the invasion, 6:00 and 10:00 p.m., all here on c-span3. next, historian jim ogden talks about weapons manufacturing in central georgia. sherman destroyed much of this infrastructure, crippling the confederate army's ability to wage war. this hour-long talk was hosted by the civil war center at kennesaw state university in georgia. >> as many of you all know from coming to some of my programs over the years, i have a tendency to use a few props of one sort or another. so i couldn't resist that opportunity today as well. to help illustrate a few points.

mike and some of the staff are -- oh, my goodness, we even recruited craig into distributing handouts. i should get a picture of this. i have a historian friend who once had trace adkins as a sound man at an event. i have a naval academy professor as a map hander-outer. that's kind of like bob creek as an easel in the western theater. bob brian, i do thank you for the introduction. as brian noted, my day job is staff historian at chickamauga military park. even though i'm here today, just as a self-interested historian and citizen, and learner, because i've enjoyed making a few notes about things already yet again from richard and now

craig. and look forward to hearing steve's talk in a few minutes. and i'm not here today as a national military park employee, but because i think the place that i work is an important historic site in the shaping of our nation, i couldn't miss an opportunity of hawking my day job. chickamauga and chattanooga military park. i know a lot of you have discovered out in the lobby there are piles of brochures for chickamauga and chattanooga military park. the old one is currently in use, and the new one which some day will be in use. and so you can pick these up at some point, and i hope to see you on the ground studying those battlefields frequently and often. also, coming around is that

handout, which hopefully everybody will get a copy of pretty soon. and i also have a power point. and let's see, mike -- okay. let's try this. aha! there we go. oh, no. there we go. okay. well, i'll only use the advance button. for the events that were, and would be unfolding in the year we are considering today in this symposium, the year now a century and a half ago, this past week of march, 1864, would prove to be a momentous one.

not only on march 17 did the newly appointed ulysses s. grant assume command of the armies of the united states and the next day the 18th, his most trusted subordinate major general william tecumseh sherman, assumed command of his new responsibility, grant's just vacated seat as the commander of the vast military division of the mississippi that western theater that richard so well described a few minutes ago, the area between the appalachian mountains on the east and the mississippi river on the west, but two days ago, on the 20th of march, 1864, in a series of what one of the participants called full conversations, those conversations drew to a close with some important conclusions. that in the end, would turn out indeed to do much towards

determining the course of events over the coming year. those full conversations, as william tecumseh sherman would kark tierize them, came to fruition in nashville. abandoned and recently constructed renaissance revival home of one of the very men, confederate quartermaster george w. cunningham, who would seen feel as if he personally had a target painted on his chest. because at that time, cunningham was working for the new confederate government in atlanta. concluding on march 20, two days ago, in the burnett house hotel in cincinnati, where the conversations had moved, including being continued on the rail line between nashville and

louisville, and then on to cincinnati, these full conversations set the strategy for the coming campaign season. two weeks later, grant, the principal in those full conversations, having relocated to the east, would reiterate the substance of those discussions as a general directive. in a letter to sherman, dated washington april 4, 1864, and marked private and confidential. grant would write, it is my design if the enemy keep quiet and allow me to take the offensive in the spring campaign to work all parts of the army together and somewhat towards a common center. for your information, i now write you my program as to present -- or as at present

determined. he outlines briefly what richard had outlined about the many prongs of grant's plans of an offensive. then he gets in the end of the second paragraph to the important part of it. and he tells william tecumseh sherman what you see on the screen. you i propose to move against johnston's army, to break it up, and get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources. six days later, sherman, wanting to make sure that he understood this, and doing something that would not be really codified in military art and science, until much later, although some of us who work with groups of military personnel today can tell you we have to continually teach this.

but sherman essentially will do a brief back in a letter to grant on april the 10th, from his then headquarters at the cunningham house in nashville. sherman having occupied the same residence after grant had vacated it. and sherman, too, marking the letter private and confidential. sherman will say, your letter of april 4th is now before me, and affords me an infinite satisfaction, that we are now all to act in common plan, converging on a common center. looks like enlightened war. most specifically he will say, like yourself, you take the biggest road -- or biggest load, and from you shall have thorough and hardy -- or from me you shall have thorough and hearty cooperation. i will not let side issues draw

