what the future is of that constitutional framework. but we all hope it works. last question is, are you confident we have adequate personnel on the ground to truly protect our embassy and the americans in baghdad? >> senator, yes. we have moved in substantial assets both to the airport and also into the embassy. i was just there as late as thursday, and we're confident that our defensive perimeters and everything, that our people will be safe. our assistant secretary for diplomatic security just visited baghdad last week to do his own assessment. we've also had teams on the ground from centcom, an ongoing assessment, and our intelligence assets have the entire everything all around the perimeter of the city of baghdad, the airport, and our embassy very well covered. >> okay, can you tell us how many people we have at the embassy, or is that something that you don't want to discuss in open -- >> we have total in baghdad about 2,500 now. >> thank you. thank you.

>> senator johnson? >> thank you, mr. chairman. let's quickly go back to the kurds. i've been made aware of the facts that the baghdad government is basically in arrears on the kurds' budget by $6 billion. is that pretty accurate? >> there are a lot of ways to do the accounting and the math. baghdad claims the kurds owe them money. the kurds claim that baghdad owes them money. and in that -- in that space is where a deal lies. and i think that's going to be part of the conversation informing a new government. >> if it is true that baghdad owes them as much as $6 billion, would the u.s. support the kurds' ability to export oil and obtain that revenue so they can keep themselves going? >> we want to get as much oil on to international markets as possible from all parts of iraq. and that's something that we very strongly support. we worked very hard over the last six months to get a deal on the table by which the kurds would have exported as much oil

as they possibly could through some of the existing arrangements with the revenue-sharing allocations that exist. and that deal almost succeeded, but it ran up again the election time frame. once in the election, it was very difficult to close a deal. i think we'll be able to get that back on the table. we want as much oil from iraq, north to south, on to international markets as soon as possible. >> okay. now -- i appreciate the fact that we're going through assessments, and we're studying the problem. but i want to -- you have to recognize reality before you develop a strategy. but i really do want to just compare where we are now versus where we were prior to the 2007 surge. and mr. mcgirk, you've been involved with this for some time. what was the level of the iraqi forces back in 2007? i really want some relatively quick answers here because i want to get some data points. >> how do you measure the level? it was -- >> i mean, how many people were in the iraqi security forces back in 2007? >> i don't have the -- i don't have the figure, but it was not

a highly effective force in early 2007. >> but in america we had about 132,000 at the start of the surge and surged about 167,000. >> correct. >> what were we in terms of enemy fighters in 2007? >> we assessed the main enemy then was al qaeda and iraq, isil -- >> how many people were we up against? >> these figures are difficult. we had assessments of 6,000 to 8,000, but probably more. >> i understand. what do we think current isil forces are? >> current, they're difficult to measure, 15,000 or so, in iraq far less. >> so basically double where -- that we had in terms of 2007? >> isil today, according to our assessments, is far more capable in manpower, resources, fighting effectiveness, yes. >> that's my point. the u.s. troop levels in iraq are how many? >> total now about -- >> yeah, we've inserted 775-ish and about 100 that were

associated with our office of security operation, so -- >> less than 1,000 -- >> less than 1,000. >> less than 1,000 now. back in 2007, prayer to a pretty difficult battle in terms of surge, we had 168,000 at the height of that. and isil now is double the size it was in 2007. and they have some of our weapons, their capabilities are much higher. >> that's right. >> where -- what was the size of the iraqi military force in june of 2014 prior to isil's moving to iraq? what was our estimate there? >> i don't have that figure, but i can get it for you. >> are we talking hundreds of thousands? i mean -- >> hundreds of thousands, but we try to look at capable and effective forces. one of the purposes of the assessment was to determine which units are effective, which are ineffective. there are some unit, frankly, that are totally ineffective, and there are some unit that are totally capable and effective. >> ms. slotkin, do you have that information? >> i think it's just shy of 200,000. >> 200,000 prior to the

intrusion or the -- >> i believe soy -- >> invasion? >> how many now? you said they lost four divisions. how many melted into the background? >> again, i don't have the exact number. it's probably closer to 160-ish. >> do you have any sense just percentagewise of what percentage of that force would have any effective not in terms of fighting -- effectiveness in terms of fighting? >> in terms of dissolved units, but 30,000. the iraqis have since recalled about 10,000. according it our isci assessments, there's about 10,000 who have come back and going through a three-week training course now. >> the effectiveness of the iraqi security forces versus u.s. forces? not comparable, right? >> can't compare them, no. >> we got a real problem on our hands. can you -- we talked a little bit about the threat to our homeland, that isil in syria and iraq represent. can you describe what the threat to the homeland is because of

the situation? i mean, can you make the american people aware of why this matters? >> what really concerns particularly our counterterrorism experts and also concerns us is that this rise in very dedicated global jihadist fighters come from all over the world. in baghdad there week there was a suicide bomber, there was a german, there was an ahn. isil -- an australian. isil was able to funnel 30 to 50 suicide bombers into iraq. we assess almost all foreign fighters. it would be very easy for isil to decide to funnel that cadre of dedicated suicide bomber, global jihadis around the region, or europe, or worse, here. that is a very significant, significant concern. they have training bases in syria, and they are recruiting on social media and the internet. it's something that we have never seen before. >> a year ago the president declared the war on terror was

