throughout the atlanta campaign, sherman largely avoided launching frontal attacks against his entrenched opponent. instead, what he repeatedly did was utilize maneuver, flanking movements, to rest the confederates from strong defensive positions. i think sherman's greatness also derives from his mastery of logistics. keeping an enormous field army supplied day after day after day, very deep in enemy territory. sherman's army numbered over 100,000 men. it had 28,000 horses. 33,000 mules. imagine trying to supply an army of that size, day after day after day. the only way to do it, of course, was via railroads. sherman, in the months leading up to the campaign, which began

in may 1864, had hundreds and hundreds of trains moving down a rail system through kentucky and tennessee stockpiling supplies in nashville and chattanooga. in chattanooga alone between the months of march and may of 1864, there are 145 rail cars unloading on a daily basis there. so he's building supply bases that he'll need as he advances into georgia. during the campaign, he had about 5,000 wagons that were constantly on the move from the railroad to the army in the field. as richard mcmurray, who is one of the foremost scholars of the atlanta campaign writes in one what's one of the best overviews of the campaign, and like some of the other speakers you've heard, i'll throw out some book titles. if you're like me, you love books about the civil war.

mcmurray's "atlanta 1864" is a very, very, very good overview. if you're looking for one book that gives you an overview, "decision in the west" by albert castel is also an outstanding book. mcmurray points out that sherman had a couple of big advantages over his opponent at the start of the atlanta campaign. first, sherman had command of a vast department that stretched from the appalachian mountains in the east all the way to the mississippi river. he had command of the troops within this vast military division of the mississippi. johnson, on the other hand, commanded a much smaller department. he had no authority, johnson, that is, over the states of alabama and mississippi. he couldn't order troops from those states to join his army fighting in georgia. sherman also had the strong support of his military and civilian superiors. sherman and grant had a very close relationship, and the

lincoln administration was also very supportive of sherman's campaigns. lastly, sherman had an army that on average during the campaign was about 40% larger than that of the army of tennessee. the start of the campaign, sherman's three armies numbered around 110,000 men. sherman commanded what i believe today would be called an army group but that term didn't exist in the 1860s. he commanded three separate armies. the largest of the three separate armies was the army of the cumberland which numbered close to 73,000 men at the start of the campaign, commanded by general george h. thomas, a professional soldier, and if you look again at the performance on the battlefield, thomas actually had a far more impressive record than william t. sherman. thomas, in fact, had won the first major military victory in the west up in kentucky in 1862. he had performed superbly at

chickamauga, actually saved the union army at chickamauga, as many of you probably know. thomas' troops had shattered the confederate lines at missionary ridge. thomas was an impressive soldier. some historians argued thomas would have made a better commander of the federal armies during the atlanta campaign than sherman. but -- but thomas did not have a very good working relationship with ulysses s. grant. brook simpson actually alluded to this yesterday in his talk when talking about the tennessee campaign in 1864. and then thomas also had a reputation as being a very slow, very methodical soldier and that caused sherman some frustration during the atlanta campaign, actually. so thomas is a very, very important subordinate, but he's an army commander during the campaign under sherman.

the second largest of sherman's armies was his old command, sherman's old command, the army of tennessee. it was his favorite army. and it was also the most successful union army of the civil war. a recent book on the army of the tennessee by stephen woodworth is entitled "nothing but victory." and that army never knew defeat on the battlefield. its commander during the atlanta campaign was james b. mcpherson, a west point graduate. he had served on grant's staff earlier in the civil war. and he was a great, great favorite of both grant and sherman. in fact, both men wrote that they could see mcpherson commanding all the union armies.

sherman writes a letter during the campaign, i believe, that he predicts that something happens to him, something happens to grant, he feels confident that mcpherson can take command of the union armies, and win ultimate victory. the smallest of sherman's armies, which, in fact, is just a single core, is the army of the ohio. it numbers close to 13,000 men under general john m. skofield, a west-pointer and someone who sherman trusts and who performs very well during the campaign. sherman also had three divisions of cavalry numbering about 8,900 men. although sherman doesn't think very much of his cavalry generals or that branch of the service. i think you can rightfully criticize sherman for his employment, his poor employment, really, of cavalry during the atlanta campaign. and he thinks -- he, in fact,

thinks that the confederate cavalry is superior to his. he's particularly worried throughout the campaign about the confederate cavalry out in alabama and mississippi under nathan bedford forrest. the close relationship that existed between sherman and his military and civilian superiors stood in stark contrast, stark contrast to the relationship between joseph e. johnston and confederate president jefferson davis. the two men did not like each other at all. and this wrangling and the strained relationship between the two dated back to the earliest days of the war when there was wrangling over the issue of rank. which general should be -- should have the highest rank in the confederate army. bob krik has written a superb essay about this, about joe

johnston. and so, the relationship between the two men is very, very strained during the atlanta campaign, too. in the months prior to the advent of the campaign, so march, april of 1864, jefferson davis had repeatedly asked johnson to go on the defensive. now, on your maps, if you look in the corner up there, it would be your upper left-hand corner, you can see the red lines on the map up here indicate the confederate positions taken during the campaign. the blue lines are the federal positions. during the first few months of 1864, the confederates are in encamped around the town of dalton in extreme northwest georgia. the army had been shattered at the battle of missionary ridge in november of 1863 under the braxton bragg.

it had been a disastrous defeat for the army and johnston is brought in and johnston, in some ways, is like george mcclellan, in that he is a superb organizer and motivator of men. johnson rebuilds the army. he boosts the morale of the soldiers. and the confederate soldiers in the army of tennessee love joe johnson and respect him. they know that he cares about their welfare. that's really one of johnson's great strong points as a general. but while he's rebuilding the army of tennessee in its winter camps, jefferson davis repeatedly ask johnson to take the offensive against the federals who were camped not only that far north of dalton in the vicinity of chattanooga, tennessee. so davis wants johnson to march up into east tennessee. but johnson claims his army's outnumbered by the yankees. the army of tennessee doesn't

have the adequate supplies or logistical capability of marching up into east tennessee. now, unfortunately for johnson, the davis administration is getting very different reports concerning the army of tennessee from some of johnson's subordinates. so his core commanders, his cavalry commander, they're sending back reports that the army's in great shape and should take the offensive. so the davis administration is unsure who to believe. although davis is more inclined to believe the core commanders, i think, than johnson. during the campaign then, up until the time of his removal, one of joe johnson's chief weaknesses is his continual failure, day after day, week after week, to provide davis and his administration with detailed regular reports of what's going on. if you look in the correspondence section of the official records and compare lee's correspondence with davis during the overland campaign

with what joe johnson was sending, there's a stark contrast. johnson's wife in late may 1864 suggested to her husband that it might be a good idea for him to keep the government better informed of what his plans are. and johnson says, replied to her that her suggestion was a judicious one but that, quote, the people in richmond take no interest in any partial affairs that may occur in this quarter. suggesting, obviously, that what jefferson davis is really concerned about are events in virginia. johnson's strategy, then, in the spring of 1864, was to remain in a strong defensive position around dalton behind a high ridge line just west of the town called rocky face ridge. you can see it on your maps there. and await an attack by the

federals. and when the federals attacked, the confederates would defeat them. after gaining a victory, johnson would then move probably west into alabama and then north up into tennessee. johnson's army at its peak strength, a few weeks into the campaign, atlanta campaign when he receives reinforcements, was about 69,000, close to 70,000 men, divided into 3 corps, under the command of william j. hardy, john bell hood, and the bishop general polk. polk actually commanded a separate army that was brought called the army of mississippi and it became a corps in johnson's army. johnson also had a cavalry corps that numbered between 7,000 and 8,000 men under the diminutive joseph wheeler. the campaign began in the first week of may of 1864.

