where it's an identifying target for kamikazes and air and surface attacks and submarine attacks from japan. how effective -- go ahead. >> why didn't they have a naval component? >> distance. iwo jima is further away. ever since the battle, the japanese don't have much of an effective surface force. they are also suffering from the submarine blockade which has reduced their access to fuel oil. in fact, what is the rest of the japanese navy, the remnants of the japanese navy do at okinawa? more or less, how? the japanese have one asset left. anybody remember it? the battleship imato. one of two largest battleships ever constructed. they send it off with only enough fuel to make to it okinawa. it doesn't make it that far.

of course, allied american cover in particular is far too strong for it, but it's kind of their last gasp. the idea is they have to have the american fleet in a place where they know they can find it. they don't have enough fuel to sail around the ocean. even if american power weren't an issue. yes? >> also right here they launched 355 kamikazes. although we did some back and sink the "yamato" and escort ships as well. >> absolutely. the american navy suffers more deaths at okinawa than they did in their whole previous rest of the pacific war. now how does that play into the japanese strategy? got to cause the pain, right? that's the whole idea.

wear down the american will by causing casualties. okinawa is almost ideal from the japanese point of view. they cause horrific casualties to the american land forces, the length of the battle forces, american navy to stay off okinawan waters, especially the kamikazes. but okinawa does fall. and the japanese high command very quickly realizes what's most likely next on the agenda. the invasion of the home islands. so how do they prepare? for this possibility? >> the japanese are going to provide 1.7 million people estimated to defend the islands. along with whatever area enforcements they have left and pretty much bring everything back to the main land, and pretty much have an all-out fight.

hopefully to repel the americans, which really is kind of hopeless at this point. >> yeah. militarily, it's a challenge at best. what they're going to do is, try to bring home as many troops as they can. remember, throughout the majority of the asian pacific war, most japanese soldiers are in china, not on the islands defending against the americans. so they're doing their best, despite the american submarine and air blockade, to bring troops home from china. to defend the home islands. and as we talked about earlier during the q & a, they're going to arm the civilian population. or the official policy becomes known, the glorious death of 100 million. the idea that rather than surrender, the japanese are going to fight to the death, as a nation. and this is an illustration of japanese school girls look to be in the 10 to 12 range, maybe early teens at the latest.

training to resist the american invasion, using bamboo spears. and you'll note in the background, you'll see a lot of army leadership. this was an official program. this is sponsored by the government. this is required by the government. all right. is there a way out for japan at this point? as you've already pointed out, their chances of resisting the invasion to actually stop the invasion aren't good. so what are the possibilities for getting out of this thing? >> talk to the soviets? >> talk to the soviets. see if they can't get soviet mediation. now, the japanese do not understand at this point the agreements that have already been made between the american, british and soviet leaders. at a series of conferences that the soviet union is going to enter the pacific war. the japanese also severely underestimate stalin's interest

in regaining territory that the japanese took from russia during the russo-japanese war in 1904, 1905. their thinking is, well, maybe we can come to some kind of balance of power arrangement. if the soviets will prop us up now, they'll help us negotiate our way out of this war with the americans. then we can maybe help the soviets later on. at least that's what we're going to tell them. so the japanese do launch a major diplomatic effort to get the soviets to mediate the war. mediate an end to the war. so why doesn't this work out? [ inaudible ] >> the soviets see they have more to gain in terms of territory and geopolitical position through entering the war than they do from helping the japanese get out of it. >> obviously, we've already had pearl harbor occur. and the death toll through the

war thus far was i believe four times that of what it was in europe. from what the book said. so at this point, even if the soviets got involved, i believe that the american people wouldn't be satisfied with anything less than unofficial surrender from the japanese people. even if you were able to enter those points, these options here, i don't think it was something that could be stopped or mediated peacefully. >> yeah. what kind of terms are the americans willing to accept at this point? >> nothing -- >> unconditional surrender. the americans have been saying this all along. the americans have issued clarifications. essentially saying, when we say unconditional surrender, we don't mean we're going to enslave the japanese people. we're not going to -- there's not going to be mass executions or anything like that. what they're saying when they say unconditional surrender is, the japanese are not going to have a voice. the americans will decide what's to be done.

the americans plan to be merciful, but this is not going to be a negotiation between equals. this is going to be a relationship between victor and vanquished. what kind of terms were the japanese looking for when they tried to get soviet mediation and push for a negotiated surrender or some sort of negotiation? what are the japanese asking for in their communications to moscow? >> was it for hirohito to be -- [ inaudible ] >> yes. the personal survival of the emperor and his continuation in power is definitely one of the things on the japanese list. >> is it keep -- keep french in power? >> yeah. they're looking to keep some of the territory. probably not all of it. they understand that. they're looking to keep at least some of the territory they conquered, because, i mean, that was what the war was all about, right? the ability to control those resources they needed. so looking for some territorial

concessions. what else? how about war crimes trials? there will be war crimes trials, but the japanese will conduct them. so it will be the japanese sitting in judgment of other japanese, without the united states having a role. how about repatriation of japanese troops? the troops trapped on the islands, or still fighting in the philippines, still occupying china. how are they going to get home and what are they going to do when they get there? who is going to take them home? >> japanese. >> the japanese will. why would that be potentially important for the japanese? >> because they could be prepared? >> i'm sorry? >> they could just leave them there. >> they could leave them there. >> still control the empire. >> that's one possibility. let's say they go ahead and bring them home, as promised.

they negotiate a deal, they can bring their troops home. how are they going to come home? are they going to come home in defeat, hanging their heads? no. if the japanese bring their own troops home, they can essentially declare victory. their troops can come home with their arms intact, waving their flags. is this starting to sound like germany in 1918? >> yes. >> absolutely. and why is the united states not going to accept a japanese surrender that involves the japanese repatriating their own troops? >> they don't want a world war iii. >> exactly. >> they want the germans to know it's over. >> that's the only point of unconditional surrender. to make sure the defeated nation knows it. so there will be no stab in the back myth like hitler exploited in germany in his rise to power. with this idea that, well, we really would have won the war if it weren't for -- name your scapegoat. the americans definitely don't want the japanese pulling that number on them.

okay? so the soviets going to mediate? nah. soviets aren't going to mediate this one. and even if they did, were the japanese willing to offer anything the americans would accept? no. all right. so here we are coming also to the end of american strategy. what's american strategy been all along? >> is it the mainland? >> yeah, get to the mainland of japan. occupy japan, force an unconditional surrender, so that the japanese know they have been beaten and there won't be another war. we've talked about in the past the progressive brutality of american tactics. the hardening of the war, as time has gone on. in part a response just to the nature of war itself, and in part a response to the calculated atrocities carried out by the japanese. the japanese are trying to wear

down american will by -- through these atrocities, and it's actually backfiring. it's making the americans more determined to carry on to final victory. as you brought up during the q & a, the fire bombings. so if the united states is being so successful in bombing japanese cities and burning out japanese industry, is that going to be a war winner? >> no. >> why not? >> because it doesn't have -- it doesn't have a strategic effect. there are still japanese soldiers on the islands with inflicted casualties. so it's not like in germany, where we can have an offensive and achieve somewhat of an effect. but in japan, i mean, we're just bombing cities and civilians. we're not actually achieving a strategic effect. >> well, what's happened to japanese industry as a result of these fire bombings?