me off from your main plan in which i am to knock joe johnston and do as much damage to the resources of the enemy as possible. i think william tecumseh sherman understands what is expected of him in the coming campaign. and joseph johnston's army of tennessee is indeed to be the first target for sherman's combined army group of the military division of the mississippi. and he'll later summarize this strategy by saying he was to go for lee, and i was to go for joe johnston. that was the plan. the confederate armies would be the first target. but there had by 1864 to be a second target, and that was the war resources. that are mentioned in this order. because by 1864, the confederate states of america had created a

capacity principally in central georgia and central alabama, and now you can turn to the handout that i've provided you, and in particular the side that is in the lower right-hand corner labeled number 1. the side with the map of the southeast of the united states on it principally. you'll notice there in central georgia, and central alabama, at places like augusta, athens, macon, and montgomery and selma, i've drawn a solid square with a straight line off one of the upper corners of that square, a symbol to represent, what? factories, manufacturing, processing, transportation, warehousing, and distribution. by 1864, the new confederate

government had created in central georgia and central alabama what we in our day would think of and call a military industrial complex. a military industrial complex that was keeping southern armies in the field. a capacity that had allowed the confederate states of america, just three months after the surrender of the garrison of vicksburg, to return most of those men surrendered there on the mississippi to the field. for grant and sherman, at chattanooga, it was some of these same surrendered, paroled, reorganized and reequipped vicksburg troops who had helped, as we've heard from craig just a few minutes ago, they had helped patrick clay burn what was supposed to be grant's main effort. much of carter stevenson's

division on the missionary ridge battlefield just south of where clayburn's brigade was located. the georgia brigade, and the alabama brigade, they had helped stop sherman's men. firing into the flank of sherman's assaulting columns on tunnel hill, was rome georgia's artillery, rearmed with products of the confederate military industrial complex. and less than five months after their surrender to the very troops who were assaulting them on that november 25, 1863, were now firing to stop those very assaults. this military industrial complex was the capacity that cause d one -- or someone walking the line of confederate cannon,

captured on lookout mountain and missionary ridge, and displayed as trophies in front of the army of the cumberland's headquarters on walnut street in chattanooga, to observe that over one-half of the three dozen artillery pieces captured around chattanooga were products of confederate manufacturing. in fact, all of the standard -- or all of the standard cannon of the day, the 12-pound napoleon, were southern manufacturers. 13 of the 19 had been produced in georgia. in fact, on a clear copy of this photograph, you can read stenciled on the trail, macon arsenal, macon, georgia. this military industrial complex was a capacity, which in april of 1864, was one of its

principal architects, if not the principal architect, gorgok summarized as -- in a report to the confederate government, it is three years today since i took charge of the ordnance department of the confederate states at montgomery. three years of constant work and application. i have succeeded beyond my utmost expectation, from being the worst supplied bureau of the war department, it is now the best. large arsenals have been organized at richmond, charleston, macon, atlanta, and selma, and smaller ones at danville, lynchburg, montgomery, besides other establishments. a superb powder mill has been built at augusta, the credit of which is due george washington. melting works were established by me at petersburg. a cannon foundry established at

macon for heavy guns and bronze found ris at macon and augusta. and saulsbury, north carolina. and corksville, virginia. a manufacturing of carbine has been built up in richmond, and a rifle factory at asheville, north carolina. and a new very large armory at macon, including a pistol factory built up under contract here and sent to atlanta, and thence transferred under purchase to macon. a second pistol factory at columbus, georgia. all of these have required incessant toil and attention, but have borne such fruit as relieved the country from fear of want in these respects. where three years ago, we were not making a gun, pistol nor saber, nor shot nor shell, except at a pound of powder, now

we make all of these in quantities to meet the demands of our large army. in looking over all of this, i feel that my three years of labor have not passed in vain. i want to spend a few minutes, or the rest of my time principally elaborating on what this confederate achievement principally in central georgia and central alabama was. because in the end, it can be argued, and certainly many federal soldiers who fought at alatoona and dalton and franklin and nashville, probably would agree, engagements that occurred after the atlanta campaign, it is in the end that sherman's greater success was probably with the second part of grant's directive rather than the first. the army of tennessee was still

a potentially dangerous force, even after sherman was es consed in atlanta. you can, of course, locate many of these places, i know lots of you all are georgians, and hopefully all of you georgians can locate these principal places in what was considered by many the empire state of the south. but in general, i'll be working from east to west. i'm going to start off withing augusta. augusta turns out to be in the end one of the most important military industrial centers for the new confederate government. it was when georgia seceded and declared independence. it was already the home of a very important facility. the united states arsenal had been established there early in