and sherman's plan, which was actually a plan that george thomas had originally devised, and that sherman adopted, was for -- with some modifications, sherman modified what thomas had envisioned -- but sherman's plan is to have the army of the ohio and the army of the cumberland to demonstrate against the confederate positions north and west of dalton. so keep johnson's attention focused in the immediate vicinity of dalton. mcpherson's army then would march west -- south and west of rocky face ridge. and you can see on the map up here, again, in the upper left-hand corner, the movements of the three armies. or you can look on your map there. mcpherson was to march 12 miles south of dalton, but west of rocky face ridge, cross through a narrow passage called snake creek gap.

and come out on the eastern side of this ridge line. and then break johnson's supply line, the western and atlantic railroad in the vicinity of dalton. the western atlantic is the supply line for both armies during the atlanta campaievpñr it was a railroad that stretched from chattanooga, which is in the far upper left-hand corner of your map to atlanta, which is in the bottom center of your map. so both armies are relying on the western and atlantic.myñi it was a good plan. it was a very good plan. and initially, it unfolded just as sherman hoped it would. on may the 8th, the thomas' troops and schofield demonstrated against rocky face ridge.

mcpherson gets through snake creek gap. which the confederates have left unguarded. they'd been there all winter. one of johnson's -- one of the criticisms you can level at johnson is that even though he had been encamped around dalton for many months, he really hadn't studied the geography very closely south of the town. the confederates certainly knew about snake creek gap, but wheeler didn't have any pickets protecting it. so johnson's men are able to march through without a fight. and then when they come out of the eastern end of the gap, very short distance in front of them is the western and atlantic. they see some earthworks around the small town of rasaka. clearly there are some confederates there. but mcpherson didn't have any cavalry with him, which was a terrible mistake on the part of the federals. mcpherson becomes worried. he doesn't know how many confederates are in front of

him. he's also worried if he continues advancing toward the railroad that confederates might march down from dalton and strike him in the flank. as he's moving east. so instead of pushing forward, seizing the western and atlantic, cutting johnson's supply line, mcpherson instead pulls his army back to snake creek gap. when johnson learns of this, because the confederates did have a small contingent of cavalry there at rasaka, johnson orders a retreat, a very well-organized one, of his troops from the dalton vicinity southward to rasaka. mcpherson had lost enormous opportunity to strike a crippling blow at the confederates. sherman realized this. and he wrote to mcpherson, i regret beyond measure you did

not break the railroad. sherman realizes that there's a big opportunity that's been lost here. on may 14th and 15th, the first major battle of the campaign is fought at rasaka. a place that's just recently been opened as a state park. the battlefield's beautifully preserved. both armies are fortified there, like during the overland campaign, these armies are constructing log and dirt works. whenever they halt for any appreciable time. both armies launch attacks at rasaka that fail. tactically, then, the two-day battle is a draw. but at the operational level, sherman scores a great victory by getting across a river just south of rasaka, ustanala, and gets one division across at a ferry site, and threatens the western and atlantic, south of versaka and forces johnson to retreat.

johnson retreats, and you can look in the middle of your map now. he retreats down to the vicinity of the small town called castle. there he hopes to lay a trap for sherman. the road network is such that sherman ends up dividing his armies as they march south. and johnson's plan was to strike one of these wings of sherman's army at cassville as it marched south. but unfortunately for johnson, john bell hood who's been ordered to launch this attack, doesn't do so. and then in a conference, a night conference that's held between johnson and his corps commanders, hood and polk argue that the army needed to retreat yet again at cassville. their line is being infiltrated by artillery. exactly what happened at this

conference and who said what was a point of bitter contention between joe johnson and john bell hood for many, many, many years. each had a very different version of what happened there that's actually really impossible to reconcile. but we don't need to go into the details of it now, but the -- johnson's version is that he saw that his corps commanders didn't have any confidence that they could hold this position, so the army retreated yet again. sherman, at this point, is pretty optimistic about the course of the campaign up to this point. in a wonderfully evocative phrase or passage, rather, he writes, this is in mid-may, we are now in motion like a vast hive of bees, and expect to swarm over the chattahoochee in a few days. the chattahoochee was the river flowing from east to west. that would be the last natural barrier between sherman and atlanta.

by the beginning of the third week of may, johnson's army was entrenched in a very strong position in the alatoona mountains. you can see it on your map there just below the etawa river. sherman was very familiar with the alatoona mountains. in fact, all the geography of this entire section of georgia, he had spent time here in the 1840s, as a young army officer. he had been stationed here. sherman knew that it would be foolish, foolish to try and attack johnson's position in the alatoona mountains. so what sherman decides to do instead is execute yet another flanking march. this one would involve some risk, though, because it would -- it would move the union army some miles away from the western and atlantic, about 15 miles away. the objective of this march would be the town of dallas. and you can see it there in the

lower left-hand corner of the map with skofield, thomas and mcpherson all taking different routes to get there. it's about 15 miles west of the alatoona position that johnson held, 15 miles west of the railroad. but johnson's cavalry informed him, in pretty timely fashion, of this movement toward dallas. and johnson shifts away from alatoona westward to try and block sherman once again. what ensued then in the final days, the last week of may, and the first couple of days of june, was some intense skirmishing every day punctuated by three small battles. two of them involving union attacks against the confederates that failed, and the third -- the failed confederate attack,

new hope church, pickets mill and dallas. the fighting in this densely wooded region was such that the soldiers on both sides called it the hell hole. when sherman realized that johnson's lines were pretty strong, along the dallas/new hope/picket's mill line, and that it would be impractical for him to continue south, to go around the western flank of johnson's army, because it would keep the union forces away from the railroad for too long, he decided to shift back eastward toward the western and atlantic. in fact, for a few days at the very end of may, sherman's army was experiencing some pretty serious supply shortages. they'd simply been away from the army too long. even though 5,000 wagons sounds like a lot, with an army of the size of sherman's, it's really

not sufficient to supply it day after day that far from the railroad. so both armies shift back over toward the railroad. and then, the skies open up. and it starts to rain. and it continues to rain over and over and over, day after day, for the first few weeks of june. both armies are nearly immobilized. you can imagine trying to move enormous wagon trains down mud -- down roads that are knee-deep in mud. you can imagine being in a trench that's maybe full up to your knees in water and mud. hundreds of men on a daily basis in both armies are sent to the rear. they're broken down. physically. and this actually continues throughout the campaign. the campaign is similar to the overland campaign.

in that the armies are in constant contact. there's constant skirmishing day after day after day. no rest, really, if you're in the trenches on the front line. and that takes an enormous toll on everyone in the armies. sherman becomes frustrated then. the pace of his advance is slowed. he makes a decision to deviate from the strategy that has been successful up until this point. the flanking maneuvers. he writes chief of staff henry hallek on june 16th, 1864, i'm now inclined to feign on both flanks and assault the center of the confederate line. it may cost us dear, but the results would surpass any attempt to pass around. johnson's army by this time was defending a line eight miles long. sherman's rationale is that there's got to be some weak points in that line.

