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assisted the iranian military in overthrowing the existing the nment in favor of u.s.-friendly shah. ext ali ansari talks about u.s.-iran relations going back to the early 20th century. he argues both sides has missed opportunities to normalize the ions and explains how history of imperialism has made the public wary of outside exploitation. the event was hosted by d.c. international connection. an hour and 40 minutes. >> thank you for inviting me. i'm sure we're all aware in a if be ave the misfortune to watching fox news, iran is right ack in the center of the agenda. me, not te striking for

necessarily for someone as an but europe, the news has been manipulated, but certainly arranged to give us a certain of what's going on. i did an interview with npr a ago.e of days it was just when -- just when the news was coming out about lebanon and nd hezbollah and israel and so on and so forth. i don't think it will be long before they start pointing the finger at iran. it's going to come. later, mr. bush did the honors. so that was good. it reiterated to me that the was a serious one. -- in some that i ways i don't think we take seriously enough. of re i go to the details what basically my book is about and some of the -- some of the for it.s of it and then i'll run through sort of the history of the last couple of years. to give you some examples of what we're talking about in the way that sometimes absence of policy

can lead us to missed opportunities and how we got to we are now. initially give you a background come i am and where i from. i'm an iranian who as we said of '79, left ss the country at that interesting time. the sent off to school in u.k., it was fairly coincidental to say, i left in june of 1978. but at the time, basically, i went to the uk in '78, finished there.ation did all of my university education. despite the best intentions of to school in go the u.s., i decided to stay in the uk. my phd. in the school of african studies back in '98. took me an inordinately a long time. you used to be allowed to do that. looking at political

developments in iran for the and the rt of 10 years thesis was on myth, political the ideologies and how it works in iran. looked en the ideas and at domestic iranian politics and tried to apply it. books, this is my third book. -- i was reluctant i have to say to write it. the temptations were enough, obviously, but principally, i worried about what was being written about u.s.-iran elations and the u.s. approaches to iran. i was sent a list of books by my publisher with sexy titles such as "countdown to "countdown to crisis." nd some of the covers were striking. congressman by a gentleman called kurt weldon.

you can't get them sent -- think u.y ban them in the can. they ban them in the u.k. but you get them sent over. it for me, this congressman, as far as i'm aware armed uty chair of the services committee, someone in the u.k. did something like this -- i don't know if they in their h too long official position, but that he ss, he decided had found a source by the name of ali who lived in paris, an iranian exile evidence that iran was about to place a dirty nuclear in boston. he approached the cia, the cia was a lunatic. they interrogated him and he was a complete joke. cia was the people at fault. he's going to write this book. out with the sentence "this book is an act of desperation." line i've seen in

a book. and he goes into the transcripts this gentlemen. ali -- no one knows who he is. me, i suppose. this chap says we have these sources and information that the iranians want to drop a dirty bomb in boston. i think that above all, really, in me that it ed would be good to look more a iously, possibly more in problems iny at the u.s.-iran relations. countries t be that that had been very good friends for a long time had turned into best of enemies. what was the process in that occurred and why when you look at the history of iran in the last 200 years in particular, interventions of foreign powers, the british, the russian, the americans in many the british and the americans come in relatively and third in the

list of bad boys to iran. clearly interventions had would put the russians thereupon in a league of their own. interventions in the 19th cent rip and the in lutions that took place 1906 were pretty atrocious. yet, if you look at the situation in iran today, you a situation with iran, we seem to be happy to depend on the russians for aspects of nuclear technology but nothing to do with the united states. an interesting sort of i took was iran's elationship with diplomatic -- diplomatic stations has not been terribly productive. draw on e analogies to this, we draw on the hostage crisis in 1979. 1829, the first russian embassy is open in teheran. defeat.tary the moment after 1828 when iran greatially ceased to be a power and was reduced to the status of a local power. power.en a regional

deeply humiliated. the would come in, set up embassy. gentleman ned is the who's the literary man. have much time. he thought they needed to be civilized. and he went out to try to do this. now, this obviously raised the ire of the terror. what did they do? ransacked the embassy and killed everyone. this is a striking thing to do days.embassy in those they killed one, got one person who got away. but this is an appalling do and the iranians immediately sent a delegation petersburg. so you know, we're sorry about this. what was interesting is the czar who had other things on his mind it, it's't worry about the ambassador's fault, he's an idiot. happened ompare what in 1829 and what happen in 1979, it was striking. only reason you can get way

from that is it was a little local difficulty in a far off nobody pays attention to. in other words, the dramatic thing to me, the changes that th century the 20 that put america in the forefront or america and britain iranian refront of relations is the growth of the olitical culture in iran and media, technology. one of the striking things you various incidence in american-iranian relations hroughout the 20th century is america becomes the bad boy in iranian olitics when politics comes of age. at the time when people are more surroundings, it's america that's in the forefront, not russia, not britain. enough, after the 1953, the of 1951 and oil crisis, you think britain it's d be the focus -- america. america inherits the mantle of the british. of a s so in a foreglare

modern media and political public, a public in teheran that literate, politically able, and making their own decisions. send a detail off to the local capital to say we're because it pened, becomes an event. it feeds in to it. this is one of the things i the book isok at in how essentially historical created to change the way we look at each other. if you look at the most book on ve iran-american relations. the council of foreign they'll say what we need is engagement. examples of how the recent incidences are praying in particular way. the media is pivotal at this by the way. take the academic level. americans will frame their relationship, u.s. and iran in 1979. starts

it e quite clear who the bad guy is. they took the embassy, the staff hostage. a nightmare for americans. that's when it started. if that's where you start the problem. where you frame your narrative, then, you know, we know that's where it started. iranians, the narrative frame is not 1979. tell you you ill can't understand 1979 until you know what happened in 1953. what happen? abbreviate it. it's done to death, this inciden inciden incident. i will use this to show you how in narratives can be done completely different ways to get results we don't want. in 1953, we know broadly the it goes to narrative is certainly popular in iran that ou had a nationalist prime ed .ster who was elect ed

he was secularist. break out of a colonial suggestion, it had to the iranian oil company. depressio -- digression. oil companies had pa past in iran. hsbc, the bank of per sha. still a registered name in bp by the way. if you go to bp offices, they hold on to the names, reuters a very colorful past in iran, one of the reasons why -- said roiters -- one of some reuters y journalists had difficulty go to iran.s to it's a deep background to this feeling.

