could delay their completion. mr. green, you raised a similar concern in your report which said this, and i quote. despite several cost kurchoccurs with obo, there is a concern that embassy's consulates can be built over the same time frame leaving more personnel exposed in the facilities for longer periods of time, end quote. mr. green, can you elaborate briefly, and what are some of the challenges with customizing versus using standard designs? and you said a moment ago -- you didn't say throw the baby out with the bathwater, you said we need to make certain recommendations, and i assume you were saying, look, we just want to be practical to get back to that security caution, function, so that we can be effective and efficient in what

we're doing. could you comment, please, sir? >> yes, sir. the observations that we made, and this is in the report and certainly not all-conclusive. these weren't six guys in the mess hall who dreamed these things up. these were based on comments we got from security experts who were with obo on a daily basis. i would tell you for one, if you can build a beautiful embassy under design excellence and you can do it as fast, and it doesn't cost any more, i'm all for it. i don't care. i don't care what we build. but what i am concerned with, it's just not logical to the people we talk to and, frankly, to me that you can build under

design excellence as quickly and as cost-effectively as we did under standard embassy design. you pull a design off the shelf and build it and adopt the facade in a way that is fitting with the local -- the country as opposed to going through a design bid build with architects and builders, it just doesn't make sense. now, if you can show me with facts and figures that it does, i'll salute and agree with you. >> there is one thing you did not mention, and i assume you meant to, function, too. you talk about security, number one. cost and function. so you wanted to make sure they function properly, too. >> yes, and absolutely. and i think that standard

embassy design was a living, breathing thing. there were reviews done constantly. was everything perfect? no. the ceiling is too high, we can't put the light bulbs in. or we don't have enough parking. or the medical facility is not large enough. and those challenges were addressed periodically and standard embassy design was modified accordingly. function is certainly important. and i think that the director mentioned 100 consular windows versus one. and maybe that happened. but that should be worked out as you're planning the design in a certain country that says, you know, five consular windows aren't enough for us. and hopefully within the budget, we can adopt that. >> now, ms. muniz, what's your

response? was the design embassy program the lay embassy construction? >> my answer is no, but i need to go into detail which sometimes loses folks, but if you can bear with me. first of all, we use two different methods to deliver projects at obo. we use build and we use design bid build. sometimes we don't have advance notice. sometimes we turn around and need to go into tripoli immediately, set up an embassy and move quickly. but because our appropriation is regular, it allows us to do advance year planning very easily. so we know in any fiscal year we're going to do these five embassies. we design before. but because we're going to get the embassy initiative to 100% designs, when we award the contract, the duration from award to cutting the ribbon and

letting people into that safe, secure facility is actually shorter. because we will only be doing construction, we will not be doing design and construction after the award of the project. if we don't have a lot of advance notice, i think that we really do need to go back to design build and reexamine the type of building that we would put in place. but i think what's great about this initiative and this new approach is that it will allow us not only to meet the same schedules but in cases to improve on them. >> what do you have to say to that, mr. green? >> i'm not an architect, nor am i an engineer, and if obo contends that they can build things as quickly, you know, i may or may not question it. all i'm saying is the folks that work with obo on a regular basis

question it. >> now, ms. muniz, the new united states embassy in iraq was built during the previous administration; is that right? before the department started the design excellence program. >> yes. >> that project met cost overruns, and the committee found back in 1997 the project was delayed 16 months and the cost was $144 million more than projected. so delays and increased costs can occur regardless if the department uses standard embassy design, concept or design excellence concept. would you all agree on that? do you agree? >> i would agree. baghdad was kind of a unique situation. once it had been planned

initially, then the defense department wanted to put more people in there, so we had to modify the size of it. i'm sure there were many, many other things that, i want to be there, i want 15 desks instead of three. it was a moving train, believe me. >> ms. muniz? >> i think that's accurate. in fairness, as my colleague mr. jones pointed out, we build in different environments. there are all kinds of things that our projects are subject to which can complicate delivery. the department, the country can decide to change the staffing pattern significantly and require us to modify. war, shortages, natural disasters can impact those schedules. so while i haven't looked at the iraq project in detail, i've looked forward since coming in obo. i do think that in difficult environments, as folks who know construction firsthand, those

can have a real impact. but i do think having a dialogue with congress, with our appropria appropriaters and this committee on such changes so people understand those changes, i think, can be helpful. >> there's exactly unanimous consent to enter into the record a letter sent to the state department on october 9, 2007 by the committee's previous chairman and describe in detail the many flaws with the construction of the u.s. embassy in iraq in 2007. >> without objection, so ordered. if the gentleman will yield. >> of course. >> i want to join with you. i was on the committee at that time. chairman waxman did a great job of exposing that our wartime construction of an embassy as for tr fo fortress usa, as a vague idea of

what they wanted was an example of how to build an embassy. i think they made a great point that that's exactly what we don't want to be doing. >> if i could have the indulgence for 30 seconds to follow up on the ranking member. mr. green, i just want to have the public sort of understand something about the standard design. if we were looking, let's say, at a 737 aircraft, something most people have flown in that are lyistening, they starred making them in the late '60s and early '70s and they were quite different than they are today. but it's a proven design that at any given time the 737 is a standard build. would that be somewhat similar to how the evolution of standard build goes, that what you build 20 years from now the standard would change over time, but the idea is to have a continuously improving product, like a 737 boeing aircraft, that everybody

kind of recognizes it but it keeps getting better over time. >> i think that's a fair analogy. >> same idea, we all recognize it's not a strict design but a design built over time. >> ms. muniz, in response to a cbs morning news program and a cbs evening news program, the state department was able to put out its fact sheet, they did produce those documents, but again, no documents produced to the united states congress. in this you say, all facilities will be delivered on the same, if not shorter, schedules. there is no evidence to the contrary. do you have any examples of a design excellence building that is coming in on time or a shorter schedule than standard

embassy design, and do you have any examples of any building that's been built for less than money -- or less than the money that we would have spent under standard embassy design? >> thank you for that question. what i'd like to go over is that as the committee knows, the process to -- >> no, no, no. i'm sorry, i have five minutes and' got like 100 questions. d do you have a single example of su success as you've stated it? >> yes. >> which one? >> there are early excellence initiative projects. there was one in 2011, one in '12 -- >> i need the names of these facilities. >> we could submit those for the record and i'll take a bit more time to go over those. >> hold on, hold on, i'm sorry, but i've already tape up a minu -- taken up a minute and a half. you're going to give us the

names of those buildings. whether y when are you going to give them to us? >> i could give them to you now. >> 2010, 2012 enchaba. those are early excellence initiatives. the first products that will be in the initial standards are fy-14. those are typically entered the end of the fiscal year. they are all on budget and on schedule and we will provide additional data about those projects as soon as those projects are awarded. >> let's go to park wars for a second. i went there in february. when was that originally slated to be completed? >> may of 2014. >> now when is it slated to be completed? >> in early 2018. >> so they're having to stay in

the same facility. it's exceptionally dangerous, correct? >> the reason fort morrisbee is getting a new embassy is because it's dangerous. >> when did you get a final determination that the marines would be located at fort morrisby? >> the numbers were provided in 2008. as the committee knows, the numbers and the program for the embassy is not set by the obo. >> i'm asking you when did you get notification that the marines would be located at -- >> we had a contract in 2011. two years into the construction of that project, we were notified that marines would be going to port morrisby and that a staff of 41 could increase by 31. including the marines, that's a doubling of the size of the embassy. there was no way to continue with the project in a way that allowed us to deploy our

resources intelligently that would have allowed diplomatic security to certify the building and to co-locate all of the staff. we made the modifications that were necessary based on real changes that reflected american priorities in port morrisby. >> let me try again. when did you get the official notification that you were getting marines? >> 2013. >> can you provide that to this body? >> yes. >> when will i get that? >> the department is part of that answer, so we will provide that as quickly as possible. >> this is the challenge, chairman. if it's so dangerous and they need marines, why aren't they there now? >>. >> the deployment of marines is not something within the obo's purview, so i would defer that

to someone else. >> that cost was going to be originally what? under standard embassy design, it was going to be expensive -- roughly $50 million, correct? >> no, that's inaccurate. that's the construction contract only. the information we provided to the committee and to the cbs reporter who reported on this was that the budget was 79 million. >> what's the budget now? >> the budget is not yet reconfirmed. i think we're going to be close to 200 -- >> wait a second. it's not reconfirmed? what about this document here that i have that has initials on it. it says, will remain $211 million for this option. >> we believe the cost will be under that. we are at 35% design. >> but that is what was signed off on. >> that is not what was signed off on. that is not a final budget. >> we will go through that in further detail. i pass my time and i have a host of other questions.