and that with the element of surprise, frontal attacks directed against the center of johnson's line might succeed and score a great victory. if it doesn't work, sherman could just once again go back to conducting flanking maneuvers. there's also some evidence in both sherman's personal and official correspondence that like a lot of career army officers at the time of the civil war, he felt that fighting for prolonged periods behind earthworks could damage the morale of the men, that it would make them timid, in effect. john bell hood is very open about this. and his post-bell lam memoir "advance and retreat" he claims

that lee feels the same -- felt the same way. so sherman orders attacks. and the resulting battle of kennesaw mountain fought on june the 27th of 1864 was a costly defeat for sherman. the troops that launched the attacks were union soldiers. bloodily repulsed. they suffered about 3,000 casualties. sherman took a lot of heat from the northern press. his men were disheartened. but if you look at the losses that sherman's army had sustained up to this point in the campaign, including at kennesaw mountain, they paled in comparison to what was happening in virginia. compare the losses, for instance, in just a single day of fighting in the wilderness to the 3,000 casualties sustained at kennesaw, and you'll see that sherman is taking a lot of territory and suffering relatively few losses as a result. the only success of the day at kennesaw, that was the phrase

that sherman used, didn't occur when these failed attacks against johnson's line. but in a flanking maneuver, launched by skofield's army against the far southern end of johnson's long line, skofield actually managed to get his troops closer to the chattahoochee than johnson. this is what forced johnson to abandon the kennesaw line. and fall back to a line that had been constructed by enormous numbers of impressed slaves along the chattahoochee river. so sherman's troops advance to the chat hoochie. it would have been crazy to attack it. but in one of the most masterful maneuvers that sherman executes in the campaign, he manages to cross troops north of johnson's

position. this is the first time he's gone around johnson's right flank instead of his left flank and by the second week of july then, johnson abandons the chat hoochie line and then he's on the outskirts of atlanta. you can see on the map, look in the bottom center of the map where the chat hoochie river runs, you can see the troops crossing the river north of the confederates river line and when the confederates retreat across the chathoochie, they're right on the outskirts of the gate city of atlanta as it was called. sherman had achieved something pretty remarkable by this point. he had taken all of northwest georgia, a region that was important in terms of agriculture and industry to the confederacy. he was on the outskirts of atlanta, and he had an army that

was strong in both numbers and moral. contrast that to the army of the potomac when it gets to the outskirts of petersburg and the moral of the army is pretty shaky. right? by this point, joe johnson -- w3 excuse me. by this point jefferson davis has had enough of joe johnson jefferson davis has lost faith in joe johnson's ability to hold the city of atlanta. johnson had repeatedly told the davis administration and politicians who visited his headquarters that the best way to force the federals out of north georgiahq pq western and atlantic railroad. strike their supply line and end up in tennessee. johnson claimed that his army

excuse me, his calvary, joe wheeler's corps couldn't do this. johnson con the afford to detach his own calvary from his army because he needed wheeler's horsemen to defend the flanks of the army as it fell back. johns didn't have enough men to stretch the line long enough. what johnson proposed over and over and over was for the davis administration to order the confederate calvary in alabama and mississippi forrest command to ride east to break sherman's supply line. this would involve stripping the states of alabama and mississippi of all of their defenders. and that was something that davis, i think wisely, refused to do. as richard mcmurray and others have pointed out, alabama and mississippi were pretty important states. stripping those states of their defenders would have opened up the rich agricultural region.

of the tom bigby river valley. they would have opened up important industrial cities like selma, alabama, columbus, georgia, would not have been a smart move. and it's highly debatable, too, whether forrest's men could have created enough damage to, in the long term, for sherman to have to retreat. sherman was acutely aware his supply line was vulnerable. he went to some lengths to try to protect it and we don't have time to talk about the ways he did but we can later if you're interested. on july 17th, 1864, jefferson davis makes the extremely controversial decision. it was controversial in the summer of 1864, it's still controversial today, of relieving joe johnson of command and replacing him with

one of his corps commanders, john bell hood. an officer probably all of you know who had gained a reputation in 1862 and 1863 as one of lee's best brigade and division commanders. he had a reputation of being a very bold fighter. he personally sacrificed a lot, you know the nature of his wounds, the loss of a leg, the partial use of an arm here in gettysburg. in the message that relieved joe johnson, the secretary of war said, as you have failed to arrest the advance of the enemy to the vicinity of atlanta, and expressed no confidence that you can defeat or repel him, you are hereby relieved. hood takes command and he has a mandate, a very clear mandate that he has to fight for the city of atlanta. he doesn't have a lot of room to maneuver. and there's some evidence,

incidentally, that hood had been angling for this command sometime prior to getting it. he was an intensely ambitious officer. johnson then was in retrospect. a general who lacked the ability to shape campaigns. throughout his career, he reacted to the moves of his opponents rather than seizing the initiative, and that was clearly the case in the atlanta campaign. what the army of tennessee needed but couldn't get, of course, was robert e. lee. hood, upon taking command immediately ordered attacks. you can see the first of the three main battles that were fought around the city and upper -- the very top, the middle of your map the battle of peach tree creek.

hood's plan was to attack the forces from the north after they crossed peach tree creek but before they could entrench. he devoted two corps of his army to the attack. his commanders were supposed to send their units forward in echelon. the attacks ended up being uncoordinated. not very well managed by the corps commanders and after hard fighting, the federals managed to hold their lines. the confederate casualties at peachtree creek numbered about 2,500 while the federals were about 2,100. there is a fine new book on the battle. a very detailed study. by my friend robert jenkins that i recommend just to study of peachtree creek. we are only now getting detailed battle studies of the west while there have been ones eastern battles for many decades. the day after the battle of peachtree creek, hood learns

that the far left flank of the union troops that are approaching atlanta from the east is vulnerable. it is in the air. and hood decides to try and execute a flanking march to strike this vulnerable portion of sherman's line. this is part of the army of the tennessee under mcpherson. hood orders a very long flank march to take place during the night of july 21st by the troops under hardy. these are men who had already had an exhausting 48 hours beforehand. they'd fought heavily east of the city on july 21st. what hood was asking his men to do was simply unrealistic in terms of their physical abilities of these exhausted soldiers. hood was also handicapped by having a corps commanders that were pretty inexperienced at that high level of command.

nonetheless, the flank march is executed and on july 22nd, the largest battle of the campaign is fought. this is the one immortalized in the cycle ra ma, the circular painting in atlanta. the map in the upper right-hand corner gives you some sense of the battle. it was, in fact, single bloodiest day of fighting in the last ten months of the civil war. the confederates did achieve some temporary success. some of hardy's troops break through the union line. they capture large numbers of prisoners and cannon. they killed general james b. mcpherson. one of the highest ranking union generals to die in the war. this was a huge personal blow to sherman. as you could imagine. but at the end of the day, the federals launch counterattacks.

they retake portions of their lines that the confederates had seized and even though many confederates at the time saw this as a victory, because they were counting prisoners and cannon and flags captured, in retrospect, this was an army that -- excuse me, a battle that cost hood's army very heavily. there's a new book on this battle, fairly new, "a fair dixie dodd" and another one i could recommend. hood's army lost between 3,600 and 6,300 men if that single day of fighting. following the battle, sherman decided to change his strategy and reorient his efforts to take the city from the east of atlanta to the west of atlanta. with hopes of cutting the last railroad into the city that led -- that led south of atlanta. at the same time, sherman tries

to launch cavalry raids that will ride around the eastern and western approaches of the city and wreck the rail lines south of the city. hood responds to these movements by sending a corps out west of atlanta to block the federal movements out there. this is under a -- the troops that hood sends out there are under very, very inexperienced corps commander named s.d. lee, a close friend of hood's. lee gets out to the area he's supposed to. he think it is federals out there aren't -- have just arrived. they aren't entrenched and takes it upon himself to start a battle. he doesn't have orders to do from hood but lee starts throwing one division after another at the federals and the federals of the army of the tennessee, the men, remember, i mentioned who have never known defeat, and what happens in the battle of ezra church is

