maybe not so much necessarily about individual people, but certainly the baby boomers -- at 65, people do tend to be a little healthier than maybe 75 or 85. and there are a lot of them shifting over that period. that's what we're sort of talking about in aggregate. >> yeah. i think andrea mentioned, too, in her part of the presentation that the projection of medicare beneficiaries as a percentage of the population is supposed to increase roughly 4 percentage points over a projection period. that's just largely a function of so many of the baby boomers reaching medicare age and

enrolling in the program as a result. >> a question about the physician spending projections. you mention that your projections included the 21% i think reduction that's coming april 1st. >> actually, no. i'm sorry. i'll let you finish. >> i just wanted to clarify. >> sure. the 21% reduction is in current law and that's under the sustainable growth rate formula. but what our projections -- our projections are consistent with the projected baseline scenario in the medicare trustees' report. and in that, payment rates are expected to grow at 0% for 2015, then .6% through the remainder

of the projection period, per year, on average. these projections do not include the cut under the sustainable growth rate formula. >> in terms of the -- couple times it came up, the increase in high-cost specially drugs and a specific mention of the hepatitis treatments that are out there. does this analysis include any offsetting factors for someone getting cured of hepatitis and therefore not having ongoing costs in the future as a result of having that disease? or any of the other types of drugs that may be out there but that's, of course, the one everyone is talking about out there. >> no, not explicitly. this is something that our office is looking into but no, there's no explicit reduction in a hospital service or physician and clinical service because of

higher drug use. there's nothing explicit, no. >> just want to bring up an early yeier question about earlier system reforms. i know there are certain projects or experiments that your office is particularly curious about. >> those are outside the context of this report. certainly over time we will continue to review the actuarial estimates from our office and examine the literature and other materials as we go forward. but at this time it is outside the scope of the project. thank you. >> i would only add that we really rely on sort of the technical analyses to drive the

decisions that we make and the judgments that we put into these reports so we're optimistic that as the technical data comes out, the empirical research plays its way out that those types of things could be included but we're sort of eager to get those results and imperial. estimates to see where things lead.em estimates to see where things leap estimates to see where things leai estimates to see where things lear estimates to see where things leaa estimates to see where things leac estimates to see where things leaal estimates to see where things lead. >> there's one of these service sector that seems to jump off the page and i don't really understand what's going on there. the dental services markets. you show a projection in the overall spending of 3.6% in 2013, but only 1.9% for dental, which, by wait, is the only service sector below 2%. and then again in 2014, while the health economy's expanding

at 5.6%, you show dental at 3.1%. what's going on there? >> well, two major things. in terms of the relatively low projected growth for 2013, certainly the impact of the recent slow economic growth is something that plays a key role in our projection for dental expenditures and also in the historical estimates as well. for 2014, while there is somewhat of an increase, certainly with the coverage expansions, the increase in projected spending for say the much larger shares of national health spending -- so say, for instance, for hospital, physicians, drugs, et cetera -- somewhat outweighs the

acceleration for dental in 2014. >> i would add that, for some of the new insured, they may or may not have very good dental coverage. so their impact would be slower than, let's say, for physician and clinical services where they were definitely going to be fully covered for those in those health plans. >> hi, sara with fox again. not to beat a dead horse but a follow-up to my question. i was curious, i'm just having a little trouble reconciling in my head, we're adding more people to our health insurance system but you are projecting costs will grow slower than they did in the past two decades, even when you specifically try and segment out the effect of the recession. and cost sharing and maybe some

measures on medicare. is that pretty much the story of what's going on? i guess what makes the 2016 to 2023 period from the 1990 through 2008 period. >> well, again, we're also coming off -- it's important to note that because of the effect of the recession and the slow recovery, we're coming off of a fairly slow base of spending growth. that's important to note. and then again, in terms of the demographic shift, i mean you do -- we do show the lagged effect of the projected increase in economic growth, and that's commensurate with the projected acceleration in economic growth, which may not be -- which isn't the same that it was in the historical period. and again, say, for instance, for private health insurance, again you have the shift out of

