[ applause ] i'm happy to answer any questions. there we go. >> yeah, can you address a little -- you talked a lot about the topic from the standpoint of what sherman ordered. can you address kind of what actually was happening on the ground for the union troops? in particular, as may marched through the swath of the south, they obviously disrupted the society that was going on. but in particular, how did his men handle african american slaves? >> that is a great question. and actually my book, i have a whole chapter on the relationship between the march and african americans. as sherman's men marched

through -- the first thing i would say is there is this misconception that people say oh, sherman's men cut a swath 50 miles wide or 60 miles wide. that is -- i always tell my students you don't want to think of it like a lawn mower strip. it is not 50 miles wide of lawn mower. it is 50 miles from the edge of one column through four columns to the furthest edge of the other. so in many ways it is very -- what is the word oi'm looking for. not sporadic or episodic. but sometimes a house is targeting and other houses a mile away are not targeted. that being said, where sherman's men and him and african american african americans is a really interesting question. i love paul's that sherman's army was probably one to great armies of liberation. they are not probably very willing liberators.

sherman was not -- certainly not a fan of racial equality or after the war according civil rights to african americans. he did not -- he was perfectly content as they went on the to plantations to have his men liberate the slaves and announce they were free. but then he was always telling them to stay put. because he doesn't want them following after his army. and of course he's unable to present african americans from following his army. so by the time he gets from atlanta to georgia there are probably about 25,000 african americans who have followed his army. and he doesn't want them. he's perfectly willing, and actually there is a section in his orders to take able-bodied african american men and put them in his pioneer corps and have them work as teamsters and things like that. he does not want to have to feed women and children or elderly people. he tries to leave them behind. there is a horrific episode outside of savannah in a place

called ebeneazer creek where sherman's men or a section of his army under the command of sherman's subordinate general, jefferson davis -- no relation -- and then you have the african americans who are following them. and then you have wheeler's confederate cavalry kind of behind that. and what happens is they use pontoon bridges to get through this river or swampy area. it's kind of a cypress swamp. and then davis orders the pontoon bridges pulled up so the african americans can't cross. and they are being chased by wheeler's cavalry. hundreds of them wind up drowning in the swamp and hundreds end up being recaptured by the cavalry. and when the news gets out sherman is condemned for not condemning davis. so it is tangled, i guess is the

short answer. >> one consequence is the rise in diversion rates from soldiers whose homes were in the area the army went through. was this a circumstance or one of the goals? >> i don't think sherman was directly hoping to influence the army of northern virginia. where i think sherman actually was directly trying to target the army of northern virginia was not through desertion but through supplies. that by, first of all, breaking the rail line from atlanta which had been a major supply line up to petersburg and then by just raiding through, you know, this relatively untouched area to deprive them of supplies. and i think also there was a

sense -- he definitely was k cognizant of the psychological impact, that he wanted people to know that he could not be stopped. and in fact any kind of rumors that might have come out about how vicious they were or how violent, he was comfortable with that because he felt there would be this deeper psychological impact. >> 50 years before the event you are talki ing about we hand episode similar to here. literally when the british came to washington after the battle of the braidanceburg and the sewell belmont house. somebody took a pot shot another general ross as he arrived in the capital plaza. killed his horse and general ross made a order of that house burned but made a point to not

specifically damage other property. and contrasted that to the uncivilized behavior of americans at york and other canadian towns they burned and looted. he said far more civilized than those terrible americans he said. so is general ross ahead of his time? was he unique at his time? or what was going on then? >> i'm far from an expert in the war of 1812. but i don't think that ross was ahead of his time. i mean, i think that -- ross ahead of his time? do you mean in burning the civilian house or? not burning everything else. no, i mean there is an argument to be made for only limiting your destruction to private buildings. i will also say that with sherman, the vast majority of buildings or structures that sherman's men burned were not actually private homes. it was again, the sort of -- the places that gave material support to the confederacy.