kennesaw mountain in reverse. it's confederates losing heavily, attacked fortified federals and the casualties are dramatically lopsided. hood's army loses about 3,000 men in these attacks. the federals lose only about 600 casualties at ezra church. that raid -- so ezra church is a great victory for sherman but the cavalry raids he launched proved disastrous. the federal divisions that rode south of the city ended up being smashed by joe wheeler and the confederate cavalry. this is wheeler's finest performance of his career and this lowers sherman's already poor opinion of his cavalry corps. and convinces him that cavalry can't wreck a railroad. it's going to take more than

that. hood had not achieved what he'd wanted in these three battles and none of them incidentally before intended to be frontal attacks against entrenched union soldiers and each instance what hood was trying to execute was a flank attack and they didn't work. but cumulative these battles did have the effect of making sherman a little more cautious than he had been. sherman's -- two of sherman's corps commanders had been classmates of hood and knew him very well. mcpherson and skoe field and knew him reputation and sherman did, too. so in the first few weeks of august, there's a semi siege of atlanta. the city's not completely surrounded but sherman brings up big guns, siege guns, and bombards the city. sherman's also trying to get

around the city to the west. he's having some problems. he's -- sherman's facing the discharge of 10,000 of his men at this point in august. he also tells hall lack in the first week of august he's too impatient for a siege. sherman's a pretty nervous, impatient, anxious individual. he doesn't want a long, drawn-out affair like what happened at petersburg certainly. so he decides on a bold plan, sherman. decides to abandon the siege lines east and north of atlanta. pull his troops out of the trenches, leave a single corps north of the city to hold the point where his supply line, the western and atlantic, crosses the chathoochie river. leave one corps up there but take the rest of the army on a wide flanking march to the west and southwest and south of

atlanta. that's shown in the lower right-hand corner of your map. and cut the macon and western railroad south of the city. sherman was convinced by this point that cavalry raids couldn't do the job when it came to wrecking railroads so sherman's infantry men pull out of the trenches. they march around and in the v last day of augusts they reach the macon and western. hood in the meantime had sent his cavalry off to do what johnson had not been willing to do. wheeler's sent off on a raid to try and disrupt sherman's supply lines up into north georgia and tennessee. wheeler's raid a spectacular failure. he wrecks his cavalry corps in the process. so at first when hood receives newses that the federal trenches north of the city are vacant, what do you think he believes? wheeler's raid been a success.

sherman's retreating to the north. but then, he realizes he, hood, when's going on and he dispatches two corps south to the vicinity of joans borough. you will see jonesborough at the south and the two corps down there are given the orders to push the army of the tennessee away from the railroad, protect that vital supply line and the first day of the battle of jonesboro, the last battle of the campaign, these two corps, confederate corps launch attack that is are repulsed. in the meantime, hood finds out that the -- that his rail lines north of jonesboro have been broken. you can see that on the map with thomas and skofield and he abandons the city.

hood on the night of september 1st, marching the troops in the city south to rejoin those who had been at jonesboro. during the evacuation of the city, the confederates discovered they've left a large train of munitions in the atlanta thatç obviously can't t out. and so they set it on fire. this is 28 boxcars full of explosives and you can imagine the sound. it was heard 15, 20 miles away. this is the scene incidentally that's depicted in gt con with the wind" when red is in the wagon trying to get scarlet and melanie and the baby out and there's all the set's burning in the background. i always -- i told my kids that some of those sets were from "the wizard of oz" which is true and they don't care anything about "gone with the wind" but upset the sets of "the wizard of

oz" burn in 1939 making this movie. so anyway, it's worth pointing out here that the destruction of atlanta cannot be attributed solely to uncle billy sherman, that hood's army, in fact, began the process with the evacuation and the destruction, the firing of this train and sherman took it a good bit further, of course, in november just before the march to the sea. on september 2nd, the mayor of atlanta, james calhoun, surrendered the city. sherman announced to abraham lincoln, atlanta is ours and fairly won. sherman also said i shall not push much further on this raid which is interesting word to characterize the campaign. the constant battles and squirmishes since the first week of may, sherman said, had exhausted the army an it needed rest so atlanta turned into a garrison city.

news of the fall of the city, of course, caused great celebration in the north. it gave a desperately needed boost to the fortunes of the republican party and here, here is where we get to the significance of the atlanta campaign. what makes it so important. along with -- so the fall of atlanta along with the victories won by phil sheridan in the shen do with a shally later in september helped to boost the confidence of northern voters that the lincoln administration was going to win an ultimate victory. and that the president needed a second term in office. so, the fall of atlanta helped to reassure the real election of lincoln and also public reaffirmation of his monodates to continue a war to end on the basis of both reunion and

emancipation, something that wouldn't have been the case if the democrats had won. at the same time, the fall of atlanta and lincoln's re-election helped ensure that u.s. grant would remain as general and chief and sherman as his chief lieutenant and that these two men would be the architects of ultimate union victory in the civil war. thank you. do we have time for a few questions? okay. if you all want to come up to the mics if anyone has any questions. yes, sir? >> was there any thought to put robert e. lee in charge of all the confederates armies? >> yes. in fact, that ultimately did happen but it was after the atlanta campaign. and davis did reply -- so the

question was, if you didn't hear it, was there any thought of putting lee in charge of all confederate armies and that did happen, although some months after the atlanta campaign. but davis relied very heavily on lee's advice not only on matters pertaining to the eastern theater, but also on command matters in the west. when davis was considering removing joe johnson from command, he asked lee, who do you think would be a good replacement? lee said that hood was a bold fighter on the battlefield but -- this is paraphrasing. i should know this verbatim but lee said something to the effect that hood is bold on the battlefield wu careless off the battlefield and i think he was saying there coming to administrative responsibilities, that hood -- hood had some

weaknesses there. yes, sir? >> two questions. >> let's do one so other folks gate chance. >> well, my question is, how did sherman come up with the idea for the -- sherman's naughts. >> oh, okay. so the question is how did -- that's a great question. how did sherman come up with the idea for sherman's knots or sherman's bow ties as they were sometimes called and what he's asking about are the twisted rails. when the union troops would wreck rail lines, the confederates, too, for this matter, the confederates employed this prior to the atlanta campaign, you get thousands of infantry men to stand next to a rail line and all at once lift up the cross ties, separate with hammers the rail, the iron rail from the

wooden cross ties, pile up the wooden cross ties in huge heaps and create bonfires. put the iron rails on the end and when the the iron rails tur red-hot, the union soldiers would grab it. >> elves real read this and wondered if they used gloves. those ties must have been pretty hot, but nymph, they would take the red-hot rails and then twist them around trees, which could male it extraordinarily difficult for the conphet razz to straighten out and reuse. >> but your question was one i really can't answer. my kind of gut feeling is that it wasn't sherman that devised this, but it was something that engineers and soldiers came up with. it had been employed prior to

this time. i mean, sherman had wrecked railroads in eastern mississippi the meridian expedition, but that's a great question. i don't know where it originated. i don't know if we actually know, but it became a pretty common procedure. so good question. yes, sir? >> i want to be back to the annacona plant. >> are you kidding? >> yes. basically the campaigns in '64, grab and shrmen the war had switched to capturing capitals and territories. to manufacturing and supply centers. to captured that i depots. could you tell us how important to the confed real war effort

were the depots and supply centers? >> sure. atlanta was absolutely vital. georgia had some of the some of the largest manufacturing centers, not just atlanta, but augusta, in the eastern part of the state the quartermaster depots there were foundry that is produced cannons it's evident -- being at the juncture of many railroads we could go on and on about the contractors

producing accoutrements, though the city had evacuated so much of the scenery, and sent them south to columbus and macon. when sherman seizes the city. he orders the expulsion of all those civilians, which is a fascinating story, too. >> you mentioned at the beginning of your talk sherman's mastery of logistics. how much of that did he directly oversee, and how much of it was delegated to. >> sure.

