stationed at a window," interesting interesting, "with its pole and the wildfire against it." at the word of command -- you see some similarities -- at the same instant the windows were broken and this wildfire thrown in so that an instantaneous conflagration took place and the whole building was wrapped in flames and smoke. the spectators stood in awful silence. the city was light and the heavens reddened with the blaze." and down below you have two examples of what these fireballs would have looked like. these particular ones are not attached to a long pole but the one on the left is made out of clay, the one on the right is actually macrame that's covered with canvas. and in there would be some type of a material that would be very, very prone to being lit to help to start a fire. so there's some similarities to this account, to the first account that i gave you with the jfl lin javelin business, but

they're also very different. and i suspect that the truth is somewhere in the middle here, and i couldn't tell you which one is better. and this is another one. this is an image that came out of one of the books that i did and it is showing the british piling up material, and this is in the capitol building. and if you'll notice, the guy on the left, on the back, he's carrying a backpack that would carry two cases for a congrieve rocket. rocket and if you'll notice the man standing on top of the pile, he's literally taking the projectile material that would have been inside of that rocket and he's sprinkling it over the top and then that's how they would light that fire and here is the actual account and this is by benjamin henry latrobe. there was no want of material for the conflagration. for when the number of members of congress was increased the old platform was left in its place and another raised over it giving an additional quantity of dry and loose timber.

all the stages and seats of the galleries were of timber and yellow pine. the mahogany desks, table and chairs were in their places. at last they made a great pile in the center of the room of the furniture and retiring set fire to the quantity of rocket stuff in the middle. the whole was soon in the blaze and so intense was the flame that the glass of the lights was melted." i love that rocket stuff. obviously americans didn't know much about these rockets and they didn't know how to describe them but that would have been the propellant that would send that rocket through the air. so we now have three different accounts as to how the british burned these public buildings. and it's possible all three might have been used. i suspect it's more likely that maybe two of those three were used and one is a slight alteration of the other and it's already been mentioned and so i can save some time and go through this that parts of these buildings were saved. they weren't completely destroyed. this is the old senate chamber.

these are the corn cob columns that don already talked about. i think they're beautiful. if you ever have a chance to take a tour of the capitol, please go and see these. this all survived the burning. then here's another quote by latrobe. "the ruin of the capitol i assure you is a melancholy spectacle, however, many important parts are wholly uninjured and what particularly is gratifying to me, the picture entrance of the house of representatives with its handsome columns, the capitals of senate vestibule, the great staircase, and all the vaults of the senate chamber are entirely free from any injury which cannot be easily repaired." myth number two. is the white house so called because it was burned by the british and they needed to cover the scorch marks? how do we get rid of that? there we go. these are some of the images.

in fact, the one that's in the upper left, that's the tom freeman. the poster for that is available in the different shop right here and tonight at the reception there's going to be a little booklet that's been written about that. this is what the white house looked like after. i told you that i only know of one image of the actual burning of quote-unquote the city. there's many depictions of what happened afterwards but that's the only one that i know of the actual burning. and these are examples of the scorch marks. and this is what the white house would look like if it were not painted white. and that's because it's made out of aquia sandstone. and you can go to the quarry, it's not that far from here, on aquia creek on the potomac river. the sandstone wasn't that great a stone but it was a nearby quarry stone. and it's streaked -- very heavily streaked with iron oxide and the color of the sandstone itself is kind of a sandy color

with a little bit of a hint of a pinkishness to it. but when the stone gets wet, it turns into a dull gray. not particularly attractive. and because the stone is relatively soft, when the building was being built, the workers were immediately applying whitewash to help to seal the stone so that water would not penetrate it. the white house has been white since it was first built. this is an example of the aquia stand sandstone. this is pohick church if you're familiar with that in virginia. i wanted to throw that one in because it has great graffiti that dates from 1813 to 1814. that would be the color of that stone. there's many examples of the stone throughout the washington, d.c., area. and this guy would not get out of the way when i was trying to take these pictures. but if you look very carefully, this is the entrance to the kitchen down in the basement area and you can clearly see the

scorch marks. but i'd particularly like you to look at the left-hand side where the scorch marks suddenly disappear. and what that shows us is that obviously those stones, for whatever reason, were replaced over time. exactly when that took place, i do not know. but not all of the original stones that make up the white house nor the capitol were there. many of them were damaged. and then this is just a detail of the same thing where my hand is pointing, that's what you would look if you could get a close-up of it and then just below it, right after all of that scorch you can see good, clean stone. and then this is just another example. and you can see this in many places. now, this is a quote that i took right out of don hickey's book about the myths. there's many other examples but i like this one in particular because this is a british quote, and i'll read it to you, or in part. "francis james jackson, former british minister of the united states, wrote in the spring of 1811 that his successor,

augustus jay foster, would act as a sort of political conduct tore attract the lightning that may issue from the clouds round the capitol and the white house at washington." so here's a british statement written in 1811, clearly talking about the white house. so i think we can now put to bed pretty much this myth that the white house was called the white house in 1814 because the british burned it. and then the final myth, because i'm running out of time, did the great storm put out the fires? and i have no illustrations of the great storm. surprise, surprise. but down below are some examples of some tornadoes that have hit the city of washington. one in 1927 and one in 1973. the first thing we have to make clear to everybody is that many of the accounts claim that this was a hurricane. no way. anybody that knows anything about weather knows that this was not a hurricane.

this was a severe line of thunderstorms, almost certainly accompanied by tornadoes. and folks, for those of you that live here, we've experienced this this year, this summer. we experience it many, many summers. maybe not to the level of what happened in 1814, but this was a severe line of thunderstorms that came through washington. it was not a hurricane. and this is a description of this great storm by george robert glegg, one of the junior officers in the british army. "roofs of houses were torn off by it and whirled into the air like sheets of paper whilst the rain which accompanied it resembled the rushing of a mighty cataract rather than the dropping of a shower. the darkness was as great as if the sun had long set. and the last remains of twilight had come on. occasionally relieved by flashes of vivid lightning streaming through it which together with the noise of the wind and the

thunder, the crash of falling buildings and the tearing of roofs as they were stripped from the walls, produced the most appalling effect i have ever and probably ever shall witness. the storm lasted for nearly two hours without intermission." think about this. if the lower eastern branch bridge was set on fire at around 8:20 p.m., if the washington navy yard was set on fire at about 8:30 p.m., if the capitol building was set on fire about 9:00 p.m. and the white house the treasury were set on fire about 11:00 p.m., that means that between 17 to 15 hours had passed before the great storm comes into washington at about 2:00 in the afternoon. and i want to just ask you, after burning that long, how many of these buildings would likely still have great amounts of flame? and i would argue that there was probably hardly any flame at all. there probably was still smoke. there were probably embers.

might have been some minuscule amounts of flame but nothing tremendous at that point. the only places that might still have been burning with open flame at that time would be the buildings that the british set on fire the following morning. and that would be the executive office. that would be the rope walks, more of these private structures. but the reasons they were built was because they had contracts to the navy to supply rope. those buildings might have still had fire when that great storm came through. so is it fair for people to say or to believe that the great storm came through, put out the fires, and saved the city of washington, d.c.? based upon the quote i just read you from glegg, it's very clear to me that the storm contributed to the destruction of the city, it did not help the city. it actually did additional damage. it blew down buildings.

it blew the chimneys off of some of the brick buildings in washington, d.c. they were probably some of these tornadoes that were part of this great storm that came through. so i'm dashing another one of these myths. and i'd just like to summarize, the british burned significant public buildings in washington, including the capitol, the president's house, the treasury, and the executive office. the british did not burn washington city but, in fact, showed restraint. and you've heard that from some of the other speakers up here already. the u.s. military burned more structures -- and you know i'm going to be a little more conservative now when i actually do the paper. i'm going to say maybe as many but certainly a significant number of buildings than did the british. the president's house was called the white house prior to the british burning. and the great storm was not a hurricane. it did not save the city from additional damage. in fact, it added to the destruction. so with that, i will close.