>> what's left is unsubstantial. >> yeah, japanese production has plummeted. it's in some ways becoming almost deindustrialized nation. but do you think it's going to make the japanese quit? >> no. >> no. no. even know the japanese are not producing war material at this point in anything like effective quantities, they still can stash away what they had, what they had already produced, and await the american invasion. we talked about the blockade. mainly carried out by submarine. also by aerial mines and surface ships and attack aircraft. how is that affecting japan? >> was it in -- between -- '41 to '42, their shipping was about 2.5 million tons -- 2.5 million tons, i believe in that timeframe. and by 1945, it was cut in half through our operational endeavors in the pacific ocean. that's obviously pretty

significant, especially in a country that doesn't have a lot of natural resources. >> yeah. i mean, that's what the war is all about, right? getting access to those resources. rubber, oil, food. and that's all pretty much cut off at this point. but is it making the japanese quit? no. and this gets us to the question you were asking, cadet ferry. about the continuation of the blockade, the continuation of bombardment being the way to go. some americans -- some american leaders did argue, yes, let's not invade japan. let's just keep up with the bombing raids, let's just keep up with the blockade, and eventually they've got to quit. what's the problem with that from the american point of view? >> don't know how long it's going to take. >> how long is this going to take? years. potentially. even with the invasion planned,

when was the first invasion of japan supposed to be, according to the timetable? >> summer of '46? >> that would be the second. spring of '46 would be the second. first was going to be november of '45. and not until spring of 1946 would the second invasion take place near tokyo. so even with the invasion, the americans are anticipating this war is going to go on at least until mid 1946. how long is it going to go on without an invasion? it's hard -- there's no telling. by american standards, japan is beaten. there's no point to this. but the japanese don't see it that way. as a result, the fire bombings will continue, even though the 20th air force is rapidly running out of japanese cities to burn. the blockade is going to it continue, but operation downfall, the invasion of japan, is on the books. it's going to happen.

at least on paper. at least on the plan. so what's it going to be like? >> brutal. 500,000 casualties, what they're predicting would be, out of the 1.2 -- i think 1.2, 1.3 million soldiers they estimate it will take to actually be successful in this operation. >> yeah, it's going to be the biggest amphibious invasion in history. it's going to dwarf the normandy invasion. it is going to be huge, and the casualties are going to be terrible. now, after the war, historians have gotten into a lot of debates over the exact casualty numbers. it's a little confused, because you have a lot of different agencies trying to estimate the casualties, and they're using different numbers. for instance, you have one group that's trying to estimate casualties in terms of replacements. so this is the number of replacement infantrymen, replacement artillery men. replacement machine gunners we're going to need.

so that's one set of casualty figures. another set of casualty figures is being set up by the medical personnel. okay? how many of this kind of hospital -- how many hospitals are we going to need, how many hospital ships are get we going to need. those types of things. those numbers are not quite contradictory, but they're different, they're all big. i think probably the most telling statistic out there has to do with procurement of metals. specifically purple hearts. the united states made so many purple heart medals, anticipating casualties in the invasion of japan, that we are still giving out that same stock of purple hearts today. any american who is wounded today in afghanistan receives a purple heart that was forged for a soldier who was going to invade japan.

it's going to be big, it's going to be bad. in addition, the united states fully expects that all of the allied p.o.w.s being held in japanese custody will be massacred. rather than allow them to be liberated. and the americans are right. the japanese high command had already issued orders that p.o.w.s were not allowed to be liberated. they were to be killed first. so is there a way out for the americans? well, one option is soviet intervention, right? and this is part of the reason the americans are negotiating so hard at yalta to get soviet intervention. because what happens if the soviets come into the war? >> you have one more person trying to negotiate terms. >> right. it's going to make things complex in terms of the negotiations. what's the price the soviets are going to demand? that's a tough question. but how about the positive? what's the positive to bring the soviets into the war?

>> it's a second front. >> where? very good. >> northern shores, mainland china, manchuria. >> yeah, manchuria and mainland china. because what did we say the japanese were doing to resist the invasion? shipping their troops home from manchuria, right? what happens if the soviets invade manchuria? >> they're going to send troops back. >> yeah, even if they may send troops back, but at the very least, they've got to stop sending reinforcements to the home islands, right? so open up another front. prevent the japanese from re-enforcing the home islands from the mainland. is that going to be enough to do in the japanese, though? >> no. >> people argue -- >> probably not. >> don't people argue, though, that maybe the japanese were more scared of the soviet invasion and maybe that's why they surrendered? >> yeah, that's -- and once

again, we're cut -- as i told you, dr. enteen used to tell me, history is not a science. you can't go back and rerun it and change the variables. what we see is here oshima, soviet invasion and nagasaki right on top of each other. it's a 1, 2, 3 combination punch that causes at least some portion of the japanese leadership to say, okay, it's time. as to what is the decisive blow, it's very difficult to decide which it is. and i tend to think really in terms of it's the sheer combination happening so rapidly on top of each other that really provides the psychological shock that let's the japanese leadership, at least some of the japanese leadership, change their thinking. but you raise a very good point. and there are some americans who say, hey, maybe soviet intervention. it's certainly worth a shot, right? negotiate and surrender. are the japanese offering anything that the united states can consider vaguely acceptable?

>> no. >> no. add to that the united states is reading japanese diplomatic traffic. we've broken the japanese diplomatic ciphers, so they know that japan is seeking mediation, but they also know its terms. and they know the terms are completely unacceptable. so there is not going to be a negotiated surrender. as a result, truman from potston issues essentially the final ultimatum. he's met with the british, he's met with the soviets. he's met with his military advisers. he knows the atomic bomb works. and so what does he tell the japanese at pottstown? >> horrible destruction is coming unless you surrender now. >> yeah. this is your last warning. prompt and utter destruction. prompt and utter destruction will be your fate if you don't surrender.

and he offers some explication of the terms. we're not going to enslave the japanese people. japan will be allowed to remain a country. will have access to resources. not control, but it will have access to resources to rebuild its economy. but we're going to try war criminals. we're going to occupy the country. iñ so this leads us to what we can call the nondecision to drop the atomic bomb. a lot of historians have burned a lot of ink trying to figure out when, where, who exactly yy' decided to drop the atomic bomb on japan, and it's really difficult to find, because in many ways, there was no decision. there was simply an assumption.ç what do i mean by that?

manhattan project, right? code word, covering the development of the atomic bomb. americans in cooperation with the british. the americans and british don't realize it, but the soviets are also getting cooperation through espionage, so they know what's going on, as well. but they produced the world's first effective atomic weapon tested in july of 1945. the second-most expensive arms program of world war ii. you remember what the first one was? talked about last time. >> b-29? >> the b-29, right. so the united states has spent -- the two most expensive weapon system in the war are here going to be united. having spent that much money, do you think there's a certain amount of institutional and bureaucratic inertia to put this

new combined weapons system into effect? of course. of course. why build the thing if you're not going to use it? is it going to win the war by itself? >> no one knows. >> no one knows. by american standards, the japanese have already taken this thing far too far. they have held out far too long. this is pointless, and it's fueling american rage. they see americans as dying for almost no purpose in a war that japan has already lost. is an atomic bomb going to be enough to wake up the japanese and get them to quit? some americans hope so. a lot of american leaders are doubtful. some of the scientists who create the bomb argue that maybe a demonstration is more appropriate. pick some uninhabited island, take a japanese -- a delegation of japanese leaders, have them sit in a boat offshore for a ways and we'll demonstrate the

atomic bomb to them. show them the destruction that it can cause. why doesn't the american leadership accept this proposal? >> because the japanese would never get on a boat and watch. >> first off, it's going to be a process, right? it's going to be a difficult process. you've got -- first off, you've got to start negotiating with the japanese to show them the demonstration. and there aren't any negotiations going on. so it's going to be a problem. >> they already announced the glorious death of 100 million. so i think at this point they're not too concerned about the -- you know, the civilian population. they're more concerned about living up to the emperor and dying a glorious death for the mainland, japan. >> yeah, absolutely. there's really been no indication from the japanese leadership that possible massive civilian deaths are going to cause japan to quit the war. they have already suffered massive civilian deaths, right? upwards of 80, perhaps 100,000 dead in tokyo in one night.

