accepted us a tweet at #c123 or you can e-mail us at comments@cspan.org. like us on facebook, follow us on twitter. coming up tonight on american history tv in primetime, day one of a symposium marking the 200th anniversary of the burning of washington d.c. and the war of 1812. first andrew lambert on the naval aspects of the war. then catherine al ger, author of the perfect union, dolly madison and the creation of a perfect nation. that's followed by alan taylor talking about his book the civil war of 1812 and later remarks by john stagg, editor of the james madison papers at the university of virginia. coming up, day one of a symposium of the burning of washington and the war of 1812

hosted by the white house historical association, u.s. capitol historical society and james madison's montpelier. next andrew lambert, author of "challenge, brittain against america in the naval war of 1812." this is 45 minutes. my name is stewart mcwarren and i'm the president of the white house historical association where we are privileged to convene today for this significant event. we're honored to have with us today two members of the board of directors of the white house historical association, the honorable ann stock and mr. nide kiplinger. we're also honored to have with us mr. william alman who's the curator of the white house. this commemorates the bicentennial of one of america's most critical yet overlooked conflicts. with the gathering of these extraordinary scholars and

experts in the history field, the next two days are sure to educate, inspire and enhance our understanding of the war of 1812. the white house historical association's mission echos the goal of echoing the public on the history of the white house. we are so pleased to host this day and a half of symposium here at the association's david m. rubin stein center for the study of white house history. this event could not be possible without the partnering and the support of our co-sponsors, the united states capital historical society and james madison's montpelier. we thank these two wonderful partners for being with us today and for the contributions that they have made to make this a i successful event. we would also like to extend a special word of things to the kimmart company who underwrote a significant portion of today's

symposium. if you're with us tonight you'll receive a specially commissioned gift from kimmart made for this symposium. we're grateful for the support we've had with kimmart for 34 years in the production of our white house christmas ornament. this began in 1981 and is a very significant part of what we do given that the proceeds from the sale of this ornament go to support our work with the white house. please be sure to take a moment to visit our shop which is right across the courtyard behind you here today as well as online at www.whitehousehistory.org to obtain the 2014 white house christmas ornament which honors president warn g. harding. finally, to our audience here and those watching on cspan from across america, we welcome you to hear these 14 prestigious presenters share their work and guide us through one of the most

significant periods in our nation's history. to begin our very full afternoon program it is my pleasure to welcome cat emhoff to introduce our session one presenters. [ applause ] >> good afternoon. it is so wonderful to be here. i also wanted to say that our board chair, the montpelier fourteen days board chair greg may joins us as well as many montpelier board members. we are pleased to help sponsor the next two days. i love the title, america under fire. mr. madison's war and the burning of washington city. declaring war congress and the president exercise powers that were granted to them by the u.s. constitution and for our young country, only three decades removed from the first war of independence, the war at 1812

tested many of the ideas in the constitution and it called upon madison to abide by the limitations of powers that he had worked so hard to institute. so as we commemorate the sobering events of 1814, this panel will be shedding light on the new scholarship and ideas about the origins and outcomes of the war. fittingly, i love the fact that we begin today with the discussion of the british context of the war. i am pleased to welcome to the podium dr. andrew lambert. he's a professor of naval history at kings college london. in addition to writing about british strategy and technology, he's the author of an award winning 2012 volume on the war titled "the challenge, brittain against america in the naval war of 1812." and it was just honored with the anderson award. so if i could have you help me join in welcoming dr. lambert to the podium. [ applause ]

thank you very much for that extremely kind introduction. the award of a medal for writing a book about the war of 1812 is somewhat ironic back home because -- [ laughter ] -- in all honesty we don't know it happened. it's a great honor for me to be here today, for which my thanks must go to the team at the white house historical association and all of those who have managed to put this splendid event together. it's important, i think, when viewing the great events of national history to take a look outside and to see what everybody else is doing at the same time where this particular set of events in this country fits into the bigger picture. and really my job this afternoon is to situate the war of 1812 in world history and to put that

relationship between brittain and america and the wider world. the war of 1812 posed serious problems for governments on both sides of the atlantic. in the united states president james madison's decision for war split the country. the federalist northeast opposed a conflict that would damage their economic interests while the republican centers south and west welcomed it as an opportunity for territorial expansion and the address of other significant internal issues. news of the war reached a british government which had recently been reconstructed. the prime minister had just been shot in the house of commons and his replacement, lord liverpool, was not thought to be destined for a long term in office. in fact, he would last 15 years, prime minister, but nobody knew that at the time. he was not thought to be a great leader, an inspiring figure. he was not a man with a command of the rhetoric of parliament. or, indeed, a great public persona. he was not a heroic figure but

