made out of stone and brick. we have the white house that's made out of stone and brick. we have the treasury which was made out of brick. we have the belmont-sue wall house which was made out of brick. the georgetown -- george washington townhouse on capitol hill which was probably accidentally started on fire by a spark from the capitol. that was made out of brick. the tomlinson's hotel, we don't have absolute proof that this was burned. but there's -- most of the evidence tends to point to it but there's some contrary information there. that was also made out of brick. now, these other buildings that you see below it, it says "houses that were possibly burned," this is based on newspapers' accounts. and there's only one reference and these are in various different newspapers. i can't honestly tell you if these are houses that actually burnt or whether it's mistakes that the newspapers make, because just like we've heard over and over today, newspaper

accounts are not necessarily the most accurate thing in the world. but if these had been supported by other information, primary documents, i'd be more likely to believe that they also burned but i can't find any of that. i just want to remind you that the americans were very upset about what was going on and when they talked about what had happened to washington, they tend to embellish the true facts. and then if you go down below, these were the things that were burnt after the evening of august 24th. so a better way to look at all of this is to compare what was actually burned on the evening of august the 24th. during that night. and you can see there's a very, very big difference there. and when we talk about the british burning washington, we're leaving the average citizen with this impression that the british came in and they burnt the entire city of washington, d.c. and if you look at this, you can see that the americans burnt a

heck of a lot in the city, but you don't hear anybody talking about the american burning of washington, d.c., during the war of 1812, i understand that. but look at all of these buildings over there. and this is the point that i want to emphasize one more time. if you're looking at the burning of the city after the british have come in and gotten to the capitol around 9:00, gotten to the treasury building, gotten to the white house at about 11:00, what do you think the flames would look like? where is the majority and the largest amount of the flames going to be coming from? are they going to come from these brick and stone buildings where you probably have fire issuing out of the roofs and maybe through the windows and doors? or is it most of it going to be coming from a navy yard that's almost entirely made out of wood, along with a whole bunch of stuff like hemp rope, canvas sails, tar, pitch, all of these things that are very, very highly flammable. i'd like to remind you to go

back to that thornton image that everybody believed was the burning of washington. and it's actually the burning of the washington navy yard. and so what i'm trying to get across to you is that i firmly believe that most of the red sky that was seen by people, whether it be in leesburg, virginia, 35 miles away, or in baltimore or even at the mouth of the river aboard one of the ships of the line where they reported in their logbook that they could see a red glow 40 miles away in washington, d.c., i think what those people were seeing were primarily the burning of the washington navy yard, which was set on fire by americans. the fires from the public buildings that the british burned and the few private buildings that they burnt because resistance came from them certainly added to that. but the flames coming out of those buildings i would argue, would be minuscule compared to what you would see at the navy yard. i don't want to go into a lot of detail here.

i'm getting hungry. if you look at the census of 1810, it's estimated that there were 109 total brick or stone buildings in washington. total structures were about 400. now, i want you to know that there's other references that say in 1814 there's possibly 800 to 900 structures. i find it hard to believe that between 1810 and 1814 you'd have that many new structures being built. again, i'm just showing you how inaccurate a lot of this information is. but no matter how you slice and dice it, if we take the maximum number of british structures that were burned or i should say structures that were burned by the british, it's 19. and that represents about 4.8% of the total structures that existed in washington at that time, if you use the lower number of 400. and when you consider that most

of those structures that the british burnt were the stone and the brick, that represents only one point -- sorry, 5.5%. i misstated here. so it's -- if you take all of these structures that were burned, it would represent 5.5. if you only take the other, it would be 1.4%. i've gotten more conservative since i put this particular power point together because we had to do this about ten days in advance and that gives you a lot of time to think about things. and i think it's always better to be conserve tive than to not be. so when i talk about the americans burning 22 buildings, i'm having second thoughts about that. and the reason for it is that i honestly believe that although there's 20 different things that are mentioned by tingey that were burned, i believe many of those were probably in the same building. so it's not really fair to think that each one of these were necessarily a separate building. so based on that, i'm going to revise this when i actually do

the paper so that you'll have a chance to read that. but the percentages are still going to be relatively small. so the important thing i want to get across to everyone here is that if you take a conservative approach to this and you combine the united states and the british and what they burned in washington, d.c., it's going to be less than 10% of the city. i don't think you can say burning less than 10% of the city somehow represents the burning of washington. if you want to be even more conservative and say that maybe there were 450 buildings there by 1814, maybe 500 buildings in 1814, if you want to lower the number of buildings that the americans burnt, you're going to come out with a much smaller percentage. you're talking more about a total of between 4% to maybe 5% of all of the buildings in the city that were burned. and if you notice that many of the speakers yesterday and

