indispensable to our defenses, and to the collective security of the americas, the panama canal must be kept open and operating. of the the mission united states forces. the mission of the soldier in panama. [captioning performed by the national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2013] tv,ext, on american history panelists debate whether the use of the atomic bomb was morally sound, necessary, or the first shot of the cold war. with thousands of combatants dying each month, president truman faced an ethical dilemma, as he put it, about which innocents to save. this is presented by the harry s truman my very and museum and the truman the white house. it is about 2.5 hours. >> the first panel today is going to talk about truman's

decision to use the atomic bomb. in 1999, a poll of journalists ranks the bombing is the top new story of the entire 20th century. beating out the landing on the moon, the attack on pearl harbor, and other prominent stories and events that occurred in the last century. the importance of a story of the atomic bombings of japan, has come over the last five decades or so, a enormous and highly acrimonious controversy, both among scholars and among the general public. it is safe to say that the issue of the atomic bombing is arguably -- and it is a strong argument -- the issue of the atomic bombings of japan is the most contentious debate in all of american history. i don't think we are going to settle it today. but i hope we will advance our knowledge of the subject and shed some light on some important issues and perhaps

lower the volume of ill will at all to often has been a prominent part of this controversy. truman'ssy over decision to use the atomic bomb arises from two fiercely competing interpretations of why the bomb was used. the fundamental question at the heart of the debate is, was the us live on necessary to force the japanese surrender? and into the war as quickly as possible on terms that were acceptable to the united states and its allies? this is a basic question. from this basic question has arisen a whole host of other interesting and important questions. on this basic question, there are two basic answers or interpretations. the first is the traditional interpretation. that is the one that most of us, at least most of us of a certain age, grew up with. that is the theory that truman's decision to use the atomic bomb

was absolutely necessary. the answer to the question is a rousing yes, it was necessary. it was necessary because truman faced a stark choice between authorizing the use of the bomb and, on the other hand, authorizing an invasion of the japanese mainland i was going to cost hundreds of thousands of american lives. with this interpretation, he made the only reasonable choice. he chose the least abhorrent option. that was to use the atomic bomb, as a means of avoiding an invasion of japan, which was not only going to be anonymously costly, but also without the use of bomb, was inevitable. this interpretation is contested by the so-called revisionist interpretation. give the opposite answer to the question of was the bomb necessary? their answer is absolutely not. the bomb without fully not necessary.

it was not necessary because japan was defeated. japan was trying to surrender. in their revisionist interpretation, japan had tried to surrender on the sole condition that the emperor be allowed to remain on his throne and an unstated part of this interpretation is that the emperor would remain on his throne as a benign constitutional monarch. in this interpretation, the bomb was not necessary to defeat japan. because it was not necessary to force japanese surrender and in the war, -- end the war, the revisionists have come up with another idea about why the bomb was used. scholars have proposed different solutions about this question. the one that is most common is that it was used to impress and intimidate soviet union in the emerging cold war. during the summer of 1945, tensions were growing between the united dates in the soviet union.

therefore, truman and his advisers elected to use the bomb not to defeat japan, because japan was already trying to surrender, but to impress and intimidate the soviet union in the emerging cold war. do as he is not for diplomatic, political reasons. you can see that these two positions are diametrically opposed. and, these are the two polar views on the issue. polls thateen mthe this controversy has been fought out. there are still a few partisans at the polls who still continue to fight the same battles and read the same quotations. most scholars have moved beyond or perhaps have moved in between the two polls and found the answer to whether or not the use of bomb was necessary, somewhere in a broad, sprawling, ill-defined middleground.

there is still lots of room for disagreement and debate within the middleground. you might hear some of that today. where we are with recent scholarship, the two polar positions are pretty much discredited. let me give you a couple of examples. revisionist you has been discredited largely because we know from japanese sources that have opened in the last 15-20 years that japan had not decided to surrender. the japanese government, the emperor had not decided to surrender until after hiroshima. there's a lot of debate about what happened after the bomb was used. the fact remains, and i think it is clear, and i think you'll hear more about this today, japan had not decided to surrender before hiroshima. there's major support for this

revisionist interpretation. the traditional interpretation, i think it is safe to say that most scholars agree that truman used the bomb to end the war as quickly as possible. the traditional interpretation is weakened by the fact that we know there were other ways to end the war besides the bomb and besides an invasion. and that and invasion, even in the minds of people in the summer of 1945 was not inevitable. think that we have reached a point where we can now conduct our arguments in a civil manner. and with respect to the views of others -- i say that cautiously because it seems like every time i make that statement at a conference or in print, we have a new eruption. i do not think we will have any eruptions today. i am certain that we will hear

some of the latest and the best scholarship that we have today. i hope that you all will find it as intellectually and lightning i i have. -- enlightening. as have. our second panel will discuss other items of importance. the nuclear arms race, radioisotopes, and the development of nuclear power. these issues have not received as much intention from scholars or the public, as have the atomic bombings of japan. i do not think that any of them were strong candidates to have been the top news story of the 20th century. but their vital components, important to atomic energy's legacy. perhaps more directly than atomic bombs, extends down to the present day. they have also been topics of much controversy and misunderstanding. and once again, in our second panel, he will hear from leading

scholars in the field who defy any standard done on these t opics. i'm going to introduce our first speaker today. our first speaker today is richard b frank. he is the author of "downfall." published in 1999, and 15 years later, still a standard among books on the end of the war in the pacific. he is also the author of other books on world war ii. he has not trained as a historian. he is trained as a lawyer, a graduate of georgetown law school. he worked for many years as an administrative judge in the federal government. although not trained as a historian, richard frank m and straights his feels as a

historian in everything that he has written. it is a great pleasure to have him here today with us. [applause] >> thank you for those very kind remarks. i want to think this entire institution for the wonderful opportunity to be here in key west and to speak on behalf of. s truman -- harry s. truman. is my job to provide an overall summary of where we were in 1945. we have to go back to 1943, when president roosevelt articulated as therican ally aim unconditional surrender of the axis powers. that policy was first articulated with a mind toward germany, not japan. in the policymaking process, that extended from basically

that moment to 1945, it resulted in the plans for the occupation of germany and japan. unconditional surrender became the fundamental foundation of the state department lawyers. ve-- gave gam the u.s. and its allies to do things it would not have been able to do under normal international law. so, unconditional surrender, was not indispensable. it is fundamental to what eventually transpires. joint chiefs of staff are responsible for coming up with a military strategy that was implemented. we know now that the joint chiefs achieved no more than an unstable compromise. interestingly, they divided not so much over what you might call a political issue.

that was the factor that they believed undermined the will of the american people. to see the war through unconditional surrender. had been at war with japan for several decades. one of the results of the study was that they were convinced invading then-- japanese islands with a march of folly. they could muster greater forces in japan than the u.s. could in the pacific. the terrain would negate american advantages of building up firepower. therefore, the navy had derived otion that to bring the war to a close, it was one of blockade and bombardment. when the navy talked about blockade, in the context of world war ii, it was to build on the policy first employed by the british in world war i. that includes a blockade of food

supplies. kills aimed to threaten or literally millions of japanese, mostly noncombatants. that is what it was about. the army under general marshall, believed that the critical issue is time. the democracies could not fight a seven-year war. he advocated an invasion of the japanese islands as the most speedy way to bring the war to a close. they were talked over very intensely. this resulted in an agreement in an agreementth for bombardment and blockade until november. at which point an invasion would take place, first place called operation olympic involved seizing the southern island for naval bases to support a second phase scheduled for march of

