ofessor weller and his class duos american and japanese military strategies leading up to nagasaki and hiroshimas. american motivation for dropping the bomb and the consideration involved in choosing target cities. the atomic bomb fit into america's goal of absolute victory. this class is a little less than an hour. >> outstanding. take your seats please. ok, so what we'll be doing today is finishing our chronological survey with the end of world war. before next week launching into a detailed discussion of race in the pacific war with john dowers war without mercy. we're starting out with the

surrender ceremony in september of 1935 with the demonstration of air and naval strength that was arranged to drive home to the japanese what happened here. also to emphasize to them that the very correct observance terms would be in the japanese's best interests. on the side is missouri itself is the site of the signing ceremony. before we get into the lesson per se which will include the battle of outcome owanowa. does anyone have any questions? >> the political -- how did roosevelt and tumor leadership in the military justify the battle when they knew they were

be dropping a nuclear bomb in two months? >> when is the first successful test of the atomic bomb? a little further forward. july of 1945. when is okanowa? april. has has lived forward even though it is written backwards. in april of 1945, nobody know if this is going to work. also as we're going to discuss in a little more detail, it is not certain what the japanese response to the atomic bomb is going to be. is it going to be a war winner by itself? most americans don't think so it. will be a useful tool but it is not going win the war by itself. the american planners, the american military and political leadership are under the asung

assumption will be defeated through economic means and that is capturing outcome okanowa and bombing the fleets that will be inevitable. does that answer your question? >> yes. >> it was mentioned that a billion people perished from the two atomic bombs. do you have numbers from how many people perished from the bombs and what was the total casualty count? >> i'm shooting off the top of my heat. my best recognize flexion recollection is if you take into account people who die

in long terms or die exactly. part of the problem is figuring it out is the risk of cancer. the risk of cancer goes up in hiroshimas nagasaki and for that matter in new mexico and nevada where nuclear test sites take place. it is not a 1:1 relationship. you go and die down the line from those risks but roughly double. >> i have a question. the fire bomb of tokyo produced massive destruction of 100,000 deaths in tokyo. so when truman issued the warning on july 26 to the japanese that massive destruction is forthcoming why don't they take heed of this? >> well, the japanese are kind

of in endurance mode. we can keep taking this until we have the opportunity until the decisive battle that we can inflict enough casualties on the americans if they won't go home they be give up and negotiate on terms that the japanese will find acceptable. the warning is vague enough they are not sure what trueman means by this. they have suffered casualties and they have passed the point of no return where they should have long ago accept what the americans have to deal out as to continue to suffer through the war but the japanese leadership does not see it that way yet. >> how serious was the government's approach to arming civilians for the defense on japan?

how serious were the convincing by the government, we're all going to die together? >> the government was very involved in this. they deeply believed in this. this program, this idea of civilians fighting to the last, sacrificing their lives as a way of inflicting enough damage on the americans that the americans would negotiate. how seriously did the japanese civilian population take it? that is a much more difficult question to answer because indeed the war does end before the invasion. so at the time, nearly every japanese civilian took it very seriously and publicly said absolutely we're all in for this, this is a great idea. to say otherwise would have been suicidal. after the war ends, many

japanese civilians say that was a bad idea i don't imagine i would have charged an american with a bamboo speer and thrown myself under a tank. it is difficult for us -- at that point the war is over right? it is difficult for us to go back and try to understand what might have really happened if the united states would have invaded. would civilians have fought or not? some would or some wouldn't. if the some would would be bigger than the some wouldn't it is hard to say. boththe united states did believe the japanese population would resist and resist violently. it is a key factor in all allied planning in the invasion and the defeat of japan. >> i had a question about -- when it was talked about after

the sur reppedzer of the japanese and the temp emperor accepted unconditional surrender. there was gunshots heard across the country and colorful language, i thought. was there mass suicides or not mass suicides but several instances of suicide? >> most on parts of the japanese military who felt that the temp emperor coming forward saying we failed reflected on them personally. the reason it ripples out there one of the things the bombings have done is severely damage the japanese communication network. plus, we're talking about the

high-level japanese discussions. up until the point where the emperor intervenes, the japanese are fighting out this until the end. so the emperor's announcement comes to a shock. they have planned this for the rest of their life, i'm going to fight the americans until i die. to have that taken away was a deep shock so a lot of military responded through suicide in an effort to sway that shame and guilty at failing. >> if they are accepting unconditional surrender why did they leave it in pow center. >> unconditional surrender is a tricky concept in some way. the idea of unconditional surrender, is not that the americans are going to destroy japan any more than they destroyed germany but japan