today, most of them tried to be very careful when they talked about this issue. and many of them said things like the british occupation of washington, or they would say the british burning of public buildings in washington, to try to stay away from what i essentially call a myth. i'm going to pass over this very quickly. these circles represent buildings that were current. the red circles, british. the blue circles, american. these are some of the depictions you see. none of these are contemporary. and you can imagine that if someone was not there, they're going to in their minds imagine all kinds of wild stuff. and there's nothing that you see here that probably is close to what actually happened. this one is particularly interesting. steve already showed it to you. this is the alan cox fresco that actually appears in the halls of the capitol today. and it's an interesting image because it attempts to show and

you can even see the title "british burn the capitol." the problem with it is that to the right you can see the brick house, the sewall-belmont house. that's the house that survives today although probably partially rebuilt if not majorly rebuilt because the british burned it because shots were fired from it as the british were approaching the capitol building. that building was burnt before the capitol. so this fresco is inaccurate. because if you want to show the belmont-sewell house the way it is right here, you would not have the capitol behind it burning. the sequence is wrong. also, notice how alan is showing the burning there. he's got a british soldier holding up a torch and then down below you can see where they're piling up combustibles and this guy is trying to start a fire to it. i really doubt that the british attempted to burn the sewall-belmont house from the outside. now, this is a quote --

remember, i told you there's a couple other accounts of how these buildings were burnt. this is by margaret baird smith. you already heard about her when holly gave her presentation. i'm going to read it. "50 men, sailors and marines were marched by an officer silently through the avenue each carrying a long pole to which was affixed a ball about the circum frens avalanche plate. when they arrived at the building --" and i honestly believe she's talking about the president's house but i can't be absolutely sure -- "each man was stationed at a window," interesting interesting, "with its pole and the wildfire against it." at the word of command -- you see some similarities -- at the same instant the windows were broken and this wildfire thrown in so that an instantaneous conflagration took place and the whole building was wrapped in flames and smoke. the spectators stood in awful silence.

the city was light and the heavens reddened with the blaze." and down below you have two examples of what these fireballs would have looked like. these particular ones are not attached to a long pole but the one on the left is made out of clay, the one on the right is actually macrame that's covered with canvas. and in there would be some type of a material that would be very, very prone to being lit to help to start a fire. so there's some similarities to this account, to the first account that i gave you with the jfl lin javelin business, but they're also very different. and i suspect that the truth is somewhere in the middle here, and i couldn't tell you which one is better. and this is another one. this is an image that came out of one of the books that i did and it is showing the british piling up material, and this is in the capitol building. and if you'll notice, the guy on the left, on the back, he's carrying a backpack that would carry two cases for a congrieve

rocket. rocket and if you'll notice the man standing on top of the pile, he's literally taking the projectile material that would have been inside of that rocket and he's sprinkling it over the top and then that's how they would light that fire and here is the actual account and this is by benjamin henry latrobe. there was no want of material for the conflagration. for when the number of members of congress was increased the old platform was left in its place and another raised over it giving an additional quantity of dry and loose timber. all the stages and seats of the galleries were of timber and yellow pine. the mahogany desks, table and chairs were in their places. at last they made a great pile in the center of the room of the furniture and retiring set fire to the quantity of rocket stuff in the middle. the whole was soon in the blaze and so intense was the flame that the glass of the lights was

melted." i love that rocket stuff. obviously americans didn't know much about these rockets and they didn't know how to describe them but that would have been the propellant that would send that rocket through the air. so we now have three different accounts as to how the british burned these public buildings. and it's possible all three might have been used. i suspect it's more likely that maybe two of those three were used and one is a slight alteration of the other and it's already been mentioned and so i can save some time and go through this that parts of these buildings were saved. they weren't completely destroyed. this is the old senate chamber. these are the corn cob columns that don already talked about. i think they're beautiful. if you ever have a chance to take a tour of the capitol, please go and see these. this all survived the burning. then here's another quote by latrobe. "the ruin of the capitol i assure you is a melancholy spectacle, however, many important parts are wholly

uninjured and what particularly is gratifying to me, the picture entrance of the house of representatives with its handsome columns, the capitals of senate vestibule, the great staircase, and all the vaults of the senate chamber are entirely free from any injury which cannot be easily repaired." myth number two. is the white house so called because it was burned by the british and they needed to cover the scorch marks? how do we get rid of that? there we go. these are some of the images. in fact, the one that's in the upper left, that's the tom freeman. the poster for that is available in the different shop right here and tonight at the reception there's going to be a little booklet that's been written about that. this is what the white house looked like after. i told you that i only know of one image of the actual burning of quote-unquote the city. there's many depictions of what happened afterwards but that's the only one that i know of the

actual burning. and these are examples of the scorch marks. and this is what the white house would look like if it were not painted white. and that's because it's made out of aquia sandstone. and you can go to the quarry, it's not that far from here, on aquia creek on the potomac river. the sandstone wasn't that great a stone but it was a nearby quarry stone. and it's streaked -- very heavily streaked with iron oxide and the color of the sandstone itself is kind of a sandy color with a little bit of a hint of a pinkishness to it. but when the stone gets wet, it turns into a dull gray. not particularly attractive. and because the stone is relatively soft, when the building was being built, the workers were immediately applying whitewash to help to seal the stone so that water would not penetrate it.