barns, gin houses, cotton -- big bails of cotton. they burn remarkably few houses. and it is fascinating to me one of the areas that i explore in actually about the cultural memory of sherman's march, is in fact the different reasons that houses along sherman's route were saved. because you can't have it both ways. you can't have sherman cutting this 50-mile swath and have dozens and dozens of antebellum homes surviving. there were reasons this house was spared or that house was spared. >> i'm also a tour guide. i take people past the statue of the horse, william tecumseh sherman, the house. the revisionist history, i say, war is a pathway to a more perfect peace. and i wonder if this

psychological effect, when he brought his children, when the family came to chattanooga, and his son died, another son named willie, how much of a psychological effect do you think it ha in making -- some say it made him manic and mean. what do you think? >> i think it was tragic for him, as losing a child would be for anybody. i think that -- i don't think sherman was mean. i think that sherman was clear-eyed. which is to say that i think sherman recognized that the way you stop a war is you make the war too costly. and that in so doing, he also really did believe that he was saving his men, because -- look, his men, they thought the march was great. they loved it. you know, they had more to eat than they normally did. they marched less each day than

they normally did. with very few exceptions, nobody ever shot at them. from sherman's perspective, saving his men's lives while bringing the war to a more rapid close, so i -- i don't think he's mean. i think he's -- he has a job, and he's willing to do what it takes. >> could you speak to how, in 1864, northern papers were covering the march, and were there lincoln opponents to pointed out anything different than had been happening? >> that's a great question. there's very little coverage of the march itself, because from november 15th, until he's right outside of savannah, there's almost no news coming out of the march. the northern paper i've looked at the most in terms of its coverage of the march has been harper's weekly, because i was

looking for images, and it does have great images of the march. but it's mostly celebratory. i'll be perfectly honest with you, i've not looked specifically at democratic newspapers. there's not a sense at the time that sherman is doing anything beyond the pale, or anything radical radically -- nobody's thinking that sherman's created this new kind of warfare. what sherman is doing of what, say, sheridan had done earlier in the valley in 1864. grant, famously instructs sheridan, that a crow flying over will have to carry his own provender with him. they see in the progress of sherman that his progress is helping to win the war. i mean, the reason that he turns at savannah and goes up through the carolinas, he's trying to

get to petersburg, ultimately, to help out grant. not to steal any of matt's thunder, but that was my problem with the movie "lincoln" is that there was no sherman in it. >> one of my favorite cities in america is savannah, georgia. can you talk about his decision to save that beautiful city, and give it to president lincoln as a christmas gift? >> that is the nicest, most gentile description i've ever heard of that. because normally, sherman didn't decide to save savannah, sherman said, look, you can surrender, or i'm going to shell you into submission. he gave them a choice. and savannahans said, we're going to surrender. in fact, they earned the enmity of every other place in the south. because they were weak and they gave up. that's just the nicest way i've ever heard that played. >> i'm just going to -- a quick

question. of course, natchez does the same thing. but i have another question. in 1863, confederate troops went out of their way, in fact, arrived late at gettysburg, because they're busy burning down thaddeus stephens' house. chasing free blacks all over pennsylvania and rounding them up. is there anything equivalent in sherman's march that says -- does his army target politicians' house, do they march out of their way just to seek revenge against particular politicians and are they rounding up any white confederates and enslaving them? >> no, i wouldn't say they go out of their way, but sherman takes a particular delight, and he has a long passage about it in his memoirs about camping for a night in georgia, and freeing cobb's slaves.

and the next one that comes in for a lot of destruction, the south carolina poet simms. they destroy his house. i read a diary that soldiers were dismayed, because it's one thing if they sort of trash the house, but they burn a lot of the books in simms' library, and he feels that that's beyond the pale. i think those are the two. the other thing is when they take millageville, sherman's men actually go into the georgia state house and they have a mock convention, where they bring georgia back into the union. it's really interesting. what they don't do, though, is they don't talk about emancipation at all in this mock convention. they just bring georgia back in. >> there were women and children from the south who were shipped via rail train to the north, who never made it back home again. has any research been done to

follow up on what happened to them after the war? >> not that i'm aware of. and by -- i mean, they go willingly. it's not as if sherman is refugeeing women and children out to the north. no, i've not seen much on that. the only thing i can recall, a long time ago when i was working on my dissertation, i read a diary from a woman who had been from georgia and spent time with family in brooklyn and came back to georgia and was upset that the minister's wife wouldn't talk to her, that she was seen as having been sort of a traitor. but no, i'm not familiar with that. >> there's a professor, i believe it's mississippi state, who recently came out with a book on sherman. and advances that one of his motives, since he had taught school in louisiana, to a military school, knew many of