>> i thank the gentleman. we now go to the gentleman from massachusetts, the other mr. cherney, congressman lynch. >> i know we're beating up on the state department a little bit. i do want to say, to be fair, the state department did turn around an immediate request from the chairman last weekend to support a delegation to inspect the embassy in london. that request came in on a friday, codell left on a sunday and the meetings and briefings were lined up for monday. usually codell's delegations are planned for weeks ahead. so the department should be thanked, i think, for the effort in helping the committee do that inspection. but i would caution you and to your colleagues that have the authority to approve oversight

committee codell's for inspecting these various embassies that we do need cooperation. we need cooperation right now in iraq, and i know you have limited resources, but we have a responsibility here as the civilian part of this government to get in and make sure that our folks are safe, so we need cooperation there. we need cooperation in yemen, we need cooperation in afghanistan, and so we understand very well the trepidation that you have. but this is a necessary part of our job and we need full cooperation from the state department on doing oversight. it's not just your job, it's also our job. so we just want to amplify our need to get in and out of these countries as expeditiously as possible. and we apologize for any diversion of resources to make that happen, but if we're going

to sign off on a budget, we need to know what the situation is on the ground. we owe that to the taxpayers and the personnel that are in these facilities, so enough of that. i do want to talk a little bit, ms. muniz, about the drawback -- i understand, mr. chaffins has an affinity for the standard design. but looking at it, it requires a pretty good parcel of land to set it down. this is the problem we had in damascus. we're downtown on the street, very exposed. we were trying at that point to get the set design configuration for the new embassy there, new location. so there was nothing downtown, so we end up further out. that exposes us, even though we would have sort of mr. chaffins' idea of a set design with an

apron of security there, we would have to be further out of town with a long commute for our people once they fly in. they would be very much exposed to getting to the embassy. this is the same problem we had in afghanistan. the most dangerous drive in recent years is when delegations fly in to afghanistan and then you've got to drive up that road through missoud circle out to the embassy. they tried to tip my car over there in that rotary there a while back. a bunch of people very upset about somebody flushing a koran down the toilet or something like that, and the crowds just went wild. so putting our people out in a remote location is not the safest result for our embassy, either. tell me the answer, how to

configure this. you haven't abandoned that whole set design, right? is that still on the table when the land is available? >> thank you for the question. let me try to reply to it quickly. you make a great point. part of the difficulty of the standard embassy design is that it was a largely horizontal solution so that where land is abundant where we could still be on that much property in close proximity to our colleagues so that we're not required to travel back and forth, which has not only security but extensive cost implications, it made sense. but in a lot of the cities we're required to build in now, not only is it not possible to find those 10 acres, if we were able to find it, it is extraordinarily expensive. the example of london. we are building on less than 5 acres, 4.9 acres.

property in london is very expensive. it makes a huge difference to be able to be on a smaller plot of land while still meeting all the security requirements, including the legal requirements for a 100-foot setback. so both cost and security, i think, play, but it also gives us a lot of flexibility to build where we need to build in where 10 acres may simply not be available. >> what you're saying is the design excellence model gives you that flexibility? >> it absolutely gives us that flexibility. >> when i try to think of the different location, the different demands that we have to operate in, it does give you

a cause to try to come up with a one size fits all solution to that, which i think the set design more or less requires. and i do support your ability to have modifications on that more towards the design excellence piece. but, you know, sometimes we do have what someone, a casual observer, might observe it as being far beyond what is necessary. so we have to caution people on the cost aspect of that as well. i've exhaust med my time. >> will the gentleman yield for a moment? i believe there are multiple examples of standard embassy design on less than 10 acres. one of the concerns i have is we have multiple gao reports, we have an inspector general report, all confirming that these buildings, in general, there are some exceptions but we are coming in under budget and faster. and --

>> just reclaiming my time for a minute, the baghdad embassy, though, dear lord, that was $750 million. that was three-quarters of a billion dollars. >> baghdad is not a standard embassy design. >> it's a modified standard embassy design. that's what it started out as. we have more than 10 acres there. not the ideal situation. what i'm saying it's not just a question of one method versus the other. i think whatever allows us some flexibility to consider the situation on the ground would probably provide the best -- and i don't disagree with the points you're raising, i don't. i don't. i just think that it is so varied, the landscape under which the obo and state department have to operate, they need that flexibility. that's all i'm saying. thank you, i yield back. >> the gentleman yields back. i now recognize the gentleman from michigan, mr. wahlberg, for

five minutes. >> thank you. i just opened my statement to have the privilege of traveling to a number of different consulates in regions of great insecurity. my impression of our public servants that are in those positions was enhanced, increas increased, almost in disbelief that someone would take those positionings. so we do want to make sure they're cared for appropriately, we want to make sure the taxpayers are cared for appropriately as well. and i would add my comments to those already requesting that if you please convey to people who can get us documents that we've been requesting. it's so important. i've been listening to questioning already and find disagreements on numbers, on size figures and things like

that simply because we don't have the information. we can't do the work. i don't expect any hard drive to break down -- i hope not -- before we get that information, but we really need that. in your testimonies, ms. muniz and mr. jones, you talk about development of design excellence. you talked about how working with them was a very precipatory process. can you describe how the department of design security worked with design excellence? >> you can move that microphone closer. thank you. >> the foundation of the excellence initiative, sort of our base going in statement, was

that we are not changing the security standards, period. i have been in discussions with my colleagues in diplomatic security at the highest levels and at the working level and have made that assurance. i think that is what is most important to them and they have every reason to insist that that still be the case. >> did they clear on design excellence? >> they cleared on our process, yes. and they support the process. >> who cleared? >> i would have to get back to you on the clearances, but, again, how we put those buildings together is in the responsibilities of the bureau of overseas buildings operations. to the degree that we continue to build facilities that meet all of diplomatic securities' concerns, that's what they need to sign off. in addition to understanding that we not add cost or add time to schedules in a way that would also jeopardize security. and we have committed to not doing that. >> but they haven't signed off

yet or they have signed off? >> we have support at the highest levels of diplomatic security and moving forward with this. a formal sign-off within the department was not in the process, but they have signed off on our documents describing the process and how we're going to go about it. >> could you get those documents to us? could i give you that assignment, to get those documents to us? >> i'd also like, if i could, a number of members have mentioned the document request. i would like to convey both personally and professionally that i take seriously the role of this committee and of other congressional committees. it was a vast request. we are working as quickly as we can to collect that information together and we'll get information to the committee. >> but again, even the information that was in al jazeera didn't come to us. >> i understand. >> i appreciate your emotion on

that, i appreciate your promise, your intentions, but we really need the documents. mr. green, the panel on diplomatic security organization and management, a group which you chair, says in its final report that, and i quote, that it understands the desire to have embassies and consulates that are more welcoming and to reflect the openness of american society. and i quote, obo is convinced that design excellence has widespread support within the department. however, the report also mentions that from a diplomatic security standpoint there are questions raised by the changes under way in the embassy construction program. the question is, can you explain what those concerns are from a security perspective? >> sure. the -- and we outlined them in the report, and i leave that to

the committee to read at your leisure. but there is another one that came up later and it goes to an earlier discussion here about the building that design excellence provides in real estate and smaller places. that is one of the areas that ds really objected to in our discussions with them, both urban sites and smaller areas. are we going to just have more waif waivers for the 100-foot setback? i know the difficulty of transiting if you're out in the boondocks somewhere, but there's got to be some accommodation. if security, in fact, is our most important issue, then -- let me quote from an obo document here. it says, whenever possible,

sites will be selected in urban areas, allowing u.s. embassies and consulates to contribute to the civic and urban fabric of those host cities. special attention will be paid to the general ensemble of surrounding building streets and public spaces which the embassies and consulates will form a part. what ds doesn't want is something on the street that a car bomb can drive up to and blow a hole in the wall. so i agree with the flexibility. there are cost issues, as the directors mentioned, but some way, as we recommended in our report, the department has got to do an in-depth analysis of the security implications before you just start building downtown. >> i appreciate that. my time has expired. >> i was going to say the gentleman's time has expired.