the white house has been white since it was first built. this is an example of the aquia stand sandstone. this is pohick church if you're familiar with that in virginia. i wanted to throw that one in because it has great graffiti that dates from 1813 to 1814. that would be the color of that stone. there's many examples of the stone throughout the washington, d.c., area. and this guy would not get out of the way when i was trying to take these pictures. but if you look very carefully, this is the entrance to the kitchen down in the basement area and you can clearly see the scorch marks. but i'd particularly like you to look at the left-hand side where the scorch marks suddenly disappear. and what that shows us is that obviously those stones, for whatever reason, were replaced over time. exactly when that took place, i do not know. but not all of the original stones that make up the white house nor the capitol were there. many of them were damaged.

and then this is just a detail of the same thing where my hand is pointing, that's what you would look if you could get a close-up of it and then just below it, right after all of that scorch you can see good, clean stone. and then this is just another example. and you can see this in many places. now, this is a quote that i took right out of don hickey's book about the myths. there's many other examples but i like this one in particular because this is a british quote, and i'll read it to you, or in part. "francis james jackson, former british minister of the united states, wrote in the spring of 1811 that his successor, augustus jay foster, would act as a sort of political conduct tore attract the lightning that may issue from the clouds round the capitol and the white house at washington." so here's a british statement written in 1811, clearly talking about the white house. so i think we can now put to bed pretty much this myth that the white house was called the white

house in 1814 because the british burned it. and then the final myth, because i'm running out of time, did the great storm put out the fires? and i have no illustrations of the great storm. surprise, surprise. but down below are some examples of some tornadoes that have hit the city of washington. one in 1927 and one in 1973. the first thing we have to make clear to everybody is that many of the accounts claim that this was a hurricane. no way. anybody that knows anything about weather knows that this was not a hurricane. this was a severe line of thunderstorms, almost certainly accompanied by tornadoes. and folks, for those of you that live here, we've experienced this this year, this summer. we experience it many, many summers. maybe not to the level of what happened in 1814, but this was a severe line of thunderstorms that came through washington. it was not a hurricane.

and this is a description of this great storm by george robert glegg, one of the junior officers in the british army. "roofs of houses were torn off by it and whirled into the air like sheets of paper whilst the rain which accompanied it resembled the rushing of a mighty cataract rather than the dropping of a shower. the darkness was as great as if the sun had long set. and the last remains of twilight had come on. occasionally relieved by flashes of vivid lightning streaming through it which together with the noise of the wind and the thunder, the crash of falling buildings and the tearing of roofs as they were stripped from the walls, produced the most appalling effect i have ever and probably ever shall witness. the storm lasted for nearly two hours without intermission." think about this. if the lower eastern branch bridge was set on fire at around 8:20 p.m., if the washington

navy yard was set on fire at about 8:30 p.m., if the capitol building was set on fire about 9:00 p.m. and the white house the treasury were set on fire about 11:00 p.m., that means that between 17 to 15 hours had passed before the great storm comes into washington at about 2:00 in the afternoon. and i want to just ask you, after burning that long, how many of these buildings would likely still have great amounts of flame? and i would argue that there was probably hardly any flame at all. there probably was still smoke. there were probably embers. might have been some minuscule amounts of flame but nothing tremendous at that point. the only places that might still have been burning with open flame at that time would be the buildings that the british set on fire the following morning. and that would be the executive office. that would be the rope walks,

more of these private structures. but the reasons they were built was because they had contracts to the navy to supply rope. those buildings might have still had fire when that great storm came through. so is it fair for people to say or to believe that the great storm came through, put out the fires, and saved the city of washington, d.c.? based upon the quote i just read you from glegg, it's very clear to me that the storm contributed to the destruction of the city, it did not help the city. it actually did additional damage. it blew down buildings. it blew the chimneys off of some of the brick buildings in washington, d.c. they were probably some of these tornadoes that were part of this great storm that came through. so i'm dashing another one of these myths. and i'd just like to summarize, the british burned significant public buildings in washington, including the capitol, the president's house, the treasury, and the executive office.