cannot negotiate terms. because the united states, the top leadership already to some degree that keeping it around might be a good idea the occupation planners are saying how do we control this country? how do we occupy this country? how do we pacify this country as they believe complete fanatics. they said if he tells the japanese not to resist if he tells the japanese to cooperation with the occupation they will. that one condition that the japanese are putting forward the united states is more than willing to accept and you will recall looking at the language, they are talking past each passed each other. the united states is not willing to say that but they are willing to hint at it if that is what it takes to get the japanese to

agree to surrender and hiro hit o will be an important part of the cooperation. >> i know when i was reading about the planned invasion. they also mentioned some people thought it would be better to use economic strangulation and fire bombing. was that still under consideration when they were discussing the use of the bomb? >> yes, that is why the option is on the table. i'm going to put a pin in that one we're we're going to discuss that in some detail. yes, that is still on the table. anybody else? let's go ahead and press ahead. what has the japanese's strategy been all along for this war? break the americans how?

inflicting casualties. japan does not realistically to win a straight-up military victory. instead, by resisting american pressure causing american casualties they will get the united states to a point where they agree on terms favorable to the japanese. specificationly, the japanese would love to keep the resources they went toward to get in the first place. that's strategy is unchanged but, again as we've seen before and we're still seeing the execution of that strategy is changing. how did the japanese attempt to execute that strategy? ok, they dig in how? >> their massive tunnel system. >> this is a switch from

previous island campaigns. the japanese become subterranean with the idea that by digging in, they can avoid the bombardment by air and sea and be alive that much longer to cause casualties. >> they gave instructions to resist, they got rid of the charges so they could last longer. >> exactly. the idea is to hold out as long as possible to cause casualties in a specific order that every soldier means to kill 10 americans before he dies and before he dies that is a built-in assumption. their job is to cause as many casualties as possible along the way. how about okinowa in the execution of the strategy?

>> they kind of -- they go and start doing their counterattack and sort of pick off the americans. >> absolutely, they allow them to be unopposed, which is different than the japanese was following in the rest of the pacific war. they allow the americans to land but then they have multiple lines of resistance and they use the terrain to great advantage because there is an additional element to the strategy. not only are the japanese trying to hold out and cause as many casualties as possible to the allied soldiers and marines. [inaudible] >> how so? >> they are going to attack the american fleet as well. the longer the japanese soldiers hold out, the american longer

american fleet has to remain in the water where is it is an identifiable target for the cam akamakazis. [inaudible] >> it is farther away. the japanese don't have much of an effective surface force. they are suffering from the submarine blockade, which has reduced their access to fuel oil. what is the rest of the japanese navy do? [inaudible] >> the japanese have one asset left. the battleship. one of the two largest battleships ever constructed. they send it off with a fleet of

light escorts and only enough fuel to make it to okinowa. it doesn't make it that far but that is their last gas. the idea is they have to have the american fleet in a place where they know they can find it. they don't have enough fuel to go sailing around the ocean even if american air power weren't an issue. >> reading also, they launched 355kamikazi and damaged 17. we can make up for that but at that time it is pretty significant even though we came and sunk the ship and five escorts as well. >> absolutely, the american navy 70'ss more deaths in okinowa than they did in the whole pacific war. how does that play into the

japanese strategy? got cause the pain, right? that is the whole idea wear down the american will by causing casualties. they cause horrific casualties to the american land forces the length of the battle forces, the navy to stay off of waters for an extended amount of time where they are vulnerable, especially to air attacks. but it does fall and the japanese high command realizes what is most likely next on the agenda. the invasion of the home islands islands. how do they prepare for this possibility? >> japanese are going to provide 1.7 million along with whatever

air reinforcement they have left and bring it back to the mainland and pretty much have an all-out fight to repel the americans, which is hopeless at this point. >> militarily, it is a challenge at best. they are going to try to bring home as many troops as they can. remember throughout the majority of the asian-pacific war, most japanese soldiers are in china not on the islands defending against the americans. they are doing their best despite the americans submarine and air blockade to bring troops home from china to defend the home island. as we talked about earlier during the q&a, they are going to arm the civilian population. the glorious death of 100 million. the idea of rather than surrender, the japanese is going to fight to the death as a