private health insurance of the baby boom generation and into medicare also happening, too. then of course the commensurate shift into medicare of the relatively younger baby boomers into a group of beneficiaries that tend to have much higher per beneficiary spending. >> what i would add to that is that, in the late '90s and early 2000s, we had really high prescription drug spending growth. so for the sector, there was maybe 70% were brand name drugs. even though specially drives were projected to drive the growth, it is still relatively slow at 5.7% versus the double-digit growth that you saw between let's say 1998 to 2003, you saw double-digit growth in

drugs every year. so there are certainly factors that kept growth in that period high. but in the projection, especially as the economy grows, as the health share of the economy grows, it's -- people are much more interested in controlling that growth. so it's -- and as far as the -- we mention the negotiation of rates is certainly -- we expect it to be stronger than it was in 1990 when the health share of the economy was lower. >> i see no more questions. thank you for your interest in the topic. reminder we are under embargo until 4:00 p.m. thanks to andrea and the rest of the team for the information. that concludes our session today.

>> with congress returning monday, here's a message to congress from one of this year's c-span student cam competition winners. >> water. it makes up 75% of our bodies. take water away, and humanity would perish within a week. water is the most vital substance to a human body, yet it is because of us humans that nearly 50% of all stream miles, lakes, bays, and estuaries are unsuitable for use due to pollution. in the u.s., we have learned to take water for granted. faucets, bottled water and flushed toilets all reinforce the same idea -- water is an unlimited resource. but step outside to our local waterways and their diminishing condition tells a different story. water pollution kills marine life, destroys ecosystems, and disrupts an already-fragile food chain. and animals are not the only ones that suffer the negative

effects of water pollution. congress, in 2014 you must provide federal funding to waste water treatment agencies across the country. the lifeblood of our nation is tainted with the negligence of generations and it must stop here. >> join us wednesday during "washington journal" for the theme of the 2015 c-span student cam documentary competition. on september 1th, scottish voters will head to the polls to decide whether to scecede from the united kingdom. here's a look at the upcoming vote and a look at scottish attitudes toward the referendum. the wilson center hosted this event. it is about 90 minutes. >> good afternoon. welcome to the wilson center. i'm samuel wells, scholar here at the center and former director of the europe program.

we are pleased to be broadcasting on c-span3 today, live. so i would like to ask that everyone turn off their cell phones so that we're not interrupted either in transmission or in our own thought processes. the wilson center was chartered by congress as the official memorial to president wilson. it is the nation's key non-partisan policy forum for tackling global issues through independent research and open dialogue. the goal of forming actionable ideas for policymakers and the broader policy community. centers program on global europe addresses vital issues affecting europe's relations with the rest of the world through scholars and residents, many of whom just arrived yesterday. seminars, international conferences, and publications. these activities cover topics

such as european energy security, europe's role in setting global standards related to governments and human rights. today we're focusing on a problem that has not existed in an active sense in europe for some years but is heating up again and that is the issue of cessation,ably scotland on the eve of the referendum for independence. this referendum will occur on september 18th and will decide whether the country will be the first western european state in history to cescesepd. the only large-scale representative comprehensive

survey in research in scotland will show where the general scot's attitude toward the referendum may be empirically wrong after showing what the polls stand and what we may expect as polling day approaches, this talk will focus in particular on how the attitudes of scottish people towards international affairs have often been misrepresented, in particular with relation to the european union, scotland's role in the world and nuclear weapons in scotland. the talk will identify issues that may still move people in either direction before casting their votes. for those of you who see the "financial times," there are three stories today, provoked in part by a poll released on tuesday by the ugov polling group which shows the race as closed and the polls, at least, to a 53-47 vote in favor of the

no. that is, the continuance of the uk. this poll has a plus-minus margin of three. the polls of three weeks ago were showing an average of 18% to 20% gap. it is a privilege today to have dr. john eichorn, chancellor of fellow and social policy at the edinboro school of social and political science. he's funded projects on the future of the uk and scotland. he is investigating the attitudes of scots in relation to this referendum. jan, it is a pleasure to have you here. he has a power point.

