have in the very administration that made that decision to pull all u.s. troops out who is now making the decisions to salvage what's left of iraq at this time? mr. mcgurk? or miss slotkin? >> i'll attack a first sttake a. it's important to review the history that both brett and i worked on the original 2008 with iraq that did say by the end of 2011 that we would be out of iraq. so that timetable was set in 2008.

there was quite a bit of discussion and debate about what should happen at that time. i really do think the point that brett made is critical. iraqi leaders could not get it through their parliament. we had iraqi leaders at that time saying i don't think it's necessary. we don't want you in. they're a sovereign country. we didn't have will on the other side. that's a critical factor. >> it's certainly a factor. the united states is a pretty substantial country on the globe and we have a lot of involvement there and our officials were meeting with their officials and there were relationships and, yes, they certainly have to degree with it. the effort that was made and the decision to pull all the troops out, it's mind boggling to think, looking back, where we are now and how different things probably would have look ed had

we done something different. i've only got one minute left. what's happening with the christians especially -- i know there's persecution going on with lots of other people besides christians. but this convert or die mentality that's now in action wherever isil is in control is something you think over 12,000 years ago, these persecutions romans made these kinds of decisions and in the modern world people are faced with those decisions. i would urge the administration to work with any resources we have available to us to push back on that with every fiber we have as a nation. >> i would just say, congressman, i agree with you, 100%. just last week, i saw bishop and

the patriarch in baghdad discussing this very question. christian enclaves in northern iraq are looking for resources to provide local security control. they're now in rathers controlled by the kurds. we've discussed this with the kurdish regional government about how we can incorporate individuals from these areas to provide security in their local areas such as a police force, to provide security on the streets. that is something that we are discussing. they've stood in solidarity with the christians in iraq. this is something that reveals who the true isil is. it's not a tribal uprising reflecting legitimate grievances. it's a vicious terrorist organization with ideology that

nobody accepts and has to be uprooted and defeated. i agree with you 100% on your comments and will follow up with you specifically on the christian question. >> thank you. my time is now expired. ranking member of the terrorism subcommittee, brad sherman of california. >> when we conquered germany and japan after world war ii, we were not embarrassed to be occupying those countries. we stayed as long as we needed to stay. we wrote the constitution for japan and we very slowly turned over power to the right people. in afghanistan and especially iraq, we were so -- we were embarrassed to be there, defensive as to whether we were somehow imperialists and we were so anxious to turn over the government that we've got maliki and karzai, neither of which would sign an agreement with us,

just to illustrate one of their many faults. miss slotkin, "the new york times" report on the front page that the iraqi security forces are so deeply infiltrated by either sunni extremists informants or shiite personnel backed by iran that any american assigned to advise baghdad's forces could face a risk to their safety. is that accurate? >> the report is draft classified and that represents a leak of information from someone who seems to know something about it, but not clearly to have read the full report. >> put aside the exact phraseology. how danger oous in aun classifi situation here, how dangerous is it for american service personnel to be advising iraqi units? >> that's exactly what we went over there to try to assess.

those are draft. they're classified and i'm not able to get into the details right now. >> okay. >> it was a threat when we were there with 170,000 troops. the insider threat is always a threat and we have to either work to mitigate it or not work with units if we thought it was an overwhelming threat. >> this idea that we should bomb isis, how important is it that we have reliable ground spotters to make sure we're bombing the right folks and not bomb iing civilians? can we run a bombing campaign with anybody we trust on the ground? >> i mean, the united states does not indiscriminately bomb targets. we have a rigorous procedure that involves having verification of the targets we are trying to hit. >> do we need humans on the ground for that procedure to work effectively? >> it is significantly better if we have reliable folks on the ground to give us verifiable information. >> do the iraqis have the

technical expertise to be those spotters? have they got good people that can tell us where to bomb and what to bomb? >> there are very capable iraqi units that would be capable of doing that. >> if "the new york times" report is correct, however, they may deliberately give us the wrong coordinates because it may meet the political needs of the sunni or shiite extremists that we bomb civilians. so we don't know, unless we know both the technical competence and political objectives, whether we can rely on those spotter spotters mr. mcgurk, does maliki have to go? >> again, there's an ongoing process to form a new government.

maliki's party won seats. it remains to be seen whether or not he can have enough seats to form a government. were we to take a position thin, it would obviously not be either in our interest or would dramatically affect the process. this is a uniquely, uniquely iraqi process with iraqi political dynamics. the outcome will reflect that process. the new speaker of the parliament, for example, is someone nobody would have picked to be the speaker of the parliament. he came out of nowhere, built a coalition, did the politicking and built a very broad coalition among sunni, shias, kurds, everybody, and won and overwhelming vote. >> has maliki announced positions that would seriously entice sunnis and kurds to believe that they would get a fair shake under a third term for maliki? has he publicly announced a platform that has serious appeals, makes serious concessions to those other two

communities? >> he has a platform that has all of those principles in it. it's just difficult after eight years and given the bad blood that's developed and the mistrust. that makes it very difficult. but a lot of his platform. -- >> so he's got some platitudes in his platform that nobody believes. i yield back. >> we go now to mr. jeff duncan of south carolina. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thanks for this very informative hearing. mr. mcgurk, you commented about the state of u.s. intelligence in advance of mosul and this most recent isis offensive. you said, quote, in the earliest days, we had to acknowledge that we were operating in a fog, end quote. you also say that intelligence collection after the fact has improved, but i'm troubled by the fact that we are -- but that we were operating in the fog in the first place because in february, you testified here and you told us exactly what isis

wanted to do, take control of western iraq, challenge the iraqi government for control of baghdad, and have sectarian conflict. for most of the past year, isis has already been in control of about half of mosul. there were other plenty of clear signs that isis was a rising threat. really over the past year, year and a half, two years. we've had eyes watching what was going on in syria and surely watching the iraqi and jordanian borders. knowing all this and knowing all we did of what you testified in february, why weren't we doing more to collect intelligence all along? please help us understand what led to the decision not to have robust intelligence collection efforts against this terrorist group. >> well, as i did testify, we began to move assets into the theater. what my testimony was speaking to was immediate crisis response.