i see patrick is quickly up to the mike. we'll take some questions. go ahead. >> well, i applaud you for everything you said and i agree with everything and i'm saying that from a researcher and also a local person, but i'm from oklahoma. so when i came in, i hear all the myths. i don't know anything about the war of 1812, even the civil war, especially the american revolution having growing up and reading our history books. so i'm glad you said it was not a hurricane. it was not a hurricane. it was like del retro. like you said, a few years ago, we had coming through, terrible storm, everybody can associate with that. with the glow in the sky, looking at when you were talking about the time frame of the navy yard, the "hms meteor," one of

the british bomb vessels down on the potomac river at maryland point, at 9:30 p.m. their time, and i don't know what -- you know. but 9:30 their time, they first report the glow in the night sky. so that might help with that concept. >> that's a good point, patrick. the problem with the ships' logs is they don't record simultaneously with the events that actually take place. >> right. >> and we do know that some of the ships' logs are off by several hours from the time it was kept locally. so it makes it very difficult. we also know that some of the ships' logs are actually off by a single day where someone screwed up the dates. so all of these things enter into the complexity of trying to determine what really happened. but you make a good point. >> so my question is, when we talk about the white house -- first off, in my book "the battle of the white house" i say after the burning of washington, i don't say the british burned it. i say "after the burning" so am

i okay on that? >> you're okay. >> all right, all right. with the use of the white house -- and my question is not about whether it had ever been called the white house by august 24th, 1814, but how prevalent was the use of it when ft. washington -- everybody still, even now, park service didn't stop till three or four years ago of calling it ft. warburton at the time it was burnt and it was only ft. washington after pierre la font came down and redesigned it. you don't have ft. warburton anywhere at the time -- >> actually, you do. i have some references -- >> okay. but generally speaking, it was ft. washington, even the british on their ships called it ft. washington. so my question is, how prevalent is the use of the white house? >> it's not prevalent. i only know of three instances. but it's -- the point is that it was known as the white house before.

>> sure. >> and it really didn't become popularized, as you know, until much later, until the 1930s. >> okay. because the wheel white house was down on the potomac. >> all right. okay. i think we're going to cut so we have enough time to have lunch. thank you all very much. friday night on "american history tv" in primetime we'll show you more of the speakers from the symposium on the british burning of washington, d.c. and the war of 1812. including kenneth bowling, author of "the creation of washington, d.c.: the idea and location of the american capital." pamela scott, author of "buildings of the district of columbia." william seale talks about his book "the president's house: a history." history." and co-authors of "madison and

captioning performed by vitac it was really inspite of rather than because of anybody's wishes. americans at the time considered political parties, political

faxes dysfunctional. the european record seemed to be that factions led to civil war, so no one really favored the development of american political parties, but they emerged anyway. the initial division was over hamilton's financial program. that division widened after the french revolution went into its more radical stage in 1793, '94 '95, and i think the parties were pretty well solidified by the time the united states ratified the jay treaty with great britain in 1795. the federalists reluctantly supported that treaty, the emerging democratic republicans who are deadset against it. they deepened still more during our undeclared naval war with france in the late 1790s which was a byproduct of the jay

treaty, one of the down sides, though we did pretty well -- that's truly or forgotten conflict. we call it the quasi war, and most of our students saying i've never heard of that. does it have two legs or four? they were ability to complement their policies. i would say their domestic policies essentially arrested on hamilton's financial program and commitment to military and naval preparedness. in foreign affairs they're usually protrayed as the pro-british party, but i think they're more accurately described as the anti-french party. i think that's what drove it, a fear and hostility to france the they reluckett negotiated and ratified the jay treaty, and later got involved in the quasi

war. i think those were probably anti-french as much as they were pro-british policies. any case, the jeffersonian republicans took over as a result of the election. in so far as they could, they reversed those policies. they rejected military and naval preparedness. they modified hamilton's financial programs. and theyible moved away from a close relationship with great britain, which it really developed during the quasi war. when the commercial clauses of the jay treaty expired in 18 on 3, the british asked if we were interested in renewing them and the jeffersonian administration said absolutely not. later when jefferson was sort of compelled to send a diplomatic mission to london to try to resolve all of our outstanding differences and the result was the monday ron/pink any treaty,

he refused to submit that treaty to the senate. that was further followed by -- largely over maritime issues, the british practice of impressment, which was removing seamen on the high seas, and the british odds which restricted our trade with the count nent the europe, between 1807 and 1812. the republicans responded to this, first by adopting a series of trade restrictions, most notab notably jefferson's notorious embargo, which was in force for 15 months from 18078 to march of 1809, and then in june of 1812, by going to war against great britain. the vote on the declaration of war in june of 1812 was the closest vote on any such declaration in american history. we've had 11 declarations of

war, but only five wars. the war of 1812, mexican, spanish-american and the two world wars, but there were multiple declarations, and we haven't had a formal declaration of war since 1942. we just don't do it that way nowadays. rather, congress authorizes it is president to take action, and then he does if and when he thinks it's necessary. anyway, the vote on the declaration of war in 1812 was 79-49 in the house of representatives, and 19-13 in the senate. now, there was actually a closer vote in the senate on the declaration of war against spain in 1898, but this is the closest vote on any declaration of war. all the others except for the spanish-american war were overwhelming, if not unanimous, so this represents an exception

here. now typically the declaration of war, the vote on the declaration of war is portrayed as a sectional vote, because so many northern members of congress voted against it and so many southerners and westerners voted for it, but that really masked what i think is the true nature of this vote. it was a party vote. 80% of the jeffersonian republicans in congress voted for the declaration of war, and every single federalist, without exception, voted against it. so it looks to me look it's more of a party vote. now, to a large extent, deep-seeded policy issues, a policy differences explain this vote. the jeffersonian republicans were convinced we had reached a position in our history where our sovereignty was at risk. we only had three ways of responding to the british encroachments on our rights -- war, more trade restrictions, or

what the republicans called submission. the federalists, however, thought there was a fourth alternative, accommodation. the conditioned of thing they had accepted in the jay treaty, and the kind of thing that jefferson had rejected in the 1806 treaty. we call that monroe pink any treaty, the treaty he refused to submit -- so there were deep-seated policy issues over how to respond to this crisis in anglo-american affairs, the jeffersonian republicans concluded we need to do go to war. the federalists thought war was unlikely to achieve any concessions on the mare typhoon issues, and they were proven right, and we are better on the striking the best deal we could with the british through some sort of accommodation. now, there was also a political dimension to the declaration of war. republicans embraced the declaration of war in part

because they thought it would further the interest of their party. it would unify their party, which was rent asunder by internal divisions. they thought it would enhance the winning of the next election, and they thought it would silence that you are domestic opponent, not simply republicans, but also federalists. so they expected to achieve some very real political objectives with the declaration of war. now, the federalists opposed the war primarily for policy reasons, but they too thought they would achieve certainly political objectives, that the war would not work out and they would finally be restored to power that they had lost in the election of 1800, but at bottom, i think you have to see the vote on the declaration of war is

really a vote on a matter of policy. once war was declared, there are some exceptions. the old republicans under john randolph in virginia continued to oppose the war. they remain divided on how -- should we concentrate on fighting the war on the high seas, or in canada. should we adopt taxes or rely heavily on treasury notes. and national loans? madison administration was really unable to overcome some of these -- i do not consider