now, this nationalization crisis that began in 1951 resulted in british losing their largest overseas asset. asset in t overseas the supply of oil. okay? you have to bear in mind if you british t at the perspective. britain just came out after a war, it was bankrupt, in debt to the united states, the last thing it wanted to do was to overseas largest economic asset. okay? moreover, what's striking. f you look at it from another perspective, britain just el elected a socialist government nationalizing its industries. the iranians said, well, we can too.t socialism at home for at work.sm that didn't work. the british got upset about this this rprisingly and said is dishonest. we have an agreement. the agreement would have taken timing. to 1979, good but that was the contract they had. for the iranian perspective, the

way oil was exploited from the dishonest.s the standard line which is often the anglo iranian paid the british to ex-chequer than in royalties to the british government. have a knack of being quite arrogant if they want to be in a colonial contest surely as americans may know. but maybe something in fact that the administration has inherited. time, s something at the certainly in the '50s, you have his -- you know, the colonial attributes in southern iran. the relationship between the americans at the time. if you look at interviews of the say you talked to american diplomats and state departments and the white house know, the british

wanted to send gun boats and start flecking their muscle. situation, this is not the way you do things. you have the united nations. striking. the british are going out and saying we want to get the possessions back. the americans say, this is not how you do things. effectively inore he suez crisis in '56 where quite drastically anglo-french developments there. basically, what the british did was they were able to pay on certain american fears. you see the motifs. the american fear wasn't the cold war in the rise of communism. but in 1951 and '52, they decide, look, what we have a is we want to negotiate a diplomatic settlement with this group. bloody lem is he's so irrational. a wonderful quote, hopefully we if get a copy of the book

you go out and buy it. a wonderful quote from a british academic. said it's clearly -- i can't remember it directly. ut he said something like it's completely unacceptable that the rational genda or the proceedings of an international il company should be held ransom by the rantings of orientals.sible a nice touch. the americans comment on this and say, we think this is a bit harsh. we think you should really come. but what the british do is they play on the fear. this issue is not an issue of us losing our asset in iran. issue of global importance. i mean, bear in mind the parallels that you get in today. not an issue about local -- this is an issue of global importance and the communists. is not a battle between us and the iranians, this is a battle between you and the the heart and r soul of iran. you going to save iran or not? korean war going on.

on the other hand, the mccarthy hearings. time now.e right the democratic administration weren't interested. two changes happened. is that churchill came to office in britain and eisenhower came to office in the united states. they got together. they're in to this sort of thing of course as you know. more willing to play into this game. so basically in 1953, mi-6 and cia, particularly the cia because the british had been orchestrated a coup which overthrew the elected the nment and installed young shah at the time ensensually the dictator of iran. relationship was not smooth. i don't want to exaggerate that. there are other reasons we succeed. the trouble was with the coup, because of the success, the cia others thought they could do it everywhere. you have to have particular circumstances and you have to discontent within the country itself. but that incident really colored

percepti perceptions in iran, particularly in the political public. why? at that time, technology was making an impact. one of the things -- i go back 1941 and 1946, iran was occupied by the paths to supply soviet union. one of the things they did, one of the benefits they brought was transsister radio. you want to dish them out liberally. moscow.sten to radio this is the one you want to load. and, of course, the idea was we liberate the peasantry and all this. anglo americans also delivered radios and said, no, liberty. the important impact of radio technology is you don't have to literate. you leap over that element of education. do is through quite vulgar propaganda, you ear generation to be politically aware. at this point in time, the urban areas,

it was active. america becomes center stage as peace.lain of the it's dramatic. they come in at this time as the people who orchestrated the coup time when the iranian political consciousness was coming to birth. the birth of the iranian nation as a political sense went hand the nd with america as villain. i don't think in many ways the americans fully understood what happened here. wouldn't. a little local problem you had and it sorted out. it's an important thing. that was mounted to that -- added to it in later issues. the statee records in department at the time. you're aware of the populace. they're central in the way of it. she's a national issue. i'm using it. we use the motifs relative to it. in the west, we talk about

hitler. when ever something comes up, we the worst guys since hitler. worst since hitler. in the middle east don't have quite that effect. decent.te not because of the jews, but because he was beating up on the british and the russians. and the british and russians are beating up on the middle east. napoleon, hitler, whatever, it was great. that's in the terms of thee our e stuff in terms of sort of collective memory, in the middle east, people don't have that sort of thing. look uch the same if you at britain and you look at germany. n britain, you can have comedies about hitler, nazi-occupied france. you couldn't do it in germany, could not do it in france. much too sensitive for them. n britain, they'll talk about the war and anything. take that similarly in iran. so when we talk about churchill and hitler and this, that, and the other, a lot of people in know these people

but they're not necessarily central to our national consciousness consciousness. you talk about moscow, other great leaders and others, it doese mote. in the west, these people mean nothing. there's a nice bit also that i at.ked this is the other thing that we have tremendous problems here is can never pronounce the names. have you notice? they can't do it. can't, but why you you can't. old used to call them mossy. they couldn't say it. and this is the way you demeanor the other, by the way, if you pronounce his name, it's a bit -- i want doesn't make sense. it's not not -- particularly polite. but you find that with journalists it happens a lot. simply can't pronounce the ames of the individuals, the antagonists and it shapes the ay in which we think about things. i said i would talk for a half an hour.

i'm only partially through what i was going to tell you and i've 15 minutes. if you have questions, raise your hands if i'm going on for too long. stage the basically the hostage crisis obviously in 1979. you can't understand the hostage understand u don't the situation in 1953. i talked to the hostage -- i talked to one of the leaders. -- this is aesting while back. guy.resting he reinvented himself as a reformist and so on and so forth. active. i said, what did you guys think you were doing. said, well, you know, we wanted to make a point. we wanted to share the americans that they can't have more coups, know? because the shah just entered the united states for medical treatment. they assumed he was there to for the coup, you know. so they wanted to make an appointment. the's interesting is that's

thirst time the embassy had been occupied. of we forget -- a number islamic out the revolution. the iran did not terminate relations with the fall of the shah. preparing states was ci-- age the trapps transition. one of the sad things is the 4,000 strong u.s. embassy in teheran, most of the officials were military, of the 4,000 strong that were there, it was huge. huge in terms of that. homes things ped were getting -- they brought in in islam.experts they said why did you come to see a revolution up close. sad, actually. so they all come in and say, oh, great, we're going to see that. know, we've got the experts. here's the interesting thing. his is how the relationship breaks down. you bring the experts in who have a sympathy, they clearly sympathy, some have done

degrees in iranian studies, studies, they c have a certain affinity. they ay not agree, but know. was february 14, 1979. evicted. immediately consul was also given short tabliz and in the summer. he managed to get them out. people were religious -- the religious leaders. wonderful -- i wanted to leave book.ames out of the he writes this dispatch and says interestingly, we had a notice saying on our door loiters and looters will be shot or something. o not enter here, signed ayatollah, such and such. we look past the building saying touch that door.

