>> that's calling for speculation on the part of the witness. i just don't know. >> i don't think we're bound by the federal rules of civil -- >> i'm sorry. again, i mean i think intelligence information -- >> the witness will answer the question. >> thank you, urinyour honor. >> you may proceed. >> pardon me could you restate that. >> it's a concern of iran and north korea have cooperated in the past. >> i think there's every incentive between them to cooperate to some aspect of this that's correct. >> you don't think, the rihani regime hasn't changed any of that dynamic that has led to the cooperation in the past? >> not that i'm aware of but one would hope there would be changes. >> a report suggests north

korean energy needs have been met by iran and that iran's desire forea armaments have bee met. what do we know about trends in oil consumption by north korea and if they are stockpiling iranian oil? >> i'm not aware of iran oil to any great extent i will say to north korea. i'm not aware of that. >> switching to russia a little bit. how have increased tensions between russia and west affected russia's relationship with north korea? >> well, russia's relationship with north korea fundamentally changed in 1989/1990 when the soviet union disappeared and the client relationship that existed did you say appeared and so now they have a very, very small economic relationship quite frankly. they have a political relationship. but it's not nearly as important as that between beijing and

pyongyang, between china and north korea. >> so you don't believe that the russians have intensified or accelerated any weapon sales to north korea in recent years? >> i'm not aware of anything significant in that regard, no, sir. >> you know, north korea skirts international sanctions in a lot of different respects. you know, one thing, i believe they are one of the largest suppliers of counterfeit cigarettes in the world believe it or not and counterfeit currency as well. any current administration actions to close these loopholes and more rigidly enforce the sanctions that you would like to expound on for a minute and ten seconds. >> sure. from the standpoint of count counterfeit goods, there was a day it was a booming business. that day has passed. we watch that very closely.

north korea will, obviously, stop at nothing to try to gain resources to use, to develop its weapons program and that's why we concentrate so much energy on nonproliferation not just unilaterally but with our friends and partners. >> thank you mr. chairman. >> the gentleman from georgia is recognized for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. in listening to your testimony i think it's rather interesting, again, with one of the key players with basically the rogueness of north korea and what they are doing in their relationship towards iran should be at least something studied a little bit more and using your words and i may have gotten this just a little bit wrong. but it was something to the effect of study and watching what is going on. that to me -- and i want says something in your testimony, it

says ultimately, mr. chairman, our policy aim is to bring to realization that north korea must take steps necessary to end this isolation. in light of that, what we'll call the desirous goal what many experts contend that administration strategy of strategic patience of wait and see have not yielded anile results but has served north korea by offering more time or affording more time to pursue its own objectives. what's the administration's assessment of its strategy of engagement and strategic patience? >> our assessment is that we've made some progress not nearly enough. we got lot further -- >> what would you say your greatest accomplishment is? >> our greatest accomplishment is in achieving in just the last couple of years two united nations security council resolutions with teeth that had

attached to them resolutions. these were unanimously achieved. china voted for them. russia voted for them. hezbollah, hamas, iran this whole nexus of issues we're doing more than studying and watching this. obviously what we're doing is seeking to disrupt illicit shipments, enforce these sanctions. we're doing it with our partners. we know they naturally would like to deal with each other. we are doing everything we can to prevent that from developing. >> what other things beyond two united nations resolutions which may or may not have the teeth or enforcement some would like to see, beyond that what's the next step. what is the next big accomplishment. what is the next big thing to ensure what you say is your own goals, to encourage north korea to become a model citizen which under the current leadership i'm not even sure it understands the definition of model citizenship.

it's a discussion here to have. what would be the next process? >> we would settle for north korea starting to do what it promised to do a long time ago and has tentatively started to do in past which is to take steps in the direction of denew c -- denuclearizing. eventually the dismantlement in the nuclear weapons program. that's what we've been engaged in for many years and we made progress in particular with china keeping the solidarity of china and rok with us. no daylight between any of the three allies in order to get north korea moving down that path of denuclearization. we're in a pressure phase.

that's what we concentrated a lot of pressure on is putting pressure on north korea so it understands it only has one option and that's the peaceful option of denuclearization. >> i understand that. i discussed with it my very capable staff. but there seems to be at least somewhere along the line for north korea at least some ways around what has been quote put in place for strategic containment and isolation for them because at this point some of that is just not, in fact, if anything there's been actual, i don't want to say regression but not a lot of progress shown. they seem to be happily going about the fact that they are isolated and would like to get back but they want to do so on their own terms. i guess the concern and the good part and you appreciate the chairman having this discussion is just simply the fact of

working with others which is a good thing but somewhere there's a gap in the system. somewhere there's roug nation, others who will have dealings with north korea and not pursue these assets and i think that's where maybe a situation which there's a much bigger stick along with a carrot that can influence this and especially with our south korean partners in this process as well. so, again, i think it's not an easy situation to answer and i appreciate your answer. >> thank you. >> the gentleman yields back. we'll go a second round which will be two of us so should be wrapped up in ten minutes or so and we'll have votes here shortly. i'll begin with myself here. recent recently japan and north korea have re-engaged on japanese nationals being abducted in the '70s and '80s and froze relations in the past number of years. i met with a family whose

daughter was abducted by north korean agents back in 1977 at the age of 13. i met with them a number of times over the years as well as a number of families. it's truly a sad and outrageous story. pyongyang further agreed to investigate the abduction of japanese in return for lifting of some sanction. it's a sad state of affairs you can leverage kidnapped citizens for relief in sanctions. what do you think is the likely outcome of this agreement? what is north korea's motivation for re-opening the investigations and how much advance notice did the administration have before japan and north korea reached their agreement? do you have any concerns about these negotiations considering north korea's long record of deception and deceit? >> well, we stand with japan in

terms of their desire which we completely understand to resolve this humanitarian catastrophe. i met with that family a number of times myself. we understand why not just the government but the people of japan want this resolved and we support their efforts. the japanese have kept us very closely informed as they these limited steps with north korea. and we've indicated to japan and we've said publicly that we're supportive of all of the efforts that japan is undertaking as long as they are undertaking transparent ally and what's ver important for all us is the shared concern of japanese we

have the concern of the north korea nuclear missile threat. we'll watch and supportive of it and see where it heads. north korea is now on the hook. they got to conduct this investigation that they promised the japanese they would conduct so we'll be watching very closely to see what kind of results the north koreans come up with and whether or not it meet the tests that the japanese are imposing on them. >> thank you. also ambassador davies in your prepared statement you said that china is quote north korea's last remaining patron, unquote. considering its budding relationship with russia and illicit networks with countries in the middle east, iran especially, i wonder if that's completely accurate and the recent economic trade deal between russia and north korea

comes as an opportune time for yang yang. provides pyongyang with an economic boost that it needs to counter the sanctions and to counter balance the chinese who have been putting some pressure on them but not nearly enough. for russia this deal undermines u.s. efforts to cut off north korea's financial and economic well being while enhancing its own web of influence vis-a-vis the u.s. for example in the ukrainian crisis. can you tell us what sort of goods russia is providing to north korea, weapons or oil or gas or food or whatever and how is the russian/north korean relationship is being considered in efforts to effectively pressure north korea since russia is also trying to bolster ties with china. is anything being done to counter this trilateral

cooperation between these nations. >> mr. chairman, the russia/north korea relationship is very small in terms of trade and some of the steps that moscow announced were basically recognition of the state of afirst. they announced some debt relief for north korea. nobody in moscow expected they would get that debt repaid to begin with. the trade is measured in a few hundreds of millions of dollars a year. they talked about some new projects that could be of interest. infrastructure projects. these are longer term nunds takings. so farther a bit at the margins. so we stay in touch with the russians. i go out to moscow and talk to them about this problem. we have a shared interest in

denuclear izatio denuclearization. we may have tactical differences that we'll continue to work on. right now i think it's fair to say that the agreement, the level of agreement we have on strategic issues with russia outweighs some of these deals that you're talking about at the margins now. >> thank you very much. my. >> i'm is expired. gentleman from california is recognized. >> thank you. my staff has given me an article from yesterday's paper that says north korea threatens nuclear strikes on the white house. i won't take that seriously other than maybe they are watching some dvds from hollywood as well that are getting smuggled in. i do take seriously that they continue to try to develop longer range missile technology and so forth and as they acquire and develop that technology they

really are a threat to not only our regional partners and allies but then, you know, guam and some of our territories all the way to hawaii that we do have to take very seriously. and that does create a sense of urgency in moving things forward. you know, my colleague from virginia, kind of underscored the challenge here. sanctions with the regime that does not seem to care about what happens to its people are very difficult. and the kim regime is not taking the interest of the north korean people at stake here. so they are the ones that clearly are suffering. so we have a limited tool box here.