i now recognize the gentlewoman from illinois, ms. kelly, for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chair. the independent review board made several remcommendations t enhance security. mr. green, you led this panel which issued a report last year raising concerns with the design excellence program. this report stated, and i quote, while the panel agrees a special consideration proposed in places like london and paris are warranted, security concerns for many others deserve serious consideration. the report also found no evidence of a business case or cost business analysis supporting this initiative. mr. green, is that correct? >> when we did the report, there was no evidence of any business case or cost benefit analysis, that's correct. >> and why is such a study

worthwhile? >> why is such -- the study we did worthwhile? this was only one recommendation of 35. there were 34 other recommendations that dealt with ds, management and operations and organization and training. this was only one which came to light as we began to talk to ds people that expressed concern about security. >> and has the department responded to this finding? >> no, the department has not responded to any of these recommendations. i've heard informally that they've accepted in part or in whole of the 35, but i frankly was not expecting them to respond. this was a report that was asked for by the undersecretary for management based on the arb recommendation. we did the report, we turned it

in and went home. >> so you're saying there is no cost benefit study on the new one? >> not that i know of. >> i take it the government has not dismissed the panel's finding as irrelevant, so what has the department done to the report? >> typically a cost benefit analysis is done before we go into a scenario where there is additional cost to make sure that that additional cost is warranted. as i've explained and assured the committee, there is no additional cost under the excellence initiative. we're setting budgets based on standard embassy design budgets. if anything, we're hoping that costs will go down as we're able to look at longer term operating costs and to make decisions that allow us to effect that. the recommendation was also that we ensure -- that we look at what the impact was on security.

again, as i've explained to the committee and to the members, there is no impact on security. we will meet all of the security standards. two of those standards, as you know, are in law. that's setback and co-location. so as mr. green describes the concern about being on urban plots, we will always meet that setback that is required in law regardless of being in a smaller plot. it's simply that the ability to have a building go up rather than be horizontal, to not have a warehouse in a place where we're able to get materials in realtime, and to build one would be wasteful, we're able to take those into consideration and build on smaller pieces of property. >> we might -- would you please remind us what the setback requirement is? >> the setback requirement is

100 feet. >> mr. green, any other comments about the director's response? >> no. >> i would like to thank you and your committee for the work on the panel. >> on the one hand, ms. muniz, you say you're confident it is going to come under budget. at the same time, we don't have a cost benefit analysis. it hasn't been done, correct? >> i've not said under budget, i said on budget. >> you were hoping it would come under budget. >> the department sets budgets, the obo sets budgets based on the number of desks and based on the program for the facility. we use data accumulated from the design to set budgets. >> but you have no completed design excellence building. in fact, you used the building

in chad as your success story, right? that was one of your examples. if we went to chad and looked at emjonina, what would we see? what would we see if we went to chad. you used it for an example of success. >> i'm not sure what we would see. >> do they even have a hole in the ground yet? >> i don't have the status. >> you came up with the example, and i'm telling you that it's not even scheduled to be completed until october of 2016. we're not even sure there is a hole in the ground yet and you're using that as a success story. am i wrong? >> i described the projects that were awarded using the excellence principles. to say that those projects were awarded is not the same thing as to say that those projects are completed. >> do you have any completed

projects under the design excellence program? >> as i explained, we do not. the first project that we awarded as a variation on the excellence initiative was in 2011. the first real projects that we were awarded, we will award, as i stated, are in 2014. that is this fiscal year. >> so the success that you have is just the awards. it's not actually achieving. my time has expired. i appreciate the gentlewoman from illinois yielding her time. we will now recognize the gentleman from michigan for five minutes. >> thank you for being here today to testify. the chairman earlier alluded to the beauty is in the eye of the beholder, and i can tell you pr experience the sandbagged bunker looks really good to a soldier

under a mortar attack, and i can assure you we don't want to build it look being like a sandbag bunker, but i do know we have a need for curb appeal. after going through these reports and talking to other people outside this hearing, i just have a few simple questions. do we have a file number for the baghdad embassy cost? >> i believe we do, but i don't have it at the top of my head. >> i heard that the contractor made over $500 billion profit. did you hear the same thing? $500 million in profit? >> again, this was a project that was -- >> one of the most expensive embassies ever built. >> this was under the bush administration. >> do you have access to those numbers? >> yes, and we can certainly provide those to you. >> what did we say the london embassy is going to cost? >> the total project cost for london is near a billion

dollars. >> a billion dollars. how many people are going to work in there? >> if you exclude the property price, it is under $800 million. the cost to do a major rehabilitation and security upgrades of the existing chancery, which would have never met security standards including two in law, are $730 million. >> for a billion dollars, i would probably -- we can't say that, we do need an embassy in london. but a billion dollars seems like we should be looking at some alternatives. i know in places like iraq, we use pascal barriers, concrete, fabricated concrete barriers that are placed relatively quickly in times of danger. as in questions in regards to costly -- wrap reinforcement, standoff distance of 100 feet, construction with curtain walls,

all kinds of things that, well, deal with security but you're putting more emphasis, it seems, on curb appeal. and i just -- a few more questions. can you give me a few reinforced concrete examples how moving to this new design strategy enhances security? >> so i think london is a great example and i'd like to speak in that context. >> a billion dollars. you have my -- >> these were properties that were existing in london. this is a project that did not have to be done. for net zero, for the taxpayer, we are able to 100% replace those facilities for $50 million more than it would have cost to do massive up gradgrades that w have left it vulnerable to setback. >> would it be just outside of london where the cost is less

expensive? a billion dollars. >> i would argue in london, it wouldn't hurt to be outside of london. >> do you have a uniform layout for all embassy facilities which could aid personnel and training during emergencies? you have to go from one embassy to the next, everything is different, the design plan is different, everything seems to be tailored at expensive costs. >> our diplomatic security staff are incredibly skilled, and right now they deal way wide variety of context and of buildings. i would also like to say that if we stayed with the standard embassy design which basically had two separate bars of construction, it is less efficient, it is harder to get from one bar to the other than a cube. london is a good example of that. and to build more efficiently also saves dramatically in terms of cost. >> a billion dollars for an embassy and that's efficient.

i just have a real problem with that, because having experienced iraq and vietnam, i know we build the same bunkers, pretty much the same standard design, a few improvements here and there. i know we could do the same thing with a more modern building, use a standard format design either going up or out. you could probably have three standard designs that would fit just about anywhere. why do i know that? because i have experience in that business. we build our military vehicles pretty much the same way. they're compartmentalized. we can go into a tank and change the engine out in a matter of hours. mr. chairman, i have a real problem with a billion-dollar design and costs when contractors are making 500 million profit on some of our most expensive embassies.

thank you very much. i yield back. >> i thank the gentleman. i now recognize the gentleman from vermont, mr. welch, for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you. you've got a pretty hard job. it really is. but two things. when mr. lynch indicated gratitude for your cooperation in turning around at codell. secondly, i know the subcommittee sent some request for information. it is helpful to the committee, it's a burden on you, but it really makes for a better life all around if there can be as much cooperation as possible in a timely way. but i do want to acknowledge the hard work that you have to do. one question i have is how much -- i mean, the costs are high. how much of the complications that you face day to day in making decisions about an embassy, wherever it may be, have to do with the enormous security requirements that now seem to be part of everything?

i'll ask you, ms. muniz. >> i think the security requirements clearly significantly add to the expense, but i don't know that anybody in the state department on this committee would call into question the need for those security measures, both operationally during building and the measures physically that are put in place. but it does, when you look at the average cost of an embassy as compared to an office building on the market, those costs are very different but they are really driven by what are some of the safest facilities in the world. >> mr. green, one of the things i find a little troubling is when i visit embassies, they're remote in many cases and difficult working circumstances, it seems, for some of the embassy personnel as a result of the security requirements. and is there some indication

that there are some cases where too much security actually interferes with the ability of the embassy pepprsonnel to do their job effectively? >> i would say generally no, but if you talk about access, for example, for employees, particularly non-u.s. employees who are held up going through various security checkpoints, possibly there is. but i think generally ds is not going to spend money to oversecure a place. if anything, we probably have some that are undersecured. >> that's helpful. mr. chairman, i am prepared to yield the balance of my time. >> my colleague yields the balance of my time. >> i would like to yield the

balance of my time to mr. schaefer. >> okay. go ahead. >> i yield my time to mr. connelly. >> i apologize for the misunderstanding. this is not a theoretical discussion. i went to beirut for the embassy bombing. no setback, right off the main thorou thoroughfare, and i had a friend killed, bill mcintire, in the bombing and we were bombed again. kenya, tanzania, some of the loudest critics of the cost of security and securing our embassies. of course, you talk about the lack of security in benghazi. and it is a balance, but security, we've learned too painfully, is a very important

component in making decisions about fortifying, setbacks and the like. is that not true, mr. green? >> it is the most important decision. >> let me ask, how do we balance, though, the need for accessibility, the need for visibility, the need for convenience in another country? i mean, we cannot forget it isn't just about us and our security and convenience. it's also about the population our embassy consulate are serving. lots of people want to do business and so forth. help us understand a little bit from your point of view with your commission. how do we strike the right balance? >> that's probably the toughest question that anyone here has asked today. i don't know that there is a magic bullet to do that. but you've got to manage risk, and people have different opinions of how you do that, whether security takes precedent or access takes precedent.