the confederate officers. and had many friendships and personal relationships. part of his motivation in the south certainly was to protect his own troops, certainly to break the will of the south, because it was obvious the war going on for four years, what we had been doing wasn't completely working. and then i think back after the overland campaign, grant hung on for almost a year, and all the loss and destruction and loss of life that went on there to take the approach to break the will of the south to continue to fig fight. and all that that entailed. but also -- but also to project his own troops. but he did not want to take on many of his friends and do battle on the field of battle. >> i've not heard that theory, that he didn't want to take on his friends. those friendships, of course,

are legendary. not so much because sherman had taught at lsu, but almost all of these officers had been at west point together over the years. i don't think that sherman -- that doesn't sort of ring true to me, personally. but i'm not familiar with the -- is it the -- the demon of the loss cause, is that the one? that's the most recent one that i know of that came out. i'd love to see it. thank you. >> when the question arose about press coverage, did walt whitman cover anything having to do with sherman? did he comment on it? and the other question i have is, can you address the mythologizing of sherman, when it began? i think maybe reston -- i think there's a big mythology in america surrounding sherman. so when did that begin? >> okay. as to the poetry question, walt

whitman has one poem that obliquely references sherman, saluting the colors. from the perspective of an african-american woman watching sherman's men marching through north carolina. actually, melville, her man melville in battle pieces has two poems about sherman's march. i think there's two that are pretty powerful. in terms of the mythologizing of sherman, i think it begins as the war concludes. i mean, he's seen as just such a hero of the war, and they march in the grand review. at the very end of the war, they march, and they have all these, like, captured cows and sheep and stuff marching behind them. certainly when sherman dies in 1891 or '2 now, i can't remember, but when sherman dies,

there's the outpouring, national outpouring of grief. it's tremendous. during the 1870s, 1860s, and 1870s, he's not reviled in the south. he makes a tour of the south in 1879, he goes back to atlanta, actually. he's welcomed with open arms. there's balls in his honor. the papers are funny because there's people like ha, ha, ha, sherman's coming. but he's really -- he's welcomed by white southerners because of the fact that he did not support equality for african-americans. and he wanted in fact a very soft piece for the south. going back to his time at lsu and his time earlier when he had been in the army in the south, he loved the south. he loved southerners. southern whites, let me be more clear. thank you all very much. [ applause ] friday night on "american

history tv," slavery and the cinema, with a look at the depiction of slavery and films since the 1930s. then the 2012 movie "lincoln" and its portrayal of the debate and passage of the 13th amendment. and a discussion about the 1939 movie "gone with the wind" and its depiction of southern society, friday night, beginning at 8:00 eastern, here on c-span3. this weekend on "american history tv," we take a look back 200 years ago this week, when british military forces set the white house and capitol on fire. we'll also hear about british admiral coburn used the waterways to invade and burn the city. coburn's idea is to make use of several different waterways in an attack on washington. if the british force simply sailed up the potomac, everybody

would know that washington was the ultimate target. coburn decides that -- or recommends that the force be split up. that one squadron sail up the potomac river and threaten the capitol and the city of alexandria, the main force is going to go up the potungset river in maryland. and it would kind of shield the ultimate british intention. because a move up the potungsset could mean anything. it could mean an attack on washington, but it could also mean an overland attack on baltimore, or attack on annapolis. or it could mean that the british were simply chasing after commedore joshua barney, who was the american commander of the chesapeake flotilla, who had a flotilla of shallow draft barges that were perfectly suited for navigating the

shallow waters of the chesapeake and the rivers feeding into it. barney, by the summer of 1814, had been trapped in the patuksin river. the british could use barney's presence in the river to more or less shield their movement for the capital. and that's exactly what coburn recommended. and it's what the british commanders, general ross and admiral alexander cochran, who was in charge of the entire fleet here in north america, agreed to do. this weekend live coverage of the panel of authors and historians, as they discuss the 1814 british burning of washington. live saturday at 1:00 p.m. eastern. then more from author steve vogel on how the british used washington's waterways during the invasion, 6:00 and 10:00

p.m., all here on c-span3. next, historian jim ogden talks about weapons manufacturing in central georgia. sherman destroyed much of this infrastructure, crippling the confederate army's ability to wage war. this hour-long talk was hosted by the civil war center at kennesaw state university in georgia. >> as many of you all know from coming to some of my programs over the years, i have a tendency to use a few props of one sort or another. so i couldn't resist that opportunity today as well. to help illustrate a few points.