just thinking those various jones, your opening testimony was touched upon where china is north korea's last remaining patron. what would happen if china joined us in the sanctions if we're just thinking through and really did cut north korea off? how would north korea respond? >> well, china has said that they support fully united nations sanctions and i talked about some of the signs that the chinese are beginning to take unprecedented action in that direction, signalling to north korea they will pay a price if they don't come around in particular on the nuclear issue. this is why when we talk to the chinese we try to talk about how we can work in concert to bring

pressure on tnorth korea in a surgical way. we're going to keep at that because we think increasingly the core chinese interests in stability on the korean peninsula and our core interest in security that these are converging concerns. and we are seeing signs for the first time in decades that the chinese also recognize this that their stability will be affected unless we can address proactively north korea's pursuit of these weapons. so that's where we're concentrating our energy, and we're saying to the chinese there's more you can do. we respect the fact you'll make decisions about how you do it. but we need to do more. and it's more effective if we can do it together with our partners. >> we're increasingly showing north korea there really is only

one path forward, that is de-escalation, de-nuclearization and becoming a more conventional nation. you know, shifting to a different scenario, again north korea continues to posture with, you know, missiles towards the south korean border and so forth. again not helpful. what would south korea's response be at this juncture, i think south korea has shown incredible restraint given some of north korea's provocation in recent years. if, in fact, there was a misfire accidentally or intentionally that were to land in the south korean city, seoul is not that far away, what have the south koreans indicated their response would be at this juncture. >> the south koreans are increasingly resolved should

there be a provocation on the park of north korea they will respond. in 2010 there were two deadly attacks by north korea on south korea including that resulted in deaths of south korean civilians. so this is what our alliance with south korea is all about. ensuring that together we can present this united airlines front on the peninsula to north korea and they can understand that they can't repeat the aggression that they perpetrated on the south in june of 1950. those days are gone. best path forward is, in fact, the vision that's been laid out by the president of south korea who has talked about a path forward involving peaceful u ff unification. so par pyongyang, north korea has rejected that. >> i want to make sure people in south korea know that as one of our close allies in the region

we do stand with them in the right to defend themselves. >> absolutely. >> to make sure those listening in north korea understand that we stand with the north koreans. >> job one for us. >> thank you very much. gentleman's time has expired. i think that is the end of the questioners this afternoon. we want to greatly thank the panel and for your testimony. members will have five days to revise their statements or submit questions in writing. and if there's no further business to come before the committee we're adjourned. thank you >> thank you.

>> that wraps up this hearing. if you missed any of this we'll show it again later in our program schedule or you can watch it shortly online at c-span.org. a look at the u.s. capitol where both the house and senate are in session today. the senate advance ad supplemental spending bill that includes money for border protection. that vote was 63-33. you can watch the senate live on c-span 2. and the house today is working on several issues including the republican lawsuit against president obama. you can see that live on c-span.

would like your opinion, should the lawsuit against president obama be a priority for the house? you can logon to our facebook page and leave your thoughts. some of the comment, jeff write, only if it comes out of their personal pockets and not my tax dollars. what a waste. meanwhile, jennifer feels differently. saying absolutely. they themselves are complicit if they do nothing. they are bound by their oath of office and need abide by it or be fired. you can keep those comments coming at facebook.com/cspan and we'll continue to try to read some on air. american artifacts on american history tv this weekend our visit to the national security archives at george washington university reveals declassified documents about the gulf coast of tonkin in vietnam. 50 years going congress passed the gulf of tonkin resolution.

american artifacts sunday at 6:00 and 10:00 p.m. eastern and watch more american history tv next week while congress is recess american history tv will be in primetime monday through friday at 8:00 p.m. eastern featuring events from watergate on its 40th anniversary. american history tv on c-span 3. a state department official told congress last week that the situation in iraq is extremely serious and that the militant group isis that's causing the violence is no longer just a terrorist organization but a full army. the comments came during a house -- this hearing will come to order.

this morning we consider the u.s. response to the terrorist takeover in iraq. nearly six months ago, the committee held a hearing. the title of that hearing was al qaeda's resurgence in iraq, a threat to u.s. interests. then the administration testified at that hearing isis had become to shift resources from syria to iraq in early 2013. that it had tripled its suicide attacks in that year and that it planned to challenge the iraqi government for control of western iraq and baghdad. that's what we heard six months ago. the administration testified that it had become aware that isis had established armed camps, staging areas and training ground in iraq's western desert in the summer of 2013 and that isis leader had again threatened to attack the united states of america. the administration told us that isis must be, in their words,

constantly pressured and their safe havens destroyed and that its objective was to ensure that isis could never again gain safe haven in western iraq. however, what the administration did not say was that the iraqi government had been urgently requesting drone strikes since 2013. that there had been the opportunity to use drone strikes on those camps both in eastern syria before they came over the border and to use drone strikes as their units moved across the desert. as you know, drones can hone in and can see what's going on on the ground, can see these units traverse from city to city. these repeated requests, unfortunately, were turned down.

i added my voice for drone strikes as isis convoys raced across those deserts from city to city, and since that last hearing, isis has done over those six months precisely what the administration predicted it would. it has taken over most of western iraq. it has turned its sights on baghdad and it may be preparing to launch attacks against the u.s. but again, no drone strikes against those columns. never has a terrorist organization itself controlled such a large resource-rich safe haven as isis does today. never has a terrorist organization possessed the heavy weaponry, the cash, personnel that isis does today, which includes thousands of western passport holders. the iraqi population is terrorized. they have suffered mass executions and harsh law.

last week the remaining members of the ancient christian community in mosul fled on foot in face of isis demand that they convert or face death. to be clear, isis's takeover has been aided by prime minister maliki's malfeasance and incompetence. maliki has disastrously failed to reconcile with key sunni groups. many, including myself and ranking member engel, urged him to form an inclusive government and this was quite some time ago and on several occasions so that isis could not exploit legitimate sunni grievances. maliki has only proven himself to be a committed sectarian certainly no statesman. it is time for iraqis to move forward in forming a government that serves the interest of all iraqis.

what started as a crisis in syria has become a regional disaster with the global implications including credible threats to terrorism, humanitarian disaster and upward pressure on energy prices in a fragile global economy. meanwhile terrorist forces and the iranian government are gaining power at the expense of friendly governments. of course, only iraqis can control their future. only they can make the decision to replace maliki. and the performance of the battlefield of certain iraqi units was abysmal. that's to be expected when you put your son in charge and replace them with cronies. americans have spent enough blood and treasure in iraq. that's exactly why the administration should have taken the opportunity to inflict

decisive damage on isis from the air, through drone strikes while its fighters were encamped in the desert months ago. this morning we are joined by a senior state department official who has been in baghdad for several weeks and an official from the department of department of defense involved in current assessment of iraqi security forces to learn of the path forward in dealing with this national security emergency. and i'll now turn to our ranking member, mr. engel of new york, for any opening comments he may have. >> mr. chairman, thank you for holding this important hearing about the latest developments in iraq. in recent months a path of violence and chaos has burned across the middle east. the unrest has left thousands of dead in its wake and driven tens of thousands from their homes. a civil war in syria has spilled across the border and now iraq teeters on the brink. since december the islamic state

of iraq has marched across iraq. with lethal efficiency. falluja and mosul has fallen to their control. hundreds of soldiers have been killed or have laid down their weapons and the military equipment they left behind. some supplied by the united states is now in the hands of these fanatics. the border between iraq and syria is gone. isis is advancing towards the jordanian border and isis's leaders have declared to rule with a band of barberism in some of the darkest chapters in human history. isis is a threat to our region and a threat to the united states. we have seen this story before and know how it ends. when russia withdrew from afghanistan in the '80s, that country was allowed to become a no man's land. it has trained recruits and plan attacks on the united states. we can't allow iraq to follow

the same path. to become another safe haven for another september 11th could be launched. how are we going to meet the challenge? we need to use all the tools at our disposal because in the end there's no solution to the problem. we need to see political changes in iraq, more inclusive policies and a greater effort to avoid sectarian conflict. i have real doubts that prime minister maliki can lead iraq into this new era. maliki must go and the sooner the better. i have real concerns about iran's support for the iraqi regime. even if the united states and iran seem to share a mutual concern over isis, i don't see how iranian and american goals can be aligned in the short-term or long-term. i don't think the u.s. should deal with iran in this regard. we also need to bear in mind that this is not solely an iraqi problem. while isis grew out of iraq, isis grew in strength and numbers while fighting in syria.