the british did not burn washington city but, in fact, showed restraint. and you've heard that from some of the other speakers up here already. the u.s. military burned more structures -- and you know i'm going to be a little more conservative now when i actually do the paper. i'm going to say maybe as many but certainly a significant number of buildings than did the british. the president's house was called the white house prior to the british burning. and the great storm was not a hurricane. it did not save the city from additional damage. in fact, it added to the destruction. so with that, i will close. i see patrick is quickly up to the mike. we'll take some questions. go ahead. >> well, i applaud you for everything you said and i agree with everything and i'm saying that from a researcher and also

a local person, but i'm from oklahoma. so when i came in, i hear all the myths. i don't know anything about the war of 1812, even the civil war, especially the american revolution having growing up and reading our history books. so i'm glad you said it was not a hurricane. it was not a hurricane. it was like del retro. like you said, a few years ago, we had coming through, terrible storm, everybody can associate with that. with the glow in the sky, looking at when you were talking about the time frame of the navy yard, the "hms meteor," one of the british bomb vessels down on the potomac river at maryland point, at 9:30 p.m. their time, and i don't know what -- you know. but 9:30 their time, they first report the glow in the night sky. so that might help with that concept. >> that's a good point, patrick. the problem with the ships' logs is they don't record simultaneously with the events that actually take place. >> right. >> and we do know that some of

the ships' logs are off by several hours from the time it was kept locally. so it makes it very difficult. we also know that some of the ships' logs are actually off by a single day where someone screwed up the dates. so all of these things enter into the complexity of trying to determine what really happened. but you make a good point. >> so my question is, when we talk about the white house -- first off, in my book "the battle of the white house" i say after the burning of washington, i don't say the british burned it. i say "after the burning" so am i okay on that? >> you're okay. >> all right, all right. with the use of the white house -- and my question is not about whether it had ever been called the white house by august 24th, 1814, but how prevalent was the use of it when ft. washington -- everybody still, even now, park service didn't

stop till three or four years ago of calling it ft. warburton at the time it was burnt and it was only ft. washington after pierre la font came down and redesigned it. you don't have ft. warburton anywhere at the time -- >> actually, you do. i have some references -- >> okay. but generally speaking, it was ft. washington, even the british on their ships called it ft. washington. so my question is, how prevalent is the use of the white house? >> it's not prevalent. i only know of three instances. but it's -- the point is that it was known as the white house before. >> sure. >> and it really didn't become popularized, as you know, until much later, until the 1930s. >> okay. because the wheel white house was down on the potomac. >> all right. okay. i think we're going to cut so we have enough time to have lunch. thank you all very much.

friday night on "american history tv" in primetime we'll show you more of the speakers from the symposium on the british burning of washington, d.c. and the war of 1812. including kenneth bowling, author of "the creation of washington, d.c.: the idea and location of the american capital." pamela scott, author of "buildings of the district of columbia." william seale talks about his book "the president's house: a history." and co-authors of "madison and jefferson." friday night beginning at 8:00 p.m. eastern on c-span3. next, day two of the symposium marking the 200th anniversary of the burning of washington, d.c. during the war of 1812. first donald hickey, author of "the war of 1812:a forgotten conflict." then steve vogel, author of

"through the perilous fight: six weeks that saved the nation." that's followed by holly schulman, editor of the dolley madison project at the university of virginia. and later remarks by ralph eshelman, historical consultant to the national parks service for the spar spangled national historic trail. now from day two of the symposium on the british burning of washington, d.c. during the war of 1812, hosted by the white house historical society, the u.s. capitol historical society, and james madison's montpelier. next, author donald hickey talks about his book "the war of 1812:a forgotten conflict." this is about 40 minutes. >> donald hickey is an award-winning author and professor of history at wayne state college in nebraska. he was called the dean of 1812 scholarship by "the new yorker." he has written seven books on

the conflict. most notably "the war of 1812:a forgotten conflict" available in a bicentennial edition in 2012. his book on an crew jackson and the battle of new orleans is forthcoming from johns hopkins university press where professor hickey is editor of a fine series of monographs on the war of 1812. so it's my pleasure to welcome professor don hickey. >> thanks for that introduction, don. i was asked to come here to talk about the politics of the war of 1812. you should have a handout in your folder with a little outline and a few books that will provide additional information if you'd like to read a little bit more on this. i called my presentation -- i'm

calling it an act of inconceivable folly and desperation: american politics and the war of 1812." this is part of a quote from the massachusetts house of representatives in a report adopted a little more than a week after the declaration of war. and it called the declaration of war an act of inconceivable folly and desperation that was hostile to your interests, menacing to your liberties, and revolting to your feelings. this was indicative of the deep opposition of the war by the opposition party, the federalist party, which controlled the house of representatives in massachusetts. to sort of discuss this setup discussion of federalist opposition to this war a little bit better, i want to talk about the origins of american political parties.