the 1800s. its first location right on the banks of the savannah river. but because of disease, it had been moved up from the valley, and perhaps a little rionicly, and also reflective of what we heard just a few minutes ago, from craig, it wound up on the land of the -- or of the land of walker, sold to the united states government. it's on walker's plantation, and some of you all may know walker, after his death in the atlanta campaign, in the battle of atlanta, will wind up being interred on the family cemetery that is still on this piece of ground. but augusta was already the location of a principal united states arsenal in the south in the antebellum period. and with georgia's secession,

the state of georgia sees that arsenal in january of 1861. and in so doing, brought 22,000 arms to the state of georgia, and then the new confederate government. it is worth noting that 12 months before, in early 1860, there were only 2,000 arms in the augusta arsenal. why the jump between january of 1860 and january of 1861 from 2,000 to 22,000? it was in response to pleas by governor joseph e. brown to the united states war department in particular to the virginia secretary of war john floyd to ship more arms south in the aftermath of john brown's insurrection at harper's ferry.

there was a fear that there would be more john brown's and more harper's ferries. the state of georgia, and then the confederate government will get this already existing facility, but will almost immediately begin to expand its capability. first by making contracts with other industrial facilities, including two foundries in the -- in augusta. but soon those foundries will be purchased by the confederate authorities, and then incorporated, administratively, into this ever-growing confederate state augusta arsenal that is located there. and the slide here on the screen shows the plan of the augusta arsenal as it developed during the course of the war. one of the reasons that this subject doesn't get a great deal

of attention today, is so many of these facilities were destroyed in the last year of the war. but believe it or not, this one in augusta is one that you can actually still walk and visit and get some idea about its size and scale. and some of you may have already visited this site without knowing that you have. this is now the main campus of georgia re gents university in augusta. and in fact, the old complex towards the -- as you view it left edge of the image is still there. most of those buildings are still present. the walls enclosing it are still there. and you can walk that ground. during rt course of the war, the confederate government will expand the facility, and build across one end of it, a very large structure that appears here in a post-war photograph.

but for this facility incorporated additional workshops, and capabilities as well, another post-war image of that structure. this structure is long gone. but because the street pattern around the campus is still pretty much still the same, you can see and sense where this structure was located. as all arsenals, it had both in-house ability to produce materiel, but also served as an administrative center for the contracting of production of war materiel. the augusta arsenal will become one of the most productive. just in 1863 and 1864, to give you a couple of ideas about its capability, it will produce 174 artillery carriages, 115 kay

sons, 10,500 wooden shipping boxes for gunpowder, 11,800 wooden shipping boxes for small arms ammunition, 73,500 horseshoes, arsenals also are where the ammunition is prepared. 85,800 rounds of artillery ammunition will be prepared. 200 tying fuses. 15 million small arms cartridges. and in addition to some male laborers in the cartridge factory, they employed dozens, hundreds of women, girls, and young boys as well. and eventually particularly in 1864, as the threat to the empire state increased, they expanded the ammunition

production aspect of the arsenal by opening a cartridge rolling facility right in downtown augusta. so that it would be closer to where much of the labor was, where people could come in and work. and when you've seen at a national battlefield park or civil war site, an individual do a firing demonstration, as you know, civil war soldiers to load and fire their single-shot rifle muskets would reach in their cartridge box, pull out that paper tube containing the lead projectile and the powder charge. they tear the end of that paper tube open and then to pour the powder down the bore. well, it was mostly women, boys and girls in factories north and south who took those trapezoid shaped pieces of paper, rolled one up around the wooden form,

twist at the end, tie it off, picked up that lead bullet which had been cast, or stamped, and then trimmed and lubricated by a man, and then place that lead bullet on the end of that now paper wrapped former, rolled that up around a second trapezoid piece of paper, twisted it, tied it off, removed the former and stuck that completed tube in the box to be sent to another part of the factory where men would put the powder in, and then fold them up. how long do you think it would take you to roll up those two pieces of trapezoid paper around that former and that lead ball? well, if you're going to get paid to do it, you're going to have to do 90 an hour, or one every 45 seconds. and when you think about just in augusta, 15,000 -- or excuse me, 15 million rounds of ammunition being produced, how many man,

women, girl and boy days, and hours were expended doing that. the augusta arsenal will also develop the important capability of producing those -- the principal and main and most important artillery piece of civil war armies north and south from the beginning of the war to the end of the war. and that is the 12-pound napoleon. now, as the confederate government, a little bit belatedly, adopted the 12-pound napoleon as its principal artillery piece, they will make a few refinements to their design of the 12-pound napoleon, primarily to reduce the amount of machining necessary, and also the amount of material necessary. the back side of your paper handout, you'll notice the profile on the left, the model