sherman had very capable subordinates, staff that would look at various logistical concerns. he had authority over -- he had banned all civilian traffic. and he had planned for the confederates to try and break the railroads by stockpiling rails and ties at various locations that could very quickly rebuild railroads, particularly bridges, as the confederates retreated. if you look on your map, they retreated across several rivers.

they would always burn these brings. it was truly remarkable how quick quickly sherman's engineers and labors would rebuilt these huge spans. that's where the mastery of logistics i think comes into play. one more question. >> general hood has been undergoing a bit of a reevaluation of the generalship recently. >> right. >> it seems to me that his plans, once he took over as the commander of the army of tennessee were fairly good plans on paper. it's just that his army couldn't execute them for one reason or another. could you comment briefly on the commander of tennessee? >> sure. hood sent didn't have the mastery of logistic that is

sherman does, and that becomes painfully evident during the tennessee campaign in 1864, but hood's operating under some severe handicaps. he also has a command structure with a lot of generals woefully inexperienced at division and core level of command. they just -- they don't execute hood's orders and don't carry out his plans the way he had envisioned them. i think the other important factor is hood's plans are just unrealistic given the time constraints that he's working under and the physical conditions of his men. and the hardy's flank march in atlanta was a prime example of that. he was asking too much of men who were already totally exhausted. about but the renaissance -- that's not the right world --

the reevaluation of the generalship is taking place with authors thank you. toorch on american history tv, a focus on slavery and cinema beginning at 8:00 eastern with a look at the depiction of slavery in films since the 1930s. and decision about the 1939 movies s. "gone with the wind" that's all tonight starting at 8:00 eastern. >> this weekend on american history tv, we take a look back 200 years ago we'll also -- water ways to invade and burn the city. >> coburn's idea is to make use

of several different wear ways. if they simply sailed up the potom potomac, coburns decides that -- or recommends that the force be split up, that one squadron sale up the potomac river and threaten the capital in the city of alexandria, the main force is going to go up the pa tuxant river into southern maryland. the advantage is it would shield the silt british intention. a move all that could mean many things. it could also mean as overland attack on baltimore or attack on annapolis, or it could mean the british were simply chasing after commodore joshua barney,

who was the american commander of the chesapeake flotilla, who had a flotilla of shallow draft barges that were perfectly suited for navigating the shallow waters of the chesapeake and the rivers feeding into it. barney, by the summer of 1814 his tracked in the patuxant river, and the british could use barney's presence to more or less shield their movement toward the capital. that's exactly what coburn recommends, and it's what the british commander, general ross and admiral alexander cochran, who is in charge of the entire fleet here in north america agree to do. you can watch mower from steve voguele on how the british utilized the waterways during

the invasion this sunday at 6:00 and 10:00 p.m. also saturday live coverage with authors and historians about the 1814 battle of bladensburg. from waterfront -- right here on c spans 3. next, his command of the army of tennessee, and the atlanta campaign in the spring and summer of 1864, with richard mcmurray this is about 45 minutes. thank you. it's always good to get down here to kennesaw mountain area.

i have a long history. my mother was born in a house about three or four miles south of kennesaw mountain. i've been coming up here all my life. as you're well aware, this is the 150th anniversary of the year 1864, a crucial year in the civil war. and we are in the process of commemorating what in the 1860s was probably the most crucial military campaign of the civil war. it is, to coin a phrase, altogether fitting and proper we should do this. especially that those of you who are georgian would do this, because that campaign was arguably the most crucial campaign of the civil war.

that i hope will be of -- you've got to remember that during the civil war there were three great areas where military operations took place. way over here in the east in virginia between the appalachian mountains and the mississippi river -- i'm sorry. the appalachian mountains and the atlantic ocean, way out here between the mississippi river and the pacific and the area right in the middle. during the course of the civil war this area in virginia had tender into a bloody stalemeat. needs side would win the war. needs side could lose the war. the federal army was too strong to lose, but the federal generals were not smart enough

to win. the confederate army was not strong enough to win, but as long as lee was alive, they were too smart to lose. so it went into a circular kind of stalemate. i tell my friends in the north if the war had been limited to virginia, it would still be going on. in the 64th battle the winchester, and the people from north of the mason/dixon line would be saying goalie, i hope we can beat lee this summer. i thought ike had him back in '45 with that atomic bomb. i don't know how he got out of that one. the war was not limited to virginia. more important parts of the war as far as determining the military outcome took place in that central area, between the

mississippi river and the appalachians merchandise, the area of kentucky, tennessee, mississippi, alabama and georgia in that area, they achieved two great strategic operatives. they regained control from the almost literally in half. cut them off from any ser quantity 'tis of foot and supplies. the second was to move the northern frontier from up in kentucky somewhere all the way

south to the tennessee river, which runs across northern alabama and cuts off most of tennessee from the rest of the confederacy. the union armies were moving from victory to victory to success in this area between the appalachians and the mississippi, the area known in the jargon of the day as the west. by 1864, the union armies appeared ready to take the next several steps to snuffing out the life of the confederacy, and to ensure that this happened, president lincoln had taken his most successful general, ulysses s. grant, the man who had gained control or secured control of most of tennessee, and moved him to command all union armies. grant planned five great military operations to wipe out

what was left of the confederacy. one of these -- which was the last significant confederate port on the gulf of mexico. and kecked -- excuse me, for the railroads that ran through mobile and connected the great breadbasket of the confederacy, which, contrary to rumors, was not the shenandoah valley. but mobile, the railroads through mobile with a connection between the confederacy one of

these campaigns east from new orleans, a second campaign would take place in the chenin dolla valley. >> remember the music last night they went up the shenandoah valley to fight -- a third campaign would take place way down in southeastern virginia. benjamin butler, the favorite union general of every citizen of new orleans. would come up there and command a union army moving up the peninsula against the confederate capital in richmond. those three campaigns were really sort of satellite or auxiliary campaigns. that would support the main effort. grand himself would command one of the main efforts in virginia,

again lee in the central part of the state and the other campaign would march from chattanooga under grant's favorite subordinate, william t. sherman. the effort against mobile had to be abandoned very early, because confederates won victories on the red river in louisiana, threatened to attack new orleans, maybe even regain possession or regain control of the mississippi river. so union troops had to be held to protect the federal holdings in louisiana. that was abandoned. the campaign up the shenandoah

valley ran into grief on may 15th at the battle of new market. with a little help from in units that happened to be in the area. as he started up, they rushed up by rail from the carolinas. blocked him and then pushed him back, and as grant said, corked him up in the area southeast of richmond. his's already lost 60%. grand himself let the main union army against robert e lee.

the wilderness, spotsylvania, petersburg. grant constantly moving around the circumference of a circle, but heant get there, because lee's army was there between his army and rim more. the exact number is somewhat in dispute, reasonable tips put the minimum of 65,000 men some put them as high as 75 or 80,000. >> grant replaced the bodies with new draftees calling enrear area units, but the grand old

arm that had -- was gone. by june or july, 1864 in hospitals back in washington and annapolis, that army was gone. grand was bogged down in a stalemate. there are histories who main tan that the federal government falsified reports of grant's casualties, because they were so horrific. lee was so secure that he send off part of the army to the shenandoah valley. they were in the suburbs of washington, d.c. it was so depressing in fact that everybody was anticipating

that linking would lose the election of 1864. lincoln himself presented he would be defeated. if he had lot and the several war had not ended in the press railings of the union, just think of what a difference that would have made. not just in the united states, but how different would the world have been in the 20th century if the united states had not been there in 19 -- it would have been quite different. by midsummer of 1864, there was only one hope left for the union government. that was what went on here in north georgia. on the very ground where this university is located.

