and secondly, i have examined thousands of homicide records in the police department, and many of those cases it's clear that there may have been a domestic violence incident. maybe someone would have gotten hurt, but no one would have died if there wasn't a gun accessible, way too handy, already there. oftentimes not a gun that anybody went out and bought the day before. although, that does happen too. but a gun that's been in that home, that the perpetrator of domestic violence has owned for years and it was easy to get at, it was all too available in a moment of extreme anger, and therefore someone died where they wouldn't have otherwise. so those are the two things that i see. >> sheriff, you talked about the environment of tension and high

emotion in a domestic violence scene. if it is dangerous even to a trained, armed law enforcement officer, what does that say about that environment for the victim? >> naturally, i think we talked about the sheer violence of domestic violence calls. the numbers are real. the law enforcement officers that are murdered each year responding to these types of calls, they're inherently dangerous. and you're correct. we are armed and trained to handle situations, but we're knowingly stepping into situations where a firearm is present, the increasing likelihood of someone losing their lives is that much greater. >> and how would you respond that adding another firearm into the mix by arming the victim would make this a safer

situation for either the victim or your officers? >> suggesting that the victim should arm themselves? >> yeah. >> well, you know, i shared with you a story a couple hours from racine county where a victim's gun was removed from her by the abuser, and she was murdered with her own weapon. my experience -- let me give you a little bit of history on racine county. my jailhouses about 876 prisoners. each year we book in 10,000 citizens on average. 10,000. of those 10,000, about 10% to 12% are domestic violence related arrests. every one of those arrests leave behind victims. typically women, typically children. every one of those calls we speak to those victims naturally. we get their statements. i was a detective for ten years. i have interviewed countless victims of domestic violence. never once have i heard a victim tell me that, where's the nearest gun shop? let me arm myself because i need to do this. they look towards the system. they look to law enforcement to do our job and to keep them safe. >> dr. malcolm, you're a

professor of constitutional law, are you not? >> yes. >> let me ask you two questions of constitutional law. the first is, does making sure that people who are lawfully required to have background checks actually get a background check offend any constitutional principle that you can define? >> no. but i think what the questions on background checks can be very intrusive. >> i'm just asking to the extent that they're lawful as they are, then having it be enforced, that's no constitutional problem there. >> right. >> second question is, where existing domestic violence laws otherwise restrict gun possession by a stalker or an abuser, does the difference

between a co-habiting victim and a noncohabiting victim raise any constitutional issues? >> no. >> okay. >> can i add something? >> well, my time is up. so let me turn to senator durbin. >> mr. daniel, i'm sorry i wasn't here to hear your testimony, but i've read it carefully, and i thank you again for being here to tell the tragic story of your sister. and from what i've gleaned from your testimony, the key element here was that her former husband had access to a gun over the internet where he was not subject to any kind of background check. had he been subject to one, he might have been caught and stopped from purchasing the weapon. >> had he gone to a federal licensed dealer, he would have definitely been denied access

because his record was entered already as an abuser. >> you probably said this for the record, but it bears repeating if you have not. as a person who owns guns, a member of the nra, as you said, conservative by nature, are you worried, offended, or have any concerns over a requirement in the law that would close the gun show loophole and would, in fact, require that we inquire of all purchasers whether they are, in fact, prohibited from purchase because of a conviction, of a felony, or because of a state of mental instability? >> none whatsoever, senator. i believe most of gun owners would agree with me that there should be a background check done on all gun sales regardless. >> mr. daniel, i'm from down state illinois. owning guns is part of growing up and part of most families, and they would agree with you.

>> most of my friends are hunters, nra members, and we often speak of this. and i haven't had a person yet say, no, why do you want to do this? it just -- to me, it's common sense that as a gun owner, i certainly do not want guns to fall into the hand of criminals or abusers. because it makes the rest of us look bad. >> professor malcolm, do you believe victims of domestic abuse are safer if their abusers are permitted to carry guns while they're the subject of temporary restraining orders? you have to turn your microphone on. >> sorry. i think to know that person actually is an abuser, he's entitled -- i'm assuming it's a he -- he's entitled to have a hearing first before his gun or any other weapon is taken away. >> doesn't the issuance of a temporary restraining order suggest in most cases a hearing? >> it does, but not in these

bills. they get -- they are able to accuse the person, their guns or weapons are taken away, then they have the hearing. >> but in these bills, we're talking about convicted stalkers, convicted domestic violence perpetrators, and those who are subject in the blumenthal bill to a temporary restraining order. in each of those cases, aren't we talking about a court hearing before that determination? >> we have been in the past. i think that this law would change it so that the -- in order to protect the woman, there is this opportunity to make the allegation that guns get taken away then they have the hearing. >> there's no question that there can be ex parte hearings because in some instances, the person who's subject to the order won't appear. that's a reality. i've been through that many years ago when i practiced law. so are we in a situation now where a woman terrorized by a boyfriend or former spouse is at his mercy as long as he refuses

to come to court by your analysis? >> no, i think once you agree to hold the hearing, if he doesn't show up, then that at least you've given him the opportunity to be heard. i think that provides a fair chance for the evidence to come out on both sides. that's a concern. >> once the temporary restraining order is issued to protect the woman, we're using a case of a woman here, to protect the woman from the stalker, the abuser, the person who's perpetrating domestic violence, once that's issued, do you still quarrel with the notion that we should at that point take the gun away from that person? >> no, i think that once there's been, you know, a fair hearing and evidence has been presented, then if this person does seem to be really posing a threat, i think that's fair. >> i'd like to ask dr. campbell what you think about this argument of the course of

hearings and such while we're dealing with perhaps a woman who has been terrorized or has evidence of abuse to present to the court. >> in order to obtain a temporary order of protection or an emergency order they're sometimes called in some states, there is a hearing. a judge has to issue that temporary order. the permanent or long-term orders are -- there's a fuller hearing, and that's when perpetrators have the opportunity to appear. >> i've been through this. anyone who's had a domestic practice has gotten the phone call. you know, i'm scared of this guy. it doesn't happen often, thank goodness. it wasn't in my practice. but it does happen. the first instinct of a lawyer, the first instinct of most persons, protect the person who's being threatened. argue it out in court later on.

but first, protect the person who's being threatened, the children who are being threatened. i think that's the premise of this whole discussion. >> right. and a judge does have to issue that. a judge, like we've heard here, who is concerned with a level playing field in issuing that order. so wants to hear evidence before that temporary order is issued. >> mr. chairman, i want to thank you for this hearing. and senator klobuchar for sponsoring this important bill, which i certainly support in its entirety. it is sad to comment in this day and age that this is one of the few hearings on the subject and that it's been over a year since we have seriously debated this matter on the floor of the united states senate. while gun violence perpetrated by criminals, facilitated by straw purchasers, sadly, the result of a system which doesn't protect victims like mothers, women, and children continues.

thank you for calling our attention to it today. i hope it'll inspire us to do something. >> well, you, senator durbin, have been a leading advocate in the senate in this area for a very long time. your home state of illinois was extraordinarily ably represented on the panel by mr. daniel. so illinois shines today in this hearing. i'll turn now to senator klobuchar. we're going to have a second round of questioning, and then we have to break up before 1:00. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. dr. malcolm, i know you wanted to follow up on something senator whitehouse was focusing on as time ran off. i wanted to get at this issue. maybe this is what it's about. i'm supportive and a co-sponsor of senator blumenthal's bill. i think ots a good idea on the temporary restraining order. let's put that aside for right now and talk about permanent restraining orders that are in the law, the federal law right

now. if you get a permanent restraining order and can't get a gun, do you support that? >> yes, i do. >> okay. great. and if you would extend that to dating partners -- see, this is what i want to get at this issue that justice mccaffery and the sheriff did here. which is what my bill does. it's a big part of my bill extending that definition of people who get the restraining orders or get a conviction to be victims who are dating partners. do you support that piece? >> i think after there's a full hearing so that all the evidence comes out. >> there will be by its nature there's a full hearing when you get a permanent restraining order. >> then i think that's fair. i don't think it should be retroactive to everybody who's ever been convicted in the past or accepted a guilty plea. i think after a full hearing, then that's reasonable. >> the other thing i was thinking about, and i think the numbers you gave on the reduction of crime rates -- and i wanted to get dr. campbell's view of that. i know that some of the work we've done here with violence

against women and the work that justice mccaffery has done when he was in law enforcement and doing more -- we have a domestic violence court in minnesota. certainly the sheriff talked about what they've been doing in wisconsin under his leadership. it's made a difference, and we have seen some reduction in those rates. i wondered if, dr. campbell, you would comment on that, and comment particularly on domestic violence and what we're still seeing, however, in terms of the numbers. >> we are extremely pleased, and i think we should all be very proud that the domestic violence homicides have gone down. but clearly from the data, they have gone down in part, in great part, because of the gun restrictions that were put on known domestic violence offenders and that has been upheld by the supreme court.

