and their objections to great written's rule. describesjoseph ellis the summer of 1776, the inner workings of the continental congress and army, and written's a little and military reaction to the start of the american revolution. [applause] >> thank you for that gracious introduction. and thank you all for making out on a not so pleasant evening. the weatherwise at least. i was supposed to be her a couple years ago and i think i had a hip operation and it knocked me out, and i always regretted that i missed it so i'm back here to sort of make up. i want to talk about a book i've just written. and so this is a thinly disguised propaganda campaign --

[laughter] to get you to purchase this undoubtedly magisterial book called "revolutionary summer." by the don't feel totally comfortable just talking my own wares. so that will be the last time we actually mention the book or say, except to say it's great beach reading. [laughter] really short and all the royalties for this book will go directly to the alexander alice scholarship fund, he is my youngest son still -- [laughter] i'm trying to do a very familiar story, a story that virtually every generation of historians has told before, and each generation has added a new interpretive gloss. it's sort of like another layer of wallpaper across the wall. and in some sense one of my path was to try to strip away the wallpaper and get back to the wall itself. and so some of the things i do say that i think are fresh, are fresh because they are not

really new. they are just so old they have been forgotten. but given the fact this is a story that's also the subject of one of the more performed place in the american theatrical repertoire, the plague 1776, i better have something new to say. i think i do, but that is very much up to you. want to talk for 35-40 minutes. i don't want to read to you. i want to talk to you. is that okay? [applause] i've got some notes. i thought about what i want to say but i don't want to bore you but if i was just going to read to you i would pass out and we would talk about it later. i began this project with a presumption end with a question. the presumption was this, that

no event in american history which looks at the inevitable in retrospect was as improbable and problematic at the time. and part of my task was to recover for the modern reader a sense of crisis and confusion and improvisation that was occurring in the late spring and summer of 1776. i have trouble because i did my letters like 18, 1713 instead of 2013. [laughter] so again, it is not easy to write clearly and lucidly about confusion. but that was one of the things i wanted to be able to do, recover that mentality, if you will. and i think you'll see a little bit of what i'm talking about fairly shortly.

the question i had, i called the wilkesboro question, after wilkesboro pennsylvania. is anybody here from wilkesboro? no kidding? unbelievable. unbelievable. there was nobody from wilkesboro in san francisco last week, i can tell you right now. [laughter] the population of contemporary wilkesboro is slightly larger than the population of virginia was in 1776. now, if we go out there to wilkes barre now, do you think we could find george washington, thomas jefferson, james madison, george mason, john marshall and

patrick henry? we ain't going to find them. now, at some theoretical level they are there. that is, human beings with the capacity for leadership are there, but the situation doesn't permit that group to rise to the surface.

and so the question is, why did that situation exist in 1776? now, there is another answer to this, which is that great leadership only emerges during times of great crisis. and this makes eminent sense, the pressure that the crisis creates. and yet we can all think of examples where there's a great crisis and there's no leadership. like now. [laughter] [applause] or the coming of your -- world war i in europe. so what was special, you can't say there was something special in the water back there then. you can't say god looked down upon the american college and bless them. supernatural explanations are not admitted. even if you're an evangelical

you're not allowed to use those in a historical conversation. i don't know whether i have a good answer to this, but some of the is in the book in an explicit way but i will give you an anecdotal version of a partial answer to the question. it relates to george washington. in may 1775, george washington puts on his military uniform and decides to go to the second continental congress. he's the only one that's going to be wearing a military uniform. he's making a statement. he thinks the war has already begun. and it has, we know, in retrospect. lexington and concord have happened in april. bunker hill is going to happen in june, which is actually one of the bloodiest battles in the war, but i know that chronology is the last refuge of the feebleminded, but it is the only refuge for historians. noticed this, it's underreported, under discussed in history texts.