isis is a regional problem. this is a spillover from the syrian civil war and fighting isis will require a regional solution. the right time to train and equip the moderate syrian opposition was well over a year ago. that's when i introduced the free syria act that would have assisted rebels to fight against both the assad regime and extremist elements of the opposition like isis. i'm glad that a few weeks ago the administration announced its support for a $500 million training program for the moderate syrian opposition, but we waited so long and by now isis has gained so much territory and momentum they are far more difficult to stop than they were a year or two years ago. i cannot help but wonder if we had committed to empowering the moderate syrian opposition last year. would isis have grown as it did? would the opposition have been

able to apply enough pressure to assad to compel him to a diplomatic transition? and by the way, we passed a bill in the house yesterday unanimously slapping sanctions on hezbollah. hezbollah has moved in as a puppet of iran and moved into syria on the side of assad and have helped tip the balance in assad's favor. the hypotheticals and the what-ifs break my heart because even if we do the right thing, it will mean a small consolation to the family in a refugee camp in syria. i support the president's decision to send teams to iraq, but i'm cautious about future action. we can't end up in another quagmire in iraq. i'm grateful to our witnesses for testifying today and for

consulting with congress about our next steps. we must be partners moving forward as we determine what the u.s. role should be in iraq and the congress must play an important role. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, mr. engel. we go to a minute now to the chairman of the middle east and north africa subcommittee. >> thank you so much, mr. chairman. today's hearing is on the terrorist march in iraq. this is not something new or something that caught us unaware. this is the second time this committee has had this witness testifying on the deteriorating situation since february. it's clear that the situation went from worse to just about as bad as it can get and i'm interested in hearing in how the administration has adjusted its policies since then because the three steps that he outlined for us last time pressing the government to develop a holistic policy to isolate extremists,

supporting iraqi security forces through accelerated military systems and information and intelligence sharing and mobilizing the sunni population against isis have all failed to stop isis and the near collapse of iraq. isis continues to advance its cause of an islamic state and christians are being targeted either fleeing, forced to convert or be killed. we have been woefully inadequate in our response to this crisis. the committee has repeatedly called on the administration to do more, to get more engaged and to be decisive because it has been paralyzed by inaction. the threat of isis is very real for iraq and the region and it won't go away by wishing it away. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you. we now go to mr. ted deutsche of florida. ranking member of the middle east and north africa subcommittee.

>> thank you, chairman, for holding today's critical hearing and for the witnesses for appearing today. i know that you just returned from several weeks in iraq. i hope you will be able to provide an update on efforts for political reconciliation. the violence perpetration by isis is terrorizing these nations. according to the u.n., 1,500 people were killed in the month of june in iraq and the news of this weekend's horrific persecution of christians in mosul adds another layer. with financial independence isis answers to no one. having disavowed even al qaeda and it's hard to imagine a terrorist organization being so vile that the vile al qaeda did not want to be associated with it. but as isis continues its march towards baghdad, how confident are we that the shia stronghold can withstand regional attacks? what are the regional players

doing? and what are we doing to ensure the stability of our regional partners? also i hope you'll address what more we can or should do to convince prime minister maliki that isis can't be defeated without some sort of reconciliation process that reverses his attempts. is he willing to do that? will he ever be willing to do that? how does this proceed if he doesn't? and i'll look forward to testimony from both of you and i'll yield back. >> we now go to mr. ted deutsche of texas chairman of the subcommittee. >> he's not the chairman yet. >> thank you, mr. chairman. isis is blitzkrieging across the north of iraq and they have their sights set on baghdad. isis is made up of a bunch of

bad outlaws and a hearing i held on this issue just last week our witnesses were unanimous in the belief that prime minister mahli i can just cannot lead iraq out of this. he needs to go. the sooner, the better. the united states should not strengthen maliki's hand for military assistance. that's not the answer. i want to know what the administration strategic plan is to prevent the advance of isis. mending relations with the saudis would be a good place to start and finally they are still held hostage in iraq. i want to know why we have failed to settle them in third countries including our own while the u.s. has people in liberty have been murdered. i yield back. >> go to brad sherman from california, ranking member. >> we see emerging from beirut

to basra an infer until crescent where militias loyal to ethnic or religious groups are more powerful than governments. where there is warfare, but even when there is peace it's an unstable peace with militias in real control no matter what the map says about nation states. it's a three-way contest between the moderate sunni, shiite alliance and extremist sunni. i believe that the shiite alliance led by iran is the greater threat to the united states. this does not mean that we should not seek to weaken isis. maliki is not a good guy just because we installed him. his approach to governing is as responsible as any other factor for isis's emergence. in the absence of isis pressure, he would not have changed at all. and now we need a new prime minister in iraq.

a distant second best would be some sort of radically changed maliki platform. maliki allows his air space to be used for planes flying to syria from iran carrying weapons and thugs. he's increasingly dependent on iran. we do not want to be his air force. we do not want to see isis expand. we have a tough problem. >> indeed. we're joined this morning by the deputy assistant secretary for iraq and iran and the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs. thank you. prior to his current assignment,

mr. mckirk served as a special adviser to the national security staff and senior adviser to ambassador christopher hill in baghdad. he also served as a lead negotiator and coordinator during bilateral talks with the iraqi government in 2008. since july 2013 alyssa has been performing the duties of the principle deputy undersecretary of defense for policy. previously she worked at the state department on iraq policy and served on the national security council staff as director of iraq. without objection, the witnesses' full prepared statement will be part of the record. members will have five calendar days to submit statements or questions or any extraneous materials they wish to put into the record. and if you would please summarize your remarks, we'll have you testify first. >> thank you, good morning. chairman, ranking member and members of this committee, i want to thank you for inviting

me to discuss the situation in iraq. since they attacked mosul seven weeks ago. let me first review the bidding on why this matters as this committee well knows. isil is al qaeda. it may have changed its name, but it is al qaeda in its doctrine, ambition and increasingly in its threat to u.s. interests. it is worse than al qaeda. should there be any question about the intense, read what their leader, abu bakr al-baghdadi, says. it's important to pay attention to what he says because we can't risk underestimating the reach of this organization. abu bakr al-baghdadi in may 2011 the death of osama bin laden and promised a violent response. training camps are named after osama bin laden. in his audio statements, he issues threats against the united states promising a direct confrontation and in his feud,

that is with zawari, he clearly is seeking to lead the global jihad. they are no longer just a terrorist organization. it's a full blown army seeking to establish a self-governing state through the valley and in what is now syria and iraq. it controls much of eastern syria. in january and february it moved into falluja and on june 10th it moved on mosul. i arrived about 80 kilometers east of mosul and i'll begin there. in meetings with local officials from mosul and with kurdish officials on june 7th we receive early indications that isis was moving and staging forces in western mosul. we immediately asked to receive permission from kurdish leaders to deploy forces in the eastern side of the city, but the government of baghdad did not share the same sense of urgency. and did not approve the deployments.

we stressed that the forces would not arrive in time. on june 9th the situation remained extremely tense and we continued to urge the deployment of additional security forces to protect against an attack from west to east. in the early mornings of june 10th, isis launched a bomb attack across a bridge and poured forces into eastern part of the city. resistance totally collapsed which led to a panic and a snowballing effect through the valley and through several cities. the result was catastrophic. five iraqi divisions nearly dissolved and the approaches to baghdad were under threat. i flew to baghdad first thing that morning with the focus on ensuring that our people were safe and the northern approaches to the northern city of baghdad were bolstered.

my written testimony sets in detail the critical response. we first made certain that our people would be safe including contractors working on bases outside of baghdad who were evacuated with the help of the iraqi air force. at the embassy, we rebalanced staff to manage the crisis and brought in additional department of defense resources to ensure the security of our facilities. in parallel importantly and at worked to urgently improve our intelligence picture throughout western and north central iraq surging surveillance flights to 50 per day, establishing joint operations centers and deploying forces to assess iraqi units particularly around the capital of baghdad. these intelligence and security initiatives were taken with regional diplomacy led by secretary kerry to better focus attention on the serious threat. we finally sought to stabilize the iraqi political process recognizing it took place at the most vulnerable most in the process, following elections that were held in which 14 million iraqis voted but before

the formation avenue government. this process of forming a new government remains extremely challenging but now has some traction. a new speaker of parliament was chosen last week with the support of all major communities in iraq and the iraqis are now proceeding along the constitutional timeline to choose a new president and prime minister. the current situation in iraq remains extremely serious. isil remains in control of mosul and is targeting everybody who disagrees with its twisted call of a seventh century cal fate. -- caliphate. it's also joined in an alliance with militant wing, and with some former groups such as the isis. going forward, the iraqis must seek to split the latter groups and isolate isil from hard core militant groups. the platforms that we have established through the immediate crisis response are now providing additional information to inform the president and our national security team as we develop options to further protect our

interests in iraq. any future decisions in this regard will be made in full consultations with this committee and the congress. any efforts we are to take must be in conjunction with iraqi efforts to isolate isil from the population. this is because what we have a serious very counterterrorism challenge in iraq, iraq has a very serious counter insurgency challenge and the two are linked. based on my last seven weeks on the ground in iraq, there's a clear recognition by iraqis that substantial reforms must be undertaken and undertaken urgently. this will require the formation of a new government together with the restructuring of the security services. the emerging consensus in iraq which we can fully support, is a functioning federalism consistent with iraq's constitution, adaptive to the new realities on the ground and based on the following five principles. first, local citizens must be in the lead in securing local areas.

