n 1814. they saw him as exercising influence without outward ambition. as a legislator, he saw in following and taking great -- paying great attention to details, and the details of how people behaved. and collecting that knowledge collecting that information is how he was able to persuade people. it wasn't through his rhetoric. and he had incredible experience. he was in the virginia assembly. he went to the confederation congress, the constitutional convention, the first congress of the united states, and then at the end of the united states he was a ra have state constitutional convention. few had this kind of experience. throughout his career, his was the art of quiet persuasion rather than the art of eloquence and cap the vacation. he analyzed the political conditions and adapted his views. he was attentive to national

considerations. he was well aware of balancing the different branches of the government and he never lost site of his state as all politicians of his generation took the same ground. he had a much more flexible conception of the constitution. especially when the nation faced difficult conditions that demanded solutions. he understood are that the federal system was fragmented. and preserving the union required negotiation. the war of 1812 was as we said an example of the competing interests in different parts of the union. and in many ways it didn't succeed. westerners made off better than the other regions they didn't get additional land from canada but as john stag mentioned they did get a lot of land from native americans. the english did not end impressment of sailors because of any pressure the united states had put on them they did

it when they chose to do so. the war are had been waged by a union of regional republics with a loose allegiance to a different government, distant government in washington. you know francis scott key's poem was originally titled "the defense of ft. mchenry," a much more localized illusion. maybe our flag was still there, but the land of the free didn't get its national anthem into the less than heralded presidency of herbert hoover. >> in balancing central authority against states rights, madison was an able leader in an unpredictable world. congress in 1814 not so much to admire, on the way of leadership. the ever quotable historian henry adams, grandson of john

quincy adams great grandson of quincy quincy adams wrote of the year, every ernest patriot in the union and many who are were neither ernest nor patriotic were actively reproaching the house of representatives for its final failure at an parent crisis of the national existence to call out or organize any considerable part of the national energies. the people however jealous of power, would have liked in imagination, though they would not bear it in practice to be represented by something nobler, wiser and purer than their own average honor, wisdom and purity. and as they required of their religion and infinitely wise and powerful deity they revolted in their politics from whatever struck them as sordid or selfish. the house reflected their own weaknesses rebelled against a petty appropriation of money. there is a lot going on in the proceeding passage, adams was reflecting on a central

contradiction in the principle of american democracy, that still applies today. people of average intelligence and mediocre knowledge require people of stronger minds and greater decision-making prowess than their own. in 1814 the people's house, the house of representatives was just not wise enough to rule. they were too much of the people. just as madison had feared in 1787 when he wanted either an elite educated senate or an extra strong executive. fortunately, for the massive political mediocrity that was the house in 1814, the chamber of commerce responsible for the budget, for the country's fiscal health, fortunately for this uninspired crowd they had a president who did his job, who knew that the job was to act in the interest of the many as many of his fellow citizens as possible. to quote adams a little further

president madison far from being called to account for errors real or imaginary seemed to enjoy a popularity never before granted to any president at the expiration of his term. more than jefferson more than washington? adams. this apparent contemptment was certainly not due to want of grievances, the internal taxes pushed hard upon the people. but no portion of the country seemed pleased that a fourth virginian should be made president. and here is the real reason why madison is someone other than that flat nerdy caricature of popular history. that hopy changy thing we associate with president monroe and the era of good feelings, that cascaded from his nearly unanimous election in 1816, it

was generated by his predecessor, little gemmy madison. a political revolutionary, life long student of government, forth coming, open minded, honorable, who lived to enlarge the boundaries of human knowledge, no less than any of his more storied contemptorarycontemporaries. hail frodonia. thank you. [ applause ] >> the obligatory q&a begins. we'll just take a little bit of time for this because i know everybody wants to get to the refreshments. >> [ inaudible ] -- >> -- between madison about

nullification. there are those that say madison pulled his punches and what was his ultimate service to the union, but in theory given that who -- who would be better thought of as an expression of original intent why were madison's opinions not -- was he honestly representing this position in his correspondence with calhoun. and my second question is, why did his responses bear so little influence on this controversy. >> i'll start and i know nancy she's the constitutional thinker of the family. just before jefferson died, a couple of months before, he wrote a letter to madison take care of me when dead, take care of my reputation after i'm gone. he knew the end was coming. and in a very real sense, in the 1820s, 1830s, madison continued to promote the best jefferson

that he wanted history to remember. not the nullifier, but the unifier. and that in part conditions what he was saying during the nullification crisis when he -- while acknowledging that he and jefferson were responsible for the kentucky/virginia revolution in 1799 which had never been publicly stated before still he -- he gave a nuanced response. >> the thing you have to remember, this is what we chart, is that madison's attitudes towards constitutional power how the constitution should be interpreted, changed over the course of his lifetime. and i have a whole critique of original intent. it doesn't -- you cannot identify it. and scholars have moved, they first argued well, it was just what the founders said, the constitutional convention. then they said, no, the ratifying convention. their opinion is original intent.

now they moved and said it is the man on the street. the man on the street in 1788, no really, how do you know this person? it doesn't exist. it is a theory that can't actually be substantiated historically because who are we going to actually embrace everyone who is at the constitutional convention or do we only pay attention to the people we want to listen to. this is the problem. the people who endorse original intent are not historians. >> all right. yes, go ahead. >> this builds on that kind of questioning, you're talking about madison understanding his place in history and his good friend jefferson and his place in history. and one of the questions i always wondered is that madison is one of the framers of the constitution, so he's the one that helps start the framework of government that we have. and as you said in later in his

life, at montpelier, he's organizing his papers to try to make sure that everything is down in the best correct possible interpretation of what it has evolved to by the late, mid-1830s. so the british are coming to washington in a war that started and thankfully ended during his administration. and much of the same way started by him. and he understands this. he has to understand this. he may not talk about it. but then as in bladesburg when the army and militia leave and they're going to come through does he ever talk about the possibility that at that moment in time, it's all going to go away? and it centers on him and at that moment. he may be the only one that's

there that's thinking in that context. >> toward the end of his second term, he and alexander james dallas collaborate on a document that's kind of a white paper, really a white wash of the war of 1812. blaming the british in every respect, and using invective and describing the destruction of washington. as time went on you know madison stuck to that narrative stuck to his guns. and egged on by jefferson as well, because jefferson was really most proactive of the two of them in looking for a republican who they could trust to open their private papers and allow them, public and private papers, and allow them to write the authoritative history of

parties. they were combatting for many years the multivol umume biography of washington by john marshall, which got well beyond george washington's life and into partisan politics. and they were especially jefferson desperately afraid that american history would be told from the opposition point of view. so you know, this kind of explains why they weren't prepared to let history judge them without their doing everything possible to line up the authoritative writers of the history of the times. >> i want to add one point. this is why history can be really complicated. what you have to know, who is writing what letter what the agenda is. if you kind of look at a document and just quote it and you don't know the back story,

you've missed what's going on. and that's why you have to go to the archive you have to do research. you have to actually know all of the players involved, not just a handful of players, to really figure out because even when they wrote in their personal correspondence, they were quite conscious about shaping what they said. i love there's a series of lit letters that jefferson writes when burr is on trial where he changes what he thinks and how he expresses what's going on depending on who the recipient of the letter is. in one letter he's like, oh, good thing. he should be hanged. to another person, he's like, oh, this is so sad that we might lose this important political figure. so this is the problem with history. you have to actually know the archive. you have to know who these people are to really understand that history in a sense is not just there in the archive for the taking. it's already been -- it's been constructed and defined before

you get there. >> it's not by accident that there's no letter no written evidence of jefferson's reaction to the death of alexander hamilton in 1804. it's not an accident. you know he was probably relieved on some level. he may have had hamilton's bust at mont acello, but i don't think he mourned hamilton's death. burr was already out of the picture as a political threat. jefferson was content that madison would be his anointed successor. and there's a certain cold-bloodedness in our early presidents that, you know we tend not to talk about because it doesn't -- it doesn't make them sound, you know as genial or as the geniuses the cerebral individuals that we like to remember the founding generation as. but they were first and foremost

hard-nosed politicians. they would understand the vindictive kind of statements that, you know that form our partisan politics today. and perhaps, you know, that's kind of the last word on this, that madison and jefferson were virginians before they were nationalists or more than they were nationalists. we don't like to know that. we don't like to see that underside. we don't like to think about madison for some reason as a guy who told dirty jokes. but this was a part of the charm that a great early american literatureur who we don't talk about anymore, james k.paulding he got to know madison, and he loved the story telling. he loved the raunchy humor. and he thought that you know, too bad american history will

not know the real james madison. thank you. [ applause ] >> okay, i just have a few final announcements. and thanks to offer and then we'll go and enjoy ourselves in the historic parlors of decatur house. first, i would like to -- first i would like to thank all of you for attending this symposium and for the wonderful questions that were asked in our sessions. you really enriched the program here, and we greatly appreciate that. also, i'd like to thank the u.s. capitol historical society with don kenning here, who is representing them, who was working with me from the outset on this program as well as meg

meg kennedy from james madison's montpelier. it was a real collaboration to put together the roster of speakers we had. so let's go ahead and give our speakers one last round of applause. i also want to thank our association staff for doing a fantastic job. particularly leslie, who is in the back of the room here, she was and also eric harrison, who was the orchestrator of our wonderful dinner last night, and then of course our reception this evening. i would also like to thank the kenmart company who underwrote a lot of the expense of the symposium. they're a lincoln rhode island, american manufacturer of our

white house christmas ornaments since 1981 and we're proud to be in partnership with them these so many years. i would like to welcome you all back to the david m. rubenstein center for white house history at decatur house where you are, and for our future events and on behalf of the white house historical association, thank you and have a great evening and don't forget you're on c-span so please tune in. thank you very much.