mike and some of the staff are -- oh, my goodness, we even recruited craig into distributing handouts. i should get a picture of this. i have a historian friend who once had trace adkins as a sound man at an event. i have a naval academy professor as a map hander-outer. that's kind of like bob creek as an easel in the western theater. bob brian, i do thank you for the introduction. as brian noted, my day job is staff historian at chickamauga military park. even though i'm here today, just as a self-interested historian and citizen, and learner, because i've enjoyed making a few notes about things already yet again from richard and now craig. and look forward to hearing

steve's talk in a few minutes. and i'm not here today as a national military park employee, but because i think the place that i work is an important historic site in the shaping of our nation, i couldn't miss an opportunity of hawking my day job. chickamauga and chattanooga military park. i know a lot of you have discovered out in the lobby there are piles of brochures for chickamauga and chattanooga military park. the old one is currently in use, and the new one which some day will be in use. and so you can pick these up at some point, and i hope to see you on the ground studying those battlefields frequently and often. also, coming around is that handout, which hopefully

everybody will get a copy of pretty soon. and i also have a power point. and let's see, mike -- okay. let's try this. aha! there we go. oh, no. there we go. okay. well, i'll only use the advance button. for the events that were, and would be unfolding in the year we are considering today in this symposium, the year now a century and a half ago, this past week of march, 1864, would prove to be a momentous one. not only on march 17 did the

newly appointed ulysses s. grant assume command of the armies of the united states and the next day the 18th, his most trusted subordinate major general william tecumseh sherman, assumed command of his new responsibility, grant's just vacated seat as the commander of the vast military division of the mississippi that western theater that richard so well described a few minutes ago, the area between the appalachian mountains on the east and the mississippi river on the west, but two days ago, on the 20th of march, 1864, in a series of what one of the participants called full conversations, those conversations drew to a close with some important conclusions. that in the end, would turn out indeed to do much towards determining the course of events

over the coming year. those full conversations, as william tecumseh sherman would kark tierize them, came to fruition in nashville. abandoned and recently constructed renaissance revival home of one of the very men, confederate quartermaster george w. cunningham, who would seen feel as if he personally had a target painted on his chest. because at that time, cunningham was working for the new confederate government in atlanta. concluding on march 20, two days ago, in the burnett house hotel in cincinnati, where the conversations had moved, including being continued on the rail line between nashville and louisville, and then on to

cincinnati, these full conversations set the strategy for the coming campaign season. two weeks later, grant, the principal in those full conversations, having relocated to the east, would reiterate the substance of those discussions as a general directive. in a letter to sherman, dated washington april 4, 1864, and marked private and confidential. grant would write, it is my design if the enemy keep quiet and allow me to take the offensive in the spring campaign to work all parts of the army together and somewhat towards a common center. for your information, i now write you my program as to present -- or as at present determined.

he outlines briefly what richard had outlined about the many prongs of grant's plans of an offensive. then he gets in the end of the second paragraph to the important part of it. and he tells william tecumseh sherman what you see on the screen. you i propose to move against johnston's army, to break it up, and get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources. six days later, sherman, wanting to make sure that he understood this, and doing something that would not be really codified in military art and science, until much later, although some of us who work with groups of military personnel today can tell you we have to continually teach this. but sherman essentially will do

a brief back in a letter to grant on april the 10th, from his then headquarters at the cunningham house in nashville. sherman having occupied the same residence after grant had vacated it. and sherman, too, marking the letter private and confidential. sherman will say, your letter of april 4th is now before me, and affords me an infinite satisfaction, that we are now all to act in common plan, converging on a common center. looks like enlightened war. most specifically he will say, like yourself, you take the biggest road -- or biggest load, and from you shall have thorough and hardy -- or from me you shall have thorough and hearty cooperation. i will not let side issues draw me off from your main plan in