1946 in the tokyo area. what we know now is that admiral king made it very clear in a memorandum to his colleagues that he was not agreeing to actually invade japan. he only agreed that they had to issue an order to have that option available come november. he said we will revisit the question of whether we need to invade in august or september of this year. early 1945 in tokyo, was greeted not with resignation, but with resolution. there is a firm grasp of how their military situation was. they believed that american morale was riddled and could be broken. they called it catch and go operations. it was a military strategy to do this -- they would confront and neither defeat or inflict such enormous casualties on the first american invasion that the u.s. would negotiate a settlement that they

would find satisfactory in the war. they moved vigorously to implement this plan. they are correctly identifying the southern issue as the most likely american target. they moved a massive forces down there. they work to conserve their forces to accumulate 10,000 aircraft, half of which were a, cause emission. to the military boost and mobilizing the economy, and the spring of 1945, the japanese government and armed forces move decisively to obliterate distinctions between combatants and noncombatants. through a series of national laws, they not only mobilized a large uniformed armed force, but also declared every japanese male age 15-60, every japanese female aged 17-40, was a member itia.e national mil

in june 1940 five, on both sides in tokyo and washington, there were important meetings. mr. truman was very concerned about the innovation in japan and call the white house meeting. he resume to the plans and he authorized olympic, the november 1945 invasion. in japan, there was an inkling of a conference. at this conference, which was affair,lly a kabuchi because the emperor does not participate in such matters -- they fought to the end without thought of surrender. in the course of preparing for that, they prepared the papers to review.

one of the aspects of those papers was this -- reading those papers come i realize that what they were saying was that even if it worked exactly as planned, this for rent us battle in kyosho -- meanwhile, there's an air and sea blockade going on. there are enormous casualties from all of these factors. if they negotiate, they realize their food situation through the latter half of 1946 was going to be catastrophic. in leadership knew that, addition to the brenda's casualties that would result from the hostilities, a large number of japanese would be dying from starvation in 1946. there was a recent book called "japan's imperial army," which said that the soldiers thoroughly understood with those papers said. if they understood it, the civilian leadership could not have missed the implications of that. maybe in a q and a, we can get into what happens.

in december 1945, in july and august, american radio and intelligence detected this enormous japanese build up on kyosho. the net result of this was a start of a roiling controversy of the joint chiefs of staff level. sent a letter to the senior officer in the pacific, asking him if this was still a viable operation. mcarthur replied that he basically did not believe the intelligence and wanted to go ahead and do it. theral king, however, took communications and put them together to put a letter to admiral nimitz in the pacific, to ask him for his views. the moment king did this, which is followed by his memoir in april -- this is now august of 1945. king also knew this. nimitz had enforced him -- informed him that he would no

longer support an invasion of japan after the expense of the okinawa campaign. what we know for sure is that there was going to be a major conflict at the joint chiefs of staff level over an invasion of japan. not because the operation was unnecessary, but because it had become unthinkable in terms of how it had been planned and ordered up to that point. marshall was looking at using atomic bombs as tactical weapons to support the invasion in order to keep that option open. meanwhile, in japan in june 1945, there was some stirring on the diplomatic front. there were a number of japanese military and naval officers in europe, as well as diplomats and entrepreneurs. they advance to various american and allied officials. not a single one of them had any authority from japan to do this. the only legitimate effort made to secure any kind of diplomatic

effort at a japanese government was conducted through the you have to understand at this point, as robert pointed out back in 1954, the man who held sway over japan numbered only eight. the emperor, his principal advisor, and then interim cabinet called the big six. that was in effect the legal government of japan. there was literally not a millisecond prior to august 6, 1945, in which the legal government of japan eberstadt down and worked out what they would accept an award. theynly occasion where only had a meeting to discuss the record where he said the only way he would discuss the end of the war is that japan had not lost will stop when they tended to mount this negotiation through moscow, the cables back

and forth between the foreign minister russia and in tokyo read like a cross-examination of feckless japanese per -- japanese diplomacy. this follows from the fact that he keep saying if this is a serious effort to end the war, japan must find some terms. terms, terms, terms. he cannot get an answer because the big six have not discussed. he sends a message to tokyo in july and which he says the best you can possibly hope for now is the unconditional surrender how the institution will be maintained. it's a centerpiece of the revisionist argument -- if only we had agreed to that set of

terms, japan would have surrendered. what is the response? it's not know, it's hell no. reading those cables, they knew in july of 1945, they were not going to secure the surrender of japan. when the bomb is dropped on hiroshima, we need to bear in mind a couple of points. the first of which is no japanese government had ever surrendered in the history of japan, which by japanese calculation was 2600 years. the second thing was an atomic bomb was an event totally unprecedented in human history third, you have to understand the japanese government was highly dysfunctional based on consensus and difficult to reach an agreement. when the first news something karen this has happened in hiroshima reaches tokyo, the japanese army really responds are not going to

launch an investigation. is an atomic bomb, they are not that powerful and are dissuaded from using them. the reason the imperial army takes this stance is because of japan's program which gives them insight into how difficult it is to make a decision to make a bomb. of august 8, the soviet union intervenes manchuria. the early reports indicate the soviets attack is very nebulous as to what is going on. the big six has their first formal meeting to figure out how lit are going to go and ace , returning the imperial institution, but there are three other conditions, including japan will try its own war criminals and disarm itself and there will be no occupation of japan which means occupation

reforms are not going to take place. the emperor intervenes that evening and orders them to take one term. when japan sends its message, saying it's accepting the declaration, the language used says it does not compromise the prerogatives of the emperor. this is what lawyers call magic it asking to stop that precedent of the japanese surrender that they believe the emperor will be supreme not oh not -- not only over the japanese government that over the occupation authorities. again, no occupation reforms, the emperor has the veto. this is rejected by the u.s. and if you read like a lawyer would read these exchanges, there is the retentiontee of the institution. the pot stamp

declaration which follows from the atlantic charter, which is that it's the will of the japanese people to maintain imperial institution, it will continue. there are a lot of things we can talk about concerning the end of the war, the soviets, the food situation in japan, the function of japanese decision-making and the areas in which the u.s. and japanese leadership saw things clearly or did not one thing i want to impress upon you is i have been doing work now on evil asian pacific war and this was a totally her rent is event from something onstop the order of 25 million human beings died. about 6 million were combatants, about 3 million chinese, 2 million japanese. that means the other 19 million were noncombatants. casualties among japanese noncombatants you can find various figures in excess of 600,000 to 1.2 million.

means every noncombatants who died, 18 other noncombatants died will stop about 12 or chinese. we heard last night from two survivors of the atomic awnings and i believe it's important we always keep in mind the karen this nature of those weapons that hang over us to this day. to me, you have to understand just how utterly god-awful the war was -- how utterly awful the daily toll was -- over 5000 chinese were dying every day the work continued. it has been estimated a quarter million people were dying every month, mostly asian noncombatants. this is the context in which all of this takes place and the makext where we can now judgments. thank you. [applause]

>> our second speaker this morning is wilson d campbell, the author of "the most controversial decision -- truman and the atomic bombs in the defeat of japan. he's the author of two other books on the truman era. australia andof received a phd from the university of notre dame. he returned to australia for a couple of years and worked in the office of the prime minister. he came back and join the faculty at the history department at notre dame. he did the masters of divinity degree at notre dame and is an ordained priest. pleased to-- we are

have mr. campbell with us this morning. [applause] >> i'm very glad to participate in this conference and i think -- i thank dr. walker and mr. bob bowles who has done such a splendid job organizing this event will stop i'm very glad to suchmy fellow panelists, important scholars from whom i have learned so much over the years. let me also thank all of you for and making an effort to try to understand some of these crucial areas of harry truman's residency. for you that i come to the issue of the use of the atomic bombs from the perspective of a diplomatic

historian. book on george kamman and his making of the use of foreign policy. my first book looking at the marshall plan and nato. in 2007, i published a book that explored the impact of american foreign-policy, more broadly understood. x lord truman's policymaking in his initial years in office and led me to worlder his diplomacy as war ii after what we now know was its final phase. to speak from a diplomatic historians to truman's initial approaches in a broad sense during 1945. then i will try to

examine something of truman's motives for authorizing the use of atomic bombs and finally, some conclusions on the morality of the use of these terrible which i haveissue tried to give some considered thought. thatds, please appreciate when truman came to office in april of 1945, he had neither the interest nor the desire to alter franklin roosevelt's policies. wanted to implement the plans of his repaired credit assessor and assure continuity in foreign policy. crucially, truman hoped to continue cooperative relations allies, especially