18 1857, 12-pound napoleon, developed in europe, and the concept brought back to the united states and refined somewhat and adopted by the united states army in 1857. you'll notice most specifically that on the model 1857 12-pound napoleon, there at the muzzle, the muzzle is flared. that is purely decorative, to make it rather attractive. but if you look at the profile of the confederate manufactured 12-pound napoleon, you'll notice that the muzzle -- to not have the flare on the muzzle, reduce the amount of machining that was necessary. and if you are short materiel, how many pounds of bronze is in

that flare. and if you save that amount of bronze for each tube, how soon might you have enough bronze to cast another 12-pound napoleon. so there is a little bit of savings in materiel there as well. in this central georgia military industrial complex, the production of these weapons will begin in the spring of 1863. and at augusta, which produces as many as 115 of these 12-pound napoleons by the end of the war, they had produced at least 57 by the end of 1863. and at least 77 were in the field by may of 1864. and almost all of them are in the army of tennessee, and the other western armies. although, today, if you're looking for the best collection

of these products of the confederate military industrial complex, you have to go to the eastern theater, and you have to go to the grounds of that -- of the scene of that small engagement outside that southcentral pennsylvania college town. but that gets to a whole other story which we can talk about another time. these guns begin to be fielded in the late summer and spring of 1863. as i noted, by the time of the confederate defeat on missionary ridge in november of 1863, many are in the confederate army of tennessee's artillery compliment, because 13 of the three dozen guns lost at chattanooga are these confederate manufactured 12-pound napoleons. there was also in augusta a

clothing production facility that employed 1,500 women, producing uniform items for confederate soldiers. but perhaps the most important of all of the industrial facilities in augusta was the confederate state's powder works that was developed there. gorgus will slightly exaggerate the case by saying that at the beginning of the war, no powder was produced in the southern states. there were really only some very small powder mills, like the one to the northwest of nashville. but one of the most critical resources that the new nation would need, even if as they fought in 1860, one, it would be a short war, would be gunpowder. and george washington rains was

tasked with deciding on a location, and also the construction of a powder works. raines made a quick trip of the industrial cities of the south, and decided on augusta as the location. not only is augusta well served by railroads, and in fact, the whole military industrial complex in central georgia is in part located there because of the railroad network, but augusta, being located on the fall line of the savannah river, and having developed that river's potential industrial power by the construction of the augusta canal, had the potential power base as well to support this powder works operation. although, in the end, most of the power for the works was

going to come from steam power and not water power. but also, as it turns out, augusta's going to be a well-chosen city because it is going to be well behind what will become the front lines very quickly, and for much of the war. the complex stretched along the bank of the savannah river, upstream of downtown, and also along the augusta canal. and on your handout, you've got a black-and-white copy of this image. both of the powder works images that i have here come out of a very wonderful and rich volume that the university of south carolina press published in 2007. never for the want of a powder, the history of the augusta powder works. and you can find this in many

libraries, and there are lots of things that you can dig out of that volume. but by the spring of 1862, the powder works quickly constructed by incorporating the industrial capacity of much of the south by having the individual parts of the factory produced in different places, including some of the incorporating wheels, the big what you can kind of think of as grinding wheels in nashville, the drive shaft in the incorporating house building which was in segments, which is almost 300 feet long, was cast in segments in chattanooga, and then shipped by rail to augusta and assembled in the complex. there was a refinery for refining, removing impurities

from the principal component of gunpowder at that time, potassium nitrate. and then large cooling magazines, and also storage magazines. and the complex was laid out essentially so that all the materiel progressed from downstream to upstream, and the finished product, and also the most dangerous part of the product was also located furthest away from the city of augusta. during the course of the war, this powder mill will produce 3.3 million pounds of gunpowder for the confederate government. in may of 1863, it was one of the principal places that the english military officer wanted

in particular to visit. he happened to be in augusta on sunday. and was disappointed, because at that time, all of the needs for gunpowder for the confederate army nationally had been met, and there was no need to operate the powder factory on sunday. so they were keeping the sabbath and kept it closed. now, if you remember kind of the look of the color image of one of the buildings i showed you, you might wonder where the confederates get some of these ideas. i just flashed past it again. but this is the national armory in vienna, austria. and notice the kind of kren oh lated and square turreted form of this. think back to the powder works images that i showed you, and also the arsenal images.