in the immediate days after mosul, it was fog and rumor and friction and chance as you get into in these circumstances. what i was trying to get at in the testimony was it was very difficult for us to know specifically what was happening. it was difficult for us to know the extent of isis' advance down the river. which is why in a meeting with the president in the earliest hours of this crisis, the decision was made immediately to significantly surge u.s. air assets over the skies of iraq, again, to go from one a month to 50 a day, including manned aircraft. that was something the iraqis also welcomed. in response to an earlier question, i want to say the iraqis, despite what may have happened in 2011, since this crisis we have been embraced. our presence has been embraced from top to bottom. they're actively seeking our assistance. to have u.s. military assets in the skies of iraq is something that was extremely controversial, even as late as last fall. right now they welcome us there.

they want us there. and it's a very different situation than it was even when i was here testifying in february in terms of the iraqi appetite for our direct support. >> here's the thing. folks in south carolina and folks i talk to all over the country are concerned of what's going on in iraq because we lost so many men and women there. not only lost in the loss of lives but lost in their ability to be productive citizens and whether it's ptsd or whether it's an actual physical injury. you know, why did we lose those men and women and turn around and lose control over an area? and we can watch and tell the heat signature, the plume, what rocket launcher it came from and where it shot down a plane in ukraine, but we spent a lot of money, a lot of effort in iraq and yet we're blind, we're in a fog? i just find that hard to believe, especially with so much going on in the region, with what was going on in syria and

isis and isil were doing. huge columns of vehicles headed toward mosul, how did we miss that? so that's a rhetorical question i don't expect you to answer, but i think it is important. i think americans are going, how did we miss this, and why did we spend so much money and loss of life in iraq to see what's going on now? why can't we do more? i noticed in your statement you said we've set up the joc in baghd baghdad. i'm glad we have. i just wonder why it wasn't set up sooner. you said, i think, six weeks ago it was set up. this thing has been going on for a while. why didn't we work with the iraqis to try to thwart that? i'm concerned about our friends in the kurdish region. i'm concerned that they're going to get surrounded. we didn't lose a single american life in the kurdish region during the iraq war. not a single american. because they're friendly.

so i want to ask this about the kurdish region. what's the administration's position on kurdish oil exports and what actions are we advising american energy companies that might be operating with the krg to take? >> our position on energy exports from iraq is very clear. we support getting as much oil out of iraq as possible and on to international markets from north to south. we also support doing that in a way that reinforces the overall stability of all iraqi regions. we have an obligation to say when people ask that there is legal risk for taking oil without an agreement. we work very hard to broker an agreement and actually had an agreement on the table that was a very good one as early as four months ago that would have gotten all of the oil out of the kurdish north flowing and had revenues coming from the south to the krg. that agreement didn't succeed for a number of reasons, and one of which is that we're in the middle of a high political season in iraq. it was an election season.

you had an election april 30th. now you're working to form a new government. i remain confident that in the process of forming a new government, we can work with all sides to have a solution to this very important issue. the budget that's being debated in the parliament right now in baghdad is about $120 billion budget. there's about $17 billion there for the kurdistan region. it's a decision the prime minister made to cut off salary payments to the kurdish north because of this oil dispute. it's completely unacceptable and should be reversed. we made that very clear. so again, we're working very closely with our kurdish partners in the north and the government of baghdad to find a solution to this issue. and through the process of forming a new government, we have a real opportunity to do so. >> my time is expired. i thank -- >> will the gentleman yield for a minute? i wanted to follow up on a specific statement there. what i want to follow up on was the comments you made about

having eyes in the air and the difficulty of that. now, in august of 2013 that is when a request was made originally by the government in iraq for assistance. in march of 2014, they actually delivered an official letter to the white house asking for help. it is certainly true that originally they wanted armed drones to do this work, but that was a negotiating position, and they swiftly fell back to the position of, okay, you won't give them or sell them to us, then can you use them in order to hit these jihadist units? and all of this incurs long before june when mosul falls, right? so i just wanted to put that in context. unless there's something i don't understand here, mr. mcgurk. but that's from the entreaties or the discussions i've had.

that was my understanding through this as we were trying to get these drone strikes on these units even before they came over the border in order to give some kind of cover for the infantry on the ground. >> again, the sequence was helping the iraqis with their hellfire strikes, with the information, and the fusion cells we set up. their request for our direct support came in may. and i think as alyssa has spoken to, our ability to do anything effectively requires a much more granular picture on the ground. we frankly have that picture now. we did not have that picture as -- >> well, as expressed, we don't understand why you wouldn't because you've also got signals intelligence, you've got human intelligence, and frankly you had a green light there for eyes in the air once they delivered a letter to the white house of an official request in march of 2014. so this doesn't add up, but i

will go to the gentleman from california. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want to thank the witnesses. i think it's disingenuous for us to lay what's happening in iraq as a failure here in america or as a failure of any particular administration here in america. i think our troops did everything within their power to give iraq a chance. we shed blood. we spent billions of dollars to give iraq a chance. one of my staff members is an iraq war veteran, a wounded warrior. you know, just chatting to him, as veterans all around this country are saddened by what they're seeing in iraq. they did lose their colleagues. they did lose many men and women, as we all did in iraq. but we gave them a chance. we really did. it's also tragic to see what's happening to some of the civilians that served side by side with our troops, supporting

our efforts in iraq and the danger that they live under. so we really do have to do everything that we can to try to ensure their safety and serve their visas as we can. but this isn't a failure of american administration. this is a failure of iraqi administration. and, you know, i think everyone in this body would be consistent that this is a failure of the al maliki administration. there were sunni tribal leaders that fought side by side with us in the surge that were made promises that were broken by al maliki. systemically dismantling some of iraqi's own defense forces in a way we saw what happened in mosul. and they fell apart. now, you know, i think ms. slotkin, you indicated the iraqi