other members of the big three, the soviet union, and great britain. securing final victory over hitler and the not seize and then over the japanese militarist. then secure their cooperation furthermore in building a peaceful post-world war world. please keep that in mind. my study from roosevelt to truman mentioned briefly emphasize the rod sweep of american foreign-policy from eight role of 45 to the potsdam conference in 1945 consisted of an effort to maintain cooperative relations with the soviet union. there were bumps along the road, but i am suggesting the broad sweep is one of cooperation. truman named to be evenhanded in with josephdealing

stalin and worked to avoid any hint of anglo-american collusion against the soviets. even truman's appointment of james f byrnes as secretary of alter this45 did not fundamental course. burns, an important player in the events we are discussing favored the diplomatic practice of arguing and negotiation. maintainill wanted to decent relations with the soviets by reaching practical burnsments at potsdam, pursued a quid pro quo approach seer of influence piece which accepted the soviet's emanation of eastern and harry truman endorsed

this approach. they hoped this would secure a workable and stable postwar settlement. america'sredly hoped possession of the atomic bomb might add some weight to his side in future diplomatic targeting in the post pots down time. let me be very clear. truman authorized the actual use of the bomb to defeat the japanese. somes not a part of anti-soviet strategy will stop truman had gone to pot them intent on gaining soviet participation in the war against japan and he wanted that participation. is very important to appreciate this point because fanciful

notions of so-called atomic those whopushed by were following their visit with -- revisiting side dr. walker mentioned, that notion has to be put aside. about think is striking america's sole possession of the atomic bomb is how little u.s. forcials sought to use it diplomatic and send purposes in those initial stages. than and let me make some fairly brief statements about truman's motives. these are the arguments i concluded from my book -- the most controversial decision. this book, the title has a certain irony to it. the decision was not

controversial for truman at the -- it wasbsequently subsequently the controversy emerged. authorized the use of the atomic bombs to force japan to ofrender with the deep hope saving american lives. he was primarily concerned with american lives. the is what moved him and american military effort. said as richard frank and his wonderful word is clarified that atomic bombs contributed to forcing japan's eventual surrender and bringing the total war in the pacific to an end. what would have been an enormously costly invasion of

the japanese home islands. onthermore, while the atomic was never entirely separated from consideration of postwar international politics, especially in the mind of secretary of war henry stimson, the decision to use the weapons was not driven by those concerns. the atomic bombs were used primarily for a military purpose. truman and his associates did not seek alternatives to using the atomic homes. they accepted it as a weapon of war and proceeded to use it. they sought as a legitimate weapon. more discussion of this matter during the question options thate

might have proven successful, alternate courses can't be certainty,with any even in retrospect. when that far removed from the pressure truman was under in the 45 -- the united states could have eventually defeated japan, , perhaps blockade starving millions into submission. it very damaging invasion. even that has some questions about it. there was not an easily available and the probe reedit option that would have meant the serious -- would have met the serious and moral objections of the later critics of truman's

decision. those who from our safe instance, now almost 70 years who offer all kinds of alternate i thinks to end the war engaged in wishful thinking but cannot be supported by the -- there hasct been an nor ms. criticism as dr. walker made clear in his introduction of the american use of the atomic bomb. i want you to consider a few points in the remaining time i complicate the rush to judge the action truman took. those who condemn truman's decision to use the atomic bombs surely should hesitate a little

so as to reshoot that had he not authorized the attacks on russia or nagasaki, thousands of american or allied soldiers, marines, airmen would have an added to the list of those killed in world war ii. that would have included not only those in the planned invasion of the home islands, british, let me at australian ground forces in southeast asia who inspected to engage the japanese and bloody fighting in the months preceding such assaults. some folks with limited eligible board to ignore the reality that there was ugly fighting proceeding throughout much of asia. months leading up to the use of the bombs. added to their number would have

been the thousands of prisoners of war in the japanese plan to execute. further, truman was most likely correct in march of 1958 when he told the chairman of the russian city cam so that the a-bombs had prevented the loss of japanese deaths in an invasion. accept whatay be to one sees the visual record of the awful destruction of hiroshima and not the sake when one hears the testimony of survivors, japanese losses probably would have been substantially greater without .he atomic bombs furthermore, the atomic attacks thege the whole dynamics of

occupation of japan. ironically, they facilitated the and aand easy surrender broadly cooperative populism the way no other method would have guaranteed. moreover, the awful weapons ended the deaths and suffering of innocent third parties point thatasia, a professor frank addressed at the end of his remarks. rather surprisingly, the enormous wartime losses of the chinese, the koreans, filipinos, the vietnamese, the javanese, at the hands of the japanese received little attention in weighing the american effort to shock the japanese into surrender. losses in hiroshima and not the sake were horrific, but they pale in significance when

compared to the estimates of 17 to 20 -- 17 million to 24 million adults -- 24 million deaths from manchuria to new guinea. gavin doors accurately described asia under the japanese as a charnel house of atrocities. during the months of war following the attack on pearl harbor, reliable estimates 200,000 toetween 300,000 persons died each month either directly or indirectly a japanese hands. furthermore, robert newman tellingly reveals that "the last months were in many ways the worst -- formation, disease aggravated the usual beatings, beheadings and battle deaths. to hold upwards of 250,000 people, mostly asians, but some westerners

would have died each month if the japanese struggled in their death throes beyond july 1945." so i put to you that the atomic tom's shorten the war, ever did need for a land invasion, -- atomic bombs shorten the war and brought an end to the japanese brutalization of the conquered peoples of asia. make the use of moral? himself had doubts in retrospect. truman's firm conviction that he had done the necessary thing, dropping the bombs, ending the war, saving numerous lives in the process did not stave off his own serious moral qualms

about the action. just on the day after the bombing of not a sake, he told his cabinet of his order that no more atomic bombs we dropped. in words that reveal his personal anguish and growing recognition that hiroshima and not a sake were much more than military targets yet authorized bombs be used against, he explained the thought of wiping out another 100,000 people was workable. his then secretary of commerce, henry wallace recorded in his diary that he, truman, did not like the idea of killing all those kids. experience in 1945 deep recovered his whole attitude to nuclear weapons will stop he

never again spoke of them as military weapons to which the united states could make easy resort and indicated some retreat from his view that the a-bomb was just another military weapon. in looking at moral responsibility, i want to put to you that we must look beyond harry truman. mightwho accuse truman refrain from putting him in some untilar part of history they carefully consider the responsibility of the japanese leadership for the fate of their own people. postwar japanese leaders effectively played up their victim role so as to induce a certain guilt among americans

about the wars ending. help disguise the important reality next lane by historian not so x that it was much the allied policy of unconditional surrender that prolongs the pacific war as it was the unrealistic and incompetent actions of japan's highest leaders. preoccupationir with the fate of the imperial let passose leaders every opportunity to end the war until it was too late. surely therms, japanese leadership had a responsibility to surrender at least by june of 1945 when there existed no reasonable aspect of success and when their civilian population suffered so greatly.

neo-samurai who lived in the japanese military geared up with true bonsai spirit to engage their whole population in a kind of national, khasi campaign. by perpetrating the war should not be ignored. put to youwant to that harry truman was a good and decent man who tried to live by a moral code, a moral code grounded in his christian views, a moral code grounded in the 20th chapter of the book of exodus, the 10 commandments, and the sermon on the mount. truman later stated honestly i up all -- i'll bore war and i am opposed to any kind of killing whether by atomic bomb or bow and arrow. truman was however a person who

knew that decisions in the war,imes confusing fog of place policymakers in circumstances where they sometimes have neither a clear nor easy moral option open to them. himself andan had the atomic bomb decision retrospectively in mind. in a discourse on decision-making, sometimes you have a choice of evils in which case you take the course that is likely to bring the least harm. today,e perspective of truman's use of the bomb viewed in the context of this long and horrific war should be seen i

believe as his choosing the lesser of the evils available to him. admittedly, he did not weigh carefully the options in some moral calculus and proceed forward with that understanding. no, he proceeded ahead because he believed this was a weapon that could end the war. fair-minded observers will see did in fact choose the least damaging of the awful options open to him. l stimson had it exactly right when he wrote in 1947 that the decision to use the atomic bomb was a decision that brought death to over 100,000 japanese. no explanation can change that fact and i do not want to gloss over it. this delivered premeditated destruction was our least

abhorrent choice. sure, and it must be understood the least of lauren as well so as to bring the bloodshed to amend. -- to an end. too must to be appreciated that truman did not turn his moraln some feasible course of action that would have secured a japanese surrender. act wouldision not to have undoubtedly incurred terrible consequences. such inaction would carry some burden of responsibility to the prolonging of the killing of innocents throughout asia in the charnel house of the japanese empire. would it really have been more

moral to stand aside so as to maintain one's supporters of -- ones suppose it moral superiority while there were 200,000 deaths a month? is there not a tragic dilemma here viii which innocent lives to save? could truman have rested at restedy the longing -- at peace by prolonging the japanese invasion of asia? as future anniversaries of the dropping of the atomic bomb on hiroshima -- on hiroshima and not a sake occur, i hope for less condemnation of truman's decision, at least in tilde >> can specify a more obviously moral and yet still feasible course of action to end the war.