the first two-party system emerged in the early 199rarly 1 it was really in spite of rather than because of anybody's wishes. americans at the time considered political parties, political factions, dysfunctional. the european record seemed to be that factions led to civil war, and so no one really favored the development of american political parties. but they emerged anyway. the initial division was over hamilton's financial program. that division widened after the french revolution went into its more radical stage in 1793, '94, '95. then i think the parties were pretty well solidified by the time the united states ratified the jay treaty with great britain in 1795. the federalists reluctantly supported that treaty. the emerging democratic republicans were dead set

against it. and those party divisions deepened still more during our undeclared naval war with france in the late 1790s which was actually a byproduct of the jay treaty, one of the downsides, although we did pretty well with that war. that's truly our forgotten conflict. we call that the quasi war. most of my students say, what's a quasi? never heard of one. does it have two legs or four? anyway, in the course of the 1790s, because the federalists did control the national government, they were able to implement their policies. and i would say their domestic policies essentially rested on hamilton's financial program and a commitment to military and naval preparedness. in foreign affairs, they're usually portrayed as the pro-british party, but i think they're more accurately described as the anti-french party. that's what drove i think the federalist train of fear and hostility to france.

and they reluctantly ratified -- negotiated and ratified the jay treaty and then later got involved in the quasi war. and i think those sort of were probably anti-french as much as they were pro-british policies. in any case, jeff seasonian republicans took over as a result of the election of 1800 and 1801 and insofar as they could they reversed those policies. they rejected military and naval preparedness, paring back defense spending. they modified hamilton's financial program, getting rid of the internal taxes and later the national bank. and they also moved away from a close relationship with great britain, which had really developed during the quasi war. when the commercial clauses of the jay treaty expired in 1803 the british asked if we were interested in renewing them and the jeff onadministration said, absolutely not.

later when jefferson was sort of compelled to send a diplomatic mission to london to try to resolve all of our outstanding differences and the result was the monroe/pinkny treaty, he refused to submit that treaty to the senate. that was followed by further deterioration in anglo-american relations. largely over maritime issues. the british practice of impressment which was removing seamen from american merchant vessels on the high seas. and then the british orders in consul which restricted our trade with the continent of europe and under authority of which the british seized something like 400 american merchant vessels and their cargos between 1807 and 1812. the republicans responded to this first by adopting a series of trade restrictions. most notably, jefferson's notorious embargo which was in force for 15 months from december of 1807 to march of 1809. and then in june of 1812 by going to war against great

britain. the vote on the declaration of war in june of 1812 was the closest vote on any such declaration in american history. we've had 11 declarations of war. but only five wars. the war of 1812, the mexican war, spanish-american war, two world wars. but this were multiple declarations in the world wars. so only five wars. we haven't had a formal declaration of war since 1942. we just don't do it that way nowadays. rather, congress authorizes the president to take action and then he does, if and when he thinks it's necessary. anyway, the vote on the declaration of war in june of 1812 was 79-49 in the house of representatives, and 19-13 in the senate. now, there was actually a closer vote in the senate on the declaration of war against spain, i think 45-35.

but you look at both houses. this is the closest vote on any declaration of war. all the others, except for the spanish-american war, were overwhelming if not unanimous. so this represents an exception here. now typically, the declaration of war, the vote on the declaration of war is portrayed as a sectional vote. because so many northern members of congress voted against and it so many southerners and westerners voted for it. but that really masks what i think is the true nature of this vote. it was a party vote. 80% of the jeffersonian republicans in congress voted for the declaration of war, and every single federalist, without exception, voted against it. so it looks to me like it's more of a party vote. now, to a large extent, deep-seated policy issues, policy differences, explain this vote. the jeffersonian republicans

were convinced that we had reached a position in our history where our sovereignty was at risk. we only had three ways of responding to the british encroachments on our rights. war, more trade restrictions, or what the republicans called submission. the federalists, however, thought there was a fourth alternative. accommodation. the kind of thing they had accepted in the jay treaty and the kind of thing jefferson had rejected in the 1806 treaty, the monroe/pinky treaty, the treaty he refused to submit to the santa anita senate. this were deep-seated policy issues over how to respond to this crisis in anglo-american affairs. the jeffersonian republicans concluded we needed to go to war. the federalists thought war was unlikely to achieve any concessions on the maritime issues and they were proven right on that. and we were better off simply living with these encroachments and striking the best deal we

could with the british through some sort of accommodation. now, there was also a political dimension to the declaration of war. republicans embraced the declaration of war in part because they thought it would further the interests of their party. it would unify their party, which was rent asunder by internal divisions. they also thought it would enhance their chances of winning the next election. it was a presidential election in 1812. and they thought it would silence their domestic opponents, not simply republicans but also federalists. so they expected to achieve some very real political objectives with the declaration of war. now, the federalists opposed the war primarily for policy reasons but they too thought they would achieve certain political objectives.

