other cities on the city stops tour at c-span.org/localcontent. you are >> history bookshelf features writers and airs every weekend at this time. the c.i.a. assisted th assistedn overthrowing the government. historythor and professor ali ansari talks about and iran relations. he argues that both sides missed in normalizing relations. this 2006 event was hosted by d.c. international connection. is about an hour and 40 minutes.

>> certainly if we have the misfortunate,he of watching fox new, we can see back into the agenda. someone whong for is not only aranny but lives in is arrangedthe news to give us a certain idea of what is going on. m.p.r. ainterview with couple of days ago. it is just when the news is about the actions lebanon and sot farther. i said it does not going to be before they point the and two hours later president bush did the honors. the problem we have is a serious one. one that i, in some ways,

seriouslyink we take enough. before i go into the details of what my book is about and some of the arguments, i will run history of the last couple of years, we give you some sort of examples of what is about and how policy or the absence of policy is lead us howissed opportunities and we got the stage now. initially, i will give you a of a background of who i am and where i come from. was in theian who class of 1979. thatt the country at interesting time. as you're being sent off to the u.k., it was coincidencal timing because we were notealize we going to go back. at the time, basically, i went in 1978, finished my education and despite the best attempts by my brother to get me

i go to school in the u.s., wanted to finish in the u.k. took me a long time, i have say. you used to be allowed to do that. i have been looking at iran and european/iran relations but also iran for then years.part of 10 it was on myth even a what i've takenn the book is i've the ideas i've developed looking iran politics and tried to apply them. is my third book. i was reluctant, i have to say, to write it. the temptations were enough, ultimately. i was so worried about what was u.s./iranten about relations and u.s. approaches to

iran. of books by myst publisher, countdown to terror, iran, and some of the covers were striking. there was one by a congressman called kurtan weldon. you can't buy these in the u.k. think they ban them in the u.k. in this book, what was striking me and this turned it for me, this congressman, who the deputy'm aware chair of the armed service committee. u.k.nk if someone in the did this -- i don't know if they long in their position. he decided he found a source, a by the interesting name ali who had evidence that dirtyas going to place a nuclear bomb in boston. he approached the c.i.a. but the

c.i.a. thought he was a lunatic. thatcongressman decided the c.i.a. was the people at fault and he was going to write this book. starts the book out with the sentence, this book is an act of desperation. then he goes into it, is a this interview with this guys, we don't know who he is. me.ould be this chap says that, you know, have these source and information that the iranians int to drop a dirty bomb boston. i think that above all triggered in me it will be good, actually more seriously, possibly more in a scholarly way at the in iran-u.s. relations. there is a number of interesting issues about this. how could countries who have been good friends for a long time turned into the best of

enemies. why, particularly, when you look at the history of iran in the and in0 years particular, when you look at intervention of foreign powers, russian, and the americans really in many ways and russians and americans irans are the third on the list in bad boys. the russians up there in a league of their own. constitutional revolution was no trough issues. look at the situation in iran today, we have a situation the irans are happy to depend on the russians but will have anything to do with the united states. i took wasparisons iran's relations with other stations have not been interestingly productive. we talk about the hostage crisis

in 1979. in 1829, the first russian was opened in tehran. it was after a defeat. after 1828, when iran ceased to be a great power and of a localthe status power and was hue mill yailted. russians know how to humiliate. what happened, which the the ambassador at the time who was a literary man. he did not have time for antics. to beught they needed civilized and he tried to do this. the terror mob. they ransacked the embassy and killed everyone. striking thing to do the embassy. this was appalling and the iranian set a delegation to

say we'reburg to story about this that we massacred your embassy. interesting, the czar who had other things on his mind said don't worry about it. fault.the ambassador's the only reason, in a sense, you 1829,t away with that in because it was a local difficulty in a far off country attentionbody paid to. the changes that happened in the put century that really american and britain in the iran'snt of the relations is media, technology. striking things about american-iran relations in the 20th century, iran the bad boy when iranian politics comes of age. more politically aware of their surroundings, it

forefront, nothe russia, not britain. incidents of 1953, you think britain should be at the focus of the attention. this legacyerits and does it in a foreglare of a modern media and a political making theirey are own delegations. say we're sorry about what happened because it is a in.a event and it feeds this is one of the things i wanted to look at in the book is narratives are created that shape the way we look at each other. at the most progressive book that comes out foir -- foreignoi

always start, it is always framed to give you the answer they want. is pivotal at this, by the way. an's talk the situation in academic level. americans will frame the relationship, if you start in 1979, it is quite clear who the is.guy took the79, they embassy and it was a nightmare for americans. is where you start the problem, if that is where you frame your narrative, we know where it started. so the iranians, the narrative start of frame is not 1979. don'tns tell you you understand 1979 if you don't go 1953.o what happened? i will talk about it briefly. death, this done to incident. i will show you how these particular narratives can be

ways to geterent results that we still don't want. know broadly the story as it goes, the narrative popular intainly iran, you had a nationalist prime minister who was elected and he was trained in switzerland. he decided that in order for their sovereign rights and to break out what is a coal lone be yule -- it is a slight digression, bear in mind, that companiesnternational had power in iran. bp. and if you go to bp offices, they hold to the name. reuters have a colorful past in

iran, which is one of the why -- maybe because i said reuters. journalistseuters had trouble getting visas to go to iran. now, this all nationalization in 1951hat began resulted in the british losing overseas asset. largest oversea asset is oil. if you look at it from a british perspective, they just came out of a war. they were bankrupt. in debt to the united states. the last thing they wanted to do largest overseas asset. britain had just, basically, a socialist government and it was busy. can doiranians said we it, too. onialism at home depended