people must do the heavy lifting on their own. can you expand on that and tell us what you think that heavy lifting would be? >> well, i think brett has spoken to some of the ideas that are currently being batted about to get towards that political solution. i think the point i would make, you know, as we look towards any potential decisions the president makes for future action is, you know, we couldn't solve the iraqi political problems for them when we had 170,000 troops. we couldn't have solved them if we had kept in 10,000 troops in 2011. and we're not going to be able to solve them through our military support today regardless of what we decide to do. the iraqis have to get at the underlying political differences in their system. isil is extremely capable, extremely dangerous, but they are getting tacid support from the sunnis on the ground in these areas. it's critical the central government solve those problems so the sunnis turn away from

isil and towards their government. >> and mr. mcgurk, in your assessment, if a new iraqi government was a more inclusive government that gave equal say to the kurds and the sunnis and g gave them a voice, do you sense some of our former allies and some of these tribal leaders would, you know, take a different view on isil? >> we have to be very clear that isil is a military force. so we have seen tribes try to take it on and they failed. we trained about 1,000 falu shans in three months of training. in their first engagement trying to move into the northern reaches of fallujah, they lost. that's because isil is a highly sophisticated military organization. it's far better than the al qaeda in iraq we fought. in order for the awakening to really get moves in those days, it took a lot of effort on our part to degrade that everett,

which allowed the tribal networks to rise. a up and fight it. there will have to be some military pressure. statement, there has to be a new government with political accommodations to isolate isil. >> if we're thinking this through strategically, new government forms in iraq that is much more inclusive. the sunnis within iraq become much more open to not supporting isil. our allies in the region potentially from the sunni side can also provide some support as well as, you know, looking at ways to cut off the funding and support of isil. would that be ascenario? >> yes, and i don't think sunnis support isil. there was an election on april 30th in which isil said anyone who votes, we're going to kill you.

they were very clear about that. we had almost a record turnout of 1.1 million people, all sunnis, voting for new leaders. isil threatens, they intimidate, they rule by brute force. and so that is one reason why they need to be confronted and isolated. but yes, that is a sequence. first, we have to continue to find ways to pressure isil, but a new government providing a new platform and also with new regional engagement and we'll hope very much when there's a new government, and there will be, that the regional capitals fully embrace that capital so we can make end roads and regional integration which has not made many end roads over the last couple years. >> thank you very much. mr. kinzinger. >> thank you, madam chair. i just want to point out i'm a veteran of iraq. it's sad to see this gone now. i'll be honest with you all. i think -- i mean, everybody east kind of not saying it, but what it seems like is the administration is just

paralyzed. they just don't know what to do. there's this fear of getting involved in iraq again and getting sucked into iraq with this reality that the worst-case scenario in the middle east is playing out right before our very eyes. frankly, this administration bears some responsibility for that. i'd also like to remind folks that in america, we threw out the articles of confederation. we had articles of confederation. we threw them out and drew up our constitution. political solutions are not something we can put in the microwave and expect to happen in a short amount of time. this takes time. what we're seeing right now with the enroacroachment and growth isil is the worst-case scenario. therefore, this kind of narrative that we have to have a political solution before we do anything, i would much rather see a flawed iraqi state in which we could then work a political solution than to see isis in a capitulated iraqi state. mr. mcgurk, the chairman touched on this. does a march 2014 request exist to the white house for what

could be included as air strikes? >> i will go check on all the correspondence we've had. >> you would know if a march 2014 letter was hand delivered to the white house requesting assistance for the iraqi government. >> i have a letter from may in which there's a very clear and specific request. i think a lot of correspondence before that was not as -- >> so you're on -- you don't know of this existing. so you can get back to me if it exists, in fact. >> i'll get back to you and go chapter and verse with all the correspondence we've had. >> okay. and another question, you know, we talk about, we didn't have the intelligence picture. as something that flew isr, it's fairly easy to get that quickly. we should have had an intelligence picture from when the iraqi government was asking us for assistance in august. that should have been the time at which we said, let's get this granular picture. now we have it. so we have the official request in may. we have a granular picture now. what's the hold up? i think what the answer is, is not so much that we're still waiting for political solution.

again, i think it's this idea that the administration simply is paralyzed and doesn't know what to do. meanwhile, that vacuum is being filled by iran, by russia providing equipment to the iraqi government at a time we're sitting around saying, i can't believe they're taking this assistance. but they're fighting for the survival of their very way of life. this is time where we have to say, you know, look, we're the united states of america with a very robust military capability. surely we can have the intelligence if we decided may was the time we were going to start looking at this. surely in three months we could have figured out a picture and begun to get engaged at that point. i also want to talk about the issue of hellfire missiles. it has a warhead of 20 or 18 pounds depending on what kind of missile it is and what its target is. these cessnas that have been retrofitted in iraq. an apache helicopter carries 16 of these hellfire missiles. the idea of an apache helicopter, one, taking out an

entire camp of isil is unrealistic with 16 of these missiles. the idea of a cessna with one, maybe two hellfire missiles being the thing that destroys these camps in syria and in iraq is crazy. i think we need a robust military -- a robust air strike campaign on behalf of the united states. when our troops on the ground get engaged in combat, we're very good. the marines and army are very good at fighting off the enemy. but the first thing they do is call for robust air support to help them win that engagement. this idea that the iraqi military melted away or that the iraqi military can take background with a hellfire missile is unrealistic when our own troops who are very well trained who have a great background and know how to fight wars call on a-10s, f-16s, b-52s to come in and do close air support in order to retake ground. so i just am saying that i'm renug the call of the

administration for massive manned military air strikes to push back this very, very bad cancer that's encroaching on the middle east. and also to target those in syria, to understand that the syrians, they are a very good fighting force, isis, and they're getting their training in syria and spilling it out to the rest of the place. so i do appreciate you all service to your country. i appreciate you being here. i know it's a tough time. at that, i yield back. >> thank you very much. ms. frankel of florida. >> thank you, madam chair. or thank you to the panel for being here. i think two or three questions. first, could you explain what makes the isil terrorists such a greater threat than the other terrorists we hear about all the time? and what is the most immediate threat to the united states and to our allies? second, you know, i've heard a lot of questions which i think are appropriate as to, you know, what did we know, what could we