that war would not work out and they would finally be restored to power that they had lost in the election of 1800. but at bottom i think you have to see the vote on the declaration of war is really a vote on a matter of policy. now, once war was declared, the republicans closed ranks on the larger issue of the war. there were some exceptions. the old republicans under john randolph in virginia continued to oppose the war. but most republicans now reluctantly supported the war. however, they remained divided on how best to prosecute the war. should we rely on militia or volunteers or regulars? should we concentrate on fighting the war on the high seas or in canada? should we adopt taxes or rely heavily on treasury notes, a kind of interest-berg paper

money, and national loans? and the madison administration really was unable to overcome some of these differences. i do not consider president james madison a very strong war leader. i think he was probably one of the weakest we've ever had. the upside of that was he didn't encroach on the civil liberties of his domestic foes, didn't use the hammer on them. there are actually republicans including the attorney general who said, we need a sedition act. it works for the federalists in 1798, why don't we try that now? madison would not consider that. that was the upside of his sort of mild presidential leadership during the war. the downside was, he simply wasn't able to forge a majority in favor of his preferred means of prosecuting this war. and time and time again he made recommendations to congress which congress did not accept. a federalist would combine with dissent republicans,

particularly in the u.s. senate, to vote down policies that they considered ill advised. madison also tolerated dissent in his cabinet. disloyalty, dissent, backbiting, a lot of internal dissension there. and madison sort of ignored it. so for a variety of reasons, even though republicans closed ranks in support of the war, they frequently were divided over how best to prosecute the war and how to pay for it. now, federal iist remain pretty unified after the declaration of war. there was initially some talk among federalists in the middle and southern states about maybe supporting the war, at least remaining neutral. but for a variety of reasons, that talk didn't go anywhere. the federalists were unhappy that france wasn't included in the declaration of war. they weren't happy with that decision. they weren't happy with the

decision to force the commercial states to pay for the war by doubling the taxes on trade without adopting any internal taxes. and they weren't happy with the decision to retain the latest trade restriction which remained on the books. even though the restrictive system had always been presented to the american people as an alternative to war, it wasn't dropped after wor was -- war was declared. and the southern and middle state federalists were not happy with a series of vicious riots that took place in baltimore which led to the immediate death of one federalist and what i consider fatal -- ultimately fatal internal injuries to two other federalists, including lighthorse harry lee, who was the father of robert e. lee. so the upshot of this was federalists in the middle and southern states who might have considered remaining neutral lined up with their more ardent

federalist friends in new england and presented a united front against the war. and you can see this in congress. federalists voted as a bloc on almost all war measures. they voted against measures to raise men or money, to restrict trade, or to foster privateering. they did, however, support two long-term defense measures that they thought were in the interest of the nation and those were measures to build coastal fortifications or to expand the navy. but nevertheless, on all these measures, they voted as a bloc. there were 305 votes in congress on more measures between june 1, 1812, when madison submitted his war message, and february 16th, 1815, when the war came to an end. and on those, federalists in the house of representatives achieved a cohesion index of --

let's see -- in the house of representatives, it was 94.4%. in the senate it was 92.5%. so on the typical war issue, you have more than nine out of ten federalists voting on the same side. typically against the issue, although it dealt with the navy and coastal fortifications they voted for it. so my point here is the federalist party presented a united front against the war. fir the declaration of war and then measures adopted by congress to prosecute the war. the notion that the opposition was limited to new england or that federalists in the middle and southern states did not oppose the war is a myth. i think the voting patterns in congress reveal that. now, this is not to deny that new england's opposition went further. federalists in new england felt more deeply about these issues and also, they had the advantage

of controlling state and local government there. and so that allowed them to use the machinery of state and local government to obstruct the war effort and they also, because they were a majority, didn't have to fear retaliation, the sort of retaliation that was visited on baltimore federalists when they opposed the war in june and july of 1812. so we find federalists in new england using the machinery of government to, in some minor ways, obstruct the war effort. we also find that they feuded with the federal government over the deployment and command of the fimilitia. the initial fear of new england federalists was militia would be nationalized and marched to the canadian frontier, forcing new englanders to take part in this wicked attempt to conquer canada. and also leaving new england defenseless. so they're very reluctant to give u.s. officers command over

their militia. they worked out a series of compromises in 1813, especially in 1814, when the british actually threatened the new england coast. but those compromises broke down in the fall of 1814 and the u.s. government simply announced it would no longer pay the wages or supply the militia in those new england states that did not allow regular army officers to command the troops so new englanders found themselves saddled with their own defense costs late in the war and that was one of the things -- one of the key things that led to the edition decision to summon the hartford convention. that was a regional conference that was convened in late 1814 to air new england grievances. long-term grievances but more immediately grievances over the war of 1812. it is sometimes depicted as part of a scheme to pull new england out of the union. but this overstates, i think,