the war starts 15 months before independence is declared. it's going to cause, it's going to shake things in this explanation is that i'm going to offer you. anyway, washington is getting ready to leave mount vernon and he says to his -- what is that? >> [inaudible] >> flood warning,right. [laughter] biblical here. [laughter] somebody gave me that line. thank you, sir. washington said he was manager of mount vernon, who was a second cousin, when the british,

potomac to burn mount vernon, get out my books and martha, presumably not in that order -- [laughter] >> he presumed he was going to lose everything. when jefferson eventually gets around to writing those famous words, our lives, our fortunes and our sacred honor, they sounded pretty rhetorical. hey, they were for real. it was everything. you have to be willing to do that. and he was willing. later, in 1779, a british frigate comes up to potomac and lund washington says i'm going to send out a skiff with fruit and presence to appease the british captain. so we does not and the british captain says, hey, man, i'm just fishing for airing. i have no evil intention figures even know this is mount vernon. so lund washington sends a report of this to george, sort of proud that he defended the

homestead. and washington writes back and says, i am extremely distressed at what you have told me. you have sullied my honor. if it happens again, let them burn it to the ground. these are the kind of guys we are talking about, okay? there's a special quality to this particular crisis that generates a level of leadership, not just in virginia but beyond. by the way, this is not a client that the founders were all iconic heroes are worthy of divinity or thing like that.

they are all human beings, each of them effective laws. i've tried to write about that. don't solve the slavery problem, don't solve the native american problem. those are major problems, but all that said, this is the greatest generation of political leadership in an american history. and the revolution is about to be cast. one of the other things that i discovered that this is president scholarly literature in some ways but not every way. is that this was an unnecessary war. there was a diplomatic solution to the crisis that was visible and known by prominent figures on both sides. on the british side, both william pitt and edmund burke in

the house of commons advocated the solution, and andy continental congress, -- in the condo congress, a resolution -- resolution called -- what do you call a? a resolution appealing to the king on this principle. you let us tax ourselves and our legislatures and legislative ourselves at our respective colonial legislatures and we remain in the empire, recognizing the authority of the king and recognizing our membership in the british empire economically. we are both beneficiaries of that. as i say, both sides, their people on both sides arguing for this. up through the middle of the spring of 1776. this is the answer that the british would later regret they don't accept, or act on.

this will be the biggest blunder in the history of british statecraft. why don't they want to do a? why don't they see that this is the way? three reasons. first of all, william blackstone, the great jurist, has ruled in 1765, or asserted, that there must be a single source of sovereignty in the empire. and in any government. there cannot be many guts. there must be one god and the source of sovereignty and the british empire and the british government is parliament, the king and parliament. and the american solution is unacceptable because it creates multiple versions of sovereignty. each calling will have its own

sovereign government. even though they claim to work within the canopy of the british king. we can't have that. not sent, since aristotle everybody knows you have to have a final source of sovereignty. by the way, the whole american constitution is based on sensing with that idea. james madison is the major architect. a second reason is an early 18th century version of what will come to call the domino theory. if we grant the americans this degree of latitude politically, what happens in ireland? what happens in scotland? what happens in india? we can't send that signal. it's a sign of weakness. assigned where not really an empire. again, if they had acted on this they would've discovered the british commonwealth 100 years early. but they're not ready to act on it.

and there's a third reason they are not ready to act. there's no reason to make a diplomatic solution when we have the militarily dominant force. we could squash this thing. the colonies have never cooperated in any military venture into political venture before, and the british army and british navy, when combined, is the dominant military force on the planet. prussian army is better. the french army is good, but put canadian, british dominant. ask yourself this question. how many wars did great britain lose between 1750-1950? 2.

everybody loses in afghanistan. [laughter] graveyard for empires. okay. and in order to implement the decision, george iii himself, it's really important you do that, george iii himself, it does come for parliament. it doesn't come from his ministers but it comes from george iii himself who says we will prepare an invasion force larger than any of the invasion force to cross the atlantic, 42000 soldiers and sailors, over 400 ships, the largest amphibious force ever to cross the atlantic. the only time it succeeded was in world war i and world war ii. we are going to squash this rebellion in the cradle. and we're going to attack new york, occupy new york as our major headquarters, and spread

from there. but a deadly, devastating knockout blow at the very beginning. what's the situation politically in the american colonies? there's a really good book about the year 1775 that talks about the fact, came out recently that there was a political consensus that had already formed by the time you got delayed 75. that's true i would say in new england because in new england has been occupied but it's not true down as you get into new york, pennsylvania, new jersey and virginia.