that's clear that's where those reductions have come from. yes, we need to do more to reduce the domestic violence homicides by other means, to be proactive, to be preventive. but we can continue to reduce the domestic violence homicides with guns if we continue to expand those -- the legislation that allows us to restrict -- >> to me, this looks at just refining the law as we see when things change. you have a lot of people that still get involved in domestic violence. i also -- when i hear these, because i know as a former prosecutor, you'd also want to get out there with, hey, we reduced crime, so great, we've done this and this. in fact, when you're a victim of crime, as mr. daniel knows, those stats don't mean anything to you. when it's your sister who was killed or when it's your child who was killed. so the way i look at this is it's a way to build on some of the work that's been done in the domestic violence field and to understand that we see a

changing situation with the population and laws can't be stacked. we have to be sophisticated as the people that are breaking them. that's what this is really about. i just wondered if you could maybe share a comment on that. >> when you look at -- first of all, let me ask you, what is your question with respect -- >> the question is about how the situations have changed with dating partners, the need to update. then i think secondly, in part because of the internet, which has some great things but also has meant there's more and more stalking and there's more and more ways for people to track people down. whereas, maybe in the past they could just kind of hide and get a new address or phone number. why we would need to have a bill like this pass. >> certainly. i can tell you from what i've seen, and i've testified about this earlier, that we're seeing more dating partner situations as opposed to spouses involved in domestic violence cases.

and we've heard the stats that more women are killed by their abusive boyfriends than their abusive spouses -- or abusive husbands, rather. that said, and we talk about stalking and how that relates. i've shared the stats we've had here in wisconsin from 2005 to '13, 29 domestic violence homicides. all of those were precipitated by a history of stalking behavior. that stalking behavior -- technology is great. i'll be the first one to admit it. i'm glued to that smartphone these days. >> i appreciate you haven't done it while i was talking. pretty good. >> so yes, we're glued to these devices today. they can be used to facilitate criminal behavior as well. we see more and more of that. i just don't know how we would go about regulating that sort of behavior when it comes to technology. >> what i was meaning is the stalking, the reason we have the stalking bill in there is we've seen -- i think there was some recent estimate of, what, 12,000 convicted stalkers in 20 states

right now who could get a gun. so we have seen -- because of this new technology, there's just new ways to find people who wish they maybe couldn't find. >> it certainly has made it' easier. >> thank you very much. >> senator blumenthal. >> thank you very much. let me ask justice mccaffery. you said earlier judges have to provide a level playing field when an abuse victim requests a tro, temporary restraining order. do you believe that judges do provide that level playing field, or do they hand out tros casually and willy-nilly? >> one, all jurists i'm aware of, senator, take this very seriously, especially when it comes to victims. we in philadelphia and for that matter in pennsylvania have been

on the leading edge, the cutting edge of protecting women that have gone through these types of traumatizing events. again, as i said earlier, to us it's far, far more than just handguns, long guns. to us, it's all domestic violence. and yes, judges do take it seriously. we have a police department now with directive 90 that makes sure our police officers fill out a specific form and follow up on all domestic abuse allegations. the bottom line is, it is one of our most -- other than child abuse, special victims abuse, it's one of our most important criminal investigations. so, yes, the answer -- the short answer is they take it very seriously. >> dr. malcolm, do you dispute that? >> whether they take it seriously or not? no, i don't -- >> well, they take it seriously and they require a showing of

facts indicating dangerousness and threat. >> i think -- i'm sure that's what they do now. it's just that you need two people. you need the person who's being accused to be able to present their facts. and not just, you know, one person who comes in and is frightened or pretending to be frightened or whatever or just trying to get to the head of the list as we heard earlier. >> you've heard the testimony about -- when you say pretending to be frightened -- >> well, using that -- >> how much courage it takes and how much strength and resoluteness it takes for a woman to even seek a temporary restraining order, not to mention -- >> i think that's true, but we -- >> divulge very private and sometimes very embarrassing facts to complete strangers. >> but we also heard from the judge that there are people who game the system. i mean, i know it must take a tremendous amount of courage, and that's why i think women should be able to protect themselves.

they can't really even with a restraining order depend on the police to protect them. there was an important case in the district of columbia, 1981, with three roommates, women roommates -- >> why would a woman game the system to protect herself from a dire and dangerous physical threat? >> well, we heard from the judge just this morning that there were all of these long lists of custody cases, and if she says that she's worried about an abuser, it gets her to the top of the list. that's something i wouldn't have known had he not made that comment from his experience. >> aren't there proceedings without the other side represented in many other circumstances where equally important decisions are made

such as searching houses, surveilling telephones, putting liens on property, both civil and -- >> i think if that's the case, we don't need to add another one to it. i don't think that people's homes should be searched for weapons on the mere allegation of some other person who they have had no opportunity to -- >> we're not talking about a search of weapons -- >> and it's dangerous for the police to go in there without this person having notice this has happened. so i think, you know, it doesn't provide the opportunity for evidence from both parties. and i think that's necessary. i realize it's very difficult for women, frightening to make allegations, and many never do because they're so frightened. and there's a whole support network to help these people. but i think all that being said, from the evidence that i've seen, half of the accused

persons, after the hearing, are found not to be guilty. and they need an opportunity to be heard. >> there is an opportunity to be heard, correct? >> there is right now, yes. >> and if there's a temporary restraining order and if the proposal i've made became law, there would be an opportunity to be heard within two weeks. >> within two weeks. so immediately, the guns get taken away or any other -- and only two weeks or three weeks later. to me, you're guilty until you prove yourself innocent now. your property gets taken away immediately. your home gets invaded. police are sent with all the danger that implies, especially if this person has no notion this is even happening. later on, he gets a chance to say something. i don't find that due process. >> so you are opposed to any kind of temporary restraining order? >> i'm not if there's a hearing at the time for the temporary

restraining order. only if the hearing is two weeks, three weeks, some other time later. >> what if the assailant, the abuser is unavailable? >> well, if you provide the opportunity for that person to come to the hearing, you notify that person that there's this hearing and they don't show up, then that's their fault. but at least you're providing the opportunity for the judge to hear both sides. >> how much notice and time would you give that person? >> i don't know. i mean, that's -- >> these are practical realities of trying to protect people, dr. malcolm. >> i'll tell you a practical reality too. the police cannot be everywhere all the time. >> when an abuser represents a threat and a judge has to protect a person, man or woman, from an assailant who has a gun and has indicated that he wants to harm her -- >> you are not -- >> -- then i don't know whether you've ever been in that responsibility or been in a law

enforcement responsibility, but these are more than theoretical or abstract ideas. they are practical, threatening realities. >> they are, but you don't know for sure that what the story is unless both people, as our constitution demands, have an opportunity to be heard. that's called due process of law. a person has an opportunity before something is done against him and not two weeks, three weeks, several months later. >> i would just -- >> just to be clear, you don't think that the police should be allowed to execute a lawful search warrant for a firearm? >> i think that they can be allowed to, but they need to have -- for a temporary restraining order, there ought to be a hearing before that happens. >> for a search warrant, there's not a hearing. so if your rule applies to a temporary restraining order, the same rule would apply to a