over. do you believe the war on terror was over? >> i think we have a very significant fight on our hands with isil which we have to manage. >> i have no further questions. >> senator cardin? >> thank you, mr. chairman. let me thank both of you for your appearance here today and for your service to our country. i certainly agree that the united states has vital interest in containing isis' growth and threat to our homeland and to our allies. i also agree that we have direct interest in dealing with a government in iraq that represents all the ethnic communities fairly with an effective government that gives confidence to moderates that their voices can be heard within the iraqi government. but it was interesting -- i was

listening to senator johnson go through some of the comparisons on the strength of the terrorist networks, whether it's isil, isis, or al qaeda, or whether it's whatever, and he was drawing a comparison over the last seven years. if you go back to before the u.s. troop invasion in 2001, at least my assessment -- my understanding was there was virtually no al qaeda, no terrorist network that was a direct threat to our homeland in iraq. so it does raise a lot of the questions that senator boxer raised initially that our use of military force back in 2001 was ill advised. we don't want to repeat mistakes that we've made in the past. that's the reason i bring it up. but i started with the fact that we have vital interests in dealing with the current circumstances that are on the ground in iraq. i -- i know this hearing is

focused on iraq, but i want to move a little bit to syria and what impact the isis is having on the opposition effective not and syria and whether we're finding any of the support for the opposition strengthening isis' capacity within iraq. and the network between the moderate gulf arab muslim states in supporting the opposition in syria, are we confident that that is not finding its way to the terrorist networks now operating in iraq? >> obviously the connection between isil -- between the threat and n iraq and syria is pretty significant. i don't -- i don't personally know of any reports for

opposition support being funneled to isil. i think they are in a pretty bitter fight against both the regime and the terrorists who have taken over territory particularly in eastern and northern syria. so i don't have any reports of that equipment and that support that's been provided getting in to their hands. but it's always a risk. >> what precautions have we taken with moderate arab states and with our own support for the opposition in syria to make sure that we are not finding american support or moderate arab states' support ending up encouraging terrorist activities now moving in to iraq? >> this is something obviously we talked to our gulf partners about quite a bit. certainly over a period of the last couple of years. and we just urge them to make sure similar to the way we do end use monitoring that they have some way of telling who they are providing things to, in what capacity, et cetera, et

cetera. we urge them to follow up the way we would want them to follow up. >> mr. mcgurk, what impact is the impasse in syria in the failure to have a workable plan in syria impacting stability in iraq? >> that's a very good question, senator. the iraqis, since the beginning of the syria crisis -- and this is really all iraqis, have had a different conception of the syria crisis than we have had. they've been very concerned that based upon their own experience that were you to see the fall of the assad regime that it would unleash chaos on their borders. and they take what's happening within that frame. there's a kurdish dimension in the syria crisis, tribal dimension to the syria crisis. it's accelerated the centrifugal forces that is tearing at the fabric of iraq. so it's -- it's very hard to

even state the impact that the syria crisis has had on iraq. in particular the rise of the suicide bombings and car bombings, all of which we assess are isil. they come month after month and they are targeted -- and this is ideology, you can go back to the writings of 2004, to attack shias in marketplaces, playgrounds, mosques, repeatedly. to attack sunni tribal leaders who disagree with them. and that's why in february almost 8 % of the suicide -- 86% of the suicide bombings isil brought into iraq were focused on the euphrates valley and anbar province, attacking sunnis who disgraced with their ideology. then -- disagreed with their ideology. then to the kurds with the disputed boundary territories in the north. that is what isil is trying to do. we got the suicide number down to five to ten a month in 2011 and 2012, and it went up this month. it has a devastating effect on

the psyche of the country. >> do we have any iraqis displaced within iraq or outside in other countries since june? >> immediately in mosul, there is about 500,000 idps, and since this crisis really started earlier this year, the idp number is over a million. >> and are they in iraq, iran, other countries? >> no, most are in iraq, and most have fled to the kurdish region in the north. we've worked very closely with our regional partners and with our u.n. partners in iraq to manage this crisis. secretary kerry, after he was in baghdad, went to paris to meet the foreign ministers of uae, saw, jordan, and went to riyadh to see king abdullah in riyadh. the saudis after that meeting generously contributed $500,000 to the u.n. agencies working in iraq, which was a much-needed contribution. we've contributed since the crisis began in mosul about $18 million. and we're working closely, particularly with our kurdish partners, to manage the crisis. >> i take it that very few of these people have returned because it's not safe at this