they couldn't do anything. -- as partly because at the at the ironic situation basically saying that basically many of the religious leadership stopping from doing that. but the fourth of november in the situation had changed. but before i go into that, efore i go to the factions of iranian politics and the way they crumble with the need to what, to me, was very interesting. but the embassy at the time was the name of bruce langeham. an unspoken hero in the book, him. bruce langeham said it's dispatch. dated the 29th of october. says in this dispatch, fascinating to read, he says i reiterate and i state again. this is what we need to do. and clear explicit terms. of all, recognize the revolution as a reality. hasn't tending it happened. we don't have to like it.

we just have to recognize it as reality. the iranians ce we're not here to overthrow the government. he listed a number of other should be done. he says interestingly that we must emphasize that just as important to iranians, religion is important a americans and we have spiritual connection. he's trying to find common ground. in 1998to what was said when he said religion and onecracy are handmaidens to another. an interesting speech. in about the sales democracy in the united states. he's trying to find the common ground. reinvent the narrative. this is what langeham does in 979, four days later, the embassy is taken. that comes to a staggering halt. what's striking is from 1979 on wards, there is no policy. langeham's dispatch is frozen in time. we have a situation today, 27 united ter, that the

states is the one country, but like with china, previously, who does not recognize the as a fact. different. maybe politicians. i mean, the villain of the peace politicians, by the way. basically, constantly interfere. thaw constantly interfere in the workings of what the professionals are doing. this ing is that we have bizarre situation where the revolution is not recognized as ground.ty on the because they assume that recognizing the revolution means and exact and legitimatize everything that comes after it. that that's not the case. i had a conversation with the americans, i said why don't you as a reality but don't have to accept all of the consequences that came with it. accept the revolution's reality on the ground that you make a lot of discontented at what's going on in the moment a ittle more secure in their own

position. regime change in the iraqi mode is pretty complete, isn't it? it's not really changing things on the edges, its's uprooting the entire thing and chucking it away. that's difficult to do in iran. it basically pushes the people need to be talking to into the arms of people that we don't want to be talking to, if i can way, okay? moment in 1979 wasn't -- wasn't dealt with since. about the fascinating relationship for me in 1979, you have a break in diplomatic relations, you don't have -- his is characteristic sort of idiosyncrasy. they say we didn't break off relations. well, you didn't verify their embassy. they genuinely say it. have a point. diplomatic f

relations. you were holding the diplomats hostage. much in t take it very the same way we talk about 1953, not so much the americans, more british. biggest openof the nonsecret. the british still deny they had in 1953. the coup secret even though aboutn books were written it. n 1979, you don't have diplomatic relations. you don't have people on the ground on either side. this is very, very important. my argument is that from 1979 on wards, iran and the united countrieseach other's becomes a domestic political issue. it doesn't become a foreign issue. it becomes a domestic political issue in the united states for two reasons. like the radio brought the fall home to many '50s, the the

elevision made the hostage crisis an internal event. he mass media is a wonderful tool in the sense that actually are in ntelligence sets the west. in the first world. it gives the third world access to the first world. every living room, you know, you see what was going on in iran. firstlamic revolution the revolution to be televised. were much russians bloodier in the revolution. terms.k in crude but if you can see it on the television and see what's becomes much more real to you. and you were personally affected y the fact that you have 44 -- what was it -- 45 -- i can't remember how many it was. days, it's for 444 deeply personal. becomes ense, the iran

a domestic political issue in a popular sense. other incident that catt loses it, the one colleague said to me many, many the united out states. he said no, the rift in the iran situation does not have anything with the hostage crisis. many people do. manipulated.e public opinion, we can sort out. ut the real risk could be iran-contra. why? because the beltway got affected. their jobs. now if you look at the people running the iran policy now, of the people were convicted in iran-contra. don't tell me they don't have a grudge. fife, baltimore? i don't think he was convicted of anything. he's so very hard line. number of others

who were involved. iran continue are a, again, part of the american folklore. we don't look at the details of it was about. it was about an opening and reagan was planning to have some by of opening with iran selling them weapons. giving them what they need, and if they could broach some sort 06 dialogue. justified it.agan the way we understand it now was a terrible act of duplicity by iranians that basically screwed up a lot of careers. the contra side of the nothing to do with iran. nobody in iran told the north to money to the nicaraguian colleague. it's when we talk about supporting d terrorism, you take money for iranians to supply and

freedom fighters. pleasant.ot terribly but nonetheless, that aspect of the equation had nothing do with iran. leak that came out in ebanon, you know, they were in lebanon again was something that basically came out due to iran and theing in guy who leaked it was executed. the guy who lived it was promoted. the key architects. became president. we tend to think the whole thing was a monumental embarrassment iranians supplied it. they didn't. the interesting thing is, of ourse, not only is it sanctioned, but the isrealies were involved. yeah? about ll know we talk condoleezza rice saying we're going to start with dialogue there. all been hat it's covert. yeah? it has happened before. people , unfortunately,

have had their fingers burnt. this is a problem. it emphasizes the other thing. i'm talking a bit -- in bits here. but just to raise this as an example, you can't understand emanity between the iraq and the u.s. if you don't understand it. betrayal if you don't have friendship. you can't have betrayal if the was not deeply personal. the republican leads and iranian revolution were well connectled. extremely he charts well very tight with the rockefellers and the kissingers and what was going on. this the republicans tried to extend throughout the 1980s. didn't -- they weren't successful. united states.he in iran, what added to the of the -- of the section of the united states was the iran-iraq war.