search warrant which means to, quote, i think what you said earlier, police should not be allowed to go into someone's house looking for a firearm, which is exactly what they do when they execute a search warrant. you really don't think that should be done? >> but they have to have evidence. they can't just willy-nilly go into someone's house. and the police when they often go in, more and more violence takes place. >> you think there's a higher evidentiary standard for a search warrant than a temporary restraining order? >> i think that for a temporary restraining order under these conditions where you have one person coming in and making allegations that you need to have the other person heard before their property is taken away. >> isn't that what happens in a search warrant too? a complainant comes into the police, makes an allegation. the police take that before a judge. if the evidence is credible, they execute the search warrant. that happens every day in law enforcement. are you really suggesting that police shouldn't be authorized

to do that? >> i'm not suggesting that the police should not be authorized after getting a search warrant. >> but just not for getting a temporary restraining order? >> a temporary restraining order to protect somebody where only that one person has been heard by the judge. >> that's exactly the circumstance in a search warrant. so if that's your logic, it also must apply to search warrants. that puts you in the position of saying that search warrants shouldn't be executed by the police. i really don't any that makes a lot of sense. >> i don't think it makes a lot of sense to invade someone's house and take their property without their having had a chance to be heard about it. >> which is precisely what a search warrant does. so obviously you don't think search warrants are appropriate. if that's your position, then that's your position. everybody's entitled to have a position. >> i think that the way the law now works -- you're changing the way the law now works in these cases. the way the law now works, there is an opportunity for people to be heard. and you've asked me, what if they don't show up?

that's their problem. but at least there's an opportunity to be heard before they are sort of put under a temporary restraining order. i think that's the issue here. i also -- if i can just make one other comment. i also think that with temporary restraining orders, with permanent restraining orders, all these issues, the potential victim has to depend on the police being able to be there in time. i think that's a real concern. and this case that i was going to mention, warren versus district of columbia, where there were women who were abused and called the police and the police never came. they sued the police. the judge said, it's a fundamental principle of american law, government, and its agents are under no general duty to provide public services such as police protection to any individual citizen. so i think in that case, since there isn't -- people can't

really depend on the police, and the police can't be everywhere, they need to be able to be armed to protect themselves. >> any last words with respect to that? >> yes, i agree. we cannot be everywhere as law enforcement. i'm sure the judge could comment on that in his days of boots on the ground policing. we certainly can't be everywhere. but we do count on our citizens to call us, and we do encourage them to exercise good due diligence. i certainly don't -- i certainly would never tell someone they shouldn't arm themselves if they're a law-abiding citizen and exercise their second amendment. there's nothing wrong with that. the issue we have is those who shouldn't have weapons, those who are convicted domestic violence abusers, those who are stalkers, those who represent a public safety threat to not only the victims but to law enforcement. that's what this is about. it is common sense legislation. >> perfect words to close on. i will express my -- >> if i may just add one quick note. >> sure. >> i will supplement it for the record.

but the notion that action by the government in law enforcement requires both sides to be heard before there can be a wiretap or a surveillance or a search warrant, search and seizure, put aside domestic violence, would not only undercut but cripple the protection of innocent citizens as the chairman well knows from his experience in the intelligence area. surveillance is done when one side unrepresented, perhaps not only weeks, months, and for longer periods of time when there is sufficient threat. and our constitutional system depends on a balance of the threats to individual safety or our national security as against those constitutional rights that may be temporarily infringed upon. >> as attorney general, i

actually had to go in and get some of those warrants myself. that's one of the restrictions the rhode island law puts on that exercise of power that the attorney general shall appear in person before the presiding judge of the superior court. so we're well familiar with that. we three prosecutors. so the hearing will remain open for an additional week. if anybody wishes to add -- i should say, the record of the hearing will remain open for an additional week. anybody wanting to remain an additional week -- but i have to say how very, very grateful i am to senator klobuchar and to senator blumenthal for their leadership in this area. how extraordinarily grateful i am to the witnesses for being here, particularly for those who brought personal stories that have had such dramatic effect in their lives. and to those of you in the audience, thank you for your advocacy and for those of you who have suffered losses in this area, we are with you.

we will not forget. and we appreciate very much what you are doing. the hearing is adjourned. live now to the atlantic council for remarks from former palestinian authority prime minister salam fayad. he's expected to talk about the ongoing anaiffairs in gaza and between hamas and other palestinian groups. we expect it to get under way in

just a few moments. live coverage on c-span3.

good afternoon. good afternoon and welcome. i'm fred camp, president and ceo of the atlantic council. by the look of the size of this audience and the buzz in the audience you know two things are happening here today. one of them is we are dealing with an issue of great urgency, and we're about to hear someone of great wisdom and significance talk about this issue and beyond. we're honored to welcome dr. salam fayad, former prime minister of the palestinian authority to the atlantic council and beyond that, we're delighted to welcome him to the atlantic council's fred scowcroft center as really our

first and distinguished statesman at the atlantic council. we have the chairman of the scowcroft center general jones here who will be introducing. i'll just take a couple remarks before passing to the scowcroft center chair. doctor fayyad adds a much-ed meed voice to the conversation on the future of the israeli-palestinian relations and what this means for the broader middle east. over the past three weeks, renewed conflict between israel and hamas and other palestinian groups has resulted in over 1,000 casualties. more than 5,000 -- excuse me, more than 4,500 wounded and displacement of tens of thousands. efforts by secretary of state john kerry to forge a cease-fire have been insufficient thus far. as the u.s. and international leaders seem unable to bring the conflict to a halt. now more than ever, we need fresh thinking, fresh approaches and strong leadership to a solution to one of the world's

most intractable conflicts. i think you'll hear a lot of that sort of thinking today. dr. fayyad has a written statement a little bit like congressional testimony which will be outside at 5:00. he'll be speaking from that statement, but in an abridged form in his opening comments before i moderate q&a with the audience. he joins us today to build upon the important work the scowcroft center's middle east peace and security initiative is doing to develop innovative strategies and analysis for a change in middle east. i salute barry pavell and his team for the work they are doing. this complements the fantastic work of the center on the middle east and i salute the acting director dannia greenfield for the work that that center has been doing on the related set of issues. he also, dr. fayyad wils also

contribute to the critical work the council has been doing on long-term regional trends, including the growth of nonstate actors in the middle east. as a respected and accomplished leader in the region, he'll be an invaluable voice along with ambassador michael warren, the council's ambassador in residence as the council works to better understand the strategic implications of continued conflict between israelis and palestinians. i'm delighted that general jones is here who, along with steve hadley, won national security adviser to democrat, and one national security adviser to a president, will play the central work in the ongoing strategy of the center and the scowcroft center but i also thank them both for helping to bring dr. fayyad as a distinguished statesman at the council. general jones is the chairman, as i said, of the scowcroft center, former national security adviser, supreme allied

commander europe and marine commandant. he's been a great partner to the atlantic council, integral to the work of the scowcroft center over the past few years but really the work across the atlantic council on a wide set of issues. general jones, the podium is yours. >> thank you, fred. and ladies and gentlemen, welcome. this is a high moment for the atlantic council, and we are honored to be here today. and it's especially exciting for me to be able to introduce dr. salam fayyad who i came to know and admire as a leader and statesman and colleague while working with him on the peace process now six years ago when i served as special envoy for the middle east regional security during 2007 and 2008. and my friend steve hadley was the national security adviser.

i think jane harman was still in office and the world was a different place. i think of all the two years that i spent working on this issue that one of the things i enjoyed the most during my time in the middle east was my visits -- my regular visits with dr. fayyad. without any fear of exaggeration, he's a man of courage. he's a man of commitment. and he's a man of peace. and i think he's, above all, a very wise man and someone that we should continue to listen to as we struggle to find a long-lasting solution in this very, very critical part of the world. at the current violence unfolding in the region underscores the importance of the middle east peace process. the regional stability. and also i would suggest global stability. and of leaders such as salam fayyad who devoted their lives

to building a better future for all stakeholders in the region. his reputation precedes him. hence the turnout today. he's a leader and a visionary, one who understands that human development and prosperity are impossible without good governance and good governance is not possible without transparency and accountability. during his tenure at prime minister, dr. fayyad championed law and in order the west bank, worked to build institutions that would meet the needs of the palestinian people and taught us all a lesson that the solution set is much broader than simply military activities. he was appointed as minister of finance over the palestinian authority under yasser arafat from 2002 to 2005 and won praise, high praise from the international community for introducing extensive economic and financial reforms and cracking down on corruption. and late 2005 he resigned from the cabinet to found and run the

third white block an independent party that would run and win in two seats in the palestinian parliamentary elections of january 2006. in march 2007, dr. fayyad was appointed again as minister of finance, international unity government and in june 2007 appointed prime minister, a position he held until he stepped down in june 2013. dr. fayyad will be a fantastic a addition to the atlantic council team. i look forward to working closely with him as the scowcroft center continues to expand its work on middle east security, especially on israeli-palestinian negotiations in the middle east peace process itself. i'm sure the scowcroft center will become a leading voice an this critical issue. ladies and gentlemen, please join me in welcoming dr. salam fayyad to the podium. >> thank you so much. thank you.