might even be some empathy for the man who felt required to make the decision and who carried the burden of it. harry truman of independence, missouri was hardly some moral monster who now needs to be placed retrospectively on trial for war crimes. decision criticize his would do well i think to place themselves into shoes and ask what they might have done in his circumstance. honest observers who refrain from superficial analysis and ill-founded criticisms will acknowledge the atomic bombs were used primarily for a military purpose so as to force japan's surrender and they proved effective in inflicting defeat on the japanese. truman and his associate did not seek alternatives to using the atomic bonds -- atomic bombs,

but alternatives cannot be identified with any all -- with any certainty. sadly, there was not an easily available and appropriate option that would have met the moral objections of the many critics of truman's decision. therein lies the tragic to useon of the decision the atomic bombs. thank you so much. [applause] >> our third speaker in this panel is robert standish noris, the author of "racing for the project'se manhattan indispensable man." this book will soon be republished -- a key not to rave reviews in

scholarly journals and ocular media. he is the author of several other books on nuclear weapons and earned a phd in political science from new york university. onhas applied his expertise nuclear weapons in jobs he is held with the national resources defense council and now with the federation of american scientists. i am very glad to introduce stand noris. [applause] -- stan noris. >> thank you very much. good to be here. i would like to thank the organizers of this event -- one correction -- the book was originally 2002. unfortunately went out of print but it is coming back. i'm happy about that. cleanup is issue here, let me summarize the paper i have submitted. with the has to do

title of this panel here. oft i say is the discipline president truman's decision to drop the atomic bomb needs fundamental re-examination. i will not be concerned with some of the issues that have been raised here having to do with whether was necessary, , or whetheras moral it was the first shot of the cold war. rather i would like to focus on whether there was any decision the wordhether decision is the appropriate word to describe what happened and concerns the timing of the bombing and the role of general leslie groves, not surprisingly since i wrote a whole book about him and his role in the bomb. actions, illow the came to this realization that it

was not really any decision by president truman to authorize the use of the bomb. he acquiesced in the decision of others. he went with the momentum of events that culminated in the bomb's use. interviewsrospect in and his memoir did he put himself more decisively in the use of the bomb in july and august of 1945. more involvement than was actually the case. look for then to authorizedhat truman , you cannot find one. of the 70 something documents in the truman library website entitled the decision to drop the atomic bomb, not one

contains any language authorizing the use of the bomb before august 6. an odd omission under that title. not totally ignorant of the bomb when he became president on august 12 upon fdr's death. theas told soon after details of the bomb. according to general groves, the only decision truman really made about bomb was not to interfere with ongoing lands -- the momentum of the project was extraordinary at that point. engineered by general groves, i think. when there was enough fissile serial, highly enriched uranium

and plutonium, when there was enough available, the bombs would be used. there is no doubt about that. i an amazing coincidence at the endamazing, of july, there was enough to real for two types of bombs to be used. uraniumighly enriched for the little boy bomb used on hiroshima and enough plutonium that was already used in the middle of july. but another amount was available. that would be used in the fat man bomb on nagasaki. it did not have to turn out this way at all and it was only because of general growth's efforts to speed up the production of these two kinds of material that the availability for the material was ready at

the time and was used. my argument is truman really did not authorize the use of the bomb. he went with the decisions that had been made long, long before. back as the authorization by president roosevelt to initiate the program. why would you build a weapon of war if it was not intended to be used at some point? it was given over to general whose bosses were stimson and marshall. advisor namedific bush and with this complex of people here, it was full speed ahead. i call my book racing for the bomb -- and speed is of the essence, everything counted.

and as i agree with my fellow panelists, the idea was to end the war as soon as possible. what if thetion is war had not and over in europe? weapon on may 8, that was too soon for the bomb to be ready. truman was in an odd place when he inherited the presidency. as will mention here, he went with the continuity of things that had already been put in place. the two men truman had the utmost respect for.

then make the contrary decision. truman's decision was not so much as to say yes as to say no. it would have taken an enormous effort to say no, we are not going to use the bomb will stop we are going to go some other route. with the people surrounding him and the plans in place and the momentum underway, it was just not in the cards that truman would do anything else but go along with what has already been put in place. as woodward and bernstein said, follow the money, it was always my research effort to follow the bomb. look at how the material was made, you focus on the timing of when the bomb was used.

when there was enough at the end of july for two types of bombs, they were going to be used. if they would be done a month forward two months before, they would do it before then. the bombs were ready and used within days afterwards. if you follow the path from hanford, washington where the plutonium was made with the oak ridge tennessee, where the highly enriched uranium was made as it made its way to los alamos where it was fabricated into the pieces that were needed and transported to the forward base from which the bombers left, you see they are racing for the bomb. there's no doubt about it. there's not a minute lost will whereas i argue truman did

officially the piece of paper that says, i, harry truman authorize the use of the atomic tom. it was in the middle of the ocean. i do not criticize him for this. i do criticize him for taking some liberties with the historical fact afterwards and interjecting himself into this ross s, taking more credit than is historically accurate. is reject himself into stopping the use of the bomb. as was mentioned before, once some piece healers began to be heard from japan after the not a sake bomb, truman interjected himself and said no more. general marshall told general

groves no more bombs are to be except upon authorization from president truman. later, the term free delegation became known as this process. bombeal order to use the came from general handy who was the acting chief of staff in washington. while washington was in pots dam. he authorize the 509 composite group to use bombs as made ready. gross being the good army officer would supply bomb number three, bomb number four, bomb number five if needed. there was an assembly line in the process in which more bombs

beyond the not a sake bomb would have been used, but truman interjected himself and stop that assembly line, stop that free delegation which had been granted in an order which i don't inc. he had ever saw. that is something to keep in mind about truman and the bomb -- he did interject himself into stopping the use of the bomb beyond not a sake and with good reason. out to haveeelers the japanese unconditionally surrender. thing in my remarks having to do with the timing. days is of these crucial to the way these things turned out.

counterfactual history is sometimes a dangerous occupation, but sometimes it is useful. case, i think in this useful to consider what would have happened had the bomb not been used in the early days of august. it was mentioned that on august 8, the soviet union entered the war and this has become, according to one scholar's that had an action more impact on the japanese than the dropping of the atomic bomb and ending the war. i don't buy it, but anyway, the japanese had to consider august ther oshima, on august 8, russians enter the war, then not a sake -- then they surrendered.

but had it gone on, the soviets had already begun an invasion of japan. had the war gone on another few weeks or another month or two, the old postwar time would have looked entirely different with japan. sovietould have had occupation and we would have had a situation much like germany. happen, so i recommend article by a good fellow named david lands who is a specialist in soviet war plans in world war ii about the invasion of japan. it is mentioned in my paper. what i have argued then is president truman was not as

involved in the decision to use the bomb as subsequent literature has alleged all stop -- literature has alleged. he should not be blamed. the president roosevelt had may, a few months longer, june, july, august, i don't think anything would have been different. the bombs were ready when they were ready and would have been used. we would be looking at president roosevelt's role in the bomb. and have i stop there any questions in the time that follows. [applause] >> we are actually running ahead of schedule. like to thank the

speakers both for the qualities of the papers and the brevity of your remarks. the two things i asked for before we got here, one was not to read their papers because they've had bad experiences with that. they did not do that and they stayed right on schedule. we have lots of times for westerns. there are two microphones at the front, please line up at the microphones and i will call when you. please identify yourself and director question toward one of the panelists. >> my name is linda chatman. inc. you so much. say all of this history is revisionist and to make a pejorative on one side or another is a pejorative. but i would actually like to go bomband say dropping the had to be done. can we talk about the strategy?