more programming about the war of 1812 tonight at 8:00 p.m. with a re-air of this morning's presentations of the conference hosted by the white house historical association u.s. capitol historical society, and james madison's montpelier. it includes donald hinckley and

steve vogel. holly schulman and ralphesherman, a historical consultant to the historical parks service. that's 8:00 p.m. here on american history tv on c-span3. with live coverage of the u.s. house on c-span and the senate on c-span2, here on c-span3, we complement that by showing you the most relevant public affairs and hearings and events and then it's home to american history tv with programs that tell our national's history. the civil war's 150th anniversary, visiting battlefields and key events. american artifacts to discover what they reveal about america's past. history's bookshelf, the presidency, looking at the policies and legacies of our nation's commanders in chief.

lectures in history, and our new series, reel america, featuring archival government and educational films from the 1930s through the '70s. c-span3, created by the cable tv industry and funded by your local cable or satellite provider. watch us in hd, like us on face facebook facebook, and follow us on twitter. coming up day one of the symposium on the british burning of washington and the war of 1812. hosted by the white house historical association the u.s. capitol historical society, and james madison's montpelier. next andrew lambert, author of challenge, britain against america in the naval war of 1812. this is 45 minutes. my name is stewart mclaurin and i'm the president of the white house historical association. where we are privileged to convene today for this significant event. we're honored to have with us today two members of the board

of directors of the white house historical association, the honorable ann stock and mr. knight kiplonger. we're also honored to have with us mr. william almond the curator of the white house. this symposium commemorates the bicentennial of one of america's most critical yet overlooked conflicts. with the gathering of these extraordinary scholars and experts in the history field the next two days are sure to educate educate, inspire, and enhance our understanding of the war of 1812. the white house historical association's mission echoes the symposium goal of echoing the public on the history of the white house. and we are so pleased to host this day and a half of symposium here at the association's david m. rubenstein center for the study of white house history. this event could not be possible without the partnering and the

support of our co-sponsors, the united states capitol historical society and james madison's montpelier. we thank these two wonderful partners for being with us today and for the contributions they have made to make this a successful event. we would also like to extend a special word of thanks to the kenmart company who generously underwrote a significant portion of tonight's -- of today's symposium and if you're with us tonight for dinner, you will receive a specially commissioned gift from kenmart made for this symposium. the association is grateful for the support and partnership we have had with kenmart for 34 years in the production of our white house christmas ornament. this began in 1981 and is a very significant part of what we do, given that the proceeds from the sale of this ornament go to support our work with the white house. please be sure to take a moment to visit our shop which is right across the courtyard behind you here today.

as well as online at www.whitehousehistory.org to obtain the 2014 christmas ornament which honored president warren g. harding and finally to our audience here at the white house historical association in washington and those watching on c-span from across america, we are welcoming you to hear these 14 prestigious presenters share their work and guide us through one of the most significant periods in our nation's history. to begin our very full afternoon program, it is my pleasure to welcome&[;bs cat emhauf, president and ceo of james madison's montpelier to introduce. >> good afternoon. it's so wonderful to be here. also wanted to say that our board chair, the montpelier board chair, greg may, joins us as well as many board members. i hope you get a chance to meet

some of our leadership. we could not be more pleased than to have this opportunity to help sponsor this next two days, and i just love the title. america under fire mr. mr. madison's war and the burning of washington city. declaring war, congress and the president exercised powers that were granted to them by the u.s. constitution and for our young country, only three decades removed from the first war of independence, the war of 1812 tested many of the ideas in the constitution and it called upon madison to abide by the limitations of powers that he had worked so hard to institute. so as we commemorate the sobering events of 1814 this panel will be shedding light on the new scholarship and ideas about the origins and the outcomes of the war. fittingly, i love the fact that we begin today with a discussion of the british context of the war. i am pleased to welcome to the podium dr. andrew lambert.

a lofton professor of naval history at king's college london, in addition to writing about british strategy and technology, he's the author of an award-winning 2012 volume of the war titled "the challenge, britain against america in the naval war of 1812" and it was just honored with the anderson award. so if i could have you help me join in welcoming dr. lambert to the podium. >> thank you very much for that extremely kind introduction. the award of a medal for writing a book about the war of 1812 is somewhat ironic back home because in all honestly, we don't know it happened. it's a great honor for me to be here today. for which my thanks must go to the team at the white house historical association and all those who manage said to put

this splendid event together. it's important i think when viewing the great events of national history to take a look outside and to see what everybody else is doing at the same time, where this particular set of events in this country fits into the bigger picture. and really my job this afternoon is to situate the war of 1812 in world history, and to put that relationship between britain and america and the wider world. the war of 1812 posed serious problems for governments on boat sides of the atlantic. in the united states, president james madison's decision for war split the country. the federalist northeast opposed a conflict that woulddamage their economic interests while the republicans south and west welcomed it as an opportunity for territorial expansion and the address of other significant internal issues. news of the war reached a british government which had

recently been reconstructed, as the prime minister had just been shot in the house of commons and his replacement, lord liverpool was not thought to be destined for a long term in office. in fact, he would last 15 years prime minister, but nobody knee that at the time. he was not thought to be a great leader, an inspiring figure. he was not a man with a command of the rhetoric of parliament or indeed a great public persona. he was not a heroic figure but he turned out to be a very good manager of a cabinet at a time when the british needed management because the king, the last king of this country as well, george iii was sliding into a permanent madness and his regent, his son george iv met a poor showing on the national, let alone international stage. we needed a leader who was solid, reliable, and made good, effective use of the resources at hand and lord liverpool turned out to be that man. the british were in the tenth

year of a conflict with napoleon bone apart. the war had broken out in early '03. the issues are many and various, but the british had been waging war against the greatest warrior of modern history for a decade. they had managed not to lose. partly because they live on an island. british ministers had little reason for optimism in 1812 that the war would end well. the last great british victory had been the battle of trafalgar, and since then, the british had hung around the margins of europe, annoying the french and hoping the rest of europe would realize that being ruled by france was a bad idea. some europeans had seen this but not all of them. the british were not especially worried by the american declaration of war. after all, the united states was then quite a small country. it had relatively limited resources and no great reputation for having a large and powerful army or indeed a

particularly large navy either. what the british were worried about was the additional strain on their already seriously overstretched resources. i show you this slide just to remind people that the louisiana purchase is transformational for the united states. it turns a country which really looks to the atlanta into one that starts to look to the rest of the continent. not just west but north and south as well. the war between britain and america was, of course, a consequence of the anglo-french war. it was britain's strategy of block aid block blockading europe with extreme measures that brought on the clash with the united states. after the destruction of his navy at trafalgar napoleon had instituted a total economic war against britain. his strategy was to exclute british trade from europe and

try to bankrupt the british. napoleon understood the basis of british power was not men, armies, or even fleets. it was trade and money. if napoleon could break the british economy, britain would surrender. his continental system would harness the european continent in a war against britain. they would exclude all british trade from europe on penalty of seizure and destruction. the british counterblockade, the famous orders in council did exactly the reverse. it cut europe off from the rest of the world, so the europeans had to fight a 12-year-long war without any coffee. there were a few other things they missed as well. the british counterblockade cut europe off from africa, asia, and the americas and fundamentally, it threatened america's economic development. from 1803 through to 1812 american shippers, much nlts

and traders had made a lot of money being the last neutral carrier, the last country that could carry goods from the french west indies to europe, through the british blockade. they were also trading with the british. and neither the british nor the french treated the americans particularly kindly. the british would arrest their ships and send them before court. napoleon simply burnt them. but the american government felt napoleon was less dangerous than the british or indeed less dangerous to their interests. the continental system not this continent, but the european continent, was beginning to destroy the economies of other european states. napoleon protected france from the economic war by asset stripping all of the conquered territories. the first country to rebel would be russia. napoleon's only serious ally, and a major trading nation with a big export trade geared towards supplying the british

market. inside the continental system from 1807 to 1811, russia saw their economy collapse. being part of napoleon's team was very bad for your business. in 1811, the czar of russia, alexander, realized if he carried on like this, his country would be bankrupt and he would follow his father to an early grave. the last time russia had made war on britain, the czar was murdered and they changed the government. basically, most of the landowners in russia relied on selling goods to the british to pay their bills. so the czar decided that bankruptcy and death was slightly less bad than being invaded by napoleon but only slightly. even as the war of 1812 is about to start, the cracks in napoleon's system are becoming fundamental, but the british haven't yet seen the future. in 1811, the long-running interchange of arguments at sea

reached a high point with the incident between the uss president and hms little belt. the little belt is the small one with the union flag. a case of mistaken identity according to commodore john rogers. a case of deliberate aggression according to arthur bingham. but the british made little of it. they were far too busy doing other things. in 1811, 1812, napoleon is beginning to gear up for the invasion of russia. this will be the great campaign that will decide the outcome of the conflict in europe. mr. madison's war depends on the french winning. if russia collapses back into the system, napoleon is done in europe. what hope have the british got of carrying on? they will have to make terms. it will be possible then to negotiate with them on a range of issues. but the british wouldn't surrender to napoleon, let alone to james madison.