thank you very much, george jones. thank you for the very kind introduction. thank you. and i thank you ladies and gentlemen for the interest you have taken attending this event which i had hoped or wished would happen against different backdrop. relative to what we all are looking at. completely tragic situation in terms of the horror that has been going on for long 25 days, past 25 days. the destruction we're talking about since the event was prepared for, more than 1400 people, including many, many children. more than 8,000 wounded. many today are in

life-threatening situation. made even more life threatening given the very poor conditions in the gaza strip and health care facilities. in addition to damage to infrastructure, housing, 300,000 people displaced. this is the extent of the damage and tragedy that's been unfolding for the past 25 days and counting. with unfortunately not there being the prospect in the immediate future of a cease-fire. of course, i hope i'm wrong on this. and we've been all following this with great deal of hope that the efforts under way, efforts that have been made toward reaching some kind of arrangement that would secure a cease-fire would be successful. still hope and pray that it would be. that's the most important thing

given the extent to which the situation has been the horror it has been. of course, what is really important beyond the obvious, which is to secure cease-fire, that's the most important thing is to see what needs to happen in the period immediately following that in order to build on that cease-fire to ensure that it is -- to ensure that as things begin to converge toward a new normal of sorts, that that new normal is fundamentally different from the old one. we've been there before. meaning specifically that a way was found on a couple of occasions before then, before this time around, where agreement was reached, tentative agreement, with not really much hope or expectation it was going to be lasting or durable.

with preparation for the next round literally beginning immediately after the cease-fire was seized -- or was secured. i hope this time around will be different. but first things first, we need an urgently needed cease-fire. this is the second part of thinking. more like a medium term to longer term context is important. i know there's a dilemma here. any time you have a crisis situation, it's very difficult to introduce elements of strategic nature or longer term implications. who wants to talk about that? who cares to listen? at time there's death and destruction, tragedy and misery about long-term or strategic dimension to what's going on. at the same time, unless those considerations are factored into the discussion, unfortunately, this situation will be one of moving from a crisis to the next one. besides, i think i happen to believe in the context of the

current tragedy that we're looking at that's unfolding and continues to unfold before our own eyes, thinking strategically or seemingly longer term is absolutely essential in order to make the cease-fire promise to be a lasting one, relative to previous efforts made in this direction. the focus of my remarks will be on this. and i think in a way, it was suggested by my colleagues an the council and i'm proud of the association. thank you for the help and i look forward to working with you and others to promote ideas related to this very conflict but also to grow the region which continues to be really going through a period of unprecedented turmoil with unprecedented violence, extremism and -- that has not

been seen. one really has to go back in history a long, long time where one can find the unprecedented violence that's been taking place for a long time. and threatens to continue to be the case. against the backdrop of all of this and the title suggested for this conversation which i'm eager to have with jeff camp in short order, try to access breaking the vicious cycle. the choice of title, which was not mine, imparts the dimension to this conversation that i have just alluded to, which is what do we do in order to ensure that the new normal is fundamentally different from the old one. and if that's not really enough, and i think in the words of a woman in gaza sitting by -- specifically and i make mention of this in my prepared remarks which would be made available to

you at the conclusion of this conversation, sitting by the remains of what used to be her home only two weeks ago destroyed completely by an air strike, and pointing to it and saying, you know, even before this, she said, we have much to lose. even before this, so much misery. we are alive simply because there was not enough death to go around. i thought it was important significant words of this kind in addition to what we just talked about in terms of the title as defining this conversation today. this is really as good a reason as any for us to engage in this kind of conversation, discussions as to what needs to happen to place this in a context that ensures the tragedy what has been unfolding the past 3 1/2 weeks. and as we do, there are some

ideas that have been put forward that involve certainly not, you know, rushing back to a political process that has gone through yet another round of failed diplomacy without adjustment, nor to focus on that exclusively to the point where efforts that need to continue to be made in earnest now to secure a cease-fire, but rather to consider what it is that has to be done. in the experience over the past 20 years or so and particularly over the past 15, since the presumptive date of end of discussion or negotiation, so-called permanent status issues, what is it in light of that experience that should be taken into consideration? to inform a process that could lead to introducing badly needed adjustment to promise delivery so that we would not end up doing this over and over again, expecting different results we

cannot possibly obtain. that is really the direction in which i decided to take this conversation in the form of the remarks that i have prepared for this conversation which, again, will be made available to you. and dare i suggest, as a matter of fact, the importance of taking a new look at some of the more important precepts of the existing framework. what is a framework, negotiation framework or peacemaking framework, if you will. one fundamental question. who represents the palestinians. what is it that that party actually represents. and the other one, the other element or the other area of possible adjustment i feel would be necessary to take a good look at is the design of the original framework that's oslo. i would make to make it clear to you, this is not going to be an argument for ditching the

existing framework. this is not about a statement that says let us abandon the two-state solution concept to the contrary. in thinking through the adjustments of the kind that i'll be talking to you briefly about, actually what i had in mind was steps necessary to be taken and undertaken in order to ensure that viability of the -- steps necessary can be restored in order for this framework to be successful. and very briefly, those two key areas of adjustment or possible adjustment that need to be examined thoroughly, on the question of palestinian representation, there is an issue, quandary, if you will, of there being essentially two camps. one that happens to have the power of representation.

that is the plo. but without much effective presence with one that has really waned over time, for a variety of reasons including most importantly as a direct consequence of the failed political process. and on the other, another group, another camp that does not have the power to represent but has real strength and field presence in ways that cannot be ignored. the doctrine has referred them, deal with what exists, and the framework that does have the power to represent, reach a peace agreement that the process itself plus the outcome would be transformative enough to really take us all to a successful end, if you will, conclusion. that has not happened. that has not happened over the past 20 years. i would say over the past 15

years since may 1999 when this was supposed to have been concluded by agreement and through negotiation and it wasn't. if anything, the goal achieved and developed out of this political process looks more distant today than in 1999. that is a really serious problem and one that did contribute to the plo being what it is. so that's a point that needs to be considered as we really move forward. both in terms of its implications for overall peacemaking effort but also in terms of its relationship with the question of national palestinian governments. how much longer can you keep on going with the countries separated and with this much marginalization going on and without adequate representation and various factions, parties having enough presence and sense of partnership that goes on. so the international requirement on one hand, the requirements of

peacemaking but also the requirements of governance that would require taking a good look at. last, it's the second issue. the second issue that needs adjustment, that's the overall design, if you will, of the framework. once again, i'm emphasizing that -- i am not talking about -- forgetting about that framework, but really fixing it. also, many people forget was about an arrangement. it was not a permanent arrangement. it was supposed to have ended. it was supposed to have culminated in successful negotiations on so-called permanent issues. was supposed to and implicit in that construction was the emergence of the state of palestine, something that was not elaborated with this explicitly at least in june 2002 when the emergence of a viable state of palestine living side by side with the state of israel

was put forward as the way forward, as the solution concept and thereby making it by george w. bush, thereby making it a universally accepted doctrine. you know, a lot of things did not happen the way they were supposed to happen. and that is why i think we need to go back. oslo itself was supposed to be a long-term arrangement. may 1999 was supposed to be. it did not happen. the arrangement may have made sense or could have been because it was interim. because actually, by virtue of signing the oslo accords, the palestinian side by virtuing of signing the accord in a formal sense accepted the occupation or continuation in a formal way for a maximum of five years beyond the 26-year period that had elapsed since then. that's the oslo accord and could