second, local citizens defending their communities, however, must be provided full state benefits and resources, perhaps modelled along the national guard structure to secure areas. third, the iraqi army should focus on federal functions such as protecting international borders and rarely deploy inside cities. it should provide support for local forces where they confront isil which is able to overmatch tribal forces. fourth, there must be close cooperation between local, regional and national security services to reduce operational space for isil. finally the federal government through a new parliament and cabinet which will be established must work on a package of reforms to address the grievances and ensure adequate resources to security services. these five principles can begin to address many of the core

grievances in the areas of iraq while importantly denying space for isil to operate and protect shia majority and other groups from attacks. restoring stability will require smart integrated, provisional approach led by a new iraqi government with an appropriate level of assistance. i can report that iraqi leaders from all communities have asked for this assistance in implementing such a program and general austin will be in iraq tomorrow to further assess the situation and discuss concrete ways in which our assistance might be effective. this model of a functioning federalism is achievable and is essential if we hope to deny space within the borders of iraq. i look forward to discussing more details and once again i want to thank this committee for allowing me the opportunity to address you here today. >> thank you. alyssa? >> thank you, chairman royce,

ranking member engle, distinguished members of the committee, i appreciate the opportunity to come and talk about the department of defense role particularly. i won't cover too much ground other than to just foot stomp the point that brett has made. point that bret has made. the u.s. does have a vital national security interest in ensuring that iraq or any other country does not become a safe haven for terrorists who could threatened the homeland, citizens, partners or allies. the advance in recent weeks and particularly its ability to continue to establish a safe haven poses a threat to u.s. interests and the greater middle east. we dot know restrict it to the specific geographic boundaries on the map. just to go over the thing that the department of defense is doing. the situation on the ground as bret described is extremely complex and fluid. we are therefore taking a very responsible, deliberate and flexible approach to the crisis.

but i do want to be clear, there will not be an exclusively military solution to the threat posed by isil. iraqis must do the heavy lifting. in the meantime, the department of defense remains postured should the president decide to use military force as part of a broader strategy. our immediate goals as announced on june 19th are, one, to protect u.s. people and property in iraq. two, to gain a better understanding of how we might train, advise and assist the iraqi security forces, should we decide to do so, and number three, to expand or understanding, particularly via intelligence of isil. all three are critical to any future u.s. strategy vis-a-vis iraq. to that end we have done the following things. one as bret mentioned we've added forces to protect our people. the safety of u.s. citizen and personnel throughout iraq are our highest priority.

for extra security for our embassy and at the airport. as described in our war powers notifications, we've sent a fleet antiterrorism security team, we call that a f.a.s.t. team, a crisis response element, and additional military assets and personnel to reinforce security at the diplomatic facilities. the uss mesa verde has ordered into the gulf. its presence including other military air cratchit provides the president additional options to protect american interests in iraq should he choose to use them. as is bret mentioned isr, as part of our ramping up efforts we have significantly surged isr capabilities, 50 sorties ada compared to one a month in previous months. at the request of the government

of iraq f. we have ramped it up as well as our information sharing initiatives with the iraqis. these sorties over iraq provide us a much better understanding of isil operations and disposition and allow us to help the isf counter the isil. we are capable of around the clock coverage of iraq, focusing particularly on isil-controlled territory as well and in and around baghdad. as you know, we have put in nearly 300 additional uss military advisers, who have gone in specifically to assess and evaluate how we might better train, advice and assist the iraqi security forces. these are small teams of special forces, members who are working for evaluate the iraqi security forces, particularly in and around baghdad. they are armed forself defense, but they do not have an

offensive mission. the joint operations have helped to coordinate and support efforts on the ground, give us a better picture of what's happening. one quick word about the assessments. secretary hagel and chairman dempsey received the draft assessment from centcom last week. department leaders are taking a deliberate approach and reviewing this print lengthy assessment. these assessments will inform recommendations to the president. meanwhile, additional assessing work goes on in and around bag gad with respect to the developing situation on the ground. in closing, i want to reiterate we believe we have a vital security interest in ensuring that iraq does not become a permanent safe haven for terrorists who could threaten the u.s. homeland, looking forward to questions to that end.

before going to questions, i would like to represent our newest member s curt clausen. while the newest member of the house, he's not new to international issues as demonstrated business hi fluency in four languages,ed time he has resided in six countries abroad. his previous work as kreismt off of a global manufacturing company and broad understanding of different culture will be an asset we believe in the committee's work to promote freedom and u.s. interests around the world. i would note his appointment brings or committee delegation from the state of florida to seven members, second only to the eight members hailing from the great state of california. in terms of questioning, if we could start with mr. mcgurk, you

testified before the committee in february, you told of isis's plan to take control of iraq and to challenge the iraqi government's control of baghdad. you reported it was the administration's objective to prevent isis from ever having a sanctuary in western iraq again. there were countless other warnings signs. i know that you, as deputy assistant secretary and others in the u.s. government were sounding the alarm. your testimony was absolutely correct. we did see this coming. that makes it more troubling, that the administration didn't do what was necessary necessary to prevent -- and specifically the iraqis asked multiple times for drone air strikes against clearly identifiable i.s.i.s.

targets. someone in our embassy brought this up as well. the agitation was for strikes on terror camps. we know the administration rejected those requests. now, no one likes malaki, but given this i.s.i.s. threat, and given the administration's stated goal of preventing an i.s.i.s. sanctuary in western iraq, why didn't we support at least in this limited way attacks that would have done damage to these columns? or to the encampments? >> let me try to correct the record on a few things. i thank you for the opportunity to testify in february.

i think what i described was when we started to see this problem emerge over the course of last summer. the first aspirin tell and the president's policy is we want to enable local actors to be able to secure their sovereign space as best we can. that was also the desire of the iraqi government. the iraqi government wanted to act on its own with our assistance in enabling functions. we worked through the summer and fall through our own surveillance and also be showing the iraqis how they could use their capability to be able to target some of these sites. they have a platform called a king air, which does persisten, they have a caravan aircraft which can fire missiles, and we are with our information to injury-rig those statements to be quite effective. and they were effective against those camps. the formal question for direct air support did not come in a formal way until may. i was there with general lawson during that visit and a subsequent phone call between the prime minister and the vice president.

but the first principle was to enable the iraqis to deny safe havens and camps within their sovereign space the they of course faced a significant problem across the syrian border, which was increasingly in control of i.s.i.s., as over the last three months of last year anded border increasingly became under threat. the first principle was to enable the iraqis. that was there is the hellfire missiles, and through the persistent isr. ed formal request came in may. >> we already have experience in afghanistan with the fact that when you're dealing with suicide bombers, you know, people who want to martyr themselves in the attack, the one thing on the ground, for example, that afghans are looking for are air

support. traditionally secular militaries run away, and they call in air support. it's been a problem -- i mean, i talked to the italians about this. what do they ask for? drones above that could give air support for their troops in afghanistan. so you've got a situation like this. yes, you've got hellfire missiles, but the iraqis were trying to fire these from retrofitted cessna airplanes. in an environment like that, when you see this coming and you know that airport, psychological for infantry on the ground in this kind of an environment has been such an issue in afghanistan, you know, when you're up against jihadists, why wouldn't we -- it wasn't just that the request was coming from the iraqi government.