in the aftermath of the -- as a result of the crimean war, jefferson davis then secretary of war of the united states had sent officers to europe for advancements in art and science. some of the things they saw were new ways of making gunpowder, and also producing a lot of other war materialle. this engraving comes out of the report of the three officer team. one of the first times that many of the observations from these officers about how to produce war materiel on the newest practice are going to be implemented is by the new nation, the confederate states of america. macon, georgia, is another

important facility. macon, too, will go through kind of the same development process of where first existing private firms like the d.c. hodgkins and son and findley iron works are contracted with. but eventually hodgkins and findley are going to be bought out by the confederate government. and along with other facilities established, they incorporate it into what is on paper the macon arsenal there. also will be -- to be located in macon is an armory for the production of small arms. and after a certain of some time, it was decided to locate the national armory of the new confederate states of america at macon, georgia. to build an armory just like

that at springfield, and what had been at harper's ferry in virginia. to locate that at macon. and property was acquired for the armory, and construction began. these are two buildings that were used by the confederate states laboratory. part of the arsenal complex producing some of the ordnance items. they also begin construction of this national armory. because it is the production of small arms where the confederates will have the greatest challenge. in macon, they'll also produce the 12-pound napoleon. as many as 80 during the course of the war, going into production again in the spring of 1863. by the end of 1863, having produced at least 37, and by may

of 1864, having at least 44 tubes in the field. columbus, georgia, will also be another major arsenal and armory complex. it, too, goes through the same process of, first by contract, and then by purchase, and consolidation of individual works. and much to craig's joy, i'm sure, he'll be satisfied to know that the confederate navy liked columbus also. the confederate navy will develop an important industrial complex there in that city on the chattahoochee river. the columbus arsenal will also produce the 12-pound napoleon, as many as 60, with at least 23 by the end of 1863, and a couple of dozen in the field by may of 1864.

columbus was also the location of some very large textile mills. like the eagle manufacturing company. and that product was then shipped to various places to be used to produce uniforms, tents, and other cloth items. columbus also had another very important military industrial manufacturing complex. and that was the rock island paper mill. why is paper important? what did the soldier expend every time he went to fire his weapon? a rectangle of paper, a little more than four inches by six inches in size. and so how much paper was expended by the confederate army in many battles. across other places in central georgia and central alabama, were other facilities as well. like the cook and brothers small

arms production in athens. a large potash works in terrell county, the georgia state armory in milledgeville. a cotton gin mrg manufacturing was converted to the production of revolvers, making more than 3,600 during the course of the war. in georgia, the ridgeton company would produce pistols as well. and this complex extended over into alabama. also, there were facilities located in montgomery, and nearby points like the textile mills at prattville. and another very large complex would be developed both by the confederate state's army, and the navy at selma, alabama.

and the factories in selma itself, and the activities that were operated out of selma, such as some of the functions of the confederate mining bureau, by 1865, the operations right at selma itself, and in the greater region had as many as 10,000 employees. not right in selma, but at facilities in that greater region. the industrial capacity at selma was capable of producing even large rifle sea coast weapons, which were very important to the confederate naval operation. then, of course, there are all of the facilities in this, the gate city of atlanta, or the nearby gate city of atlanta.

and while atlanta had some key facilities itself, like the rolling mill depicted here as a result of the abandonment of the city of atlanta in early september of 1864 in ruins, atlanta was primarily an administrative center for the confederate military production. offices here in atlanta contracted with firms large and small throughout the region. and then receive the product of those operations, and then distributed them to the armies in the field as needed. but one of the most important facilities in all of the atlanta

complex was the quartermaster clothing depot, run by that tennessee now confederate quartermaster george washington cunningham. which had been sherman headquarters in nashville in late 1863, and early 1864. cunningham operated a facility in atlanta that was capable of producing 130,000 complete suits of uniforms in a 12-month time period. and the -- he did this mostly by piecework. he had male tailors and other staff cutting out fabric in warehouses in atlanta, and then all of the pieces of a given garment, like a jacket or a pair of trousers would be bundled