i'm no expert in this. why civilian targets? why not military targets? of theas a huge buildup japanese military in keo jew -- oju.y second, why did we have to drop two of them? >> i guess this is aimed at me. it was general groves who was in charge of establishing what was called the target committee in april. the first time they met was april 27. it is a master bureaucrat and said i have nothing against the committee as long as i get to choose the members. members andthe

their is a collection of military people, oppenheimer and scientists and the army air forces come so on and so forth and they decided they would that had noty already been bombed. they wanted a fresh look at them on bombed city to show the power of the bomb. intent of why some of these targets were chosen. obsessed with trying to get kyoto on the target list and stimson who visited japan it historical and cultural import to the japanese. tryingas obsessed with to get kyoto on but it did not

happen. best, the target list became era and neck got a. those were the ones at the end of the target committee. they did not know if this is going to work a lot. they were sure about the little boy bomb. take two pieces of uranium, fire one into the other, it's going to blow up. to test it.d it's going to take too long if we have a test bomb and we don't have one for many months later. but this plutonium bomb is a new animal. we better test that first. on july 16, it was tested in the new mexico desert. it worked. full speed ahead toward getting and have theny him

509 composite group ready to deliver it. of course, the you know what gay aircraft --t combat combat aircraft. in a perfect mission that went according to plan, it dropped the bomb on hiroshima exactly when they said it would. there was much more difficulty in the second mission against nagasaki. go into all of those details held they lines and were covered in clouds and they wanted and officials target. so on and so forth. that almost aborted but it didn't.

it made the japanese take that final step, a distinction between defeat and surrender. they are not the same thing. the revisionists have constantly said japanese word fetid. of course they were defeated. they were probably defeated at midway, although they did not know it will stop but how do you get them to surrender on your terms? that took a long process and eventually, it was the atomic bomb that convinced the emperor to intervene and say enough, it's over. >> let me just add to the point to support professor diller. use, assion to professor north made clear in his paper, was the one decision.

in retrospect, i can understand how we from our vantage point, why didn't we give them more time after hiroshima and give them time to make a decision. it was essentially the one -- both cities were military industrial targets. they were not simply filled with civilians and targeted because of that. hiroshima was the headquarters of the japanese army responsible for the defense of the southern part of japan and it was a supply and logistics base for the communications center, not a sake, of course very important -- wide-ranging industrial

activity. the complicated dynamic of how japan fought the war and who was a civilian and who was a combatant, etc., made targeting something that had already devolved into an area where dare we say civilian targets were on the lists. it is under fdr the tokyo fire farming -- firebombing occurs. ae war had devolved into what level we can look back and say is almost barbaric targeting of who had been warned to evacuate the city's will stop -- these cities. that is were the tragic dimension enters them. >> let you say, i think what you have to understand looking at the design and use of the atomic

bombs, you have to understand the most important thing was the purpose. was the idea it would take some tremendous shock to get japan to actually capitulate. the targeting was a second issue. whether you should target a military unit ursus the city, the question was which was going to be more impressive to leadership in tokyo. then was atomic bomb much, much, much smaller than anything that came after. not nearly the same sort of thing we have lived under the cloud now for 70 years. general groves of others saw the use of the bombs against cities as a life. it was a bluff to prove we had

not merely one bomb but that we had an arsenal of bombs stop what this would lead japanese decision-makers to realize was, as premier zoo -- premier suzuki would say in december of 1945, if the americans have such weapons and quantity, then they will not comment they japan. japan, do not invade japan's military leaders had no strategy short of national the use of the one bomb followed three days later by the other bomb was fortuitous in a lot of respects, but nonetheless it achieves the bluff. it created a relentless rhythm of nuclear attack and implied we had a very large arsenal of bombs will stop one of the points you have to keep in mind you have youre own nuclear program, as soon as

they heard a word atomic bomb swath of japan's leadership knew what an atomic bomb was. this was not a bolt from the blue. they also knew how incredibly difficult was to make a bomb from an engineering standpoint to make fissile material. that's when the first reports of the bomb, the imperial army says we are not going to concede it is a bomb until we have an investigation. the imperial navy even more ominously says even if it is an atomic bomb, they can't have that many of them, they can't be that powerful. sakesecond bomb at not a not the props out of the idea that the u.s. did not have an arsenal of atomic bombs. all of why, as tragic as that is, those two bombs in conjunction achieved the bluff. if we understand what the japanese military was talking about, it shows no demonstration

whatever work because the japanese comeback would have had this is very interesting. let's see you do three a row. >> is one point on the timing. general growth told general marshall about the third bomb. is we have timetable speed things up here. it can be ready as early as august 17th. august 9, the next bomb, it was going to take that span of time from the night of the 17th to get it ready to use. the third bomb was scheduled for august 17. groves had them lined up,day september, november, october. he would have upwards of 20 by the end of december.

already, the assembly line was , and plutonium was coming from the hanford reactors in huge amounts of that point. you could calculate all of these things. it would take this long to fabricate it, get it up the chain. he was ready for many more than just two, but he thought two would initially be probably enough, but he wasn't going to stop there. he continued to make them. >> thank you. my name is kathleen sullivan. i would like to invite us to broaden our perspective. , truman'sk at this nuclear legacy, i think we could also easily say human nuclear legacy.

if one concedes that nuclear weapons are a weapon of war, then one does not understand what a nuclear weapon is. while we can speak specifically about hiroshima thenagasaki, those of us at symposium last night heard other names. the atomic weapons used at hiroshima and nagasaki are still killing survivors to this day. this isn't a violence that ends in a moment of time. i think what is perfect -- particularly interesting for an american audience is to consider how the production of nuclear weapons has threatened united soils citizens on our own through testing, atmospheric testing, the production of the various assembly lines which were put in place by general groves. if we look at the one example of

hanford in washington state right now, we have that -- vats that are filled with solid, liquid chemical and radioactive waste that are too hot to physically be around. we have literal ticking time bombs as a result of the manhattan project, which we have no idea what to do with. i think the issue of nuclear waste is germane to both nuclear weapons and the nuclear power argument. "solution", the one that has been manufactured and country,d in this which has taken waste primarily from rocky flats, the plutonium .anufacturing plant 25 years later, we have big leaks going on to this day.

if we broaden our perspective beyond the decision, if we think about the testimony and how radiation is still killing survivors today, and we bring that forward to our own citizenry, our tax dollars and the production of these materials, these weapons on our own land, and what that has done to u.s. citizens -- the human nuclear legacy. i would like to hear your comments. i think the question is a good one. years, i worked at a place called the natural resources defense council, which looked into the environmental legacy of making the atomic bomb and hydrogen bomb from 1945 on. we looked and sued the government many times over how quickly, how adequately they were cleaning up the mess that had been made.

environmental and health considerations were always secondary. the primary one was, the russians are coming. i'm sorry. we build bombs like crazy. i think about 66,000 of them over the course of -- from 1945 1992.about constantly recycling them. they were the things to have for the military. the military wanted them in every variety. we had two competing laboratories that supplied whatever they wanted and sometimes gave them things they didn't even know about. this was the dynamic of part of the arms race, the russians were , theg, competing interservice rivalry between the army and navy and air force.

laboratories, good jobs in all of these places. towas in congress's interest have budgets to support it. this was the engine of the arms race. we are going to live with the legacy of what happened for decades to come, and we have already spent countless billions of dollars cleaning up the mess that was made at rocky flats and hanford, oak ridge, smaller places. it will be long before all of us are gone, before they even begin to make a dent in this, but it is fuel the department of energy -- has fueled the department of energy budget quite a bit. as far as testing, people were exposed. the famous desert rock exercises in nevada where they had soldiers entrenches -- in

trenches charging mushroom clouds. thinking?they there were many legacies. to say nothing of the russians did. if we did it this way, you can imagine what the russians did. they did it in a horrible way, dumping all sorts of nasty things all over the place. their legacy is even worse than ours. there are smaller legacies among the british, french, chinese, anybody else who decides to go for the bomb. the person who asked the question raised a very good point. the legacy endures, and we have to think beyond what happened in august of 1945. it's a very important and valid point.