secessionist sentiment in new england. in new england during the barwaf 1812 there was talk of withdrawing from the union, there was secessionist sentiment, but there was no serious secessionist movement. and you can see that in the report of the hartford convention which was issued in early january of 1815 which was really quite moderate. and fully half of that report was devoted to airing grievances over the war. particularly the fact that new england now had to provide for -- finance its own defense measures. so a pretty moderate document. and i don't really see even a hint of secession in that document. now, the hart tuesday convention did propose a series of amendments to the constitution designed to protect new england's interest in the future and also prevent a rekuns of

those policies of the republicans that the federalists thought were so utterly disruptive to new england and to the nation. for example, in the future would require a two-thirds vote to embargo or trade or to declare war. and in fact embargoes i think would be limited to 60 days. admitting new states to the union from the west, that would also require a two-thirds vote in congress. the whole point of these amendments was to protect new england's position in the union, also a recurrence of the most destructive of the republican policies. well, nothing came of those amendments. the war ended shortly thereafter, and in fact the hartford convention was used thereafter by republicans as a club to pound their federalist foes at election time in the post-war leaks. the republicans after the war was over -- what happened here in washington was the low point for americans in the war.

but fortunately for the american memory of the war it was followed first by the successful defense of ft. mchenry, and then almost simultaneously the victory on lake champlain which forced the british to pull a large army out of upper new york. and then, of course, in january of 1815 by jackson's lopsided victory over the british at new orleans, when we actually were fighting veterans of the napoleonic wars. that was i think the only battle where that happened. that allowed americans afterwards to say, we have single handedly defeated the conqueror of napoleon and the mistress of the seas. they talked repeatedly how he defeated wellington's invincibles or the conquerors of the conquerors of europe. it has a nice ring. the british beat the french, and we beat the british, at least at new orleans. that turned out to be the real significance of the battle of new orleans. it didn't have any impact on the outcome of the war or the peace

treaty. but it really did help in a profound and lasting way, shape the american memory of the war. so in the wake of that, republicans claimed all the victories in the war and blamed all the failures and all the setbacks on federalists. and it worked pretty effectively. federalist party pretty quickly disappeared after the war of 1812. i think they ran their last candidate for the presidency in 1816. and he got swamped. now, this was a party that was out of tune with the dominant ethos of the american people anyw anyway. too hostile, too territorial expansion to survive in this era anyway. in fact the federalist party had been in decline since 1800. what revived it was the restrictive system, most notably the embargo and the war of 1812.

you look at how federalists did during the war of 1812. at election time they actually did pretty well. the number of states they controlled in the course of the war increased, out of 18, from three to seven. and there was an uptick in their support -- in their numbers in congress. not a big increase. but a 5% or 10% increase in the number of federalists who sat in the house or the senate. so one can argue that opposing the war of 1812 worked to the interests of the federalists during the war, but most assuredly it did not after the war was over. it was just too easy to portray them as disloyal, as torys, the really bad thing you could call someone in those days, or traitors. and so the party quickly disappeared. now by way of conclusion i want to make two broad points about this period and about federalist opposition to the war of 1812.

you look at the early national period and party differences were deep and bitter. and i think they were deepest duck the quasi war in the late 1790s and during the period of the restrictive system and the war from 1807 to 1815. these differences could not be bridged by some bipartisan compromise. and i think it's important that we understand that. these were deep-seated policy issues that could not be bridged. and it looks to me like there are other periods in our history. the 1850s on the eve of the civil war. the 1890s when we saw the rise of populism. the 1960s when we were divided over a host of fundamental issues, most notably the war in vietnam. and today. and i think the policy differences in these periods are so deep-seated, they cannot be bridged by bipartisanship.

so my advice to those who call for bipartisanship today is, don't be surprise tuesday you don't get it. now, how do we resolve these matters? well, typically the civil war i guess was an exception, but typically we resolve these differences by leaving matters up to voters. the voters basically have to decide which side do you support? and then ultimately these things are worked out. at least that's the way it should work and normally does work in a democracy. the final concluding point i want to make is about opposition to the war of 1812. this was, in my judgment, the most vigorous party opposition to any war in our history. and i would therefore put it at one end of the spectrum if i was looking at all of our wars. at the other end of the spectrum we have world war ii.