japanese didn't quit. so -- yes. >> you also have -- it's not a chief factor, but true american leadership see the writing on the wall between the soviet union and the united states. the ideological difference is obviously going to play a huge role. if the atomic bomb can -- has the potential to bring the japanese to surrender, then why not do it before the soviets invade? >> yeah. that's a factor. that's floating around in there. i always think of this as kind of staff meeting stuff. if you've ever been in a staff meeting, once everybody knows what the decision is going to be, now everybody sits back and thinks, okay, how can my particular agency benefit from this? and that's why i'm calling this a nondecision. everybody knows -- everybody who is in the know about the atomic bomb knows it's going to be used. so state department, those in the state department who know it's going to be used are

saying, okay, how is this going to affect our post war relations? they're starting to see how it affects their particular -- their particular bailiwick, diplomatic relations. and there are a lot of americans excited about having the atomic bomb in their pocket to use in tough negotiations with the soviets. so that's definitely a factor. but i am not convinced by the arguments of historians who say that it's the predominant factor. to my interpretation, the predominant factor is ending this war. any intimidation of the soviets that comes out of it, that's just gravy. certainly not to be turned down. but not the primary reason. so where are we going to target this thing? where are our american planners looking at? [ inaudible ] >> looking at military targets. in fact, hiroshima is actually the headquarters of the army that is slated to defend the

southern island kyushu. that's also a major port facility, a lot of military targets in it. >> also, the cities they chose were relatively untouched by the fire bombing, as well. >> absolutely. there weren't too many left in japan at this point. but the idea is, in some ways, it's a matter of informing the americans, how do you bomb damage assessment on to a target that's already half destroyed when you hit it? in this case, the americans want to know just how effective this new weapon is. and it also will hopefully enhance the shock value to the japanese. one city that was pretty much intact, one bomb, one destroyed city. most americans aren't confident this is a war winner by itself, but there is some hope, just maybe this will work. and if it doesn't, well, there's always the tactical use of atomic weapons.

those who were in the know about the atomic bomb began writing atomic bombs into the operation downfall plan. to use atomic bombs to destroy major military hard points and to help the american troops get ashore, and help the american troops get inland in japan. not a lot of deep understanding at this point about the long-term impacts of radiation. the best advice they had was, you know what, don't send any troops through any place where you drop an atomic bomb for about 48 hours. >> i saw a documentary after the war, they actually had characters and what not they were going to fire warhead shells out of -- miles across the battlefield at the enemy. but obviously no one thinks about -- at that time, no one thought about the implications that come from, you know, radiation and what not.

>> yeah, when we get into the 1950s, the american military is going to experiment when a whole variety of atomic weapons, atomic artillery shells, the atomic bazooka, the davy crockett, an atom bomb that can be launched from a jeep by two or three people. for a while, atomic weapons seemed like the wave of the future before the full realization sinks in. and part of what's going to cause the realization of the long term effects to sink in are indeed having used two of them at hiroshima and nagasaki, americans and people around the world can see the long-term effects. but in 1945, those are not well understood at all. not in the least. so this leads us to what we call the triple punch. hiroshima, the soviet invasion of manchuria and nagasaki. within three and a half days, japan has to absorb these major blows.

finally, there is enough of an impact on the japanese senior leadership to make a difference. it's not that there had been no one in japan who was contemplating getting out of the war by surrendering up until this point. certainly nobody did it publicly. but within high government circles, there are peace advocates, folks saying the war is lost, we need out of this. but they were outnumbered and outvoiced, outshouted in some cases, by the militarists who wanted to hold on. the idea of being one more battle. one more battle. if we can just inflict american casualties in one more big battle, then we can negotiate and really get something out of this war. but after hiroshima, after the invasion of manchuria and after nagasaki, the japanese high command finally allows the

emperor essentially to step in and override, make the final decision to surrender. there's a little bit of last-minute negotiating over the survival of the emperor personally, and his position within society. again, the americans and the japanese kind of talk past each other. they come up with language that's vague enough that both sides can interpret it to mean what they need it to mean. the japanese say the position of the emperor will not be prejudiced and the americans say, well, you know what, the japanese are going to get to choose their own form of government after the occupation, as long as it's respectful of all people and that sort of thing. and if they -- if they want to choose an emperor, that's okay. but in the meantime, the emperor will be subject to the supreme allied commander. and that's good enough for both sides to interpret it the way they need to, to reach the point of surrender. >> so i have a question. >> yes. >> between the first dropping of the bomb and the second one.

how much opposition existed within the british government and the united states government after seeing the destruction of the first bomb and hiroshima and how much opposition was there to dropping a second one? >> very little. none serious. part of it's the information lag. we're used to living in the information age, satellite reception, that sort of thing. information from hiroshima, which, remember, is a foreign country at war, is very slow to come out to the allies. part of the problem is the japanese don't realize what happened. the japanese understood atomic physics. they had their own atomic program. but it had not advanced very far, and the one thing the japanese had figured out about atomics, it's really difficult. and to fact of the point, they said we don't even really think some of their top scientists said we don't think a bomb is practical. so when one goes off hiroshima, first off, you've got to round up your experts, right? you've got to get them there.

they've got to figure out what happened. they've got to come back. they've got to issue a report, convince some skeptical people this is really what happened. and none of that information is getting back to the united states. so the united states, hearing no response to its ultimatum, continues with the plan. and it's another nondecision. it's simply following through with the plan as stated, we're just going to keep dropping atomic bombs as part of our preinvasion strategy. the invasion will take place as planned. up until the point where the japanese accept unconditional surrender. yes. >> do we underestimate how brutal the atomic bombs were going to be? >> yes, it was not well understood what they were going to do. in fact, i think our standard

way of expressing the explosive power of nuclear weapons is indicative of that. how do we describe atomic or nuclear weapons? how do we measure their blast? >> as related to, like, tnt? >> yeah. we call it kikilotons or megato. and that is equivalent -- a kilo ton is equivalent to a thousand tnt, a conventional explosive. so to try and get our minds around this new force in the universe, or this new force that humans have figured out not how to control, but at least how to tap, that's a big intellectual leap. and it's going to take time. >> i thought the 20 kilotons was one of them, right? was that a little -- was that the 20 tons -- kilotons? sorry? >> i don't want to go on record on that. >> somewhere in the book it said

that the -- that between the two bombs, it was equal to the -- all the conventional bombs dropped in europe, and obviously, that's pretty significant, you know, considering how much we actually did drop. even more significant is, you know, think about current day. we have 50, 60, 70, megaton, you know, warheads on our nuclear bombs. that's, you know, 1,500 times what nagasaki was. it's pretty significant when you think about it in that sense. the amount of destruction that could come from one of those bombs. >> absolutely. we're literally talking in mathematical terms about orders of magnitude. more destructive. but the chief terror of nuclear weapons is not just their blast, but also their long-term effects in terms of radiation. those things were so ill understood in 1945 that most people just thought of them as really, really big bombs and expressed them as such.

kilotons. thousands of tons. it's the same as 70 b-29 loads. trying to come up with some way to express this, to understand that people are falling back on their understanding of conventional explosives. good. very good. so we're good so far. all right. then let's go ahead and wrap it up. what do we come to? the japanese strategy of spiritual exhaustion, of inflicting such horrific casualties and such horrors on the americans that the americans will come to some sort of negotiated settlement that will be acceptable to japan. that failed. and, in fact, the horrors that the japanese deliberately perpetrated actually reinforced the american desire to fight on to unconditional victory or unconditional surrender and absolute victory. the american strategy of seeking absolute military victory ultimately was successful. the americans got what they wanted or needed out of this war.