he turned out to be a very good manager of a cabinet at a time when the british needed management because the king, the last king of this country as well, george iii was sliding into a permanent madness and his regent, his son, george iv, made a very poor showing on the national let alone the international stage. we needed a leader who was solid, reliable, and made good, effective use of the resources at hand. and lord liverpool turned out to be that man. the british were in the tenth year of a conflict with napoleon bone na part. the war had broken out in early 1803. the issues are many and various, but the british had been wagging war against the greatest warrior of modern history for a decade. they had managed not to lose, partly because they live on an island. british ministers had little reason for optimism in early 1812 that the war would end

well. the last great british victory had been the battle of true fall ger and since then they had hung around the mountains of europe annoying the french and hoping that the rest of europe would realize that being ruled by france was a bad idea. some europeans had seen this but not all of them. the british were not especially worried by the american declaration of war. after all, the united states was quite a strong country. it had relatively limited resources and it had no great reputation for having a large and powerful army or, indeed, particularly large navy either. what the british were worried about was the additional strain on their already seriously overstretched resources. i show you this slide just to remind people that the louisiana purchase is transformational for the united states. it turns a country which really looks to the atlantic into one that starts to look to the rest of the continent, not just west but north and south as well.

the war between brittain and america was, of course, a consequence of the anglo french war. it was brittain's strategy of blockading europe with extreme legal measures that brought on the clash with the united states. after the destruction of his navy at trufalger, napoleon had instituted a total economic war against brittain. his strategy was to exclude british trade from europe and to try to bankrupt the british. napoleon understood the basis of british power was not men, armies or even fleets, it was trade and money. if napoleon could break the british economy, brittain would surrender. his continental system would harness the european continent in war against brittain. they would exclude all british trade from europe on penalty of seizure and destruction.

the british counter blockade, the famous order in council, did exactly the reverse. it cut europe off from the rest of the world. so the europeans had to fight the 12-year long world without any coffee. and there were a few other things they missed as well. the british counter blockade cut europe off from africa, asia, and the americas and fundamentally it threatened america's economic development. from 1803 through to 1812 american shippers, merchants and traders had made a lot of money being the last neutral carrier, the last country that could carry goods from the french west indecember to europe through the british blockade. they were also trading with the british and neither the british nor the french treated the americans particularly kindly. the british would arrest their ships and send them before court and napoleon simply burned them. but the american government thought napoleon was less

dangerous than the british, or indeed less dangerous to their interests. the continental system, not this continent but the european continent, was beginning to destroy the economies of other european states. napoleon protected france from the economic war by asset stripping all of the conquered territories. first country to rebel would be russia, napoleon's only serious ally, and a major trading nation with a big export trade geared towards supplying the british market. inside the continental system from 1807 to 1811 russia saw their economy collapse. being part of napoleon's team was very bad for your business. in 1811 the czar of russia, alexander, realized that if he carried on like this his country would be bankrupt and he would follow his father to an early grave. the last time russia had made war on brittain the czar was

murdered and they changed the government. basically most of the landowners in russia relied on selling goods to the british to pay their bills. so the czar decided that bankruptcy and debt was slightly less bad than being invaded by napoleon, but only slightly. even as the war of 1812 is to start, the cracks in pa polian's system are becoming quite fundamental but the british haven't yet seen the future. 1811 the long-running interchange of arguments at sea reached a high point with the incident between "u.s.s. president" and "hms little bell" which is the small one with the union flag. a case of mistaken identity according to common door rogers. a case of aggression according to bing ham who commanded the "little belt." they were far too busy doing other things. in 1811-1812 napoleon is

beginning to gear up for the invasion of russia. this will be the great campaign that will decide the outcome of the conflict in europe. mr. madison's war depends on the french winning. if russia clapszs back into the continental system, napoleon is utterly dominant in europe, what possible hope have british got of carrying on. they will have to make terms. it will be possible to negotiate with them on a range of issues, but the british wouldn't surrender to napoleon, let alone to james madison. the main british army was fighting successfully in spain against the duke of wellington and the royal navy was protecting global trade. the british simply had no spare ships, men or money to fight a war with anybody else. indeed, during the war of 1812 the british military effort on land and sea was rarely more than 7% of their land and sea forces. they simply didn't have any more to spare. it wasn't a case of choice, that