be understood this way. but not forever. it was accepted as an interim period. that's the sense of it. may 1999, past that nothing made sense anymore. once that threshold was crossed, it became an open-ended agreement. and hence, understanding of the plo in the eyes of the palestinian public. beginning with the signing of the accords hinged critically on its success in delivering life, freedom and dignity in a country for a percent of people. and that obviously has not worked out. and past 1999 it became open-ended. to put it bluntly, palestinians being told go on, continue to negotiate with israel. accept what israel has on offer for you or else except continued

occupation. that doesn't make sense. and that's why i say, you know, this side, this part needs to be looked at again. that's not what oslo was supposed to be like. how do we make sense out of both of these considerations? how do we put them together in order to come up with a concept that can, on the one hand, reinforce the effort under way to securities filed but then important to sustain it. with this introduction, i submit and to questions and answers, and thank you, ladies and gentlemen, very much. thank you. >> thank you for submitting to interrogation. thank you for those opening initial comments. i missed saying something that in these modern days you said

there's in different times i was supposed to say at the top. and that is for those of you tweeting it's #acgaza. #acgaza. this is all on the record, obviously, and not only will the full comments be made available physically outside of 5:00 p.m., but we'll also have them on our website if i know our team right at the same time. so i think it should be at the same time. i do want to give a special greeting to steve hadley. i didn't see he was in the audience right at the beginning. he's been so much a part of bringing dr. fayad here. it's good seeing jane harman and many board members throughout, thank you for being here. let me start by drilling down on what you were saying. you were essentially saying we don't have the representation, right, we don't have the framework right. essentially. >> yeah. >> could you tell us what should

the representation be, what should the framework be? >> there's more than -- i hope this is okay. can you hear? >> yeah. >> there is really a very complicated problem here. on the one hand, you know, the oslo accords were signed on to by the plo acting on behalf of you' all palestinians. and those accords involved early on. and that was the declaration of mutual recognition presented to the palestinian people. and that defined the process. and that defined the palestinian counterpart. and as i said, that point in time onward, this is the criterion by which the plo was to be judged, the extent to it was not supposed to be successful in delivering freedom to the palestinian people and palestinian statehood. that didn't happen, as i alluded to in my opening remarks.

and if anything, that appears to be more elusive today, more distant than it did then. not surprisingly, the standing of the plo has eroded over time. consistent with an erosion in the terms of reference of the political process or the peace process. things that used to be taken as for granted in the past like, for example, discussions about 1967 being the presumptive boulder in negotiations. all of a sudden in more recent years, having become an issue of contention, whether or not it can be included in a policy document, including one put forward by the united states, not israel. this is a remarkable erosion in terms of the process. this is not something that is easy. thereby, i mean, this failure was very costly. it made the difference involved

between the maximum offer by israel and the minimum acceptable palestinians progressively wider and wider. so you had a plo that had failed to deliver by the end of the five-year period, which was all of it was, but then stack on to that, going through the second intefadeh, 2014, there's failure after failure after failure. one round of negotiations giving way to the next. except that the next round of negotiations started with it having eroded even further. so the plo acting on behalf of all palestinians, having the power to represent, the privilege to represent, the responsibility to represent, but then looking at the situation, it's becoming more and more difficult to handle. at the same time, there were these other factions that never were part of the plo framework. from the very beginning.

they did not accept oslo as a framework for resolving the palestinian/israeli issue, from the very beginning. and over time and in parallel with this decline or erosion in the standing of the plo, their power, even though, you know, field presence, if you will, strength, the extent to which their ideology resonated with people, you know, understanding the ups and downs of political cycles and sentiments and all but over time, one cannot really see there has been rise. and that happened to be enforced by federal diplomacy. and as a matter of fact, become even more pronounced, especially more pronounced at times like these when you have a most dangerous escalation. you have death and suffering and distraction and tragedy and all. with them really actually saying look at what this other faction

has brought you or this other school or thought. it has brought you nothing, failure. so you have a situation where you have these non-plo factions standing on a platform of this kind, gaining strength over time. at the same time, the plo acting on behalf of palestinians losing ground. this is something that needs to be fixed. >> so you have to somehow bring these factions into the representations. is that what you're saying? >> you know, it's very important for two reasons. one, i said there were two dimensions to this. international in terms of engagement to israel and the international community, but then there is the governance issue. what do you do about, you know, government and about overall government framework when certain factions are excluded? when they have at the same time this much power and field presence, if you will. not to mention the arms and what have you.

i'm talking about what appears to be -- again, perceptionwise. superior ideology. at the time when unfortunately it started to develop, that after all, violence pays off. who's going to really win in a situation like this? not the plo had had really committed to nonviolence to peace, but those all along said that's not really going to happen. and they would say -- and i think that's a really strong argument -- that where else in the history of national liberation movements, national liberation movements had to lay down their arms before they secured independence? it's difficult to argue against that. if you really look at the history. but you'd understand that in the palestinian context only to the extent that oslo was supposed to be an interim arrangement. promising delivery five years later, the commitments undertaken by the plo on behalf of all palestinians, the right of the state of israel.

also denounce violence made sense in the context of it coming to an end and delivering. but once that happened, once we crossed that, it started to become difficult to really argue. additionally, the number of things that happened over this period of time that in a way validated that kind of thinking. and you can't ignore that in this day and age. it's not the 19th century, even 20th century. you have to make sense to people you govern. you can't ignore them. there are many things that happened over the course of the past 20 years that actually validated the theory that says violence pays off. many things. not only in an independent context. we were talking about lebanon, for example. and this all happened over the course of the oslo framework, has nothing to do with the oslo framework separately. and several instances of dealing between the palestinian

authority and israel. take, for example, just one example, the prisoner exchange deal. where in one goal, israel traded the freedom of more than 1,000 palestinian prisoners to secure the release of -- contrast that with the experience that we and the plo authority had to go through on the same, trying to release palestinian prisoners. what does that tell the public at large? belligeren belligerence. you can't ignore the perverse events like this on perceptions. and you can't ignore perceptions. you can't govern without people. it's not good enough to say the right thing. the question is can you carry. and, you know, in light of the experience and failed experience of diplomacy for the past 30 years, it's very difficult for

me to see the palestinian framework as is able to carry. and that's the bottom line. that's the bottom line. that can't be ignored. you know, what i'm saying to you here, that drives people away from their comfort zones. this is not really -- i would exclude myself from many. but look, there is tragedy going on. and it will repeat itself, time and again. and there are consequences to failure. you can't keep doing the same thing. and really in the process do nothing more but kick the can down the road and pretend that you can go back to the old framework and do it. you just can't. i'm sorry if this pushes some

outside their comfort zones. now, how is a question. how can we do it is the question. it's not that we're starting from principle with the luxury of designing things to the liking of everybody. but we need to take into account, you know, these complications. >> well, let's go to the how to do it question because it seems to me that you're saying very passionately and articulately this vicious cycle we're in can't continue. and violence pays off and we're also experiencing unprecedented violence. it sounds like you're prescribing changed representation in the palestinian part because it's necessary and it's urgent. but without saying specifically what that should be. and the changed framework without saying specifically what should be but just saying that it has to change because it's not working. but you're not being specific. you're not prescribing a new framework. >> i'll do what i can to be more speck.