as i say, some in the embassy pushed for this. certainly i raised this a number of times. why, when you can monitoring something with the eyes of a drone, can go in and see below it, you know, that you have in the jeep the flag of al qaeda waving and a column moving across the desert, why that asset wouldn't be deployed as these troops are coming out of syria? or why you wouldn't take the encampment, and come in and take out the encampment. i understand this request went all the way up, you know, in the administration and was turned down? i'm trying to get to the bottom of why? >> first i want to answer from my own perspective. the iraqis are very effective

with the hellfires and the camps. >> yeah, but again, this is with a retrofitted cessna airplane. at least this is what i understand from the iraqis, that they were trying to deal with in order to suppress that. can you imagine how effective it would have been with something, you know, a platform twhakt really deliver something more than a hellfire. >> i just want to correct the record. when the formal request for direct air support, that request never went up and has been denied. in fact it's still under active consideration. >> you know, that's like saying, if i could interrupt you. i remember eliot engel making the point three years ago about support for the free syrian army when there were no foreign fighters in syria, and him laying out the argument that foreign fighters were going to come in the absence, if we didn't support the free syrian

army. that's like saying, well, that's stilt under active consideration, yes, but after three years of not effectively getting engaged in a major way, you know, the clock begins to run out and things happen on the ground. that is what's happened with i.s.i.s. we've watched it come into a vacuum over a three-year period, establish itself on the border with iraq, no action being taken against that encampment, no effective support to the free syrian army to do something about it, then we watched it go from city to decide across iraq without it being hit from the air with drones, despite the request that i know were being made. this is the reason for at least on my part concern about the lack of action here. >> last thursday i was in the joint operation and i can say the information we have now on

these networks is night and day from where it was in may when the request from the iraqis first came in. therefore the options that are being developed for the president will be much more concrete and specific than anything we could have had before. there's a significant risk, mr. chairman, of taking any military action without that level of gland lardity, so cle-- granularity. we have a much better picture, to inform the decisionses. any additions would be in the full consultation with this committee and the congressivities right, but i.s.i.s. now has the treasury of the central bank in mosul. they have at that disposal, you know, probably half a billion. >> they put out they got $400 million in the first week or so. we don't think that's particularly true, but they are a self-sustaining organization and flush with resource, cash and equipment, no question. >> i'm out time.

i'll go to mr. engle. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman, and bret and elisa, thank you for your testimony and for your good work. i want to talk about the division of iraq, or keen iraq whole. a the one hand, when you look at some of these borders in the middle east they were done by the colonialists and i have obvious felt why should we be obligated to maintain those borders? iraq is not a real state. it was slapped together. you've got the kurds, you have the shia and the sunni, who really don't want to be part of each other, and so particularly the kurds, who have autonomy now, practically have their own nation, and probably will proclaim it very shortly, so my sympathies would be to say to the kurds, well, why should we suck you back into iraq? you have the right to your own

nation. frankly nobody has ever explained to me why the palestinians are entitled to self-determination, but somehow the kurds are not. i don't know -- i don't think that's fair, quite frankly. other than the, we're told that if the kurds break off, there's practically no way that you could stop the rad cams from dominating what's left of iraq and that the kurds provide some sort of a counterbalance to prevent the radicals from gaining control. i would like to heard from both of you what your views are on keeping iraq intact or not. >> let me address that briefly, and i can turn to my colleague elisa. as as i described with the federalism concept, it's a concept under the iraqi constitution and would be recognize a substantial devil lose of powers. there's a recognition from iraq

from the center out, you will never fully control all these areas, and there's also recognition that locals alone and tribal forces alone cannot defeat isil. they need support and resources from the central state. a functioning federalism concept is really the model that is an emerging consensus within iraq. the kurdish region now shares about 1,000-kilometer border with what is effectively i.s.i. we're in active conversations with the kurds to make sure they are able to manage that problem. they also face a very serious strategic -- geostrategic environment, just giving the geography of the region, but believe me, we are in a very active conversation with the considered stan region about their future in iraq, but significantly it's important to recall that on april 30th 14 million voted on a national election, a 50% turnout?

anbar province, a p 28-member parliament, which has just convened. today was the first session with the new speaker of parliament, a very moderate, pragmatic sunni leader who secured the support of all political blocs. today in the parliament, again its first session, they all stood together, all groups, to denounce the very horrific tragedy inflicted by isil on christians in mosul. the people do not want to divide into three different countries or three different states. there is no easy solution for that. when you game it out, actually the consequences are quite serious. >> mr. mcgurk, it's my feeling -- correct me if i'm wrong -- that the kurds -- the consensus is that they want to separate from iraq. >> there's a lot of kurds -- at the heart of every kurd, they want an independent state. no question. we have to recognize that. we also have to recognize the

kurds are among or closest friends in the region. we have to have a close, close partnership with the kurds, and we do. but there's also a pragmatic elements given the economic realities and other thing in which we want to work closely with the kurds on their future. i think the future within the constitutional structure, the kurds right now are choosing their nominee to be the president of iraq, and we hope to have that sorted out over the coming days. within the constitutional framework and we've had conversations just over the last week when i was in erbil, and with the leadership of the patriotic unity of kurdistan, about their future, how we can work with them and about a future within the constitutional framework. at least in the near term, i think that's the best way to go. >> i just don't feel that it's fair to hold the kurds hostage because we've, unfortunately, screwed up things in iraq and everything is falling to pieces. we're essentially say to the

kurds, you know, you have to be the glue that keeps iraq together, therefore we're going to deny you your aspirations. i'm not sure that's quite fair. m ms. slotkin. >> given the isil threat, the biggest blunt to that threat would be a strong capable government in iraq that's able to exert control and influence to push back on that threat. while i guess it is sort of a -- there is -- there has long been this idea that iraq can split into three pieces, i just ask the question, who is in charge of that western and north-central part of iraq in that model? so while i think, as bret described, there certainly are lots of folks in the kurdish regions who have aspirations of independence, think of what that means in that neighborhood and territory they're left in if you don't have a strong, capable government in baghdad that's ability to blunt those threats.

they have syria, the situation on the southern border right there. they have iran on the other side. that is a tough neighborhood. from a security point of view, the single best blunt frankly to both isil and a strong dominant iranian influence in iraq is a strong capable federal government based in baghdad. >> i was going to ask you about iran, but i see my time is up. let me quickly say that i hope that the united states does not think that it can be lulled into some kind of partnership with iran in iraq. there are some people who feel because or interests may come together, converge, that maybe we should partner with iran. i couldn't disagree more. i think that iran is major -- the lead supporter of terrorism in the world. we plook at what's happening now

with israel and gaza and all the weapons of hamas, which is a terrorist organization provided by iran, and i just think it would be a tragic error if we thought somehow iran was a viable partner in iraq. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you. eliana roh-lentinen. >> in your excellent opening statement, you said we must ensure that isil -- and you w e were -- we all know how that turned out. just a few months later isil took over most of western iraq. how could your assessment have been so far off? how did iraq lose this territory? why didn't we respond to their calls for help? your testimony from february shows there was some serious disconnect within the administration on the reality of

the threat in iraq or we've just been completely failing in addressing it. you stated that the u.s. began to accelerate some of our foreign military assistance programs and information sharing to get a better intelligence picture of iraq last month secretary kerry said nobody expected isil to capture mosul. even if our foreign military assistance had not quite kicked in yet, shouldn't our information and intelligence gathering efforts have been able to get a better assessment? a more accurate assessment of samarra and mosul? and it has been widely reported that while taking care of mosul, isil seized rather large quantities of u.s.-supplied foreign military assistance and made off with nearly half a billion from the local banks in addition to tankses and humvees that were taken, u.s. officials were quick to deny the claims of isil that they captured advanced

weaponry such as blackah helicopters. did they capture any caravan aircraft with advanced weapons platform? did they take any other advanced weaponly like man pads? , u.s. military equipment and hundreds of millions aren't the only items that isil has seized. the iraqi government confirmed that isil took urannium from mosul university. what is the status of that? what could isil use it for? on the christian community, wyche so that they're under siege by these islamist militants, once a vibrant and sizable community now over 1 million christians have been forced to flee their homes and communities or be killed. their homes are being marked by isil and being given an ultimatum to flee, to convert or to be murdered. in february, mr. mcgurk, you

said you were trying to make sure the christian community had the resources to protect itself and we had actually made progress. it's clear that we haven't made any progress. we cannot protect them, so what are we doing now to help protect the few remaining christians and their religious sites and artifacts. as ranks member engle had pointed out we on any level, directly or indirectly, coordinating with iran on or -- or syria over our iraq policy or isil, and does the administration believe that malaki must go? yes or no. thank you, sir. gentlelady. >> let me try to address some of these in order. first, the very good discussion we had in february was focused on anbar province. i will bring you up to speed. at the time fallujah was in control of isil.