the main british army was fighting successfully in spain, and the royal navy was protecting trade. the british had no spare ships. men, or money to fight a war with anybody else. indeed, during the war of 1812, the british military effort on land and sea was rarely more than 7% of their land and sea forces. they simply didn't have any more to spare. it wasn't a case of choice. that was all there was. in 1812 and 1813, british strategy is defensive and it's largely reactive. americans had the initiative. they chose where to fight and how to fight. as we know the united states opened the conflict with what should have been a three-pronged defensive into what is now canada and a surge of warships and privetears into the western atlantic to cut britain's economic lifelines. the canadian frontier became the main military theater and for three years heavily out numbered

members defended the border. to meet these attacks, the british shifted some troops into the canadian theater, but they came from the west indies, not from europe. the british moved no soldiers until the end of the napoleon conflict. as long as napoleon remained in power, british strategy would be defensive. the border did not move. this was a long-running but ultimately stalemated conflict. this left the madison administration with an alternative strategy the destruction of british floating trade and the wrecking of britain's economy. a strategy that relied on privateering. the united states navy was too small to do this. it needed the assistance of a large number of privately owned and operated licensed predators. the british response to the american declaration of war, there is the canadian frontier was the appointment of vice

admiral warren seen here with his red sash on here. a diplomat highly successful naval operator he was sent to command the entire theater with powers to negotiate an armistice and an early return to the status quo independentempty, that's what the british wanted. are the americans serious about the war, are they not prepared to think about this and go back to business as usual? warren's job was to do everything but wage war until he knew the americans were absolutely determined on fighting. his command strikes from newfoundland to mexico and he would be hampered by inadequate means, poor communications and very limited support from his home government. his defense of british shipping in the atlantic would determine the outcome of the war. but only after the americans had declared they were desperately serious about waging it. only then could he turn defense into offense.

imposing a devastating economic blockade that treated it as part of napoleon's system, something to be blockaded and economically ruined. initially, shortage of ships and limited rules of engagement hampered warren's business. but even in late 1812 he began the difficult job of capturing and incarcerating the american privateer fleet. as british prisons filled with american sailors, theprieve tear effort would begin to falter. only in mid-november, some 5 and a half months after the declaration of war, did warren learn the americans were determined to continue the conflict. he was then tasked with setting up a fully effective convoy system to protect all the shipping transiting from the new world to the old from the caribbean and from british north america into british ports. by this stage, over 150 british

merchant ships had already been captured and more privateers were fitting out. there was money to be made in privateering. it was an attractive option in 1812. his masters in london underestimating the scale of the privateer threat and rather ignorant of the length and complexity of the united states coastline sent them very few resources. what they did send initially were not of the first quality. they woke up when the united states navy won three shattering victories over the royal navy. these successes in the autumn of 1812 made the british government pay attention. here we see the constitution taken in the wonderful picture which manages to disguise the key fact of the batter. it was only two thirds the size of the constitution, it had two thirds the fire power and rather less than two thirds the crew if the american captain would have lost the battle, he would

have made a poor showing indeed but that's not the story that appears in the republican newspapers. the second battle was rather embarrassing. the british captain was both blind and a fool but the third frigate captured put up a very credible fight against once again a far bigger american ship. the two defeats were neither dishonorable nor disadvantageous. they got their crew back and the one thing they were short of was sailors as we know from the prewar impressment, while they had won the battles instead of carrying on to destroy british war ships had to go home for repair repairs. at the cost of glory, the americans had ruined their mission. as was said, these were strategically irrelevant victories, but they provided the united states government, which had a lot to explain with very useful propaganda. the fact the republican administration had hamstrung the

navy for the previous 12 years made it all the ironic it was the navy who rode to their rescue. the british government belatedly ordered general reprisals against the united states on the 13th of october, 1812, news that didn't reach the new world until the end of november. on november 21st the british government imposed a strict and riggious, and i wrote, blockade on the river. they had read the division list of congress, and they knew who voted for war and who didn't. if you voted for war, there british blockaded you and attacked you. if your congressman didn't vote for war, the british left you alone. the british understood the best way to defeat the enemy was to divide and conquer, not overwhelm. because britain is a small country, we have no history of overwhelming anybody. furthermore, the northeastern ports were providing huge amounts of resource for the british war effort in spain in particular, the duke of wellington's army ate

american-grown grain. american food supplies also crossed into british north america. the good people of vermont fed the british army in canada for the entire war. to their enormous profit, one has to understand. critically the economic blockade was finally establishes on 21st february 1813, eight months after the war had begun. there had been a golden eight months in which it was possible to continue operating peace and war at the same type. ultimately, this blockade would break the american economy, bankrupt the state, and it would leave it unable to borrow money or raise credit either internally or internationally. quite simply, the united states would run out of money, and as everybody knows the sinews of money are money, money, and more money. when you run out of that, you have to stop fighting. there's the constitution taking the java. this is by a british artist and it gets the scales of the ships -- well -- that's actually

not quite as accurate as it might be. the java was a little bigger than that, but it does look like the constitution is shooting at a rowing boat. the decisive battle of the war of 1812 happened on the 2nd of september, 1812. you're all familiar with it. it's one of the great moments in world history, enough to write a vast symphonic work to inspire a magnificent novel and bring down a great emberrer. in a single field work on this day of battle, more russians died than were killed or died of illness in the whole of the war of 1812 on all sides. this really was a titanic clash.emperors and two vast arm armyies numbering close to 200,000 each. frankly, it wouldn't be fought by 200,000 men all told. as 1813 began, james madison

knew that napoleon had lost. his army was in full retreat. it was indeed in complete collapse. he the taken the country to war on the premise the french would win. they had lost. now what was going to happen? this also took the pressure off britain, and it released naval re-enforcements from the british fleelt fleet in the baltic, a very important fleet keeping the baltic open for the previous five years. those ships and key personnel were moved across to the northern american station. the british very carefully picked out the right ships and the right officers to send to blockade the united states. their best men. many of them proteges of nelson, one of whom we'll come to. furthermore, with rurth trade open, the british didn't need to buy grain from the americans anymore. the russians had plenty of grain and it was closer to britain. the summer of 1813, fast british battleships and more numerous and better commander friigates

were available to blockade the chesapeake. the united states navy would find it difficult to get to sea and they would not find it easy to attack well protected and organized convoys. among the men who arrived in 1813, none would be more famous than admiral george coburn. picked out as one of the staroffs the future by the great man himself. he was spent over here very specifically to take the offensive onto the american coast, and i quote accelerate the return of peace. we know what he did. these re-enforcements enabled warren to impose a naval blockade of the coast pinning sloops and friigates in boston and new york. this meant the threat to convoys was merely from volunteers. it was safe from american pronation. by may 1813, the economic blockade was biting, too. new york, the largest american

port producing one quarter of the nlsh nart revenue from customs dues was closed. the revenue was drying up because most federal revenue came from import and export dues. they felt catastrophic levels. it was impossible to pay for the war. it would have to be paid for on borrowing. they stopped selling at rates. as henry adams observed, the pressure of the blockades was immediately felt. the war soon turned in britain's favor. first, the frigates were -- and the chesapeake seen here with the stars and stripes under the union jack was captured by hms shannon in a battle that lasts 11 minutes. the most brilliant, brave and heroic feet of either navy in the entire war. the fact that captain who won

the battle was an obsessive megalomaniac meant he picked the wrong enemy. but with those three frigates removed from the list of ships at sea, the american naval threat effectively evaporated. the royal navy now focused on volunteers and 6,000 were locked up in a british prison in south devon, which was a particularly unpleasant place to send them. we built it for the french, but we ran out of frenchmen, so we used it for americans as well. they wanted the americans to say, we're sorry. we'll sort of go back and status quo. that was on the table from day one. that's all the british wanted. in 1813 the shannon action got the british quite excited. here is the contemporary cartoon by george crookshank, rather summed up the british view of the war. this was annoying and they

rather wished it would go away. but 1813 was not about america. it was about napoleon. there was another great battle in september 1813. napoleon lost 73,000 from an army of 250,000. he retreated into france. the writing was on the wall for his empire. the british poured money and munitions into europe to defeat napoleon. they did not send money or men to america. they would have taken status quo any time. they defended canada, but they didn't have any resources to do anything else. in 1813, george coburn's rage in the chesapeake bay seized initiative, damaging the property of those who voted for war. at the end of 1813, the economic blockade was stretched all the way up to the edge of maine. new england was blockaded too. this would promote sectional conflict, but british options

were very limited. in the autumn of 1813, they had a chance to do something they had wanted to do for 30 years the capture northern belgium the one place you can invade england from. they sent all the troops they could find to do this, and they lost. it was embarrassing. they didn't have the manpower to do anything serious in europe, and europe was far more important than north america. the idea that had any offensive plans here is untrue. throughout the war, there would be more british troops defending the west indies than there were defending canada because the political power of the farmers and minchants was far greater than canada. west indian commercial interests saw admiral warren replaced by alexander cochran in the spring of 1814, and he, too we'll feature in the war. as peace approached in europe the british foreign secretary told the europeans that he would

not discuss maritime belligerent rights at a peace conference. blockade impressment, and he told the americans the same thing. these were the basises of british power. britain is a land power, not a sea power. control of the seas is their only strong arm. they maximized the strength of their navy. british naval power kept the american war and european war apart and condemned madison to a solitary conflict. once the americans had taken maritime belligerent rights off the agenda, peace could be discussed again. they might as well have had the treaty in britain. the americans resorted to some interesting mechanisms to defeat the navy, but they weren't impressed. not impressed. here is a german cartoon of the

downfall of napoleon. he went from emperor of the world to emperor of elbow which is a very small island. and the germans love this. here is the main player in our story. this is admiral sir george coburn's portrait, how he wished to be remembered. this isn't accidental, this is the man telling us about himself. he clearly thought this was one of his more important events. as we know the occupation of washington and the destruction of the public buildings was a major event. but more important it sparked a run on the american banks. everybody who had any cash took it out of american banks and put it into canadian banks in british government securities which paid better and weren't defaulting. on october 4th the united states became insolvent, a month later, it defaulted on the terms of the louisiana purchase. yet neither the destruction of washington nor the defeat at plax brg of british forces had