those colonies are divided. now, we know there's about 20% of the colonial population, actually 19% that his loyalists. but in new england they have already been driven out. you don't want to be a loyalist and be living in new england. they will tear your house down and kill you. that doesn't mean, however, that the other 80% are all week patriots. -- whig patriots. this very some colonies call me, region to region. it's like going on cnn during an election and watched the red states, blue states and purple states. and within those states different counties. my own best judgment is that of the 80%, about 60% were pretty committed to the cause, and they called it the cause. but there's another 40% of the 80% that are really and decided or will go where ever the nearest army happens to be.

give you an example. in valley forge, the continental army starred amidst the most productive farming area in the american colonies because the farmers sold their code is to the british army in philadelphia because they get more money for them. some are quakers, too, so they have that exclusion. at any rate, up until the middle of the spring, the moderates

dominate the continental congress and the public opinion in the country at large is divided. the moderate position is most effectively defended by john dickinson, a radical position, independence by john adams. that's one thing that 1776, the play, clearly gets right. what changes the chemistry of the political situation is the realization that we are about to be invaded. people talk about the impact of tom paine's pamphlet, common sense, which comes out formally in late january and it's very, very influential, no question. but one of the reasons it's influential, severing the relationship between the colonies and the king, not just parliament but the king, is because it's published and read in a specific context. and that context is the son of the guns are sending the largest amphibious force with 15,000 prussian troops who are committed to taking no prisoners. they're sending them to get us.

how do i know this? why am i confident that what i just said is historically supported by the evidence? in may, may 15 of 1776, the congress sent a resolution. it's written by john adams, requesting each of the colonies to redo their own charters as state charters are adams says, for obvious reasons, this ss de facto declaration of independence but if your estate is going to rewrite your charter, it's because you're decided to go to independence. they sent these to every governor. the governor sent to the legislature a legislature sent to all the counties and towns in each of the colonies. the reason obscure source added by got an 1840s has preserved all the responses. for example, there are 42 towns in massachusetts that respond. they all say the same thing. we cannot imagine having this conclusion only six months ago.

when we still believed in our king and our membership and the british empire. iv has betrayed us. he is no longer our friend. in effect he has declared his independence of us. and, therefore, we have no choice. and then they used this phrase, this is where jefferson gets it. we pledge our lives, our fortunes and our sacred honor. it must come from some british poem that i don't know, i have tried to find a but that's where jefferson gets the phrase. it's almost unanimous, is one that in massachusetts the cake that says i'm not sure but the british days going to bombard us as soon as we say it. [laughter]

anyway, the real reason why there is a political consensus for independence by the early summer of 76 is that they are being invaded. and so in effect the british decision to squash the rebellion generates the political will to cement the rebellion. does this begin to sound familiar? the attack is going to be in new york. now, if you look at a map, new york is an archipelago. it's three islands. staten island, long island, and manhattan. whoever controls the seed control for the battle. and there is no question about who controls the see. in retrospect, even at the time,

new york is indefensible. so why do we side -- so why do we decide to defend it? while this is where the store, the military side of the store and the local side keep interacting. the british fleet lands on july july 2, the entering seconds of the british fleet, july 2. that's the day the colonists vote on independence. the resolution from virginia, that these colonies are and have every right to the independent states. okay, the continental congress says look, how would it look if we just be clear independence? and then the army retreats to the main, either connecticut or new jersey? another question that might have been asked is how would it look at the army doesn't retreat and is annihilated? [laughter]

there's a second reason why they defend it. but washington is a blade and civilian control your dog is wants him to defend new york, he's going to defend new york. there's another reason. washington is in on a driven man, as my earlier example testifies. almost medieval chivalry. and washington believes that the enemy, in this case general howe presents himself on the field, he is on the bound to meet him in the same way that he is honor bound to answer a summons to dual. this is stupid last. [laughter] he needs to get over this. he will eventually get over this, but it's going to come at an enormous cost on long island and manhattan. the average experience of a