sxrams madison a strong war leader. the up side is he didn't encroach on the civil liberties, didn't use the hammer on them. there are actually republicans, including the attorney general who said we need a sedition act. it worked for the federalists in 1798. madison would not consider that. that was the up side his sort of mild presidential leadership during the war. the down side is he simply wasn't able to force a majority in favor of his preferred means of prosecuting this war. time and time again he made recommendations to congress, which congress did not accept. a federalist could combine with disi dent republicans to vote down policies that they considered ill-advised. madison also tolerated dissent in his cabinet, disloyalty, dissent, back-biting, a lot of

internal dissension there madison sort of ignored it. so for a variety of reasons, even though they closed ranks in support of the war, they frequently were divided over how past to prosecute the war and how to pay for it. there was initially some talk among federalists in the middle and southern states about maybe supporting the war, at least remaining neutral. but for a variety of reasons that talk didn't go anywhere. the federalists were unhappy that france wasn't included in the declaration of war. they weren't -- they weren't happy with that decision. they weren't happy with the decision to force the commercial states to pay for the war by doublingle taxes on trade without adopting any internal taxes, and they weren't happy

with the decision to retain the latest trade restriction, which remained on the books, even though the restrictive system had always been presented to the american people as an alternative to war, it wasn't dropped after war was declared, and the southern and middle federalists were not happy with a series of vicious riots that took place in baltimore, which led to the immediate death of one federalist, and what i consider fatal -- ultimately fatal internal injuries to two other federalists including lighthorse harry lee, who was the father of robert e. lee. so the upshot was federalists in the midland and -- who might have considered being will be rat lined up with their more ardent friends in new england. you can see this in congress.

they voted against -- or restrict trade. they did, however support two long-term defense measures they thought would be in the interest -- they voted as a bloc. there are 305 votes in congress. a cohesion index. in the house of representatives, it was 94.4%. in the senate, it was 92.5%. so on the typical war issue, you

have more than 9 out of 10 federalists voting on the same side. typically against the issue, though if it dealt with the navy and coastal fortifications, they voted for it. my point here is the federalist party presented a united front against the war, first the declaration, and then measures adopted by congress to prosecute the war. the notion that the opposition was limited to new england or that federalists in the midland and southern states did not oppose the war is a myth. i think the voting patterns in congress reveal that. now, this is not to deny that new england's oop position went further. federalists in new england felt more deeply about they issue it is, also had the advantage of controlling state and local government there. so that allowed them to use the machinery of state and local government to obstruct the war effort. because they were a majority,

they didn't have to fear retaliation, it is el the sort of retaliation that was visited on baltimore federalists when they opposed the war in june and july of 1812. so we find federalists in new england using the machinery of government to in some minor ways obstruct the war effort. we also find that they feuded with the federal government over the deployment and command of the militia. the initial fear of new england federalists was that the militia would be naturalized and marched to the canadian frontier, forcen new englanders to take part in this wicked attempt to conquer canada and leave new england defenseless. they were reluctant to give -- they worked out a series of compromises in 1813 and -- especially in 1814 when the british actually threatened the new england coast, but the compromises broke down in the

fall of 1814, and the u.s. government simply announced it would no longer pay the wages or supply the militia in those new england states that did not allow regular army officers to command the troops. so new englanders found themselves saddled with their own defense costs late in the war. that was one of the key things that led to the decision to summon the hartford convention. that was a regional conference convened in late 1814 to air new england long-term grievances, but more immediately grievances over the war of 1812. it is sometimes depicted as part of a scheme to pull new england out of the union, but this overstates i think secession sentiment in new england. in new england during the war of 1812, there was talk of withdrawing from the union. there was secession sentiment,

but there was no serious secession cysel secessionist movement. you can see it was really confide moderate. fully half of that report was to airing grievances over the war, particularly the fact that new england now had to provide and finance its own defense measures. so a pretty moderate document. i don't really see a hint of secession in that document. now, the hartford convention did propose a series of amendments to the constitution designed to protect new england's interest in the future and prevent agmh recurrence of those policies of the republicans that the federalists thought were soñr utterly destructive to new england and the nation. for example, in the future it would require a two thirds vote to embargo our trade or to declare a war. and in fact, embargoes i think

would be limited to 60 days. admitting new states to the union from the west would require a two thirds vote in congress. the whole point was to protect new england's position in the union and also a recurrence of the most destructive of the republican policies. nothing came of those amendments. the war ended shortly thereafter, and in fact the hartford convention was used tlafr by republicatlafr by repu the post-war -- the republicans, after the war was over, what happened here in washington was the low point for americans in the war, but fortunately for the american memory, it was followed first by the successful defense of ft. mchenry, almost simultaneously a victory or lake

champlain, and then, of course, in january of 1815 by jackson's lopsided victory over the british at new orleans, when we actually were fighting veterans of the napoleonic wars. i think that was the only battle where that happened. that allowed americans afterwards to say we have single handedly defeated the conquerer of napoleon and the mistress of the seas. they talked about repeatedly how they defeated wellton's invincibles. it has a nice ring. the british beat the french, and we beat the british, at least at new orleans. that turned out to be the real significance of the battle of new orleans. it didn't have any impact on the outcome of the war or the peace treaty, but it did help in a if% profound and lasting way, shape the american memory of the war, so in the way of that,

republicans claimed and you have victories in the war and blamed all failures and all the worked pretty effectively. federalist party pretty quickly disappeared after the war of 1812. i think they lan their last candidate for the presidency in 1816. he got swamped. this was a party that was out of tune with the dominant ethos of the american people anyway. it was a party too aristocratic, too pro-british, too hostile to expansion to survive. what revived it was the restrictive system. and you look at how federalists did during the war of 1812. at election time they actually did pretty well. the number of states they controlled in the course of the war, increased out of the 18 from 3 to 7. and there was an up tick in

their support -- in their numbers in congress. not a big increase, but a 5% or 10% increase in the number of federalists who sat in the house or the senate. so one can argue that opposing the war of 1812 worked to the interests of the federalists during the war, but most assurededly did not after the war was over. it was too easy to portray them as disloyal as torries p. the really bad thing you could call someone in those days, or traitors. now, by way of conclusion, you said to make two broad points about this period and about federalist opposition to the war of 1812. you look at the early national period, and party differences were deep and bitter. i think they were deepest during the quasi war, and during the

period of the restrictive system. these were deep-seeded that could not be bridged. it looks to me like there were other pertains in the 1850s. the 1890s, the 1960s when we were divided over a host of fundamentalists, most notably the war in vietnam.

in my judgment this was the most vigorous party opposition to any war in our history. i would thereof put it at one of perspective. at the other end, we have world war ii, when there was no serious party opposition. in fact very little opposition at all. that's at the other end of the spectrum where morse americans rallied around the flag.

we may find it comforting to think that the american norm is world war ii, but it ain't so. most wars are a lot closer to 9 war of 1812 than they are to world war ii. there was significant opposition to the american revolution, the mexican war, the war in vietnam, and just about every other war we have fought since vietnam. there was some opposition to the spanish-american war to world war i, and to the korean war. it looks to me like the exception in the history isn't the war of 182 or the war in vietnam. the exception is world war ii. my take is that this is simply the price we pay for democracy, that if we're going to go to

war, we should expect opposition, and if that war drags out, that opposition will only increase. that, my friends, is the price we pay to being a democratic republic. okay. thank you. i think we have q&a now. now, this is my opportunity to learn from you. i always like the q&a part of any presentation, because you guys get to tell me where i got it wrong, and i can learn from you. yes, sir? >> the fall offal federalist party is the only other example of the demise of the american is the when is at the eve of the civil war. one theory is that jefferson's genius consistent on

incorporating into the federal system those that nascent anti-federalist feeling and giving it expression within the context of federalists. would you gra el with that or not? >> generally. the point this gentleman is making is the only two major parties to disappear from american history -- and i don't think that's quite right, but let's say it is -- the federalist and the whenig party and it is because the dom nan party bakley coopts the bask issues. my take is political parties enjoy popularity, because they offer something of fundamental important to the american voter. the classic example is the republican party of the 1850s. they got ahold of the issue of antislavery, and that resonated with people, at least in the north of the united states. they were the dominant party roughly in 1860 to 1932, but

what happens is a political party comes into power offering a program that is very attractive to the american people, but that program is then enacted into law, and as the years pass, that party finds itself on the wrong end of a big issue. for the federalists in the 1790s they were charged with launching the new government under the constitution, they did a great job of that, but by the late 1790s, their program was in place, at least most of it, and they had outlived their usefulness, and they were on the wrong side of these big issues, the rise of democracy, territorial expansion, and our position in the great european war. and i think the same thing happened to the jeffersonian republicans. they're at the cutting edge, but by the 1850s, they're on the wrong side of some really big issues, namely the preservation of the union and slavery. it seems to me that's the pattern that i see in american history of the rise and fall of political parties.