we'll go through some very interesting slides which we can then discuss in greater detail. >> thanks very much and thanks for the opportunity to speak about the referendum with you. it is always a great opportunity to speak about it outside of scotland because the discussion becomes a bit more -- let's say slightly more dispassionate and a little more political. i want to give you a very brief background to the study so it is transparently clear where the data comes from. if you have more questions in the discussion, feel free to ask. i want to outline the situation right now and the data from by now 80 polls that have been conducted on this. it is a very heavily polled topic. then want to discuss what counts for voters. a lot has been said and certain topics dominate the political discourse on this topic. what is crucial of course in a referendum is what the voters think and what really differentiates yes from no

voters. our focus is most specifically to look at attitudes toward the eu, scotland's role in the world and also the question of nuclear weapons. finally i close with two short bits. one the issue of referendum turnout which is crucial for the result but also for anyone interested in democracy crucial obviously because we might see certain processes that will last beyond the referendum and the specific feature of this referendum so that the voting age was lowered to 16 and a question might be was that a good idea or not. i'll speak for, at most, 40 minutes so we have quite a bit of time for discussion afterwards. please excuse that i'll rush through some of the slides quite a bit but they'll all be made available afterwards if you want to study them in more detail. the idea is to give you a broad oversue so that you can pick your favorite topics for discussions afterwards. okay. background was already introduced a moment ago. it is now 15 days away. in scotland, people are noticing -- even people like me

have been researching this for two years, we all feel, wow, this is actually happening now. we've been working on this for two years. the atmosphere is getting quite tense. for multiple reasons. we have two campaign groups, yes scotland, the scottish national party who are in government at the moment, who have an absolute majority of seats in the scottish parliament, therefore could ask for this referendum to take place. it takes place in agreement with the uk government. it is not one-directional thing. there is an agreement reached that says both sides will accept the outcome of this referendum. if it is a yes vote, scotland most likely will become independent. very few people wouldn't argue that that would be the case. there is the campaign at the core advocating for a no vote and scotland staying if the union. largely made up of the three unionist parties that dominate the westminster parliament -- sorry, the conservatives, labor and liberal democrats. led by alistair darling, former

chancellor of gordon brown's labor administration. the background, as i said, two projects from the future of the uk and scotland programs so it is public funding that funds this research, which means i'm entirely politically neutral. we've been accused by both sides of favoring the other so that shows we are neutral, i think. so i have no particular view one way or another here. the scottish social attitude survey which has been conducted since 1999. our projects and together with other people from the university of edinboro. it is a high-quality face to face survey, the largest and most comprehensive on political attitudes in scotland. that goes through very stringent and robust design processes and with the funding that we receive we could develop large modules with specific questions on the referendum, but we also have a

time series back to 1999 that allows us to check how some of these things have developed since the establishment of the scottish parliament. there is a website what scotland thinks.org where you can access all the data and the data of all the polls that have been conducted. the aim of these projects was to create research output during the debate that's accessible to the public and we've made this accessible through this website. the second project is a specific survey of the under 18 year-olds because there was a lot said when the voting age was lowered, such as young people don't care about politics, they are not engaged, they won't vote. and however, we have no data on them because they usually are not part of the electorate. no representative data at least. therefore we developed a telephone-based representative survey in scotland that was conducted. also one of the parents of the young person was interviewed and in cooperation with the german

think tank for whom i work as well and we've produced the research results but we've also developed a set of teaching materials that's freely available which is another side of how we have engaged on the public side of it probadebate r than just producing research for academics. i want to start talking about the actual results. what is this situation right now at the beginning of seth. the first graph simply shows you a plot of all the polls that have been conducted since the referendum question has been agreed and the question is -- should scotland be an independent country. i already got my voting ballot for postal vote and it says it on there that two options -- yes and no. very simple. what you see here is on top an orange, the no. the bottom in blue, the yes. these are all the opinion polls that have been done. what you see is there's no single opinion poll apart from one that was commissioned by the

s snp. all polls show no was in the lead. that's consistent. what we also see however is that it might look like it is a bit narrower toward the end. what it also looks like is that there is a lot of volatility actually in the polls. that, however, is not true. why there is so much difference even within time periods is that the different polling institutes have come up with very different results, very different base lines. some polling institutes that consistently polled at the lower end for the yes vote and some at the higher end for the yes vote. reason why it is so difficult to poll -- i'll show this later -- is that turnout in this referendum is expected to be very high. that means that a large number of people that usually do not vote at all in any elections will be taking part. of course, doing polling and weighting of groups that you don't really know very much about is difficult. that's the reason why polling institutes have come up with different results. it is very hard to say which ones are right. obviously the polling institutes