you have to bear in mind that the weapons that were in tinyence in 1945 were compared to what has come after. emphatically agree with the notion of expanding our horizons and putting all of these events in context. what i would like to emphasize to you is, think about the "good was.the way it actually on september 1, 1939, when hitler rolled into the soviet kim snyder wrote a wonderful book called "love ."nds he writes, at that point in time, hipper had killed approximately 10,000 human beings on the basis of race or political reasons. by that point in time, joseph stalin had killed somewhere between 6-8,000,000 human beings in implementing his policies.

by my count, at that point, the japanese war in china had killed probably at least 4 million chinese. when hitler roles and the soviet stalinn june of 1941, has added several hundred thousand additional victims in poland, finland, the baltic states. hitler has probably killed a nexus of 600,000 beings -- human beings. by this time, somewhere in the vicinity of 7.5 million chinese have died. in my view, a very important moral rubicon in the 20th century at this point. we decide we are going to ally with the soviet union. from a strategic standpoint, it seems to me that this is undoubtedly the only correct decision and really the only reasonable decision at that point. we did have a choice about how we would characterize that relationship. as anld have depicted it

arms length, the any many of my enemy is a friend, but we chose to depict stalin's soviet union proto-democrats and obscured the nature of that regime. when the accounting came over the deaths of over 20,000 polish, we chose to cover it up. when you understand at the very outset of our participation in this war ii, we have made fundamental moral choice about how we are going to depict our actions and allies, then you see the long slide from ther through a whole series of events in the ware that leads to the bombing of cities and using the atomic weapons. a series of other fraught moral choices that truman faced. this is part of the larger context of the issue of the andession and production the residuals of using and making atomic weapons.

it is even bigger in my view. it is a whole moral universe that we have to recognize people were living in in the mid-20th century. we should give some consideration to what they thought they were dealing with at the time before making judgments. >> i would just add a couple of points. when we sit in our location today, we often wish that things had worked out differently or occurred differently, but of course, what drove the manhattan was the fearally that hitler and the nazis were going to develop an atomic bomb. you would wish in retrospect everyone was just a good person and we decided not to pursue such technology, but i believe it was a responsible decision on

the part of the americans and british who were already engaged , because they feared what the world would be if adolf hitler was the first person to possess atomic weapons. you understand what sort of andes the decision-making organizational genius -- the decision-making, and then the vesanizational genius of gros pursues it. i don't dispute some of the unfortunate consequences of the american possession of atomic weapons, and yet i think we that hiroshima and nagasaki are the only times when weapons were used in warfare. perhaps, in a terrible way, they gave us an example of the awful

consequences of these weapons, on allat statesmen sides in the cold war have held back because they know of the awfulness of these weapons and that they play at least some part in that regard. that there are all kinds of issues that bubble .orth from nuclear weapons for myself, however, i would have to say that during the cold war, i'm glad the united states didn't engage in any sort of unilateral disarmament. by and large, i think deterrence worked, and the soviet union was a threat to the united states. they were held at a by the nuclear balance. >> let me make one brief comment. what is different about atomic dropping 500sed to

isventional bronze -- bombs the enormity of the atomic bomb and the radiation effects. i was going to ask of the second panel this afternoon -- i will throw out the radiation effects, what the latest findings are of radiation effects from hiroshima and now the sake -- nagasaki. yes, there have been radiation effects. there are still people dying from diseases from radiation from the bombs, but the numbers are not huge. i think we should keep that in mind. 1950-1997, of the survivors of the bombs in hiroshima and nagasaki, there have been above what the incidents would be expected to be, what normal incidence of

cancer and other diseases would be in those two cities -- there has been an excess above which you would expect normally in those cities, deaths from cancer and other diseases, possibly caused by radiation. between 1950-1997, the latest figures they have posted, 440 total deaths from solid tumors and 250 from noncancerous and also between 1950-2000, the latest figures they have posted, the excess number of deaths from leukemia -- this is what showed up first in the atomic cities -- the excess number of deaths, beyond what you would expect in a , the excesshat size number of deaths in hiroshima

and nagasaki is 94. these are not numbers to be dismissed, but i think they take issue with the perception, which i think is widespread in this country and possibly japan, that there is still an epidemic of deaths from radiation. these are serious numbers, and we have to take them seriously, but i think we have to be clearer on what the numbers are. skidmore. is jerry as mentioned, it wasn't just a race to end the war. it was a race to get the bomb first. when president truman told joseph stalin that we had a weapons of mass destruction, there was almost no emotional reaction from stalin at all. probably their espionage had already uncovered and knew what we were doing, and there was no doubt they were also developing

their own bomb, which they did a .ew years later do we know to what extent japan and germany, how far along they were in their programs? was there any cooperation between germany and the axis powers to develop the bomb, and do we know how and where and when they would have used this weapon? >> there's been an extensive investigation of this question of the german bomb and how far along they were. this was an obsession of general groves. this was an early recruiting method. had of the scientists worked for key german scientists and had fled to the united states. they were concerned about what was going on back in germany.

it appears, after looking at just about everything, that the justn program was halted as the american program really got under way, probably the spring of 1942. elton schreier would have been in charge. heisenberg, one of the greatest scientists of the 20th century, was involved in all this, as were some other notable germans. 1942, it looked pretty good for the germans. maybe the war is going ok and we don't need to diverse resources into this thing when we need more tanks and this and that. program was de-escalated, was a very low .evel an

there was no general groves. general groves was obsessed. he created a team, which was a group of soldiers and scientists who were at the leading edge of the invasion of europe, first in italy and later with d-day, to find out really what was going on. team hasr 1944, this found out that the german program was not going anywhere. there is no fear of the bomb. nevertheless, that didn't cause the american effort to go any slower. along atit was racing an extraordinary pace. 1945 -- 1944, early 1945

, they rounded up the scientists, the american soldiers, and they sent them to england in a place called farm whole, which was a nice shadow near cambridge -- château near cambridge. general groves had the place bogged and listened to the german conversations going on to really find out what was going on. 1945, the german andntists were incarcerated learned of hiroshima. heisenberg said, they didn't. he thought that you deeded -- needed a lot of highly enriched uranium. of course, you don't need very much at all. this began an explanation that

german scientists used after , and it wasy tricky almost immediately decided by heisenberg and the others that they would take the position that they knew how to make a bomb, but they didn't want hitler, because he was a nutcase and madman, so we wouldn't give it to him. scientists argued this for many years, and i think it is totally fallacious. first of all, i don't think they knew how. they never investigated enough to know how to make a bomb. they could have done it. anybody can do it. as we know and in the history of what has happened over the last 70 years, many countries have successfully done it. every country that set out to make one made one. they are still doing it. iran is going to get a bomb.

there is no doubt about it. only one of the countries, south africa, has willingly given it up, but that is another story. rested on scientists this argument, yeah, we knew how to do it, but we didn't want hitler to know that. we were the dissidents in the thing. i think this is baloney. there were a lot of books written about this. groves, he listened in on these transcripts, which finally became declassified -- she got the first copy, and they are fascinating reading about the state of the german bomb program, which was going nowhere. respect to the japanese, what you have to bear in mind, there are two parts of an atomic bomb program. .here is the science part the basic idea was well known to

by citizen in the world 1939. the tough part was the engineering. as were japan simply do not have the resources to advance an atomic bomb program beyond a very low level experimental stage. in addition to all of the trees , there haveedlessly been books published that claim the japanese program had , and one byfar claiming there was a test of the japanese atomic bomb in august of 1945 in korea. it's nonsense. once again, i come back to the point -- remember from the third quarter of 1944, the idea about an atomic bomb and atomic bomb

program, the potential importance of an atomic bomb was well known in the top levels of japanese leadership, including general dojo. they understood the idea of an atomic bomb. pages question like the germans whether anybody else could do it. questioned, like the germans, whether anybody else could do it. back throughout human history, world leaders have employed extreme tactics to bring nations and city states to their knees. we appropriately decry such as atrocities, but popular culture seems intent on venerating these individuals and their efforts. while this is most often seen in light of imperialism and not thatse, it might appear the same cultural mindset is at work here.