they did achieve unconditional surrender. and i put a little asterisk on here, because there was that talking past each other negotiation about the status of the emperor. i think it's important to remember the reason the united states was willing to let that japanese sort of term slide was because the americans wanted to retain the emperor as a tool for the occupation. so in short, the japanese were forced to capitulate unconditionally, the americans set the terms which is what they were fighting for. there was a decision to use the atomic bomb. instead, this new weapon, and people didn't realize quite how new it was, simply became part of the overall american strategy. the search to force -- the desire, the need to force the japanese into unconditional surrender. it just becomes part of the deal. the demonstration plan is rejected. strategic use against cities with military value. but remember, the tactical

planning is in place to use them as part of the invasion that many americans still expect will be part of the ultimate downfall of japan. the implications of atomic weapons. how they have changed the world and how we recognize that now. that was a question that people in 1945 on all sides -- for them it was a question that would be answered in the future. okay. a lot of good books. i did manage to limit myself to three this time. a lot of good books to take a look at on this. i especially recommend chappell's "before the bomb: how america approached the end of the pacific war prior to knowing about the atomic bomb." the atomic bomb is a tightly held secret. right? a lot of people planning for the end of the war who know nothing about the atomic bomb. as you brought up, hasegawa is

probably the best argument the atomic bomb is really more about dialing with the soviet union than dealing with japan. i deeply respect his scholarship, even if i'm not convinced. and leon sigal's "fighting to the finish: the politics of war termination in the united states and japan." approaching this final outcome of the war. that concludes our discussion, our chronological discussion of world war ii. when we see each other again next week, we'll start delving into race and the war in the pacific. i bid you all a pleasant day. you are dismissed. each saturday evening at 8:00 and midnight eastern for classroom lectures from across the country on different topic said and eras of american history. lectures are also available as podcasts. visit our website,

c-span.org/history/podcasts or download them from itunes. tonight on american history tv, a focus on the cold war. beginning with a discussion about the lessons learned 25 years since the fall of the berlin wall. then a look at some of the human radiation experiments conducted by the defense department during the cold war. and scholars debate the foreign policies of then president george h.w. bush and the decisions that led to the end of the cold war. that's all tonight, beginning at 8:00 eastern, here on c-span3. next, authors and historians debate the military and moral questions surrounding the dropping of the atomic bombs. this event was co-hosted by the harry s. truman library and museum. it's about two and a half hours.

the first panel today is going to talk about truman's decision to use the atomic bomb. in 1999, a poll of journalists ranked the atomic bombing of japan as the top news story of the entire 20th century, beating out the landing on the moon, the attack on pearl harbor, the wright brothers first flight, and other very prominent stories and events that occurred in the last century. along with the importance of the story of the atomic bombings of japan has come over the past five decades or so enormous and often highly acrimonious controversy, both among scholars and among the general public. i think it's safe to say that the issue of the atomic bombings is arguably, and i would say, it's a strong argument, the issue of the atomic bombings of japan is the most contentious debate in all of american history. i don't think we're going to settle it today, but i hope we will advance our knowledge of

the subject, shed some light on some important issues, and perhaps lower the volume of ill will that all too often has been a prominent part of this controversy. controversy over truman's decision to use the atomic bomb arises from two fiercely competing interpretations of why the bomb was used. the fundamental question at the heart of the debate is was it use of the bomb necessary to force the japanese surrender and end the war as quickly as possible on terms that were acceptable to the united states and its allies? this is a basic question and from this basic question have arisen a whole host of other interesting and important questions. and on this basic question, there are two basic answers, two basic interpretations. the first is the traditional interpretations. that's the one that most of us, at least most of us of a certain age, grew up with. and that is the theory that

truman's decision to use the atomic bomb was absolutely necessary. the answer to the question is a rousing yes, it was necessary. it was necessary because truman faced a stark choice between on the one hand authorizing the use of the bomb and on the other hand, authorizing an invasion of the japanese mainland that was going to cost hundreds of thousands of american lives. so in this interpretation, truman made the only reasonable choice. he chose the least abhorrent option, and that was to use the atomic bomb as a means of avoiding an invasion of japan which was not only going to be enormously costly but also without the use of the bomb, was inevitable. this interpretation is contested by the so-called revisionist interpretation, and revisionists give the opposite answer to the question of was the bomb

necessary. their answer is absolutely not. the bomb was not necessary and it was not necessary because japan was defeated, japan was trying to surrender. in the revisionist interpretation, japan was trying to surrender on the sole condition that the emperor be allowed to stay on his throne and an unstated part of this interpretation is that the emperor would remain on his throne as a benign, kindly constitutional monarch. in this interpretation, the bomb was not necessary to defeat japan, and because it was not necessary to defeat japan and force a japanese surrender and end the war, the revisionists have come up with other ideas about why the bomb was used and different scholars have proposed different solutions for this -- for this question, but the one that is most common is it was used to impress and intimidate the soviet union and the emerging cold war. by the summer of 1945, tensions

were growing between the united states and the soviet union, and therefore, truman and his advisers elected to use a bomb not to defeat japan because japan was already trying to surrender, but to impress, intimidate the soviet union in the emerging cold war. it was used not for military reasons but for diplomatic political reasons. you can see that these two positions are diametrically opposed and these are the two polar views on this entire issue, and it's between the poles that this controversy has been fought out. there are still a few partisans at the poles who still continue to fight the same old battles and in fact often read the same quotations, but most scholars now have moved beyond, or perhaps i should say moved in between the two poles and found the answer to the question or whether or not the bomb was

necessary somewhere in a broad, sprawling, ill defined middle ground. there's still lots of room for disagreement, and there's lots of room for debate within the middle ground. and you might hear some of that today. but in terms of where we are with recent scholarship, the two polar positions are pretty much discredited. let me give you a couple of examples. the revisionist view has been discredited largely because we know now from japanese sources that have opened in the last 15 to 20 years nat japan had not decided to surrender. that the japanese government, japanese emperor had not decided to surrender after hiroshima, there's still a lot of debate about what happened after the bomb was used, but the fact remains, and i think it's clear, and i think you'll hear more about this today. japan had not decided to

surrender before hiroshima and this knocks out a major support for the revisionist interpretation. but the traditional interpretation, and i think it's safe to say that most scholars now agree that truman used the bomb primarily to end the war as quickly as possible, but the traditional interpretation is weakened by the fact that we know and we have known for a long time, there were other ways to end a war besides the bomb, and besides an invasion. and that an invasion even in the minds of people in the summer of 1945 was certainly not inevitable. i think we have reached a point where we can now conduct our arguments in a civil manner and with respect to the views of others. i say that cautiously because it seems like every time i make that statement at a conference or in print, we have a new eruption. i don't think we're going to

have any eruptions today, but i am certain that we will hear some elatests and the best scholarship we have today, and i hope you all will find it as enlightening as i have. our second panel today will also discuss complex issues of great importance. the origins of the nuclear arms race, the benefits and hazards of ionizing radiation, especially radio isotopes and the development of nuclear power. these issues have not received as much attention from scholars or the public as have the atomic bombings of japan, and i don't think that any of them were strong candidates to have been the top news story of the 20th century. but they are vital components of truman's atomic energy legacy, and this legacy perhaps even more directly than the use of atomic bombs extends down to the preside present day. there have also been topics of

much controversy and misunderstanding and once again in our second panel today, you'll hear from leading scholars in the field who have by any standard done grown groundbreaking outstanding work on these topics. i'm going to introduce our first speaker today. our first speaker today is richard b. frank. who is the author of "downfall, the fall of the imperial japanese empire" published in 1999, and 15 years later, a standard among the many, many books on the end of the war in the pacific. he is also the author of other books on world war ii. he's not trained as a historian. he's trained as a lawyer. he's a graduate of georgetown law school and he worked for many years as an administrative judge in the federal government. although not trained as a

historian, richard frank demonstrates his skills as a historian in everything that he has written and it's a great pleasure to have him here today with us. here today with us. i want to thank this institution for the opportunity to speak on bam of harry s. truman. it's my job to provide a summary of where we were, and to do that, we have to go back to 1943, when president franklin radios very well articulated the american allied aim. now.. when that policy was first

articulated, in the policymaking process that extended from basically that movement to 1945 that resulted in the plans for the occupation, unconditional surrender became the fundamental foundation, because it gave the u.s. and its allies authority to do things in the occupation reforms in both germany and japan that it would not have been able to do under the normal international law, so my first message is it was not a dispensable aspect. it is fundamental to what eventually transpired as a free, democratic and peaceful japan. they were responsible for coming up with a military strategy that would implement and secure unconditional surrender form we