was all there was. so in 1812 and 1813 british strategies, they had the initiative, where to fight and how to fight. as we know, the united states opened the conflict with what should have been a three-prong defensive into what is now canada and a surge of warships and privateers to cut economic life lines. the canadian frontier became the main military frontier. for three years they defended the border. to meet the attacks the british shifted some troops into the canadian theater but they came from the west indecember, not from europe. the british removed no soldiers from the european theater until after the end of the napoleon anything conflict. as long as napoleon remained in power british strategy would be defensive. the border did not move. this was a long-running but

ultimately stalemated conflict. this left the madison administration with an alternative strategy, the destruction of british floating trade and the wrecking of brittain's economy. strategy that relied on privateering. the united states was too small. it needed a large number of privately owned and operated licensed predators. the british response to the american declaration of war there is the canadian frontier was the appointment of vice admiral john boulaise warren. a diplomat, highly successful naval operator, he was sent to command the entire theater with powers to negotiate an armistice and an early return to the status quo. that was what the british wanted. are the americans serious about this war? are they not prepared to think about this and just go back to business as usual? warren's job was to do

everything but wage war until he knew the americans were absolutely determined on fighting. his command stretched from knew found land to mexico and he would be hammered by inadequate means, poor communications and very limited support from his home government. his defense of british shipping in the atlantic would determine the outcome of the war but only after the americans had declared that they were desperately serious about wagging it. only then could he turn defense into offense imposing a devastating economic blockade that simply treated the united states as another part of napoleon's continental system, something to be blockaded and economically ruined. initially shortage of ships and limited rules of engagement hampered warren's business. but even in late 1812 he began the difficult job of capturing and incarcerating the american

private tear fleet. as british prisons filled with american sailors, the private tear effort would begin to falter. mid november some 5 1/2 months after the declaration of war did warren learn that the americans were determined to continue the conflict. he was then tasked with setting up a fully effective convoy system to protect the shipping transiting from the new world to the old, from the caribbean into british ports. by this stage over 150 british merchant ships had already been captured and more privateers were set out. there was money to be made and it was an attractive option in 1812. his masters in london underestimating the scale of a priva privateer threat and rather ignorant of the united states coast line sent him very few resources. what they did send initially were not of the first quality. they woke up when the united states navy won three shattering

victories over the royal navy. these successes in the autumn of 1812 made the british government pay attention. here we see constitution taking it to garrier in the wonderful picture which manages to disguise the key fact of the battle. the garrier was only 2gs 3 the sides of the constitution and it had rather less than 2/3 of the crew. the american captain had lost the battle he would have made a very poor showing, indeed, but that's not the story that appeared in the "republican" newspapers. the second battle of macedonia was rather embarrassing. the british captain was blind and a fool. the third frigget captured put up a credible fight against a far bigger american ship. the two defeats of the garrier were neither dishonorable nor disadvantageous. the british quickly got their

crew back. the one thing they were short of was their sailors. when the american ships had won the battles, they had to go home for repairs so the cost of winning some glory the americans had ruined their mission. as alfred mahan said, these were strategically irrelevant victories but did provide the united states with a lot to explain with some useful propaganda. the fact that the republican administration had ham strung the navy for the previous 12 years made it all the ironic that it was the navy that rode to their rescue. the british government belatedly ordered general reprize alzheimer's against the united states on the 13th of october 1812. news that didn't reach the new world until the end of november. november 21st the british government imposed a strict and rigorous quote blockade on the chesapeake bay and delaware

river. if your congressman voted for war, the british blockaded you and attacked you. if your congressman didn't vote for war, the british left you alone. the british understood the best way to defeat the enemy was divide and conquer, not overwhelm. brittain is a very small country. we have no history of overwhelming anybody. the northeastern ports were providing huge amounts of resource for the britts's war effort. the duke of wellington's army ate american grown grain. american food supplies crossed into british north america. the good people of vermont fed the people of canada for the entire war. to their enormous profit one has to understand. critically the economic blockade was established eight months after the war had begun. it had been a golden eight months in which it was possible to continue to operate peace and war at the same time.