specific. i don't know if i can be too specific. for the reasons what i have in mind is a set of ideas i'm putting out for consideration. what or the extent to which we'll be successful and start a discussion on this is important here. and i think it's really up to, you know, various factions, whether domestic or foreign to somehow coalesce on something. what i'm really talking about here is, if you will, the broad architecture of this but not the specific details in terms of, for example, you know, i talk about time-bound commitment on nonviolence. what does that really mean in terms of length of time? the concept is there, but it's really up to all concerned to define it. but the idea is the following, the substance, to be more specific, it needs to be adjusted. i started to make the point that

adjustment was necessary, but then in what direction? what does it really need? first you have a plo as a matter of course and legality and national legitimacy had entered into an agreement going back in 1993 that has a great deal of significance. that cannot be ignored. and the power to represent was certainly there. it continues to be there today. but then what do you do to make that adjustment? my own suggestion would be to leave the plo alone. i mean, do not really get to the point of saying let's undo this or, you know, open it up without any criteria anywhere that makes international engagement very difficult if not downright impossible. just keep it as it is with its right to represent in the way that's referred to in nose

agreements. but in a way that has come to be known, leave that alone. but in parallel, in parallel, having a unified leadership framework that involves participation by everyone. you know, old fashioned. whether there are plo or non-plo. they're all sitting at a table. and there together collectively are to inform decision-making by the executive committee of the plo. what does it really mean? is this really asking too much? let's just say that the plo doesn't like that or doesn't want to do that, let's assume. this is just for the sake of argument. i don't think they would. but you know, what is the basis for the plo or for the plo to continue to engage in international diplomacy when it's not sure it will be able to carry. you know, again, we could really choose, you know, the kind of game we would want to play.

but we're not going to deliver unless we have good answers with questions. it is in the interest of the plo and its leadership, tourism. to really have its decision-making process in full. in order for it to be able to secure the consensus needed in order to deliver an agreement. you know, this is not going to be just an agreement between two people. this is a formality of it. but is it going to be delivered to a point where it is going to be this moment? something they've lost their life for? it's very important to prepare and not to continue to pretend. so no, i don't think should. and i think it should welcome it. what kind of processes are involved? and that's why i say this is really open for discussion. this is as much intended on our own domestic political team as

it is international. ideas. exactly how we're going to concentrate ourselves in order as a consequence of dialogue that's taken place to achieve reconciliation. how to authorize it in a way that meaningfully informs the decision-making by the plo which continues to serve. that's one element of this. another is how to govern domestically. anyone out there who thinks there is going to be an end to this conflict and palestine emerging. without gaza, you don't need to really rethink the position. it's not going to happen. it's not going to happen. look at it from the point of view in israel who are in favor of a two-state solution. clearly, the element is based on

the kind of government and country they would like to have. and so demographics are important in that argument. and time and again, i've seen one after another making the case for a state of palestine. without gaza, if you take gaza out of that mix, they will -- it's very important. so what do we do domestically? we need to have all of them adequately presented. this is in the interest of everybody. and at some point, two final elements. one that needs to be basis for -- there is a critical mass that is absolutely necessary in order to permit a takeoff here. especially on security. it would be a case of two missing ingredients. something needs to be agreed. and so far as violence is concerned, i think there really

needs to be an understanding of the need for there to be preventable violence. how long? let that be discussed and agreed. that's in the interest of everybody. and use the time on the palestinian side. use the time to rebuild. use the time to reunify the institutions of the people. gaza and the west bank have been separated for seven years now. there's a lot of work that needs to be done to unify institutions. you put all of these things together. let's say a consensus could be formed on these credits cal iit. that's when we should feel powerful enough to go to the israelis and the international community and say this is what we have. this is what we can and expect

to do over the next period. can we now -- and this is really the most critical, the adjustment that's intended to deal with the design flaw in the overall framework. can we now agree on a date certain for ending the occupation? that's how you really put all of these elements together. can we agree on a settlement for action? we can't keep on going like this. we need to agree. the default to failure to negotiations cannot be denied occupation. this has to be the certainty of an end to an occupation. can we agree and then work backward. and then the international front will begin to proceed with the degree of a sense of coherence that makes sense to the people. and that's we important. for us to expect the process to succeed and deliver. >> dr. fayed, thank you for

that. t some in israel would say and let's come to the present tense, the situation on the ground. some in israel would say to break the cycle is to defeat. >> host: once and for all to ensure its safety. that's exactly what michael orrin argued in "the washington post" recently. last week at the aspen security forum, lieutenant general michael flynn, head of the d.i.a., warned if. >> host: is totally defeated in the current round of fighting, it's likely that a more extreme group would rise in its place. i'd like to know your vision on this. and i know your job is not to advise the israeli government, but what would your advice be to the israeli government in this sense? you know, you see the popularity figures of what's going on right now. of netanyahu rising. so first this question of what

replaces. >> host: would be more extreme. this tension between say what ambassador orrin said and the head of the d.i.a. and then secondarily if you were sitting in a room advising the israel government, what would you say to them? >> i'd say stick with it. this notion that somehow you're going to really continue to engage in this escalation until it leads to the alienation of. >> host: and other factions of the same kind, apart from the tragic consequences and implications of continued fighting of the kind that has been taking place. this is not really -- i mean, we're talking about people's lives. and loss of life that simply cannot be tolerated. this is completely unbearable.

and then what? everyone has to remember that we are dealing here, at least so far, with unsafe actors. you know. >> host: hamas is in control of gaza for sure, has been since 2007. understanding the unity arrangement that was brokered recently or agreed to recently. effectively is there. but still it has not acquired the status of a state operator, a state. and this is really a quandary. not only insofar as factions of the palestinians are concerned, but other activists of the world. a criteria of winning and losing, you know, are different when you are dealing with state actors. we've seen this happen time and

again in the united states with a country like afghanistan, for example. in terms of firepower, you know, bombing and the rest of it. the situation is like this. we talk about survival of a few. who after the extensive damage, loss of life and misery and all and say we won. what are we going to do about something like this? this is serious. and lives are at stake. with futility. absolute futility. that's number one. number two, whether or not you agree with hamas and likeminded factions is not as significant as realizing the need for any palestinian leadership to carry in order for that leadership to

deliver an agreement. and you simply cannot ignore the ideology. even if you disagree with it. that's the kind of work we live in. these are the kinds of standards by which developed and advanced countries you will live by. it isn't a set of standards for the developed advanced world, another set of standards that should apply to others. it's time for all of us to be taken on board. then i think it should not really be beyond strong leadership, enlightened leadership. at some point you need to pay for failure. this is not 1990 or 1991. more than 20 years past oslo and more than 15 years past, you know, the end of the time line under oslo. and to somehow pretend that we're just starting this and to really take a purist approach to

this in a matter that conforms to the highest standards, what someone would like to happen is, i think, extremely unrealistic. inclusiveness. inclusiveness. you need to include and you need to govern in a way that's effective enough to ensure that there is sufficient support for that which we stand on. otherwise we should not be there presenting to the conflict. this is essential to what we're looking at. it's a necessity, in other words. but to think, you know, this way is i think is constructive and productive. unfortunately 1,000 more lives and more suffering, people come back to the same conclusion. it's not hamas, per se. it's that ideology. what do you do? what do you say to people who look at the record over the past 20 years and tell you what have you done for us?

what do you tell them? forget about hamas. let's just put hamas aside. unless you're able to be convinced and to make sense when you say, you know, we have an alternative. you need to really provide an answer to that question. if a solution is what you're interested in, we need to show enough courage to be accepting, of being pushed away from our comfort zones in the direction of finding something sensible. finally, on the other point that you raised, the region, and i sort of alluded to this in my opening remarks. really when it will end and how it will end, only god knows. but there are very few people i know who would have expected things to be the way they are today. but they are. i mean, in terms of extremism, violence. this is unprecedented, and i think defies expectations of

many in terms of what's going on. the degree of extremisextremisme this, extremely grotesque and certainly alien to any kind of decency if you really think about it this way. what do you really need to do to somehow understand this and prevent this becoming an ideology. if it's managed by and led by few, you know, unless something is done, i'm afraid this is really going to be most dangero dangerous. the key to the solution lies in good, honest, responsive government. one that responds to the needs of people. good governance is really key to do this. it's not a luxury. something that's absolutely essential. >> let me ask a quick question and quick answer, then i want to turn to steve hadley to start the audience with the first

question. i want to pick up on what you just said. tom friedman in april 2013 when you resigned wrote that that it was an arab spring before there was an arab spring. he described you as a new generation -- what was needed was a new generation of don't leaders whose primary development, their own people, not the enrichment of tribe, sector, party. and part of the difficulty and failure of the arab spring was noncorrupt, that there was not enough support and the arabs, u.s., israelis for noncorrupt institution-focused leadership. do you agree, has the arab spring failed and are these the reasons why the arab spring has failed? >> i'd like to still believe it's a nature of a work in progress, although it's hard to use those words to describe the state of play when you're looking at the extent of

violence and extremism that has taken place and continues to take place. nevertheless, you know, from time to time, i think it's really important to try to take a step or two away from what you see, to put it in perspective. i think it's useful to look at the experience of other nations and other revolutions, going back -- not that far back in history, recently, and see if things like this happened before elsewhere before we would come to the conclusion that, you know, things are impossible in the region. that somehow, you know, arabs are or belong to a species that cannot handle both democracy and stability at the same time. somehow you need to choose, you know, either democracy or stability.