soldier in the continental army is five and a half months. the average experience of a soldier in the british army is seven and a half years. within the officer class it's even more dramatic. i mean, henry knox, the head of artillery, as a general was a bookseller in cambridge. so both in terms of the terrain and in terms of the power of the professional, power of the two armies, this is going to be a debacle. why did they think they had a chance? all the messages from headquarters at this time are part of this republican virtuous rhetoric. soldiers who believe in their cause and fight for their own

values and their own country can defeat mercenaries in any field of battle. if you believe, you are a better soldier. at some level this sounds really great, except it doesn't work. and in the battle of long island, the continental army is routed, easily. they suffer over 1500 casualties casualties, and they are trapped on long island. this could be the end of the war. what would happen if the

continental army was destroyed and washington and his staff were all killed? but they get off in a miraculous miraculous, everything has to work perfectly. it's a perfect storm of the benevolent source. the nor'easter is coming. the current has to fall a certain way. the falcons to commit just at the right time and to get across on the night of august 30 safe, so like an even more dramatic version of dunkirk. it's in sum was the most important political campaign of the war because if it didn't happen i'm not sure the war would even continue.

we can't know that. i'll mention that in the second. but at the end of this defeat in long island, richard howe, the admiral, as for meeting with the american representatives from the congress, all kinds of back and forth whether they can diplomatically do that, blah, blah, blah. but eventually they send three people, been confronted, john adams and edward rutledge to meet with howe, richard house, at staten island on september 11, after the battle. and howe says, look, we just demonstrated to you that you cannot win. it is a hopeless cause. step back from independence. listen to the terms the team will offer you. they will be generous. i can tell you he's going to let you govern yourselves as you want to, although i can't guarantee it. and we'll probably have to hang most of the leaders. [laughter] he doesn't say that but that's what they mean. and both adams and franklin say something really interesting. adams says, it makes no difference what happens here. if you destroy the continental army, we will raise another army. demographically there are over 500,000 americans between the ages of 15-50. it's the same thing ho chi minh says to us. so go ahead, but it doesn't make

any difference. franklin says something like that but he is friends with richard howe. they both try to end the war. the howe brothers do not think the american war is a good idea. sir richard, you tell us we cannot win and i tell you you cannot win. you were not fighting an army, you are fighting the people. you must subjugate the american population. you will never be able to do unless you raise troops that will never be justified in terms of cost to the british public. like the seem crusades. your defeat.in the man

save as much as a reputation as you possibly can. ell, it is really an interesting question and an unanswerable question. what would have happened if the british destroyed the continental army on long island and manhattan? they had several chances to do so. suggested,as i really didn't want to destroy the continental army. they wanted to rough it up. demonstrate that they could not possibly win but i didn't want this war to become the kind of four against the irish and scottish that was a genocidal war. they wanted to ended in which they can all come back

together. that that is a question haveis unanswerable that i some obligation having spent four or five years thinking if they goti think in washington, they could replace the army easier than washington. what would've happened is that each estate would've reverted to its own state militia as the source of authority and what would've became a guerrilla war. the british would've still lost but it would have been a different war. probably longer. possibility -- a at thessibility oth

instruction of the continental army would've destroyed the will of the rebellion. that is what i cannot know. i do not think it would've happened. if i was a betting man, i would put my odds on american victory in the end. one of the things that happened as a result of this experience is that washington began to understand the strategic factors. it became central to his success. this is not the way to fight the war. the american army was never going to be competitive with the british army in a man-to-man situation. let's fight a war of posts is what they called it. not quite individual -- a guerrilla war bought a war you don't fight unless you have superior numbers and superior terrain. you adopt a defensive strategy. for aill work for you

reason that is really important. we never really win the war, they just decide to give up. at the end of the war, there are over 30,000 troops still in north america but they decide to leave. lesson in learns this the summer of 1776. begins at thatss time. it is hard for him to accept this but eventually he does. many ofhink about it, the great generals in world history are losers.