looking forward, should review mr. truman's decision as more akin to the philosophy where you must do what your conscious demands, even if the act seems or is evil, or does this signal may be in a profound disconnect in our thinking that precludes us from finding the peace that we seek? or to add a modifier, do we have any more of a decision and whether or not we are a nuclear world than mr. truman did? thank you. >> thank you, trucker. -- trevor. i've tried to present the issue as truman deciding among a series of deeply awful options and choosing the one that was -- looking at it in retrospect --

i'm not suggesting he engaged in -- heeep moral evaluation was guided by groves. the momentum was there. they considered it a military weapon. they thought it would shorten the war and save american lives. in retrospect, i think there is a case that they pursued an option that can certainly be seen as the least awful of the awful options that they had. there was no easy option. that is what i ask folks who -- who quickly rush to judgment on truman. course, the alternate and what would have been the civilian casualties in that course of action? i never want to see nuclear weapons utilized. i don't think they can in any way be justified because of the

indiscriminate nature of them, particularly the nuclear ,eapons, as he pointed out that today are vastly more damaging and their consequences than the weapons used at hiroshima and nagasaki. ethically going forward, i think statesmen have to work hard to make sure that there can be a reduction in these weapons and that they never be utilized in warfare again in the same manner that, hopefully, things like poison gas and so on will never be used again. i don't know if that fully addresses your question, but i hope it helps. >> let me just add -- i think bill captured accurately what mr. truman had, which is often glibly written off as, he never

lost any sleep over the decision. no, this is not what happened. his mind and conscience operated on two levels. one level was, did i make the best choice of the awful choices in front of me? i think he always felt he had done the best choice that was presented to him at the time. was he absolutely pained, stricken about the consequences of that decision for the rest of his life? the answer to that is emphatically yes. this was not something she considered as one decision among many as president. he was tortured in many ways. and you read all of the comments he made later, it really leaks out. in those interesting moments in august 1940 5 -- he talks directly in a cabinet meeting. killing 100,000 people with a bomb. isknow now that that number

precisely a number that appeared in his hands that they were the .ay before that was a report by the japanese navy about casualties at hiroshima. he was reading the great interest and intensity what reports were about what happened . >> as i mentioned, he interjected himself into stopping any further droppings of the bomb, which had been pre-delegated to general groves to keep using them. he told them to stop. they did. you know, at a certain level, truman as president new cube or ultimate responsibility. a decision not to intervene is

in a sense a decision. he was carrying out the policies . when you put it in the context of, truman takes over, and as we know now, with no proper preparation for that role, and he announces that he wants to execute the legacy of frank when if you go through these moments in these early he is a man very much alone, finding his way. you read about these very moving scenes -- he goes on with these great reading lists, trying to figure out, what was fdr's legacy? what did the president really want to do? via searching earnestly to find this. one of the areas he deals with an atomic policy, he had enormous confidence in stimson and marshall, and he knew that this was a policy roosevelt had horse. compared to other things he was

facing, this seemed like a simple matter. this was the president's policy. i've announced on following the president's policy. he has a meeting about the invasion of japan, because he is concerned about casualties. he has no separate meetings, although later he recalls something like this, specifically about dropping the bombs. way, insort of perverse my way of looking at it, when truman later says, i made this decision, you look -- you can look at it another way same, i responsible for this happening. should rename this session "truman's nondecision to use an atomic bomb." [laughter] >> thank you very much for this interesting session. my question is for mr. walker. at the beginning of the session, you talked about the division

between the traditionalist view and the revisionist view, and you said that at this point you thought both extreme views had been discredited, and specifically on the traditionalist side, you said the view was discredited because the u.s. had other ways to end the war. throughout the rest of the panel, i feel we have heard quite a strong defense of the traditionalist view, describing the option narratives using the bomb is either a naval blockade and masturbation of the japanese mass starvation of the japanese populace. what other alternatives were you thinking of? >> the other alternatives -- in the context of 1945, they were not viewed as alternatives to the bomb.

the bomb was potentially one way to end the war. there were other ways that included waiting for the soviets to enter the war in asia by invading manchuria, continuing with the conventional bombing -- i put that in quotes because the conventional bombing of japan was for effect, and we should never lose sight of that. the blockade, which richard mentioned, was going to have excruciating effects on the japanese population. the other possible way was a demonstration shot of the bomb, which was ruled as not an effective way to show the power the bomb. as richard and others have mentioned, the value of the bomb was not its killing power necessarily. it was the shock value, to shock the japanese leadership into surrendering. that was the purpose of the bomb. there were other ways that the war might have ended, might well have ended, and american leaders

knew that the japanese were at least considering surrender. the so-called peace advocates were not in control, and american leaders knew that, as well. movement at least some towards a surrender on the condition that the emperor be allowed to remain on the throne. i mentioned this in passing, and richard mentioned it -- japanese picking up a time among the leadership was not at the emperor was going to become a constitutional monarch with that the emperor was going to remain divine ruler. that was totally acceptable to the united states. -- unacceptable to the united states. it is my conclusion that the war would have ended without the atomic bomb and short of an invasion, but it would have lasted longer than it did. we don't know how much longer. the fact is that american soldiers were still dying, and

sailors were still dying. that was truman's main concern. as we heard, hundreds of thousands of innocents were dying throughout asia at the same time. the longer the war went on, the more deaths there were going to be. that was truman's concern. the war would have ended we don't know exactly when, but there were other ways that were under consideration and were discussed in that june 24 in which the bomb wasn't even mentioned until the very end. the war would have ended. we don't know when. >> another course would have been for the united states to completely change the terms of surrender for japan. i think that would have been politically impossible for /nyone to undertake

>> let me just follow up. be, if therewould was the possibility of the japanese side maybe not deciding but considering surrender, and there was an option of waiting for the soviets to enter the war , how does that inform our judgment of the moral calculus of if not deciding to drop the bomb, then the decision not to intervene before the first bomb was dropped? >> not to intervene? to wait for the soviets and see how that went? >> if he could have waited another week for the soviet invasion and seen the japanese reaction, does that change how we view the decision? >> i don't think so. leadership asan's needing such a shock to force

surrender that he didn't see the use of the bombs and the soviet invasion as an either-or. it is both-and. he is keen for the soviets to enter the war. calculation was correct. >> again, the timetable -- follow general groves and how the bomb, physically, was made and got there and dropped. there was no time. the other point is, who knew about the bomb? even very high members of the joint chiefs of staff didn't even know about the bomb and ,nly learned of it very late and thus, there is not as open discussion. to really have the word everybody has to

be informed. none of this happened. the train has left the station. it is going down the track so fast that nobody is going to interfere with his thing -- this thing. keep it limited to as few as people -- as few people as possible to know about it. that itntum was such was inevitable that once you started down that track, it was going to happen. general groves made it happen. >> what impressed me was the idea that ms. campbell had said earlier that there was no moral ,ption that truman did not take and it seems to me that a moral option would've been -- mr. noris, you pointed out it would have been incredibly hard for him to stop the program entirely -- but what if truman had said, let's wait one week?

would not have been a moral option? >> let me address that specifically. there is a fundamental fallacy in the arguments about soviet intervention as an alternative. the way this is normally presented, we know atomic bombs are used, and we know the orbotech effects of those bombs. the soviet intervention, the -- the only consequence is deaths in manchuria and asia. the reality is, hundreds of thousands of japanese were captured by the soviets, combatants and noncombatants. 1.7 million total. there has been, for years, scholarly debate about the total number of japanese and soviet captivity who died. there was a book published couple of decades ago by a japanese scholar who said that

the number of japanese who perished in soviet captivity was between 300,000-500,000. book, thed another number was estimated at 400,000. in recent book by a professor at berkeley who had access to soviet archival documents, it shows that roughly 73,000 japanese combatants were killed in fighting with the soviets in august and on into september of 1945. about 62,000 japanese soldiers were combatants who were captured by the soviets in that august campaign died in soviet captivity from disease, abuse, starvation. it also shows about 180,000 japanese noncombatants died from soviet captivity. that is just the japanese who have died as a result of combat on the asian continent.