which i am to knock joe johnston and do as much damage to the resources of the enemy as possible. i think william tecumseh sherman understands what is expected of him in the coming campaign. and joseph johnston's army of tennessee is indeed to be the first target for sherman's combined army group of the military division of the mississippi. and he'll later summarize this strategy by saying he was to go for lee, and i was to go for joe johnston. that was the plan. the confederate armies would be the first target. but there had by 1864 to be a second target, and that was the war resources. that are mentioned in this order. because by 1864, the confederate states of america had created a

capacity principally in central georgia and central alabama, and now you can turn to the handout that i've provided you, and in particular the side that is in the lower right-hand corner labeled number 1. the side with the map of the southeast of the united states on it principally. you'll notice there in central georgia, and central alabama, at places like augusta, athens, macon, and montgomery and selma, i've drawn a solid square with a straight line off one of the upper corners of that square, a symbol to represent, what? factories, manufacturing, processing, transportation, warehousing, and distribution. by 1864, the new confederate government had created in central georgia and central

alabama what we in our day would think of and call a military industrial complex. a military industrial complex that was keeping southern armies in the field. a capacity that had allowed the confederate states of america, just three months after the surrender of the garrison of vicksburg, to return most of those men surrendered there on the mississippi to the field. for grant and sherman, at chattanooga, it was some of these same surrendered, paroled, reorganized and reequipped vicksburg troops who had helped, as we've heard from craig just a few minutes ago, they had helped patrick clay burn what was supposed to be grant's main effort. much of carter stevenson's

division on the missionary ridge battlefield just south of where clayburn's brigade was located. the georgia brigade, and the alabama brigade, they had helped stop sherman's men. firing into the flank of sherman's assaulting columns on tunnel hill, was rome georgia's artillery, rearmed with products of the confederate military industrial complex. and less than five months after their surrender to the very troops who were assaulting them on that november 25, 1863, were now firing to stop those very assaults. this military industrial complex was the capacity that cause d one -- or someone walking the line of confederate cannon, captured on lookout mountain and

missionary ridge, and displayed as trophies in front of the army of the cumberland's headquarters on walnut street in chattanooga, to observe that over one-half of the three dozen artillery pieces captured around chattanooga were products of confederate manufacturing. in fact, all of the standard -- or all of the standard cannon of the day, the 12-pound napoleon, were southern manufacturers. 13 of the 19 had been produced in georgia. in fact, on a clear copy of this photograph, you can read stenciled on the trail, macon arsenal, macon, georgia. this military industrial complex was a capacity, which in april of 1864, was one of its principal architects, if not the

principal architect, gorgok summarized as -- in a report to the confederate government, it is three years today since i took charge of the ordnance department of the confederate states at montgomery. three years of constant work and application. i have succeeded beyond my utmost expectation, from being the worst supplied bureau of the war department, it is now the best. large arsenals have been organized at richmond, charleston, macon, atlanta, and selma, and smaller ones at danville, lynchburg, montgomery, besides other establishments. a superb powder mill has been built at augusta, the credit of which is due george washington. melting works were established by me at petersburg. a cannon foundry established at macon for heavy guns and bronze

found ris at macon and augusta. and saulsbury, north carolina. and corksville, virginia. a manufacturing of carbine has been built up in richmond, and a rifle factory at asheville, north carolina. and a new very large armory at macon, including a pistol factory built up under contract here and sent to atlanta, and thence transferred under purchase to macon. a second pistol factory at columbus, georgia. all of these have required incessant toil and attention, but have borne such fruit as relieved the country from fear of want in these respects. where three years ago, we were not making a gun, pistol nor saber, nor shot nor shell, except at a pound of powder, now we make all of these in