any serious effect on british policy. the british offers status quo because they just wanted the war to go away, even after the downfall of napoleon. there was not a war here they wished to fight. and the pieceeace treaty signed on the 24th of december was little more than a recognition of that fact. here is some of coburn's handiwork handiwork, and here's more of it. the battle of north point an interesting event, but far more important, the signing of the treaty of gent. by the time the treaty was signed the united states was in default by 3 million pounds, $3 million, $15 million with an outstanding on interest payment. the national debt rose by 200%. little wonder that canada demands an impressment and belligerent rights were abandoned. there would be two more battles. battle of new orleans you have heard of. this is the one not in the

textbooks. they captured sandy hook in another action in which both captains fought brilliantly, but the british captain was more brilliant. it is no accident that the headquarters of the royal navaly in london is hms president. it's the direct descendant of this mess. if you stop before the bar, you will see four engravings of this battle. this is the one the british remember. this is a map of the war of 1812. this is what 1812 is all about not interfering in the settlement of europe. the congress of vienna created a peaceful, stable european business that was open for business and unlikely to lead to another major conflict. that was britain's war aim. in the whole course of 22 years fighting the french, the british took from the rest of europe two very small islands, one in the mediterranean called malta, the other in the north sea. that's the entire access of

european territory in this war. they gave it all up for peace and stability. and then of course napoleon came back, but not for long. he was rapidly arrested after the battle of waterloo by the man who had run the blockade of new york for the previous two years. when the war was over, the republican party did what you would normally do as a political organization when you have presided over a failure, they declared it a great success. and the republican party's speechwriters, their newspaper men, and everybody else celebrated a great victory and erected a great arch of victory three frigate victories in new orleans which came down through the years. so walter scott, who understood how to create fabulous stories realized what the americans were doing and rather regretted they hadn't been taught a more severe lesson, but he realized the british weren't prepared to fight a war for such nebulous objects as teaching lessons. he knew the american pens would

create the victory that had eluded their swords, and he also understands that the enduring legacy of 1812 would be not territory, not maritime belligerent right, but a distikt american culture. the war of 1812 forced the united states to face up to itself and recognize that it wasn't part of something else. it was of itself. it was a country that would have its own culture. it would paint its own pictures. it would write its own stories. it would create an american identity, and this war is the spark from which that emerged. the war drove america to acquire a distinctive new world identity, one that privileged landscapes, scale, and the westward opportunities over the narrow confines and dusty histories of europe. perhaps the theory destruction of a classical mansion was the conflict's most appropriate metaphor. thank you very much. [ applause ]

we now have a short opportunity for some questions and answers. and i would be more than happy to do some questions. please. >> how did the american finances recover after the war? was it out of trade duties sufficient to refill the treasury? did we undefault on the loans? >> yeah. the economic problems of the united states were ended by the conclusion of peace. it opened up the international money markets to america. it also persuaded american financeiers there was something worth investing in. if you have seen the capitol

city trashed and the government fleeing, you don't think this country is something you want to invest in long term, so the resumption of peace opens up the domestic taps. it also leads to a massive boom in trade. all of that trade that didn't happen from 1812 to 1815 it happened pretty much as soon as the war ends. news of peace in london prompted every merchant in the whole of england to load the ship up with goods they think will sell in america, and this huge armada of trade crosses the atlantic and all of a sudden the east coast ports are flooded with goods. business booms again. there's then an economic setback, but essentially, the united states is able to recover its equilibrium and recover in the aftermath. peace is good for the business, good for the economy. war is not. a lesson the british had learned many years before. >> yes, have you seen what is

called the public record office. >> i'm sorry. >> have you seen in the public record office any orders to coburn and ross to burn the public buildings in washington? and the implication being retaliation, question mark. >> thank you very much. this is one of the great questions about what happened in washington. were coburn and ross operating under specific orders to do something as specific as burning the white house. certainly, there was a sense that after the occupation of what is now toronto and the destruction of the public buildings and in other parts on the niagara front where there had been cross-border destruction of private and public buildings by both sides that the public buildings of the state that had started the war were fair game. and nobody in europe would have thought this was in any way surprising. the whole operation was

organized by george coburn the only man among those in command who had been here long enough to work out what the target was and how to get there. the chronology is quite clear. the army with ross and alexander cochran arrived in the chesapeake and the next morning they set off and land and march across towards bladensberg. it's coburn's operation and he is responsible for everything that happens. he had no problem with that. but he didn't have specific orders to do it. his boss, alexander cochran was very supportive. cochran had lost his elder brother in the revolutionary war and harbored some dislike of americans as a consequence of that. it was a very divisive war and there were many on the british side who were old enough to remember that conflict. they had fought in it either as young men or as a ship capt in in the royal navy. memories of the last were were still very strong. they were quite raw for many

people. >> you have mentioned the burning of the government buildings, but we have heard it often said that no private buildings were burned. but a panel of scott showed me a drawing the other day i had noticed before that hadn't thought about it in this context, a drawing by latrobe in december of 1815 that shows george washington's buildings burned, ruins of them. and a large tavern nearby near the capitol that was also in ruins. this is a year after the british were there. and it seems as though they must have done the burning. >> thank you for that. did the british destroy any other buildings in washington other than the public buildings? the one private building they

destroyed was a building from which a sniper shot general ross' horse, obviously missing general ross, who i think was the target. the british didn't burn the building because it was part of a terrace so they pulled it down, and they destroyed the national intelligence, as any general would like to see the press suppressed. coburn took cs out of the press box so they couldn't write scurrilous articles about him. they had compared him to satan and not to satan's advantage, so he took a particular delight. he then decided he hadn't done enough, so he got the press out and burned that as well. remember that in the aftermath of that occupation there was a tremendous storm and there was a lot of damage done by the storm as well. so that may have been storm damage. but there's certainly no record of the british deliberately destroying any of the private

buildings. >> thank you very much for being here. when as part of the coburn's operation and ross' operation, of course, there was the squadron under captain gordon which came, ascended the potomac river, a rather remarkable adventure in itself. and as they came up and before they engaged ft. washington they sailed by mt. vernon. the very symbol of america with george washington. why didn't they just blow up mt. vernon? >> thank you very much. tomorrow evening, i'm going to be speaking in the masonic hall about that very operation. the reason the british didn't blow up mt. vernon is because george washington was a liberal hero. as far as british liberals, certainly on the left of politics were concerned george

washington was a very significant figure in the creation of british democracy. he taught the british some very important lessons about representation. so they didn't burn the building. they stopped and the band came up and they played washington's march in his honor. so the british were not making war on america. they were making war on the american government. and they recognized that half the population of america were not enthusiastic about this war. the federalists response to the war was not particularly engaged. they saw that this was very much a partisan conflict within america, and they very carefully targeted those americans who they believed to be the causes of the war. hence the use of the congressional divisionalists. george washington is off limits part of the history of britain and america. he's an officer in king george's army first and he's spared as all are almost all private buildings the british can spare. thank you.

one there and one there. why don't you go first? >> at one point was part of the british war aim's for concluding the conflict to create some sort of native american territory in the old northwest and what happened to that for it to go status quo ante? >> the british government's position on the peace treaty was not entirely unified. the british minister who was most involved in running the war, the secretary of state for war was also responsible for british colonies and his view was it would be a really good idea if we could build some kind of buffer zone between the united states and british north america to reduce the possibility of future conflict, and the native american peoples were seen as an ideal opportunity to do this. his cabinet disagreed vehemently. they didn't want to spend $10 million a year to improve the border of canada.

he was out voted and then the international lawyers started to look at the problems of creating a buffer zone which belonged to a people who had no residential qualifications and did not have any national identity. and at law it would have been almost impossible to have created a territory to give to the native americans. there was simply no framework to do this. european legal systems did not recognize the rights of native peoples. which is how you're able to sweep right west across the whole of the continent because there was no legal framework for giving them national identity. it was an idea it was mooted and used as a way of pushing the americans away from talking about maritime belligerent rights. the british put something up which they had no intention of trying to execute because it was incoht. there was no particular form you

could give it there was a line in the northwest, but it was never intended what the line was, who would decide it, who would police it. the americans thought they won something, but what the british had done is make the americans worry about something which they couldn't care about and exchange, they got maritime rights off the treaty table. so it's a nice -- it's a nice way of everybody feeling they have won something, but there was no way that this could have been set up. we would have to have agreed washington and london that the native american peoples were a nation and that they had a national identity rather than being tribal peoples who were spread across the countryside in a completely different way. sir, question there. >> okay. there's a william charles cartoon or pair of cartoons. one lauded baltimore and the other condemning the alexand rheens. i wondered if you could comment. >> yeah william charles, the

famous cartoonist who makes fun of the alexand rheesen lived and works in alexandria and he was british, a british republican. his cartoon is very much the republican view of the alexan dreeens which was very unpliz unpleasant, and he then used the baltimore cartoon of showing the british could be beaten. they weren't beaten at bloor baltimore. they just decided they didn't want to -- if you want to start baltimore, we can do it. there are 20000 americans dug in in a very strong position at baltimore. the british have less than 4,000 ground troops. how are they going to get into baltimore? the british didn't have another army, so if they burned their army up attacking baltimore they had no more troops back. >> i'm more curious about alexandria. >> with alexandria, the picture is quite clear. a mythic beast has got the citizens of alexandria on their

knees with their hand standing up on end as your hair would if you saw a real miniature, but the sailors are saying we have to get out of there before the american naval heroes turn up. john rogers and david porter and oliver hazard perry. they did turn up and tried to stop the british leaving but they failed. the british got back after some interesting exchanges of fire. it's a very important political cartoon, but you have to read it as a very much partisan cartoon. it's like the cartoon i showed, it's one side of the argument, but it's an internal cartoon. it has no resonance with the british at all. this is the republicans pointing the finger at the federalists and saying you're not patriotic. one more. >> i would just like to say that the score is now even. this last weekend, the city of alexandria challenged the royal navy to three sporting events, and the city won all three.