imperialism abroad, so that did not work. british got upset and they said we have an agreement, the taken themould have up to 1979. --t was the contracted they contract they had. beingy they were exploited was dishonest. is standard line, which interinterrated that they played higher in taxes than they government.ranian it is. you talk about that situation. other aspects. the british have a knack of being arrogant if they want to be in a colonial context as know.ans may maybe something, in fact, maybe administration inherited but that at the time in the 1950's,

know,ve this, you colonial attitude in southern iran. is the interesting relationship between the british and the americans. you look at interviews at the time, you talk to american stateats and the departments and the white house, and the british wanted to start flexing their muscles. in the post war situation, this is not the way you do things. the united nations. so you have this element the we want to saying get our imperialism position and saying this isre not how you do this. basically, what the british did able essentially to pay on certain american fears. motifs, other people play on american fears

today. wascally, the american fear cold war and the communism. 1952, they said we want to negotiate a diplomatic settlement. the trouble is he is so bloody irrational. wonderful quote, hopefully, if you get a copy of the book. a wonderful quote that who also worked for the services.ce he said something like it was completely unacceptable that the rational, you know, agenda or rational proceedings of an international oil company should be held ransom by the orienteddals. even the americans comment on is aand say we think this bit harsh. british do is play on the fear. not an issue of iran.ing our asset in

this is a global issue. this is not an issue -- this is an issue of global importance and this the communists are going to take over. is a battle between you and the soviet union. are you going to save iran or not? bear in mind, the korean war and the mccarthy hearings. happen, one is came into office in britain and eisenhower came into the united states. eisenhower is more willing to play into this game. in 1953, the, hada. because the british been expelled elected a crew overthrew the government. the relationship was not smooth iran.he dictator of

couprouble was with the because they thought they could do this everywhere. you have to have particular assumptions and you have to have discontent within the country itself. coloredident perceptions in iran, particularly in the political public. at that time, technology was making an impact. things, i go back slightly between 1941-1946 was occupied. one of the things that the did was the transitter radio. they dib tributed them out them tothey wanted listen to radio moscow. happened and the anglo americans also delivered yon.itter ray havethat does is you down

that -- you leap over element of education. propaganda, you are enabling a generation to be more aware.ally i don't want to exaggerate but it is urban areas overactive. entrance.amatic at a time when iranian con susness is coming. you can argue that the birth of in aodern iranian nation political sense went hand-in-hand with america as the villain. that was added in later issues. they were well aware of the

difficulties arising but they thought they could overcome them. you look now, they are debate.that the nuclear this is a national issue. use theotice we always motifs relevant. in the west, we talk about hitler. when someone comes up, we say hit.is the worst guy since he is worse than hitler. most guys in the middle east don't have that affect. hitler was decent because he was russians and the they were beating up on the middle east. of the motive stuff, in and collective memory, people in the middle east don't have that stuff. germany and in comediesyou can have

about hitler. you can't do that in germany or france. but in britain, don't talk about war. you can take that similarly in iran. churchill andbout hilt her, other people in iran these people but they are not central. you talk about other great leaders and it does. these peoplee, mean nothing. this is the other thing, we have tremendous problem here with our journalists is they can never the names. i don't know why they can't. mossa soalled him old they could not say it. this also is the way you demean the other. pronounce his name it does not make sense. particularly polite.

journalists.ith it is also shapes the way in we think about things. now, i've noticed, i said i was to talk for half an hour i felt like i'm partially through i've talked 15 minutes. to askmeans if you want me questions about things, raise your hand if i'm going on too long. let me go to the next stage, crisis inhe hostage 1979. you can't understand that you don'tisis if understand the situation in 1953. when i talk to the host j, i leaders.ne of the this is very interesting. back.s a while reinvented guys, he himself and trying to be active. think you were

doing and he said well, we wanted to make a point. the americanshow coupshey can't have more anduse the shah entered they wanted to make has point. the was the third time embassy was being occupied. of things. number the united states and iran did not terminate relations with the fall of the shah. was preparingtes to manage the transition. 4,000 strong embassy in tehran. the 4,000military but strong that were there. it was huge. of them were shipped home people inrought 70 who were experts in islam.

iny said why don't you come and you can see a revolution up close. actually. sad, they said great. we've got the experts and this is how the relationship breaks down. whobring the experts in have a sympathy. studies inone studies.island in february 14, 1979, they were evicted once the provisional government got together. of ours was also being given -- but he managed to get them out. was interesting, the people religious,m out were the religious leaders. in the know the names

book because i wanted to leave them out. interestingly, we just had a notice slapped on our consulate door says looters will be shot. wanderinghese people passed the building. they wanted to get in but they could not do anything and it was partly because of this ironic situation, basically, that many of the religious leadership was stopping them from doing it. by the fourth of november in changed. situation that, for meinto the was interesting is langum.was run by bruce i says in this dispatch,

reiterate and i state again, need to do ine clear explicit terms. first of all, recognize the as a realty. stop pretending it hasn't happened. have to like it. we just have to recognize it as reality. must convince the iranians iras that we're not here to overflow government. a list of other things he says saysd be done but he also we must emphasize that religion iranians andto religion is important to americans. commonrying to find a ground. it is similar to what was said in 1998 when they said religion democracy is very similar. wasas drawing this and he trying to find the common ground. narrative.ent the

now days later the embassy is comes to ahat staggering halt. no policy. his dispatch is frozen in time it.nobody has dealt with we still have a situation today where the united states is the one country, like with china who does not recognize the fact.tion as a it is quite difficult to argue politician, the villain of the piece is the politicians, by the way. interfere.ntly the thing is we have this where thetuation revolution has not been recognized as a reality on the ground. they assume recognizing the revolution that you accept and everything that comes after it. that is not the case.