together, along with the necessary thread to sew them together, and the buttons and other bits of trim, and then women would come in and check out these bundles of unfinished garments, take them home, sew them together, and then bring them back in and receive pay for them once they were inspected and found to meet standards. by the spring of 1863, this operation in atlanta employed 3,000 women a month. sewing uniform items together. and if we do not discount the sundays, just crude mathematics means that on a daily basis, about 100 women were arriving and departing the columbus -- excuse me, the atlanta clothing depot, delivering finished products and checking out more

bundles and taking them home. there probably was a pretty busy street corner scene there each day in 1863 and 1864. now, while this complex that i have described, is set in place, and was so successful, the product really of the hard work of not only george washington raines and richard tyler, and james h. burton, john mal let and george washington cunningham and frederick c. humphries, and isaac m. st. john, and a host of others, while that capacity to produce war materiel had reached such a point that between july 1, 1864, and january 21 of 1865,

it could issue more than 200,000 complete suits of uniforms to its soldiers in the field just in that time period. i do have to note a few qualifications. it was not always the most perfect system. the southern railroad network as it deteriorated often meant that raw materials and finished products would be delayed in either reaching the factories or reaching the destination points. it also meant that some alternate materials had to be used. instead of the preferred all woolen outer garments, jackets, coats and trousers of the military uniform of the time, the confederates had to rely very extensively all on what was commonly called jean cloth, a mixture of wool and cotton. a cotton warp and a wool weft.

what was often called negro cloth. in the antebellum period this was used to produce clothing for slaves in the south. for the production of shoes, the -- even the agricultural south had a shortage of leather. and could not make two standard infantry footwear. the jefferson booty that had been developed in the united states army in the 1850s. the southern style shoe had to be produced a little more simply. after our presentations today, if you want to come and handle these and look at them a little more closely, you'll be able to -- i'll have them out in the lobby there. but they also had to use some expedient methods. in the south, with plenty of cotton, why not substitute cotton cloth for some parts of

leather items. and so shoes that are partly leather, and partly canvas, is a part leather, part canvas shoe as good as an all leather one? no. but will it put a shoe on a soldier's foot for a time? in the summer of 1863, you would have seen thousands of army of tennessee soldiers wearing these part leather, part canvas shoes. accoutrements were done often the same way. instead of a set of infantry accoutrements, made almost entirely out of leather, why not make a combination of leather and painted canvas. it is part leather, part painted canvas set of accoutrements as good as an all leather set? no. but it will work for a while? 5,000, or many more, 5,000 at least, were in use in the army

of tennessee in the fall of 1863. while alternate materials often could offset some of the difficulties, there were still some problems which were very hard to overcome. one of the greatest difficulties the confederates had in production, at least reliably, was artillery fuses. they were notoriously unreliable. porter alexander during the siege of chattanooga said he felt lucky if he could get one projectile in nine to explode on target. one in nine on target is not very good. unfortunately for us, he did not record how many of the other eight exploded prematurely, or not at all, or well beyond the intended target. but we do know in one case where

many of the projectiles fired, had fuses that burned longer than the ar tillerist believed. that is in preparation for that charge on the third day of july, at gettysburg. but despite these caveats, this complex by 1864 was what was keeping southern armies in the field. it was that complex which produced the materiel that confronted grant and sherman at chattanooga, and would confront sherman as he drove into georgia beginning on the 7th day of may. it is also the complex that sherman's men encountered as they advanced south into the empire state of the south that spring. on may 17th, sherman purposely

took the industrial city of rome, georgia, to knock the industrial facilities at that site out of the war. six days later, troops were sent specifically to the iron works on the atawa river run by what had previously been run by mark cooper, then being run by robinson, and knocked them out. and as sherman pushed ever further south, of course, he will knock out the textile mills at roswell and sweetwater creek and high falls and other points around atlanta, and then by his mere presence outside of atlanta in early september caused the destruction of some important facilities. and as sherman advanced south, also became -- became more threatening. it caused the labor force at many of these facilities in augusta, macon, columbus, and other points to be diverted from their production responsibilities and turned at

least into temporary soldiers. a machinist handling a rifle and standing in the entrenchments at macon guarding against one of the cavalry raids that sherman launched around the greater atlanta region is not a machinist who can be turning out a part for some piece of military equipment. in the end, as i noted, it is probably sherman's success in disrupting and destroying parts of the military industrial complex that -- where he had the greatest success and achieving what grant had outlined for him back in those full conversations in march, and in that directive of april of 1864. because how many months is it between sherman's arrival in atlanta in september of 1864, savannah in december of 1864, and the collapse of the south's fo