moment? >> yes, that's right. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, mr. cardin. senator flake? >> thank you, mr. chairman. how long have we known that isil was a threat to the extent that they are now? how long has the state department assessed it as a threat? >> we've known this organization since 2003. it's al zarqawi, iraq -- >> i know we've known it, but at what point did we think that there was a threat, that they would be able to take over mosul or -- >> well, in mosul, they've had this mode us vivendi in which they run racketeering schemes, and they self-generate funding for about $12 million a month in mosul. we've known that's been going on. their open assault into mosul, we didn't have indications of that until a few days beforehand. >> just a few days before that. when did we give warning to the iraqi government that this was a threat, or did they -- have they -- has their intelligence

network been sufficient to know this before it was a problem? >> it's a very good question, senator. in fact, we've been giving warnings, expressing concern to the iraqi government about the security environment, not just in mosul but in northern ninawa, going back about the last year. it was a part of the conversation that i know our vice president had with prime minister maliki when maliki of here in november. we've been very concerned about it and trying to work with the kurds and with the iraqi security forces in those areas to have some coordination because isil comes through that border crossing south of a town called ribia, and they have filled that space gradually over the last year. >> without our military there conducting ground operations, our effort have been in the diplomatic field. one, to try to convince the iraqis to be more inclusive and not give rise to this kind of activity or space for that kind of activity to happen. but two, to warn them and

remember them combat this -- and help them combat this. seems that we've been spectacularly unsuccessful in the diplomatic arena in that regard. and do you have any response to that, or -- how hard are we working there? what intelligence do we have, are we passing it on, are they -- is the iraqi government simply unresponsive? what's been the hydrohere? >> in terms of intelligence sharing with iraqi forces and cooperation with iraqi forces, right now as we speak, it is at a level we haven't seen since our troops left in 2011. so there is some tlunts for -- opportunities there for us. since we've focused on the al qaeda isil threat in iraq, going back to last summer, you see statements the state department made about baghdadi. he's in syria and isil is an increasing threat to iraq. we've developed platforms with the iraqis to try to develop a

better intelligence picture. but a lot of it was slow going. on the political side, we are very focused when the crisis began in anbar to make clur, very clearly that any tribal fighters rising up against this group will get full benefits and resources of the state. the iraqis also agreed to train about 1,000 natives of falluj, gave them three months of training, and there was an operation in northern fallujah. and frankly, those fighters lost. they lost because the isil networks, particularly in fallujah, with snipers, with ieds, with military sophisticati sophistication, is able to overmatch any tribal force that comes to confront it. that's the situation right now. it was also the situation in northern ninawa because we have tribal contacts up there with the main tribe up there. and over time, given the infiltration was syria, given the amount of force that isil can bring to bear, it was very difficult for locals to stand up to them. >> you say cooperation with the iraqi government was slow in

coming. where -- where does the fault lie with that? was it slow -- were we slow to recognize the threat of isis, or was the iraqi government simply slow to heed the warnings that we were given, or the -- the cooperation that we offered? >> i think we started moving fairly aggressively in the summer. the iraqis wanted to do things on their own. they didn't want our -- they didn't really formally request direct u.s. military assistance until may. although there was a conversation about the possibility of such assistance earlier than may. but the formal request came in may. you know, iraqis are very proud of their sovereignty. we have a strategic framework agreement that allows us to do an awful lot. the notion of flying surveillance drones over iraqi skies, frankly, was controversial at first. so we had to develop the mechanisms and the procedures for doing these things, and we

have those now well in place. >> our role in congress, one of our main roles obviously is to provide funding for these conflict, for intelligence, for diplomatic efforts, aside from thousands of lives lost. we've spent about $800 billion at last count in iraq, just in iraq. what can we tell our constituents that we've gotten out of that? where are we now that we wouldn't be had we not spent $800 billion? >> i think -- i mean, as senators boxer said, we gave them an opportunity, and we hope that this isn't the end of the story in iraq. we believe that there is still an opportunity for the iraqis to form a government and do something about this problem. and we're urging them to get on with it and, you know, i think

that that's -- we still believe in a way forward in iraq. they just have to take the opportunity. >> is it possible at all in the state department's view to move ahead with maliki in charge? will there be sufficient trust, any trust from the sunni population that he'll be inclusive enough, his government, or does our strategy rely on somebody else coming in? >> i think it's going to be very difficult for him to form a government. so they're facing that question now, now that the president's been elected to face the question of the prime minister. any prime minister, in order to form a government is going to have to pull the country together. so whoever the leader is is someone that's going to have to demonstrate that just to get the votes he needs to remain or to be sworn in to office. so that's something that's going to unfold rapidly over the coming days. whoever the nominee is has to

form a cabinet and present it to the cabinet to form a government. the speaker of the parliament again was -- was elected overwhelmingly with support from all major groups, as of the president, and we would anticipate the prime minister -- as the president said, it has to be somebody with an inclusive agenda and bring the groups together, otherwise he won't be able to govern. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you. senator? >> i want to thank senator menendez for chairing this hearing. senator kaine and corker, as well. and thank the witnesses for your testimony. i will follow on senator flake's questioning in a moment. i share the administration's ultimate goal, as you've just been testifying to, of encouraging the creation of an inclusive iraqi government supported by all of iraq's different sectarian groups that has some hope of a secure and stable iraq going forward given how much has been sacrificed over how many years. i'll renew a theme you've heard from several senators, that i do not support a return of active