why don'tussions on you accept as a reality but you don't have to accept the consequences that came after it. onyou accept the revolution the ground, you make a lot of discon tented a little more secure in their own regime changese a is pretty complete. it is not changing things at the edges. entireprooting the thing. it pushes the very people that talking to into the arms of the people we don't want to be talking to. this central moment in 1979, since.dealt with what is fascinating for me in have a break in diplomatic relations. characterric, we never

relation. americans broke off relations. but you did occupy their embassy. they go, what? [laughter] it. genuinely say point.had a this is nothing. attempt.ust an it is not the americans but the 1953.h in secret.the biggest open british still deny they had a coup even though 19 books have been written about it. but they won't accept it happened. 1979, you have these situations where -- you don't have people on the ground on side. this is very, very important. from 1979 and

onward, and the united states become a domestic political issue. it is not a foreign policy issue. one is just like the radio brought the fall of mohammad the television made the hostage crisis an internal event. the mass media is a wonderful that 90% of television sets are in the west or the first world. gives the third world tremendous access to the first world. in every living room you could see what was going on in iran. is the firstn revolution to be televised. the french and the russian were not televised. they were much bloodier. you look at crude terms.

honestly, if you can see the on in theg television, it becomes much more real to you. are personally affected by the fact that you had 44 -- what is it? i can't remember it was 52 personal.it is deeply in that sense, iran becomes a a popular issue in sense. the yellow ribbons. transformsncident the situation. details thato the will come up later in questions. me, many,gue said to many years ago in the united states. rift has nothing to do with the hostage crisis. besays people can manipulated. you don't have to worry about that. real rift came with the iran beltway gotse the affected. people lost their jobs.

yeah? the people look at running iran policy now, most contra.victed in iran don't tell me they did not hold judge. i don't think john bolten, maybe he did not have to be convicted anything. there is a number of others who involved. again, forms a political folklore. it was about an opening. planning to have some sort of opening by selling them what they need and see if they could approach some sort of dialogue. don't doubt that is in part what he did. the way we understand it now is a terrible act by the lot ofs that skewed up a careers. it had nothing to do with iran.

in iran told the north to sell money or whatever to the countries, which on the other side, when they talk about terrorism and supporting terrorist groups, it was a metaphor that you take toey from the iranians support freedom fighters. definends on how you freedom fighters. some of them were not terribly pleasant. aspect of the equation had nothing to do with iran. the leak that came out in lebanon, you know, lebanon again was something that came out due to internal feuding, perhaps in iran. it was promoted. key architects later became imprisoned. think that it was such an

no theysment, sanctioned it. butonly was it sanctioned the israelis were involved. we talk about condoleezza rice about we're going to start dialogue over there but you've been in dialogue for ages. it has been covert and freedom people have had their fingers burned. here.lking a bits just to raise this as an example, you can't understand depths of the embassy if you don't understand the pride of this. you can have betrayal if you don't have friendship. the best person actually to look bill. james very tight with the rock fellers kissingers and the others. this, the republicans tried to

extend throughout the 1980 also added to the sort of general political folklore in states.ed in iran, what added to the fork is the iran and iraq war. to this and one of the bees in my bonnet, where i'm not eloquent in the book because tragedy. manipulated by the west. here i hold more for the europeans. west actually engaged in selling saddam hussein the weapons that he used on the battlefield. you talk to people here and ever so much embarrassment here. i talked to a guy in the state department and he said we did

protest. said, well, i never heard it. he said it was fairly quiet but protest. they did protest but it was muted. in britain it was limited and countries that were selling and germany atn the time. there was not enough protest and supported atn was the time. if you're getting real time satellite imagery to the iraqis. them real time morelite imagery and it is fair in a sense. theof the tragedies is journalists with the possibility of an interview partnership brought up the issue and she had it.dea about it is a major incident for me. incidenten when i'm speaking when i was coming to terms with what iran was

about. it shows how this narrative gets diverted. i remember this vividly when i london as a student. an iraqi polite. i think the plane had been sold by the french, the missile was lease. it was not bought. it was offered as a gift by the french. french complain a lot about iran's terrorist activities in western europe, which they have do.ght to you know, i can also see the iranian point. french was supplying last of nasty equipment. fairly cynical about it. missilenic thing, the goes off, when i talk to the

thets they were trained by american pilots. largestd we have the oil finery and the iraqi pilots would miss it because they did not fly low enough. there was a general contempt for pilots. and 33 american sailors were dead and he said it iran's fault. what was striking about this is arms.mmunity went up in i remember one of my friends times. letter to the they said what do you mean we're barbarians. we write great poetry. reagan had to pull that back. at the record, there is nothing official in the reagan files that he said that. it was an interview of the

barbarians. iran question pilot in a jet ald by the french with missile loaned by the french and fault?ran's this is absurd. a made me question things as student. what is this about? it is a complete tragedy but a of david versus goliath. state-of-the-art battle cruiser. it was sent off to the persian gulf. what are you fighting there? you're fighting gun boats in little starboard motors. now andke what you see off you go and you send this is there to fight the soviet navy. it ae book, i soften little bit. the reality was worse. captain is will rogers.