and here i hoped for this -- one bonnet, one ofmy the bits where i'm not eloquent book is where my blood boils over. it was a tragedy heavily the west, no doubt about immaterial. and the fact is that the west -- the i hold more for europeans, actually. the west engaged in selling the chemical weapons he used on the battlefield. 1982 on wards.rom you talk to people here and there's so much embarrassment about it. the stateo the guy in department, we said, oh, no, we did protest. did protest the use of weapons. i said, i never heard it. it was quiet. protest, but it was muted. in britain, it was limited. the countries selling the stuff, the time.germany at the point is there was not enough protest. saddam hussein was supported by

the united states and others. the notion is -- nonsense as far i'm concerned. realtime satellite imagery to the iraqis. the only people who used to get were the israelis. realtime satellite imagining and pening up a new front on the persian gulf and the iranian forces, it's more fair in a sense. is the he tragedies u.s.s. incense. talking to journalists recently. and ile brought up the issue of the u. is. incense and she had no idea about it. i'm quite struck about that. incident for me. a major incident when i'm personally speaking when i was with what iran was about. it affected me. gets how the narrative completely diverted. one inremember this vividly when i was in london as a student. been hit bytark had an iraqi air force pilot sitting mirage, i think it was,

firing a missile. the interesting thing is that been sold by the french. the missile was on lease, wasn't even bought, it was offered as a by the french. the french complained a lot terrorist s activities in western europe and stuff, they had the right to do that. the iranians got after all sorts of nonsense in france in the i can see the iranian point. the french was supplying a lot nasty equipment. very cynical about it, i have to say. the ironic thing, this missile goes off, the pilot -- i talked iranian military pilots, they would talk about the iraqi ir force and deeply contentious. they said we have the largest oil refinery in the world and it.pilots miss how can you miss it? it flew low enough.

the pilot got it wrong. hit the u.s.s. stark. 32 american sailors were dead. eagan came out and said it's iran's fault. the word he used was barbaric. barbaric.ns are the community went up in arms. remember in the times, what did you mean? we write great poetry, so on and so forth. they said -- they were really offended by this. and reagan had to pull that back. it's interesting if you look in the record, you can't find -- nothing official in the white house or in the files. barbarian, iranian, so on, so forth. the logic was bizarre. pilot, jet sold by the rench, theis missile stole by the french, it was iran's fault? it affected a lot of people, it affectled me at the time. it made me start to question things to be honest. i said what the hell is this

about. the u.s.s.vincenz is more of a concern. complete and utter tragedy but a classic case of david versus goliath. it's the state of the art battle cruiser. persian gulf, the completely pointless for the persian gulf. fighting? revolutionary guard gun boats nd the little motors, the rockets, a bit like you see now. and off they go. aegis cruiser his there to fight the soviet navy. happens is these -- i soften it a little bit. the captain of the u.s.s. will rogers, an interesting name. will rogers -- what's that? junior. sorry. the medical for the day is very i have to say. going to fight, get his medal. it.l summarize

but he finds himself in a fire fight with the revolutionary guard gun battles. a concocted fire fight. he sends the helicopter off. shots to him.ing he said we have this m.o. to do this. used a warning shot to get justification to go into the offense i have. in this fire ed fight with revolutionary guard gun boats. does is breaks the rules of engagement, goes straight to territorial waters. he goes in to chase them even though they're backing off, nothing to do with this. on the rotest, they see radarsome plane is coming in. 9/11.is a dry run for there's this jet. this is what's scandalous about this. f i remember being and talking about it. my brother and i were in tysons and people say they must have a suicide mission. anything the iranians do, to be a hese days, has

suicide mission. the jet is coming down. f-14.hey thought it was an the one in service has to be said. in mind, you wouldn't have the f-14s if it wasn't for the shower. coming on a e descending trajectory to hit. what's interesting is this wonderful computerized battle ruiser, we sit there and think it's descending so on and so forth. we have to input -- they have to input the missile coach 27 times. they keep getting it wrong. they fire the thing. what's tragic about this is that is that theres -- was a camera crew on the board -- the bridge of the ship t the time filming for a documentary on life in the gulf. and they were sitting there. you can see the crew there. missile, woosh,

off it goes. three, four seconds later, the blip goes off the radar. all clapping and cheering and you know, i think one of the commodores, calm we don't want the camera crew. all this. and suddenly over the air waves, you hear this s.o.s., iran air bus down. go to find -- we don't know what happened. it's dawned on them that what they've done is hit a civilian airliner. a huge cover-up for this. i have to say where credit is redit is due the reason the cover-up is done is the u.s. naval personnel themselves broke ranks. deeply upset were with what happened. two other ships in the area. on.y knew what was going the commander in bahrain was also in the air cover. things worth recording. one is that the aircraft wasn't ascending. was. two, they couldn't read the warning calls, the radio -- it was on the military unit. civilian airliner. okay?alking to me,

when the sites did connect with civilian air, change course. it did change course. it changed course to get out of of the u.s.s.vincenz. he commander had one of the carrier groups had two f-14s coming out to cover the area. drew the aircraft back because worried that the captain why shoot happy and down his own plane. one asset to have visual sight wasn't there. the u.s. naval and air power, they were drawn back. aircraft, 270 odd casualties, grotesque if you see the video. iranians can't believe it's an accident. the americans are about to declare war. the analogy today is you talk to the conservatives, they say the the vincenz of proves if you're -- it's after years of war. let's not get carried away. they read it.y

this is the way they read it unfortunately. summarizethey want to it is the black box. no one recovered the black box. recovered no one has it, the vincenz took it. the ship on site, he had it. the bbc documentary crew, they got on the freedom of information act. it's classic. of information act to say, well, it's a cia document that comes out. t's five sheets and the journalist takes it and literally said the iran air bus, five pages and it's black. absolutely black. nothing on it. them over. the whole thing -- the freedom of information, obviously. and you can't see it. is the what happened black box was seized and we know the aircraft was not, actually -- it was ascending but they got it wrong. it was a tremendously mistake.ate iran didn't view it like that. a tremendous disaster. hese are the narratives that build in. you have the development of the over 1990s when the

attemptser with made. no doubt about it. comes out is we not presence a diplomatic mediate it, but they become domestic issues that difficult to undermine, to challenge. f you watch the news now over hezbollah and whatever. --zing how the myths in iran what happens is someone comes up a pundit, used or erving in the cia whatever. happened.u may have what he may say is entirely legitimate. e may say, well, in my view, such and such. but it's a view. an opinion. implausible n

opinion or plausible opinion. opinion. it doesn't have evidence to back it up. the next time the news is becomes he opinion fact. you build upon it. that fact is built on by other facts. f you look at the current situation. i was talking to my family earlier. i said i'm struck by this. interesting to see. first of all, they said, the srealies and hezbollah, they say we're quite certain that hezbollah had not done this directed by teheran. no evidence. implausible. but there's no evidence. he next thing is to say, we're quite convinced that not only was it in teheran, but all of sold by the were iranians to hezbollah, whatever, or delivered. okay, fine. he next stage is to say actually there were iranians sitting in lebanon firing the missiles. on this and ilding

you think it gets more and more incredible. now accepted becoming less and less plausible that they're firing missiles. evidence if you bear in mind. still no. but that's how you build this way. i'm using the american example. god, the iranians can do it just as well. i had wonderful stories about doing in mericans are iran. they can concoct themselves. nobody towhen there's challenge what's going on, this is how it builds. the next stage -- what i found other thing the they do. they puff it up. first of all, they say this is israel.lt on this is an assault on the only in the middlentry east, always a nice touch, you know? interestingly over the last few its's an just that, assault on the west. an assault on america. assault on america. that, a radical assault on western civilization. is how it builds up.