now now they achieved nothing moor than ahn -- think questioned over a political issue, and that was what was the factor that they believed would be most likely to undermine the will of the american people to see the war through to unconditional -- the fleet had studied with japan for zephyr decades. one result was they were absolutely convinced that invading the home islands was a march of folly that american casualties would be totally unsustainable. the terrain would negate -- and therefore the navy had derived a nothing that the only correct strategy to bring a war with japan to a close was one of blockade and bombardment. here i must point out when the navy talked about blockade in the context of world war ii, it was to follow on the policy

first employed by the british in world war i. that was a blockade of food supplies. it was and i said to threaten or actually kill millions of japanese from starvation. that's what blockade was really all about. the army under general george c. marshall believed the critical issue was time on the army therefore advocated an invasion of the home islands as the speediest way to bring the war to a conclusion. those two conflicting visions which were fought over very intensely in 1945 resulted in an agreement in april/may of 1945 that resulted in orders that effectively continued the campaign of blockade and bombardment until november at this point a two-phase initial invasion of the home islands would take place. the first phase, called "operation olympic" included sfa seizing key youru to support a

second face tentatively set for march of '46, which was intended to land in the tokyo/yokahama area. what we know now is that admiral king made it clear in a written memorandum that he was not agrees to actually invade japan. he only agreed that they had to issue an order to have that option available come november. and he said, we will come back and visit the question of whether we need to invade japan in august or september of this year. it was greeted with resolution. they had a firm gram of how deteriorated the military situation was. however, they ultimately believed that american morale was brittle and could be broken. that they would confront and either defeat or inflict such

enormous casualties on the first american invasion of the home oolds, that the u.s. would negotiate a settlement they would find satisfactory to end the war form they correctly identified southern key kyushu. they moved to reorganize and conserve thafr air forces to accumulate over 10,000 aircraft, about half of which intended to be for the kamikaze mission to support this climactic armageddon battle in southern kyushu. the jaap need government and armed forces also moved decisively to obliterate distinctions in japan. through a series of national laws, they not only mobilized a large uniformed armed force, but also declared that every japanese male age 15 to 60.

every japanese female age 17 to 40 was a combatant, a prototype of that program was in okinawa with horrendous effects on okinawan civilians. on both size in tokyo and washington there were important meetings. he only authorized "olympic" the november '45 operation. he did not authorize and empirial conversation, which is to say -- at this conference. which was essential a kabuki affair, because the emperor does not participate in such matters.

we have aspects was this. when i wrote downfall, when i was reading those papers, i realized what they were really says is even if it worked exactly as planned, this horrendous battle in kyushu, meanwhile, there's an air and sea blockade going on, enorms on casualing. they realized their food situation, as they got to the latter hat was goinging to catastrophic. a large niche better of japanese would be dies from starve ace in 1946. agreed dre recently published a wonderful booked called "japan's imperial army" he pointed out that the soldiers clearly understood what the papers said.

maybe in the q&a we can get into what actually happens during the occupation. in the summer of 1945, particularly in july and august, american radio intelligence detected this enormous japanese buildup. the next rupt was a royaling controversy. marshall send a message for general mcarthur, asking him whether he thought the invasion of japan was still a viable operation. mcarthur replied he basically didn't believe the ask him for his views. at the moment king did this, this is following on with his memo in april, this is now august of '45, right?

we're going to review the situation, king always knew this nimitz had informed him that nimitz could no longer support a -- after the experience of the okinawa campaign. we knew there would be a major, major conflict over an invasion of japan. in terms of how it would been planned and ordered up to that point. marshall was looking into using to support the invasion in other to keep that option open. meanwhile, in japan, and continuing on, there was some stirrings on the dippic front. there were a number of japanese military and naval officers in europe as well as diplomats who became what i call peace entrepreneurs. they advanced to various american and allied officials knows about negotiating the end of the war. the problem was not a single one

had authority from japan to do this. the only legitimate effort made to secure any type of diplomatic effort by the japanese government was conducted through the japanese ambassador a fellow named sato. you have to understand at this point, back in 1954, only -- and an inner cabinet called the big six. in which that legal government of japan ever sat down and worked out what they would accept to end the war. the only occasion on which they had a made to -- when the war minister said the only basis which he would discuss the end of the war was that japan had not lost.

es the cables back and forth read to a lawyer like a crocks of feckless japanese diplomat is not. if thises a serious effort to end the war, japan must define some terms. he comes backs to that several times, terms, terms, terms. he can't get an answer from sato, because the big six had no agreed to terms. finally he sends a message to tokyo, about you 17th of july in which he says, look, the best you can possibly hope for at this point now is unconditional surrender modified only to the extent that the imperial institution will be maintained. they're in black and white is a

revisionist argument, that if only we had agreed to that constituent of terms, that japan would have surrendered out of sato's capable. what's the responsible fromming too, it's not no, but hell no. basically reading those capabilities, as american leaders did, they knew basically that in july 1945, even an offer to preserve the imperial institution was not going to secure the surrender of japan. when the bomb is drop on hi rosh man, there's a cup 8 points. no jaap neat go. had surrendered, which by their calculation was 2,600 years. the second thing is an atomic bomb was totally unprecedented in human history. you have to understand the government was highly dysfunctional based upon consensus and very difficult to reach an agreement. when the first news that something horrendous is

happening, it reaches her rosh mo, it reaches tokyo, the japanese army responds that they have -- we're not going to agree until there's an investigation. the navy far more ominously says even if it is an atomic bomb, they can't have that many, they're not that powerful and maybe they'll be dissuaded from using them. the reason they take that stance is bomb japan's own atomic program, did give them insight into how difficult it was to make. on the morning of august 8th, the soviet union intervenes in manchuria. the big six has its first formal meeting to discuss how to end the war, and they split tloo -- only advance the condition of returning the imperial institution, but three others want three out conditioning, include japan will try its own

war criminals, will disarm itself and above all, no occupation of japan. the emperor intervenes that evening and ostensibly orders that they accept the one term, except when japan sends its message to the u.s. saying it will accept the potsdam, the language providing it does not -- this is what they call magic language. what the japanese term is asking for is not preservation of a constitutional monarch, it is asking for the allies to agree as a condition press dent to japanese surrender that they agree the emperor will be supreme not only the japanese government, but also over the occupation authorities. again, no occupation reforms. the emperor has a veto. this is rejected by the u.s. in point of fact there never is a guarantee that the u.s. will

guarantee retention of the imperial institution. there is reaffirmation repeatedly of the potsdam declaration, which is if it's the will of the japanese people to continue in an imperial institution, it will continue. there's other things we can talk about. the areas in which the u.s. and japanese leadership either say things clearly or did not. one thing i want to impression upon you is this. this was a totally horrendous event from 1937 to 1945. by my best estimate, something on the order of 25 million human beings died, about 6 million combatants, about 2 million japanese. that means the other 19 million were noncombatants.

if you round it and call it a million that means for every noncombatant who died, but 18 others died. about 12 of them were chinese. we heard very movingingly and very appropriately last night from two survivors of the atomic bombings. i believe it's extraordinarily important that we always keep in mind the horrendous nature of those weapons that hangs over us to this day. but to me you have to understand just how utterly godawful the war was, how utter will you awful the daily toll was. over 5,000 chinese were dying every single day the war continued. it's been estimated a quarter million people were dying every month, mostly asian noncombatants. this is the context in which all of this takes place. this is the context in which we can now sit back and make judgments.

thank you. our second speaker is the author of the most controversial decision, truman, the atomic bombs and the defeat of japan. the author of two other prize-winning books on the truman era. bill is a native of australia. he received a p hmm d in history from the university of notre dame. he returned to australia for at least a couple years and worked in the office of the prime minister, and then he came back and joined the faculty of the history department at notre dame. even while doing this, he earned a master's of divinity degree at notre dame, and he is an ordained priest.