quantities to meet the demands of our large army. in looking over all of this, i feel that my three years of labor have not passed in vain. i want to spend a few minutes, or the rest of my time principally elaborating on what this confederate achievement principally in central georgia and central alabama was. because in the end, it can be argued, and certainly many federal soldiers who fought at alatoona and dalton and franklin and nashville, probably would agree, engagements that occurred after the atlanta campaign, it is in the end that sherman's greater success was probably with the second part of grant's directive rather than the first. the army of tennessee was still a potentially dangerous force,

even after sherman was es consed in atlanta. you can, of course, locate many of these places, i know lots of you all are georgians, and hopefully all of you georgians can locate these principal places in what was considered by many the empire state of the south. but in general, i'll be working from east to west. i'm going to start off withing augusta. augusta turns out to be in the end one of the most important military industrial centers for the new confederate government. it was when georgia seceded and declared independence. it was already the home of a very important facility. the united states arsenal had been established there early in the 1800s.

its first location right on the banks of the savannah river. but because of disease, it had been moved up from the valley, and perhaps a little rionicly, and also reflective of what we heard just a few minutes ago, from craig, it wound up on the land of the -- or of the land of walker, sold to the united states government. it's on walker's plantation, and some of you all may know walker, after his death in the atlanta campaign, in the battle of atlanta, will wind up being interred on the family cemetery that is still on this piece of ground. but augusta was already the location of a principal united states arsenal in the south in the antebellum period. and with georgia's secession, the state of georgia sees that

arsenal in january of 1861. and in so doing, brought 22,000 arms to the state of georgia, and then the new confederate government. it is worth noting that 12 months before, in early 1860, there were only 2,000 arms in the augusta arsenal. why the jump between january of 1860 and january of 1861 from 2,000 to 22,000? it was in response to pleas by governor joseph e. brown to the united states war department in particular to the virginia secretary of war john floyd to ship more arms south in the aftermath of john brown's insurrection at harper's ferry. there was a fear that there

would be more john brown's and more harper's ferries. the state of georgia, and then the confederate government will get this already existing facility, but will almost immediately begin to expand its capability. first by making contracts with other industrial facilities, including two foundries in the -- in augusta. but soon those foundries will be purchased by the confederate authorities, and then incorporated, administratively, into this ever-growing confederate state augusta arsenal that is located there. and the slide here on the screen shows the plan of the augusta arsenal as it developed during the course of the war. one of the reasons that this subject doesn't get a great deal of attention today, is so many

of these facilities were destroyed in the last year of the war. but believe it or not, this one in augusta is one that you can actually still walk and visit and get some idea about its size and scale. and some of you may have already visited this site without knowing that you have. this is now the main campus of georgia re gents university in augusta. and in fact, the old complex towards the -- as you view it left edge of the image is still there. most of those buildings are still present. the walls enclosing it are still there. and you can walk that ground. during rt course of the war, the confederate government will expand the facility, and build across one end of it, a very large structure that appears here in a post-war photograph.

but for this facility incorporated additional workshops, and capabilities as well, another post-war image of that structure. this structure is long gone. but because the street pattern around the campus is still pretty much still the same, you can see and sense where this structure was located. as all arsenals, it had both in-house ability to produce materiel, but also served as an administrative center for the contracting of production of war materiel. the augusta arsenal will become one of the most productive. just in 1863 and 1864, to give you a couple of ideas about its capability, it will produce 174 artillery carriages, 115 kay

sons, 10,500 wooden shipping boxes for gunpowder, 11,800 wooden shipping boxes for small arms ammunition, 73,500 horseshoes, arsenals also are where the ammunition is prepared. 85,800 rounds of artillery ammunition will be prepared. 200 tying fuses. 15 million small arms cartridges. and in addition to some male laborers in the cartridge factory, they employed dozens, hundreds of women, girls, and young boys as well. and eventually particularly in 1864, as the threat to the empire state increased, they expanded the ammunition production aspect of the arsenal

by opening a cartridge rolling facility right in downtown augusta. so that it would be closer to where much of the labor was, where people could come in and work. and when you've seen at a national battlefield park or civil war site, an individual do a firing demonstration, as you know, civil war soldiers to load and fire their single-shot rifle muskets would reach in their cartridge box, pull out that paper tube containing the lead projectile and the powder charge. they tear the end of that paper tube open and then to pour the powder down the bore. well, it was mostly women, boys and girls in factories north and south who took those trapezoid shaped pieces of paper, rolled one up around the wooden form, twist at the end, tie it off,