ultimately, this blockade would be the decisive strategy. it would break the american economy, bankrupt the state and leave it unable to borrow money or raise credit either internally or internationally. quite simply, the united states would run out of money. as everybody knows, the sinus of war are money, money, more money. when you run out of that, you have to stop fighting. there is the constitution taking the job. i like this picture. this is by a british artist. it gets the scales of the ships -- well, that's actually not quite as accurate as it might be. the java was a little bigger than that, but it does look like the constitution is shooting at a rowing boat. the decisive battle of the war of 1812. the battle of boradino. it's one of the great moments in history. enough to write a vast symphonic work, to inspire a magnificent

novel and bring down a great emperor. on this day of battle more russians died than were killed or would die of illness in the whole of the war of 1812 on all sides. this really was a titanic clash of two emporers and two vast armies numbering close on 200,000 men each. the war of 1812 would not be fought by armies of 200,000 men. in fact, it wouldn't be fought by 200,000 men all told. as 1813 began james madison knew that napoleon had lost. his army was in full retreat. indeed, it was in complete collapse. he had taken his country to war on the premise the french would win. they had lost. now what was going to happen? this also took the pressure off brittain and it released naval reinforcements from the british fleet in the baltic which had been keeping it open for trade the previous five years. those ships and key personnel

were moved across to the north american station. the british picked out the right ships and the right officers to send to blockade the united states, their best men, many of them proteges of nelson one of whom we will come to. furthermore, with russian trade open, the british didn't need to buy any grain from the americans anymore. the russians had plenty of grain and it was a lot closer to brittain. by the summer of 18 -- 1813 vast british battleships and more numerous friggets were available to blockade new york, boston and the chesapeake. the united states navy would find it difficult to get to sea and the privateers would find it difficult to attack british convoys. among the men who would arrive in 1813, none would be more famous and relevant than admiral george coburn. he was picked out as one of the stars of the future by the great man himself. he was sent over here very specifically to take the

offensive onto the american coast and i quote, accelerate the return of peace. we know what he did. these reinforcements allowed him to have a reinforcement pinning american sloops and friggets in boston and new york. this was mainly from a group of privateers. this was safe from american predation. by may 1813 the economic blockade was biting too. new york, the largest american port producing 1/4 of the national revenue from customs dues, was closed. the revenue was drying up because most federal revenue came from import and export dues. it was impossible to pay for the war. it would have to be paid for on borrowing. american governments stopped, failed to sell at sustainable rates. a clear sign that something was fundamentally wrong. as henry adams observed, i quote, the pressure of the

blockades was immediately felt. the war seat turned in brittain's favor on june 1st, 1813. first the frig gets, united states and macedonia were driven into london from wince they never emerged and then the "u.s.s. chesapeake" seen here with the stars and stripes under the union jack was captured in a battle that lasted 11 minutes at the most brilliant, brave, and heroic defeat of either navy in the entire war. the fact that captain phillip broker won the battle meant that james laurence captured the chesapeake had captured the wrong enemy. with those three frig gets removed from the american navy's list of ships at sea the american naval threat effectively evaporated. it focused on privateers. they were locked up in south devin which was a particularly

unpleasant place to send them. we built it for the french but we ran out of french men so we sent the americans there as well. the british still hoped war would go away. they just wanted the americans to say, you know what, we're sorry. we'll sort of go back and stay quiet. it was on the table from day one till the very last day. that's what the peace treaty was. that's all the british wanted. in 1813 the action got the british excited. here is a contemporary cartoon by george crook shank. it summed up the british view of the war. this was annoying and they rather wished it would go away. 1813 was not about america, it was about napoleon. there was another great battle. september 1813 napoleon lost 73,000 men from an army core of 1 million. his german empire collapsed. he retreated in france. the writing was on the wall of his empire. the british poured money and

munitions into england. they did not send money or men to north miracle america. they defended canada but they didn't have any resource toss do anything else. america. they defended canada but they didn't have any resource toss do anything else. america. they defended canada but they didn't have any resource toss do anything else. america. they defended canada but they didn't have any resource toss do anything else. america. they defended canada but they didn't have any resource toss do anything else. america. they defended canada but they didn't have any resource toss do anything else. america. they defended canada but they didn't have any resource toss do anything else. america. they defended canada but they didn't have any resource toss do anything else.america. they defended canada but they didn't have any resource toss do anything el in 1813 they damaged property of those who voted for war. at the end of the 1813 the economic blockade was stretched up to maine. new england was blockaded as well, too. this would promote sectional conflict. british options were very limited. in the autumn of 1813 they did something they wanted to do for 20 years, to capture northern belgium, the one place you can invade england from. they sent all the troops you can find to do this. they lost. it was embarrassing. they didn't have the manpower to do anything serious in europe and europe was far more important than north america. the idea they had any offensive plans here is untrue.