have done maybe to have avoided the threat of isil in iraq and syria? my question is, how far back should we go? could you give me your opinion, if you have, is what our war in iraq, the invasion of 2003, how that relates to the rise of isil? because i think many of us in this country think that was an act of malfeasance by our current president at that time and by our congress to send our country to war in iraq. so i would like you, if you could, answer those two questions, and if you have time to explain to me the difference between what might be -- some people say is paralysis versus first doing no harm. >> sure. so i can speak to the terrorist threat and why isil is particularly different, why we're paying such close

attention to it. i think, you know, it's the territory they now hold, the self-financing that they are capable of. not getting donations and living off of donations but the self-financing, self-sustainment. the span of control, the capability of some of their fighters. they are very, very experienced and war tested. and then the number of western passport holders we know have travelled to syria and are engaged with both isil and other groups there. isil's stated intent, we're coming for you, barack obama, rhetorically. and what we know to be active plotting in europe. so all those things in combination make them, i think, probably, it's safe to say, one of the most capable and the best funded group in the region right now and that's what makes it such a particular concern. >> i can talk a little bit about the history, although the

questions you ask are really questions i think the historians will sort out. but isil is a group that we know. it's al qaeda in iraq. the first leader was in iraq before the war. he was kind of the leader who really focused on this effort to spark sectarian conflict. if you go back to their writings at the time in 2004, it might have looked preposterous at the time, but his plan has always been, and i testified to this in some detail in february, to establish a state. a state in iraq and syria. that has always been his focus. he said, we're going to do it three ways. we're going to attack the shia majority in iraq consistently. we're going to attack their marketplaces, their mosques, their playgrounds until they respond. then he says we will unite the sunni ranks behind us. that has always been his strategy. he also will attack any sunni who disagrees with him. that's very clear in his do doctri doctrine.

also, he'll attack kurds to tear open that very narrow fabric which exists in the territories in iraq. that his stated strategy in 2004. it's now the strategy of al baghdadi. we know this organization. we fought against it. we now their ideology. what's particularly scary about it now is that it basically effectively controls the state. it has ambitions to take the mantle of the global jihad away from al qaeda central. so that is why it is a significant threat. that is why we're here and we thank you again for the time to testify about the situation today. and that's why we look forward to consulting with you to get a handle on it over the weeks and months ahead. >> not sure if you answered my question about the war in iraq. >> i have to say, congresswoman, i'll let the historians sort out what happened over the last 12 years. >> thank you very much. i waive the rest of my time. >> thank you. mr. cook of california. >> thank you, madam chair.

once again, ms. slotkin, i apologize. i'm usually the one that asks the question about the role of qatar. you give me the same answer. i understand what's going on. i did -- i'm very, very concerned about maliki and his credibility, which to me is absolutely zero. we got the folks that are representing camp liberty, ashcraft, and what has happened in the past. you cannot overlook that. what scares me even more was isil, isis and the fact that they went in there and they defeated four divisions. you know, in the history of the united states marine corps -- the marine corps has never had four divisions in one place at one time. they had six in world war ii.

they had three on iwojima. you had four divisions and you have a group that had pick-up trucks, ak-47s, what have you. it just shows that in terms of at least from a military person the total lack of credibility in the maliki government. obviously, they don't have any trust, the military in the lack of federalism. so i'm very, very pessimistic on the future in terms of reconstructing the military, particularly when maliki, whoever is in there, if they're going to continue to go to the iranians for the revolutionary guards, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. and with hellfire missiles falling in the wrong hands, i'm

just very, very nervous about this whole thing. it's been touched on a little bit, but i think from the united states that once again we have to recognize the changing geopolitical situation. you're absolutely right about jordan. if we're not ready to defend jordan or be there for them, we're in serious trouble. i'm a strong, strong supporter of kurdistan. the point has been made that not one military person was killed there. the other one -- and i've been believuating, but i want to get your take on turkey, on how in the past they might be influenced because they surround this area. and turkey lately -- and obviously turkey is a big, big player where they are also a member of nato and the fact that

some of their behavior with the muslim brotherhood is very, very scary. could you address that, please? >> turkey remains a close partner of ours, and yesterday, in fact, at the state department we had almost an all-day dialogue with a very senior delegation from turkey about a whole host of issues, including isil. we recognize broadly that in order to really squeeze isil -- i mean, when we focused on al qaeda in iraq in the 2007 time frame, we called it an anaconda strategy to squeeze their finances and everything. it's really three prongs. first, you have to shut off the infiltration networks. turkey plays a big part of that, but turkey will remind you a lot of the source countries in which global jihadist fighters are coming in. we have to stop these people before they get on the airplanes and stop them if they make it into turkey before they get into syria. that's critical. secondly, denying them a safe haven in syria. that's why we're focusing in on training the moderate opposition and finding a way to control

space to isil in syria. and then helping iraqis control their sovereign space in iraq. that's extremely difficult, but that is the three-pronged approach that we have to try to take against this. and the conversations yesterday with the turks led by our deputy secretary and their undersecretary were focused upon that. i think we have a fairly common understanding of the way forward with the turks on this. >> i don't think i have much more to add other than i think they are -- they've been living with the threat emanating from syria for a long time. they are extremely focused on it. they're extremely focused on what's happening in iraq. as a nato ally, we're talking with them every day. so i feel confident we know what they're focused on. >> okay. playing beat the clock. if you could comment again on the revolutionary guard and their influence right now and whether they have replaced the american military completely.