more and more exaggerated and more and more desperate in some ways. and you start to write the news agenda. all of those statements, there's shred of evidence. i've been taken to task, i have to say. have to say you ear an apologist, you've done this. apologist what i'm an for. i tell you what i'm an apologist for. my an apologist for discipline. and my discipline tells me you don't make a statement until you evidence.it up with i'm an historian, i'm trained as an historian in a western university. my theory of knowledge, everything i'm taught tells me statements, e unequivocal statements until you get the evidence to back it up. may hate some people, dislike some people, may really be people.ous of some i cannot make unequivocal tatements and that's how i'm meant to teach my students but i'm amazed at how the government doesn't think they're under rules.

in britain, it's far worse, by the way. classic case in the iran core is that blair got dossier that he play jerrized from a student in berkeley. a cambridge professor looked at search and google said hang on, this is written by of massguy, the weapons destruction. it was absurd. we see plagiarism in a expelled., you get in the british government, it was a justification to go to war. that.ed to draw possibly -- just wondered when i was going to be toll to be quiet. obviously not, great. seven more years. questions, then.

current problems. i don't think you can understand the current problems outside of the political context. issue between iran and the u.s. is not about weapons at all. iran and u.s. cannot have a situation with korea.rn slap on the wrist. missiles is different. we've got a we said bomb. not very good. on two aks the seals drums and whatever it was. the world is about to come to an end. no doubt about that. there's much shows more attached to it and the fact that it's political. don't think because it's political, which is what the ranians say, they say it's

political. it's a joke. no, not a joke. this is what drives people. this is what drives people to decisions. i think we made our situation much more difficult for a number of reasons. -- we neverwe never developed like an inherent policy to try to find a way to with iran. i don't mean slapping each other. no, engagement with the issue, a sense. engagement with the problem. no one is engaged with a problem. everyone is engaged with the causes of the problem. the problem is in my mind, the st century, , the 21 how you reintegrate iran for the egion -- i say the persian question in the 19th century is how you deal with the client. manage the client. the iranian question is how do you come to terms with a country by historical term claims to be the hedge monic in the region. shah, ublic, the

whatever. if you want to see the attributes against the shah, was a thriller novel that was in the crash of '79. all of t the 79 french, the russians, they're all there. islamic em is not the republic. the problem is iran. what do you do? ou look at some of the israeli commentators, they say the reason iran is too big, we have to stop this man. last empire we are to dismantle. this is a dangerous track to go down. ut nonetheless, that's the issue that we need to engage it. punts, we number of missed in my opportunity.

i think a lot of people disagree. we failed to respond effectively to changes going on in iran. iran, a domestic political issue is only been dealt with in certain terms, dealt with as an aspect of american politics. rivalry, be it even an aspect of transalantic rivalry. on inaling with what goes iran. a couple of examples of how this works. number of seminars and workshops in the nixon center or the brookings or whatever. you go there. the whole team go from europe. the americans come in. two sessions, one session is crisis.uclear the session is packed. in, the senatorial aides. and the second session, the one for iran, empty. the group from london with a america and we were talking to each other. where are all of the politicians? they're not interested in what iran.on in

this is a major issue. we missed that opportunity. -- i can w in a sense go to more detail. i'll go into one. where a classic case of the historical narratives make a mess. an urge to there was get the europeans, all of them work.ng it will in this case, britain became part of old europe with germany and france. they went. they've seen saddam hussein demolished. they thought maybe this is a good time to talk. the mood is right. by november of that year, things are looking distinctly iraq.asant in the iranians are getting more confident. have, a europeans did big monumental mistake by them is to focus on the nuclear issue to get a deal on security that they forgot about the context and the context was what is domestically. what was happening was that the were going to launch a

coup. it was a parliamentary coup. they vetted 3,000 candidates now the sitting deputies were islamic.ly on the old thing is rigged in constituencies. y iranian standards of democracy, it's poor. blatantly obvious. the europeans said nothing. protest.n't i can tell you some iranian foreign officials sailed you must protest. come s happens, you must to our assistance. nothing happened. why? ecause they read the history books and decided that intervention was not the way to go. that's an example of how istorical encounters and mifts are misinterpreted. in the modern age, i tell you ladies and gentlemen, nonintervention is not an option. because nonintervention itself intervention.t of ecause the europeans stay ed

quiet, iranians complained the europeans come police it in this act of fraud. can read it in the text. they said why didn't they protest? prince charlesds over, classic timing for the earthquake, of course. papers, prince charles has come with a letter to mr. mother to give done.ni and say well this is the argument? i said what in the hell are you doing? thing is, eresting this was another classic case that i may try to finish on, all people that had any experience of iran were working baghdad. because we had a shortage of middle east and those people who had expertise all sucked into the quagmire that is iraq. they were working on the authority invision baghdad or whatever.

they were dragged away to their basra.d sent to what it meant was the person who igned off on prince charles' visit was john smith, recently graduated from the university of so and so who sat there and said, did they do it? and they said, yeah. attention was focused elsewhere. argued this incessantly with people, rather than get $25 laden, spend bin more money to get grants out to and train nd persian the experts that you need. i had this debate with the state department. i went and listened to a talk. of intelligence. give you one -- 11 spoke of all of the people who

worked there. this is not the heyday of can assure you. there was an urgency to get up.le trained i asked, i said, what is the state department doing? know things have changed by the way. but still they haven't done enough, i want to say. haven't done enough. but what are you doing to arabists? he looked and he said, you know? you know, you're right. it's a problem. i said what -- how can it be a problem? a difficult c is language. that is unacceptable to me. that is unacceptable to me. unacceptable that the world's last remaining superpower cannot find the to train the people it needs to do the job that it's given itself to do. be addressed.