napoleon, robert e. lee. washington was not a good general. he lost more battles than he won but he was a winner. he was a winner. because of his resilience and the insight he had at the strategic level. i think my time is kind of up. i will end with one controversial question. a statement. when the war in iraq was ratcheting up, i got a call from one of the op-eds at the l.a. times and she said, i want you to write an op-ed of what washington would've done about iraq. [laughter]

or what he would do. i said, stephanie, washington wouldn't know where iraq was. [laughter] you wouldn't know about weapons of mass destruction, jihad, whatever. she said, that is right. now write the piece. [laughter] i wrote this piece in which the main point was washington would've said we are the british and i don't understand that. poll amongstke a american citizens and to whether the united states is empire, the majority of americans say no. if you take a poll in the rest of the world, everybody says yes. imperial poweran since world war ii and inherited hegemonic power from great

britain since 1945, 1946. we have made specific decisions in specific context -- the cold war, iraq, afghanistan, syria. i want to step back from the specifics of those particular contexts and say there is the reason we are an empire in denial is because we know that the core values of our republic are incompatible with imperialism. republic must depend upon the power of her ideas to succeed. voluntarily. an empire depends on the power of its arms to thsucceed. the korean war, the gulf war, the bosnian war. of the like to encourage

a national conversation about the conflict between our origins and who we are now. we can then say well, george washington is part of another era. thomas jefferson is in a lost world. we are in a different place. but, if we believe in original intentions and if we believe the core values of our republic were established at that moment, i think we should have a seminar on this. it will be an interesting conversation in which liberals and conservatives may be able to come together. thank you for having me. [applause] don't embarrass me by not having any questions, for heaven's sake. >> i am a big fan of yours.

growing up i was a big fan of thomas jefferson. i thought he was the greatest president that there was. up.ved peas growing he grew peas. i love wine. he went broke with wine. i loved him and thought he was fantastic and then i read your book. [laughter] fantastic book. it changed my mind on jefferson. so, i have two questions. what are my questions is in all of your research, have you ever changed your mind on any of the people you have written about? i'm reading your book on adams and i love adams. i tend to agree with him more. that is one of my questions -- do you ever change your mind about anybody you are writing about? number two, i know it is difficult to put people in the past into the modern times but,

when i read your books i try to figure out where politically jefferson and adams and jefferson and washington and hamilton -- where they would be politically on the spectrum. i get the feeling that jefferson would actually be a tea party guy. he hated big government. >> he is a libertarian. >> could you just briefly go down a couple of the guys and say where you think they would -- >> ohm, nmman. what i really said to the l.a. times reporter that i didn't mention is that trying to bring these guys into the president is like trying to plant cut flowers. [laughter] they won't grow. -- you have to make atranslation -- almost like translation from one language into another language. that is a better analogy.

i will stick to the second question first. jefferson is the ultimate idealist. wilsonian in terms of the 20th-century terms of -- making the world a safer democracy. he is a believer in small government. in some sense, with the industrial revolution and the end of and the beginning of an urban the society, jefferson's values become irrelevant. he would say that. when we stop being in a great area society nothing continues to apply. it does because he is one of those resident icons and his monument on the tidal basin is one of the most lovely and moses most visited. i think jefferson would've gone

with the confederacy in 1861. i think jefferson would've opposed the civil rights act of 1965 because he believed blacks were biologically inferior, not just because nurture. realist.the cannon, american state department guys like adams -- adams is also a contrarian who could never possibly be elected to any government in the 21st century. [laughter] and would be thrilled to be able to tell you that. and would be proof of his virtue. what was the first question? it had to do with -- do i change my mind? i never do. once i made up my mind, i stay with it. [laughter] i do.

i begin with certain convictions that probably do not change at the root. my first impression of washington was that he was really foboring and flat. i didn't completely change. he is the single most impressive of the founders. est fathe founding her of them all. they all agree on that. franklin was the wisest. adams was the best red. ad. madison was the most politically agile. hamilton was probably the brightest. you get the highest grades on the lsat's. [laughter] but they all agreed washington was the greatest. it was the judgment.