>> we remain the part aner of choice for the ike i craqis. no question about that. $11 billion into the reserve and $193 million just last week. again, i was there during this cris crisis. there was a major vacuum, and iran has stepped up in some ways to fill the vacuum in ways we made very clear to the iraqis are not particularly helpful. >> thank you very much. >> i yield back. >> appreciate it. mr. conley of virginia. >> thank you, madam chairman. and welcome to our panel. i have to have say that in listening to many of your answers, i hear a lot of aspirations, and i share them too, but i'm not quite sure whether they're realistically achievable anymore. for example, ms. slotkin, you made a pretty forceful statement in response to one of my colleague's questions that there's no substitute for a strong central government located in baghdad. well, ms. slotkin, we've been there for 12 years.

we've poured $1 trillion into the country. we've lost precious men and women in fighting there. what -- how does one achieve this strong central, effective government in baghdad? >> thing is what the iraqis are grappling with right now. and as they form their government, they will have some fundamental questions that they have to answer about the future of their state. brett has talked about some of the ideas that are on the table. >> i know, but i guess my question carried with it the inference that maybe we need to reassess. the vice president of the united states wrote an op-ed piece before he became vice president dismissed at the time in which he said, frankly, what ought to happen in iraq, what's likely to happen as well, is the sort of segmentation of iraq into three autonomous zones. a sunni dominated zone, a shia

dominated zone, and a kurdish dominated zone. well, looking at the map today, that may be looked upon in retrospect as a view that was accepted at the time. maybe we have to give up on the idea after 12 years of trying on a strong central, functional government that holds sway over the whole country based in baghdad. >> yeah, i can't speak to the retrospective piece, but i can speak to, you know, what it would mean right now if somehow we decided to give up on a strong government in baghdad, centered in baghdad. who is in charge in that sunni-dominated area? some very, very scary people. while i think the idea may be interesting on paper, i just think in reality based on who is in charge in these large swaths of the country right now, it's just a -- it's a much less favorable option than having a strong government in baghdad. >> of course. i take your point.

but i mean, the question is whether we should continue to pour blood and treasure into that hope. at what point do we recognize we're going to have to at least modify that hope because it's not going to happen or not going to happen any time soon realistically. because if we continue to pursue policy however noble and desirable that is not realistic and is going to get us in a lot of pain and difficulty, that's not a good foreign policy. mr. mcgurk? >> i think what i laid out in my opening testimony is a way forward that is focused upon the hard realities we face on the ground now. that's within the fabric of the iraqi constitution. that can harness their very significant national resources to empower local communities in

order to deny space to these terrorist groups. and that is a model in which recognizes the principle of authority. were iraq to wish to develop more regions, such as the region that exists in the kurdish region, there's a process for doing that through the iraqi constitution. >> but mr. mcgurk, again, i agree with you. that ought to be how it works. the maliki government has significantly alienated huge swaths of its own country. and in the process has opened the door for reseptivity to isis. but they've lost a huge amount of political goodwill, if they ever had it, amongst their own countrymen. how do you restore that in a time frame that stabilizes the

situation and forcefully push back isis? >> we had to make sure the election happened and happened on time. that's something we focused very hard on over the last eight to ten months. the election did happen. it was a credible election. again, 14 million iraqis turned out to vote. they're now forming their government on their constitutional timeline. they chose a speaker. that kicked off a timeline for 30 days to choose a president. once there's a president, there's a 15-day clock to name a prime minister, then 30 days to form a cabinet. the iraqis will get through this process along their timeline and will come out of it with a new government. again, we remain hopeful that that government will reflect a fairly broad consensus among the principle groups. right now the presidency, for example, is a choice the kurds are coming up with their nominee for the presidency. we hope to have that done soon. that will kick off the timeline to choose the prime minister. they happen to be in this period they have to form a new government. once they begin a new government, it'll be a process of a very genuine dialogue about

these very important issues you face. i hope with this committee we can be a part of that dialogue. >> my time is up. i just hope that the the state department and the pentagon both hear bipartisan skepticism, goodwill, hope you're right, but the skepticism in this committee today is very bipartisan. >> thank you. and now we turn to mr. perry of pennsylvania. >> thank you, madam chair. mr. mcgurk, in violation of u.s. and u.n. security council, what support is the maliki government receiving from iran that you know of? >> the question of sanctions under those provisions is something we're looking at very closely. it's a very complicated question, actually. >> all right. well, then just tell me what kind of material support you know of and then we'll try and figure it out from there. >> it's another question i think i'd like to follow up with you in a closed session.

>> all right. ms. slotkin, do you know? >> sir, i really do think in a closed session we can much more specifically answer your question. >> all right. i get your point. well, knowing that iran is supporting the insurgency in yemen, is the yemen model sponsored in some sort by the president, is that realistic or viable for iraq? didn't that -- isn't that fairly complica complicated, knowing that iran is essentially an adversary, an enemy of the united states that we're barely working with on a treaty regarding their nuclear program, which many americans, myself included, disagree with? what position do we put ourse ourselves in, and how can we move toward trusting the maliki government, knowing they're r y relying on iran? can we expect the folks in the camp to receive better treatment knowing the government is the collaborating with iran?

>> so i would say -- i want to make sure i understand your question about the yemen model and whether -- it seems like you're implying that the iraqi government is completely under the sway of the iranians. >> no, i don't think it's completely under the sway. i think that considering the yemen model is viable and iraq is myopic and irresponsible and knowing that we're working at cross purposes, even mentioning that is kind of indicates cluelessness at the point of the administration, in my estimation. i just want to get your feeling on it. >> again, i'm not -- i'm sorry. i'm not sure i'm completely understanding your question. if the question is, could the yemen model work in iraq, if that is what you're asking -- >> is it viable? could it work? yeah, it could work if we had different people in iraq in power and a different circumstance, in my opinion. but that's not the circumstance. so is it viable now? do you see the yemen model as viable now in iraq? >> i think, if i understand what

you mean by yemen model, meaning working very closely with the central government -- >> yes. >> -- on a program, i think that first of all right now we are working with the iraqis on the ground. we have people there that -- our own people that need security and we rely on the iraqis to provide part of that security. i think what we're trying to figure out is the answer to that question. by sending folks out and understanding the iraqi security forces and whether they are a viable -- >> seems a little irresponsible to come out with those kind of statements with hen you're tryio understand the circumstances. but moving on. so japan and germany essentially defeated by coalition forces, including the united states, probably didn't want us to stay, if they would have had their choice. i wasn't around then. i suspect you weren't either. let me ask you this. what responsibility does the administration have, understanding they disagreed with the united states government's actions in iraq, and i'm respecting that, but what responsibility do they have to secure the gains of the previous or any administration?