so we are very pleased to have bill miscampbell with us this morning. >> i'm very glad to participate in this conference. i thank dr. walker, our conference convener, and mr. bob walls, who has done such a splendid job organizing this event. let me also say i am have glad to join mice fellow panelists, such important scholars, from whom i have learned so much over the years. of course, let me also thank all of you for coming, and making an effort to understand some of these crucial areas of harry truman's presidency. let me clarify for you that i come to the issue of the use of the atomic bombs from the

perspective of a diplomatic and political historian, as sam mentioned. i wrote a book on george canon and his contribution to the making of u.s. foreign policy. my first sort of exploration of the truman administration foreign policy, looking at the marshall plan and nato. then in 2007, i published a book that explored the impact on american foreign policy more broadly understood of the transition from franklin roosevelt to harry truman. and that book explored truman's policymaking in his initial years in office, and it led me to consider his diplomacy as world war ii entered into what we now know was its final phase. so i want to first speak from a diplomatic historian's perspective, to clarify truman's initial approaches on foreign

policy in a broad sense during 1945. then i will try and examine something of truman's motives for authorizing the use of the atomic bombs, and finally some conclusions on the morality of the use of these terrible weapons, an issue which i have tried to give some considered thought. friends, please appreciate that when truman came to office in april of 1945, he had neither the interest nor the desire to alter franklin roosevelt's policies. he sincerely wanted to implement the plans of his revered predecessor, and to assure continuity in foreign policy. crucially, truman hoped to continue cooperative relations

with the wartime allies, especially the other members of the big three -- the soviet union and great britain -- secure their cooperation in securing final victory over hitler and the nazis, and then over the japanese mill tarrists. and secure their cooperation furthermore in building a peaceful post war world. please keep that in mind. my study from roosevelt to truman, which dr. walker mentioned briefly, clarifies that the broad sweep of american foreign policy, from april '45 to the potsdam conference in july of 1945 consisted of an effort to maintain cooperative relations with the soviet union. there were bumps along the road, but i'm suggesting the broad sweep is one of maintaining cooperation. truman aimed to be evenhanded in

his dealings with winston churchill's britain and josef stalin's soviet union. he worked to avoid any hinge of anglo-american collusion against -- even the appointment of james f. burns as secretary of state did not aller this fundamental course. burns favored the diplomatic practical of bargaining and negotiation. with the sovietss by reaches settlements of the issue they faced. he accepted a sphere of influence peace which largely --

and harry truman endorsed this approach. they hoped this would secure a workable and stable post-war settlement. burns assurededly hoped that the poets of the atomic bomb may add to weight in his future this the post-potsdam period, but let me be very clear. truman authorized the actual use of the bomb to defeat the japanese. it was not a part of some anti-soviet strategy. truman had gone to potsdam intent on gaining soviet participation in the war against japan, and he wanted that participati participation.

it's very important to appreciate this point, because fanniful notions of so-called atomic diplomacy pushed by those who have followed him on the revisionist side that dr. walker mentioned in his introduction, that notion has to be put aside. what i think is striking about america's sole possession of the atomic bomb is how little u.s. officials sought to use it for diplomatic ends and purposes in those initial stages. let me move then and make in fairly brief statements about truman's motives. these are the arguments that i concluded from my book, the most controversial decision. this book, i should add, the

title has certain irony to it. the decision was not controversial for truman at the time. it's subsequently that the controversy emerged. truman authorized the use of the atomic bombs to force japan to surrender, with the deep hope of saving american lives. he was primarily concerned, of course, with american lives. this is what moved him and the american military effort. . it must be said, as richard frank and his wonderful work has clarified, that the atomic bombs contributed to forcing japan's eventual surrender and in bringing the brutal war in the pacific to an end.

prior to what would have been an enormously costly invasion of the japanese home islands. furthermore, while the atomic bomb was never entirely separated from considerations of post-war international politics, especially in the mind of henry dimson. the decision was not driven by those concerns. the atomic bombs were used primarily for a military purpose. now, truman and his associates did not seek alternatives to use the atomic bombs. they accepted it as a weapon of war, and proceeded to use it. they saw it as a legitimate weapon. but we can say this, and we can have more discussion i'm sure of this matter in our question

period. viable options that might have proved successful, alternate courses, can't be identified with any certainty, even in retrospect and when far removed from the pressures truman was under in 1945. of course is the united states could have eventually defeated japan. a choking blockade perhaps starving mill yonts into submission, a very damaging invasion. but even that has some questions about it. there was not an easily available and appropriate option that would have met the serious political and moral objections

of the many later critics of truman's decision. those who from our safe distance now almost 70 years, who offer all kinds of alternate scenarios to end the war i think engage sometimes in wishful thinking. that cannot be supported by the historical facts. as you know, of course, there has been enormous criticism, as dr. walker made clear in his introduction of the american use of the atomic bomb. but i want to ask you to consider a few points in the remaining time i have, that might complication the rush to judge the action that truman took. those who condemn truman's

decision to use the atomic bombs surely should hesitate a little so as to appreciate that had he not authorizeded attacks on hiroshima and nagasaki, thousands of american and allied soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen, would have been added to the lists of those killed in world war ii. this would have included not only those involved in the planned invasions of the home islands, but also american, british, let me add australian ground forces in southeast asia, who expected to engage the japanese in bloody fighting in the months preceding such assaults. some folks with limited knowledge of world war ii ignore the reality that there was ugly fighting proceeding throughout much of asia. during those months leading up

to the use of the bombs. added to their number would have been the thousands of allied prisoners of war whom the japanese planned to execute. to complication further the rush to judgment, one must acknowledge that truman was most likely very correct in march of 1958, when he told sukasa, the chairman of the hiroshima city council that the a-bombs had prevented the loss of japanese deaths in an invasion. hard as it may be to accept when one sees the visual record of the awful destruction, when one hears the testimony of survivors, japanese losses probably would have been substantially greater without the atomic bombs. furthermore, the atomic attacks

changed the whole dynamic of the occupation of japan. ironically they facilitated a quick and easy surrender and a broadly cooperative pop you las in a way no other method of military victory would have garen tee. moreover, the awful weapons abruptly ended the death and suffering of innocent third parties throughout asia, a point that professor frank addressed at the end of his remarks. rather surprisingly the enormous wartime losses of the chinese, the koreans, the filipinos, the vietnamese, the jahvid aniejavae at the hands of the japanese, take -- to -- the losses in her rosh man and knack saki

assurededly were horrific, but think pale in significant when compared to the estimates of deaths attributed to the japanese during the ramp an from manchuria to new guinea. it was accurately described asia under the japanese as a channel house of atrocities. during the months of war following the attack on pearl harbor, reliable estimates established that between 200 to 300,000 persons died each month. each month, either directly or indirectly at japanese hands. furthermore, robert newman tellingingly reveals that, quote, the last months were in many ways the worst, starvation and disease, aggravated the usual beatings, beheadings, and battle deaths. it is plausible to hold that

upwards of 250,000 people, mostly asians, but some westerners, would have died each month at the japanese empire struggled in its death throes beyond july of 1945. so i put to you that the atomic bombs shortened the war, aaverted the need for a land invasion, saved countless more lives on both sides of the ghastly conflict and the cost, and brought an end to the japanese brutalization of the conquered peoples of asia. does that make their use moral? truman himself had doubts in retrospect. truman's firm conviction that he had done the necessary thing, dropping the bombs, ending the war, saving numerous lives in

the process -- did not stave off his over serious moral qualms about the action. just on the day after the bombing of nagasaki, he told his cabinet of his order that no more atomic bombs be dropped. in words that reveal his personal anguish and his growing recognition that hiroshima and nagasaki were much more than the military targets he had authorized the bombs be used against, he explained that the thought of wiping out another 100,000 people is horrible. his then secretary of commerce, henry wallace recorded in his diary, he, truman, didn't like the idea of killing, as he said, all those kids. truman's experience in august of 1945 deeply colored his whole

attitude to nuclear weapons. he never again spoke of them as military weapons to which the united states could make easy resort, and he indicated some retreat from his pre-hiroshima view that the a-bomb was just another military weapon. in looking at moral responsibility, i want to put to you that we must look beyond harry truman. those who accuse truman might refrain from putting him in some singular dock of history until they carefully consider the responsibility of the japanese leadership for the fate of their own people. post-war japanese leaders effectively played up their victim role.