they recognized and respected that. again, i don't want to reiterate -- this is not the sanctify these guys. the conspicuous qualities of most of the scholarly literatures of the founders over the past two years -- i like it because i am making money -- is that they are all flawed. have a't certain kind of depiction. is movinge profession off into a different direction. a lot of the best work being done on the founders is being ron churnow,e like david mccullough, stacy schiff.

none of those people are professional historians. i am a professional historian. i have a phd from yell university. most of the people in the profession are moving off into the direction of social history, race, class, gender, women, african-americans. thank you for the question. yes, sir? impressioneen my that the bulk of the patriots -- >> the new england patriots? [laughter] >> the patriots in general and the early part of our country. they are either out of new england or virginia. they were not in between but the ones we read about and hear about -- >> in the army or the political realm? >> political. i was wondering if you would

care to talk about that. >> the first the six presidents of the united states come from massachusetts and virginia. those are the big states. virginia is the biggest state in the union by far. but, within the continental congress, pennsylvania is really big. it is a big state and it is a moderate state meaning the source of the moderate movement that are reluctant to declare revolution. new york is also a moderate state. these other middle states play a role but they don't assume leadership for the revolution. they are resistant to it until the very end. a lot of guys from pennsylvania -- everybody thinks there is this moment and this is the thing in 1776 on july 4 where they go inside the document,

right? it never happened. never happened. they never signed the document all at once. most of them signed it on august 2. the real vote was what adams thought was the anniversary of the independence which was july 2. there are some guys assigning in october from like philadelphia -- pennsylvania and new york. robert marx was one of last once the sign and he sighed at the very top. he was there first but he was n't. the importance of massachusetts and virginia is true. leadership comes from those colonies, states. it does not reflect the importance of the middle colonies in shaping opinion in this crucial period. yes, sir? about a deadask

white male you have not written about and somewhat neglected. maybe not exactly a founding father but someone whose career spanned a number of these presidents and is as very important as many of them. >> i cannot wait to hear. >> you name him earlier in the virginian twho rose with them. i am talking about john marshall. you read about him. >> you don't have to persuade me. i would love to write a really great biography of john marshall. the problem is he destroyed all his correspondence. you don't have the same level of information that you have -- you have all of this legalistic information about his cases and the papers have been published at the college of william and mary.

guy who was a real stud. [laughter] who like at valley high was known as -- jumper -- he won all the athletic competitions. he was the leader of the equivalent of a special forces team throughout the war. he had six or seven platoons from under him. and then goes on to be a major figure in virginia politics and then secretary of state for a brief time under adams and in the greatest chief justice in american judicial history serving from 1802 1835, 1836. story whenell a marshall died he was visiting his daughter in new york and they carried the body down to his home in virginia and when a, they rang the liberty l and it cracked.

[laughter] it is a great story and turns out not to be true. everything about him that is written tends to be from a purely judicial point of view. there are a couple of good biographies. -- he was a little young -- the ellis criteria is you have to a been a prominent leader both in the time of the war for independence and at the time of 1790'sstitution in the implementation of the .constitution . he is a big player in the second one but he is a soldier in the first one. he is too young. he is a great man. thank you. yes, ma'am? >> did you see any parallels between the revolution and the

arab spring? >> oh. do i see any parallels between the revolution and the arab spring? hmm. um, i see more differences than parallels. beennk that egypt has governed by autocratic rulers for most of its 20th-century history and there is no tradition of democratic politics on which to build. they have to discover it and make it in the midst of sectarian strife and divisions between different ethnic groups. muslims within the muslim world and the muslims and the secular world. those divisions have been controlled by autocratic power. you remove the autocratic power and they come to the surface just as they did in bosnia and the former yugoslavia.