if you presume we are going to let the soviets to the invasion and secure the end of the war, that means a soviet occupation .one in japan the math is that about one out of seven japanese who fell into soviet captivity were going to die. do the math. how many more japanese are going to die? when we talk about moral consequences, it seems to me we have to recognize all of it. we don't create a hierarchy of victims in which some noncombatants are entitled to immunity andmplete other noncombatants are not even worth discussing. >> we have two people who have been waiting patiently. yes, sir, i will take you. my name is ron cole. i would like to thank the panel for some excellent discussion. i would just like to follow-up

on something. she mentioned last night that after the bomb, none of the doctors had any clue what was going on, but the hospitals that were shut up, it seemed to be they were more aligned on researching the medical effects of the bomb. it's almost as if this was premeditated. they knew there were going to be some effects, and they wanted to follow-up on those. there is the issue -- a lot of science involved, but there is also the engineering aspect -- regarding the scientific discussions ahead of time, the ionizing radiation and those kinds of things -- and we could probably follow up on some of this in the next session, but i'm pretty sure president truman didn't have any access to these

discussions. military, who might have had access to the potential fallout of these kinds of weapons? what is it going to do to the atmosphere, the ozone? can you give us some insight into those scientific , and ultimately, was president truman made aware of those things are going down the road with the atmospheric testing? >> i think he dial your number, sam. oppenheimerbert when he joined the program, there was consideration among the scientists that maybe if this went off, it would ignite the atmosphere and end all life on earth. oppenheimer went all the way to the summera of the guy who headed the chicago laboratory, arthur compton, to tell him about this,

and the response was, but her live under the nazis feel then than to end is a -- life on earth. there was this fear that something would happen. is flyingjuly 16 down, facing away from the test on, and the flash goes off, he thinks in the first instance, all my god, i think they've let the atmosphere. anyway, they knew something was special about this weapon. there were scientists and medical people looking into it. the first reports that came back from hiroshima about this radiation sickness were very .larming again, general groves did his best to tamp down the exposure

of this new fact going on, limiting journalists and those around who would talk about it. it was something new. and disturbing. and later became much more disturbing to the japanese in terms of atmospheric testing. we knew that was bad. finally, the world said, enough. there was a treaty. benefit, our thankfully, they stopped it. ignorance tonts -- revelation, it is still going on , and we are still investigating. areah physics is a whole of research that are not competent enough to follow. >> scientists knew about the

effect of radiation, and there was some discussion of that before the bombs were dropped. they didn't think that the effects of radiation would be all that much in hiroshima and nagasaki because the scientific assumption based on their calculation was that these were air bursts. there wasn't a lot of radioactive fallout. the assumption was that the deaths that occurred -- there was no question that there would be a large number of deaths -- the deaths that occurred would be from heat and blast, not so much from radiation. it turned out they were wrong. they were clearly aware, the scientists were. i doubt if truman was. clearly, there was a lot of basic, but atill lot of knowledge about radiation effects in 1945. it, what isrstand striking to me -- at one level,

the scientists knew that radiation was a hazard, could do terrible things, but in their populations, they convinced that basically anyone who was in danger of having a lethal dose of radiation would already have been killed by the blast door heat. whentruly were shocked those first reports rolled in about radiation sickness. i think it is entirely clear that no one up the chain had any inkling of this. the scientists didn't think it was a hazard and didn't communicate that. , ifof the great what ifs they had a grip on what radiation actually did that made , more akin to poison gas, over which there was a taboo about the use, it probably would have changed the

entire dynamic of decision-making. the only nation that extensively used poison gas on the battlefield of world war ii was japan primarily against the chinese from 1937-1945. the germans used gas, and we know what the context of that was. there was something clearly about gas and the idea poison that at a visceral level i'm sure would have had a much more profound effect on simpson and truman than the notion that they had that it was just a bigger bang. have one final, and it will be a final question. >> i have a specific question, but before i talk about it, can i just express my general comment? i have listened to you people. i realize that you seem to share a similar view and perspective.

i was thinking that in this country, there are many other historians and other experts who do have very different viewpoints on the issue we are talking about. i think it would be of great service to american citizens to have this kind of symposium withed by the people different perspectives. people, the american but i think there are a lot of japanese historians, japanese experts who have very different viewpoints. other parts of the world, as well. wouldn't it be wonderful if we could organize a symposium of this nature? >> i can address that if you would like me to.

why i asked the people i did to speak today -- i based my invitations on people who have done outstanding work. on theirt based ideology. it was not based on their position on the bomb. it was intentionally not a panel revisionists, one traditionalists, and one guy in the middle. that, been on panels like and they are extremely unproductive. they are extremely unpleasant or candy because all we do is trade quotations. i specifically wanted to avoid that. i got the best people i could. i think i succeeded. they are people from the broad and sprawling middle that i talk about. i think i disagree with these guys coordinate. i don't want to be nasty about agree on thenk we fundamental question that the

bomb was primarily used to end the war as quickly as possible, and within that, there is a lot of room for disagreement. that was my approach. >> my specific question is this. i'm sure you all know that after the bombing, the united states 29 with military .ersonnel, scientists the government wanted those experts to go to hiroshima and not a sake, make the assessment -- and nagasaki, make the assessment of the quality of destruction, and to write a report that to the government. you all know about the report said. perhaps many of the people in the audience don't know. what i understand is that the report from that team was, yes

indeed, japan was already beaten. therefore, the use of atomic .ombs was not needed this is public knowledge. today, i thought it was interesting. you didn't mention anything about the government's effort to make that assessment and what the report said and how you react to that. i thought it would have been useful for us to hear your comments on the government people. >> what you are referring to is called united streets strategic bombing survey, and the specific report were talking

the bombs were used. i'm in a skirt on explosives. -- an expert on explosives. [laughter] >> that was admiral leahy. >> thank you all. thank you to our panelists. thank you for your attention. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014] >> you are watching american history tv, all weekend, every weekend on c-span3. to join the conversation, like us on facebook.

likeness,unting likened by some to a sold apart in the body composition product of the women's titanic memorial association. over 1500 lives were lost when the titanic went to the bottom of the north atlantic after striking an iceberg on the night of april 14, 1912. half of the ship's female passengers perished, a number that would have been higher but for hundreds of men who yielded seats on lifeboats. titanicwhy the women's memorial is explicitly dedicated to the men of the titanic, over three fourths of whom never reached new york. figure thathigh towers over washington's channel part is itself the creation of a female sculptor and patron of the arts.

ironically, gertrude vanderbilt whitney is probably less remembered today as the founder of new york's whitney museum of art than she is for her leading role in the sensational 1934 child custody case involving her 10-year-old niece gloria. in a strange twist of fate, misses whitney lost her brother alfred and another tragedy at in mayn a german u-boat 1915 saint the passenger ship lusitania off the coast of ireland. 16 years later, helen taft whose husband had been president at the time of the titanic disaster officially unveiled the titanic memorial located in washington's rock creek park way. it is flanked by an elaborate stone bench attributed to henry dakin, the designer the lincoln memorial. in the mid-1960's, the memorial was moved from its original site to make way for the john f. kennedy center for the

performing arts. today, it stands close to the waterfront and southwest washington. >> next week, special primetime programming on the c-span networks. monday on c-span, from glasgow, debate over scottish independence. on tuesday, the issue spotlighting on irs targeting of conservative groups. wednesday night, the conservative of connecticut's magnet school on educating children from disadvantaged backgrounds. thursday, i house budget on public and private anti-poverty programs. friday night, native american history. an c-span2, book tv in prime time monday at 8:30 eastern, discussion about school choice. tuesday night at 8:00, writer john o'brien on his book "how the poor can save capitalism.

thursday night at 8:00, a tour of the headquarters of simon & schuster. on friday night at 8:00 p.m., "in-depth" with former congressman ron paul. when tonight, at the 25th anniversary of the fall of the berlin wall. thursday, a look at how americans attitudes about world war i change for the course of the war. on friday, a nasa documentary about the 1959 apollo 11 moon landing. find the television schedule one week in advance on www.c-span.org. join the c-span conversation, like us on facebook, follow us on twitter