will rogers jr., sorry. was gunning for a fight. gunning for a fight and he his medal.et basically, he finds himself in a the fight with revolutionary gun boats. fight. concocted they fire warning shots to send them back. to other boats in the area, we were meant to be neutral. used this warning shot to know, justification to get on the defensive. he gets involved in this fire with iranian gun boats. ofbreaks the rules engagement and goes into territory waters to chase them, even that he they are backing off. they see on the radar this plane

in.oming this is a dry run clearly for this is what is scandalous. and my brother talking about and people said it a suicidebeen on mission. anything that muslims do a has mission,a suicide unfortunately. they thought it was the f-14, the one f-14 in service. f-14's ifnot have the it was not for the shah. that flew that is meant on a descending trajectory to hit. they sit in this battle cruiser they say we want permission to knock it out of the air. have to missile the code 27 times. wrong.pt getting it

finally after the 27th time, they fire it. tragic about it is many things. crew on thecamera bridge filming on a documentary gulf.e in the you see the crew there and off three,is missile and four seconds later the blip goes off the radar. cheeringclapping and commathink one of the com doors say call down. you hear an s.o.s. what dawns on them is they hit a civilian airliner. there was huge coverup. there is a reason why the coverage is done because the u.s. naval broke ranks and they whatdeeply upset about happened. there were two other ships going

the area. there were a number of things worth recording, one that the aircraft was ascending, not descending. warning not read the calls because it was a civilian airliner. talking to me. didof the other ships connect and said change course, it did change course. it changed course to get out of the route. the commander of one of the aircraft carrier groups had two the's going out to cover area and drew his aircraft back. captainorried that the was trigger happy and might shoot down his own plane. of having visual sight to confront it wasn't there. u.s. naval air power was drawn back. it was 270 casualties. it is grotesque if you see the

video. iranians think that the americans are about to declare war. you talk to the conservatives when you're tough with iran it works. war. after eight years of let's not get carried away. this is the way they read things, unfortunately. the one thing they wanted to recoverednobody ever the black box. it.reason because they took it was the ship onsite had it documentary crew did the film, they got the freedom to say -- itn act is a c.i.a. document and it is it says theand ands. and it is five pages the black. there is nothing on it. wholern it over and the thing and you cavern see it. clearly what happened is the

we knowx was seized and the aircraft was ascending and they got it wrong. an unfortunate mistake. if you look at the situation in read it liked not that. it was a disaster. these are the narratives that build in. you the development of the history over the 1990's when tensions were made. at only do we not have diplomatic presence to mediate both iran and the u.s. become domestic political issues difficult to undermine, to challenge. we look now and what is theresting if you watch watching thebe i'm watching wrong news channels. it is amazing how there are myths in iran. there are all these myths. sayone comes up and they you used to serve in the c.i.a.

whatever american enterprise institute or whatever it is. happened?u think what he may say may be legitimate. he may say well, in my view, such and such. it is a view. is an opinion. the point i'm trying to say it plausible opinion or implausible opinion. it does not have any evidence to back it up. it is miraculous how that fact.n becomes that fact is built on it by other facts. my familying to earlier. i said i'm struck by this. it is interesting to see first all, the israelis are that we are quite certain that hezbollah this unlessve done directed by iran. i'm not saying it is not -- plausible.

but then they say we're missiles yout the were sold by the iranians to hezbollah. that.ght have evidence of the next stage ask is to say, the iranians were sitting in lebanon firing the missiles. now you're building on this and andare saying it gets more more incredible. you are building on something that people have more accepted plausible to build on this. iranians can do this just as well. thatrd wonderful stories the americans are doing. when there is nobody to challenge what is going on, this how it builds. the other thing they do is, say it is an they assault on israel. onlyn itsel assault on the

democratic country. the west.ssault on it is an assault on america. radical assault on american civilization. morecomes more and exaggerated. in all of the statements, there is not a shred of evidence, not shred of evidence. i would take it to task, it says an apologist and you do so and so. i will tell you what i'm an for.gist i'm an apologist for my discipline and it tell mess you yout make a statement until can back it up with evidence. i'm an historian. in a historian in a western university. my theory of knowledge, tellthing i've been taught mess you don't make statements, you don't make-up equivocal

until yo you have the evidence to back it up. some people. i might really dislike some people. peoplet be suspicious of up unequivocale statements and that is what i teach my students. britain it is far worse. in britain, the classic case is up to the iraq war is blair plagiarized off the berkeley. student in that reason they found suggest a cambridge professor looked at search orid a google whatever it was. they said this was written by some other guys. was about weapons of mass destruction and links to al qaeda. playism in a university you get

the british in government, it is a good excuse to go toward. i thought i was going to be told to be quiet. great. then.stions current problems. can understandou the kern problems outside of the historical context. can understandou the current problems outside of the nuclear problems. not about nuclear problems. you cannot have a situation that korea can develop a slapped onb and be the wrist. earlier they said we have a good.not very iran breaks the seals on two drums of whatever it is and the about to come to an end. it is absurd and we used to talk

london.is in there is no doubt there has to wayesponsibility but the they define this relationship, it shows there is much more emotion attached to it and there is more political attached to it. i don't think it is political. that is what the iranians say. joke.a it is not a joke. this is what drives people. it drives people to make decisions. think we made our situation more difficult for a number of reasons. a co-here coherent policy. an attitude that engagement means sitting around love each other. no, engagement with a problem. with thes been engaged problem. we engage with the consequences of the problem. mind, them is, in my had youtury

iran.grate timesanian problem in our is how do you come to terms with that could be the shah or whatever. if you want to see what the attitudes were go and read, if you can, there is a wonderful called "the crash of 1979." is goingerun on what on now. you have all of the characters. ae shah was to develop nuclear weapon. the americans do a preemptive strike. disaster. all the motives are there, the dodgy russians. they are all there. so you see that. iran.oblem is no if you look at the hard line, they understand this.