throughout the war there would be more british troops defending west indies than canada. this was far greater than political interest in canada. west indian commercial interests saw admiral warren replaced by alexander cochran and he, too, will feature in the war. as peace approached in europe the british foreign secretary told the europeans that he would not discuss maritime belligerent rights at a peace conference. blockade, impressment, and he told the americans the same thing. these were the bases of british power. brittain is a sea power, not a land power. control of the seas is brittain's only strong arm. as a strong, weak state it maximized the strength of its navy. british naval power kept the american war and the european war apart and condemned

president madison to a solitary conflict. once the americans had taken maritime belligerent rights off the agenda, peace could be discussed again. a town in belgium then occupied by british troops. they might as well have had the treaty in brittain. the americans resorted to some interesting mechanisms to defeat the royal navy but the british were not impressed. not impressed. here's a german cartoon of napoleon. he went from emperor of the world to emperor of elra. here is the main player in our story. this is admiral george coburn's officially commissioned portrait. this is how he wished to be remembered. this isn't accidental. he was telling us about himself. he thought this was one of his more important events. as we know, the occupation of

washington and the destruction of the public buildings was a major event, but more important, it sparked a run on the american banks. anyone who had any cash took it out of american banks and put it into canadian banks in british government securities which paid better and weren't defaulting. on october the 4th united states became insolvent. a month later it defaulted on the terms of the louisiana purchase but neither the destruction of washington nor the defeat of plattsburgh had any serious effect on british policy. the british offered status quo ante because they wanted the war you to go away even after the downfall of napoleon. there was not a war here they wished to fight. the peace treaty signed on the 24th of december 1814 at ghent was little more than a recognition of that fact. here is some of coburn's handiwork. here's some more of it. the battle of north point, an interesting event, but far more

important signing off the treaty of ghent. by the time the treaty was signed the united states was in default by 3 million pounds. $15 million was outstanding on interest payments. the national debt rose by 200%. little wonder that canada wants impressment and belligerent rights were a ban donald. two more battles, new orleans you all heard of. this one is not in the textbooks. the british captured the "s.s. president" off sandy hook in 1815 in another action in which both captains fought brilliantly but the british captain was more brilliant. it is no accident that headquarters of the royal navy in london is "hms president." if you stop before you get to the bath, you will see four engravings of this battle. this is the one the british

remember. this is the war of 1812. this is what 1812 is all about, not interfering in the settlement of europe. the congress of vienna created a system open for business and unlikely to lead for another major conflict. that was brittain's war aim. in the whole course of 22 years fighting the french the british took from the rest of europe two very small islands, one in the mediterranean called malta. the other one called heligoland. that is the entire access of european territory in this war. they gave it all up for peace and stability. then, of course, napoleon came back but not for long. he was rapidly arrested for the man who ran the blockade of new york for the previous two years. when the war was over the republican party did when you've presided over a failure, they've

declared it a great success. republican party's speech writers, newspaper men and everybody else declared it a victory. three frig get victories which came down through the years. so arthur scott who understood how to create fabulous stories realized what they had been doing and rather wished they had been taught a more severe lesson. he knew that the american pens would create a victory that had a hue to their swords and he also understood that the endearing legacy of 1812 would be not territory, not maritime belligerent rights but a distinct american culture. the war of 1812 forced the united states to face up to itself and recognize that it wasn't part of something else, it was of itself, it was a country that would have its own culture. it would paint its own pictures.

it would write its own stories. it would create an american identity and this war is the start from which that emerged. the war drove america to acquire a distinctive new world identity, one that privileged landscapes, scale, the westward opportunities over the narrow confines and dusty histories of europe. perhaps the fiery destruction was the conflicts's most appropriate metaphor. thank you very much. [ applause ] we now have a short opportunity for some questions and answers, and i will be more than happy to do some questions. please.