picked up that lead bullet which had been cast, or stamped, and then trimmed and lubricated by a man, and then place that lead bullet on the end of that now paper wrapped former, rolled that up around a second trapezoid piece of paper, twisted it, tied it off, removed the former and stuck that completed tube in the box to be sent to another part of the factory where men would put the powder in, and then fold them up. how long do you think it would take you to roll up those two pieces of trapezoid paper around that former and that lead ball? well, if you're going to get paid to do it, you're going to have to do 90 an hour, or one every 45 seconds. and when you think about just in augusta, 15,000 -- or excuse me, 15 million rounds of ammunition being produced, how many man,

women, girl and boy days, and hours were expended doing that. the augusta arsenal will also develop the important capability of producing those -- the principal and main and most important artillery piece of civil war armies north and south from the beginning of the war to the end of the war. and that is the 12-pound napoleon. now, as the confederate government, a little bit belatedly, adopted the 12-pound napoleon as its principal artillery piece, they will make a few refinements to their design of the 12-pound napoleon, primarily to reduce the amount of machining necessary, and also the amount of material necessary. the back side of your paper handout, you'll notice the profile on the left, the model

18 1857, 12-pound napoleon, developed in europe, and the concept brought back to the united states and refined somewhat and adopted by the united states army in 1857. you'll notice most specifically that on the model 1857 12-pound napoleon, there at the muzzle, the muzzle is flared. that is purely decorative, to make it rather attractive. but if you look at the profile of the confederate manufactured 12-pound napoleon, you'll notice that the muzzle -- to not have the flare on the muzzle, reduce the amount of machining that was necessary. and if you are short materiel, how many pounds of bronze is in

that flare. and if you save that amount of bronze for each tube, how soon might you have enough bronze to cast another 12-pound napoleon. so there is a little bit of savings in materiel there as well. in this central georgia military industrial complex, the production of these weapons will begin in the spring of 1863. and at augusta, which produces as many as 115 of these 12-pound napoleons by the end of the war, they had produced at least 57 by the end of 1863. and at least 77 were in the field by may of 1864. and almost all of them are in the army of tennessee, and the other western armies. although, today, if you're looking for the best collection of these products of the

confederate military industrial complex, you have to go to the eastern theater, and you have to go to the grounds of that -- of the scene of that small engagement outside that southcentral pennsylvania college town. but that gets to a whole other story which we can talk about another time. these guns begin to be fielded in the late summer and spring of 1863. as i noted, by the time of the confederate defeat on missionary ridge in november of 1863, many are in the confederate army of tennessee's artillery compliment, because 13 of the three dozen guns lost at chattanooga are these confederate manufactured 12-pound napoleons. there was also in augusta a clothing production facility

that employed 1,500 women, producing uniform items for confederate soldiers. but perhaps the most important of all of the industrial facilities in augusta was the confederate state's powder works that was developed there. gorgus will slightly exaggerate the case by saying that at the beginning of the war, no powder was produced in the southern states. there were really only some very small powder mills, like the one to the northwest of nashville. but one of the most critical resources that the new nation would need, even if as they fought in 1860, one, it would be a short war, would be gunpowder. and george washington rains was

tasked with deciding on a location, and also the construction of a powder works. raines made a quick trip of the industrial cities of the south, and decided on augusta as the location. not only is augusta well served by railroads, and in fact, the whole military industrial complex in central georgia is in part located there because of the railroad network, but augusta, being located on the fall line of the savannah river, and having developed that river's potential industrial power by the construction of the augusta canal, had the potential power base as well to support this powder works operation. although, in the end, most of the power for the works was going to come from steam power

and not water power. but also, as it turns out, augusta's going to be a well-chosen city because it is going to be well behind what will become the front lines very quickly, and for much of the war. the complex stretched along the bank of the savannah river, upstream of downtown, and also along the augusta canal. and on your handout, you've got a black-and-white copy of this image. both of the powder works images that i have here come out of a very wonderful and rich volume that the university of south carolina press published in 2007. never for the want of a powder, the history of the augusta powder works. and you can find