nation. they were trained to resist the american revolution using bamboo speers. in the background you see a lot of army leadership. this was an official program. this is sponsored by the government. this is required by the government. is there a way out for japan at this point? their chances of resisting the invasion to actually stop the invasion aren't good. so what are the possibilities of getting out of this thing? >> talk to the soviets. >> talk to the soviets. see if they can't get soviet medication. the japanese do not understand the agreements that have been made between the american,

british, and soviet leaders. the soviets are going to enter the pacific war. the japanese under estimate stalin's interest in regaining territory that the japanese took from russia in the war of 1904-1905. their thinking is maybe we can come to a balance of power arrangement. if they prop us up now they can help negotiate our way out of the war with the mrns, we'll help them out later on, that is what we're going to tell them. they get the soviets to mediate an end to the war. so why doesn't this work out? ok the soviets see they have more to gain in terms of territory and political position from entering the war than helping the japanese get out of

it. >> obviously we had pearl harbor occur and the death toll through the war thus far was four times what it was in europe from what the book said. so at this point, even if the soviets got involved the american people would not be satisfied with anything less than unconditional surrender from the japanese people. even if you enter in the options here i don't think it could be stopped or mediated peacefully. >> yeah, what kind of terms are the americans willing to accept at this point? >> nothing but -- >> unconditional surrenderer. americans issued clarifications. essentially saying when we say unconditional surrender, we're not going to enslave the japanese people. there is not going to be mass

executions. when they say unconditional surrender, the japanese will not have a voice. the americans plan to be merciful but this is not going to be a negotiation between equals. this is going to be a relationship between victor and vanquished. what kind of terms were the japanese looking for when they tried to get soviet mediation and push for a negotiation? what were the japanese looking for in their negotiations to moscow? >> was it for hiro hito to take charge? >> yes that is one of the things on the japanese list. they are looking to keep some of the territory. probably not all of it. they look to keep some of the

territory that they conquered because that is what the war was all about to control the resources they needed. looking for territory, what concessions, what smells how about war crimes trials? how about repatriation of japanese troops? the troops still fighting in the philippines, still occupying china, how are they going to get home and what are they going to do when they get there? who is going to tame them -- take them home? why is this important for the japanese? i'm sorry? >> they can choose to leave them

there and still control the empire they want to. >> that is one possibility. let's say they bring them home as promised. they can bring their troops home. how are they going to come home. are they going to come home in defeat handling their handling -- hanging their heads? no, it is the japanese. they can bring their troops home with their arms in tact waving their flags. is this starting to hear sound like germany? >> they want them to know it is over. >> absolutely. that is the whole point of unconditional surrender to know make sure the defeated nation knows it. there will be no stab in the back myth like hitler exploited in germany like in his rise to

power. we would have won the war if it weren't for -- name your scapegoat. so the soviet is going to mediate. no, the soviets are not going to mediate this one. even if they did were the japanese willing to offer anything the americans were willing to accept? no, all right, so here we are coming to the end of american strategy. what's american strategy been all along? >> the mainland. >> get to the mainland of japan. con scwur japan, force an unconditional surrender so the japanese know they have been beaten and there won't be another war. we've talked about in the past the progressive brutality of american tactics the hardening

of the war. in part of a response of the atrocities carried out by the japanese. the japanese are trying to wear down the american will by the atrocities and it is making the americans more determined to carry on to final victory. as you brought up during the q&a the fire bombings. if the united states is being so successful in bombing out japanese cities and industry, is that a war win center. >> no. >> why not? >> there are still japanese soldiers on the island. it is not like in germany where we can can achieve somewhat of an affect. in japan we're just bombing cities and civilians. >> well, what happened to

japanese industry is a result of the fire bombings. >> what left is. >> yeah, japanese production is plummeted. in some ways it is becoming a deindustrialized nation. do you think it is going to make the japanese quit? no, even though the japanese are not producing war material at this point in anything lying in effective quantity, they can stash away what they already produced and await the american invasion. we talked about the blockade, mainly carried out by submarines and attack aircraft. how is that affecting japan? >> between 1941-1942 their shipping was around 2.5 million tons, i believe. in that timeframe, by 1945 it was cut in half through our

operational endeavors in the pacific ocean. that is, obviously, pretty significant, obviously in a country that does not have a lot of natural resources. >> that is what a war is all about, getting access to resources, rubber, oil food. that is all pretty much cut off at this point. but is it making the japanese quit? no. this gets us to the question that you were asking about the continuation of the blockade or the continuation of the bombardment being the way to go. some american leaders did argue yes. let's not invade japan. let's just keep up with the bolling raids, let's keep up with the blockades and eventually they have got to quit. what is the problem with that from the american point of view? how long is this going to take?