u.s. combat troop presence in iraq. i am concerned about the security of our embassy and personnel. and i'm very concerned about the region and about some of our vital regional allies. so first, i think we do need to we'll do defeating isis and the regional threat here in a regional context as you've testified. and i think it's imperative that we have to find a way to move forward that has some reasonable chance of resolving the ongoing crisis in both iraqyand syria to the best interests of the united states, of israel, of jordan, of turkey, of all of our regional allies. so on the point you were just discussing, what do you see as the prospects, the path forward for a political solution in the next 15 days? have you met with anyone who strikes you as a promising potential prime minister who really could bridge these divides given reports of high-level delegations of iranian military officials and diplomats meeting in baghdad and

najaf? i'm concerned that there are fewer and fewer realistic chances of a broad-based inclusive government being formed given active interference, engagement from iran. >> i can speak a little bit to the process. this was iraq's third national election they held on april 30th. it was win of the best elections they've held in terms of the turnout. in 2006, it took about seven months to form a government in an extremely difficult process. and what they did was they built this very bloated government with every seat filled and voted in to office. in 2010, they wound up being the same thing. it took nine months, and again they built a bloated structure, then swore it in to office. this year, this time they're proceeding quite differently. they're moving through their constitutional timeline, speaker, president, now prime minister. it's moving much faster than ever before. again, nine months in 2010, we're less than three months out from the april elections. and we're now on the step for the prime ministership.

i'd be hesitant to put timelines on it because it's a very complicated process. the 328 members in the iraqi parliament represent the entire spectrum represent the thought in iraq. it's difficult to get full unity on any one person or any one issue. so there will be a very strong debate. it's not -- not beanbaged the political process there. and now they're starting to focus on the most critical question of who is going to lead the country as the chief executive. >> your riveting description of the fall of mosul suggests that a lack of urgency, a lack of reality about the situation on the ground was outcome determinative, led to failure to act in a timely way, and to isis sweeping across much of the center of the country. do you think there's a sense of urgency, a sense of reality both as to the defense posture that isif faces and to the political challenges that they face? >> yes. and there is a culture in iraq

that sometimes folks don't want to give their leaders bad news. and sometimes we're the ones who have to deliver the bad news and say you face an urgent situation. mosul is a good example of that. the generals were not saying that it was particularly urgent. so we are often the ones that have that do that. now given the information we have, given the relationships we have on the ground, military relationships, we're able to give them a very clear picture of the situation they face. the relative tactical success they've had in clearing some of the highways north of baghdad, and relative because it remains very difficult, but the highway -- highway 1 that goes all the way north, up through the tigris valley from baghdad to samarra, they did clear that. that was partially on their own but partially because we helped them with some information. and then the next stretch from samarra to tikrit, the same thing. as i mentioned, we done advise them to go in to tikrit city itself. that's a very difficult military environment to operate in. again, it's why general austin

on the ground, to discuss with thoo new commanders who we have very good relationships with and with the iraqi political leaders how we can better approach this going forward in a more cooperative way. >> miss slotkin, there's been widespread reports of sunnis sort of bristling under isis rule. they are extreme, they conduct not just terror attacks and suicide bombings and target assassinations, but they were imposing a particularly harsh form of sharia. what prospects are there for outreach for reengagement with element of the sunni community that might assist the iraqi security forces, might play some role in rising up against isis in a replay of what happened previously? >> yeah. i think we've seen this story before in our own experience in iraq. that many of these groups who may give tacit support to terrorist organizations in their neighborhoods as soon as there is some prospects of turning against them and they know they have some support from their central government to do it,

then they will turn on them. they don't like living under sometimes the sharia law that's been imposed on them. so i think the prospects are still there, but i think ultimately it will come down to whether they feel like they have a partner in the central government of iraq. there is something to break away for. and that is up to the iraqi government, the new government will have to attract the sunnis away from isis and isil and toward them, and the -- the security forces have to be a part of that. at the end of the day it is about a political compromise that they strike in baghdad and lure those sunnis away. >> i am particularly concerned about our vital ally in the region, jordan, about their both military and economic and strategic stability given the flood of refugees that they've already been taking in as a result of the syrian crisis and about the open increasingly porous borders. what concrete steps are we taking to reinforce and to

ensure the stability and vibrancy of jordan, and how does the announced intent to deliver support to the vetted moderate syrian resistance strengthen tha that? >> so i think the most important thing is that the jordanian military is a very capable military force. so we are very focused on the threat right on their border, but so are they. they've reinforced their troops on their border with iraq, and we have -- we have a very close relationship military to military with the jordanians and talk with them on a daily basis. again, because of the syria crisis, the u.s. already had a robust presence in the country. we have f-16s there. we have a patriot battery there. we have a $3 hundred million fmf program, education there. it is a strong relationship, one of the strongest in the region. i feel confident that we are doing everything we can in