themselves always say we have the b.e.t. methodology but it is very hard to assess this. we usually use the average. it doesn't mean the average is right but it gives us maybe the best view. view.for the period since the question was agreed, the yes and no vote once the undecideds are taken out from these polls, you can clearly see first, in 2013 basically nothing happened. the polls stayed stagnant. about 61%, 62% no, and the opposite for yes. it was at the beginning of 2014, end of 2013, beginning of 2014 when we saw the biggest shift up 3% to 4% in the polls. all the polls saw an increase for yes. the subsequent months, there was very little movement again. so in about april, may, not much happening. there was about another percent that, yes, gained, but not very

much. again, much more flat the process. then in july and august we saw a bit of an increase but most crucially this is just the view of all the polls that have been conducted in august. nine polls have been conducted if august. again it looks like there's a lot of volatility but that's again the difference between the polling institutes. remember, some polled closer to 40% for yes, some closer to 45% or above. what is most crucial the last four polls that have been conducted all saw an increase in the yes vote. and most crucially the poll mentioned just -- the poll just mentioned yesterday by ugov is probably the most interesting one. a single poll in itself doesn't say very much, but it is so important because ugov institute's had most recently close 40% yes vote and now polling closer to 47% yes vote. these polls are not perfect. but, we have clearly seen a

narrowing of the gap so that we are now looking, on average, of at least 45% to 55%. most recent polls polling 47% to 53%. this race is definitely a close race at this stage still. that's the very recent data. but this take bait has been going on in scotland for some say 300 years. i'm not going back as far right now, i'll just focus on the process since scotland saw a devolved parliament. people's preferred option for scotland's governance, people could say scotland should be independent of the uk, outside the eu. people could say it should be part of the united kingdom but with an own parliament. and they could say it should be part of the united kingdom and please get rid of the parliament again. that was a terrible idea

basically. that's no devolution. on the top you see those that favor devolution, at the bottom, those who say no devolution. what's very clear here is independence was never the favorite option when asked in this survey. some of the people who said devolution say we would like more devolution than we've had at the moment. i'll come back to that in a bit. but what's clear is that independence was always somewhere between one-quarter and one-third. most interestingly, it dropped to about one-quarter, actually the lowest levels were measured in -- since 2007 which is when the snp became part of the government. why if more people vote snp does the support for independence go

back people evaluate the devolution settlement better since the snp is in yy=ujuy this shows you people's evaluation of whether scotland gets its fair share of public spending. before 2007 what was always the case, majority of people said it's less than its fair share of spending. since 2007 the proportion that says less than its fair share or pretty much its fair share are equal. that's effectively a success of the scottish national party so people have a more positive evaluation. obviously if people have a more pos ittive evaluation of devolution, it mightç be the te for independence. we see a second graph. it is a question that asked who benefits more from the union -- scotland or england. no surprise by the way if you ask this in england, you get kind of the opposite view. but before 2007 a larger group used to always say england benefits more than scotland. obviously quite a few people say both benefit equally. since 2007 that has become much more even.

however, since 2011 here we've seen a separation again and more people saying that england benefits more from the union might not be completely surprising considering since 2010 we have a conservative government again in england and obviously the conservative party is not particularly strong in scotland. they only have one member of parliament at westminster from scotland at the moment. okay. that's just the big picture. what some of the long-term trends were, and what is happening right now. but crucially is the question -- what really counts for the voters. i'm going to start by using an absolute overused quotation, but it is the economy. it's very, very clear. nearly everyone who thinks scotland's economy would be better if scotland became independent indicates that they vote yes. nearly everyone who says scotland's economy would do worse indicates that they would vote no. that's nearly a perfect relationship. i teach statistics classes at university. i will be using that as a real