years, potentially. even with the invasion planned when was the first invasion of japan supposed to be according the the timetable? >> summer of 1946. >> that would be the second. the first november of 1945 and not until the spring of 1946 would the second invasion take place in tokyo. even with the invasion, americans are an tis paletting this war will go on until 1946. how long will it go on without an invasion? there is no telling. by american standards japan is beaten. there is no point to this but the japanese don't see it that way. as a result, the fire bombings will continue even though the 20th air force is rapidly running out of japanese cities to burn. the blockade is going to

continue but the operation down downfall is on the books. it is going to happen. at least on paper. it least on the plan. what is it going to be like? >> brutal. 500,000 casualties are what they are prodeathing out of the 1.2- 1.2-1.3 million that will be successful in this operation. >> it is going to be the biggest amafternoonamphibious invasion. after the war historians got into a lot of debate over the casualty numbers. it is confused because you have different agencies trying to estimate the casualties and they are using different numbers. you have one group trying to

estimate replacement men replacement artillery men, that is one set of casualty figures. another casualty figures is being set up by the medical personnel. how many hospitals are we going to need? how many hospital ships are we going to need? these numbers are kind of, not quite contradictory but they are all big. the most telling traffic statistic out there has to do with per curement of medals, specifically purple hearts. the united states made so many purple heart medals anticipating the invasion of japan that we're still giving out the same stock of purple heart.

anyone wounded in afghanistan gets a purple heart that was for a soldier invading japan. it is going to be big. it is going to be bad. the united states expects all of the ones held in japanese custody will be massacred. the americans are right. the japanese already issued orders that p.o.w.'s were to be killed first. is there a way out for the americans? one option is soviet intervention right? this is part of the reason why americans are negotiating so hard to get soviet intervention. what happens if the soviets come into the war? >> you have one more person trying to negotiate terms to end the war. >> it is going to make things

complex. what is the price the soviets are going to demand? that is a tough question. what is the positive? >> it is a second front. >> where? very good. >> northern shores, main land china. >> mainland china. what did we say the japanese were doing to resist the invasion they are shipping their troops home. what happens if the soviets invade man manchur sksia? >> they will send troops back. open up another front. prevent the japanese from reinforcing the home island from the mainland? is that enough to do in the japanese though? >> no. >> people argue that maybe the japanese were more scared of the

soviet invasion, maybe that is why they surrendered? >> yeah, that is -- once again we're caught in -- i was told history is not a laboratory science. you can't rerun it and change the variables. we have hiroshimas and nagasaki on top of each other. it is a one-two-three combination punch that causes japanese leadership to say, ok, it is time. as to what is the decisive blow, it is very difficult to decide which it is. i think in terms it is the combination of it happening on top of each other that provides the shock that let some of the japanese leadership change their thinking but you raise a good point. there are some americans that say maybe soviet intervention

and it is worth a shot, right? negotiation surrender, is the japanese offering the that the united states are considering acceptable? no add to that the united states is reading japanese diplomatic traffic. we've broken the japanese ciphers so the united states, not only knows that japan is seeking mediation. they also know the terms. they know the terms are completely unacceptable. so there is not going to be a negotiated surrender. as a result, truman offers the final ultimatum. he met with the british, the soviets. he knows the atomic bomb works. so what does he tell the japanese? >> horrible destruction is coming unless you surrender now. >> this is your last warning

prompt and utter destruction. prompt and utter destruction will be your fate 23 you don't sursurrender. so he says we're not going to enslave the japanese people. japan will remain a country. we'll have access to resources not control but it will have access to resources to rebuild its economy but we're going to try war criminals. we're going to occupy the country. these are nonnegotiable. so this leads us to what we can call the nondecision to drop the atomic bomb. a lot of historians have burned a lot of ink trying to figure out when, where, who decided to drop the atomic bomb on japan. it is difficult to find because

in many ways there was no decision. there was simply an assumption. what do i mean by that? ok manhattan project right? code word covering the development of the atomic bomb americans in cooperation with the british. the americans and british don't know that the soviets are getting cooperation through espionage but they produce the first effective atomic weapon. the second most expensive arms program of world war ii. do you remember what the first one was? we talked about it last time. the b-29, right. the united states have spent -- the two most expensive weapon systems of the war are going to be united.