i think i've talked for far too long. starting to - i'm sweat. i think questions if there are -- tions if i can direct there's a lot more i can say. i'll go on for another hour and be happy. will not > the problem negotiated with iran is you have several governments. at their choice, they would push a party forward and pull the other one back. we will have like a supreme leader. president.have the you would have the parliament. thethen you would also have siege who can go out and do hings on their own without clear authority. so for any administration, like g with a situation that is fairly impossible you don't have one

policy. >> i agree. everything you said. i think there are multiple voices. there are multiple voices in this country. you know? i think there are many different channels in the way things work. one of the frustrating things dealing with the united states is that thee welcome to recall cycle goes every two years. initiative is started, we have to restart it depending on presidential elections. saying is you need the tools to try to engage with it. sooner or later you to deal in with iran. the alternative is to go to war. reality.e basic the alternative is to ignore the country and g et in the situation. that conflict ue worst of two evils? okay? now i agree entirely with the complicated re's a structure there.

can't believe the american people cannot put together a team if you will. entirely, they get deeply frustrated and annoyed. to have ay to do it is ambiguity. you deal with it with precision. ness, you have obtuse ear more transparent. the uropeans more than americans in a sense are beginning to understand what you ave do is communicate with the iranians themselves over and above their government in some ways. but it has to be done. do it.e to n my mind, one of the real is rre thing is war fashionable. we don't take the necessary workinging to the u.n., out other routes before we start party. the other

we saw that recently in lebanon. these are the issues that need to be dealt with. difficult, not a small country. e don't have the notion of handing an emir, it's complicated. frustrated. believe you me, i think if the west put its head together, it it in some form or way. i didn't have the solution for you. o neglect it is to let it fester and get worse. >> i know as an historian, you're going to speculate. a great deal of talk about regime change in iran, but little about regime change here. nd i'm wondering based on your bservations, albeit, if it's theoretical, you would think for engagement, you change here regime

as well? >> one would like to think -- i there's difference before you start engaging in things. if you look at the presidential what is it?or 19 -- 2008, they're more hardline in iran than the current incumbent i can see. they're outdoing each other to be tougher on iran. with the of dealing israeli is central to this. with israel.al nonstarter for me. you do have to use the language of the regime change, you have to have the right people in place. let's put it that way. you have to have the right people. can say that in the sense of if you gave me a choice, i would take richard armitage. ave me a choice between mr. ahmadinejad, i would take the other. america all ath to

the time or someone who says, you know, i agree, burning the u.s. flag is not a great thing. 1998, what they said in you know? so uh aguy you have to have the right people in place. i don't see it happening yet. what do the british think of iran at the moment? > i think the british are moving increasingly their rustrations to iran and moving much more towards the american side of the equation apart from he fact that they're european in the view that you cannot talk regime change. >> i know french positions are different. it's someone who's hard line, actually. iran.ey're pretty much in

they have 99% of all of the contracts. they're much more hard line. the french are much more -- they are. really. >> they give -- to anything with iran. not going to be the -- interesting. the negotiations we're having -- we were in negotiations. divided eans could be as the french after iraq have been very, very anxious and make with the americans, to be honest. they have. they have contacts. that big.ts are not no. 300 ome on, 200 million, million? >> air force. >> no, they don't have the airport. >> they're doing right now the construction. one of the biggest ever made. >> not sure about the extent. >> i'm sure. >> a quick question about the of precision.

it sort of falls into two problems. ne is although i really advocate the conflict, my question is it's hard not to seriously.inejad once you have the historical problem of hitler, nobody took seriously. he did spell out his foreign olicy and he said something about well it sounded completely ridiculous, he did it. perspective, it's hard not to make a comparison. precision.e is as you mentioned, it's -- there's a big problem right now arabist and get people who actually understand who they're dealing with in the system. obviously the bigger question because although the intelligence and u.s. government wants to have people a big issue ere's of security clearances. and if you have a relative overseas, you're

almost automatically isqualified for a position of power and position of authority. engage kind of hard to in precision somebody you figure similar to hitler but you don't have somebody with enough an issue to of say, no, this is not exactly the parallel. >> i don't think the hitler analogy is useful at all. it every - we raise time. nassar was hitler in his day. saddam hussein was also hitler. of language of appeasement. it's -- i want's an understanding of world war ii world war ii to which is also largely simplified. but nonetheless, it's -- i don't it's terribly helpful. but it's -- it's all completely of es out on the complexity iranian politics and the way it works. why people e

would -- might want to raise it. to my w, these analogies mind, and i'll focus on this harvard round in writing awkward op-eds. iran-stalin. is all of these things have a use. cloud as well y lum illuminate. he wants to run the expansion. on the news that he said radical islam is expansionist and wants to britain. the point is i don't think he had in that point of view. he's running down a hardline of israel. you don't have people in power who have that --lity to >> yeah, that's true. >> one of the problems of condoleezza rice, for instance, that she's fact

coming onboard with the europeans much more firmly is soviet expert on the union and therefore everything she says is under the guise of the totalitarian system. has the uses and misuses. the notion you can't do the security clearance. country, i is the one connectione having a to that country does not mean you'll rise up. maximization on the eve and decided to head up the foreign policy team. he's an australian national. speaks with an australian access listen to him. you have the islamic connection, it's much more difficult to get higher echelons of government. know, i think of

exceptions. heliozar? >> very different. >> very different. >> yeah, he went to the right school. well -- very different connection. i know. know. i know. but still, you can make that case. i agree with you. after a -- i remember 9/11 when the fbi were going want to recruit arabists and teach them to speak. with the right sort. sort of limited. you're right. in europe, perhaps, is a little leeway. i would have thought that -- i'm surprised in the united states to e isn't as much leeway recruit these sorts of peep. that, the some of security clearance is immense. >> you have to pay for it. security for standard

clearance. but if you're somebody -- >> do that for you? to do it yourself? >> the government. have if you actually do it overseas, it goes up significantly. o if that particular agency must need -- must need you a lot to go for a process. >> thank you. you presented it in a clear the way i was understand it. you stopped your history in the which is today does iran have the right to proceed with nuclear possibly to leading a nuclear bomb. going on as we see now, you know, iran is not a be occupied.can you have to totally destroy it. way that's mutual