here in 1864. i'm not going to go into the details of the atlanta campaign. there's a good booed called atlanta 1864, which everybody should buy and read. truth be told, i don't care if you read it. but i do want to give you the sort of outlirn of what happened, and some ideas about the man who was, i think, the most crucial in the outcountry of that campaign. indeed i think he was probably the most important military person in the history of the confederacy, at least as far as the outcome of the war is to be concerned. he has a greater role as has

been written, but as it happened, i think joseph p. johnson was the most important of confederate generals. johnston commanded the around that won the first major battle of the war at a time when rocked e. lee was a desk officer in run monday. after lee surrendered in 1865. in addition, confederate forces in florida, alabama, east louisiana were subject to his orders at one time or another. he commanded the confed real area in the military vicksburg

in 1863, and atlanta in 1864. i quarters with jefferson davis, which is a fascinating subject in itself. but it's just a quarter between jeff davis and joe johnston. that quarrel runs like an angry scar through the history of the confederacy, and arguably one of the key reasons for a confederate defeat in the war. johnson is an absolutely crucial to confederate mitt tale history. you know, when you were there just barely for the skren tenial, i think i'll live that

to them. but johnston is a man i was trying to understand and i want to off a few thoughts about i think hi most important military alexander, which was that here in georgia. president davis did not want to appoint him. by that time he and johnson thoroughly loathed each other. johnson had convinced himself that davis was trying to destroy his military reputation. but he had no choice. because there really was nobody else he could appoint to that

post. all the other high ravens confed real general were either obviously failures or unable to exercise command in the field or in the case of lee, couldn't be moved from where he was. so very reluctantly in decent 1863, he picked joe johnson from on cured. davis had consigned him to -- doubtless hoping an alligator would give him sometime, the union army that was opposing johnston was based in chattanooga. when sherman moved into north georgia in 1864, he confronted johnston in his fort i haves at dalton.

the campaign began and followed a pattern. it was to take up a strong position. fortify it and sit in it hoping that sherman would attack it. in that case, johnston's fortified men would be able to repulse the attack and win the victory. sherman had -- that attacks in the civil wart were not likely to work, and that it was best to do something else. so the pattern of the campaign was set. one general didn't want to fight it out. the other general didn't want to fight unless it was perfect conditions. so sherman would march up in front of it, they would skirmish for a few days. sherman would req an order, say

it was too strong, he army would march out, around johnston, and come in behind -- behind him, south of him, to threaten the railroad, because the railroad from atlanta to dalton, or to johnston's army was the lifeline of that army. then he would retreat. fortify, sit in it and the whole process would repeat itself. so it went from dalton to resacka, to calhoun to adairsville, to cassville, to altoona, to dallas, to kennesaw mountain, to smirma, to the chattahoochee river, by july johnston was back and only a short distance north of atlanta. the confederate government was

going bonkers with this, because the area into which which johnston was retreating was, by that time, the industrial and agricultural heartland of the confedera confederacy. johnson's retreat exposed all of that area. remember what i said earlier about the tom bigby valley over in alabama? jefferson davis was alarmed that sherman would stop his advance, wouldn't try to go beyond the chattahoochee river, but would turn ned go southwest and then south along the chattahoochee river down to apalachicola, florida. that would cut sever railroad between the tom bigby valley and the confederate army in virginia. it was a very real possibility. as far as i know, sherman never

seriously considered it, but the confederate government did not know that. johnston, without telling his government much xw what he had been doing, had retreated into the heartland of the confed raegs, opening up this possibility. that his retreat would enable sherman to cut off the supplies from the tom bigby valley. it at least rivals richmond, if it didn't surpass richmond, and johnson's reteeth threatened the loss of all of of that. therefore in mid july, july 17th, davis is thinking about removing johnston. he has sent johnston a telegram. i wish to hear from you so specifically as will enable me to anticipate events, what every planning to do.

johnston sent back a response that was so vague that it was meaningless. the enemy outnumbers me. my plans depending on the action of the enemy. we're trying to put atlanta into condition to be held for a few days so that army movements may be freer and wider. johnston had earlier recommended that the confederate government move the prisoners at andersonville, about 120 miles south of atlanta. did that mean johnston was about to abandon atlanta? and retreat back into south georgia? that would be even worse. davis, therefore, on july 17th, sent a telegram, removing joe johnston from command of the army and naming general john bell hood in his place. hood fought three battles with sherman outside of atlanta pe h

peachtree creek, atlanta, he did not achieve great victories, but brought sherman's advance to a halt. in late july and august, hood's cavalry wrecked sherman's cavalry in several battles south of atlanta. it appears as mid august came that sherman and if that remained the case without the victory, faced with all enormous casualties lincoln might well be doomed in the november election. but sherman tube most of his army, watched out a wide circle around atlanta.

cut the railroad to macon, and hood was forced to advance. that's when scarlet and prissy and had to get in the wagon and free the city. hood had vail. lincoln had the great victory he needed. lincoln's reelection was assured. there would be for compromise with slavery. there would be no compromise with secession. that was the atlanta campaign. what did it mean? why did it turn out like it did? almost immediately, confederates who had been involved in the atlanta campaign began casting blame on each other. joseph p. johnston was the first to stripe. he had gone south to macon, and he was in macon for several

months working on his official report of his compare, which he finished and sent off to richmo richmond, and in that report he set forth an interpretation of his campaign, that he had never waivered from. his strategy had been to fight on the defensive, inflict casualties, punish sherman, weaken sherman, and then as sherman's army got near atlanta, that army weakened by these casualties would fall prey to johnston's successful counterattack. johnston believed thinks strategy had worked. he also believed that jefferson davis had deliberately withheld resources, so that johnston would fail. all davis cared about was

embarrassing joe johnston. this was johnston's basic approach. it want longer than that when hood submitted his report, which was a total reverse of johnston. johnston had not been heavily outnumbered. he had chosen to retreat, to abandon the strong positions in north georgia. he had lost some 22,000 moan, johnston claimed he had lost only about 10,000. johnston's army had been demoralized. johnston had passed up many opportunities to strike at the enemy, and the army was so weakened in numbers and morale that not even hood could win success when he replaced johnston. these two views of the campaign which for simp hisity sake we'll call the johnston interpretation and hood interpretation, it echoed from that point down to this.

but for most of that time, joseph e. johnston's view of is the xam had prevailed. for one thin hood had failed. the confed razz had not -- and kind of hard to disguise that fact. food recalls reduced to arrangen that i held it longer than johnston had this is sort of like, i did not inhale.

for another reason -- one he deserved, after three decades of distinguished service. he was experienced. he had been in no less than five branches of the arm, the artillery, the top ographical engineers, the quartermastr master. he was a brave man. hood had no reputation when the war began. he was obviously brave, too. he had lost a leg at chick amaulinga, but he did not have the experience and reputation and respect that johnston had. so you reduced to the argument, well, he was going to be defeated if he had remained in command.

johnston also prevailed because his critics were in disrepute immediately after the war. jefferson davis was just reviled in the last years of the confedera confederacy. he was the failed leader of the lost cause. had the federal authorities not arrested him, put him in a cell at ft. monroe, clapped him in irons and made a martyr out of him, he would have been denounced throughout much of subsequent southern history, but they turned him into the man who is persecuted for the white south, and thus made him a hero. but even so, conphet razz, post-war confederates did not like to air their dirty linen in public and most did not do so. johnson was also praised in the writings of his federal opponents. william t. sherman had good things to say about johnson in

his memoirs. u.s. grant had good things to say about johnston. after all, grant said i worried more when joe johnston was in command in front of my army than when robert e. lee was. i don't know if grant actually said that or not, but if he did, that alone should take his reputation down many notches. because, among other things johnston almost never commanded troops in front of grant's army. only for a few weeks did johnston command troops, and those troops that time sat in their winter quarters and had nobel battles with each other. johnston's men are attacking with snowballs. we have to worry about that. johnston benefited from a lot of the early writing about the war. one of the early prolific historians was edward a.