okay? did the federalists have a coherent strategy for dealing with the violation of american trade neutrality for the indian attacks on the settlers moving into ohio, in indiana? did they have a clear alternative to war with great britain? and did they press that throughout the war? >> did the federalists have a clear alternative to war? they did, and i don't get this. you look at the literature on the run up to the war, and a lot of historians say the federalists had no alternative. i've got a hot flash for those guys. their alternative was no war. peace. okay? that's a viable alternative not going to war. now, did they have an alternative for forcing the british to give up our

encroachment -- their encroachments on our rights? no, they did not, but their argument, and i think it was sound, is these encroachments were tied to the warp in europe. the british had no fundamental interest in encroaching on our rights. they were trying to win a war in europe. if they encroach on our rites, it was because they felt those policies were necessary to winning that much greater war in europe. they were actually surprised and a little hurt that we went to war over these issues, because they felt they are fighting the what are for western civilization, and we were -- i think the federalist argument was, look, we're making money and these encroachments aren't going to last forever. they are the price we pay for profiting by trading in a war-torn world. those encroachments on our rights will end when the war in europe ends. and there's nothing we can do to force the british to give up

those encroachments. i think the treaty of gent vin cath indicated that the violations of -- abuses of naval black ades, definition of contraba contraband, those issues were not issued in the treaty of gent. the argument sometimes given is, well, that's because the issues went away with the end of the war in europe. that's true, and i think that was the federalist argument. but there was nothing in the treat doctor of gent which would have prevented the british from resorting to those policies again in the war in europe resumed. it did not, so they did not, although some of those same issued surfaces again in world war i. there's a guy named earnest may who has written a book on our neutrality period, and he talks about the tension between the united states and great britain.

that chapter is entitled, i think the shadow of 1812. so that was a federalist alternative. look, we've just got to live with these encroachments, we're doing okay, and this is the nature of what second-rate powers have to do in a war-torn world. the great powers, if they're locked in a titanic struggle, a life-and-death struggle, they will not make concessions if they think it's going to undermine their war effort. they're just not going to do it. so have at it. i think the problem here is that jeffersonian republicans did not fully understand that we were a second-rate power. there's a great quote at the

beginning of the war in which he talks about we have considered ourselves of two great a weight in the scale of nations and assumed we could control things that really were beyond our control. yesterday david cameron announced a multimillion pound contract for vehicles for the british army. the headline is 800 jobs. whenever you see money being allocated, a brac here or moving a carrier, it's jobs that everyone is looking at. building a 44-gun frigate that takes -- both of them were probably built an boston or philadelphia. in supporting the war, in

particular the naval war, did jobs ever come into any of the equation in 1812, or looking longer through american history, when does jobs become an issue of national policy? >> when did jobs start running our defense policy? >> yes. >> not during this war. i don't see any evidence that federalists said we've got to support expanding the navy, because that will be jobs in our commercial ports where we are often in a majority. i have not seen a hint of that. this is a rare war in that we really did bad -- sometimes we do very well during a war. i think it's more typical that the massive spending and the employment -- world war ii being the best case probably generates

economic activity, but not in this war. that's largely as andrew lambert will be happy to remind us, because of the overwhelming power of the british navy, which established a blockade of the coast of the united states, and that would a devastating impact on the u.s. economy. not only virtually cut off all of our foreign trade, but even much of the coasting trade, and a lot of goods and commodities were moved up and down the coast. it was also easier to move things in those days by water. it also had, by the way, an impact on american public financing. the government didn't have enough money, so what happened in november of 1814, the united states government, for for the only time in our history since hamilton put our financial house in order, defaulted on the national debt. it could not make the payments on the interest due in new england in gold and silver coin,

as was required by law. now, one of the ironies of this is our overseas bondholders got paid because our international banker was the house of bering in england. even though it was a british banker, they fronted us the money to pay or bondholders in europe, a reflection in those days of sort of the notion that the war was still to some extent the king's business, and not the concern of private citizens or private companies. the british government, as i understand it, understood bering and brothers were doing that and did not object okay. what else? you tack about madison, pendleton and some of the personalities? >> some of the personalities. well, madison, the guy was a

great statesman but really more comfortable crafting legal treatieses, and you look at those documents he produced it, as jefferson's secretary of state. these are wonderful works of legal scholarship, but i don't think he was particularly well suited to be a commander in chief in time of war. he just -- and the republicans, you look at what they were saying. they're saying, this guy, he's too nice of a guy. he's too mild-mannered. that was a fairly commonly said by republicans privately to one another, and you can see it in the correspondence. >> at one of the birthday celebration at montpelier said

they have a special place, because he founded the united states marines. i hadn't heard that before, and he said we've always been in charge of the ceremonies, and we always hope we will be. and he said he was our founder. >> madison founded the u.s. marines. that's news to me. >> that was at the 200th anniversary. >> we've got to have a marine who knows who is responsible for the legislation in 1776. who's credited with that? >> i'm sorry, what -- >> who's credited in 1776 with founding the marine corps? >> tom's tavern. >> who was the driving force in the continental congress? >> i guess -- i guesssh. >> did it have to do with his declaration against piracy? >> well, you've got me. i don't see madison having a significant role there. now, interestingly enough when

the british purpose washington, "time" magazine ran a piece, and it its online verse on the anniversary about a week or so ago. they had titled it why americans celebrate the burning of washington? i wrote the piece for them, and i had, celebrate? what are you talking about? maybe commemorate or remember. when the british burned the public buildings of washington, they mished the marine corps barracks. the myth group up because the british really respect the u.s. marines. nah, nice try. they put up a fight at bladensburg. they were part of a barney's -- the only troops that put up a decent fight before the british overran them and then occupied

the city, but the british i think did not know this was the marine corps barracks. >> who is edmund pendleton? >> i don't know what he was doing. >> he already -- >> john sagg says he's dead. >> i'll take that from john. what else? yes, sir. >> we've been learning much more these last few weeks as the war of 1812 is in the national public eye. and we talk about how the navy -- the u.s. navy came out of the war of 1812 was a much more clear picture of what they needed for a national defense, and also the need for the united states to have a standing army, not to rely solely on a militia called up on a time of need. so if the war of 1812 had never

happened, can you give us kind of a picture of our own self as we approach the time period where we went to our own civil war? if we had not had these national defense teams in place, maybe how that might have played out? >> well, i try to avoid questions that deal with what didn't happen rather than what did. this is counter-factual history and it's great fun if you're at a war college or staff college. i'm a historian, i prefer to deal with what did happen. here's my take on this. we typically dismiss the war of 1812 as a small and by my ard is it had a prooff and on and lasting legacy. part of that legacy is it stimulated defense enough it

needed a defense tans, that after the war was -- committed to maintains a small regular army, and somewhat larger navy. the navy was really the biggest winner there. the irony of this is we had had a number of successful naval engagement on the high seas, especially at the beginning of the war, but they had absolutely no impact on the course of the war. the "uss constitution" wanted to nicknamed it old ironsides, probably to this day is the most famous ship in the u.s. navy. it's once again a committed minneapolis in the u.s. navy, has been since around 1940, so we did commit to maintaining a small army and medium-sized navy. that was one of the buy products of the war of 1812. the other sort of military