destruction. the only way to defend themselveses by having weapons provide a mutual destruction. so you have any comments on that. because it's y designed for a different age. it's an agreement, a contract etween the nuclear weapon powers and the nonnuclear weapon powers and says to them, we will elp them with your civilian nuclear technology as long as you forsake the decision to go it to nuclear n weapons capability. the point is you can build the infrastructure for a bomb. what it's asking you is not to take the next step. it's a voluntary agreement. within its rights hen it says it wants to enrich uranium. it's a policy devised under the shah. which says we want the option. where the west made it more difficult to itself in handling one that

misunderstood the whole domestic dialogue. seen as anr issue is international issue. it's seen as the west trying to from becoming economically advanced. the sign that there are a lot of progressive and technologically sophisticated. engaged in that debate at all. it's hit on the legal aspect of he debate, which is in some ways is not a bad strategy to take. very tler rocks -- difficult to argue with the iranians on two fronts that you international to law which it doesn't mean a huge amount. asking everyone to invade another country. to settle. one i know in britain, for instance, every d after international lawyer, academic international lawyer said the illegal.aq was they found one person to say it was legal. there's an aying is ambiguity there. it's difficult to make the case. that's one point. he other thing is the

neoconservative view of the world with the law of the juggle encourages the iranians to a nuclear weapon. if international law is not going to protect you, you need else.hing that backfires. the iranians, their view -- they haven't discussed the terms for weapons. ahmadinejad never claimed he wants a nuclear weapon. we have strong suspicions they won the auction. that.ubt about i agree they won the option. but no one has made the claim -- claim.has made the you get pundit after pundit. is khamenei said they were islamic. that's what he said. we know he can change it tomorrow. said.o far that's what he now, the debate on the other hand, when they do talk about weaponizing and other things, say, look, it's not so much israel. obody thinks in iran that necessarily having a nuclear weapon or anything will deter the israelis or anything. the iranians south

south asia when south asia went iranians started to panic. the pakistanis worried me. the time.ran at that's when the nuclear issue became hot for the pakistanis, do with national pride. if the pakistanis can do it, why can't we, one. the other was serious concern because they were fighting a proxy war in afghanistan. iran was the only country at the time to declare know, with the perversion of islam, when the the an were wandering streets of washington, you know? quite interesting. so i think from the iranian perspective, they -- they do feel acutely about their right certainly the rights on mpt. t's very difficult to argument when the british want to replace trident. nuclear t is that the powers will reduce their arsenals and begin to disarm. it.ch they're not doing

the other aspect is they are meant to help with nuclear technology. either.en't done that hey don't trust the iranians the indians not signing the mpt, makes a mockery of it. little bit of a a thing -- they never signed it. not a good argument to make, the

israelis. they never signed it. we signed it. we thought we were going to get some help. thing.one but the other thing, really, is situation.q one of the biggest losses for the west for iraq is not being as they are, the material losses and the human tragedy. it's also the loss of actually the west and the moral high ground has been lost. that's something that's going to take the west a long time to pick up. that has to do with the fact that international law, which at was created e day to support and sustain an international system that was by the is overturned west. back ifficult now to get to the situation that we could lecture on this. makes it very, very difficult. i think as i said this situation will only be solved when we get a political solution. had mentioned that really what he's needed is -- are some engagement.s for

. d so ahmadinejad would be retired it would be by far the easiest thing. disastrous.road is i don't think he's helped. more than that, the team around him is not good. i don't think the team -- he have a huge amount of nderstanding of the in touch

media. some changes are taking place in iran. iran is where procrastination is art. we can't necessarily anticipate easy, quick changes. -- not going to happen. but my idea of frustration. very good people in iran not in do the t places to negotiation. the ave to remember cabinet, 90% of his cabinet were the united states, it was an american cabinet. london, ambassador in very good ambassador too spoke with an american accent. but zarif again, an american educator. an understanding. we communicate with you as a people. e know what the or worries and fears are. the current team doesn't have that option. there are serious problems there. back.ve stepped no doubt about it. but for me, ideally, what iran's had beenolicy strategy since 1979 was always to play the europeans off the americans. if the americans are going to be problem, we stick on past the

europeans and they compromise the europeans. there was interesting compromise the europeans took place. after 2004, they ditched that policy. we're going to look to the east. you people in the west can go to hell, basically. people have used this as a tactical move, others use ideological move. i this that's a mistake. i would say you have to come to of a solution, if not with the united states, at least with the europeans. you're going to have to compromise. name of the game, politics. you can't have it all. west, i'd say, also you're going to have to engage n -- when i said it to the americans, the americans tend to play for everything. you want it all, you end up getting nothing. if you actually go for something slightly less than more unity is better.

the canadians, australians, all together, s, making clear statements of what you want, very clear. convoluted legalistic jargon that goes to some documents. very clear. our concerns are. this is what we would like. these are the benefits. these are the costs. clear, transparent, and you say everything is on the table. one of the things about the rice is h condoleezza that they're very, very qualified. here.w it was a big deal it was a big deal in this -- it shows how far we have to go. condoleezza rice can say we're happy to join in a great gotiations is break. if you look at the way it was structured, you say you come

once, you stop uranium enrichment. before you top that start the discussions. it's a bit of a nonstarter. was more problematic or more limited saying we will issues,cuss the nuclear not the other matters. the issue for me is the consequence of other matters so the other deal with matters. the hostage crisis. whatever, deal with it. but get in the groups of it. i can tell you, i don't expect the meetings to be particularly pleasant. but at least you get them out think they should be transparent. and if on the other hand, also the other thing i think on a immediate term or whatever, is you must not exaggerate the threat. exaggerate the threat, you demeanor it, you trivialize it. a wonderful phrase in the 19th century where he says the problem with our persian is whether it's apathy or neglect, we always exaggerate it. iranians, about the hey tend to get the most

adjectives, the central banker of terrorism, the spider at the web, you know, everything is extra bad in iran. things are bad enough. you don't need to make them extra bad. you u make them extra bad, trivialize it. so when you have a situation like the u.s.s. stark or things on o blame iran for which iran is not you're ble for, all doing is putting people who would have a grievance saying this is unjust. we're going to go inside with people we think you're -- and that is a major problem we have. sides do it. don't get me wrong. the iranians, the cia is everywhere. iran, i have to say. one of the things you should not is when there were no anti-war demonstrations against the iraq war in iran. one, i remember talking to a friend of mine, i said, you know, you have 30,000 people. he said it was getting embarrassing.