when there was no serious party opposition, in fact, very little opposition at all. that's at the other end of the spectrum. when most americans rallied around the flag. now, we may find it comforting to think that the american norm is world war ii. but it ain't so. most wars are a lot closer to the war of 1812 than they are to world war ii. there was significant opposition, domestic opposition, to the american revolution, the quasi war, the mexican war, the civil war, the war in vietnam, and just about every other war we have fought since vietnam. and there was some opposition to the spanish-american war, to world war i, and to the korean war. so it looks to me like the exception in our history is in the war in vietnam -- or is in the war of 1812 or the war in

vietnam. the exception is world war ii.w war of 1812 or the war in vietnam. the exception is world war ii.t vietnam. the exception is world war ii. my take is this is the price we pay for democracy. if we're going to go to war we should expect opposition and if that war drags out that opposition will only increase. that's the price we pay for being a democratic republic. okay, thank you. i think we have q&a now. now, this is my opportunity to learn from you. i always like the q&a part of any public presentation because you guys get to tell me where i got it wrong. and i can learn from you. yes, sir. >> the fall of the federalist party is the only other example of the demise of a major

american party is the whigs at the eve of the civil war. and one theory is that jefferson's genius consistent on incorporating into the federal system those nascent anti-federalist feeling and giving it expression within the context of federalism. so would you agree with that or not? >> generally. the point that this gentleman is making is that the only two major parties to really disappear from american history, i don't think that's quite right, but let's say it is. the federalist party and the whig party. and it is because the dominant party basically coopts some of their basic issues. my take on it is that political parties come into being and enjoy popularity because they offer something of fundamental importance to the american voter. a classic example is the republican party of the 1850s. they got ahold of the issue of

anti-slavery and boy that resonated with people, at least in the north of the united states. but -- and they were the dominant party roughly from 1860 to 1932. but what happens, it seems to me, is a political party comes into power, offering a program that is very attractive to the american people, but that program is then enacted into law and as the years pass, that party finds itself on the wrong end of a big issue. now, for the federalist in the 1790s, they were charged with launching the new government under the constitution, they did a great job of that. but by the late 1790s their program was in place. at least most of it. and they had outlived their usefulness. and they were on the wrong side of these big issues. the rise of democracy, territorial expansion. and our position in the great european war. happened to the jeffersonian republicans. they're at the cutting edge in the early 19th century but by

the 1850th they're on the wrong side of some really big issues, namely, the preservation of the union and slavery. and it seems to me that's the pattern that i see in american history of the rise and fall of political parties. okay? what else? yes, sir. >> did the federalists early in the debate over war with england have a coherent alternative strategy for dealing with the violation of american trade neutrality for indian attacks on the settlers moving into ohio, in indiana? did they have a clear alternative to war with great britain and did they press that throughout the war? >> did the federalists have a clear alternative to war. they did. and i don't get this. you look at the literature on the runup to the war and a lot of historians say the federalists had no alternative. well, i got a hot flash for those guys.

their alternative was no war. peace. okay? that's a viable alternative. not going to war. now, did they have an alternative for forcing the british to give up our encroachment -- their encroachments on our rights? no, they did not. but their argument, and i think it was sound, was these encroachments were tied to the war in europe. the british had no fundamental interest in encroaching on our rights. they were trying to win a war? europe. and if they encroached on our rights it's because they felt that those policies were necessary to winning that much greater war in europe. they were actually surprised and a little hurt that we went to war over these issues. because they felt they were fighting the war for western civilization. i think the federalist argument was, look, we're making money and these encroachments aren't going to last forever. they are the price we pay for

profiting by trading in a war-torn world. and those encroachments on our rights will end when the war in europe ends. and there's nothing we can do to force the british to give up those encroachments. and i think the treaty of gant vicinity dated that view. the maritime issues that caused the war, impressment especially, vi violations of our territorial waters, abuses of naval blockades, possession of can tra band, those issues were not mentioned in the treaty of gant. the argument sometimes given is, well, that's because the issues went away with the end of the war in europe. that's true. and i think that was the federalist argument. but there was nothing in the treaty of gant which would have prevented the british from resorting to those policies again if the war in europe resumed. it did not and so they did not. although some of those same

issues surfaced again in world war i. there's a guy named earnest may who's written a book on our neutrality period 1914 to 1917. he talks about the tension between the united states and great britain and that chapter is entitled -- i think "the shadow of 1812." so that was a federalist alternative. look, we just got to live with these encroachments on our rights, we're doing okay. and this is the nature of what second-rate powers have to do in a war-torn world. the great powers, if they're locked in a titanic struggle, a life and death struggle, they are not going to make concessions to second-rate powers. if they think it's going to undermine their war effort. they're just not going to do it. no more than in world war ii if brazil had come to the united states and said, hey, we want to trade with germany, is that okay with you? we're going to say, gee, we don't want to upset brazil, they might go to war against us, so have at it.

i think the problem here is that jeffersonian republicans did not fully understand that we were a second-rate power. and there's a great quote from a federalist, daniel sheffy, at the beginning of the war in which he talks about how we've considered ourselves of too great a weight in the scale of nations and assumed that we could control thing that is really were beyond our control. o that. okay? >> yesterday, david cameron announced a multi, multimillion pound contract for vehicles for the british army. the headline is 800 jobs. and whenever you see money being allocated to the military, discussing barack here, or moving a carrier from norfolk down to mayport, it's jobs that everyone's looking at. now, building a 44-gun sprigat,