i remember when i was still at the state department, there was a big battle between those who -- in the old usia who wanted more access for the local populace to go to the libraries. and on the flip side of that were the security people who said we can't afford to have a library hanging out there in some commercial building. so we haven't solved it. i think it's -- you know, you have to manage risk based on the situation, based on the threat, and if you need more security or less security, then that's what you do. i mean, we can adjust. >> let me add, based on what you just said, you can't just have a

cookie cutter approach because the situation is different everywhere. >> that's right. >> i yield. thank you. >> we now recognize the gentleman from florida, mr. micah, for five minutes. >> thank you. i think this is a very important hearing. sometimes it doesn't get the attention others do but it's an important meat and potatoes hearing that talks about our em -- embassies' security that was highlighted by benghazi and our various posts around the world. it's kind of interesting, my brother was a member of congress, chaired the subcommittee -- i think it was international operations that did the inman buildings when they were looking at security

facilities. >> mr. mica, that was your democratic brother. >> it was. and if he got it right, we wouldn't be here today with this hearing. but 6 it's nearly impossibility to protect every compound. our employees are at risk around the world. they can't all be confined in the compound, but some things can be done. we have two lists i understand. one is prepared by o.b.o., and another one is by the security folks, diplomatic security folks, on the risk level. i just saw a copy of one of those, which you have all not provided to us, but we've gotten a copy, and for obvious reasons we don't publicize that.

we don't want our enemies to know where our emphasis is, but there are just some common-sense things that need to be done and more posts are at risk than others. mr. jones and mr. green, you would agree? one of the problems we have is there's a security list i have seen and it differs from the o.b.o. list. can you tell me about the differences? >> yes, i can, and i appreciate the opportunity. d.s. assesses every facility worldwide on an annual basis for its risk. that's called the vulnerability list. that list is very, very extensive, because it includes every building in a compound which may have, say, a half dozen facilities spread around the town. we take that -- >> but it does rank them?

>> it does, absolutely. >> your list is different from their list. is that correct? >> we basically translate their list into the highest risk posts. we pull up -- in other words, if they're assessing 12 facilities, we pull up the highest at risk and put it on the -- our vulnerability list, our our capital -- >> but they don't match, i'm told. >> they can't match exactly, because for their ten entries, we would have one. >> well, again this started out as looking at design excellence and choosing design as opposed to security, you have diplomatic security that is directed to make certain that our folks are protected, and you are making your determinations, but they don't mesh.

that may leave must have or facilities at risk. for example, benghazi i was told was high on the list, but actually didn't get the attention either from reinforcement after a number of requests of security personnel, and other safeguards, and that some of the attention that should have been focused there -- and that would be the second tear of state's ultimate responsibility. is that correct? or is this -- >> the department o.b.o. and d.s. decide on that capital security schedule. >> does the secretary review the list? >> not to my knowledge. >> not to your knowledge? that's something we may need to change in the law, but again, i would think that the secretary of state charged with the safety and security of our embassies would at least look at the list.

you don't think like the former secretary when benghazi occurred even looked at the list or was given the list? >> i can't speak to that, but i can assure you working with diplomatic security, which we do every year on that list, that diplomatic security signs off on the order of that list, and that it is based on the ranks of our buildings. >> someone failed in benghazi. i'm told it was high on the list, that the proper attention was not paid to making certain it would the protections. even a high school -- a high schooler could look at the list, libya, benghazi, and pick that as a top priority, wouldn't you say that would be a top priority if you were looking at a list? a year ago or whenever? >> the capital security

construction program provides for consualates. >> benghazi was neither an embassy nor a consulate and was not on the list. >> but it had american personnel, and it also posed a risk diplomatic security was also responsible for the security of the personnel there. i'm -- and they contracted also for services. is that correct? >> i could make a general statement about benghazi and about o.b.o.'s role, but i think beyond that i didn't come today prepared -- >> i just want the general procedure. mr. issa and i visited post-benghazi some of the different diplomatic posts. we saw some simple common-sense things that needed to be done, improvements in video capability, improvements in a whole host of areas. are you aware that those improvements that have been identified by the different groups and congress have been made so our personnel are not at risk?

final question. >> you're talking about improvements in benghazi, we no longer -- >> security improvements in our diplomatic posts that have been -- there's a host of groups investigating, reporting, and they've said that certain things need to be done. i cited one as video capability. there are many others. maybe we don't want to discuss it in an open forum, but can you tell the committee, from your position, have those improvements been made and addressed? >> so let me respond on two fronts. >> excuse me, could you please speak into your microphone. thank you. >> sorry. as the committee knows, the secretary in the wake of benghazi appointed an accountability review board. that review board made 28 recommendations. the department accepted all of those recommendations, and has been aggressively implementing those recommendation.

they've also reported to congress on the implementation. o.b.o. is involved -- we're -- >> can i interrupt you right there? part of that accountability review process was the development of this report by mr. green, and you had secretary -- undersecretary kennedy go on cbs news and say they don't accept it. so how do you represent that the state department has accepted all those recommendations when the work of mr. green was not accepted? >> and also, mr. chairman, if they could for the record -- and i think all the members would want this -- >> let's -- >> can you also give us for the record what has been implemented if some of those recommendations have to remain not public, that's fine, but give them to the committee? >> i can certainly take that back to the department and we can reply to that request. >> you didn't answer mr. chaffetz's -- >> we're going to recognize mr. connelly and we'll come back to

this. >> i thank the chair. the assertion is being made that patrick kennedy contradicted the secretary of state, and i don't believe that's true. i believe that's ink accurate, and for the record, i would ask you to go back and have mr. kennedy clarify, but i'm quite confident, knowing mr. kennedy, he was not contradicting the secretary of state, who said she had accepted all recommendations, as you just said. if there's in daylight between those two points of views, by all means come back and clarify, but i didn't hear mr. kennedy say any such thing. i also find it interesting that in hindsight we have perfect understanding of the security needs in benghazi, and you should have understood that benghazi of all the posts in the world was number one.

shame on you for not understanding that. how many post dos we have in the state department around the world? >> roughly 270. >> i'm sorry? >> roughly 270. >> you really don't like that microphone, do you? thank you. >> we have roughly 270. >> yes. >> so we have lots of security challenges, and benghazi was neither a consulate nor an embassy. that doesn't mean it's not important. we want to protect all american personnel, we don't want anyone at risk, but unfortunately we live in a dangerous and imperfect world. here's the same crowd explaining about you spending too much money, which, well, you know, in any security situation, you've got to do some triage in where you put your money and how you prioritize it. >> i think that's absolutely right. >> and obviously you wish all 270 posts, including benghazi were perfectly secure with the

perfect setbacks and in the right location that met all of the demands, the functionality, the needs of the host country, accessibility for everybody, but security that's impregnable. is that not correct? >> i think that's accurate. >> that would be called a perfect world. would that be fair? >> yes, that would be. >> so i'm not quite sure how much that perfect world would cost, but absent a perfect world, the question is, can we do better? can we make better decisions? better informed decisions? as mr. green and i were talking about earlier, clearly understand that in security in some ways is to dominate some decisions or at least takes preponderance of the weight as we consider auld factors, but it can never be the only consideration, because what's

the point of having a state department facility? an embassy, a consulate, if it can't function? that's the dilemma. that's what mr. green and i were talking about earlier, that balance. i assume that's something that bedevils you and your colleague, mr. jones? >> i would say that i'm naturally optimistic, and i really do believe that with great architects, great engineers, great builders, that we can crack that nut, that we can build buildings that are secure, we can make them as efficient as possible, but i really do think that we can't do everything that's humanly possible and have those buildings do the maximum they should do. i think the standard embassy design taught us a lot. i think we were able to take a lot of those lessons and i think we'll continue to learn and make these facilities better and better and fast ever

economical and efficient. but i believe that we're going to get there and i'm dedicated to getting us there. >> i want to pick up on this point, however. while i am bothered by, sort of a double standard. some seem to have about this whole issue of security. you should have known but don't spend so much money and the cookie-cutter approach will do fine and as mr. green said, it won't be fine. we have to take this into the verification among the 270 posts and the different cultures and threat assessments and so forth. but a billion dollars is a lot of money. first of all, it was not clear, it's hard to follow your map. were you telling us that all by $50 million of the $1 billion has been recovered by the sale of other property we own in london and in the vicinity?