[ applause ] >> i'm very pleased to hear that, but of course, the score in frigates in the war of 1812 was three each. and as the british took all three of their prizes home and the americans got only one of theirs home, i think we got that one on points. thank you very much. [ applause ] coverage of the speakers of the symposium on the british burning of washington, d.c. during the war of 1812 continues with allen taylor the author of the civil war of 1812. it's 55 minutes. so i now have the great pleasure of introducing dr. allen taylor. he joins us as the thomas jefferson, just talking about that gentleman.jefferson chair at the

university of virginia. he's previous two decades were at the university of california at davis. he is, as probable all of you know, a distinguished scholar of the war of 1812 and wrote the book, the civil book "the civil war of 1812" which really looks at that engagement in great detail. but recently and very exciting for us who live in virginia, he published the national book of war and pulitzer prize winning, "the internal enemy: slavery in the war in virginia 1772 to 1832" and it really looks at the war of 1812 with such a different lens. alan's groundbreaking work, "the scholarship" which highlights this very understudied story of the war of 1812, particularly the runaway slave who sought their freedom by joining with british forces, it's just something i think is very intriguing and alan, we want to learn so much more. so please come forward and let's hear about this new story of the war.

[ applause ] >> thank you, kat, for that very kind introduction, and i'm grateful to you and to leslie for all your hard work in organizing this, to the white house historical association and the u.s. capitol historical association. and to james madison's montpelier for bringing all of us together today. i want to introduce some characters who tend to be bit players in the usual story of the war of 1812. and to try to make a case that they were much more than bit players. and i want to begin with one of them, a man named willis. we don't know his last name. because enslaved people were denied in the public record last names in virginia in this period of time. he was 14 years old when he

first escaped from his master's plantation in virginia. and he escaped from princess ann county which is down in the vicinity of where you would find virginia beach today. it's july of 1807, he was 14 years old, and he stole a boat and he rode out to the a british warship. anchored in nearby lynnhaven bay. now, he expected a warm welcome from the british because war then seemed eminent. this was in the immediate wake of the british attack on the american forget the uss chesapeake which came very close to igniting war five years before the war of 1812. initially the british mariners did feed and welcome and clothe willis and four other refugees who also stole boats to get away to the british.

but a month later, the british captain forcibly sent all of them back to their masters. in a bid to defuse tensions with the americans. but remarkably, instead of dwelling on that betrayal, willis later recalled that he quote, had been to the british once and that they treated him well and he wished his master let him remain, end quote. and in 1814, after war did break out in earnest, willis had much better luck fleeing again to a british warship along with quote, many other negroes in the neighborhood. end quote. and this time, he remained free. now, willis' persistence demonstrated the persistent allure of the british as potential liberators among the restive slaves of the tidewater region of virginia and maryland.

for example, in july 1814, in calvert county, maryland a farmer sought water by visiting a spring. he noted a group of slaves already there. and so the farmer hid behind a tree, and he overheard, quote, the negroes belonging to the said john j. brook assigned to the different british admirals, end quote. two days later, three of those cheering slaves fled to the warships. now the argument i want to make today is that by their enthusiasm for the british as potential liberators, the enslaved people of the chesapeake made it so. flocking to them in unanticipated numbers that would by early 1814 compel a major rethinking of british strategy in the chesapeake. at the start of their first chesapeake campaign in 1813, the british officers were under orders to take on no more than a

few black men and only men who could be useful as pilots and guides. but a year later in 1814, they would seek and entice hundreds of runaways including women and children, and including willis. so like willis, the other runaways would not take no for an answer. now, professor andrew lambert gave a very nice introduction of the reluctance of the british to engage in these war, and they were slow to wage the war with great vigor because they hoped that it would end pretty quickly in its first year. and so it's only in the second year of the war in 1813 that they send a major expedition into chesapeake bay with the purpose of punishing the states of virginia and maryland.

from a perception that those two states were the heartland of american resources and also the political home, principally, in virginia of the governing republican party which the british quite rightly blamed for making this war. so the british purpose in coming into chesapeake bay in 1813 is initially not to free any slaves of any significant numbers. the job is to punish the americans who lived along the shores of the chesapeake. to do so primarily by rating shipping that was vulnerable to this british naval supremacy which was overwhelming in chesapeake bay. and secondarily to raid exposed and vulnerable villages along the major waterways. what the british are very reluctant to do is to go into the interior. they were fearful of the very

dense forests that surrounded the chesapeake. they feared being ambushed, they feared american riflemen, they didn't know where an attack might be coming from and they didn't know in what numbers and they severally did not know the lay of the land. and that's very inhibiting on the british. and when you read the letters of their captains and their admirals during 1813, they are full of mystery and fear about the interior. just a mile or two beyond where they could make their landings. so they're very skittish and they're not all that effective. so despite the miseries that they do inflict on a fair number of americans during the campaign of 1813, that campaign closes with a sense of frustration by british naval commanders in the chesapeake. they have not achieved their

principle goal which was to make life so miserable for the people of virginia and maryland that their government would call off their invasion of canada. far from it. the united states is planning yet again to pursue an invasion of canada in 1814, despite the failures of their invasion attempts in 1812, in 1813. now another problem that the british had that had inhibited them from being aggressive in going ashore is that they were fearful that their own men would desert. the royal navy had a major problem which was it was shorthanded. and it shorthanded because the royal navy's very large and as andrew lambert pointed out, england, or i should say the british isles, are not

particularly large and populous places. and maintaining a global navy was a major challenge. and to do so at an unprecedented scale, the royal navy is larger than it's ever been before in its history in 1813 and 1814. because of their war against napoleon on a global scale. and so the ships that are sent over into the chesapeake are shorthanded. and then they suffer the loss of further seamen. now a few of them are combat desks, but and a few more of them are deaths from disease, but there's also a significant loss by desertion because sailors decide that wages are higher and alcohol is cheaper in the united states, and the working conditions are a whole lot better off in baltimore than they were on the british royal

navy warship. now i'm not saying here that most sailors deserted or that most sailors wanted to desert, but any desertion is a problem for these crews that are already shorthanded, and british officers have the perception that their men are prone to desert along the coast of the united states to a much greater degree than they ever would desert anywhere else in the world. so the british, this adds to a certain skittishness when the british do go ashore, because their commanders have the unenviable task of fighting an enemy while also closely guarding their own men. so the chesapeake have a couple of problems that are revealed in 1813 in their operation. one is they need able-bodied men who will resolutely fight the enemy rather than desert to it.

a potential solution lay in the hundreds of runaway slaves who were eager to be on british naval warships. and they were fleeing in stolen bolts and canoes to seek refuge during 1813. unlike the british deserter who anticipated a better life in the republic, the former slave didn't want to go back to the republic. and so they did not desert. indeed as marines, they could be deployed to watch the white sailors and to pursue deserters. admiral coburn sought to replace many of his white marines with recruits. quote, they are stronger men and more trustworthy. for we assure they will not desert, whereas i am sorry so to say we have instances of our marines walking over to the enemy. end quote.

and promoting slave escapes seemed a perfect turnabout to punish the americans who were so zealous about enticing britains to desert from their duty. and so it is the desertion problem that is one of those things that nudges these naval officers to embrace blacks as essential allies in the chesapeake war. to perform more effectively, the british needed more men. now they have a second problem, they need better knowledge of the landscape. and here, too the solution to their problem lies with runaway slaves who are pressing themselves on the british in growing numbers during 1813. now, they're under strict orders not to take in a significant number of refugees. these orders were renewed in march of 1813 by the british secretary of state for war in the colonies.

but despite these orders, black men, women, and children are stealing boats and they are rolling out to these warships and they are essentially calling the bluff of the british naval commanders. and they are forcing those naval officers to make some hard decisions. will they take in these men, women, and children in violation of their orders or send them back to suffer severe punishment by their masters? and naval officers are coming to perceive african-americans as a potential military resource that could be invaluable. and they know that if they start systematically sending these people back to severe punishment, that they will lose that potential resource. also, frankly, they like feeling holier than thou compared to

americans and they're just sick about americans going on about how liberty loving they are. here's a great opportunity for british naval officers to say who is the world's most sincere and true champions of liberty in the world? the people taking on napoleon bonaparte, and willing to emancipate the slaves held by these allegedly freedom-loving republicans of the united states? well, this is just too delicious for british naval officers to resist. and they really don't want to resist and so they have to write to their home government to try to get that home government to shift its policy. in late may, admiral warren reported that his warships had received about 70 refugees, quote, to whom it was impossible to refuse an asylum, end quote. and in these reports to his

superiors, warren is walking a fine line. he's making clear that he's following official policy and doing his best to discourage these runaways but can't really turn them all away. although they're including entire families of women and children, as well as men. by the end of 1813, the best evidence is that at least 600 enslaved people from the chesapeake had escaped to the british. on november 14th, the captain of the royal navy noted their military potential. quote, the slaves continue to come off by every opportunity and i have now upwards of 120 men, women, and children on board and if their assertions be true, there is no doubt but the blacks of have is a and maryland would cheerfully take up arms and join us against the americans, end quote. although many masters have come

out on the flags of truce to the british warship and asked for permission to speak to their slaves. quote, not a single black would return to his former owner, end quote. january of 1814, the british government comes around and endorses warren's proposal to enlist black troops among the runaways. and, indeed, it also authorizes the naval commanders to take in women and children as well, for it was well understood that the men would not come if they could not also bring women and children with them. implementation of the new policy fell to vice admiral sir alex cochran who supplanted war in command of the north american squadron on april 1st of 1814. and he issued his famous proclamation, which is extremely clever in its word. it never uses the word slaves. but instead his address is to, quote, all those who may be

disposed to emigrate from the united states with their families." now, it turns out there's only one white family that takes them up on this and that was in georgia at the end of the war and the british were completely flummoxed by this and had to explain to this poor white family that it really wasn't meant for them. but it's also -- in his proclamation, in the tie pogfy of this because he had 1,000 copies of this printed out, the word free is put in capital letters compared to everything else around, and it's giving these emigrants quote, their choice of either entering into his majesty's sea or land forces or being sent as free settlers to north america or the west indies where they will meet with all due encouragement, end quote.