do they have any? it's an opinion question for you. >> do the iraqis have a -- >> no, what is our administration -- >> what is our responsibility? i mean -- >> do we have any? >> i mean, we have invested incredible amounts of blood and treasure. my husband is an army officer. we met in iraq. as a country, we have invested so significantly in that country, so of course we are invested in making sure that it continues as a viable state and doesn't become a breeding ground for terrorists. >> so having spent time there as i did, do you believe circumstances on the ground would be different had we maintained a s.o.f.a.? using the excuse -- and i see it as an excuse -- that the government couldn't get itself together enough to get support if it, we get that. they didn't want us there. that's a big surprise. didn't we have some responsibility to make sure it happened? i mean, the president's got a pen and a phone. if he'd have said, we're staying, what are you going to

do about it? would things be different? do you think things would be different now if we would have stayed in some fashion, providing some security prorks vieding some intelligence, providing some oversight of a fledgling government in a very difficult circumstance that we earned a victory for and literally almost installed piece by piece? >> i think that things may have been different, but i don't know that we wouldn't be in a similar situation to where we are today based on the fact that we still lack political accommodation at the heart of it in baghdad. >> thank you very much, mr. perry. we turn to mr. weber of texas. >> thank you. mr. mcgurk, you said, quote, our objective is to ensure that isil can never again gain safe haven in western iraq, end quote. in your opinion, has isil, isis, whatever we want to call them, today operated with lightning speed?

>> depends how you characterize lightning speed, congressman. >> in your opinion, would you characterize that as lightning speed? >> their advance through mosul caught them off guard, frankly. >> so baghdad, you cough taught something about blitz kreeg, wouldn't you agree? >> again, not sure quite how to answer that question. >> okay. >> isil's proven to be very capable. >> you remember how ted deutsch asked you today, how confident are you the shiites can withstand repeated attacks? in your exchange with him, do you remember that question? >> i believe so, yes. >> okay. here's my question for you. how confident are you that camp liberty can withstand more attacks? >> again, i want to mention i visited camp liberty a number of times. >> have you ever stayed there? >> well, i have not stayed overnight there, but i have lived in trailers under repeated rocket attacks, so i know what that feels like. i have discussed that with them.

>> do you think they'll all be killed before or after baghdad falls? >> again, congressman, i think that's a bit of a hyperbolic question. >> but you don't think it's a real threat? >> they're located on the airport facility. they're located very near where we're located. >> you don't think it's a real possibility? >> i'm not going to -- again, i'm happy to come address the specific security apparatus we have at the airport. >> okay. do we just write them off? >> certainly we don't write them off. it takes a substantial amount of time and energy focusing on the question. we have a senior adviser at the state department that does this full time. >> earlier you said, let me tell you why this matters. does camp liberty matter? >> yes, of course it matters. that is why, again, we have a senior official at the state department dedicated to this issue full time, reporting to the secretary and he'll be on a plane tonight -- >> does it seem odd to you that

we've got some -- in the current calamity on the border, we have some 60,000-plus crossing our southern border and getting, quote, refugee status or asylum over here but we can't get the same thing for camp liberty. is that odd, ironic? >> the administration's made a decision to bring in -- >> oh, they've made a decision all right. >> up to 100 residents of camp liberty into the united states. we believe that's a significant decision, which also should enable other countries to do the same. >> you see all the yellow jackets behind you? have you seen those? okay. you think that's an important issue for them? >> again, it's a very important issue to us. >> well, the actions don't seem to follow up that idea. you and i talked back on february 5th about t-walls and they began to put in place for a short time. seemed like they ended quickly

thereafter. i would say not only is it an important issue for those who are here to support some action on the administration's part to help camp liberty but obviously it's also important for camp liberty. i think the administration has let them down. somehow we need to make that a priority. what is the answer for those camp liberty residents? how do we make this a priority before it gets so bad that there's no hope for them? what's the toons that? >> we're determined to do everything we can to get them out of iraq. their safety will depend on their getting out of iraq. that's why we have to find third countries to take them. we have made the decision to take in 100. >> should we encourage them to go over to mexico and come up to the southern border? >> again f t, if the mexicans a willing to take a number of them, that's why we have a senior adviser focused on this question. he's gone to countries

throughout europe, scandinavia, east asia, everywhere. we are making some progress, but we need to keep at it and need the support of the international community. that's why we've put $1 million into a new u.n. trust fund so even countries who may no have the resources are able to take them in. >> ms. slotkin, i have 30 seconds left. what do we need to do? >> sir, we're trying to figure that out right now, and that's -- >> you're trying to figure that out? how long have they been over there? >> they've been over there since late -- mid to late june. i believe it is important to have a prudent, thoughtful, responsible approach before we just jump in, as someone who's worked on this. >> it's not going to be very prudent if they all get killed before we do something, now is it? >> sir, i think that it is critical that we have a thoughtful regional approach to this problem before we jump in. >> well, i hope you will encourage the administration to get real thoughtful real fast. i yield back. >> thank you very much, mr. weber. i'm pleased to yield to our new

member of our committee, mr. claassen of florida. >> those from camp liberty, thank you for coming. you've made your point with the newest congressperson here. the two of you, thank you for coming. and thank you for your service to our country. and i'm sure this is not an easy moment for you. it's never easy to be at the point of the spear in this kind of situation. so i respect you for coming and speaking straight and ask you to speak straight to me too. to use your words, mr. mcgurk, there are some hard realities here, right? i cannot overestimate those realities people are dying. and these are people that don't deserve to die. and we've been there for a while. it feels like a perilous situation to me as our enemies consolidate friends, allies, and

territory, which will certainly some day threaten our friends, israel, and maybe even us, if i'm getting the drift of what's going on here as the newcomer. and in that backdrop, it feels like we have bet on a team that is divided, right, maybe artificially put together, and a coach that we and you as an administration don't have full confidence in. that sounds like a bad situation for us to be in. as i hear the talk today, it also feels that this lack of leadership, therefore, causes a deterioration in safety, and where there's a deterioration in safety, there's also a deterioration in culture. people losing lives and their

own culture feels like a bad situation. and it threatens us in the longer term. if i'm capturing correctly what's going on here. and so in that vacuum of chaos, you all are making decisions that will affect us eventually and people on the ground immediately. for my constituents, i think what would be good would be two things. number one, each of you give me a very brief summary for those that aren't experts that don't know all the missiles, that don't know all the things involved here, what is your summary way forward? where is the administration taking us? i don't want to get into partisan bickering. i just want to understand where we are going and where we will be six months from now. and then secondly, i would like to understand what can this