legacy was both service emerged from the war with a greater commitment to professionalism. now, i think the navy was already a fairly professional service, but it was even more so after the war was over and congress created the board of naval commissioner at the tail end of the war to ensure that. the modern army was born on the niagara frontier in 1814, and it became an evermore professional service thereafter, because westpoint was feeding into the service these professionally trained officers. andrew jackson remained in the army as one two leading commanders until 1821 and undoubtedly the outstanding commander in the war of 1812, no question, but hi represented the past and not the future. the amount tour, the part time soldier, the guy who liked to lectures his superiors or ignore their odds when he didn't approve of them, that whole

outlook was fading. our army was being -- was becoming a professional corps that recognized and didn't question civilian leadership in the way jackson did. that was the wave of the future. that was part of the legacy of 1812. yes, ma'am, remembered your question? >> yes. nobody has spoken about the economy within the united states once the blockade became effect ive how did they keep things going? >> i thought i d how did the blockade affect the u.s. economy? it had a devastating impact on the u.s. economy. >> how did they survive? >> how do people survive in hard times? well, there was a lot of trade with the enemy along the coast and the canadians frontier, and a lot of historians following

contemporary republicans wanted to blame that enemy trade on the -- but i think it was bipartisan. i think more republicans traded across the canadian frontier, simp lay because there were more republicans living in those remote areas. about you people traded with the enemy, and they did what they had to do to sort of survive the hard times of the war. what people always do during hard times. is that it?

okay. first i want to announce following our next presentation, we will take a ten-minute break. our next speaker will be speaking about mr. madison will have to put on his armor, coburn

and the capture of washington. steve vogel is the author of through the perilous fight and the pentagon history. he's a veteran journalist who wrote for "the washington post" until 2014. most recently covering the treatment of veterans from the wars in afghanistan and iraq. his reporting about the war in afc was part of a package of "the washington post" stories that was selected as a finalist for the 2002 pulitzer prize. he covered the september 11th attack on the pentagon, and also covered the fall of beryl -- of the berlin wall. he's actually currently working on a project on the history of berlin during the cold war, so maybe he has gone back in hi

mind at least to the fall of berlin. a graduate of the college of william and mary with a degree in government, he received a master's degree in national public policy from john hopkins, so it's our pleasure to welcome steve vogel to the podium. >> thank you very much. a great honor to be here, and thank you to the u.s. capital historical society and the white house historical sorry for including me in this great honor. i thought i would take on -- i thought i would take on the myth that the british marched to

washington to avenge the burning of york or what is today toronto in canada. as i was starting to think about this paper back in april, i was wondering, do i really need to make this argument? do people still really think that? now that we're well into the bicentennial, i can tell you, yes, people still really think this. in fact i'm kind of biased, because i do think t"the washington post" is our nation's finest newspaperened they have this terrific section called kids' posts. this was the headline a couple weeks ago. revenge hungry british set d.c. afire. the story tells us after americans set fire to new york, now toronto in canada, the british decided to do the same

thing to washington. i know from experience if you don't make that claim in your stories or book or whatever, you'll hear from a load the readers or viewers who think otherwise. in fact there was something on cbs sunday morning the other day about the burning of washington, or at least the burning of the white house and the capitol. there was a viewer who commented, why not disclose the reason the british burned the white house to your viewers? i'm surprised that you failed that mention that york was burned in 1812 and that the burning of washington was retaliation for that act. perhaps then the american viewers could hear the whole story. i suspect this guy is canadian, but -- and canadians have a right to be miffed about a lot of ways that americans remember this war, including perhaps who won the war, canadians likely

have a better claim to that. and certainly many americans have forgotten that we actually invaded canadians territory as a part of this war multiple times, or much less, that we failed in those invasions. so the canadians certainly have their grievances. this idea of retal yags for york is a myth, and i'm going to try to talk about that today. retaliation did not brings the british to washington. this gentleman admiral george coburn brought the british to washington. he was really one of the most remarkable figures in all of the war of 1812. as andrew lambert mentioned yesterday, he was a protege of nelson. he got his start in 1793 just

when revolutionary france declared war on great britain, and he would rise high during the two decades of war that followed. early in his career he was assigned to a squadron where his -- he was commanded by a young captain named horacio nelson who took a great liking to coburn finding in him, quohe served as a senior captain in nelson's squadron. trusts him with command in his absence telling him that, quote, we're so -- we think so exactly alike on points of service that if your mind tells you it is right, there can hardly be a doubt, but i must approve. so in 1812, at the relatively young age of 40, cockburn reaches flag rank, and the admirality in london looking for

a new assignment for him with things calming down in the mediterranean decides to send him across the ocean to north america. now, the first months of the war had not been exactly stellar for the royal navy. you know, as we heard from previous speakers, whether and how significant the battles were is certainly in question. but in any event, they were a bit of an embarrassment for the royal navy, and the commander, the north american station, sir admiral john warren was conducting a pretty lackluster campaign. there was some thought he needed the boost of a subordinate who could be a bit more aggressive. there was a british naval historian who was actually detained in philadelphia when war broke out. and he would later write, his name was william james, and he would later write, until cockburn's arrival in the

chesapeake, people in this region would, quote, scarcely have known except by hear say that war existed. and that was about to change. cockburn arrives in the spring of 1813 and finds the chesapeake just custom made for an expeditionary force such as he had, 200 mile length of the bay with all the rivers serving as tributaries, really provided access to what was then the real economic as well as political heartland of america. and this chesapeake bay quickly turns into a lake. quite quickly in the spring of 1813, we start seeing attacks on the upper shores of the bay of many towns includie ining hale e

havre de grace and towns along the eastern shore. brigadier general zebulon pike leads an american landing force on the shores of ontario near york. and they defeat the british and canadian defenders, but there is an explosion which kills pike and many other americans. and in the confusion that follows, it is apparently some american troops that set fire to the parliament building in new york. these soldiers were not operating with any instructions, but nonetheless are more than likely the ones responsible. so this was an act that wasn't sanctioned by american commanders and it -- it doesn't spark much reaction at all from great britain.

it is not reported in the dispatches sent back to london. it is seen as a relatively little consequence and the british were not terribly upset by it. cockburn is doing a number of things that is infuriating others, including the burning of havre de grace and the attack on hampton, virginia, several months later. and these were acts that truly tare fide americans. and infuriated them. cockburn at the time was probably not only the most hated man in america, but also the most feared. and what cockburn is doing

really is to -- to practice a form of total warfare, 50 years before william tecumseh sherman was doing in the south. cockburn wanted to inflict so much damage on this rich country around the capital that the government would find it impossible politically or militarily to continue the war, to continue its invasions in canada. so this british invasion of the chesapeake was really intended to divert troops from canada. but cockburn sees the possibility for more. he's so unimpressed with the quality of the defenses around -- in the region, that he begins to think of -- that the capture of the capital would be certainly possible. and he sees this as a possibility to persuade americans of this high cost of this war and to so humiliate the government of james madison that

they would be forced to make peace on british terms. in the summer of 1814, john stewart skinner, who was an american prisoner of war agent, who incidentally would later be francis scott key's companion watching the bombardment of ft. mchenry, skinner travels out, sales into the potomac to meet with cockburn to exchange some letters and gossip. and cockburn mentioned to skinner as they're walking along the deck of albeon, the flagship, that he doesn't see much way out for the president. he says, quote, mr. madison will have to put on his armor and fight it out. i see nothing else left. there is nothing subtle about this, and cockburn was aware that this word would get back to

washington and madison pretty quickly. but cockburn was so unimpressed with the american defenses that he didn't mind sending this word. he knew that there was nothing really the americans could do about it. in its third year, the war had taken a very ugly turn for the united states. driven primarily by events overseas, in particular in april 1814 prosecution the application of napoleon, which appears to have ended two decades of war in europe, and the british who had been able to really devote relatively scant resources to this annoying war on -- across the ocean were now in a position to put an end to this conflict. and relatively small number of troops, some of them from the force that had just defeated napoleon, some of them who had been under the command of the

duke of wellington are put on transports in france and sent across, including some 4,000 that are sent to the east coast. and the other thing that happens is the replacement of warren with admiral alexander cochran as the new commander of the north american station. and cochran was a real hater of americans, his brother had been killed at york town, beheaded by a cannonball and he was quite eager to give the americans a good drubbing. and upon his arrival in bermuda, in taking command in april of 1814, cochran issued cockburn a cart blanche. quote, you are perfect liberty as soon as you can muster a sufficient force to act with utmost hostility against the shores of the united states. their seaports laid in ashes and the country wasted will be some sort of retaliation for their savage conduct in canada. a couple of points here.