>> how did the american finances recover after the war? was the resumption of trade duty sufficient to refill the treasury? did we undefault on the loans? >> yes. the economic problems of the united states were ended by the conclusion of peace. it opened up the international money markets to america. it also persuaded american financiers that there was something worth investing in. you've just seen the capital city trashed and the government fleeing. you don't think this country is something you want to invest in long term so the resumption of peace opens up the domestic taps. it also leads to a massive boom in trade. all of that trade that didn't happen from 1812-1815, it happens pretty much as the war ends. news of peace in london trumped every merchant to load ships up with goods that they think will

sell in america. this huge ar mad da of trade crosses the atlantic. the east coast ports of flooded with goods. business booms again. there's then an economic set back but it's supposed to rebuild the equilibrium in the aftermath. peace is really good for business. it's really good for the economy. war is not. that's a lesson the british had learned many years before. >> go to the mic please for questions. >> yes. have you seen what you would call the public -- >> mic. sorry. >> have you seen in the public record office any orders to coburn and ross to burn the public buildings in washington and the implication being retaliation, question mark? >> yes. thanks very much. this is one of the great questions about what happens in

washington. were coburn and ross operating under specific orders to do something as specific as burning the white house? certainly there was a sense that after the occupation of what is now toronto and the destruction of the public buildings there and in other parts on the niagara front where there had been some cross border destruction of public and private buildings of both sides, that the public buildings of the state that started the war were fair game. nobody in europe would have thought this was in any way surprising. the whole organization was organized by george coburn. he's the only one who has been here long enough to work out what we're talking about. the chronology is quite clear. the army with ross and alexander cochran arrives in the chesapeake and the next morning they set off up the pawtuxan and

land towards bladensburg. he didn't have a problem with it but he didn't have specific orders to do it. his boss, alexander cochran, was very supportive. he lost his brother and harbored some dislike of the americans as a consequence. it was a decisive war. they fought in the conflict either as young men or in the case of alexander cochran as a ship captain in the royal navy. so memories of the last war were very strong. they were quite raw for many people. the government buildings, but we've heard it often said that no private buildings were burned. but pamela scott showed me a drawing the ore day that i had

noticed before but hadn't thought about in this context. a drawing by latrobe in december of 1815 that shows george washington's buildings burned, ruins of them, and a large tavern nearby near the capital that was also in ruins. this is a year after the british were there and it seems as though they must have done the burning. >> thank you for that. did the british destroy other buildings than the government buildings. the only building was from which a sniper missed general ross. the britts didn't burn the building it was part of tariff. they pulled it down. they destroyed the office of national intelligence, any sound a general would like to see the press suppressed. george coburn took all of the

letters c out of the box so they couldn't write anymore scurrilous letters. he took a particular delight. he decided he had not done enough so he got the press out and burned that as well. >> remember in the aftermath of that occupation there was a tremendous storm and there was a lot of damage done by the storm as well so that may have been storm damage. but there's certainly no record of the british deliberately destroying any other private buildings. >> thank you very much for being here. when as part of the -- coburn's operation and ross's operation of course there was the squadron under captain gordon which came, ascended the potomac river, a rather remarkable adventure in itself. as they came up and before they

engaged fort washington, they sailed by mount vernon. the very symbol of america with george washington. why didn't they just blow up mount vernon? >> thank you very much. tomorrow evening i'm going to be speaking in the masonic hall in alexandria about that very operation. the reason the british didn't blow up mount vernon is because george washington was a liberal hero. as far as british liberals certainly on the left of politics were concerned, george washington was the very significant leader. he taught the british some very important lessons about representation so they didn't burn the building, they stopped and the band came up and they played watching top's march in his honor. so the british were not making war on america, they were making war on the american government. the federalist's response to the

war was not particularly engaged. they saw that this was very much a partisan conflict within america and they very carefully targeted those americans who they believed to be the causes of the war, hence, the use of the congressional division list. george washington, he's off limits. he's part of the history of brittain and america. and he's spared, as are almost all public buildings that the british can spare. thank you. one there and one there. why don't you go first. >> okay. at one point was part of the british war aims for concluding the conflict to create some sort of a native american territory in the midwest? what happened for that for it to go status quo? >> the british government's position on the piece treaty was

not entirely unified. the british minister most involved in running the war was also responsible for british colonies and his view was it would be a good idea if we could build some kind of buffer zone between the united states and british north america to reduce the possibility of future conflict. the native american peoples were seen as an ideal opportunity to do this. his cabinet colleagues disagreed vehemently. they didn't want to spend $10 million a year to improve the war against canada. bathos was out voted. they were looking at a way to create a buffer zone who have no residential qualifications and did not have any national identity. at law it would have been almost impossible to have created a ter tore riff to give to the native americans. there was certainly no framework

to do this. european systems did not recognize the rights of native peoples which is how you're able to sweep right west across the whole continent. there was no legal framework for giving them national identity. it was an idea. it was mooted. it was used as a way of pushing the americans away from talking about maritime general rights. the british put this up because they were trying to communicate. it was a kind of line somewhere out in the northwest but it was never determined what that line was, how it was decided. it marred the americans think something needed:c5ñ to be done. they got maritime rights off the treaty table. it's a nice way of everybody feeling they've won something, but there was no way that this could have been set up.