pollard, a richmond journalist who absolutely hated jefferson davis. and pollard was writing books almost by the month. i mean, almost as furiously as brian does here. just books vomiting out of edward a. pollard. in which he denounced jefferson davis in very harsh terms, especially for his treatment of joe johnston. it's interesting to sit down with pollard's books, because a lot of it sounds an 5u68 lot like joe johnston, and i have some pretty good indications that he and johnston spent a good deal of time talking. henry stewart-foot was another one of, member of the confederate congress, wrote things about davis, vile things almost about jefferson davis in his treatment of joe johnston. even some of the northern writers took this up t. one of

the early was was horace greeley, the rather ecsentry new york -- wrote on the american conflict. his main source for writing about the atlanta campaign was edward a. pollard. greeley said i think pollard got his information from johnston, so we know it has to be correct. this is not the critical thinking that one would like among historic at writers. johnston also benefited by his early biographers. johnston died in 1891. who confessed in hi introduction that i love joe johnston. the other once by his kinman robert hughes, and for 50 or 60 years those were the only two

biographies that were available. hood didn't have a biography at all until the middle of the 20th century. jaubs ton benefited from trends in civil war writing, meant that people writing about the war in georgia in atlanta didn't have much to work with and didn't spend a lot of time to people like pollard and greeley, food and others. the sources for writing the history of johnston's army are widely scattered. you could write a history of the confederate army of northern virginia, and never go more than 150 miles from richmond. and washington and baltimore to the north.

and you couple that with charlottesville and the material in richmond itself. there's no point in going elsewhere to write a history of the confederate army in virginia. you have to go all over the map from austin, to tallahassee, to raleigh, to nashville, to baton rouge, to little rock, to san marino, to new york we're getting collection nothing. and so it won't be quite as bad in the future as it has been in the past, but the risk of all of this was that joe johnston's view of the atlanta campaign was almost completely accepted for decades. in the 20th century.

the fact that you -- in 1930s and 1940s, that's what you hear. he would have defeated sherman outside atlanta. he would have flanked him order to nashville, would have forced him to retreat to -- back up through illinois, across the great lakes. sherman, the remnants of sherman's pathetic army would have been drowned in hudson bay, after which joe johnston would have turned and marched on washington and forced abraham linking to -- joe johnston was great. and it's very different to get people to understand what they see in movies and on television is just not necessarily so.

there was a movie made back i believe in the 50s. one or two of you might be old enough to remember that. but it's a movie said in australia in the aftermath of world war 3rd they've killed everybody on earth except the people in australia. thee singing "walton matilda" and awaiting the arrival of a nuclear cloud that's going to wipe them out, too. this became the pilot movie for a whole genre of films like this, on wiping out all life on earth. i think wfs one that was a made for television movie if i remember correctly called "the day after." the same thing, except in indiana or kansas or south

dakota, somewhere in there, they're dying of radiation. i had students come up and talk to me about that. they said, what was it like growing up in the 1950s. i say, what do you mean what was it like? they said all you worried about was being your life snuffed out in some kind of atomic blast, go off to school in the morning thinking you'll never see your family again. some of you remember this, you practiced getting under your desk in your homeroom in case the russians dropped a hydrogen bomb on the school? the students say, what was it lie thinking about that all the time. i said i have no earthly idea. i didn't think about that. they said what did you think about it? >> i thought about the scenario that began 800 million years ago when there was a mass i have been rupture of the cosmic continuum out on the other side of the big dipper. as a result of that, a gigantic killer asteroid was jarred out

of its normal orbit around the star al fay centauri, sent careens off on a trajectory that in 1955 brought it hurtling into the solar system are it bounced off pluto. pluto was a planet in 1955, ricocheted over, smashed boo the earth, throwing up a gigantic cloud of dirt, dust and debris. when all that had settled down, there were only 12 people left on earth. only 12 people left on earth. who were they had, you ask? elizabeth taylor, natalie wood, jane russell, susan hayward, marilyn monroe, kim novak, ava gardner, audrey hepburn, gina

loc lollobrigida, sophia loren and myself. that's what i thought about when i was in high school. but you put this into movies and television about johnston being such a great general and hood being such a bad guy, and people -- it's got to be true. i saw it in a movie, you know, kind of thing. you could ignore what hood wrote. after all, by that time hood was a pathetic creature, ambitious, not just normally ambitious, but unscrupulously ambitious, a liar, in competent. addicted to drugs because of hi amputated leg. trying to move himself a man

because he was engaged in the beautiful, ko celtish sally buchanan preston. just a total worthless man hopping around on his one foot trying to impress her. the problem with ignoring hood is the facts get in the way. facts are strange things. and when you get beyond the rather superficial stuff that people like pollard, greeley, and some of the other have written and get down to looking at the facts, things begin to look quite different from what they were originally in your mind. let me just give you one example. at the very beginning of the campaign, cord to joseph p. johnston, hi army numbered about

43,000 men. but -- but the fact that in the official records there is a document dated -- in which they reported to -- 55,000 men, i don't know what happened to those 12,000 men on the night of april 30th, may 1st, mass desertion maybe that radio -- wiped out -- or the question of casualties, johnston had his medical director, johnston lost according to his medical director 9,972 men dilled and wounded in his infantry and artillery in may and june. and they ignored those

qualifications, killed and wounded, may and june. what about prisoners. what about men lost to sickness during the retreat. what about deserters. shoot says johnston lost in the cavalry in the first two weeks of july, and the retreat across the chattahoochee river you wind up pretty close to the 22,750 men that hood had specified. what i'm getting at in all of this, is if you get into the facts, johnson begins to look a lot less brilliant a lot of the

writing has been moving in that direction. so the view of the campaign or a lot of us read about. is changeses. it is true he did not lose any great battles but it is also true his retreat into the atlanta area was a political and logistical disaster for the confederacy. johnston's one -- has begin to come down.

why do the call this the general in the jar? many years ago the folks at the dallas/ft. worth round table were kind enough to invite me to come and speak. there's a gentleman whose hobby is about making figures of civil war people. if you've got a speaker on, say, jefferson davis, he will make a little figure like this. he will mount that figure or a wooden disc, a circular disc, and put a glass bell jar over it and present it to the speaker. it's a nice gesture. so he had seen i was speaking on the atlanta campaign, and he was certain that i was going to tell him what a great general joseph p. johnston was.

when i finished my talk. he god up and showed me this little figure he had made. he had a rather sheepish look on his face. he said, would you like me to take this and make one of hood? what are you going to do? saw off one of the legs? i mean, that's what the doctor did. but it's a one of the things. anyone would like this on the mantelpiece. so i was very glad to get it. took it back to the motor that night. wrapped it up in an old dirty t-shirt, put it very carefully in my suitcase, went down to waco in a rental car the next day, spoke there, came back, went to the airport at dfw, checked the bag to go to

washington, because i was going up there to a smithsonian program, spend a few days at my brother's doing research in the archives. did that, jar still wrapped up in its t-shirts, went back after i finished to the airport, checked the bag to go back to my home in americus, where i was living then. changed planes in atlanta. they changed it to little world war i plane they use between atlanta and albany, georgia. got down to albany, drove back, i was convince that had bell jar had broken and there would be a million pieces of glass, i would have to throw out everything in the suitcase. i got home, very carefully unwrapped the glass bell jar was fine, but somewhere in the jars

around, the little figure of joe johnston had gone -- that seems very symbolic form thank you, people. i hope i've given you something to think about form. tonight on american history tv, a focus on slavery and cinema beginning at 8:00 eastern with a look at the depiction of slavery in film in the 1930 are, and then the movie lincoln. . and a discussion about the 1939 movie "gone with the wind" and its depiction of southern society. that's all tube starting at 8:00 eastern here on c pan 3. here are some of the highlights for this weekend. tonight in primetime, we'll visit important sites in the history of the civil rights movement. saturday night at 8:00,

highlights from this year's new york ideas forum, including cancer biologist andrew hustle. on sunday, q&a with new york congressman charlie rangelal 9:00 p.m. eastern. tonight at 8:00 on c-span2, in tept with reza aslan, saturday at 10:00 ben carson, and sunday night 11 p.m., on the competition between the wright brothers and glen curtis. american history tv on c-span3 tonight at 8:00 eastern, a look at hollywood's portrayal of slavery. sergeant night at 8:00, the burning the washington. and sunday night at 8:00 p.m. former white house chiefs of staff discussing how presidents make decisions. find our television schedule one week in advance at cspan.org and let us know what you this i about the programs you are watching. call us or e-mail us.