response to help them with their situation on the border. and i think the idea of supporting moderate vetted opposition in syria is only more positive. we need -- the united states needs capable partners and formul platforms to deal withdrawal this threat. the jordanians are a big part of that and so will the syrian moderate opposition. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you. senator rich defers his questioning now to senator rubio. >> thank you. i appreciate that. let me begin with my -- i think our priority for everyone here is the safety and security of our personnel including the department of defense personnel and certainly the state department personnel at the embassy given recent events. so there's been increased reporting that the isf is increasingly linked or intermingled with shia militia forces that some of these shia militia forces are wearing isf uniforms, but it's becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish between a shia militia fighter and a -- and an

isf personnel and we've seen open source reporting that the shia militia could pose a threat to our personnel including potentially our military trainers and others. can you briefly describe, one, how we assess the threat of these militia, and what are we doing to mitigate the risks that they pose to our personnel given the fact that they're now basically embedded and intermingled with the iraqi security force personnel that we're working side by side potentially with? >> sure. this is exactly what we were trying to assess by going over there and looking unit by unit in and around baghdad at things like command and control, morale, and in particular infiltration of militias. the grand ayatollah sis tani put out a call for volunteers to join the military. as these new folks came in, where would their allegiances be?

would they respond to the commanders of their unit or someone else? i think that is what we've been trying to figure out, and i think the picture honestly is mixed. in some areas we have good morale, strong adherence to command and control through the military channels. and in other places, it's a more open question. those are the kinds of units that we don't want to be working with and why we are taking this deliberate approach. >> there is the real risk, is there not, that shiamish that a that are there could -- shia militia that are there could be the ones firing our embassy and personnel as isil personnel could be unless they're somehow otherwise constrained. >> senator, the two militias are something we watch closely. there's been a cease-fire, the shia militias have had a cease-fire in place since 2009 against their own government forces and cease-fire, we have not had any attacks from shia militia since 2011. but it's something that we watch extremely closely. the assessment assessed every unit around baghdad, and without getting into the details, some

units are infiltrated and dangerous. some are very capable, very effective, and have close relationships with us. >> i wanted to get to a broader question. you touched upon it in your statement, and even more so in the written statement that you submitted. here's the question that we get from people. that is people are outraged by what's happening, especially the reports about the different things that isil is doing. by no means is this a group that's popular. i think americans understand this is a terrible radical group of violent individuals. that being said, public opinion polls and just from the phone calls we get in our offices, the attitude of much of the american public is it's a mess, but it's their problem. let them figure it out. now i personally said that this is not even about iraq at this point. it's about the long-term security of the united states and the threat that isil poses to the united states, especially if they're able to establish a safe haven of operations similar to what al qaeda did. in fact, even worse than what al qaeda was able to do in afghanistan. but i was hoping that from the administration's point of view

and the state department of and department of defense's point of view you could use this opportunity to explain to my constituents in florida why this matters to america, why something happening halfway around the world in a country that people quite frankly think increasingly perhaps we shouldn't have gotten involved in, why does this matter? why should people care about what's happening in iraq given the programs we have here at home? >> thank you. i'd say a couple of things. i, of course, addressed the isil threat in my written and opening statement. that is a serious counterterrorism threat, number one. these are vital, vital u.s. interests in the iraq. number one, the al qaeda terror threat. two, the supply of energy resources to global markets. iraq through 2035 will account for 45% of all of the growth in oil energy special report. if iraq were -- exports. if iraq were to collapse in a major sectarian civil war, the folks our own economy at home would be -- effects to our own economy at home would be quite serious. every single fault line crossing through the middle east, arab,

per persian, arkurdish, to unleash caldron of sectarian violence that would spread throughout the wlooeft devastating effects to our economy at home. vital interests at stake from al qaeda to energy resources in our own economy are at stake. >> thank you. did you want to add something? >> i would just foot stomp the isil threat, you know, they are self-funded, they have control of significant territory, they are tested in battle. they are -- they are a serious threat. and while we don't assess right now that they are doing distinct homeland plotting, they've certainly said rhetorically, they are open about it, that they are coming to the united states. in my experience as a defense official, i don't want that to fester. i want to do something about that. >> i thank you for that. i think you've done a good job of joust lining the reason why we should care and why this

matters. this is not simply about iraq. this is about the united states. could you then briefly -- if i sblaut people here in florida or -- brought some people here from florida or they're watching, could i explain the plan? what are the thing we're doing, two or three things we're doing to address the threat that you have described as a significant one to our country? what is the plan? >> let me focus on isl. we need to two doo three thing. we need to strain the network. the foreign fighter in particular. we had a meeting all day yesterday to focus on. that we have to strangle their foreign fighter flow into syria. two, we have to begin to deny space in safe haven and sanctuary which they have in syria, why we're planning to hope to train the moderate appropriation with the train and quit program. three, we have to help iraqis take control of their sovereign space. as i explained in my testimony, a functioning federal system which n which we recruit locally with tribal structures. but with the resources of the central government. there was a conversation about recruiting tribes which is what we want to do, but we have to