so as to induce a certain guilt among americans about the wars ending. this helped disguise the important reality, explained by the historian herbert biggs, that it was not so much the allied policy of unconditional surrender that prolonged the pacific war, as it was the unrealistic and incompetent actions of japan's highest leaders. blinded by their preoccupation with the fate of the imperial house, those leaders let pass every opportunity to end the war until it was too late. in moral terms, surely the japanese leadership had a responsibility to surrender at least by june of 1945, when there existed no reasonable prospect of success, and when

their civilian population suffered so greatly. instead, the neosamurai who led the japanese military geared up with true bonsai spirit to engage the whole population in a kind of national kamikaze campaign. their perfidy, in perpetrating and prolonging the war, should not be ignored. friends, i want to put to you that harry truman was a good and decent man who tried to live by a moral code, grounded in his christian views, a moral code grounded in the tin commandants anded sermon on the mount. truman later stated honestly, i abhor war and am opposed to any kind of killing, whether by

atomic bomb or bow and arrow. truman was, however, also a person who knew that decisions in the sometimes confusing fog of war place policymakers in circumstances whether they sometimes have neither a clear nor easy moral option open to them. perhaps truman had himself and the atomic bomb decision retrospecttively in mind when he wrote 15 years after their use, in a discourse on decision making that, quote, sometimes you have a choice of evils, in which case you take the course that is likely to bring the least harm. from the perspective of today, truman's use of the bomb, viewed

within the context of this long and horrific war should be seen, i believe, as his choosing the lesser of the evils available to him. admittedly, he did not weigh carefully the options in some moral calculus at the time and proceed forward with that -- he believed this was a weapon that could end the war, but fair-minded observers will see that he did in fact choose the least damaging of the awful options open to him. that the decision s. no explanation can change that fact, and i do not want to gloss

over it, said still son, but this deliberate premedicated discussion was the least abhorrent choice. abhorrent for sure, but it must be understood the least abhorrent as well so as to bring the bloodshed to an end. he did not turn his back on some feasible moral course of action that would have secured a japanese surrender. even a decision not to act would have undoubt think incurred terrible consequences. such an action would carry some burden of responsibility for the prolongation of the killing of innocents throughout asia in the

channel house of the japanese empire. would it really have been more moral to stand aside? so as to maintain one's supposed moral purity while a vast slaughter occurred at the rate of over 200,000 deaths a month? chet innocent lives to save? could trouping have rested at people by prolonging the japanese domination of asia? i hope for less condemnation of truman's decision, at least until the critics can specify a more obviously moral and yet

still feasible course of action to end the war perhaps there may be empty think for the man who felt required to make the decision and carried the burden of it. harry truman of independence, missouri, was hardly some moral monster who now needs to be placed retrospecttively on trial for war crimes. those who criticize his decisions would do well, i think, to place themselves in his shoes and ask what they might have done in his circumstance. honest observers who refrained from il-founded criticisms will acknowledge that the atomic bombs were used primarily for a military purpose, so as to force japan's surrender, and that they proved effective in inflicting defeat on the japanese.

truman and his associates did not seek alternatives to using the atomic bombs, but viable options that might have proved successful cannot be identified with any certainty, as i have said. sadly there was not -- there was not an easily available and appropriate option that would have met the moral objections of the many critics of truman's decision. therein lies the tragic dimension of the decision to use the atomic bombs. thank you so much. our third speaker in this page is robert starndish norris,

the book came out to rave reviews. he's also the author of several other books on nuclear weapons. he earned a ph.d. in political science from new york university, and he has applied his expertise on a nuclear weapons in jobs he's weld, and now with the federation of american scientists, and i'm very glad to introduce stan norris. the book was originally 12002.

i say the -- needs fundamental reexamination. so i won't be concerned with the issues -- some of the issues that have been raised here, having to do with whether it was necessary, whether it was moral or the first shot of is the cold war. rather, i would like to focus on whether there was any decision at all. and concerns the timing of the bombing and the role of general leslie groves, knolls surprisingly since i wrote a whole book about him and his role in when you follow the

actions of general groves, i came to this realization that it was not -- there was no really any decision by president truman to authorize the use of the bomb. he acquiesced in the decision of others he went with the momentum of events that culminated in the bombs ease use, and only in retrospect in interviews and in his memoir did he put himself more decisively direct in the use of the bomb in july and august of 1945 more involvement than was actually the case. when you begin to look for the documents that truman authorized the use of the bomb, you can't find one. of the 70-some doubts that are in the truman line braer and

website, entitled the decision to drop the atomic bomb, not one contains any language by truman authorizing the use of the bomb before august 6th. an odd omission in -- under that title. of course, truman was not totally ignorant of the bomb. when he became president august 12th upon fdr's death, and he was told soon after by secretary of war stillson and general groves, the details of the bomb. and according to general groves, the only decision that truman really made about the bomb was not to interfere with ongoing plans. the momentum of the project was extraordinary at that point. all engineered by general groves, i think, i try and show,

and when there was enough material, both highly enriched uranium and plutonium. when there was enough available, the bombs would be used, period. there's no doubt about that. in an amazing coincidence that i still find amazing, at the end of july, there was enough material for the two types of bombs that were to be used. enough highly enriched uranium for little boy bombs, which was use on hiroshima, and enough plutonium for a test bomb that was already used in the middle of july, but another amount was available at the end of july that would be used in the fat man bomb on nagasaki. it didn't have to turn out this way at all. it was only because of general groves' efforts to speed up the production of these two kinds of

material that the availability the material was ready at that time. and was used. so my argument is that truman really didn't authorize the use of the bomb. he went with the decisions that had been made long, long, long before. going as star back as the authorization by president roosevelt to initiate the program. i mean, why would you build a weapon of war if it was not intended to be used at some point. it was given over to general groves who -- whose bosses were stillson and marshall, and another adviser, and with this complex of people here, it was full speed ahead. i call my book "racing for the

bomb." speed was of the essence, every day counted. the intent, as i agree with my fellow panelists, was to end the war as soon as possible, and the pacific war as soon as possible. another question is what if the war had nod been over in europe? would the bomb have been used in europe? the war was over on may 8th. that was too soon for the embalms being ready. the question was never focused on whether it would have been used in europe. so truman was in an odd place when he inherited the presidency, and as -- as bill mentioned here, he went with the continuity of things that had already been put in place. the continuity being that stimson and marshall, two people

that truman had the utmost railroads for, better to go along with what was already in place than make the contrary decision. so as general groves says, truman's decision was not so much as as to say yes, as to say no. it would have taken an enormous effort to say no, we're not going to use the bomb, we'll go an alternate route. with the people surrounding him and the plans already in place and the momentum under way, it was just not in the cards that truman would do anything else than go along with what had already been put in place. so as woodward and bernstein said, follow the money, it was always my research effort to follow the bomb. when you look at how the

material was made, you focus in on the timing of when the bomb was used. as i said before, when there was enough at the end of july, for the two types of bombs, they were going to be used. if it had been done a month before or two months before, it would have been used then. so it's just a matter of when there was enough material of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, that the bombs were ready and were used within days afterwards. if you follow the path from hanford washington, or from oak ridge tennessee where the highly enriched uranium was made, as it made its way to loss alamos, where it was fabricated into the pieces that were needed and transported to continuian island, the forward base from which the bomb eers left, you s they are racing for the bomb.

there's not a minute lost, and whereas i argue that truman did not authorize officially -- there's no piece of paper that says i, harry truman, authorize the use of the atomic bomb. when the bomb went off. he was in the middle of the atlantic ocean. i don't criticize him for this. what i do criticize him for is taking some liberties with the historical facts afterwards and interjecting himself into this process and taking more credit than is historically accurate. what he did do was interject himself into stopping the use of the bomb. as was mentioned before, once some peace feelers began to be heard from japan after the

nagasaki bomb, truman better jected himself and said no more, and general marshall told general groves no more bombs are to be taken to tinnian. except upon authorization from president truman. later the term pre-delegation became known as this process. the real order came from general handy, while marshall was in potsdam. and he authorized the 509th composite group to use bombs as made ready. as made ready. and general groves, being a good army officer would supply bomb number three, bomb number four,

bomb number five, if needed. so there was an assembly line in process in which more bombs beyond the nagasaki bomb would have been used. but truman interjected himself and stopped that assembly line, stopped that pre-delegation, which had been granted in an order which i don't think he ever saw. i mean, i don't know. he did interject himself into stopping the use of the bomb, and with good reason, because there were feelers out to have the japanese unconditionally surrender.