having spent that much money, do you think there is a certain amount of institutional and bureaucratic inertia to put this into effect? of course, why build the thing if you're not going to use it? is it going to win the war by itself? >> no one can know. >> no one knows. by american standards the japanese have take than thing far too far. they have held out far too long. it is fueling american rage. they see americans dying in new purpose in a war that japan has already lost. is the atomic bomb going to wake up the japanese and get them to quit? some americans hope so, a lot of american leaders are doubtful. some scientists who create the bomb feel maybe a demonstration

is more appropriate. take a deserted island and take military leaders have them sit off shores and we'll demonstrate the atomic bomb and show the destruction it can cause. why does this american leadership not accept this? >> the japanese will not get on a boat. >> first off, it is a difficult process. first off, you have to start negotiating with the japanese to show them the demonstration. there aren't any demonstration going on so it is a problem. >> they announced the death of 100 million. i think at this point, they are not concerned about the civilian pop you laying. they -- population. they are concerned about the death for the mainland for japan. >> there has been no indication from the japanese leadership that possible massive civilian deaths are going to cause japan

to quit the war. they have already suffered massive deaths. upwards of 80,000 deaths in one night in tokyo and the japanese did not quit. >> it is not a key factor but truman and the american leadership see the writing on the wall between the soviet union and the united states. if the atomic bomb be a potential to bring the japanese to surrender, why not do it before the soviets invade and intervene? >> that is a factor. that is floating around in there. i always think of this as staff meeting stuff. if you have ever been in a staff meeting, once everyone knows what the decision is going to be now everybody thinks how can my particular agency benefit from this. that is why i'm calling this a nondecision. everybody know, everybody who is

in the know knows the atomic bomb is going to be used. those in the state department are saying, ok, how is this going to affect our post war relations? they are seeing how it affects their diplomatic relations. there are a lot of americans who are excited about the idea of having their atomic bomb in their pocket to use with tough negotiations with the soviets. it is definitely a factor. i am not convinced of the arguments that it is the predominant factor. to my interpretation, the predominant factor is ending this war. any intimidation of the soviets that come out of it, that is just gravy. certainly not to be turned down but not primary reason. where are we going to target this thing? what are american planners looking at?

>> looking at military targets. >> looking at military targets and the headquarters of the army slated to defend the southern island. it is also a major port facility, a lot of military targets in it. >> also, the cities that shows are relatively untouched by the fire bombs as well. >> absolutely, there were not too many left in japan by this point but the idea is in some ways it's a matter of informing americans, how do you do bomb asset on a target that has already been hit. it will enhance the shock value to japanese. one city that was in tact, one bomb, one destroyed city. most americans are not confident this is a war winner by itself but there are some hope that just maybe this will work.

if it doesn't, well there is always the tactical use of atomic weapons. those who were in the know about the atomic bomb began writing atomic bombs into the operation downfall plan. to use atomic bombs to help the american troops get ashore and help american troops get inland in japan. not a lot of deep understanding at this point of the long-term impacts of radiation. the best advice they had was don't send troops any place where you drop an atomic bomb for 48 hours. >> after the war, they actually had the cannons and whatnot and they were going to fire the nuclear war head the shells out

of and nobody thinks about -- at that time, nobody thought about the implications that came from radiation. >> when we get into the 1950's, the american military is going to experience with atomic weapons, the back davey crock crockett. for a while it seems like the wave of the future before the realizization sinks in and what caused the realization is having used two of them in nagasaki and people around the world can see the long-term affects. in 1945, those are not well underat all. not in the least. so this leads us to the triple punch.

within three three and a half day, japan has to absorb these major blows. finally, there is enough of an impact on the japanese senior leadership to make a difference. it is not that there has been no one in japan contemplating getting out of the war up until this point. nobody did it publicly. within high government circle there were peace advocates. they were saying the war is lost and we need out of this. they were out voiced by the militarists who wanted to hold on. one more battle. if we can just inflict american casualties in one more big battle then we can negotiate and get something out of this war. but after hiroshimas, after the invasion of manchuria and

nagasaki the japanese high command finally allows the emperor to step in and override and make the final decision to surrender. there is a little bit of last-minute negotiating with the emperor's position in society. they talk past each other and they come up with with language vague enough to mean what they interrhett itinterpret it to mean. the japanese are going to choose their own form of government after the occupation as long as it is respectful of all people and that sort of thing. if they want to choose an emperor that is ok. in the meantime, the temp pourry will be subject to the allied commander.