we would have to have agreed, washington and london, that the nato american people were a nation, that they had a national identity rather than being tribal. question? >> okay. there's a william charles cartoon or pair of cartoons, one involving baltimoreans and the other -- >> yes. william charles, the famous cartoonist who makes fun of the alex and dree ans, he loves working here and he was british. his cartoon is very much the republican view of the alex andrey ans which was very unpleasant and he then used the baltimore cartoon as a way to keep beaten. they decided they didn't want to -- if you want to start

baltimore, we can do it. there are 20,000 americans dmug at a very strong position at baltimore. british have less than 4,000 ground troops. how are they going to get in there? the british didn't have another army. >> what's your -- >> yeah. with alexandria the picture is quite clear. john bull, who's a minortor, mythic beach, has the citizens with them on their head. but the british sailors are saying we need to get out of here before the american naval heroes turn up. john rogers and david porter and oliver hazard perry. they did show up and they tried to stop the british from leaning. brits will come back.

you have to read it as a partisan cartoon. it's just like the cartoon i showed. it's one side of the argument. it has no resonance with the british at all. this is the republicans pointing the finger at them and saying, you're not patriotic. one more? >> just like to say that the score is now even. this last weekend the city of alexandria challenged the royal navy to three sporting events and the city won all three. [ laughter ] [ applause ] >> i'm -- i'm -- i'm very pleased to hear that because of course the score in friggets in the war of 1812 was three each. had the british took all of theirs home and we only took one home, i think we get that one on point. thank you very much. [ applause ]

the symposium on the war of 1812 and the burning of washington, d.c., continues thursday. author and historians discuss the war, the role of dolly madison and the national historic tour. we have a live from decatur house in washington, d.c., starting at 8:30 a.m. here on cspan 3 and 8:00 p.m. eastern we'll give you another chance to see the discussions and remarks from the event. that's also here on cspan 3. here are some highlights of this coming weekend. today live at 10:00 a.m. on cspan, the nebraska supreme court will hear oral arguments on the keystone xl. michael konkts and robert mcdowell with campaign 2014 gearing up, watch the latest debates on cspan. sunday kate haggan and tom till

lot and from the california goff's race, jerry brown and republican nominee neil kushcurrie. yu on international law and what little effect has on the behavior of powerful nations. mike gonzalez thinks republicans can make gains for the hispanic vote. and sunday at noon, three hour afrgs ken your phone calls with tonight, at 8:00 eastern on american history tv on c-span 3, authors and historians talk about the burning of washington during the war of 1812. saturday on real america, the building of the hoover dam and sunday night at 8:00, the anniversary of president jared ford's pardon of richard nixon. find their schedule at cpsn.org and let us know what you think. call us about the programs you're watching. send us a tweet at #c123.

like us on facebook, follow us on twitter. thursday on c-span, a senate agriculture committee hearing on improvzing meals in schools. we hear from new york senator on the subject. here's a look. >> of course kids like nonwhole grains, yes, that's what they prefer. they like sugar even more. you give your child a choice, sugar for lunch or etc. fruits and vegetables. their taste buds love it, but we have to be the adults in the room. you just don't give kids the foods they want, you have to give them and teach them how to eat well for their whole lives. and that takes leadership, it takes determination. it takes creativity. and i love the fact that you told your school district pick

three colors every day. my children, when i was teaching them about nutrition when they're four, five, and six. that's how we do it. how many colors on your plate. and they loved that. because i fed my children steamed vegetables as children, they only like steamed vegetables. they don't want butter, cream, no cheese, they want steamed vegetables. they've been eating fruit since they were babies. so my kids as a consequence because they're given and introduced healthy foods at every meal. they prefer healthy foods. so for a lot of these kids, they're not getting healthy foods at home. they're getting refinaled carbohydrates. a typical meal will be a burger and fries. of course they prefer it, that's what they've been fed since they were little. we have to do more. i just, i feel that yes, to senator hoven, it is easy to have flexibility. they like it grits. but let's not serve refined foods at lunch. let's actually push them to eat something healthy that makes

them healthy and reach their full potential. when a kid's obese, he doesn't reach his full potential. he can't concentrate in class. he's often made fun of. he has low self-esteem, he doesn't reach his full potential. she doesn't reach her full potential. so i am grateful that all of you have thought outside the box, figuring out how to solve the problems, meet nutrition standards. so i do not want to back off the standards. let's figure it out. we can figure it out. >> thursday a senate agriculture committee hearing on efforts to improve nutrition in school meals. see it at 8:00 p.m. eastern on c-span. now more from the symposium on the war of 2812. katherine allgor discusses her book a perfect union, dolly madison and a creation of the american nation. this is 35 minutes.