there's the microphone again. >> okay. let me go ever out very briefly. >> really briefly. i have 90 seconds. >> we sold all of our current properties in london. the proceeds of the sale from those properties are paying for the project. there will likely be a small amount of money left in reserve at the end of the london projects. comparison i was making is that the bureau before my time there and i believe at the time that mr. green was at the department, assessed whether it would be better to fix the current chancery, which would have cost $730 million, or to build a new one. when you compare the cost, excludeing the site in london, it's under $800 million. for a difference of $50 million we're able to build a facility that needs setback and it meets all the security requirements and that doesn't require any new appropriated funds. >> thank you for that clarification. mr. chairman, thank you. >> thank the gentleman.

we'll recognize the gentleman from north carolina. mr. meadows. >> thank you, mr. chairman and thank you each for your testimony. i want before mr. connelly leaves, he made the comment to the gentleman from virginia. he sits on the foreign affairs committee with me. i guess i'm troubled that this is the first time that we're really hearing about design excellence and in terms of the re -- and in the way that it's gone and i'm -- i'm a passionate about foreign affairs. and i attend the majority of those hearings and so, i think the gentleman from virginia would say that this is the first time he's heard but i yield for a couple of seconds. can i just -- >> to my friend from north carolina. i'm sympathetic to the challenge we face. i think before, you're right. for me, this is not some political thing? >> right. >> i had a friend killed in one of our ambassador in our terrorist attack because there was no setback and because we

were not diligent about the threat assessment. >> is this the first time you've heard about design excellence? >> it is. and i want to tell you this whole issue of building security. when i worked in the senate 30 years ago, we were talking about this. and it seems to bedevil the state department in part, because it's not their expertise. >> i think the gentleman from virginia, it is very troubling to me that when i sit on an authorizing committee and now, on an oversight committee, and probably even more difficult for me because i built the buildings. i've worked with architects. i know design build very well. that how do we have a set of standards, for example, let's talk about security. all of us in a bipartisan manner here, agree on security. what diplomatic security standards do we have for this

design excellence component? who's weighed in on that? or are you just counting on architects and engineers? >> all of the standards are established by diplomatic security. and in law. setback and law. >> i'm not talking about the setbacks. i'm talking about the actual design part of it. the setbacks are pretty easy. we talked about that today. you have a set of standards by diplomatic security that are published that i can find today? because i couldn't find them. >> i know that some of those standards are classified. >> i've got security clearance. i'd be glad to go look at it. you're saying if i go in a classified setting i could find that today? make sure, you're under oath. you know, you've got some staff

behind you. are you sure about that? >> let me put hit the way. we meet all of the security standards established by diplomatic security for every new consulate and embassy. diplomatic security certifies the buildings meet not only their requirements and their standards established by the ospd but also the standards set in law. all of the standards established by bs and obo to the degree that we're responsible for like safety and fire standards. all of those are met. nothing will be changed with respect to those security standards going from the standard embassy design. >> what does change? >> i think the way i would explain it is that we took what was a fixed module, a fixed solution to building and we deconstructed it in a way that it became more of a part. >> why? >> to make it look better? >> no. to make it more efficient and cost less. to build less in environments where we don't need a warehouse

and we don't need ten acres. >> but let me -- >> and these buildings are crafted to maintain low operating. >> i understand that was the goal. where do we have any example where that's actually really happened to date? >> that's a fair question but it's a relatively recent initiative. >> so the answer is yes or no? do we have any example? one? one example? >> the examples that we were early examples are in the pipeline so -- >> so do we have one completed example? yeah or no. >> no, don't. >> so how can you say definitively that it's costing the taxpayers less and it's secure and it meets the standard and it does all of that? are you projecting that? >> we know the designs are certified by diplomatic security. we know what the costs are because weigh set the budget and we know what the schedules are because those are the schedules that we felt to build those facilities overseas. >> why haven't we heard about in

foreign affairs? >> i'd like to go back and answer that question. we have briefed this program and there have been new settings on the hill where this program has been discussed since 2011. >> yeah, so when was the major initiative briefed to -- >> the first time it was briefed to the hill was in march -- >> to foreign affairs. i sit on that committee, too. i'm not aware that you ever briefed us. when did you brief us? the major initiative? ever? >> we offered briefings. i'd have to go back to my staff and find -- >> they're behind you so turn around and ask them. when did you brief us? i have my calendar. i'll be glad to check. can and i'm stalking about the major initiative here.

i'm not talking about a teeny component. >> it's my understanding that we offered briefings when we went up and briefed in march of 2011, we offered all committees the opportunity to be briefed in this program. >> the house foreign affairs turned you down? >> my understanding is that, yes, they did. i'd like to go back and put together the schedule but we offered briefings to our authorizers and -- >> let me tell you that i sit on that committee. and it hadn't been authorized. you've had new budget requirements and i would suggest as part of the normal order, that you would go before that committee as well. don't you think? >> i would be more than happy to brief any committee that's interested in the program and to answer any of the questions. i know we invited staff to and provided materials but i would be more than happy to go to any committee and have a conversation about this. >> before you put out any more bids and award any more contracts? would you be willing to commit

to that? >> no. >> i yield back. >> i recognize the gentle woman from illinois, ms. duckworth for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. so i understand the tension between making sure our embassies are accessible to the host nation citizens that want to do business with the united states and as well as to allow the embassy personnel to do the jobs they need to do. and folks are seeing where there's not enough security but these are the same folks that voted to cut funding to the state department. i wasn't here then. i'm here now and my focus is moving forward. and in looking at the design excellence program. as i have so far, i do applaud its modularity concept.

you have these components that help with security and you can put them together in different ways as appropriate to the nation, the security risk, the available land, all of those things and as opposed to the single embassy design. there is a security issue with that as well. we don't want one single embassy design where everyone we build was the same. if i was off terrorist i just have to figure out one and then i know the weaknesses for all the embassies. but i have a concern with the design excellence program. and that is the involvement of security experts in development of the design excellence program. i know there were some who were on the commission to develop it. but ms. munaz and mr. green, if you could address the actual input of the security experts into the program and setting

standards in the program, and whether there's an ongoing effort to keep the security experts involved. beyond what the state department comes up with on its own. one of the criticisms that has happened has been that the state department has underestimated the security needs and the security threats. and i want to make sure as we move forward and build these embassies that security considerations are part of that ongoing process of assessment. so if you could sort of address that, starting from who was on the initial commission and whether that involvement and security continues and mr. green, if you could gives your assessment as a security expert yourself. >> i'm not really a security expert. >> you led the committee that was asked by the arb and i think that you have some very valid comments that i would like to hear about in terms of security

in the design excellence program. but i like ms. munoz to start, if you don't mind. >> as i mentioned earlier, the founding commitment with this program as with any other programs that would evolve over time relating to embassy and consulate construction is we meet all the security standards. change them over time. whatever they throw at us, we're going to implement because that's our responsibility. i want to make that point very clear. our goal with this process is also to improve our coordination with the dip maltic security. so to have them more involved with us and have them more involved earlier to make sure that they see everything that we're doing throughout the development of the project. so i would argue that their involvement is going to increase and that the key commitment that i know is important to them is that we continue to meet all of the security standard. and i have assured the department, i assure this

committee we'll continue to do that. >> mr. green? >> i don't know what the interaction today is between ds and obo as they develop new plans for embassies and consulates. what i do know and recognize, this report was done now more than a year ago. maybe they're all joining hands and singing now. but when we interviewed people who were concerned with security. not just ds but people from other parts of the government also, they were not happy, the people we talked to, were not happy in their role -- with their role in the selection process and felt very strongly that the pendulum has shifted

from security to design. i mentioned -- and there's several examples of our observations as i said before -- didn't come from the six of us. these were based on the interviews that we did with more than 100 people. not all of them, obviously, opined on obo and security. but many did. and so those observations that are in there, it's not my opinion. it's what we got from people who work on a daily basis or hopefully, work on a daily basis with obo. >> thank you, i'm out of time, mr. chairman. >> if the gentle woman will yield so she could reclaim some time and respond to this. >> yes, i yield. >> mr. green speerhead this is effort and puts together this report which was an offshoot and started because of the accountability review board, ms. munoz, has the state

department accepted this? has this been approved? is there anything under your mind that's been -- that did they disagree with it? >> as mr. green pointed out, the ds management review board really looked at ds's organizations. i don't know the status of the response or the implementation of the recommendations. >> i could take it back to my colleagues. >> that's my kin. >> let me finish. with respect to the questions relating to obo there was one recommendation that we look at the cost implications or the security implications of this program. and we have affirmed time and again that there will be no security implications to this program. we're dedicated to meeting all of the security requirements that ds establishes, that are established in law and in working with ds to innovate better and better products every year that better meet those security standards.