fallujah is till? control of isil. i made clear our advice was not to move in, to set a corden that corden remains in place, those it is fairly loose. so far they are holding the provincial capital of irbati. what has changed is a significant attack that took plaps on the strategic border crossing. which proves that isil is a military force. it was a multiple-day assault. >> i think to your written testimony isil also generates $12 million a month through illicit business in mosul. that's a lot of -- quik an economic engine. >> they're self-sustaining. what we had sees is a bit of a mod us avendi, is they were in control at night, but not openly control. that's why the assault into

mosul did catch everybody off-guard. we saw some indications. but we did not envision the assault nor the collapse of the security forces up there. i will say i've had a number of conversations. >> i'm out of time. i apologize. you threw a lot of questions so you could give me some written p responses. i apologize. i'm out of time. we'll go to albio seres. >> thank you, mr. chairman. ms. slotkin i've been here since 2006. i have come to hate the word assess and train. we seem to be assessen and training iraqi soldiers, assessing the situation in iraq, and i think the situation is worse than ever after spending

billions of dollars. we train an army, they fire a shot, they run for the hills. where did we go wrong with this, people? that we put all this money and training, and they can't even defend a section of their own country? i just -- it's mind-boggling to me. now we have the situation where we have i.s.i.s. moving in all sorts of directions. i'm concerned that we have about 2 million refugees in jordan. if we have a situation where they stabilize jordan, the whole area is just a whole mess. what do we do with all that money that we put in to train these people? where are these trained people? i've been here since 2006. it's not just this administration, i'm talking from 2006 on. can you just can you assist me in understanding this? >> let me address the issue of

the training. i think, you know, anyone who has watched the news or been a part of our efforts in iraq was disappointed by what we saw in mosul, and i think the biggest thing we looked at and were surprised by was the dissolving of frankly four iraqi divisions up and around twha area m. areas where they did not fight. in contrast to western iraq, where they were putting up a serious fight. rather than a lack of capability, i think what we believe is that they just lacked either the will or the direction to fight. either -- there was a snowballs effect and out of the fear they stripped off their uniforming and turned or waited from direction from baghdad that did not come, therefore departed. we don't believe that these lacked a basic capability. it's at the end of the day they did not have the will or direction to fight in that part of the area. that is critical for any future

plans we decide to pursue in iraq. we have to understand whether the partner in iraq that we'll be working with has the will, the direction, the capacity to fight, and that's why we have folks on the ground right now trying to figure that out. but i mean, it is not that it's not frustrating. it of course is. >> we spent billions on a group of people who are not willing to fight. >> i don't think we can say that about all the iraqi security forces. we see them attempting to take offensive action in iraq. it's not a blanket statement you can make. as bred said in western iraq -- >> we're talking four divisions. >> four divisions, that's correct. >> mr. mcgurk. the leadership and command in mosul of these units have all been fired. we immediately were in conversation with iraqi and security leaders and recommended a wholesale change in the

command. new commanders have been appointed, commanders we know very well, they're also quite effective. iraqis just in the past month in terms of fighting units, they have suffered almost 1,000 killed in action, and they are holding the line and they are beginning to conduct some very rudimentary offensive operations to clear some highways. i will not underestimate the extreme challenge here, but what we saw in mosul was not indicative of the force as a whole. we are finding that the units, many of them, are balanced -- there's about an average -- i was just on the phone with our folks out there today the composition of the force is about 55% shia, about 23% sunni, and what we have found within the unit themselves there's no fracturing among sectarians lines. there are incompetent, incapable units with poor leadership. we found those, but we have found extremely capable, extremely proficient, and

extremely dedicated units. it's in our interests, i believe, to invest in those units. we should not write owl what happened in mosul, because that would not be an accurate response to the overall situation, nor i think would that be in our long-term interests. can you talk a bit about the direction going towards jordan, and what are we doing to -- to offset that? ? >> so obviously particularly the news a couple weeks ago about isil taking ground near the jordanian border was -- we all looked at that very closely, particularly the jordanians. i think what's important to ver is the jordanians are a very solid, capable force that is laser-focused on this issue. they have moved troops to the border in order for reinforce their side of the border, and then the united states has a robust relationship with jordan that is only strengthened, frankly, in the way of

everything that's gone on in syria. so there's quite a significant amount of interaction on a daily basis with the majorityians, but we obviously watch that with keen interesting. >> i'm sorry i ran out of the time, but i wanted to ask you about camp liberty. chairman, thank you very much. >> we'll let the witness respond to your question. >> can you talk a bit about iranian use in this situation to attack camp liberty? >> it remains our goals to be all the members and residents of camp liberty out of iraq. we are working on that extremely hard. we have some leads with other countries, and third countries. we also are going to do all that we can to make sure they remain safe. i can assure you in all my conversations with iraqi leaders, i raised the issue of camp liberty, making sure the

residents remain safe. >> thank you for your courtesy, mr. chairman. we go to crist smith of new jersey. >> thank you very much mr. chairman, for calling this very important hearing. let me ask you, if i could, some experts argue that at least 10,000 u.s. counterterrorism forces should have remained in iraq, but the president and m l malaki both those otherwise. in retrospect, did that contribute in any way to isil's emergence and current situation on the ground as it exists today? secretary mcgurk, you said a formal request was received in may. wsh think informal requests from other avenues, including from the iraqi ambassador made to the u.s. before that? how do you define formal request?

if certain individuals are asking for help, what modality needs to be employed to say, they've actually asked. al baghdadi as we know, was in the united states custody and was released. when he was released, he told the american guards who were from new york, so perhaps that what he meant or could have had the double meaning of we'll come get you 9/11-like, he said i'll see you in new york. he has emerged as the leader of i.s.i.s., and, you know, obviously has posed an enormous threat to life and liberty of iraqis, to christians, perhaps even to the united states. my question is, especially in light of what has happened with guantanamo, where as a result of the 2012 intelligence act, it was required for the administration to tell us how many of those who were release fred gitmo went back into

battle. and the report suggested that of the 614 that were released, 104 were confirmed to go back into the battle against americans and our allies. 74 probably went back, but they couldn't confirm it. for a total of 178, which is a huge number of potential american and allies' death to service members, and we had them in custody. so, the question there, with regards to back article al baghdadi, did we in any way see this coming? why was he released to be allowed to go and form i.s.i.s. and do the terrible things they are doing is a? >> on the -- i'm not playing with words on formal or informal request. the conversation kind of goes like this, you'll sometimes hear from an iraqi officials, they want direct air strikes, you

that you can about this is what that would means access to your airspace, and then it's wait, let's find out a way to do it on our own. that's why we worked with the caravans and hellfires, the formal direction, access to airspace, direct to the u.s., came in may, very unequivocal. that came in may. i do not have the information on release of baghdadi, but i can obviously get back to you on that. again, in terms of 2011, i can just speak from my owns experience, i was out of government, i came into the process extremely late. we had a legal requirement that s.o.f.a. would have to go through the entire iraqi parliament. i can report from my own experience, that none of the political blocs in the parliament were going to support that request given our own requirements, so therefore it was just not possible for us to stay. the rise of aqi, as i think i testified in my last hearing

here, it really regenerated in syria, and on the battlefieldses of syria. that's where we saw the massive regeneration, massive influx of foreign fighters, then started to see it come back into iraq over the course of last spring and summer. that was really what led to the regeneration of al qaeda in iraq, which we now know as isil. >> if you could get back on al baghdadi, i would appreciate that. the requests started coming in in august of 2013 for assistance. is that true? >> yes, for enhanced assistance, in terms of sharing information, in terms of enabling some of their units, yes. >> did we respond to it. >> we responded immediately, we set up intelligence fusion sharing centers. we helped them with the hellfire missiles, precision strikes. we helped them in terms of training forces on the ground. >> because i'm almost out of time, are there items or

requests that went unfulfilled? >> again, other than this most recent question in may, in fact in january we got a list of things they wanted. we have fulfilled every piece of that list. i can an in writing a very detailed response. >> if you could, i would appreciate that very much. thank you, mr. chairman. mr. ted deutsche of florida. subsubmitee chairman of middle east and north africa. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i'd like to talk about our regional partners. it's a really simple question. we talk a lot about jordan and the threats that jordan faces, and ms. slotkin spoke about that, and the chairman and i were there recently, and we appreciate that.