developedans already habits of what we call democracy. they knew how to govern themselves. they have their own legislator, elected officials. they had been for 100 years -- adams writes about this -- america was different from england and europe in terms of its politics for basic reasons. there is not as merely the shock value, the shock experience in the united states when they move through this revolutionary experience because it is not really revolutionary, it is evolutionary. this too good of the revolutionary war was not it was not really a revolution, it was an evolution. the egyptians are going to have a very difficult time discovering what came naturally to us. this is not a comment on muslims, ok? although, it is part of the package.

they don't have history of practicing democratic powers. >> thank you. >> you are welcome. >> thank you for coming. think you're bei -- thank you for being a professional historian. passmportant was his legislation saying all segments of american history now have to give portions the gays and transgenders? >> that is another thing they would not understand. >> my children who attended woodward academy -- the revolution learning was between americans, native americans, african americans. overview and teach college students in different levels of education and knowledge. histories becoming more and more prevalent. i would like your thoughts on how the american revolution is

being taught today and how legislators are getting involved in the future of history and what that means for us in the future. [laughter] >> i don't like the involvement of state legislatures deciding what kind of textbooks and that kind of thing. currentthat the situation is close to disastrous. restorable the literacy of this generation and the rising generation. all of the surveys and polls tell you something that is really awful. they don't know what century the civil war happened. all kinds of specific oral things -- horrible things. testingthe emphasis on

has handicapped good teachers, especially at the middle school and secondary school level by forcing them into certain kinds of lessons that don't work very well. i think that the social of medicaltion and secondary school education not reallystory, history but a blend of y.ography, sociologica on the point you made -- i therstand your concern that native american experience, the african-american experience and the women experience is being given a new emphasis and this is true at the college and graduate school level. if you want to go on in american history, it would be a good idea to do native american stuff and you will get a job.

this is a compensation for past years of neglect. is it a bit extreme? it depends on where you stand. i am here to simply argue that the late 18th century was shaped by a group of dead white males who were elite. you are not supposed to say that but i believe that is the case. me so i say let 1000 flowers bloom. the situation at the secondary and middle school level with regard to the teaching of -- is prettyt desperate. >> one last question. >> thank you for your comments. given the performance of the continental army in 1776, losing why did thenhattan,

continental congress continue to have problems in washington? there was rebellion among his close -- >> you are right about that. if you want to study washington's life and career, this is the period he is that is very worst both as commander and psychologically. he is clinically depressed throughout the late summer and fall because he sees the defeat of the army as the defeat of himself. the army is a projection of his own character. there are a couple of people on his staff that are talking to people in the continental congress and saying he is not up to the job. he is made some strategic blunders that could have cost us the whole thing. daniel green is not one of them but there was rumors that there -- back there.

they don't amount to much and night -- in 1776. they come to some sort of percent oh and the following valleyen he is in forge. again, it fails. adams is behind him and adams is ahead of the war of ordinance. whenever some kind of challenge comes, washington says, if anybody wants to do this job -- you can have it. because he thinks he is not being given sufficient support from the congress and he is right. butink you hear rumblings while the british changed commander three times, the americans never changed. of thethe stability leadership in the continental army that makes a difference. washington is a guy that makes mistakes but learns from them

and that makes a big difference. thank you all for coming tonight. [applause] >> on history bookshelf, here from the country's best-known american history writers for the past decade every saturday at 4 p.m. eastern. to watch these programs anytime, visit our website www.c-span.org . you are watching american history tv all weekend, every weekend on c-span 4. 33. president ford pardoned former president nixon 40 years ago on september 8, 1974 a month after the only presidential resignation in american history. sunday at 8 p.m. and midnight eastern on the presidency. author in history presenter john robert green considers the reasons why ford pardoned nixon and whether there is a deal between them. will hearremarks, we archival footage of president

ford's address to the nation. >> next on american history >> next, we mark the anniversary of the september 11 terrorist attacks with retired lieutenant colonel robert darling. he talks about his experience inside the white house bunker where he worked alongside vice president dick cheney and national security advisor condoleezza rice. lieutenant colonel darling is the author of "24 hours inside 9-11-01:dent's bunker, the white house." this event was hosted by the college of the ozarks and is about an hour. [applause] >> thank you.