now, i mentioned that cochran had a thousand copies of this printed up. he had his subordinate admiral coburn and his subordinates distribute this when they go on shore. they'll nail this up on trees. they're trying to get the word out. incredibly, the americans help in the process, unwittingly, by reprinting the proclamation in their newspapers. now, they do this because they can't wait to denounce it because they just think this is the most horrible thing on earth and it's really an invitation to slave revolt and they want to assure slaves that they are really being lulled away and the british are going to sell them away into slavery in the west indies. so, by anything that appears in the american newspapers, people talk about. that is the can ululture of the day. and this is world in which black people and white people live right intermixed amongst each other. and so anything that white folk talk about, black folk learn about and they interpret it in their own way. so the national intelligence

doesn't mean to be promoting slave escapes but it unwittingly does so. and the orders now are different. so cochran instructs to coburn quote, let the landings you make be more for the protection of the desertion of the black population than with a view to any other advantage. the great point to be obtained is the cordial support of the black population, with them properly armed and backed with 20,000 british troops, mr. madison will be hurled from his throne. so this is now job one. this isn't some by-product. this is what you've got to do first and foremost because it is the essential means to the end. the defeat of the madison administration. now, these are the types of

boats that the british used in the shore raids. this is a drawing done by a rear admirals who was active in the chesapeake operation, sir malcolm. the actual drawing was done along the coast -- along the shores of louisiana later in the war, but it's the same type of coastal craft used in the chesapeake. now, the british establish a refugee camp on tangier island and it's regarded as ideal because it is sufficiently removed from the shores of virginia, the mainland shores of virginia. it's pretty secure from attack. but it's close enough and it's right in the center of the black population of virginia, which is in the tidewater both on the eastern shore and to the west on the western shore. and coburn's words, the island was, quote surrounded by the

districts from which the negroes always come, end quote. this is a modern artist's attempt to imagine the drilling of colonial marines. colonial marines was the special unit formed for american blacks, former slaves, to augment british forces in the chesapeake. we have no images from that time of colonial marines so it requires an artist informed by knowing what the uniforms of regular marines looked like and knowing something about the structures that would be built in virginia at that time. so this is showing the refugee camp at tangier island and it's showing the drilling by a white officer who is the man gesturing with his hand of three new recruits of the colonial marines.

initially, admiral coburn has a pretty low expectation of these troops. and the colonial marines is a unit that resembles on a much smaller scale the union color regiments of the civil war in that the officer is a white man but the enlisted men and the ncos are african-americans. and they are being attracted into the service because they're not being compelled to it, and indeed, as far as we can tell, most of the runaways, indeed, including most of the men, don't choose to be colonial marines. some may end up as sailors or others work more informally as guides. many women worked as laundresses and nurses. some of them are serving as paid servants for british officers and others go to work for the dockyard in bermuda. so there's a whole range of roles, and it is a subset of the

men who are serving in the colonial marines and they're not compelled to do this though there is a great deal of persuasion applied to encourage them to serve. and they are attracted by the fact they will be paid they will receive decent clothing for the first time in their lives. they will receive a daily meat ration for the first time in their lives. they will receive a daily alcohol ration for the first time in their lives. they will receive some respect and they will have the opportunity to plunder and in some cases kill their former masters. now, possessing racial prejudice, because these british and naval officers, again they're growing into this role. don't get the idea that these are william lloyd garrison from the decks of these naval warships. you know, they've got other priorities.

so they're not natural-born abolitionists but they are working up a real good hatred for the united states as this conflict fwoezgoes along and they're trying to think, how can we really stick it to them? it occurs to them by liberating their slaves and using them against them. that's what's going on here. and coburn thought, well, it's useful because it draws these people away from their masters. it weakens the economy. he's not so sure that these young men are going to be effective fighters. he said, quote blackie hearabout, that's what he says in 1814 as the drilling has started. a month later, however, coburn changed his mind upon noticing how well the new recruits responded to their training. he reported they were, quote getting on astonishingly and are really fine fellows. they induced me to alter

the bad opinion i had of the whole of their race and i now i believe these who we are training will -- end quote. and with glee he noted that this is the news of the colonial marines was alarming the local masters. quote, they expect blackie will have no mercy on them and they know that he understands bush fighting and the locality of the woods as well as themselves and can perhaps play hide-and-seek in them even better, end quote. and during may and june, he starts to employ the colonial marines as part of the rating forces and they are systematically targeting militia batteries, particularly along the eastern shore and along the northern neck of virginia and in the valley of southern maryland.

and they perform very admirabley and win the universal praise of british naval officers. i'll just quote one of them and, again, it's coburn but you could multiply these quotes. quote, how uncommonly and unexpectedly well the blacks have behaved in the several engagements and though one of them was shot and died instantly in the front of the others it did not daunt or check the others in the least but on the contrary animated them to seek revenge." now, on the one hand, by recruiting blacks in significant numbers, the british are able to escalate their shore raids. they are able to go deeper inland than they ever could in 1813. they also need to do so because the british cannot sustain their crews without food drawn from the shores of the chesapeake.

and there are more and more people on these warships and on tangier island as they are welcoming more refugees. in the first year of this operation when they were reluctant to take on the refugees, 600 had come to them. i believe that 2,800 went during 1814 which shows the payoff of the british now welcoming them and aggressively going out and seeking them. but now they have to feed them on top of their own crews. and so that means they have to accelerate and escalate their rating into the interior to get food, to get livestock, in particular, but to get hams, to get chickens. they are seeking out food. and they are going to the places where their colonial marines know best, their former neighborhoods. and that's an opportunity, then, for some revenge and it's also, more importantly, an opportunity to get out relatives who have been left behind.

so everybody's purposes are being served by these raids, the purposes of these runaways who have become colonial marines and the purposes of the british who want to punish the americans and need to get food for their own crews and this expanding refugee population. they benefit from the nocturnal knowledge of enslaved peoples who have had to become intimate experts in the landscape. because they have had to know how to navigate it at night and dodge slave patrols in order for them to meet their friends, to meet their wives, to meet their children because black families have been split up in this period of time and tend to live on different farms and plantations. so the black mustn't is maintained by nocturnal travel. they are the experts in this landscape. they know it better than their masters who allegedly own it. and it is that knowledge that passes to the british.

and we can find both in british sources very eloquent statements about how better informed and more secure they are now that they have blacks as their guides and as their light infantry in the form of these colonial marines, but we also find it from american officers. one of them brigadier general john p. hungerford of virginia said, quote, our negroes are flocking to the enemy from all quarters which they convert into troops vindictive. with the most minute knowledge of every bypass. they leave us as spies upon our post and return upon us as guides and soldiers in incendiaries. it was by the aid of these guides that ambushes were formed everywhere in the woods. from this cause alone, the enemy have a great advantage over us in a country where the passes and biways, through our

innumerable necks and swamps are so little known to but very few of our officers and men in through which the enemy can penetrate and be conducted with so much ease by these refugee blacks, end quote. and this is the same modern artist imagination of the colonial marines engaged in one of these raids at benedict maryland, and it shows them destroying some kegs of alcohol in the foreground. in the middle ground, you see a british naval officer directing a black family to safety and freedom in british boats that are just out of the scene here and in the distant background you see an american sailing ship being burned. so the whole range of activities that colonial marines would have been involved with, several of their activities are combined in this one imagined reconstruction of their activities. now, the point i want to make is

that this raiding would not have been as effective without the colonial marines that transformed british operations. here is a map done and i am grateful to ralph for sharing this with me. this shows the variety of targets the british had in 1813, the first year. and you'll see that it's fairly randomly scattered along the bay, east and west, north and south, by the maritime targets are the prince targets and that's indicated by these symbols for sailing ships. if we go to 1814, we'll see a very different nature of british attacks. many more shore raids and they are concentrated particularly along the northern neck of virginia and in southern maryland, either along the shores of potomac on the maryland side but especially along the patuksa river.

the british are targeting them for a reason. one, there are a lot of black people there eager to get out and help the british. these are also the pathways or i should say the waterways that lead to washington, d.c., and coburn has been looking for the opportunity to get to washington. he did not have that opportunity in 1813. now he has it in 1814. what he must first do is soften up and eliminate militia resistance along one of these two corridors. the virginians are much more republican than the marylanders of southern maryland and they fight a lot harder so coburn decides that the resistance is eliminated much more quickly and earlier because most of the people living in southern maryland don't really want to be part of this war at all. and they certainly don't want to deal with superior british

forces that are now well-guided by the local experts in the landscape. and it is because of this that the british are able to land without any opposition at benedict in mid-august of 1814 and they are able to advance to the upper reaches of the river and to approach the very outskirts of washington, d.c., again, without any opposition because that opposition has already been eliminated by the raids of the summer. and they were able to brush aside militia resistance which it belatedly appears at bladensburg and push into washington, d.c., where they famously burn the public buildings. here is a very famous image of that. and you will notice there's not a single black face represented in this which is all too common among representations of battles of the war of 1812.