i would like to talk about our renal seasonal partners in the gulf. the question is -- who is concerned? what are they doing about it? and who is concerned, but maybe not helping or maybe even making more things difficult? >> i can just say the conversation has shifted over the last 18 months from -- there used to be a conversation when you would talk about this rise of extreme virulent al qaedatime groups that in a second warrick -- i this is the conversation is obviously these things would have to be done in parallel. there's a renewed focus. second tear kerry when in iraq last month immediately went to paris and held a meeting with the former ministers of jordan, and then went on to riyadh. we found a really new emphasis,

a new colessens in terms of how we have to go about this threat of isil. they took a small town that haz a route. certainly, certainly as are the jarredenians, and we work with them every single day. the cooperation we've had in terms of iraq and trying to think about how to squeeze isil, is at a new level now than it was, i think even six to eight weeks ago. i'll just add that the folks have added into iraq have come from the centcom region and we are in regular consultation with all of the gulf countries, particular those who host our troops, and of course saudi arabia i've seen has pledged

significant amounts of humanitarian aid for the situation in iraq. so i do think people are aware of it, and i think the thing that is critical going forward on all of they questions is were going to need a regional approach to this problem. isil threat is like air in a balloon, if you squeeze one part all the air gods to one side, and then you squeeze that side. so we need 5u89 partners in the region to play a role in countering this threat. >> can i just follow up? >> the qataris are aware of it. can we talk more, particularly frankly in light of -- and ms. slotkin, i'll direct this to you, in light of a very large

arms deal that was announced with much fanfare, tell me what more the qataris are doing other tan being aware of isil? >> i know that secretary kerry has had a significant amount of phone conversations with all of the gulf allies on how to get more engaged. i think the -- you know, i don't think other than remaining in close contact with them that there's anything that anyone is doing right now, because we're still trying to get a handle on the threat and what to do about it in a coordinated way. >> are there any funds coming from qatar or any of the other countries to support isil or any of the other groups in the region? >> i've been asked this question a couple times. to our knowledge right now, and again the intelligence community is assessing that no states, regional states are sponsoring --

>> that's not what i asked. >> i can't speak in this form with groups to this countries, but the states are not supporting isil. >> i yield back, mr. chairman. >> thank you, to mr. dana rohrbach. >> thank you very much. malaki hasn't done a good job, has he? he hasn't done a good job, has he? he's made things worse, hasn't he? >> we have serious concerns about the effectives in of the governor of iraq. i would add we had an election on april 30th. they're now establishing a new government and whether or not the prime minister can achieve a third term is something that remains in question. >> so we have not, however officially suggested that he

leave? or have we unofficially suggested to him that it might be time for him to visit some of his money in dubai? >> let me also just back up, in fairness to the governor of iraq, you know, they also face a tremendously difficult situation. the 30 days before they had an election in iraq, there were 53 suicide bombers in iraq, blowing up mosques, marketplaces, parades, fairgrounds, playgrounds. any country facing that level of violence, and that is all from isi will. is going to face extreme difficult, because isil is trying to tear apartment the political fabric of the country. >> i will accept we cannot just blame malaki himself, but he has not provided the leadership that would be necessary to overcome what could be an inherent problem is having a country called iraq made up of that

territory and those peoples that now compose that territory. that territory was devised and put together by european imperialists who decided that would be what the country of iraq would look like. let me just say that, as far as i am concerned, the united states should not be having to limit itself and limit what solutions we can possibly have based on what the british empire determined 100 years ago. with that said, i would hope that we would be open to situations like having an actual kurdistan exist, maybe a fallujah as well. there used to be a country named

baluchistan and the british decided to split that up. the kurds have always deserved to have their own national identity. until we do, i happened to believe that no kind of leadership that we could put into place in iraq is going to be successful. maybe it's too much, even if malaki was the best, it might not be enough, because that may be an ungovernable creation that our british friends gave us as a present when they exited as world leader. when you want that we are watching very closely what's going on with the m.e.k. and camp liberty, it's not enough. it's not enough. last time we were watching very closely and hundreds of those people have been murdered, we're talking over the years where we

watched and the iraqi army went in and murdered those people and we're looking for someone to take them. why aren't we decides to take them? they are vulnerable. they are people who we have had to deal with is it our government -- i know i have a resolution, mr. chairman, suggesting that we take these people in. they're going to be murdered otherwise. so why are we just watching? are we not -- why aren't we moving beyond that and moving them out? >> we're working, as our senior rho resettlement, he's working to find, again, more third-country settlement options. one particular lead we are hoping, a country that has already taken a significant number will take more, perhaps a substantial amount more. we are working, and i would be

happy to follow up with a more detailed briefing on where that stands. >> i would be very appreciative if you could follow up, but also let me, mr. chairman further state. we maid a deal with them, they have provided us very important intelligence information and activities over the years. if other countries will not permit them to come in, it might be in our moral interests as well as interests of having other people trust us in the future just to take them into the united states as refugees and if there's any group of people in the world that are at risk and refugees, it would be these folks in camp liberty. thank you very much, mr. chairman. thank you mr. rohrabacher. we go to mr. david sis lynni of

rhode island. i want to begin by welcoming a colleague from across the pond, a member of parliament from great britain, who is here today. welcome. he's part of our program of shadowing members of congress, and we welcome you. thank you to the witnesses for your testimony. i want to say first, like most americans, i am very concerned about the unfolding situation in iraq and the rapid advance of i.s.i.s. is incredibly sdeshing particularly following the lost of mower than 4,000 american lives during "operation iraqi freedom." we also need to remain mindful of the sacrifices of our brave men and women, but the dangers that surround any further military involvement. it was reported recently that a classified military assessment of iraqi forces showed deep infiltration by sunni extremist

informant and forces remained dependent on -- this poses i believe a very significant risk to military personnel advising iraqi security forces. the situation in iraq is a problem that requires a political solution. in june, secretary of state john kerry said the formation of a new government in iraq that is inclusive of all parties in stakeholders is an requisite. secretary kerry said it would be an act of great responsibility to order offense i have been action without a stable government. so two questions, in light of that context, first, to you, mr. secretary, you spoke about this functioning federalism, which i think has significant appeal. my question is, what is your assessment of the capacity of the iraqis to proceed with that sort of model? the willingness to proceed, particularly since it involving the devil lose of power, and what are the first, kind of key

first steps we should be looking for or supporting for that to go forward? second secondly would you comment on the humanitarian situation? we're hearing reports of -- horrific sanitary conditions, and more than 1.2 million iraqis being displaced. are international organization or the iraqi government working effectively to mitigate these conditions? and if you could talk about the current humanitarian situation. >> first, let me address the humanitarian situation. it also gets to congressman deutsche's question on the saudis. i forgot to mention one thing. the saudis put $500 million into the organizations managing the humanitarian response in iraq. we work closely with that organization. that contribution was welcome and essential. so it's a point that we have some coalescence in the region.

i request get you the constituents. i don't want to take too much of your question time. in terms of the willingness of a functioning federalism, it's all within the iraqi constitution, pretty much spelled out, so i think there is a growing recognition that a model like this, both is appealing, because it conforming with the new realities on the ground. local actors, tribal actors will not be able to defeat isil on their own. i have examples of that where some tribes have ridsen up to fight, and isil has responded with tremendous and brutal force. they are killing sunni wherever they go, wherever sunnis disagree. when a speech was given a, because isil killed all the moderate clerics before isil moved in. they need support to grow their

own security forces, they want to be in control, and there's a recognition from the center that the army cannot be reconstituted to take control, so i have to have a cooperative federalism model. it's something that we can fully support and i think help enable. the iraqis are working to reconstitute the units that dissolve in june and training about 10,000 of those soldiers who either fled from their posts or significantly one third of those soldiers with on their r & rs during that time and most have come back. they're working to retrain them, again something that we can help with, but everybody recognizes you cannot recon attitude the structure on the structure pre-mosul. it has to be smarter and more adaptive to realities. because it's within the constitutional framework, this can be a fairly brought consensus for that model. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i yield back. >> we go to mr. steve shab bot, chairman of the asia

subcommittee. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you for holding this very important hearing. we appreciate or panelists being here today. there's quite quite frankly a great deal of skepticism in on you the administration has overseen the unraveling of iraq. i think we're all aware that the president was anxious, desperate to reduce our involvement in iraq. he had made promises about doing just that, and there was, i think kind of a scramble for the door there from the very start. i've been to iraq a number of times. i chaired the middle east subcommittee in the previous congress, and i think we've known -- i mean, it was always the plan, always assumed that we were going to have a military -- a u.s. military presence there following the war, and it was

for a number of reasons, principally to secure the gains that had been made at such a high cost of american blood and treasure, and of course we know that there was a failure to reach an agreement on the status of our forces afterwards. there's a lot of debate on how much of an effort was actually made in securing that agreement, but whatever the case is, there was a failure to secure it, and virtually all u.s. troops were pulled out. many of us, some who are no longer in congress, some who are still here, some on this committee, some not, many of us predicted not exactly what would happen, but pretty much what would happen and the unraveling and the chaos, and the tumultuous situation we see in iraq now was predicted by so many people. and i would just like -- my first question would be, what