big.say iran is too it is the last empire we have to dismantle. a very dangerous track to go down but that is the issue we need to engage with. missed a number of opportunities. we missed an opportunity. we missed a massive opportunity. a lot of people disagree with me. think we failed to react to changes going on in iran. is a domestic, political issue has never been on its own terms. it republican rivalry but dealing with what goes on in iran. i've been to a number of seminars and workshops here at center or the brookings. you go there and the whole team comes in from europe and the come in. one session is iran nuclear crisis. packed.ion is they all come in, all the

interns. second session is domestic politics in iran. it empties. it was the group from london and a group from america and we were talking to each other. where are all the politicians? whatare not interested in goes on in iran. we missed that opportunity. i can go into more detail. go into one because this is a classic case where the historical narratives make a mess. after 2003, there was an urge to the nuclear weapons sorted out. we're going do show these it.icans we can do britain became part of old france.ith germany and they were worried because they saddam hussein demolished. the mood was right. thingsmber of that year, were looking unpleasant in iraq and the iranians realize they

not next on the list. the europeans did have and this is a big mistake by them. they decided to focus so much on the nuclear issue that they context.out the the context was, what is domestically? the hard line was going to launch a coup. the basically butchered parliamentary elections of 2004. canneds and siting deputies -- the whole thing was rigged. even by irans standards this is pretty poor. it was observe. europeans said nothing. they did not protest, even iranian officials say you must protest. tothis happens you must come our assistance. nothing happened. they decided the intervention to go. the way example of how sometimes

the historical encounters are misinterpreted. in the modern age, nonintervention is not an option. nonintervention becomes an active intervention. europeans stayed quiet, iranians proclaim they can complicit in this act of fraud. you can read it in the text. didn't they protest? when the british sent prince the classic timing for the earthquake. papers came with a letter from his mother to give say well done. this is the argument and i what thesaying friends hell are you doing? the interesting thing is this is classic case that i may try to finish on, all of the experience of any iran were working in baghdad

shortage ofad a expertise in the middle east. expertise in the middle east were sucked into this quagmire that is iraq. they were working in the london,y in baghdad, washington, whatever. they were dragged away from their jobs. what this meant was, the person princened off on th today ron justtoda the graduated. not have the tools to do what we need to do. people.ued this with rather than spend $25 million to get bin laden, spend a bit more out to doet grants arabic and train the experts

that you need. this debate with a state department official. he gave a talk and it was a good talk. use and abuse of intelligence. of the 630 people working the baghdad, 11 spoke arabic. i want you to think about that. heyday empire i can assure you. urgency to get people trained up. stated, what is the department doing? i know things have changed, by the way. slow. western democracy is like an oil tanker, it takes ages. they still haven't done enough. doing to recruit arrestics? arabics? said it is ame and problem. problem?t be a

he said it is a difficult language. unacceptable that the last remaining super power cannot the the resources to train people it needs to do the job it has given itself. addressed. be i will just leave it there icause i don't know, i think talked for far too long and i'm starting to sweat. i think if there are questions i could -- there is a lot more i go on fort i will another hour and my brother will not be happy. >> the problem with negotiating with countries like iran is you have sever governments. pusheir choice, they will a party forward and pull the other one back. like, theave, theident, you will have parliament and then you have the

do things onn their own without any clear authority. in dealing with a situation like fairly impossible because you don't have one policy,nt, one especially democratic policy. by the a question constituents. >> i never say dealing with iran easy. i agree with almost everything you said. voices,the multiple there are multiple vowses in thivowses in --voices in this c. the frustrating thing in with the united states electoral process is every two years. you need the tools to try to engage and sooner or later you iran.o deal with the alternative is to go toward. the alternative is to ignore

into auntry and get situation of conflict. i would argue that conflict is of two evils. agree that there is a complicated structure there. cannot believe that the united states of america does not have to playurces to put will,orm of team, if you that can begin these people and a policy.d if you look at the way to do it, i think, is where you have ambiguity. you deal with it. where you have obtuseness, you are more transparent. the europeans more than the americans are beginning to understand that you have to also communicate with the iranians themselves over and above their government, but it has to be

done, and to my mind, one of the real bizarre situations we have in the modern era, i would say, is that war has become so fashionable. do not even take the necessary steps, going to the united nations, talking about working out other routes. we have just seen recently what has happened in lebanon, but these are the issues that need to be dealt with. i would agree -- it is difficult. it is not a small country. we do not have the notion of having an amir or king or something running it. it is come for katie, frustrating, irritating, but believe you me, i think it is a that taken together, it could manage it in some form of way. to neglect it is to let it fester and get worse. know as a historian, you are not going to speculate about the future, but there's a great deal of talk about a regime change in iran but very little

about regime change here. i'm wondering, based on your this isions, albeit just theoretically, do you think there could be a meaningful ? gagement but would like to think, you have to start engaging with things a little more properly. if you look at presidential contenders -- what is this, 2008? that are more hardline than the current income but, as far as i can see. they are all out doing each other. israel is central to this. you've got to deal with israel. this is the plight of iran as well. rather than use the language of regime change, i think you have to have the right people in the

state. let's put it that way. i can say that in a sense of having a professional opinion. if you gave me a choice between john bolton and richard armitage, i would take richard armitage. i would have someone who is able to communicate with the other. i agree, you have to have the right people in place, but i do not see it happening yet. the question was what do the british think of iran at the moment. i think the british are moving increasingly in their sort of frustrations with iran are moving much more towards the

american side of the equation apart from the fact that they are very much european in their view that you cannot use the language of regime change. and you cannot. is somewhatosition more hardline. they are much more hardline on the nuclear issue. it is interesting because in the negotiations, the europeans could be divided. the french have been very anxious to take up and make hay with the americans, to be honest. they have. they do have contacts, but their contacts are not that big.

>> [inaudible] one of the biggest ever made. sure.l, i'm not ok. ok. >> quick question about your phrase about engagement of precision. i think it sort of falls into separate problems. my question is -- it's hard not to take a modern a job seriously once you have the historical problem of hitler. nobody took hitler seriously either, although in "mein kam pf," he did announces foreign policy. he said something that sounded ridiculous, and then he did it. it's hard not to make that comparison.

big problem right now to get arabic sent people who understand what they are dealing with in the system, and that is obviously a bigger question. although the u.s. intelligence and u.s. government wants to have people like that, there's a big issue of security clearance. if you have a relative somewhere overseas, you're almost automatically disqualified for a position of power and position of authority, so it's kind of somebody youe consider a figure similar to hitler, but you do not have somebody that is enough understanding of an issue to say, "no, this is not exactly the historical power." >> i don't think the hitler comparison is a useful tool. saw dom hussein was hitler.