committee do to help save lives and protect people. i am not interested in assigning blame. i think, mr. mcgurk, you said it best. history will sort that out. i think it's more helpful if you tell us where we're going, and if we like that path, how we can help to get there. in layman's terms, so i can understand it and therefore take it to my constituents. i know this question is a little different than most, but does it make sense to you two? >> yes, congressman. i thank you for the very thoughtful question. again, i think explaining this to your constituents is critical about why this matters. a lot of the history on iraq, i think it can have a clouded view upon why this really continues to matter to the united states. >> but i want you to look forward with me. >> so let me just say three things. first, when this crisis began,

as i stated in my written testimony, we immediately had to get a very precise, very accurate eyes-on picture on the ground. and i just want to speak from my own firsthand experience, president obama immediately ordering a surge of intelligence assets, moving an aircraft carrier into the gulf, that was all done -- there's been a lot of talk about the 2011 s.o.f.a. that was all done under another permanent agreement we have with the iraqi government called a strategic framework agreement. that's a permanent framework, agreement, which allows us to assist the iraqis in ways that protect our interests. we had to get a clearer picture of what's happening on the ground. we're getting that now, and it'll become clearer in the days ahead. second, we had to get the political process on track. iraq just had an election. 14 million iraqis turned out to vote, almost a 62% turnout. that showed the democratic aspirations. of the iraqi people. we can't let them down. they want to see a new

government formed, a new parliament has just convened in iraq can 328 members. they're now working to form a new government. we have to be behind them as they do that and encourage them to do so. as soon as that new government is stood up, and it will be set up, we need to embrace it and give it every chance to succeed. it is in both their interest and ours and it is also in the interest of all that we have sacrificed in iraq. so that in a nutshell, we have to get a better picture on the ground, better eyes can on to know exactly what's happening. we're going that. secondly, we have to et get political process on track, which reflects not just the political elites but the aspirations of 14 million iraqis who voted. once that government is stood up, we need to embrace it and give it every chance to succeed. >> thank you very much. >> so in summary, we wait until the new government is formed and then give that government full support. >> we're not waiting. we have people on the ground now doing significant things under the strategic framework agreement, which exists with the future iraqi government and the current one and the one before that. >> thank you very much.

now we will turn to mr. morino of pennsylvania. after that, mr. collins of georgia. >> thank you, chairman. good afternoon, the two of you. thank you for being here. unfortunately, and i don't mean to be facetious, but you two have drawn the short stick to be here and put up with us. as i tell individuals that come and testify, you should be accommodated for that in your reviews. it's a tough group here. but i think we all have one intention in mind. it's just a different way we seem to want to go about it. there's no question, complex is not enough of words to explain what is going on over there. and i understand the two of you

have been over in iraq. so you know first hand what things are like. i visited there twice in short periods of time. ms. slotkin and mr. mcgurk, you can respond to this if you'd like to. several moments ago, you stated that there would be no difference if troops were left in iraq, 10,000, pick a number, but troops left there. it would have no impact on what's taking place in iraq now to repel isil. did i understand that correctly? >> so let me clarify because this just came up a couple minutes ago as well. so it's not that there'd be no difference. i don't know exactly how it would have been. but i know that it wouldn't have forced the iraqis into a political solution that only they can make. >> okay. none of us know how it would have been, but i'm glad you clarified the political statement. >> the political piece.

that's critical. >> it is critical. but i somewhat disagree with that assessment because i've read and studied this extensively. probably not nearly as up to date with it as the two of you are, but i've been reading military reports, listening to experts from generals to commanders to tacticians, et cetera, and they disagree with that assessment. if there would have been troops left there -- and make no mistake about it. a lot of this is maliki's fault. but i was reading an article in "the new yorker" that said if troops would have been left there, first of all, it would have had an impact on maliki. it probably could have -- they probably could have clipped his wings on preventing him from doing what he should have done and didn't do. but it also would have an impact

on isil as well. so could you please tell me what the difference is now since president obama has sent some troops over there now. if sending the troops over -- if not leaving troops there would really not have made a difference, what is the intent then behind sending troops now? would that not make a difference? do you understand my question? >> i believe so. >> thank you. >> first, i just want to clarify that we have sent in an additional, i think it's up to 775 troops. 475 of that total are for the security of our people and our facilities. >> the airport, et cetera. >> exactly. the other 300 are there to assess and answer those very questions, right. and i think the important thing that has changed since even just a year ago is the threat from

isil, that that poses to us, our allies, to our partners, and the importance is that puts on pushing back on them. so i think if your question is, you know, what more could we do, we should have left troops, and now we're considering putting them back in, we're trying to figure out whether additional folks on the ground would help in that fight. >> i'm ambivalent on this as well because i don't want to see another american come home in a body bag. i've been on the ramp and saw the ceremonies where two people were sent back to my state. it's something that i do not want to experience again. but we did have the civil war under control by the time the troops left iraq. do you agree with that assessment? >> i agree that the sectarian violence that had been raging in iraq at the height of the war was significantly diminished, significantly, by the time we departed. >> mr. mcgurk, do you have any

comments on my questions? >> i just want to say first it's a tremendous honor to be before this committee all the time. the breadth of this committee and the veterans and everything else, it's a tremendous honor to be here and discuss this with you. >> thank you. >> i think 2011 we just -- the requirements to get something through the iraqi parliament was not possible, but we still had the strategic framework agreement. and where we are now is that we have been fully embraced to do training, to do advising, to do all sorts of things. what we are undertaking at the direction of the president is a very careful review of what we can do to be most effective. so i think hopefully in our feature conversation we'll have more concrete way forward in terms of what we have decided will be the most effective because that is the conversation that's ongoing now internally. >> thank you very much. and mr. collins of georgia is recognized. >> thank you, madam chair. i appreciate it. looking back, i'm not going to do that, especially with my experience. but i will just say this in