that's the wrong conclusion. we're like everyone else. we can handle democracy and we need stability. democracy sustains stability. you can't achieve stability on the strength of force, but you cannot sustain it with a strength of force of governance. that's what we are missing. that's what's really important to keep in mind. looking at history of this, the arab spring is the nature of a revolution. people standing up for their citizens' right, for being respected, listened to, taken seriously, if you will. not thinking that the most important task in life -- the arab spring, its essence was about this. its essence was about this.

and i think in that sense, it was overdue. you know, it took a long time. deep sense of injustice, you know, thinking that there was too much double standards in the way the world was managed, the region itself was managed. the way the global west was relating to the region. the arabs were siding with regimes that were not doing the right thing for their own people. only they would present the case for them was the case against the alternative, with the alternative first being communism and then muslim brotherhood. you get a region that's unhappy, and so therefore in that sense, it was overdue. but it happened. it's in the nature of the revolution. what else are you going to really tell me that experienced a revolution that delivered stability immediately afterwards. it did not happen even in this country. i found the french revolution,

it took three of those. it didn't happen in the chinese refuse solution, the russian revolution. and so yes, the extent of the violence is important. there's no question about that. but to think that somehow the arab spring, if it is really about a revolution, i think it is fundamentally, to expect, you know, to deliver, serenity, stability, tranquility in the aftermath of a major upheaval like this is expecting too much. two things. we need to place it in that kind of perspective to get a better handle on it. but i think it's really time for everyone to begin to think that this is a region like all other regions. these are people like all other people. people are people. and stand and have to be laid out for systems of governance

that respect their own citizens. this is so basic, but it's basically obvious, but somehow you -- and they think they need to find a solution immediately. you're not going to get there unless they respect them. that's it in a nutshell. >> fascinating answer. thank you so much, doctor. steve hadley. >> i have to make a disclosure that i had the opportunity to have lunch with salim fayed, and i'd like to invite you to share a little bit of that conversation, and i realize there are some sensitive pieces to it. the reason i say that is because i think there's a lot of despair in the united states that the current situation in gaza can lead anywhere positive. and i think it's useful if you could share some thoughts about that both to give some hope but

also to stimulate some thinking. and i'm thinking specifically some comments you made about the kind of cease-fire that might allow both what the israelis want, which is the demilitarizization of hamas and what might allow hamas to get what it wants, which is the opening of the borders for flows of goods and services. you talked a little bit about that. what kind of arrangement might permit that. the role that the p.a. might play in that. and also, the issue of reconstruction of gaza and how that might be structured in such a way that actually could begin not just a reconstruction process but a reform process that could begin to do what you talked about, getting these institutions in a line between gaza and the west bank. i admit these are sensitive questions. i think what you said was very interesting and would be useful, and i would just simply invite you to share that portions that

you're comfortable with. >> thank you very much. no, i would be extensive on those issues. i think it's really important to place this in the right context in terms of how to deal with gaza and to begin to bring that into this course. as i said in my opening remarks, it's hard to use thinking in a time of crisis. but in this particular case, i think bringing that forward may help in facilitating an agreement on a cease-fire. people really start to get a sense of what happened afterwards. understanding divergence. take, for example, what you said about demilemilitarization of g. i'd said that would be a tall order now. gaza was not demilitarized even when he was there. minus the rockets, there was

just about everything else. this is the reality. so for someone to come and say hamas and gaza should be demilitarized as a condition for cease-fire, that really is setting the bar too high. death, injury, misery, epidemics, water and the power plant having been bombed and water stations and the rest of it is simply beyond -- and there is, you know, on the palestinian side, the legitimate demand and expectation for lifting the siege on gaza. one really needs to separate issues here. it's a key point. there was a lot of focus on rafa. i think it's important to really take rafa out of the discussion in terms of not completely out of the discussion but not to make the debate on access

exclusively one of what to do about rafa. it's now an issue of egypt and palestine. i think all along the idea -- i mean, post 2007. but since then, after 2007, it became exclusively a palestinian/egyptian issue. i think it's important. but even before -- and i think really sadly didn't happen, it should have happened before. you know, nobody really needs to get to an he saescalation like . it should have been dealt with before. and discussion between palestinians and egyptians. and the solution to it, even at time of separation, would have been to open it subject to it being run by the palestinian authority. something that really made sense, even at time of separation. it would have brought the p.a. back into gaza for the first

time since june 2007. important. something to build on. it could have paved the way for the government afterwards. but to begin with that something basic. something as basic as that, didn't happen. it should be approached this way. it should not mask the need for resolution, of access issues elsewhe elsewhere. for sure. but from our point of view as palestinians, opening gaza northward, connecting it with the best bank, is strategically a lot more important. it should be open. subject matter. focus on rafa and pushing gaza southward, if you will. or peace in the region, a

two-state solution concept. something that requires immediate attention. it didn't happen before. it should not be something about cease-fire or no cease-fire. cease-fire is absolutely necessary. and that discussion needs to begin. you know, egypt needs to say, you know, in order for my national security interests to be protected, the following arrangement should be respected. and i think palestinians would be more than willing to accommodate. the statelike structure of the palestinian side. and now that there is unity even though it's not deep enough and has not taken hold. regardless of what happens elsewhere. but then again, at this moment, what can happen to immediately change the landscape? history tells us that it takes time. you need to really secure the cease-fire. but you need to give people a sense of what is going to come

later. short of demilitarization. and again, if you could everything, you'd have everything. this is natural. this is what economics is about, after all. but you have to make choices. here is a proposition. you look at a situation where you're the state of israel demanding demilitarizization. i don't think that's really realistic. i don't think it's really in the cards. again, they were not able to achieve this even when they were in gaza itself. let's face it. what kind of nonaccepsense is t? that doesn't work. but short of that, what if there was serious consideration of a promise of a period of calm, calm, total commitment, by consensus, by everybody on the palestinian side. not the ultimate objective.

we surely look forward to the state of palestine to be one that is based on co-existence and total respect for agreements and renouncing violence and to assume nonbelligerence. including state of israel. but in the run-up to that. what if we say -- a long time with this in my pocket -- what if we could commit everybody on the -- that's not demilitari demilitarizati demilitarization. we need to really look at the situation. fortunate fortunately, it's not between good and bad. it's between better or worse. in this particular case, number one, the cease-fire. two, the promise of people. that's better than not having anything.

but it gets things going. it requires a greater role for the palestinian authority. not of the crime that's happened post-unification which has not happened. it's for ballistic, if you will, so far. what we really need is one that is inclusive. one that is seriously supported by the factions but one that can gain strength and presence possibly in a way that could make it an effective player. and remember, that was part of the thinking early on in terms of what the palestinian government was supposed to do, going back to the road map and in-power person of government. this is not a small issue. this is something that gives all four people to be included.

and i prefer personally for it to be guilty of factions am themselves. this is a time of national crisis. you know but doesn't require commitment? to unify, but at the same time to agree with israel and for a date certain on ending -- we can't really push on the domestic front with the international front. something like this i think would be necessary. >> thank you, doctor. jane harman. >> thank you very much. it's a pleasure to see a dear friend in washington. >> thank you. >> really a pleasure. congratulations to the atlantic counsel for this enormous cow in getting our friend to join you. two things. first of all, everyone in this audience wishes you were still prime minister of the

palestinian authority. i speak on behalf of everybody here. >> and dissenting voices, please be violent. >> uh-huh. and we all remembered the two-year plan to improve so sfa. that is what my question's about. they've done a pretty good job of running the west bank. and ramallah is, and build settlements and other things that israel has done. is there a fact that given the arab neighborhood is not fond of hamas to use that story with their support to help build a coalition for enhancing the pa's role.