>> welcome back everybody. for america under fire mr. madison's war and the burning of washington city. for those who may be just joining us, if you have one of these little devices, if you can make sure it's turned off or in the silent mode, that would be fantastic. so i have the pleasure now of introducing dr. katherine algor. she's going to tackle james madison's other half and some may say his better half, dolly madison. katherine has written several very important books on dolly including a perfect union. dolly madison in the creation of the american nation. and most recently she edited an important memoir written by dolly madison's niece. katherine is the director of education at the huntington library, art collections and botanical gardens and at riverside. today she will discuss the

republic against the war and her events known as squeezes they were so popular. i've also heard she's going to mention maybe the role of snuff in the war of 1812. and i would encourage all of you later on to take a look at dolly madison's snuff box which is over at the delaware cater house. we just brought that up today so go take a look look at snuff box. with that teaser, join me in welcoming dr. katherine algor. >> thank you so much for that lovely introduction, i'm tempted to say forget about the speech, let's look at the snufz box. but no, no, no. i'm very happy and honored to be here with such a distinguished set of scholars and if i may say, even more distinguished and lovely audience. thank you so much to bill and to

the white house historical association, to the u.s. capitol historical side and james madison mount pooelier for getting me here. and thanks to the huntington library for the day off. the slogan don't give up the ship, the figure of uncle sam, the star spangled banner. the proliferation of symbols that emerged from the war of 1812 constitutes a paradox. though as this conference demonstrates. much recent scholarship on the causes, conduct, and legacies of the war has produced fresh insights about the kothss and gains of the war, even the combatants. at the time the treaty was signed, americans understood that piece gained them little in policy, international power, or territory. so on the one hand, it seems contradictory that such a wealth of symbolism emerged out of a

feckless endeavor. on the other hand, the very futile nature of the war accounted for its symbolic booty. the victory that contemporary americans and many later historians claimed was a psychological one. as member of the peace delegation, albert observed quote, the war has renewed and reenstated the national feelings and character which the revolution had given and which were daily lessening. he said, the war made citizens feel more americans. they feel and act more as a nation, and i hope the perm nancy of the union is there shall better secured. so appreciating both sides of this paradox, may explain the national energy that took in account a fairly mundane battle and set it to the tune of an old drinking song and made it a national anthem. some of the most potent images to emerge from the war of 1812

are those of dolly madison. facing down the enemy, fleeing the burning capitol, saving the gilbert-stewart portrait and otherwise demonstrating heroism under fire. and what i'm arguing to you today is that part of the reason that dolly's american audience seized upon these images, endowing them with a heft that would propel them. we all know the images that is that they were really a culmination of a process. and the process was dolly's construction of a political identity. and she began when she was the wife of the secretary of state in 1801. she would have no idea of course what would be happening 12 to 14 years later. but it turns out what she did was precisely right. >> now this idea of constructing an identity is one of the most rich and fruitful historical

inquiries in the last 50 years and there's a whole literature on identity, and it's far too wide and varied to be simplified here. are are some demonalties to the identity constructing process. identity making can occur at the individual level, single person, and at a larger collective level, and of course sometimes they operate both at the same time. similarly, identity processes can happen both consciously and unconsciously. and these dynamics about identity mark the awareness and the manipulation of the self, which makes it a modern phenomenon. people are becoming aware of selves. in viewing dolly's political construction, you can see a lot of tenants of identity here to ya play, as the time and place, she was offered and accepted probably unconsciously the roles provided by her culture and those roles were southerner,

lady, political hostess, along with the more common roles of wife and mother. dolly added elements from european and royal cultures, however to create her republican queen. a persona which she deployed to political effect. dolly's position as queen dolly resulted in her ascension as the figure for the madison administration, and as i said, it began quite early, certainly by the time the inaugurated in 1809, it would be enhanced by the outbreak of war. in the historical search for dolly's creation of this republican queen, the sources don't lie in dolly's own words. she is not discussed her work that way in her private correspondence. for evidence we must rely on the many descriptions of dolly that were supplied by those who saw her or met her, especially at her famous wednesday night drawing rooms. generally the descriptions of