recognize that unless the local people and local tribes have the resources of the central government or national-based resources, they're not going to be able to defeat this organization. >> what are we specifically doing and going to be doing to crush their networks and prevent them from having safe havens? operationally, what are we going do to accomplish those goals that you've outlined as part of our plan? >> well, i can speak to the iraq portion of this. this is why since the crisis began in early june, we immediately surged, a significant surge of intelligence assets in to iraq to get a better picture of the situation. we put special forces on the ground to get eyes on. and we're now at the point where we have collected all the information, we have a fairly concrete, precise picture, and we're coming up with options for doing just that. this will be an ongoing conversation with this committee and congress over the days and weeks ahead. >> sherritt shaenator shank? >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you for being here. i want to follow up on the line of questioning that senator rubio of following and your

response because you mentioned in your testimony, mr. mcgurk, that we need to work with our partners in the region, especially turkey, to seal the border in syria -- to syria from foreign fighters and isl recruits. so can you talk a little bit more? i know you're limited to some extent, but about how this is proceeding and what -- what other partners we might engage to address this concern. >> no, thank you, senator. we have some experience in doing this in the late 2006/2007 time frame where it was the same foreign fighter network at the time. they were all flying in to damasc damasc damascus, aleppo, into iraq. we did an anaconda strategy to squeeze the entire network from the source capitals of where they were getting on airplanes, to get them off the airplanes. we're now doing a similar effort, and ambassador bradke is -- senior adviser at the state department under the c.t. bureau

focused on the foreign fighter network. it's two parts. turkey has a very long border. it's very hard to control. but turkey is doing some things to -- to strengthen their own border and focus on this problem. but also the source capitals in which young military-aged males are getting on airplanes and going to certain national airports turkey. we're working carefully through our entire interagency and the next are really expert in this with the source capitals in which people are getting on airplanes and coming in to syria and with the turks. and it's europe, it's north africa, and it's the gulf region. >> and can you talk about how long we've been doing that and whether we're seeing any results as -- as a result of that effort. >> senator, we've been doing it for some time now. and i can follow up with you after speaking with the experts dealing with this and have a written response. >> i would appreciate that. and senator sharing it with the committee would be helpful, as well. you also talked about the tremendous effort on the part of the kurdistan government to

accommodate the internally displaced people fleeing from other parts of iraq. and i wonder if you could talk about the extent to which the government in baghdad recognizes the strain this is causing and has been willing to work with the kurds at all to help address this. >> one promising sign, senator, in what is a very dark landscape. i want to be very clear. the humanitarian situation is extremely serious, and it is heartbreaking, particularly whether it comes to the christian minorities -- when it comes to the christian minorities and vulnerable groups. i met with the christian leadership in baghdad throughout my last trip about how we can do a better job helping these people who are under a very serious threat. the iraqi government could do more to help the kurdish regional government, particularly with state resources and state funding. the iraqi parliament, which is just meeting because it just convened for the first time a

brand new parliament, a brand new speaker, the first session really was yesterday. one of the first things they, first they all united in condemnation of what is happening to christians in the northern province and also formed a very broad committee from all the major groups to figure out how to direct state resources. and remember, iraq has significant resources. there's a budget pending in the parliament for $140 billion. that is something that the government has to tap in to to help these people. they just formed a committee yesterday to figure out things to do. and we're obviously actively engaged with them to try to influence that process. >> so does the selection of a kurdish president help with this effort? >> certainly we look forward to working with the new president, with -- with the president on these issues. he won an overwhelming victory on the vote today on the floor of the iraqi parliament. so it's a good step forward. but we work with all the kurdish leadership and all in baghdad on

this. >> but i would assume that given his -- his election, that he might have some influence in the parliament that could be very helpful. has he made statement about the need to -- statements about the need to help address what's happened to christians? >> well, he was just elected as i was coming over in the car. i haven't seen the statements he's made yet. we will be immediately working with him. and again, all the leaders to get the resources up to the north to the kurds to deal with the humanitarian crisis. >> okay. finally, again, i think this is for you, mr. mcgurk, but ms. slotkin, if you would like to weigh in, please do. one of the things that has not gotten a whole lot of attention but has -- you mentioned it in your testimony, and certainly we've seen it in other places where extremist islam has been in charge, that the plight of iraqi women and girls has borne the brunt of a lot of the

violence as they've advanced through iraq. can you talk about what we can do and what is being done to help address this? >> first, senators, the fact that you're asking the question is number one. we have to put international focus and attention on this problem. in n mosul, the situation with isil goes from bad to worst. they've first gone after the christians, then kurds, and now they're going after women, particularly young women. this is a serious international problem. the governor the iraq, foreign minister of iraq, wrote a letter to the secretary general of the united nations asking for international assistance against this threat to their people. so it is something that we need the entire efforts of the entire world to focus on because frankly the iraqis can't deal withdrawal it on their own. we've to give it international attention and then address it. in my testimony, particularly in mosul, where i was setting up really the capital of the califate, that's what it's trying to do, we have to work with local tribal forces to make