of a a reference parliamentary deputy berating being too ision for anti-american in the coverage of the iraq war. this is said -- none of this was engaged. none of this was attempted to a e an engagement that was constituency. he earthquake, when the firefighters came back, they said they never had a problem. was ct, the relationship very good. none of this is worked on, none of this is being developed. there are problems. ahmadinejad in some ways has changed the dynamics. ut at the same time, there are things that can be done in my view because the situation so critical now. to be in a situation now honest that this current crisis in palestine is where lebanon or escalate s going to out of control. there's no doubt about it in my mind. is at the way the rhetoric

building up. for me, never too late to basically have this fundamental rethink of how we're going forward and how we want to achieve our objectives. think to be explicit and transparent and say what we want don't want and how we get it proactive call it., i it's got to be much, much more energetic. >> how do you suggest that an dministration speak to the iranian people. beyond just government people. what -- what -- media outlets. sent an 18-page letter to bush calling him to -- islam, sorry, fraudian slip. islam.g him to it was a -- it was a great the start

wonderfully. they say how can you -- people and t tolerate oppression tyranny and they do not like to be told what to do or to have well, you know, some wit of the white house going to turn that around and say you ear talking about your own country. nobody did it. trivial and some ways small example. there were opportunities where you could have -- the other ways the media, through an -- through also i think through academia. things that rises now. very useful for the likes of me others to increase the use of scholarships and people to come out. on camera, when

out, that's omes what kills it. we had a joke earlier. they said why do we let the dissidents out? america and get completely delegitimateized, a tactic. these things you have to be more subtle in the way you're engaging people and understand saying.ey're when we deal with the people who come out, they have genuine actually , we're not talking to them. we're using them to resolve our own grievances. trying to what i'm say? it's what we want -- you have to see what they want. work with that. it's their country at the end of day. they do have genuine grievances nd it is -- they are fighting for things that we find that are very familiar. > some other historian had the

letter that ahmadinejad wrote to president bush to prophet mohammed. that's the original model. that's -- just a comment. is what is your take or he iranian position if any backing hezbollah. how dangerous is it? is that the clearly, i mean that's the way i've described hezbollah. funded, directed for many years by the iranians. it's the iranian proxy. but in the last decade or so, outgrown the direct relationship. no doubt in my mind they act in or ways their own terms they take initiatives on the ground. mind in a sense, what the iranian connection is now,

honest, there are different arguments to whether iranians are going to have soldiers, whether they're going were.e where the soldiers we don't know yet. i don't think it's implausible hey would know to be perfectly honest. but what is key is everyone are being directed to iran. iran has to take the necessary steps to show that it isn't, not going do in the sense -- but the tragedy of the so far ent in lebanon, out of hand before we have a moment to think about what we're doing. very difficult now if the israelis, the agenda really to crush this. long time going to get rid of hezbollah. large part,ne -- in hezbollah is the only group to in any he israelis engagement. so they wanted to go -- i find it impossible to believe that iranians will not come to their assistance if they get beleaguered. find it impossible to find

for inejad not make a case coming to some form of a system if the situation gets bad. it's what the israelis want to do. it's been on them for a long time that the israelis want to pretext to t of resolve their dispute by eliminating them. but this is the thing they do.ted to but now they've taken the opportunity. if it's deliberate timing or accidental. i don't know how we suddenly got to this situation. i certainly wish the europeans and others acted more a long ously over gaza time ago. they let i stew for far too long. sore.s becoming a but to my mind, if hezbollah is put under enormous pressure, i the iranians will not come. that will broaden it. it'sink the relationship if not immediate and direct in a sense, it's still close. it's still close. hey're not going to let hezbollah funding -- hezbollah s the one -- we talk to the

iranians, they say hezbollah is our deterrence. they're not going to let it disappear. in strategic terms, they need it. see what wouldto happen if it continues as it is, very likely -- it's because it's basically going to be a fire fight between rockets and the israeli air force. what happens in iraq? the shia prism might come to life. this is interesting. i'm struck actually in the united states how we talk about the middle east. the middle east actually means lebanon, and jordan. i mean i'm really struck by that. we need to talk about the middle east. one talks about iraq. omeone said to me, said, the iranians and the israelis want america to be drawn in to the middle east. i said you are in the middle east. are -- you know? one thing.hasize actually a lot of the punditry is going on, we don't know, precisely what the

connection is and what's happened. it's not implausible. comes ink if hezbollah to serious pressure, iranians will come to their assistance the other. i don't know how. as i want to let everyone continue to ask questions, here's what we're we're going to ask -- we have time for one quick question. sure. >> got to be quick. please? in the back. >> in the back. to ask you a oing question and end up building on saying let's say scenario, a t case civil war ensues, the shiites ave their own area in the sunnis, etc. how -- what would that deal iran.vis and plus the alliance with whatever -- however you want to it with the loe regime in syria. the ongoing thing with

hezbollah and israel can be what kind ofthough alliance and what kind of -- >> from the iranian perspective, carefully, from teheran, the perspective is they are the great winners in the war on terror. it.doubt about saddam hussein is gone. the regional influence is not graded for a long time. if they're better more constructive with what they're doing. the fact of the matter is the they view it, talking to people in iran, a year ago, they were clear about the position in iraq. the position in iraq will not allow military threat to the again.y quite clear, very justifiable. north, the n the shiahs in the south. he shiahs are where they're more influential. it's not direct. of rians have a capacity making them not like them. some of the shiahs in the south, it's not an ily --

automatic relationship. but the fact is that the perception from teheran is that successful. then you have hamas winning the election in palestine. it looks good. looks good. they feel quite robust. this is emboldenening them. and what they're anticipating is eventually the united states will withdraw. they're not going to stay there forever. they will withdraw. we will pick up the pieces. this comes from something that i beginning but he the instruction of the book is you have to understand that iran t the end of the day is an imperial power. that's what it is. one of the striking things is now they now know how to oaring minister, and power a course of action. what was striking about iraq, in british particularly dealing with something, they said why are the arabs doing more, you know, to work with the us groups, because iranians were smooth things over basicallyand ngos and

dealing with welfare. but they were well known. it british were tolerating because nobody could do anything about it and served the purpose. manage these to things. what i said to the british is i aid you know what you created for iran is a utopia. change the want to system. the iranians look at the mess brilliant, this is what we always work with and we're going to come and operate this operated e we always the system. we know how to manage chaos. you guys at the end of the day frustrated and you're going to leave. but we've moved in, we're going to do the job. -- i wouldn't say a perfect job, but the reasonably good job. are acutely sh aware if there is a, quote, uprising in the south, they ear going to be ilo