-- saddam hussein. although it is an understanding of world war ii and the run-up of world war ii, which is also largely simple fight, but nonetheless, i do not think it is terribly helpful. on theletely misses out complexity of iran and politics. but i can see why people would -- might want to raise it. -- heanalogies to my mind was compared to stalin, but, i mean, all these things have a use. but my argument, from an academic point of view, is they actually cloud as well as in limited, but also its of associations with hitler that would not be applicable to a modern the todd. i mean, i saw something on the news recently, they said a modern a job, radical islam is

expansionist and wants to conquer britain and all this. thinkint is i do not there is anything he said from that point of view. what he's running down is a very hardline radical view of israel. is if you i'm saying don't have people in power who have that ability -- >> true. that's true. one of the problems with condoleezza rice, for instance, is that she is an expert on the soviet union, therefore everything she says is under the guise of a totalitarian system, which, again, has its uses. likees not apply to people thein and it, but israel is one country, i think, where having a connection to that country does not hinder your rise up to the hierarchy, and he's the classic point. he got his american naturalization on the eve of clinton's inauguration. he is an australian national.

still speaks in an australian accent if you listen to him. in some ways. in the current climate, we have this awkward notion if you have any sort of islamic connection of some sort, it is much more difficult to get into the higher echelons of government, but, you .now, i can think of exceptions you got kalil said -- kalil's 0- -- khalilzad. i assume he is muslim. very different connections. but still, you could make that case. i remember after 9/11, with the fbi were going around saying that they want to recruit arabic sent arabic speakers, and they said yes, but only of the right sort. i think in europe, perhaps there's a little more leeway.

i'm quite surprised in the united states there is not as much leeway to recruit the sort of people, either, but again, some of that unfortunately has to be with just bigotry. >> secured clearance is immense. >> you have to pay for it. quick to pay for standard secret clearance, you can pay $2000. >> you have to do it yourself? >> the cost to the government. livedtually if you have somewhere overseas, it goes up significantly. that particular agency must need you a lot. want to thank you for a very eloquent presentation. you took a very complex history and presented it in a clear manner that i was able to understand. really, the biggest question, which is of today, whether iran

proceed witho nuclear developments, leading possibly to a nuclear bomb. today, as we see going on now, iran is not a country that can be occupied. if you attack it, you have got to totally destroy it. the only way they can defend themselves is by having weapons that provide a mutual destruction. do you have any comments on that? it is a bad treaty, by the way. it is a bad treaty because in a sense, it was designed for a different age, and it is largely a voluntary treaty. agreement, a contract between the nuclear weapons powers and the non-nuclear weapon powers, and it says, "we will help you with your civilian nuclear technology as long as you forsake the decision to go further to turn into a nuclear power."

the point is you can basically build the interest of your for a bomb, and it's asking you not to take that next step. ran is within its rights. the policy it holds to is i think is a policy that was devised that basically they want the option. we in the west have made it more difficult for ourselves and handling in this. misunderstood, the domestic dialogue. and iran, the issue is seen as an economic issue, not as a weapons issue. it is seen as the west trying to prevent iran as becoming economically advanced. nuclear developed on the railway to the 21st and tree. this is their sign that they are not an, progressive. we have not engaged in that debate at all. sitting on the legal aspect of the debate in some ways was not a bad strategy to take, but a hit the rocks after iraq. very difficult to argue with the iranians on two fronts that you have to adhere to international law when actually international law does not mean a whole lot

because we want to invade another country. it's a difficult one to settle. asked, i think, every international lawyer -- academic international lawyer said the war in iraq is illegal under international law. they found one person to come and say that it was legal. all i'm saying is there is an ambiguity there. it is difficult to make the case. that's one point. the other thing is that the sort of neoconservative view of the world is the law of the tunnel and encourages iranians to develop a nuclear weapon. if international law is not going to protect you, you need something else. this also backfired. we have strong suspicions that they want the option. i have no doubt about that, and i quite agree that they want the option, but nobody has ever made the claim -- nobody has ever made the claim. pundit after pundit after pundit one thing -- how many said

nuclear weapons are un-islamic. he could change it tomorrow, but that's what he says. the debate on the other hand, when they do talk about weaponize and and other things, it's not so much israel in actual fact. the issue is not israel. nobody thinks in iran that having a nuclear weapon or whatever is going to deter the israelis or anything. the issue for the iranians is south asia. when south asia with nuclear, the iranians started to panic. it was the pakistanis going nuclear that worried more than anything. i was in iran at the time, and that was when the nuclear issue became hot. one of its was to do with national pride. was syria's concerned because they were fighting a proxy war in afghanistan. remember, iran was the only country at the time to declare the taliban, you know, a perversion of islam. when the taliban were wondering the streets of washington. quite interesting.