>> if it takes longer to build something do you consider that a security implication? >> as i explained to the committee, from the time of award, which is how obo receives its funding annually, the time to build the facility, because we're doing construction only, will be the same or shorter, which means that we'll have in safer facilities, faster than using the design build methodology, in particular, when we have advance time to plan. >> and i hope and ranking member and colleagues on both sides of the aisle, this report was done. we asked for a kwoip. -- we've asked for a copy. state department has thus far refused to give us a copy. al jazeera has it.

they have it out on their website. we don't have one and you're in the united states congress. even though i'm holding one that i got off of al jazeera are. you have patrick kennedy in off significant post go on cbs news and say he disagrees with this report. i think it's part of our business to understanding with what does hi disagree with and what does he agree where? if the very person that's implementing this office isn't totally familiar with it, isn't necessarily implementing it, there's a problem. there's a problem. >> again, i would like to restate. it was a ds management report. it hit and touched on ds diplomatic security would be better positioned to answer that question. >> i think they would be in a great position to answer it and i think next time we have this panel, we should include diplomatic security. if i had to do it over i would include diplomatic security here as well. >> would the gentle lady yield to me? >> yes. >> thanks. >> one question, mr. green. again, trying to get to the bottom line, security. when you did your surveying,

what exactly -- exactly -- you said you talked to 100 people surveyed 100 people. can you tell us a little bit about that process? so we can fully understand and appreciate what it was that you did and what you were telling these people and why you were asking -- because that's significant. you went to people whose interests -- whose interests would be to make sure that they were secure. am i right? >> well, yes. we interviewed more than 100 people. we had them come in and they spread across the -- all the bureaus in the state department and some from outside of the state. we interviewed some of the people that were on the review board. we asked different questions of different people.

some were organizational questions. does the assistant secretary for diplomatic security have enough of a role within the running the organization? there was a lot of emphasis on high-threat posts. post benghazi to establish a special cell for high-threat posts. not all of the people that we talked to, did we ask about the relationship with obo and others, but many of them we did ask that question to. and out of those questions, came these observations we laid out in our report. and the final recommendation, as i said before, we didn't make a determination that design excellence should be tossed out the window. all we said was -- before you go

a lot further with this, we recommend that the state department do an in-depth analysis to look at the security implications of this program. >> and it seems to me that, you know, a lot of times -- we have the departments and individuals disputing issues in government. and the people suffer during the dispute. you know, at some point we've got to figure this out so that our people are protected. i think members of congress and certainly the public, when they hear the debates, you know, not necessarily interested in watching this being made. they want to make sure that people are secure.

that the costs are reasonable and that the facility is functional. and that we're doing whatever we do effectively and efficiently. i just think sometimes, you know, it seems as if we feel like we've got to argue this and argue that. but at the same time, the people who need what we're supposed to be yielding, they're not getting it. what they get they're not getting it in a timely fashion. >> what our report, obviously, focused on security. >> i understand. >> and as i said early on, if someone can show me that we can do it just as inexpensively, just as securely, just as fast, using design excellence, i will sign up tomorrow. >> thank you, gentlemen. thank you the lady for yielding.

>> thank the gentle woman. i'll now recognize myself. i want to ask the cobb sent to enter into the record, it's called "the guide to design excellence" including the message from you, ms. munoz. the question for you is -- without hearing any objections, so ordered. we'll enter it into the record. who at state department, has approved this? >> the director of obo approved that document before i was director. it was adam mann. i want to make clear that this was a development that was widely briefed with security and on the hill and briefed publicly and was provided widely. so while it's within obo's authority to innovate and to develop programs that help us build the best buildings that we can that are cost effective and efficient, that is the -- >> and the question that we have long term is diplomatic

security's feeling about that. we'll come back to that. in response to cbs news, state department put out this statement. there has been no evidence that excellence projects take longer to build. in fact, under the excellence initiative, from the fiscal year award to occupancy, facilities will be delivered on the same if not shorter schedule. and in response to cbs news it says -- all facilities will be delivered on the same if not shorter schedules. there's no evidence to the contrary. help me understand, then, why this unclassified document help me understand what's going on in maputo. it started as a standard embassy design with an estimated development of 39 months. and, yet, now the says that on march 28th of 2014, they were changing to design excellence

and that it was going to take 46 months. >> i don't have the document that you have. i'd like to be able to respond to that but i need to be able to go back and look at detailed budgets and schedules. >> but this is something -- this is the frustration. we request this type of document formally, you play hide and seek. you don't provide it to us. you make all these representations that everything is ahead of schedule. in fact, it is probably going to be shorter is what you say. you put that out to the world. you gave that to cbs news. and you let everybody know, no, no, no. nothing is behind schedule and yet i find document. why is that? >> because i said i'd like to -- as i said i'd like to look at the case and the document you're holding to speak knowledgeably about that. >> do you dispute what i'm say

ing? >> i'm not sure what you're saying. >> i'm saying that in maputo you went from a 39 a month project to a 46-month project and if you're in africa and don't have the proper security you're going to feel the effects of that. >> again, i'll have to go back and look at the details of that project. >> tell me -- tell me about oslo. is it ahead of schedule or behind schedule? >> oslo has a new contractor working on that project. >> is it behind schedule or ahead of schedule? >> at this time, it's behind schedule. >> and it's a design excellence project? >> no. it's not. >> what is it? >> oslo was a project that was developed and could not be done as a standard embassy design because many cities, in particular in europe, have zoning requirements that require us to develop buildings differently. that's the case in oslo. >> it seems very convenient that you toggle between is it design excellence, is it standard

embassy design? is it or is it not? we don't have that clear definition. there's a lot of people and i believe some documents out there that say it is design excellence. so help me with what's going on in the hague. is it ahead of schedule or behind schedule? >> i'd have to look up details about the hague. again, the hague is like an oslo project. the hague was a project that was developed based on -- it had to be an adjusted design based on city requirements. >> based on design excellence? >> no. not based on design excellence. >> is it design, bid, build? >> i believe the hague is design, bid, build because the requirements in those cities force a very extensive development of the project in a way that indicates that design,

bid, build. that's a condition that we find in very many cities in europe in particular. we have that issue. we had that issue in london. we are had it in oslo and we have it in the hague. but those are projects that were started before the excellence initiative. the way in which they were developed, i think, may very well be responsive to the environment in a way in which the excellence initiative would have. >> let's go to kiev and the ukraine. what happened there? we needed more seats. we needed more personnel? what did you do there? >> usaid added an annex in kiev. >> how many seats? >> i don't have that -- >> more than 100 right? more than 100 seats? >> you've that at my fingertips. >> i do. it was standard embassy design and we add more than 100 additional seats. >> we added annex. >> still, seats. >> let me go to mr. jones. you've been so patient. let me go to you.