cochran was talking not about york, but newark, which was on the niagara frontier in which where american troops had truly done a heinous thing and burned homes and left civilians out in the dead of winter. there had been other actions along lake erie that had also caused quite a bit of concern. the other point, of course, is that cockburn had been laying seaports and ashes and wasting the country for quite some time now. for over a year. towns such as hampton in virginia had been burned. now he has sufficient sanction and the british would claim their actions in the chesapeake were in retaliation for american actions in canada. now, with troops on the way to the chesapeake on july 17th of 1814, cockburn submits a secret

plan to cochran to capture the capital. all he needed were the troops that he could bring up the patuxent river, one of the tributaries that would provide a back route to washington. and he says, within 48 hours after arrival in the patuxent, such a force, the city of washington might be possessed without difficulty or opposition of any kind. and cockburn spends the summer preparing for this, this invasion that he has in mind. he's got his base at tangier. and we heard from alan taylor about how the colonial marines were trained at this island. tangier was a perfect base for the british because it provides easy access to both potomac and the patuxent there in the middle of the bay, deep water, except for mosquitos and the fact that a lot of the british came down with various illnesses, it was a well situated. and all this time, cockburn is

doing sound, taking soundings along the potomac and patuxent, looking for the best route to washington. he's getting all kinds of intelligence from escaped slaves, from sympathizers and british in southern maryland and also from the newspapers, which are very hopefully printing all kinds of information about troop strengths and movements and all of which cockburn takes careful note of. there was really only one man offering any real opposition to cockburn at this point. and that's commodore joshua barney, who was a hero from the revolutionary war and had sprung to action when war was declared and commanded a privateer very successfully and then the -- as cockburn is going ravaging the chesapeake bay, he proposes the

construction of a -- a more or less a mosquito fleet of shallow draft barges that could attack the british in the chesapeake, which much of the waters in the chesapeake being quite shallow. he sails from baltimore in may of 1814 and pretty soon comes into contact with the british, who chases him into the patuxent river, and he's soon trapped in st. leonard creek. this is now june of 1814. now, barney manages to escape up the river, blasts his way out through a combination of incompetence by the british and barney's aggressive actions and he manages to continue up the patuxent. cockburn is not too happy about this at first. he quickly sees an opportunity here. true, he would have to take care of barney and the flotilla before he can mount an attack on

washington, but he sees the flotilla as an opportunity to disguise his designs on washington. he can use barney being in the patuxent as a reason for going up the river in force and to keep the americans confused, which turns out to be not very hard to do. in mid-august of 1814, the british reinforcement troops arrive under the command of major general robert ross, who was one of welli ining ton's ve capable lieutenants in the peninsula war. ross was -- his instructions were to create a diversion along the east coast, and he was very specifically told not to do anything with this force that would risk it. british have designs eventually on attacking new orleans.

this is a pretty small force. 4,000 men compared to these armies that had been raging across europe, 100,000 and more. this is a small force and ross knows it. and he's finding -- he's a bit skeptical at cockburn's claims that they can capture washington with this force. but cockburn goes to work persuading them otherwise. he emphasizes that the weak american defenses and talks about how much he's been able to accomplish just with his royal marines. and he elaborates on this plan they have in mind, he would -- the main force would go up the patuxent river, with the army landing here at benedict, which is how far up river they can sail with large ships. and then another force would go up the potomac river, which, of course, is the more obvious

route to washington. but it is protected by the kettle bomb shoals and the expectation is that large ships carrying large guns are not going to be able to sail past the shoals. cockburn has done some scouting and he's found a route through the shoals. and some more ships would sail up the bay under captain peter parker to disrupt communications and further confuse the americans. and he's able -- he's able to persuade ross and admiral cochran to go along with this. ross, he takes them ashore, in st. mary's county and ross sees how poor the defenses are. and ross is, you know, an aggressive commander himself. he certainly has proven himself in the european wars, and he's eager to get home. he's got a wife who is not at all happy he's been sent across the ocean to fight in this new war. so what they agree to is they

don't commit to an attack on washington, but they agree that they'll land the forces at benedict, and go try to trap barney and based on the resistance they meet, they can make a decision as to whether or not to continue on to washington. cockburn's plans are zealously endorsed by one of ross' officers. this is lieutenant george de lacy evans. this was taken during the crimean war where he commanded a division. i love this photo because it kind of shows you -- we don't see too many photos of participants in this war. and this gives you an idea of what the american militia was up against, you know. a very serious, tough minded soldier was evans, and he is at ross' side and he's certainly encouraging the general to do

this attack. quick aside, when i was doing research for this book, i flew to london, to look at the archives there, the day i arrived, i was staying at the flat of my former high school roommate and said, let's go look for cockburn's grave, it is in pencil green cemetery. we were wandering around in the cold and fog. and instead of finding cockburn's grave, we did find george de lacy evans and he's a stone's throw from cockburn. two of the figures most responsible for this attack in washington are within a stone's throw of each other. is with ama was amazed. i don't know about my friend, but i couldn't get over it. he wanted to get back to watch some soccer. but so the landing takes place on august 19th, and it works beautifully, just as cockburn has said it will.

the americans are completely flumoxed. they can't figure out what's going on. they do trap the flotilla, august 22nd. barney blows it up rather than have the boats fall into british hands. he escapes with his flotilla men. but by this point there has been so little resistance offered ross that he is persuaded that it is worth continuing on to washington. and in washington there is some hope that, well, now the british are going to turn back. they have finished off barney's employ flotilla, they have done their business and they're going to go sail away. this is an example of wishful thinking we see in the defense of washington. there is several more brilliant faints as they move to upper

marlboro, and it becomes more apparent that washington is going to be a target. even then, general winder, the american commander who is getting no support from the secretary of war john armstrong is very confused as to where he should position his forces. in retrospect, it should have been quite obvious they were going to have to come through blainsburg to get to washington because in order to cross the eastern branch of the potomac, as it was then known, they were going to -- they would have to cross that river and it was going to be too difficult down here where the river is quite wide. and the river -- one can anticipate the bridges would be blown. but at brightonsburg, the water was shallow enough that they could forge if the river there was blown. after a final faint, and very belated realization by the americans that brighteonsburg ws the site, on august 24th, there is a battle at brightonsburg.