difference would a u.s. military presence there have made? and how much confidence can we have in the very administration that made that decision to pull all u.s. troops out, who is now making the decisions to salvage what's left of iraq at this time? mr. mcgurk? or ms. slotkin. >> sure, i'll take a first stab at it. i do think it's important again to review the history. both bret and i worked on the original 2008 s.o.f.a. with iraq which did say by the end of 2011 we would be out of iraq, so that timetable was set back in 2008. i know there was quite a bit of discussion and debate about what should happen at the time in 2011 about a follow-on agreement, but i really do thing the point that bret made is critical. the iraqi leaders could not get it through their parliament, unlike what we have in

afghanistan today, we have iraqi leaders at that time saying i don't think it's necessary and we don't want you in. they weren't inviting us in, they're a sovereign country, so we made a decision to cease negotiations, because we didn't have will on the other side. that's a critical factor. >> it's certainly a factor, but the united states is a pretty substantial country on the globe, and we have a lot of involvement there, and our officials were meeting with their officials, and there are relationships. yes, they certainly had to agree with it, but the effort that was made and ultimately the decision to pull all the troops out, i mean, it's just mind-boggling to think, looking back, where we are now and how different things probably would have looked had we done something different. i have only one minute left, so let me shift gears. what's happening with the christians especially. i know there's persecution going on with lots of other people

besides christians, but this convert or die mentality that's now in action where isil is in control, there's something -- you will over almost 2,000 years ago and the roman persecutions, these were decisions made back then. in the modern word that people are faced with those decisions? i would just urge the administration to work with any resources we have available to us to push back on that with every fiber that we have as a nation. if you want to comment on that, i would welcome in. >> i would say, congressman, i agree 100%. in my just last week, i saw beneficiary hop orda in erbil, and saw the patriarch in baghdad discussing this very question. the christian enclaves in northern iraq, they are looking

for resources to provide local security and control. they're in areas controlled by the kurds. we have discussed this with the kurdish regional government how to incorporate individuals from these areas we can incorporate this with regionals to incorporate that this like police force to provide security on the streets and that's something that we're discussing. but this has the attention of the united nation's security council and the attention of the entire world. as i said the entire iraqi parliament, the first real session they had, all stood in solidarity with the christians in iraq. this is something that both reveals the true nature of who isil is. not a tribe aal uprising. it's a vicious terrorist ch organization with ideology that nobody accepts and it has to be uprooted and defeated. i agree with your commented and i'll follow-up where you more specifically on the christian question. >> thank you, mr. chairman, my time has expired. >> mr. brad sherman, ranking

member of the terrorism committee. >> when we conquered germany and japan after world war ii we were not embarrassed to be occupying those countries. we stayed as long as we needed to stay. we wrote the constitution for japan. and we very slowly turned over power to the right people. in afghanistan, and especially in iraq, we were so em -- we were embarrassed to be there. defensive as to whether we were somehow imperialists and we were so anxious to turn over the government that we have maliki and karzai, neither of which would sign the status of forces agreement with us. just to illustrate one of their many faults. "the new york times" reported on the front page that the iraqi security forces are so deeply

infiltrated by either sunni extremists informants or shy united stat shiite personnel backed by raern that this is a risk to their safety. is that accurate? >> i want to caution that the report is draft classified and that represents a leak of information from someone who seems to know something about it but not clearly to have read the full report. >> put aside the exact phraseology. how dangerous in unclassified situation here, how dangerous is it for american service personnel to be advising iraqi units. >> that's exactly what we went over there to try to assess. those are draft -- they're classified and i'm not able to get into the details right now. it was a threat when we were there with 170 now, troop,000 t

the inside threat is always a threat and we have to work if we thought it was an overwhelming threat. >> the idea that we should bomb isis how important is it that we have reliable round spotters to make sure we're bombing the right folks and not bombing civilians? can we run a bombing campaign without anybody we trust on the ground? >> i mean, the united states does not indiscriminately bomb targets. we have a rigorous procedure to have verification. >> do we need humans on the ground for the procedure to woork effective uly. >> it is significantly better if we have reliable folks on the ground. >> do the iraqis have the technical expertise to be those spotters? do they have good peopling that tell us where to bomb and what to bomb is this. >> there are some very capable iraqi units that would be capable of doing that. >> if the "new york times"

report is correct, however, they may deliberately give us the wrong coordinates because it may meet the political needs of the political shiite extremists that we bomb civilians. so we don't know unless we know the technical competence and the political objectives with whether we can rely on those spotters? does maliki have to go? >> again, there's a ongoing process to form a new government. maliki party's won about 91 seats. you have to have 165 seats to form a government so it remains to be seen whether or noting that happen. i would also add were we to take a position on such a thing, it

would obviously not be either in our interests or dramatically ain effect the process. this is a uniquely iraqi process where iraqi political dynamics and the outcome will reflect that process. the new speak of the parliament is somebody nobody would have picked. he came out of nowhere and built a coalition and did the politicking and built a broad coalition between the sunni, shiites and kurds and everybody. >> has malwhich announced patchy fogs that would seriously entice sunnis and kurds to believe that they would get a fair shake under a third term formal i can? has he publicly announced a platform that has serious -- makes serious concessions to those other two communities? >> he has a platform that has all those principles in it. it's difficult after eight years given the bad blood that's

developed and the mistrust, which makes it very difficult. a lot of his platform. >> he has so the great plat tuesdays in his platform that nobody believes? i yield back. >> we go now to mr. jeff duncan, of south carolina. >> thank you, mr. chairman and thanks for this very informative hearing. in your written testimony you commented about the state of u.s. intelligence. in advance of the following mosul and this most recent isis offensive, you said, quote, in the earliest days we had to acknowledge that we were operating in a fog, end quote. you also said, intelligence collection after the fact is improved. that i'm troubled by the fact that we're -- that we were operating in the fog in the first place because in february you testified here and you told us exactly what isi. wanted to do. take yol of western iraq. challenge the iraqi government and control baghdad and ferment the sectarian conflict. for most of the past year isis

has been in control of mosul. plenty of clear signs that isis was a rising threat for the last two years. we've had eyes watching what was going on in syria and surely, watching the iraqi and jordanian borders. so knowing all this, and knowing all that we did of what you testified in february, why aren't we doing for to collect intelligence all along? please help us understand what led to this decision not to have robust intelligence collection efforts against this terrorist group? >> well, as i testified, we began to move assets into the theater. my testimony was speaking to is the immediate crisis response and the immediate days after mosul it was fog and rumor and friction and chance as you get into these circumstances and what i was trying to get at in testimony is that it was very difficult for us to know specifically what was happening

and it was very difficult for us to know the extent of mosul's advance south whard down to the s tigris river valuely which is why in the early hours of this crisis the decision wraus made to significantlily surge the u.s. air assets over -- including manned aircraft and that was something the iraqis also welcomed and response to an earlier question, i want to say the iraqis, despite what may have happened in 2011, since this crisis, we've been embraced. our presence has been embraced from top to bottom and they're actively seeking our assistance. over the iraqi -- u.s. military assets in the skies of iraqi was extremely controversial as late as last fall. right now they welcome us there and they want us there and it's a very different situation than it was even when i was here testifying in february in terms of the iraqi appetite for our direct support.

>> here's the thing. folks in south carolina and folks i talk to all over the country are concerned of what's going on in iraqi because we lost so many men and women there. not only lost in the loss of lives but lost in their ability to be productive citizens and being -- whether it's ptsd or whether it's an actual physical injure, why did we lose those men and women and turn around and lose control over an area and we can watch and tell the heat signature, the plume, what rocket launcher it came from and would it shot down a plane in ukrained but we spent a lot of money and time in iraq and we're in a fog? we're blind? i find that hard to believe with so much going on. with what was going on in syria and what isis was doing. how many columns of vehicle headed towards mosul, how did we miss that? that's a rhetorical question. i don't expect you to answer.

but i think it is an important. i think americans are going -- how did we miss this and why did we spend so much money and loss of life in iraq to see what's going on now? why can't we do more? and i noticed in your statement that you said we set up the joc and baghdad. and i'm glad we have. i wonder why it wasn't set up sooner? you said, i think, six weeks ago, it was set up. this thing has been going on for a while so why didn't we work with the iraqis to try to afford that? i'm concerned about our friends in the kurdish region. i'm concerned that they're going to get surrounded. we didn't lose a single american life in the kurdish region during the iraq war because they're friendly. so i want to ask this. about the kurdish region. what's the administration's position on kurdish oil sports and what actions are exports and what action we're advising american energy compans