you were the one in you're testimony here, let me ask you. if it takes longer to build an embassy, we have people in harm's way. and it takes longer to build it, do you think that that puts people in harm's way or not? >> in the case of this? >> yeah. >> is that the question? >> yeah. >> the situation in port morsiby is we had a significant increase in the number of people who would be located on site and the addition of u.s. marines. >> so for those of you that aren't as familiar, we had 41 personnel. and that number was going to go up to 71 personnel, correct? >> right. >> but under law, we're required to co-locate the mission and would north have been able to do -- would not have been able to do so had we only built a building for 41 people. so there is a way, though -- >> so there's awe way to build

under standard embassy design, increase in the number of personnel. let's go back as to why -- why was the number of personal increased. >> we started with what was essentially a standard embassy design. it was a mini standard design. when we got increase to add the marines, we were unable -- >> when did that decision that marines were going in become -- when did you get that in. >> i believe it was in march of 2013. >> and you have documentation for this? can you provide that to the committee? >> yes. when we provide the other documents you requested we'll include that among them. >> okay. so there are no marines there now? and i think the public in general has a misconsengs as to what the marines actually do and don't do. they don't go outside the wall. they're there to protect classified information. in port morisby there's an exxonmobil project, multibillion dollar project being developed to support chinese.

the chinese have a 20-year contract. so i still don't fully understand or appreciate, and you're not necessarily the right person to answer the question want i don't want to put you on the spot, as to why we had to suddenly have this surge in the number of personnel. but nevertheless, the occupancy date for port morisby was going to be may of 2014, correct? >> that is correct. >> and the cost of that embassy was estimated to be, what? >> i believe the cost of the original facility was to be somewhere around $79 million. >> my understanding is it was going to be less than $50 million. >> the cost to construct the facility itself was 49. that includes -- the number i gave you include site costs. >> so we have the site, whether it's standard embassy design or design excellence, i happen to go there in february. the chief of mission has no clue

that any of this is going on. none of discussions, he had no idea. he was still anticipating and understood there was a delay but still thought that during his tenure they were going to be able to in. what is the new date that they're going to move in? >> i believe the new date will be in 2018. >> so and what is the estimated cost? >> we don't have a final cost yet because we don't have a completed design. >> because it's not a standard embassy design, correct? >> no. that's not the issue. >> are you telling me that this is not design excellence? that this is under standard i'll design? >> no. what i'm saying is that the compound in port morisby began as a standard facility. and it experienced an significant increase in staffing which prevented us from being able to use a standard design. the facility was not capable of

being modified because it was so small. so it required an annex. it is the addition of the people, the annex and the marines that are now making the delivery date in 2018. that is based on a cost-benefit analysis that the department has done. that is the fastest time that we're able to get the folks from that mission colocated on the compound with the marines. >> so this is so amazingly frustrated. the paperwork i have, not from you, but it said are said this facility costs in excess of $200 million. we're going to spend $3 million per seat! per seat!

>> in port morisby, new guinea. average per capita income is like $2500. >> i'd like to take some of these questions. >> well i'm not asking you. i'm asking mr. jones. i'll come to you. i'll give you plenty of time. so we're going to spend $3 million per seat and they're not going to be there for a good four yourself. you don't have a final design. what are they supposed to do for security there for the next four years while they wait? >> we are attempting to get safe and secure facilities open the fastest time schedule that we can. we're doing everything in our power to ensure that weir delivering safe, secure and function alpha -- -- functional facilities to the mission as efficiently as possible. >> my understanding is we added more than 105 desks in the ukraine. here we're talking about 30 and it cost us about $24 million.

and now we're looking at a project that was less than $50 billion to build and estimated to go north of $200 million in papa, new guinea and the consequence to this is, they're going to be in harm's way for a longer period of time. we're going to have less money to build other facilities in other parts of the world. it is behind schedule. and these poor people are working in some of the most difficult situations i've seen, in a very -- when i was there there was an attempted carjacking of u.s. diplomatic personal, while i was there. we also had two people who showed up at the door trying to represent themselves as somebody that wanted to come see me and come see the -- this was on a saturday -- dressed in garb that represented that they were there to meet people in the embassy. because you can walk right up. right across the street multiple times a year, very close, the pharmacy there, armed bandits

come in and try to rob that place. and there was no communication with that facility there in port morisby. the chief shouldn't have been getting that message from me, that's for sure. ms. munoz, i think you wanted to say something? >> i wanted to point out that as we explained earlier, the forces causing the change, the design, are outside of the bureau. we talked about iraq earlier. when you're in any environment when things are changing rapidly you have to adjust to these changes. there are costs related to those changes. a decision was made two years into a construction contract to add marines to a facility. to add significantly to the staff. to add classified capacity. that adds an extraordinary amount of expense in an existing

contract. i think that when we have detailed information and you have received the detailed information that you've asked, we can go over those costs in detail but i think given the location in new guinea and given the fact that we learned that all materials and labor need to be shipped into the new guinea and given the environment, the discovery of natural resources there, have led to greater competition in a small market. those cost increases can be explained when a mission doubles in size. >> i have gone way over time. i have more on this issue but i'll recognize the ranking members' comments. >> mr. green? where do we go from here? i mean, really. >> you know, i think unfortunately, where we go is we

need to see the dollars and the time that it's going to take to do design excellence. we don't have that. we're comparing apples and oranges. i'm not so concerned, personally, with the appearance of embassies. the state ig did a report in 2008 and the key findings were essentially that people were happy with the appearance. and the host countries of those 12 embassies that they looked at were happy with the appearance. so that's not what i'm worried about. what i'm worried about and i think what ds is worried about from a security standpoint, is can you actually produce these things in the same amount of time with the same security at the same cost? and until we know that and i don't know how you get to it before you do some of them, but i think the chairman raised an

issue, what is cost per desk? what is cost per desk. under standard embassy design? we have some good figures on that i'm sure. what is cost per desk under design excellence? until we can compare apples to apples, you know, i think there's going to be continue to be a lot of skepticism that you can do this as fast and as cheap. >> i'm listening carefully and i'm concerned and i think we all should be concerned when we don't get documents. and it becomes very frustrating. time is valuable.

and you know, i listen to ambassador pickering when they talk about the r&b report. you know, it was some of the most, i think it was ambassador pickering that said -- i asked him why was he -- why did he agree to do that, to get on the board? and he talked about the fact that the review board. that he felt that he owed it to his country. and to those who died and their families, to make things better so it didn't happen to anybody else.

and in some kind of way, when i listen to you, mr. green, it makes sense that if i've got something that's already designed and i mean, i've got something that i'm working with and i guess you've had years to make any adjustments that you see, right? is that right? in other words, it's like you got this house. you use the same pretty much the same materials and same structure, over and over again. and then in the meantime, if there were problems you can make those adjustments or -- and correct me if time wrong, i'm trying to put in simple language for the american people. or, if you want to -- if you're in a country where there's unique situations where you need a different kind of door or you may have some height requirement or whatever but still using the

same basic model, is that right? >> yes. >> logic tells me that if i'm using the same model, then -- it's just logic, that it would be quicker if i didn't go to another country and use that model. that's basically what you're saying, right? >> that's the logic that makes sense. >> and so i think for the state department, listen to this, it becomes a difficult argument to sell not only to us, but to the american people. because the american people, they don't know everything that you know. so you've got -- it's easy for us to -- and i can understand because it's your expertise and what you all do, but sometimes you have to break this stuff down so the people get what you're talking about. because to them it makes no sense.

and i'm not saying -- i'm saying, with the limited knowledge it makes no sense. with all of your information, it probably makes a lot of sense. and so, we find ourselves in a situation where you've got what mr. green said and yao got what you're saying and -- the bottom line is going back to what mr. green has said -- if he had the data to show that we could get the same security costs and time, all those factors pretty much the same, that he would sign on the dotted line, am i right? >> that's correct. >> so why can't we get the information? there seems to be reluctance and i don't know what that is. can you help us with that? because see, one of the things that happens here, and i've lived long enough and seen

enough and been up here long enough, we can get distracted in the mission by getting caught up -- it doesn't allow us to do what we're exposed to be doing and that is, providing security. they are legitimate questions. they'll really are. but at the same time that's time that we could be taking our energy and focusing on making sure our folks are safe. that's what the american people want. so, go ahead. >> i think that's absolutely right. and i'd be happy to explain in more detail why it is that if we award 100% design on the date of award, the period of performance is shorter. and we can have people into safer facilities faster. what it means is that if we know that our appropriation is fixed, we know which buildings we're doing, it might take us longer to do the design.