that is good enough for both sides to interpret what they need to reach the point of surrender. >> i've a question between droppling the first bomb and the second one. how much opposition existed in the british government and the united states government after seeing the destruction in with the first bomb in hiroshimas and the second one? >> very little. we're used to living in the information age, the satellite reception, that sort of thing. information from hiroshimas, which remember it is a foreign country at war. it is slow to come out to the allies. part of the problem is the japanese don't realize what happened. they understood atomic physics. they had their own atomic program but it was not advanced very far and one thing they figured out is it really difficult. to the point their top

scientists said we don't think a bomb is practical. when one goes off over hiroshimas, first off you have to round up your experts. they have to come back and issue the report and they have to convince skeptical people that this is what happened. none of that information is getting back to the united states. hearing no response the united states continues with the plan. it is another nondecision. it is simply following through with the plan as stated. we're going to keep dropping atomic bombs as part of our preinvasion strategy. the invasion will take place as planned up until the point where the japanese accept unconditional surrender. yes? >> do we under estimate how brutal the atomic bombs are

going to be? >> it was not well underwhat they were going to do. in fact, i think our standard way of expressing the explosive power of nuclear weapons is indicative of that. how do we describe atomic or nuclear weapons? how do we measure their blast? >> as related to tnt. >> we call it kilo tons and it is 1,000 tons of tnt. so to try to get our minds around this new force in the universe or the new force that humans have figured out, not how to control but how to tap, that is a big intellectual leap and that is going to take time. >> i thought the 20-kilo ton was one of them, right? was that the 20-kilo tons?

>> i don't want to go on record on that. i doing remember. >> it said somewhere in the book that between the two bombs it was equal to all of the conventional bombs dropped in europe. obviously, that is significant considering how much we did drop. even more significant, think about the current day, we have 60, 70 mega ton war heads on our nuclear bombs. that is 1,500 times what nagasaki was. it is significant if you think about it in that sense and the amount of destruction that can come from one of those bombs. >> absolutely, we're literally talking about in mathematical terms is orders of magnitude, more destructive. the chief terror of nuclear weapons is not just their blast but their long-term effects and fallout and those things were so

ill understood. most people thought of them as really, really big bombs and expressed them as such. it is the same as seven b-29 loads. trying to express this so that people are falling back on their understanding of conventional explosives. good. very good. so we're good so far? let's wrap it up. what do we come to? the japanese strategy of spiritual exhaustion of inflicting such casualties and horrors on the americans that the americans will come to some sort of negotiated settlement that will be acceptable to japan. that failed. the horrors that they perpetrated reinforced the american desire to fight on to unconditional surrender and

absolute victory i. the americans got what they wanted or needed out of this war. they did achieve unconditional surrender. i put ans an astrixes on here. it is important to remember that the reason the united states was willing to let the japanese sort of term, slide because the americans wanted to retain the emperor as a tool for the occupation. in short, the japanese were forced to surrender unconditionally and the americans set the terms. there wasn't a decision to use the atomic bomb. instead, this new weapon and people did not know how new it was simply became part of the overall american strategy. the search to force -- the desire, the need to force japan into unconditional surrender

becomes part of the deal. strategy use against cities with military value. but remember, the tactical planning is in place to use them as part of the invasion that many americans still expect will be part of the ultimate downfall of japan. the implications of atomic weapons, how they have changed the world and how we recognize that now. that was a question that people in 1945 on all sides, for them it was a question that would be answered in the future. ok, a lot of good books. i did limit myself to three this time. a lot of great books to look at this. talking about the american approached the end of the pacific war. you have all of these planners. the atomic bomb is a tightly held secret.

as you brought up, hasegawa is the best with the atomic bomb is more about dealing with the soviet union than dealing with japan. leon is seagal is an excellent comparison on how the united states and japan are approaching this final outcome of the war. that concludes our discussion, our chronological discussion of world war ii. when we see each other next week we will delve into race in the pacific. have a pleasant day. you are dismissed. >> you're watching american history tv. 48 hours of programming on american history every weekend

on c-span 3. follow us on twitter at cspanhistory to keep up with the latest history news. >> each week american artifacts takes you to museums and historic places. up next, a visit to 28th street in new york city the birthplace of roosevelt. >> his legacy still impacts us today whether it be around conservation or federal regulation or foreign foils which --policy. the panama canal his vision for america, given his time was extremely progressive. it is something that i think