reference to my friend from pennsylvania. i've been there when they were put in body bags, and i'm appalled we did the fact so little in the s.o.f.a. agreement. and do not accept the political answer that politically we couldn't have gotten through. also, there was a political issue here at home in which the president had made a promise to get out. so there's political aspects on both sides. let's not kid each other. at least in this committee that we're doing that. i'll be honest about that. i won't go back, but i want to go forward and look at this. that is a very much of a concern for me for the price that you shared. we spent a lot of blood and treasure, and to leave it like it is now is very, very concerning for those of us who were there. going forward, it is a concern for me and iran is used as a close relationship with iraq and it was growing toward the end anyway. to use the air space to fly weapons to hezbollah and other partners in their fight in syria. the u.s. has time and time again

asked iraq to stop allowing iran to use their air space. what's the most recent activity the obama administration has taken to have iraq cease >> we continue to discuss in some details with iraquis. it is unclear in terms of what is on specific flights. iraquis won't shut down airspace. an ongoing conversation that could send sensitive information which i'd be happy to follow up in a new setting. >> i agree. there's a lot of conversation that may not need to have here. i'll also say a lot of things dealing with the iranians on in pressure points on other sides. i'm very concerned about their continued involvement in this basically messed up soup of syria. >> i want to move to 475 there

for additional embassy and advisers to the iraqi army. under what authority is the president deploying this force? >> so as part of the 775 in total were notified in the three war powers notifications that came over to the hill. >> okay. all right. >> so article 2 war powers resolution, been here 30 days, after the 60-day mark which authorizes the course will president will use iraqi amf or g 1 amf? which one is -- which one are we looking to use. >> military close conversation with the congress and obviously one of those issues to be discussed will be specific legal

authorizations through which the administration determines the president has that authority. >> okay. so at this point in time, though, the question that had to have come up that we're about 30 days away from using this, so the question would have had to at least be we thought about this. which are you going to come back and ask for a new authorization? this at some point in time has to be asked. basically saying we'll think about it in 30 days frankly is not satisfactory to me. >> congressman, there's a number of legal authorities through which the president is able to play military force around the world. specifics are something to be determined within the administration and close consultation. >> lets discuss the iraq amf for a second. if he intends to use this, at what point without congressional repeal or sometime not using it, when is -- this administration chose to withdraw in 2011 the authorization still valid or are we going to keep it for add in

finite um. >> a legal issue to defer to the lawyers. >> i'm sure they are not fog to beat down our door to come talk about. that's why you're here for that. like i say, this is concerning, again, i believe we left with no real strategy. we're now having to deal with it. for those of us who did deal with it on the ground are frustrated about it. one last thing, appreciate you coming up the hill, a difference of opinion, you're limited by what you can or cannot say, which is understandable but not satisfactory. but to the supporters in iraq, looks secretary of state department, any other agency, united states needs to continue to employ all means to protect

everyone there. it is our obligation, our right. studying it forever is not the option. that needs to stop. the next time someone comes to this committee, they are actually saying this is what we're doing, not we're looking at it. that's very disingenuous in a lot of ways. we've been looking at it for a long time now. with that, i think there's a lot of big questions here, madam chair, that are left, especially concerning use of force. i would like to have a healthy discussion about that and not just, well, we'll get to it later because there's a lot of legal options. i'm an attorney as well. there is a lot of legal options here but we need to decide what are we going to do it under and not make it up on the fly because we're not sure what to do. >> thank you so much, mr. collins. thank you, mr. engel. thank you for the panelists and audience and media. with that our committee is adjourned. thank you.

>> more live coverage from capitol hill when senate commerce and transportation committee looks at ways to enhance consumer protections on cruise ships. witnesses include represents from international cruise victims association and passengers who were the victims of sexual assault while on a crews. that hearing scheduled for 2:30 panama eastern on c-span3. over on the senate floor members voted 93-7 to advance a bill that would give tax breaks to employers who return jobs to the u.s. while eliminating deductions for expenses incurred from moving jobs overseas. the house this week is working on several bills dealing with federal student aid including one for degrees on competency rather than credits earned. house members taking up a number of bills dealing with victims of human trafficking. you can watch the house live on

c-span, senate is live on c-span 2. senate veterans affairs committee today unanimously voted 20-0, full senate the nam nation of robert mcdonald to be the next veterans affairs secretary. chairman bernie sanders of vermont posting a statement on his website saying, mr. mcdonald brings us two very important qualities. number one, he is familiar with the military because he served many years. the other, he's been a ceo of a major corporation. that experience gives him the tools to create a well run and account able v.a. that vote by the full senate expected either this week or next. a reminder, you can watch mr. mcdonald's entire confirmation hearing on our website c-span.org. forty years ago the watergate led to the only resignation of an american

president. revisiting 1974 and final weeks of the nixon administration. the committee as it considers impeachment of the president and charges of abuses of power. >> what you have here are questions about what the framers had in mind, questions about whether the activities that had been found out by the committee and by the senate watergate committee were, indeed, impeachable. thirdly, can we prove richard nixon knew about them and even authorized them. >> watergate 40 years later sunday night 8:00 eastern. a new report on the current threats and homeland security challenges. this comes 10 years after the commission issued its recommendations for reforming u.s. intelligence community in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attack. following remarks from members of the commission, we hear from

the chair of the house homeland security committee milk make mccall from texas. this is an hour and 45 minutes. >> good morning. thank you for coming today. we appreciate you being here. i am the director of the homeland security project at the bipartisan security center. nonpartisan, bipartisan think tank founded by four former majority leaders, baker, daschle, george mitchell and bob dole who today we're here to celebrate the birthday of not only the commission report but i would be remiss if i didn't say it was bob dole's 91st birthday as well. >> on behalf i want to say thank you for coming. i want to think annanberg policy

center. we have representatives here as well. i'm not sure where in the room. right over there. we'll hear from kat line hall jamison and the team. we thank them very much for the support. without them we simply could not have made this report happen. thank you very much to the annanberg policy center. i'm going to take my bpc hat off just for a second. as many of you know, my mother was killed on september 11th, 2001. so 10 years ago today was a bit of a different day for me and the other 9/11 members many of whom are in the room. my mother was lost. janice's mother is here. abraham scott who lost his wife is here. for us the 9/11 commission report was a bit of the end of a journey, not just the beginning.