something you've just suggested. as part of the solution which would include a cease-fire, which would include an agreement for i would hope demilitarization of gaza. i understand that's a hard thing to do. but also an agreement for a version of a marshall plan to rebuild gaza and run gaza as part of -- as part of the demonstration program and hopef hopefully in the state of palesti palestine. are there more to find out how much it's earned in light of the governance of the west bank? >> when we say fees fire,

agreement by whom? mainly hamas. but they're the ones calling the shots. on the other side, who is really committing to this? and the fact that they've -- a difficult situation for me to watch doesn't have the formal presence in gaza, and that has been the case since 2007. without, you know, putting together an arrangement that is open to being more inclusive, being capable to act only, you though, again, i think it's really a question of choosing a

it. what, you know, governance, framework. procedures followed and something that made accepts to peop people. it's a most interesting area for consideration. and two, up with needs to keep into account that there are elections elections. i haven't said anything about the election so far, but it's important. moving toward having a democratic state. it militant, strong show values of open communication, what have you. we need to rebuild our political

process. as this process moves on and the system begins to be opened up for more participation, grow the base of participation, opening it up and then have elections at the point -- you know, if that happens, i think that is something that's a lot easier. given where we are, we need to somehow find a way. we need to improvise and find a way between now and then. because we're going to d-- you know, give right-of-way, someone el else. we have the ones on the front li lines. how to really approach this.

think seriously about putting something that could enjoy critical mass of support, adequate, just enough to enable it to begin to deliver, rebuild and implement policies that do all of these things and open the system, political system and then have elections. >> thank you very much. questions, please. >> good afternoon, sir. 22 years ago i was the staff author of a law that requires the state department to report on the rights of indinl nuss peoples around the world and its annual human rights reports. in terms of yl and t, there is . and if you use the term

indigineity as used by the united states, it would force israel's neighbors to israel to the area, but will they then recognize the palestinians having a right to their homeland. nerd, a nation state has viable. why isn't the question of indiginetity part of the new paradigms that need to be discussed in the future once the bloodshed dies down? >> you know, i've argued for something less than that. among other things, you know, going back to 1993, so-called declaration of mutual recogniti recognition. the pla -- plo. the right of the state of israel to exist in peace and security.

that's what has not happened. what did not happen then and has not happened since was for therr right, the palestinian's right to an independent state. that, i think, should be adequate, to really put the process in a more symmetrical path going forward. that, in some way, begins to address the deep sense of security. and impossibility and disillusionment. that's so prevalent on the palestinian side when they see -- the expansion of settlements and what all of that is doing. the settlement and the state of israel on the part of its rail in terms of the prospect country and -- you have a form of recognition of our right -- is this too much to ask for after

all -- the right of the state of israel to exist in peace and security since 1993? contrary to conventional wisdom, have you thought given the name of it, the declaration of mutual recognition, it recognizes the right for a palestinian state did not happen. for much of the period, much of the period, since 1996, governing coalition of israel, the platform of the partners were to say there is not very friendly to the concept of the solution. and so it is important for it to be that recognition. but i agree with that. you have that taken it beyond that. that's the basic requirement that's really needed. i wouldn't really take it to the next level in terms of what kind of state and in terms of the characterization and all that. let's make sure that the -- is adequate to carry out and move

on. >> thank you. fred hoff, senior fellow here. you may want to add a sentence about the role you've played in middle east peace. >> dr. fayad, you mentioned that a possible creative way forward in terms of all in terms of negotiations would be to set a date certain by which the occupation would come to an end. could you expand on what that actually means in terms of procedure and what would it look like when that date is arrived at? >> i think that adjustment is necessary, you know? also, by the way, not many people know this, also, it's time for conspicuously and curiously silent on the issue of palestinian sovereignty and state. it's presumed it was presumed when oslo agreed that this was

what the outcome is going to be but you won't find any reference to palestinian state and sovereignty in the documentation itself. very strange understanding is exactly opposite. and i think, again, that may have given the history and given the difficulty in getting people together to sign on to something and i wouldn't -- or take away anything from the huge significance of the signing on the white house lawn in september of 1993. that's very significant given the history. and i know many people that were there personally. very significant. to be fair to those engaged in the process, those who were actually involved and did it on the palestinian side, maybe, you know, at the time with thinking that this was was going to be a

maximum of five years and you know, it was going to happen and justifies having gone it into it but there's no justification for the possibility to go on with it without an adjustment that created t created the presumption of that which we palestinians would like to see happen and i would argue is equally as important to israelis. they require that, to be honest with you. when you're looking at the situation all of a sudden the flamework is flawed. there is examples in history where that happened. other cases where occupation or authority of settlement over it ended and, again, to invoke the first rule, the way hong kong was. in order to -- and over to china. it was supposed to happen within a certain time period and in 1997, clockwork, it happened. a lot of discussion and

negotiation up to that. but the negotiations, you know, should be about arrangements and assurances but not about principles. 20 years past oslo talk about whatever palestinians do have an inalienable right to live as free people with dignity in a country of their own as an express of their natural right to exercise a substantial life. we shouldn't be discussing this. it should be behind us. that's what's missing. so with the wars having come to an end we really need to define this. let's talk about one that's feasible. this is not to end negotiations. having agreed on this for ending the uk authority over hong kong did not preempt the need for negotiations with china and others who produce the outcome that was produced.

but everybody knows what's prospect. you negotiate an arrangement, assurances, the principle of solution are out there. there's enough in the body of international law as it existsable with various solutions of the united nations and that provide inner guidance so far as the solutions are concerned. but we can't really approach it in the way things are happening right now. this is, asymmetry in the framework right now between the occupying power and the occupied. and without presumption of an end to occupation that is enshrined in a binding agreement what this framework is telling the palestinians, go negotiate with israel for however lodge it takes and as long as you fail to agree -- meaning as long as you don't take what is an offer you have to accept the continued occupation, oppressive

occupation. that's -- there's something wrong with this. that's you know what i'm really saying, needs to be fixed. so everything needs to be assured about this. the palestinians and that, i think, could make a huge difference. the escalation, demille tearizatitea tearatitear -- demil demilitariation. and even if they went to them and said, we have a commitment. winding commitment and enshrined in the yes as a solution. this is one trip to new york i'd like to take. to end the occupation. negotiate, yes, we negotiate when the settler is -- but there's no -- you know, illusion

as to what the outcome is going to be. the outcome cannot be continued occupation. exactly what is this incentive? when you look at the framework and the huge imbalance, listen to what is said by cabinet officer after cabinet officer on the israeli said about the two-step solution including the words by prime minister himself. that something to the effect that he was right all along that he wanted -- that the scli people to know that he was right all along about them not being a possibility admissible possibility of israel relinqu h relinquishing control over jordan. what does that do to the conseventy of a two-state solution? so the rhetoric is out there and it's significant. what do you do to provide assurance? what do you do to begin to -- this is something that they'll really have to contend with. it's not a matter of choice.

you know, there is -- the question of you know, a people that is living under oppressive occupation, which it does not want, and you know, you can't continually vote on this forever. it's time for everybody to go up and approach it sensibly but to ensure that as we move forward, they are able to bring people along to carry, in other words. >> i'm going to ask you a final question because we've run out of time. it's off twitter from henson paris and i'll put in a different context as well. the question is can gaza in ruin and the west bank economically ailing could economic development hold the key to solution of the conflict? i'll also put it a different way. you predicted when you were prime minister we'd have a palestinian state by 2011. a lot of your approach is what people called unilateralism at the time. which was you were less

interested in the symbolism of recognition of a palestinian state, the u.n., and more interested in what could get done on the ground. so take that question, but also, lay on to this, when do you now predict there will be a palestinian state and what would you do unilaterally right now in the palestinian position to push this along? >> that was constructive unilateralism as opposed to something else called settlement activity and the rest of it. and i did not predict actually at the time the person what would happen in two years. what the program was about, specifically, you know, was inspired the motivated by political thinking. w45 i predicted and said we would be ready for was statehood. the program was about putting everyone on notice, similar to what we're saying today, in a