sure they can stand effectively against isil which now, frankly, they can't. and the kurdish forces because mosul is in a pocket in the kurdish region and eventually federal forces to be able to slowly squeeze and take back these areas. this is going to be a long-term effort, but especially for the sake of people living in these areas, we have to give it everything we have. >> and finally, i'm almost out of time, but this may have been asked, and i apologize if you've already answered it. there was a reported in "the new york times" on july 13th that suggested that only about half of iraq's operational units are capable enough for us to advise them. can either of you speak to whether -- without revealing classified information, whether we're concerned about this -- what's the substance of this report being accurate. >> sure. so -- it was mentioned briefly, and i just cautioned against relying solely on a leak in "the

new york times." that the a critical thing that we were looking at in these assessments. they are still on draft. and i think what's accurate is the picture is mixed. i don't know if it's exactly half, but i think that we're finding units where that's a real problems and units where it's it ae it's not a problem. we're trying to process that. what does that mean if certain units we can work with and they're ambitious and want to do things to take back their territory and others aren't the right units for us to be working with, what should our policy number that case? that's complicated, and that's why we're taking our time to think about it. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. >> senator mccain? >> thank you, mr. chairman. miss slotkin, we learn more from "the new york times" and from the "wall street journal" than we do from any briefing that we've ever had with you. i don't agree with you very often, but i certainly do agree with your statement you can't fight something with nothing because that's what we've been doing, nothing.

the situation in iraq was predicted by us and predictable. now we find ourselves in a situation where mr. mcgurk, director of the intelligence, director of the fbi, secretary of homeland security, and attorney general have all stated publicly that the islamic state of iraq and syria or isis or isil pose a direct threat to the united states. do you agree? >> yes. >> you do agree. well, would you agree that iraq and syria are now effectively one conflict, that we can't address isis and n iraq without also addressing it in syria and vice-versa, particularly with reports that we see published reports of equipment that is -- was captured in iraq showing up in syria? >> i think it is one theater. it's a tie gris and euphrates valley theater, yes. >> so you do believe that this

califate, the richest and largest base of terrorism that i know of is both iraq and syria. this enclave? >> that's exactly what it's trying to do. it's trying to establish it. >> have they achieved it pretty well so far? >> since june, the iraq/southeasteiraq/syria border has more or less collapsed. >> that means really then if we're going to take action in iraq, we should also take action in syria. would you agree? >> again, these are all options that are being looked at, senators. >> i'm just wondering if you would agree with that. i'm not asking whether you're examining options or not. >> i think, senators, as i mentioned, in order to really get at this network and learning from the past with al qaeda in iraq, we have to squeeze the entire network, that's the foreign fighter flow, that's denying safe haven in syria and giving iraqis sovereign territory. >> so if we did initiate a -- an

air-to-ground campaign without including syria, they would have a sanctuary in syria. would you agree with that? >> one of the reasons, and again -- i dover my colleague, alissa. but we're focused on training the moderate opposition to have a force that's able to deny safe haven and deny iso networks in syria. >> well, probably so, but -- secretary of defense and chairman of the joint chiefs have both stated publicly that the iraqi security forces are not capable of regaining the territory they've lost to isis on their own without external assistance. do you agree with the secretary of defense and chairman of the joint chiefs? >> the iraqi security forces have moved a little bit out of a -- we had sothis snowballing effect -- >> again, i'm asking if you agree or disagree with the secretary of defense and chairman of the joint chiefs who have stated that iraq security forces are not capable of regaining the territory that they've lost to isis on their

own without external assistance? do you agree or disagree? >> they did not conduct combined arms operations which would not take without some enabling support. >> so since we all rule out boards on the ground, that might mean the use of -- boots on the grounds, that might mean the use of air power as a way of assisting them. would you agree with that? >> senator, i just -- all of these options, potential options for the president, are being looked at. and as alissa said, we're not going to be crowding -- >> how long have we been "looking at them" now, mr. mcgurk? >> sir, the assessments came in last week -- >> so the assessments came in last week. how long have we been assessing? >> i think we assessed for two solid weeks. >> oh, i think it's been longer than that since the collapse of the iraqi military, miss slotkin. >> i think the president made his announcement on june 19th, and then he instructed that

assessors fly to baghdad. they flew there and began assessments immediately. >> i see. and so far we have -- we have launched no air strikes in any part of iraq, right? >> that's correct. >> and you stated before that we didn't have sufficient information to know which targets to hit. is that correct? >> i think we have radically improved our intelligence picture overall -- >> but at the time, in your view, we didn't have sufficient information capability in order to launch air strikes? >> i think that we -- given our extremely deliberate process about launching any air strike, we would -- >> you know, it's interesting, i asked do you think at that time we did not have sufficient information to launch air strikes against isis. >> i think given the standards the united states has for dropping ordinance, we did not have it at that time.