they are presented as lily white affairs in almost all cases. the colonial marines were very much present in the occupation of washington, d.c., and in the burning of the white house and the capitol. now, so my argument today has been that the colonial marines and black refugees in general transform the british operation in the chesapeake and make it far more effective and destructive to the americans than had been their operation in 1813 when they did not have the same level of support and assistance from black americans. now, this is an image that is produced. i'm going to get this magic arrow out of the way, which is not part of the original image. you may recognize this structure.

it's the u.s. capitol building. this was produced in 1817 by a critic of american slavery, an american critic of american slavery named jesse torrey and jesse torrey wants you to think about the destruction of the capitol building and wants you to draw certain conclusions from it and those conclusions that he wants you to reach are indicated by the other figures he's put in this particular engraving. you can see down here in this right foreground, a group of enslaved african-americans, a slave coffle. washington, d.c., was a major center for the interstate slave trade of the united states which is accelerating in this very period of time. and, indeed, although i certainly find it impressive that 3,400 african-americans will escape to freedom during the war of 1812 from the

chesapeake, it is probably that something on the order of 60,000 enslaved chesapeake slaves were moved deeper south into the harsher slavery of the deep south during the same period of time. and jesse torrey is commenting on that. we have a slave trader who is there with a group of enslaved people, men, women and children. and then just so you will further get the message, we have a couple of other figures floating in the sky. two lady liberties who are -- so when you put together the three components of this, the message is that the u.s. capitol burned for the sins of the united states in sustaining slavery in the land devoted to freedom. now, the last thing i want to show you is the only photograph that we know of of one of the runaways from the war of 1812.

this is gabriel hall. he came from calvert county maryland. he was born probably in 1801. he was 13 years old when he escaped, so about the same age that willis had been. and this is a photograph taken much later in life, in 1891, when he was 90 years old. and he was a prospering farmer in nova scotia, which is where approximately 2,800 of the ref swri gys from the war of 1812 end up after the war as free people. that had survived and maybe those additional images will pop up by right now this is our only chance to look at the face of someone who from the african-american community experienced the events that i've discussed today. thank you very much. [ applause ]

so i'm happy to take any questions you may have. yes, please? [ inaudible question ] >> yes. okay. so i'll repeat the question. where do the british take the refugees at the end of the war? during the war, they are being taken to tangier island, to bermuda, a major british naval base and is the central headquarters for the operation on the chesapeake. other main british naval base in north america is at halifax, nova scotia. so probably about 1,200 during the war years are moved on to nova scotia and then another 1,600 are moved on to nova

scotia from bermuda or from the sea islands of georgia where the british also operated at the very end of the war. so we're getting about 2,800 who go to nova scotia. we've got another approximately 360 who go to new brunswick, another of the maritime provinces. and probably about 1,000 including most of the colonial marines who go to the west indian island of trinidad. and in trinidad they have their most successful experience. and they manage to maintain distinct communities in a distinct identity. professor allgor talked about identity formation in her presentation. this particular community in trinidad has maintained its cohesion, and they call themselves to this day the merikans to distinguish themselves from the many other

peoples of color in trinidad. so they dropped the "a." they turned the "c" into a kt"k." and they're merikans and a fair number of them have subsequently become immigrants in england or in the united states. but they are still very proud about being merikans. yes? >> [ inaudible ] the british was integrated. so why didn't the royal navy apply the lessons in louisiana that it arguably should have learned from the chesapeake? >> well, the british do. so the british forces in the chesapeake include two regiments of -- from the west indies. the black west indian regiments. so the british are really in the forefront of deploying people of color in their military. they do so in end wra and they also do so in the west endindies.

so 2/3 were actually black people when the war of 1812 begins. the united states is extremely reluctant to employ even free blacks in its military. it does so in the navy and the privateers, so free black americans make a major contribution to the u.s. war effort in the navy and the privateers but are not allowed in the u.s. army until the very end of the war when policy suddenly changes because the united states is basically on the ropes militarily and is desperate for men. the only place where a significant number of black men are employed in the united states army is at new orleans by andrew jackson. there are two battalions of free blacks were employed and probably another battalion of enslaved people promised their

freedom but andrew jackson. this employment outraged the local whites of louisiana. so andrew jackson is going out on a limb and he's a slaveholder himself in tennessee but this shows you how desperate he was for men to fend off this british attack which included back soldiers. unfortunate, or fortunate whatever side you want to put, unfortunate or fortunate on in this war jackson wins big-time and then he reneges on his promise to the black soldiers. he promised them freedom and then said, sorry, you're not going to be freed because i really don't have that power. yes? >> thank you for a superb presentation. >> thank you. >> clifford from warrenton, virginia. i question the effectiveness of a 1,000 broadside circulation to a population that cannot read by reality, the effectiveness of

their inability to read. and i also question the notion that white virginians, marylanders, would discuss the circulation of this broadside to their enslaved people. can you address that? >> yes, i can. two very good questions. one is, there is much greater literacy among the slaves in this period of time than i think we've recognized. this is probably the peak period for literacy among enslaved people. a couple of reasons. one is, it's not illegal yet to teach slaves to read and write in virginia. that will become illegal in 1832. in the wake of nat turner's revolt. until then, there's an actual fair amount of teaching slaves to read and write, particularly artisans and house slaves. the other thing is, this is also a period in which the vast majority of enslaved people in chesapeake have become

christians and they're usually methodist or baptist and they their class leaders or teachers would like many of them to be able to read the bible. so there's much more literacy than we have bargained on and you don't need everybody to be able to read it. he can read it to everybody else. the other thing is that people in america are lousy at keeping secrets. they are the world's worst people at keeping secrets and this comes back to bite them all time in the war of 1812. you get officers in the front line writing letters about how terrible their troops are and they're not prepared and they're sick and they get published in the newspapers of that time. people talk about stuff. they can't stop themselves from talking. so we live in a society now where we've been conditioned for

the last three generations to try to keep secrets militarily and our government has become better and better at trying to keep these secrets. so it can be hard for us to understand this time where people were just blabbing away about everything. and we get this notion that black people and white people live in separate worlds. at that time, they didn't. and you'll get these virginians were who frankly say, we have an internal enemy and they are waiting on our tables, they are working in the fields next to us and they are hanging on everything we say and anything we say is being reported to the enemy. >> thank you very much. >> you're welcome. thank you for the questions. yes, ralph? >> why didn't the british -- [ inaudible ] why didn't that keep going? >> okay. well, this goes to the points that andrew makes. the british don't want to be in this war.

you know, sometimes these naval officers work up these real good fantasies about how great it would be to break up the united states and really stick it to the americans. but that's never the official policy of their government at home. their policy at home is, let's get out of this war as soon as we can so they want to inflict pain on the united states but not with a goal really at the official government level of breaking up the united states but of just getting them to give in and make a peace treaty as quickly as possible. so if we compare -- you know, at the peak, the colonial marines is a unit in the chesapeake of 360 men. you're not going to topple slavery with 360 men. in the union force that would end up toppling slavery had 360,000 black troops. it's a whole other scale of things. and that's because the union's goal was not to try to negotiate

a solution. it was to crush the south. and they realized the only way that they could crush the confederacy was to enlist thousands of african-americans to help them do it. and the british never get to that point because the war goals are so much more limited for the british and at the end of the day, what do the british want? they want the united states to go back to being their number one trading partner in the world. they want to be able to resume business and that's not going to be so good if you've totally destroyed the slave system in the united states. so the goal of the policy is to inflict pain on the united states, get them to give in and then go back to a more peaceful and trading relationship that is profitable to british manufacturers again. yes? >> i'm doing research on the slaves get on board the potomac squadron that came up the potomac river after the burn in washington. and the ship logs -- the british ship logs show they picked up slaves on several occasions and even trained some of the slaves

on board the decks in small arms in preparation for fighting the americans. and i've looked at the depositions that you've looked at so well described in your book. in these same depositions by the landowners that are filed after the war and give these wonderful stories about how the slaves got to the british they seem to be -- you can tell the landown landowners or the neighbors are making a big point on whether or not they went on their own accord or were forcibly taken. so i would like for you to speak about that. >> yeah. so slave masters don't like to see these escapes as a referendum on their conduct as masters because they like to believe that they've actually treated their enslaved people in their view, well. and so they preferred to believe that the british have come in and forced people away or -- but

sometimes you find out what this force means, and it means they come in and they've told the slaves that they'll have a better life if they'll go away with them. and from the perspective of masters in the chesapeake, these are just lies. that they're not going to have a better life with the british. so the overwhelming majority of people in virginia and maryland do not believe that the british are at all sincere in what they're doing and that these slaves are going to end up ruining the day they ran away from their masters. now, there's abundant evidence that this is not true. and there are a handful of slaves who do choose to go back to their masters at the end of the war. you can number them on the fingers of a hand. whereas you've got over 3,000 that prefer to stay with the british.