from the iranian perspective, they do feel acutely about their right to have -- it's very difficult to argue, particularly with the british -- one aspect is that the nuclear power would reduce their arsenal and would begin to disarm, which, of course, they are not doing. the other aspect is that they are meant to help with nuclear technology, but of course, they have not done that, either. they do feel that if the pakistanis and the indians -- -- now getsigned cooperation with the united states for the nuclear energy, it does make a mockery of it. that whole thing -- that's why i feel that the whole thing is a -- it is a weak argument in some ways. it has been tried, and i think the europeans made the best of a

bad job, but i think the west hampered itself. tied both its arms behind its back when it went to negotiate. it's very difficult to tell the hand,ns -- on the one they would say you have to adhere to international agreements. they would say that india and pakistan have not, and they would say they never signed it. it is not a good argument to make. "we signed it because we thought we were going to get help." one of the biggest losses for the west and iraq has not been, as better as they are, the material losses and human tragedy going on in iraq -- as bad as they are. the moral high ground has been lost. that is something that is going to take the west a long time to pick up, and that has to do with the fact that international law, which at the end of the day was created to sustain an international system that was western was overturned by the west. very, very difficult now to get

back to a situation where we can lecture others that they are not part of an international system. that makes it very, very as i said, iia and think the situation will only be solved when we get a political solution. that what mentioned is needed are some opportunities for engagement, and so given what you have also just described, what would you recommend to the iranians? if you were in tehran right now meeting with people, these three different parts or institutions within iran, what would you terms of creating opportunities toward the west? and, if you were in europe or, like, here in d.c. and speaking to an administration here, what would you tell them that would create effective opportunities for engagement with iran? >> to me, you'd need to get rid

of -- to be honest, if mr. martin a job could be retired, it would be by far the easiest thing. i think his image abroad is disastrous. that, i think the team he has around him is not good. this is someone who does not have a huge amount of understanding of the international community. some changes are taking place in iran is where procrastination is an art, so we cannot necessarily anticipate easy, quick changes. not going to happen, but that is my ideal situation. there are some very good people in iran that are not in the right place. the last ambassador in london -- he spoke with an american accent. i mean, at least they have an

understanding. to communicate with people. you know what your worries and fears are. the current team do not have that, i don't think, anyway. there are serious problems there, and i think we have stepped backwards. for me, ideally, what iran's foreign strategy -- foreign policy strategy had been, was also that if the americans are going to be a problem, they stick hard and fast with europeans. they always make compromises with the europeans. after 2004, they ditched that policy. they said they would look to the east. people in the west can go to hell, basically. some have used this as a tactical move. others as an ideological move. i think that is a mistake. we have to talk to them and say that they had to come to some sort of solution, if not with the united states, at least with the europeans, and they will have to compromise. that's the name of the game in politics. you cannot have it all. to the west, i would say, also,

you will have to engage. americans tend to play for everything. if you actually go for something slightly less than 110%, you may end up writing you get more than you bargained for. engagement in a way that you talk with the -- not only to the iranians as a whole and not from a los angeles tv station, for goodness sake. that was a fiasco. but actually more serious in terms of communicating what they want, but also in a political sense, i do think, actually, that more unity on an international front is that her. more unity when you have not only the europeans, but the canadians, australians, japanese, and others, all together making very clear statements of what you want -- very clear. none of the legalistic jargon that goes into legal documents. you make it very clear, you make it very transparent, and you say everything is on the table.

they are very, very qualified. i know it was a big deal here. just shows how far we have to go, but the fact that condoleezza rice said we are happy to join the negotiation was seen as a great breakthrough. but look at the way it was structured. first of all, they would come once they stop uranium enrichment. as in they would rather they stopped it before they start the discussion. a bit of a nonstarter in some ways. the other thing that was problematic or more limited was the fact that they basically said they would only discuss the nuclear issue but not other matters. when in actual fact, the nuclear issue for me is the consequence of other matters, so you need to deal with the other matters. if it's the hostage crisis, whatever, deal with it. get the goods. i do not expect these meetings to be particularly pleasant, but at least you get them out, and i think they should be transparent. also the other thing, i think, on the purely immediate term is you must not exaggerate the

threat. when you exaggerate the threat, you demean and trivialize it. the problem with the holocene is whether it's from apathy or neglect. the central bank of terrorism, the spider at the red. everything is bad in iran. i think things are bad enough. we do not need to make them extra bad. when you make them extra bad, you trivialize it. when you have a situation, to actually blame things on iran for which iran is clearly not responsible for, all you are otherwiseeople who have reason saying this is unjust, and that's a major problem. iranians me wrong, the

-- the cia is everywhere. it's less so in iran. you should notgs forget his there were no antiwar demonstrations against the iraq war and iran. got 1 -- iinally remember talking to a friend of mine. said i saw that they had 30 thousand people out. they said it was getting embarrassing. a parliamentary deputy borough rating -- berating state television for being too anti-american in its coverage of the iraq war. none of this was engaged. none of this was even attempted to have an engagement. the first time americans and theians engaged, when firefighters and others went to the earthquake, and talk to the people who came back, they never had a problem. in fact, the relationship was very good. none of this was worked on.

none of this has been developed. ahmad and jot in some ways has changed the dynamics. but at the same time, there are things that can be done in my view because the situation is so critical now. a situation where it could escalate out of control. there's no doubt about it in my mind. me, it's never too late to basically have this fundamental rethink of how we are going forward and how we want to achieve our objectives, and i explicit and transparent and say what we want and what we don't want and how -- it hasto get it got to be much, much more energetic. it just is not at the moment. it just is not. suggested that the administration speak to the iranian people, beyond just government people? statement.y simple

a monitor johnson and 18-page letter to bush calling him to .slam vestment, the sort of to him really delivered to gorbachev. really -- i don't know why there wasn't a response . it would have been interesting if there was a response. you know, he could have done a lot of the -- when he said -- the letter starts off wonderfully. he says something like, "how can you -- people do not tolerate oppression and tyranny, and they do not like to be told what to --and do not like to have" you know, some at the white house could have said, "you are talking about your own country."

there are opportunities where you could have had it. the other way is obviously through the media or also i think through academia. one of the things that was very useful for me and others is to increase the number of scholarships. that is what kills it. earlier.ing a joke this is a classic tactic in some ways. these things -- you have to be much more subtle about the way you are engaging people and also understand what they are saying. you have genuine grievances. you are not actually talking to them. we are using them to resolve our own grievances. you see what i'm trying to say? it's not what they want. it's what we want.