>> i find that interesting because none of the military that i talked to that served there and -- and even those who fly there are absolutely -- they're absolutely convinced, as i convinced, as i am, that when you have convoys moving across the desert in open terrain, you can identify them and strike them. do we know that they were operating out of bases in syria out in the open in the desert. so with those of us who have some military experience and the efficacy of air power, we hardly disagree, and that isn't just me, it comes from military leaders who served there. so, mr. mcgurk, published media reports say this state has a thousand foreign fighters, 3,000 syrian and 3,000 iraq; is that correct? >> that is an estimate we routinely see, yes.

>> and of those foreign fighters, many of them are from european countries. right? >> yes. >> and when returning to their countries, they don't require a visa to come to this country, which is why, as i say, the director of national intelligence, director of the fbi, and the attorney general have all stated that this poses a direct threat to the united states of america. in light of that, do you think so far we've had a proportionate response to that threat? >> i just want to say if that is a direct quote from them, i defer to them on the quote. one thing you have done in your questioning of ms. slotkin, when this started, they had zero missiles in their arsenal. with the center, the iraqis have

deployed those missiles and it made a difference. >> what difference has it made? certainly not in isis areas of iraq that the isis has been able to gain control of. >> it began to blend some of the momentum. >> you didn't really believe they could take baghdad, did you? no one in their right mind would. >> in the initial days of this crisis s crisis, there was a very deep concern that the iraqis could substantiallily weaken and it was a real concern of ours. >> it might have been on your part, but certainly not for those of us who understand iraqi, shiite and sunni. i've overused my time, but i certainly agree with you when you say you can't fight nothing with nothing. you're exactly right. >> thank you, mr. chairman. odds and ends because most of my questions have been asked already by my colleagues, but give me the status of the safety of the american embassy in

baghdad and our con suls in iraq. >> senator, thank you. it's our foremost priority, something we watch every day very closely. that's why we rebalance our security apparatus at the embassy and we brought in substantial department of defense capabilities into the embassy and the airport. our secretary for airport security was there last week and we feel very confident about the protection of our people, and it's something we watch literally every second of every day. our knowledge and understanding of the defense of baghdad in particular is night and day different from where it was just six weeks ago. >> because of the employment of advisers, as you were discussing. >> yes. >> let me ask you this. it ra the iranian influence in iraq, how about iranian expenditures in iraq, whether it's to back up the military and provide training and assistance? what is iran doing in iraq now that's costing them money? >> i don't have a figure on the

expenditures. all i can say is the iraqis, again, they want the u.s. to be the backbone of their military force. that's why they've looked to the fms program to be that backbone. where we've developed relationships with iraqi military officers, even in times of extreme crisis, has proven essential. when i have an example of my testimony, we had to get 500,000 iraqi, and that is a kinder relationship we need to continue to invest. >> you don't have an expenditure figure that iran is spending in iraq, but are they, or is it just more on the political and relationship side. >> they were spending resources. they were particularly concerned about the george and damask is.

>> separately we're having this intense discussion about it rain ya -- the iranian nuclear weapons and we're being told from many quarters that the irani economy is still suffering very greatly. they seem to be deeply in in terms of expenditures in syria and they seem to be in in expenditures in iraq. that tells me they're either incredibly soft, and that is relevant in terms of the negotiations that are under way with respect to the nuclear program. i'll follow that up with others. this is a question that you might not be able to answer on the record, and if so, i'll submit it -- in public i'll submit it for the record. what are the efforts under way by the united states to disrupt isil financing?

>> yeah. sir, i think we should take it off the record, if you don't mind, just in a classified session. i would be happy to provide that to you. >> we have had testimony in these hearings before. some kind of financing i believe can be talked about publicly, they do distortion, they do kidnapping, they go to march chants and pay us x. some are funding but governments who are allies of ourselves, and i would like to know in a classified setting, we will submit a written question, what are we doing to interrupt? could you talk about your recent discussion about the persecution of christians while you were if b -- in baghdad? >> thank you. i went to the home in baghdad to

discuss this directly with him and also to intervene with bishop wardia. it is an extremely suspicious, i just had a service with about 500 worshippers across the city of baghdad in his church. this sunday he had a service in which muslims and christians came together in his church to say, we are all christians. these are all our people to stand against. the refugee with the duft ift t irt, president barzon there can i immediately after that meet g

meeting -- it reveals the threat to the region and to us. >> we should feel deeply since united state feels so deeply. for the first time weekly masses not being celebrated there. that's a pretty significant thing. i have been critical of us, the senate, for slowness in ambassadoris improvements the. am a time in the world that are suffering because of the

persecution of religious persecution of. it is a core value of ours. we have such a good story to tell, that should be with a nam prompt promptly. thank you rkts. gunning the conflict with isis and the iraqi leader ships struggle to taken taken and continu continues. the group continues to control oil field in northeast. it brings in perhaps a million

dollars a day, it is being reported. with the groups am fit into the broader strategy. >> they need the resources so seizure vooi. they need the energy resources that are stored in those tanks in order to keep mosul running. the refinery battle has been going on for a month. there is a unit of iraq's terrorist forces there, people we know and have trained who have been fighting rather h heroically. it is a very desperate struggle, but they believe these resources, too. >> what further steps need to be taken