we're going to be looking closely at the requirements. what are the materials that are going to work in that environment? how do we put the building together in that environment? from the date of award, when we award that project, it's not going to include any design time. it will be no longer than it would be with a design build standard embassy design and it will likely be shorter. i could go into more detail. we could provide the -- >> one little thing, whoa, whoa, rewind. there's one little thing that bothers me and that is -- why? in other words, if i've got my model and if it's working, i know what it's going to cost, i know how much time it's going to take. am i missing something that i have to go to something else? so, like, okay, let me run and

do something else when i've already got this -- i've got it. finally. you follow me? >> yes. i think it's a fair question. and what i've tried to lay out is that the standard embassy design was a fixed solution based on an average hypothetical size embassy or cannes what. -- or consulate. we build embassies and consulates in every environment. whether that's because it's very hot. whether it's because it's very cold. whether because some systems are going to work there on the sea front and other systems are not going to work in a completely different environment. we're looking at the real requirements of missions and thinking about how do we build the best buildings for those missions. the standard embassy design was a good fixed solution but it also required us to build free-standing warehouses regardless of the location. there's some places we don't need a warehouse. why build a warehouse if we

could get -- >> then you take it off, right? i mean, you take it off. if i don't need a garage, if i got a house with a garage and i don't need a garage, i take the garage off. and by the way, it's not just one design, right? there's several designs, right? >> there's one. >> one standard embassy design. >> so you take ta garage off. >> all of those things taken together and -- if i could try to sort of put or describe the excellence initiative in a nut shell. it's really to say that we're taking those lessons learned from the standard embassy design. we're taking those modular pieces of it but we're providing a lot more flexibility in how those could be put together in a way that's meaningful. again, you build a very large embassy. having these two bars is not efficient. you're u crowding two with buildings as opposed to one.

you're securing two separate buildings as opposed to one. so i think that using architects, engineers and folks within the department. our security professionals, we look at each case and come up with the best and the most efficient solution. in many ways, what the excellence initiative is doing, is exactly what you're suggesting, right? it's taking a sort of base line and modifying that baseline in a way that is sensible for the mission. >> right now the standard embassy design or the standard embassy design we're moving forward from was a very nixed solution. again, very horizontal. ten acres. warehouse. that's not always the best solution in all environments and i'd like to also state that the cost per desk, we use that cost-per-desk to develop our budget so we have a cost-estimating office in bureau. when we build a budget whether it's a standard design budget or an excellence project. they tell us, you know what you've spent historically in this environment? this much. that's what your budget is.

we're going to work to that same budget under the excellence initiative or under the standard embassy design. what you just explained. now i'm finally getting it. so in other words, you know, what i thought you were going to say is that circumstances change. we have new technology. i thought that's what we were going to hear. that new technology better use of certain -- in other words, better materials, all those kinds of things, might go into it. and i don't know anything about building. but all of those things might go into changing the box. and what you're saying is that you may -- help me if i'm wrong -- you may look at the box, but you're forever changing the box. not that you don't look at it.

you don't take it into consideration. but it may be changed substantially. is that -- or are you talking about just a brand new box, period? >> i would say it depends. so again, if we're looking at a very large mission, to have these -- the standard embassy design and put that in place would simply not be efficient. london is a good example in the case that not only are we building a cube which is much more efficient than sort of two separate boxes that go up which would require twice as much clad, but we're also using materials that make the building significantly lighter. that reduce the size, the weight and the expense of the foundation that needs to be put down. curtain wall reduces the weight which influences the foundation and it's all able to go up faster than a traditional concrete building would have been able to go up in that

place. so both materials and base building in certain cases. >> last question. is it your -- do you anticipate being able to take, say, that box -- london is very unique. but other -- perhaps, the creation of another box or something that you can use in more than one place? you follow what i'm saying? as you're developing. how does that play into that? do you follow me? >> yes, i think i do. >> in other words, if you build a embassy and you do all the things you just said and now weave gth a great design and we've got security and this. this is the best bang for our buck, time, everything is straight. do you anticipate being able to use, say, for example, that model? a model like that somewhere else? you follow me? >> yes. let me use an example which may be too common but i think it

sort of demonstrates the point. there was a time when most people who drove had a model t. it was a great car. a simple car. as we evolved, cars got better and better. they evolved. and they separated it out into the different types of cars. so today rather than going with a model t, you could go with a model that is much more secure, much more safe, but you could choose to have an aston mini or an suv, but those things depend on where you are. you want to be in a small urban environment. you're a small mission. you can go with a smaller size and still meet all your requirements and be more efficient to run but there's the other times when you're going to need the larger solution. you're going to need -- you're going to need the suv. and i think that being able to put the aappropriate solution with the mission and to consider those things and to make sure that we're appropriately spending the money the taxpayer

gives us and considering not just first costs but long-term costs, i think that's what we're talking about doing. >> thank you very much. thank you. thank you all for being here. >> i recognize the chairman of the committee? >> thank you. thank you, chairman chaffetz and ranking member cummings. i appreciate your questioning and fortunately, i came back in just in time to have you talk about automobiles. and i agree that sometimes -- i actually think the fiat 500 or the mini is ever appropriate from a safety standpoint for our men and women in the state department. but having said that, i certainly understand the difference of size and scale and some of the urban versus rural considerations. but mr. green, those considerations really aren't what we're asking about today. what we're asking about is -- do you to the greatest extent

possible, use a mass production concept which is what standard build is? it's about do you build a one-of-a-kind formula race car that's beautiful and fast and has unique characteristic and each one is different? smabl as a matter of fact, the secrets aren't even shared between formula racers. are do you build a toyota camry in order to get -- or a ford focus or a ford 500. do you build a mass-produced consistent reliable, understood, bugs worked out, repeatable product so you get a highly reliable product, that can be maintained throughout the system? standard windows, standard other characteristic, if possible, in order to get a good product at a better price? and i switched to ford quickly when i realized it is about henry ford's model of greater value for less cost, isn't it,

mr. green? >> yes, it is. i think it's like standard embassy design might be the chevroletsuburban, but when necessary, it becomes the escalade. >> there are options and so on? ms. munoz, one of the other questions, inman is all about security, right? so-called inman designs? >> i'm not as familiar with the inman designs as that program was over long before i came in. >> let me tell you what i was told 14 years ago when i came in and started going to embassies as a member of foreign affairs. we didn't used to think of embassies in the same security sense we do now. and what we discovered, the beirut barracks and the marine barracks in the beirut embassy

bombings and others taught us there is no substitute for setback. do you understand that as the person making these decisions? >> yes, absolutely. >> so when you talk about urban versus rural and location, i was just in britain where setback is highly compromised and they're compliant, but they made a five-acre decision and went vertical, and did the best they could, including the famous moat, part of, in fact, crash considerations. those safety considerations, anytime you give upsetback, you have to trade off higher costs for that setback, don't you? >> you do, but we' are not suggesting under this program to ever trade setback. >> you did small footprint. the truth is that the standard build, and i'll go back to mr. green for part of this, is about starting off with a footprint sufficient for current and future embassy considerations, including

possible add-ons in a country so we can make a 50-year decision on sovereign u.s. soil, isn't it? >> yes. >> mr. green? i was on this -- i apologize, i was able to take a democrat staffer, but none of my counterparts were able to attend because of short notice, but i was struck by something in the record today and what was talked about earlier in papua new guinea. changing characteristics, when they were talking about and they flew in people from your offices to be there where we were in london. they started talking about, well, you know, it's individual. we have to work it out. and i suddenly realized what you're doing is you're custom building more and more. you're going into a rut which is instead of saying state department will plan, including excess space if appropriate, we

will plan for the anticipated 50-year necessary facility and we want to make sure that it's very much understood, instead, what they were talking abiliout one group may need a little more here and somebody may -- what suddenly hilt me is you're talking about the current, according to what i was told, you're talking to the current people in an embassy, the current ambassador, the current staff, in order to find out what they want as part of this design aircra characteristic. that's one of the things i came back profoundly concerned about from the trip to london. it wasn't the london facility because at half a million square feet, there's a lot of room, but when you're looking at embassies and starting to ask, should it be plus or minus based on current characteristics, aren't you inherently creating that downstream problem that you're designing based on what an ambassador and their staff want,

not based on a plan that looks 50 years in the future? i would like each of you to answer that the to extebt you can? >> that's a great question because it addressed one of the intouring questions of the department. we're trying to build buildings for 50, 100 years and things change. i think where we can financially and based on the urban environment or the environment where we're building, we do try to buy larger sites. we actually make a deliberate effort and this was not always done with the standard embassy design. we site the building in such a way where we know where a later an exwill go. for years, maybe forever, it will be a lawn, but we know in advance how we will use that space so it gives us the flexibility. the other thing we have done under the initiative and i think this is meaningful and reduces quast in the long term. we're looking at things like using raised floors, using demountable partitions. making sure infrastructure is sized in a