wantave to see what they and work with that. it is their country at the end of the day. they do have genuine grievances, and they are fighting for things that for us is very familiar. >> [inaudible] >> that's the original model. >> [inaudible] my question is -- what is your take of the iranian position or participation in backing up hezbollah in the current situation? >> the truth is the argument -- clearly, that's the way i have always described hezbollah. they have founded, funded, directed for many years by the iranians.

but, in the last decade or so, it has sort of out around this direct relationship, and is no doubt in my mind that they basically act in many ways on their own terms, or they take initiatives on the ground. what, you know, to my mind, in a sense -- what the iranian connection is now -- to be honest, there are different arguments as to whether the iranians have the knowledge to abduct the soldiers, knowing where the soldiers were. we just do not know yet -- i don't think it is implausible that they would know, to be honest, but what is key is obviously that everyone in israel and the united states actually believes that they are being directed from iran, so iran has to take the necessary steps to show that it is not, which it is not going to do -- the tragedy of this whole event in lebanon is a got so far out of hand before we even had a moment to think about what we would do. it's going to be very difficult now if the israeli agenda is to crush hezbollah.

for a long time, they've wanted to get rid of hezbollah, and this is their number one -- in large part because hezbollah is the only group to have defeated the israelis in any engagement. i find it impossible to believe that the iranians will not come to their assistance if they get beleaguered. i find it impossible. ahmadinejad may as well not make getse if the situation really bad, which is what the israelis want to do. there's always been argument for a long time that the israelis want to use some sort of the text to resolve their dispute with has bullet basically by eliminating them. this is the thing they wanted to do, but other taken the opportunity -- i do not know if this was deliberate timing by the israelis or not or whether this was accidental. i certainly wish europeans and others had acted more longpitously out of gaza a time ago. they just let it stew for far too long.

puty mind, it has bullet is under enormous pressure, then i cannot see how the iranians will rescue. to the i think the relationship, if it is not immediate and direct in a sense, it is still close. they are not going to let has the 1 --has bullet is we talked to iranians, and they always say has bullet is their .eterrent they do not want to let their deterrent disappear. in strategic terms, they are going to need it. i would like to see at this continues as it is. is very likely because it is basically going to be a firefight between contusion rockets and the israeli air force. what happens in iraq is the shia crescent may actually come to life. struck, actually, in the united states, how long we talk about the middle east. i'm really struck by it, when

you talk about the middle east, nobody talks about iraq. yesterday, someone said to me that the israelis want americans to be drawn into the middle east. i said we are in the middle east. -- ald emphasize one thing lot of the punditry going on -- we just do not know actually precisely what the connection is and what has happened, but it is not implausible. but i do think it has below looks like it is coming under serious pressure, the iranians will come to their assistance. much as i want to let everyone continue to ask questions, here's what we are going to do -- we are going to believe we have time for one quick question. >> in the back. ask you ad to question building on what you were just saying. let's say in iraq, the worst-case scenario hopefully

will not happen, but a civil war ensues. shiites may be have their own area. what will that do regarding iran ? with they're all alliance -- their alliance with the baptist regime -- baptist -- their alliance with the baathis t regime isn syria. >> in tehran, the perspective is that they are the great winners in the global war on terror. taliban are gone. saddam hussein is gone. i think they could do a lot better if they were a little more constructive about what they were doing, but the fact is, the way they view it -- and i remember talking to people in beforeout year ago even a modern jot was coming in. they were very clear about their position in iraq.

very justifiable. but the way they were operating was to influence and infiltrate perspectives. they also have a tremendous capacity for making people not like them, after all. it is not an automatic relationship, but the fact is the perception from tehran is that they have been successful. then you have hamas winning the election. in palestine. it looks very good. they feel quite robust, and this is in bolding them. their argument is eventually the united states will withdraw. and they will eventually pick up the pieces. this comes from something i did not say at the beginning, but it forms part of the instruction in the book. you have to understand that iran at the end of the day is an imperial power. that is what it is. what i mean by that imperial

mentality is that they know how to organize. they know how to administer, and the course of action. you talk to the british, particularly. they always used to ask what the arabs are doing more to work with various groups? they were swamping southern iraq with ngo's, basically, dealing with welfare. it was well known, and the british were tolerating it because nobody could do anything about it, and it actually serves a purpose -- feeding, clothing, so forth. 8000 troops in southern iraq is not a lot, so they needed a certain amount of help. what was interesting was the iranians moved in with alacrity. they moved in a new how to manage. britisho say to the that what they created for iran was a utopia because you guys have come in there and said, "we want to change the system." the iranians look at the mess and say, "brilliant. this is what we have always worked with, and we will come in and operate the system just as

we always have. we know how to manage chaos. you guys at the end of the day are going to get frustrated and leave, but we have moved in and are going to do the job." they are doing i would not say a perfect job, but a reasonably good job, and the british were acutely aware that if there is is sort of uprising in the south, they are going to be in a lot of difficulty, and the iranians do have a certain amount of influence there. about them being emboldened, i think they already are. that is part of the problem. we have made them stronger. backe bush has given iran an empire without iran having to do anything for it. it is quite a remarkable turn of events. enough to make people think that maybe the islamic republic does have some divine blessing around. it is a remarkable turn of events. i would never have predicted in a million years that without shedding a drop of blood, the iranians would now be running .outhern iraq

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>> all weekend long, american history tv is joining our charter cable partners to showcase the history of casper, wyoming. to learn more about the cities on our 2014 tour, visit /localcontent. we continue now with our look at the history of casper. this is american history tv on c-span3. ' producer is creating a documentary about the life and career of former vice president dick cheney, who grew up in casper, wyoming. as part of the process, he sat down with the former vice president for a series of one-on-one interviews as well as with former colleagues and journalists who covered mr. cheney's career. >> what got you guys to casper? >> we were living in lincoln. eisenhower got elected.