speaking of marines, this shows some of the marines fighting at brightonsburg. a couple of points, i don't want to talk too much, but we always talk about the blainsburg races and how the militia just scattered and the british cut through them. all that is true to a point. i think the first place we have to remember that the militia that shows up, these are civilians who have not been well trained. not well equipped, very poorly led by winder and very poorly supported by armstrong, the federal government. and yet they showed up. they -- these are citizen soldiers showing up to fight a very formidable force, maybe not in numbers, but certainly in terms of experience. and had they been better led or had they been used earlier to show any resistance, i think ross would have turned around. and there is also very strong

showing by the marines, who are serving as infantry to barney and his flotilla men who form a third line of defense. after the first two lines of maryland militia are scattered, the british have to charge uphill into barney's guns and there is some very heavy fighting, and i would say that this battle was not -- was not a done deal that barney comes close to turning it around. runs out of ammunition. and the british proved to be too much. he's desperately wounded. the british after a few hours of fighting then are left with an open road into washington. winder retreats all the way through town to georgetown and decides that's not far enough. he goes to tenley town where the heights there. you seat burning sta insee the

begin. he decides he's too close. he goes all the way to the courthouse, not his finest moment. we can see the path that madison would take. we hear more about that later today. i won't go into much detail about that either. the british, once they enter town, i think it is quite clear that ross had come to the conclusion, even as their entering town, that the federal buildings in washington would be burned. if they couldn't receive a healthy r yy ransom for it. and, in fact, after one incident at the belmont home where they come under sniper fire, they get to work and the capital is soon in flames, the americans themselves burn the washington navy yard, which is just stocked full of timber and tar and all

sorts of naval supplies. and this is really what makes some of the largest fires. and you have -- we're speaking earlier of conflagrations. this is what you see, the sight of the navy yard burning from very far away and the sheets of flame winding up from the capital can be -- are visible as far away as fredericksburg, frederick, maryland, and ominously in baltimore they can see the glow in the sky. this was an enormous fire that was burning in washington and then soon the white house itself goes up in flames. we saw this portrait yesterday and you can see that cockburn doesn't feel a huge measure of regret here. ross had come to share cockburn's view that the burping

of washington was -- could be a way of forcing an end to the war. so in the report that he sends to london, very soon after this, ross calls the destruction of washington's building, quote, the opposite of the expedition and makes no mention of retaliation. but instead describes it as a humiliation for the americans that would soon end the war. he wants -- he believes it is going to get the u.s. government's attention and they'll be forced to make peace. he writes, quote, they feel strongly the disgrace of having had their capital taken by a handful of men and blame very generally a government which went to war without the means or the abilities to carry it on. the injury sustained by the city of washington in the destruction of the public buildings has been immense and must discuss the country with a government that has left them capital unprotected. nonetheless, i think it is fair to say that ross likely would not have consented to burning

the federal buildings in washington, had he not thought it justified in response to what the american actions in canada. this isn't what drives him to burn it, but he does feel that they do have some justification here. it is not york that is the justification that is on british minds, it is really newark, which i mentioned earlier, and similar episode at dover on the north shores of lake erie that were really on british minds. now, one point i wanted to make about this moment is that the news quickly arrives within three weeks in great britain that, you know, the capital has been capture and the building is burned and there is great joy in london, celebrations at hyde

park, guns being fired, and a real belief that the war is going to end very quickly and that great britain after two decades is finally going to be able to have a time of peace. but in the weeks that ensue, there is some criticism that surfaces in the european press that notes that napoleon conquered europe without burning the capitals of europe and how come the british weren't able to do the same. and the french particularly liked this line of argument and one of the french papers actually writes that this action in washington is, quote, unworthy of civilized nations. and it is only then that by november, when there is -- the issue is brought up in parliament, that you hear any mention of york. don graves, a great canadian scholar on the war of 1812 has

pointed out that the first mention in parliament of york comes november 8th. so this -- york becomes a justification after the fact for the british actions. and it soon is pretty well accepted and 200 years later, we see some of the results of that. now, three weeks after the attack on washington, the british launch an attack on baltimore and this -- this is an attack that had the british launched immediately after washington, had they gone directly over land as in fact ross considers the outcome could have been very different. but in the three weeks since washington, the militia commander in baltimore, the baltimoreans had the sense to more or less stage a coup and not let winder take over as he should have, and major general samuel smith is in charge. and unlike winder, he has a

scheme of defense and, you know, a real tactical sense and by building a large force of some 15,000 militia that have descended on baltimore from virginia, western maryland, from pennsylvania, and then putting his best men from baltimore city brigade out at a thin point on north point where the british are advancing by land, he's able to in fact delay the british attack and in fact kill general ross in the skirmish that proceeds that battle. and then you have following up on that the attack on ft. mchenry, which, of course, is what francis scott key accompanied by john skinner and some other americans witness and we won't go into that story. safe to say that i think it is always important to remember that there is a question mark at

the end of that first verse that key writes. when he's witnessing this attack, he's not just wondering whether the flag is going to be flying over the ft. mchenry, he's wondering whether the united states is going to survive, you know, three weeks after the destruction of federal washington, it certainly seemed possible that the country was on the brink of collapse. and baltimore and also as don mentioned, lake champlain and more important victory that turns back to the british attack from quebec really, when this news arrives in london, this changes the atmosphere quite a bit. so after the heady rush from washington's collapse, reality begins setting in. it is worth noting that at gent, on august 24th, the very day that washington is burned, the american delegation was meeting

with british commissioners and they were rejecting demands that the british just made, which included creating a 250,000 square mile buffer zone for native americans in the old northwest. would have given great britain military control of the great lakes and navigation down the mississippi. so by the time that the news from baltimore and lake champlain arrives and there is a real realization certainly encouraged by welling ton who is asked for his opinion on the matter and he tells liverpool that you don't really have much of a basis to be making extreme demands here. he advises making peace. this is what happens at the treaty that is signed december 24th. i think it is worth noting that, you know, i think ross and

cockburn came pretty close, really, to realizing their vision. the -- in the end, the capture of washington doesn't really give the british the advantage they hope and they find themselves later on the defensive because of criticism and then you have the results from baltimore and lake champlain, but if washington had been followed up by different results in baltimore, and lake champlain, i think the outcome could have been quite different and the burning of washington, the federal buildings, would be seen in a different light today. but anyway, with that, i want to stop and take questions. thank you very much. [ applause ] >> i think we would all love to

hear that paragraph in your book, that wonderful paragraph about libraries and ladies. okay. >> right. >> secondly, i have a second question, which -- i'm going to sit down. before i can give up the retaliation story, i need a little more clarification. you say it was after -- it was an after the fact justification. and in your talk today, you said that the british chesapeake campaign was retaliation for the american campaign in canada, not specifically york. but in general. but don't you say in your book, that robert ross, in washington, said it was retaliation for york or am i wrong? >> you're right on that. and in the sense that this is something that is written by dr. yule many years later by an

american witness in an account that while very useful has some, you know, leaves some doubts as to the details of certain incidents and recollections of what was said, so this is the only reference to york, only reference to york attributed to ross. and it is not ross himself in his own words and the letters he writes home, he doesn't say anything about new yoyork. he doesn't say anything about newark or delaware or anywhere else. he talks about humiliating the americans. i think you also mention the not making war against libraries and ladies, i think in -- that comes from the same account. and i think there is a germ of truth in all of this. i think ross felt quite embarrassed when he learns that the books of library of congress were actually in the capital building. and he -- he allegedly says, had

i known that, we would have taken the books out. and ross, i think, felt a bit uncomfortable about the whole thing of burning these buildings. he had come to the conclusion, though, best way to end this war quickly. and, you know, to the extent that retaliation is motivating him, i really think if he said anything at the time, almost certainly would have been about newark, because this was the issue that had been raised with cochran. this was the issue that was really -- had really infuriated the british. so i think that -- and the ladies too. i think he was certainly -- i think the idea they wanted to capture dolly madison is pretty ridiculous, the british were interested in capturing james madison.