every one of these days is crucial to the way things turned out. counter-factual history is sometimes a dangerous occupation, but sometimes it's useful. and it is, i think in this case useful to consider what would have happened had the bomb not been used in the early days of august, august 6th and august 9th. it was mentioned that on august 8th, the soviet union entered the war. this has become, according to one scholar's argument an action that had more impact on the japanese than the dropping of the atomic bomb and ending the war. i don't buy it, but anyway, the japanese had to consider august 6th hiroshima, august 8th, the soviets entered the war, august

9th knack saki, i mean, what's going on here? and they did something about it and they surrendered. but had it gone on, the solve jets had already begun basically an invasion of japan, and had the war gone on another few weeks or another month or two, the whole post-war period would have looked entirely different with japan. japan would have had soviet occupation, and we would have had a situation much like germany. and, you know, that didn't happen. so i recommend to you a very good article by a fellow named david glens, who is a specialist in soviet -- about the invasion of the japan and it's mentioned in my paper.

so what i have argued then is that president truman was not as involved in the decision to use the bomb as the subsequent literature has alleged. and this neglect was not entirely his fault, and he should not be blamed. if president roosevelt had lived a few months longer, may, june, july, august, i don't think anything would have been different. the bombs were ready when they were ready and would have been used, and we would be looking at president roosevelt's role in the bomb. so why don't i stop there, and if you have any questions in the period that follows. thank you.

we're running ahead of time, and thank you for the brevity. i asked them one was not to read the papers, because we've all had bad experiences, and they didn't do that. and they stayed right on schedule. we have lots of time for questions. the format is there are two mikes at the front. if you have questions, please line up. i will call on you. please identify yourself and as much as possible direct your question toward one of the panelists. >> my name is linda chapman, thank you so much, very instructive. i would say all history is revisionist. maybe to make a pejorative of one side or another is a pejorative. anyway, that's just my comment. actually i would like to go back and say that dropping the bomb

was an imperative, and that it had to be done. can we talk about strategy? anybody who knows, i'm no expert in this. why targets? why not the military target as you suggested. there's a huge build-up of -- of the japanese military there. why wasn't that the target of the bomb? . and maybe the second question is, why did we have to drop two? i mean, if it were about, really, ending the war and not just making a test of these two bombs that were developed? thank you. >> i guess this is aimed at me. again, it was general grove who was in charge of establishing what was called the target committee. this was done in april. the first time they met was april 27th. groves, a master bureaucrat. he says i have nothing against

committee as long as i get to choose the members. so -- so he chose the members. and they were a collection of military people and scientists. and the army air forces and so on and so forth. and they decided that they would spare any city that hadn't already been bombed. they wanted, really, a fresh look at an unbombed city to show the power of the bomb. i mean, that was the intent of why some of these targets were chosen. groves was obsessed with trying to get kyoto on the target list. and stimson knew its historic and cultural import to the japanese and vetoed him again and again and again.

groves was obsessed with trying to get kyoto on, but it didn't happen. and thus, the target list became hiroshima, nagasaki and nagata. i think those were the four. on the end -- at the end of the target committee's deliberations. i think, you know, they didn't know whether this was going to work, or not. they were sure about the little boy bomb. you take two pieces of uranium, boom, you fire one into the other, it's going to blow up. plus, it's going to take too long if we don't have a test bomb. and we won't have another one for a long, long many months later. but this plutonium bomb, this is a new animal here. we better test that first. so on july 16th, it was tested in the new mexico desert. it worked.

and full speed ahead towards getting enough plutonium to all the rest and have the 509th composite group ready to deliver it and, of course, the first combat aircraft. and in a perfect mission that went according to plan, it dropped a bomb on hiroshima exactly when said it would. and returned safely. there was much more difficulty in the second mission against nagasaki and go into those details about fuel lines and i almost ran out of gas. and there was covered -- it was covered in clouds and they wanted a visual target on to nagasaki, so on, so forth. and so that almost aborted, but it didn't.

i think the element of shock, we have to shock the japanese into taking that final step. general groves makes a distinction between defeat and certifica surrender, they're not the same thing. the revisionists have constantly said japanese was defeated. of course they were defeated. probably defeated at midway, although they didn't know it. but how do you get them to surrender? surrender on your terms? and that took a long process and, eventually, i think it was the atomic bomb that convinced the emperor to intervene and say enough, it's over. so -- >> we just had a further point to support professor norris. the decision to use as professor

norris made clear in his paper was the one decision. in retrospect, i can understand how we from our vantage point, why didn't they give them more time after hiroshima, see if that would make a decision. but it was essentially driven by general groves, the one decision made to authorize the use of the weapons that had to use. both cities were military industrial targets. they were not simply filled with civilians and targeted because of that. hiroshima was the headquarters of the japanese army responsible for the defense of the southern part of japan. and it was a supply and logistics base for the military communication center, nagasaki,

of course, very important port. wide ranging industrial activity. the complicated dynamic of how japan fought the war and who was a civilian and who was a combatant, et cetera, made targeting something that already devolved into an area where civilian targets were on the list. it's under fdr that the tokyo fire bombing occurs, of course. and the war had devolved into a level of what we can look back and see as almost barbaric targeting of populations who, i should add, had been warned to evacuate these cities. but this is where the tragic dimension, in my view, enters in. >> let me say, i think what you

have to understand in looking at the design of the use of the atomic bombs, you have to understand the most important thing was the purpose. the purpose was articulated a number of times, the idea that it would take some tremendous shock to get the leadership of japan to actually capitulate. the targeting was really a separate issue. question on whether you should target a military unit on key issue, the question of which was going to more impress leadership in tokyo. also, the atomic bomb is -- they then existed, which we cannot forget are much, much, much smaller than anything that came after. not nearly the things we looked under the cloud of for some 70 years. general groves and others also saw the use of the bombs against cities as essentially a bluff.

it was a bluff to prove that we had not merely one bomb but that we had an arsenal of bombs. and what this ultimately would lead japanese decision makers to realize was as premier would say, if they have weapons in quantity, they will not come and invade japan. and if they do not invade japan, japan's military leaders had no strategy short of national suicide. the use of the one bomb followed three days later by the other bomb was fortuitous in a lot of respects. but nonetheless, it achieved the bluff. it created a relentless rhythm of nuclear attack and implied that we had a very large arsenal of bombs. one of the points i touched upon you have to keep in mind is because japan had its own

nuclear program, and what in my view is very interesting is that as soon as they heard the words atomic bomb used, a big swath of japan's leadership knew what an atomic bomb was. this was not something from the blue. they also knew how incredibly difficult it was to make it a bomb. and primarily from an engineering standpoint to make material. that's why the first response, the first reports of the bomb, the army says, well, we're not going to concede it's a bomb until we have an investigation. and the imperial navy even more ominously says, well, even if it is an atomic bomb, they can't have that many of them, they can't be that powerful, maybe they'll be dissuaded from using them. under the whole idea that the u.s. did not have an arsenal of atomic weapons. and that's why as tragic as all of that is, the two bombs in conjunction achieved the bluff.

it also if we understand what the japanese military was talking about, it shows that basically no demonstration would ever have worked because the japanese comeback would have been this is very interesting, let's see you do three in a row. >> just one point on the timing of it. general groves told general marshall about that third bomb. and he said the timetable is that we've speeded things up. we've got august 9th. the next bomb, it was going to take that span of time from the 9th to the 17th for it to get -- and ready to use. so the third bomb was scheduled for august 17th, they might have gained a day or two. but that was the timetable. and many more after that. i mean, groves had them lined