join the c-span conversation, like us on facebook, follow us on twitter. next, how general sherman brought the war to the south and the embark of the union army's capture of atlanta, as truman's troops set towns on fire, he established a code of conduct for how the union army was to behave. author and history professor and sara reuben discussion the march as part of the 2014 civil war sim posity hosted by the u.s. capitol historical society. this is an hour. thank you very much, paul, and thank you all very much for coming. merchant of terror, demon, attila, if you type "was sherman a" into google, the autocomplete includes war criminal, hero or

villain, and if you add a couple more letters, you get terrorism. the urban dictionary, a popular william t. sherman as having employed the vicious tactic of targeting civilians continuing, such tactics had previously been deemed morally unacceptable. the deliberate targeting of civilians for attack was taken up in world war ii ending in the deaths of millions. the bombing of european cities by both sides of the war and japanese cities by the u.s. as well as attacks on civilians in china the philippines and korea by japan were consistent with and encouraged by sherman's precedent. the logic of saving lives in the long run by these tactics seems to have been refuted by history. finally, if you scroll through this entry, the words related to general william t. sherman tags

at the bottom include collateral damage, modern warfare, murder, terrorist and war criminal. now let me be a little bit honest and fair here. this is not the best source out there on sherman. it was written by somebody named tex in tex, and it misquotes sherman at one point and i'll also concede that if you look at the word association tag line it does also include war hero, but what this does represent is a really popularly-held view that william t. sherman and the march through georgia and the carolinas during the final months of the civil war have something to do with the creation of total war, and the millions of civilian deaths in the wars of the 20th and 21st century can somehow be laid at his feet.

nor does this view reside entirely on the internet, noted repository of kind of crackpot theories. a history of henry county georgia explained simply that, quote, sherman's march to the sea was the first hint of the concept of total war which was to come to full fruition during the second world war in which civilian infrastructure is considered a legitimate military target. later writers notably james reston, jr. tried to connect sherman's march to the atrocities in vietnam and reston made the argument, he said when a rash confederate ventured a shot on his trains from a courthouse, the courthouse was burned. when a lady burned her corn crib, she lost her house. the proportionality, this is against reston of the retaliation is roughly the same if geometrically less as hostile fire from a jungle rifle being greeted by a b-52 strike. one of the issues that comes

into play when we talk about sherman and the questions of total war and the laws of war is that people seem to use pretty slippery definitions. often sherman seems to be judged by the standards of today rather than of his own time and often when -- not as much historian, but when people use total war they seem to be referring to the degree of mobilization rather than the range of targets, so what i want to do today is take a closer look at sherman's march in the context of changing union policies over the course of the war and see if that doesn't paint a more nuanced picture of what sherman was doing and whether that fell within the bounds of kind of civilized warfare. so in 1864 there were no hague or genevia conventions to govern the acts of blij rans.

that was not to say there were no guides for military behavior and conduct but these wars were very fluid and evolving and changing as the very nature of the civil war changed. so initially, union policy towards the confederacy and its civilians would be one known as of conciliation. the idea behind it was lincoln believed that there was this silent majority of unionists in the confederate states and that all he needed to do was animate them and they would rise up and the states would rejoin the union. this conciliation policy meant a narrow focus on targeting the confederate armies rather than antagonizing southern civilians and in effect southern civilians were still being treated as though they were american citizens rather than the citizens of a belligerent nation, but as early as 1862 that had begun to change and during that summer union general john pope had issued a series of orders that allowed the army of

virginia to subsist on t produce of the local countryside and lincoln actually, he was frustrated by the progress of the war at that point and he approved these orders. pope's soldiers went on a tear of destruction and violence reminiscent, actually, of the stories that would come out of georgia and the carolinas two years later and so great were the abuses perpetrated on civilians that pope had to backtrack and condemn his men for being so out of control. so that's happened. at the same time in the summer of 1862, lincoln has come to the realization that he needs to use emancipation as a war measure and once he issued the preliminary emancipation proclamation in september 1862, the opportunity for this policy of conciliation to work was pretty much over and the war would become in historian mark

grimesly's phrase, hard-handed. at the same time, all of this is happening simultaneously in different levels, the union war department had begun consulting with oppression-born professor named francis lieber about devising a military code. lieber then in turn called his 1863 work a code for the government of armies, but the war department issued it as general orders number 100 and it's more popularly come to be known as the lieber code. so, the lieber code was designed to codify the laws of war and particularly as they pertain to the interactions between civilians and soldiers. one of the most significant sections of the code are articles 14 through 16 which very carefully delineate military necessity. lieber has a pretty broad definition of that that deplores cruelty and deplores acts of

vengeance as he would put it, but did allow for the making of war on civilians in specific situations, and in fact, there's a sort of tension internal to the lieber code over what's military necessity and what's going too far. so he does explain further in article 17, wars not carried on by arms alone. it is lawful to starve the hostile belligerent armed or unarmed so that it leads to the speedier subjection of the enemy. he talks about also in a later article, he said the citizen or native of a hostile country is, thus, an enemy as one of the constituents of the hostile state of nation and as such is subjected to the hardships of war. so it's clear from lieber's code that there are ways that civilians can be targeted because of the fact that civilians are presumed to be

inherently helping their military. that being said, among the code's prohibitions were the theft and/or destruction of artworks and the like, and under punishment of death, this again is lieber's language all wanton violence committed against persons in the invaded country, all destruction of property not commanded by the authorized officer and all robbery and pillager sacking even after taking place by main force, a rape, wounding, maiming or killing of such in habitants. there is a line and that is physical violence against civilians. you can destroy their property, some of it, not their art, which is nice. there's limits. confederates when they read the lieber code complain that it's

so broad that as to license mischief under the grounds of military necessity. also, by 1864 when sherman is preparing for the march, lincoln and the union in general have become comfortable with a high degree of destruction of private property. cotton could be burned easily, the contents of homes if not the homes themselves in areas like missouri and the shenandoah valley. so one can argue that the lieber code, at least as it pertains to the treatment of civilians and their property was honored more in the breach than it was followed to the letter. just after the war something called field service in war by francis j. lippit was published specifically on military logistics and he also leans on

this doctrine of military necessity to justify foraging. he says it was quote, a well-established right of war. now he does concede, though that there need to be restraints placed on foraging because, as he put it, to do otherwise would be to bring dishonor upon the country. and lipit's work, i know it was published after the war but it will all make sense. lipit's work demonstrates the complexity of the moral issue that surrounds foraging. by its very nature, when you seize supplies from civilians, you are im flikting hardship on that civilian population and so in order to inflict sort of the magical right amount of hardship enough, and to operate within the moral boundaries of civiliwa