and it's also untrue it's a canard that just lives on and that the british sold at least some of them into renewed slavery in the war of 1812 and there is zero evidence that this happened. yes? peter. >> does a slave revolt have any effect on the military operations of the americans? >> yes, very much so. particularly on the ability to muster militia. so the united states has a major manpower problem of its own which is it doesn't have enough men to invade canada properly. and they're sending almost all of their regular troops to invade canada which leaves the defense of the coast overwhelmingly to state militias who are not trained and equipped or motivated for this job in any prolonged way, but they're out there month after month obliged to serve in harsh conditions with inadequate equipment and

food and a lot of them are being pulled in from the piedmont to the tidewater and they don't like it, and one of the things that they keep coming up with why they shouldn't have to go down to norfolk and die of malaria, which is the number one killer of american troops in the chesapeake is malaria at norfolk which is a graveyard for these militia. the reason they come up with is, the slaves are probably going to rise up and revolt if the militias pulled out of piedmont and went to the coast. the irony is, by all measures of violence, such as arson, poisoning, murdering of masters, even running away in the piedmont goes way down during the war. because there are so many militiamen marching back and

forth on these roads that actually the slaveholders in piedmont are in more secure control than they were in peacetime. the reverse is true in tidewater where enslaved people can see the british warships, they can hear the british warships because coburn very thoughtfully has his band playing as they go up and down. coburn liked to call attention to himself. he also liked to call attention because he knew that if -- that enslaved people would come the night after they heard this warship loudly moving up and down let's say the rappahannock. >> were the slaves who escaped house servants and artisans or were they -- which is what i would expect. >> there's a broad occupational range that slaves have in the chesapeake, and every occupation they have including field hand is very well represented. what i did find was that the

number who were artisans or house slaves, they are disproportionately represented among the runaways. what that means is, i am not saying they were a majority. because a majority are probably field hands as was a majority of the enslaved population. but the proportion of those who run away who are artisans and house slaves is larger than the proportion of the enslaved population. and we find the same pattern in the civil war. that the people who are -- who feel most aggrieved by slavery are those who have a little more education, a little higher skill, and are much clearer that their ambitions are being stifled. and the british are presenting an opportunity for freedom, what freedom means to a lot of former slaves is the opportunity to finally get the worth of their skill and to be able to hold their families together. and this is appealing across the

board but the people who kind of work up the courage to make the attempt are disproportionately artisans and this shocks the hell out of their shockers thinking, these are the people we've been best to and they should be most loyal to us and they're not. we get the same kind of rhetoric come out of slaveholders in the civil war when they are shocked their own house slaves would betray them. okay. thank you very much. [ applause ] . each week, "american history tv's" "american artifacts" visits museums and historic places. 200 years ago on september 11th

1814, british and american naval forces clashed for 2 1/2 heres in cumberland bay near plattsburgh, new york. the culmination of six days of army and navy conflict. up next, we travel to plattsburgh where author of "the final invasion: plattsburgh the war of 1812's most decisive battle" takes us on a tour of key locations to tell the story. >> we're in new york new york on lake champlain. today i have something to show you that's very rare. the militia deployed from the state of new york and there were 2,500 that were asked to only to fight the british as they rossed the border but only 700 showed up. and captain martin aiken who was the son of a lieutenant colonel in the militia he decided that he had all these weapons and no one to use them. and since the arsenal for the militia was in the basement of st. john's academy, he went upstairs to see the reverend. he asked to address the class. and the class consists of boys and girls of course, teenagers.

and he said to the boys, your fathers are all going forward to fight the british, and you're here, you could really help out. i've got plenty of weapons downstairs. if you come with me, if you volunteer to come with me and come downstairs and get these weapons, i'll show you how to shoot them and i'll show you how to do the military drill. and this afternoon we'll go out and we'll join the militia and we'll defend these girls and other members of the city right here in plattsburgh. well, of course, with that the boys looked around at all the girls and every one of them volunteered. 18 teenagers went downstairs with martin aiken and they learned how to use the rifles. and as the regular army passed by, they joined at the end of the column. this little platoon of teenagers led by a 20-year-old captain. they fought for five days. they stayed when the militia ran. and at the end of the battle

when mccomb was successful he was so impressed with aiken and his boys that he gave them their rifles. he granted them their rifles. of course, the army being the army, nothing ever changes. the quarter master said to the colonel, we don't have the authority to give away these rifles. these are government property. they had to recover all the rifles from the boys, and they left. in 1825, congress granted decorative rifles to the boys. and this is the only one that we know exists. this is martin aiken's decorative rifle. looks a little unusual because it's a haul and it was the very first of the rifles to have been assembled on line, therefore the lock, the stock and the barrel are all separate and interchangeable. this lock rather than being fed from the side is fed from the top. with a release mechanism here,

the entire lock comes out, can be replaced with a good one, snapped back in place and the rifle is functional once again. no longer would the rifle be made individually. congress wanted people to know exactly what this rifle was and so when they granted them the rifles, they put this decorative plate on the butt of every rifle. one of these showed up on the "antique road show" a couple years ago, the second one. the only other one we know that exists. i bet you there's more out there. take a look around. have you ever seen a rifle with a plate on it like this? our coverage of the white house historical session symposium on the war of 1812 and the burning of washington, d.c., continues with university of virginia historian john stagg. this is a little more than an hour. with that, let me introduce

with great pleasure dr. john stagg, professor of history at the university of virginia and the editor of the james madison papers where he's edited so far 20 of these critical volumes of madison's personal correspondence. and we'd like another 20, john if you think you could fit that in in the next few years. [ inaudible ] because of the work of john and his team we have much more complete understanding of madison and the contextsck of his life and really we cannot have done our work of james madison's montpelier without this incredible research. today he's going to illuminate the intricacies of madison, as well as the perpetually fluctuating cabinet and madison's later life reflections on his thought about the war. so please join me now in welcoming our colleague and our mentor, dr. john stagg. [ applause ]

>> thank you, cathy for the warm welcome. i would like to add my thanks to the previous speakers and to the organizers of the conference today. as the bicentennial of the war approached i found myself saying what was the federal government and washington goichk to going to do about the war of 1812. it was entirely predictable that the great state of maryland would have a pardon. particularly in 2014 because the great state of maryland thinks it has a franchise on the star spangled banner and the nation's flag.

i'm glad to say that we are doing something here today. and, as i say, i'm grateful to the conference organizers for that. let me start with some very general remarks about the nature of james madison's historical reputation. for the first half of the 20th century, i think madison's standing was not high. the main reason for that was the war of 1812 which i don't think i need to belabor here at the moment. one of the most frustrating and unpopular wars ever waged by the united states. but there was also the impression that madison was really just a pale clone of thomas jefferson. he didn't have a clear sense of madison as a distinctive

personality. there's also another factor, that was that madison, at a certain point in his life contributed not insignificantly to theories of nullification that drove the nation towards civil war in 1861. that was held against madison by national historians a long time ago. so if you looked at these rankings of prisons, you'd find that madison was always in the bottom half skchlt. admittedly, he wasn't right down there, but he was not thought of very highly.

well some strange things happened since then. if you look at current presidential rankings you'll see now that madison is ahead of 44 presidents to date. madison is now in the top 20. he's not way down there like he was before. recently, i saw a poll that said madison was number six. now, i'm not quite sure how to explain this. i'm just going to ask you to take my word for it at the moment.t;= in fact, such a poll does exist. i say this without self reference or flattery. i think it does something to the appearance of modern founding father's editions in the second half of the 19th century.

we now have a much clearer idea than previous generations of what madison contributed and how he might be compared to his contemporaries. on that process, i think madison has generally come to fair pretty well. he's emerged as an extensive figure. it might also owe something to the phenomenon sometimes referred to as founding sheik. madison has generally had his figure burnished. i might tend to suspected that as we become more satisfyied since the 1960s; there was more competitions in places at the bottom rankings. [ laughter ] >> i've had the effect of pushing up the standing of presidents from a very distinct past.

however, it does remain a problem with the war of 1812. even in the era of the bicentennial americans are confused about this war. they're confused why it occurred. the campaign to this war was by no means clear that the united states was a victim. the best many historians say, the nation managed unmuddled. so i think it's something of a paradox. the historical reputation of the present rising, in the war of 1812, has not.

someone said more about that paradox. if you take almost any book on the war of 1812, and there are a great many books on the war of 1812 from the past two centuries of the event, it's easy to pull out half a dozen factors or problems which contribute to its unsatisfactory progress and rather ambiguous outcomes. some historians relate this directly to madison. they say it's his fault. others can describe it as a problem which madison, as president, had to contend with, but he didn't do a very good job of overcoming. so what can we say about ma diay madison himself? my serious charge is that he did not want this war.

and how that's any of the other factors that determine the government of the war. so our first question is who's war was it? was it madisons or was it the war hawks? most historians favor the war hawks. the critical developments that face the final path on the way to the war occurred between march and july of 1811. in march of 1811, maydison

learned of the war and lanced edlapsed into his final bout of insanity. it was assumed they might then modify the fractions. now, ma day soften read these reportings. and he sensed there was a chance for american relations. and to take advantage of that possibility, he brought into his cabinet james monroe.

there were a number of reasons he did this. but one reason was that monroe had previously served as the american minister in london and had formed some personal relations with some british politicians who were expected to become british ministers. now,this was a window of opportunity. the region never changed. and, for that reason british policy towards the united states remained unchanged. now, addmittedlyadmittedly, in the summer of 1811 madison knew that george iii,'s old ministers were not likely to ease up. now, this prediction would come to pass.

now, how do we know this? we know this because of an editorial in the administration newspaper. oh, sorry. okay. all right. i wasn't looking behind me. yes. onwards and upwards. yes, how do we know this? because an editorial in the newspaper, the national intelligence, the newspaper that coburn trashed when he burned washington in 1814, it said as much. and we know from a surviving fragment of the diary of the paper, joseph gailles, that madison had dictated the