[ inaudible ] >> and maybe he wouldn't have. i think it is possible. or at least he would have made sure she left. yes, sir. >> earlier mrs. taylor asked don hickey to discuss some of the personalities. could you comment on dewitt clinton and daniel tompkins who were both governor of new york state. and also the landing of money by tompkins to fund new york state's role in the war of 1812, which when he died, he was very -- he was broke. and tompkins went on to serve as monroe's vice president for eight years. could you comment on the role of dewitt clinton and daniel tompkins. >> i probably couldn't say more than what you have. certainly not an area of expertise for me. but what i would say is that

the -- at this time there is sort of a movement towards secession that has been going on in new england. and i think the -- the burning of washington is one of the things that pulls the rug out from that movement because there is quite a bit of outrage that spreads, including up to new england and to new york over the burning of washington. i don't know if anybody else has something to add about it, but -- >> are there any other personalities you want to discuss that had a role in the war of 1812? >> oh, sure, i mean -- you know, i'm always fascinated actually by the role of francis scott key because to me he epitomizes the divisions in the country at this time. francis scott key, who we see as, you know, the guy who writes the most patriotic of all songs, was a huge opponent of the war.

he in particular is appalled at the u.s. actions towards canada, the fact that we're attacking canada, which he views as an innocent third party, and he actually writes a letter to john randolph of virginia, who was the congressman leading the a% nottingham. and he also forgets to bring along a spyglass, by the way. so his scouting reports aren't

particularly useful. and then at blainsburg, he inserts himself in the chain of command and moves some of the forces around, so that they're not in support of each other. fascinating story, but he and madison, i think, really redeem themselves after the british depart washington. they -- madison spends the last night in refuge in brookville, maryland, and gets the word that the british have withdrawn after 24 hours. and he and monroe immediately ride back to washington. this is a moment when a lot of people were urging complete capitulation, still has that second british force coming up the potomac river. and just as madison enters washington, there is a big boom coming from down the river. and that's where the british are starting to attack ft. washington, which soon blows itself up, so you have a continued assault on the capital, and at this point, madison and monroe, i think, show their finest moments in

their roles and monroe effectively takes over defense of the city. and becomes more or less the acting secretary of war. and one of the good things they have the sense to do is to keep -- not interfere with the defenses of baltimore. and they keep winder out of -- from being inserted back in control there. and i think monroe's actions also in trying to trap the british forces, they're leaving alexandria were noteworthy. so, yeah, a lot of characters that we haven't been able to speak about that i think deserve more mention. >> could you elaborate a little bit more about the conduct of cockburn and ross in regard to barney as the battle ended. i think that is sort of an interesting story, and i wanted

to hear how you felt about it. >> it is very interesting. because when barney is wounded, and he falls into british hands very quickly, a soldier goes to get first its captain wainwright, one of the british naval ship captains and then cockburn arrives as well and ross. and, you know, they are very impressed by the performance of barney and the flotilla men. in fact, ross himself had to take command after colonel william thorton, one of the british brigade commanders led the way had fallen. and they had -- i think they recognized they were on the cusp of maybe losing this battle because barney had initially been able to drive the british back. he actually even, you know, orders a charge at one point that really throws the british off guard. so they do immediately upon finding him, ross says, well,

we're going to issue you a parole, which essentially means that he's not going to be held captive. he can't fight in the war further until he's officially exchanged. but it is a gesture of honor, of respect for barney. and i also would add that as alluded to earlier, the marines were fighting with barney and they fought very well, they suffered 25% casualties, but that's not why the british left the marine commandant's home. you -- it comes down to evans writes in a memo that, well, we were going to burn that house, but the neighbors pleaded that it was going to -- it would spread to other homes, the area around the navy yard and marine barracks was very heavily populated at the time. there is a big wind blowing. so they may have respected the marines, but that's not why they saved that building. >> you think that part of the

battle was overlooked pretty much by history. it seems like it hasn't been mentioned at all. >> which part? >> barney's -- >> i don't know if it has been overlooked. i think there is -- there is a general recognition that, you know, barney was a real hero. there was a great event in blainsburg, just two weeks ago, ten days ago, where a memorial sculpture to barney and to -- includes a marine and a flotillaman was unveiled. and i think that's a -- was a fitting gesture. so i think, you know, at least among people who paid some attention to this fight, there is a recognition that barney and the flotilla men really were a high point in what was otherwise a pretty dismal day. yes, ma'am.

>> i'll stand up. i object to the idea that washington was burned because of what americans did in york. and canada. and so i spent a good deal of time researching what did happen in york, now toronto. the americans, yes, i think did burn the parliament building. but it wasn't american troops. it was american settlers who were fed up with being british subjects, when they were used to being citizens. and they were just plain fed up with the british administration and with the local administration and so one way they had been fighting in parliament, actually, against certain laws that the governor

was trying to pass, that they thought were oppressive. and so i think that when the americans attack that the local settlers just said to themselves, okay, here, we'll get even. and they burned the parliament buildings. if anybody did, it might have been the people that were released from the jail, they were jail birds, then they might have been in there because the british jailed traitors. and so they may have had a good reason to burn the parliament buildings. but so they may have joined some of the american settlers and burned the parliament buildings, but it wasn't the american troops. >> well, there is still a great bit of mystery and uncertainty about exactly what happened. nobody can say with certainty who burned the parliament, certainly americans of some sort, more than likely deserved

some of the responsibility. but, again, this was not something that was sanctioned by the american government. any other questions? >> yes -- the york issue. i do agree with you. your book was great and i encourage anyone to read it, everyone to read it, i should say. the point that i find fascinating with york is that the u.s. navy has some items, still has some items that were taken from the parliament at york. they're at the naval academy museum. the guilded lion, at one time, they had the parliamentary mace which was returned by franklin roosevelt to canada sometime in the '30s and then there is some standards that were taken from there. which suggests that there was some official involvement or else they took them away from the guys who burnt it. there also was a wig or they said it was a scalp initially, but it turns out it was the

speaker's perry wig. it was not a human scalp, it was the -- so, any reaction? >> well, yeah, there is a lot of items that if the rightful owners knew were being held by the u.s. government, either at the naval academy or other places, probably will be mobs demanding their return. i don't know the provenance of those items. but i wouldn't be surprised at all if some items were taken as souvenirs by the troops who had fought there at york, if they were brought back by the troops and ended up somehow at places like the naval academy. it wouldn't surprise me at all. >> anybody else? yes, ma'am. >> general ross issued an order

that there would be no burning of private buildings, yet admiral cockburn burned the natural intelligencer office. i was wondering because you said that cockburn was interested in laying waste to the -- why that didn't happen to the rest of washington? >> ross was certainly in charge of the forces going into washington, so i think cockburn was chomping at the bit at times, there were several buildings he wanted to burn. now, including a bank building. now, he was going to burn the national intelligencer and was getting ready to do that, when, again, these neighbors that keep on showing up at different points appeal to him saying if you like that, that building on fire, the fire is going to spread. it is going to ignite other buildings. and this is actually -- this actually happens on several occasions, the fires from the capital, for example, are responsible for igniting the -- that home that george washington

had once owned that was basically collateral damage from the capital fire. so cockburn doesn't actually burn that building, but cockburn, you know, ross keeps cockburn largely in check, but there was no way that cockburn was going to be denied the pleasure of doing something to the national intelligencer, which, you know, had compared him to attila the hundred and many other barbarians. and, i think the americans were quite lucky that ross was in charge of that attack. in fact, you know, he's nearly shot at the belmont home at the start of the british arrival in washington. and some of the british troops told civilians that, you know, if ross had been killed, you know, this town would have been absolutely decimated. and i don't really doubt that. okay, well, thank you very much]

>> we are going to continue rolling on because we are on c-span 3 and excited to be on it. but if you need to take a break, you know how -- where the door is. with that, let me introduce with great pleasure dr. john stagg, professor of history at the university of virginia and the editor of the james madison papers where he's edited so far 20 of these critical volumes of madison's personal correspondence. we'd like another 20, john, if you think you can fit that in in the next few years. because of the work of john and his team, we have much more complete understanding of madison and the context of