life example if the future of a near perfect correlation. we can see that this clear crystallization of the vote has become the dominant issue that relates to people's evaluation. nothing else splits the yes and no vote as clearly. even in 2012 in the red bars, you see that those who said scotland's economy would be a little better, only about half also supported independence at that point. now that is 80%. so it is very clear, people -- even if they only think it would be a little better, they are basically nearly all voting yes. so there's a clear crystallization of this process. on the other hand, esee the same for those who have a more negative outlook on this issue. the economy differentiates or yes and no voters better than any other variable. i'll come back, as i said, to the governance options. now if we don't use the word

independence but genuinely ask people what is your ideal for how scotland should be governed, then we can say the scottish parliament should decide everything -- basically independence. or we could add an option that offers effectively max misdemeanor devolution. uk government should decide on foreign defense and the scottish parliament about everything else, including taxation. that's the most strong proponents of maximum devolution are suggesting. what is crucial here is that those who say the scottish parliament should decide everything for scotland, ie, the people for home the ideal would be that scotland would govern itself that number has increased substantially from 31% in 2013 to 41% in 2014. that's a big jump of people who say my ideal is that scotland governs itself. however, i call this group the independent sympathizers. not only aebl liesing those

people the scottish parliament should decide everything themselves, of them, only about 56% indicate that they vote yes in the scottish social attitude survey. a small group says, 10%, no. 33% indicated this is data from may to july when the survey was conducted that they were still undecided. . that group has gone down a bit overall but it is still a sizable group that kols in here. some undecideds have leaning toward yes or no but say they haven't made up their mind yet. that's not a small group. so the people who have as the ideal that the scottish parliament should decide everything, but who at the same time are not indicating that they definitely vote yes are 17% of all respondents at that point. that's still 13%, 14% of respondents now. there's a really sizable group that is not acting on their ideal of scottish self-governance. and why is that. you might not be surprised -- it's because of the economy. on the left is those independent sympathizers that indicate that they would vote yes.

as you can see, nearly all of them think scotland's economy would be better after independence. on the right are those that say scottish parliament should decide everything, but either indicate that they would vote no or that they are not fully decided yet. there is a much more mishgsed picture. very few are convinced that scotland's economy would do well. crucially what this says is, even when people have the ideal of scottish self-governance, if they're not also convinced that scotland's economy would do well, they might not act upon this ideal. this economic issue is really kind of super imposed on quite a lot of other issues, for not everyone but the majority of the voters. there are a few other issues though that are not as strongly related but also very strongly related. one is the issue of social inequality. that hasn't always been the case. there is the myth that scotland is a much more left leaning society than england. they are in terms of voting more likely to vote labor, for example. but if you actually analyze

people's views, public attitudes towards benefits, for example, then scottish views are only a few percentages more left than english views. so voting and views are not always coming together in the same way that other factors might come in. that was no surprise that in 2012, only about half of those who thought scotland would be a more equal society also indicated that he they supported independence. but now in 2014, we are looking at 80%. this is an issue that the yes campaign has been focusing on, social inequality, and it is an issue that polarizes voters much more now than it did before. that's a success on the yes side. another issue people care about is scotland's role if the world. people who thing that scotland's voice in the world would be a lot strong er, by a lot, tend t vote yes. not as strong again as the effect we have seen for the economy, but it matters clearly.

but it doesn't matter as strongly. those who only think it is going to be a little stronger are not fully convinced. and so there's something going on. so peel care about scotland's role in the world, and i'll come to issue about the eu and nuclear weapons in a little while, but it is not as strongly related as the valuations about the economy. this is what you get when you put the different factors into regression modeling so that you can control for all the other factors because they are related to each other, of course. the most -- then we can look what has the strongest effect. the top four issues that differentiate yes and no voting are all issues that reflect on what people expect would happen to scotland after independence. it's pragmatic evaluations of what they think would happen. the number one issue is the economy. then scotland's voice in the world. the pride of scots. then the development of an equality. then there is a substantial gap in kind of the size of the effects. then we get national identity.

i'll come back to that in a moment. so national identity is correlating to yes and no voting but much less strongly than the economy inequality expectations or expectations for scotland's role in the world. what's also much less strongly correlated are demographic issues. men are more likely to vote yes but that correlation is much less strong than these pragmatic oval weighingevaluations, for e. oval weighingevaluations, for e. german journalists always tepid to be a bit disappointed when they come to scotland and report about it because they expect more people with blue face paint shouting freedom, i have the feeling. but that's not how the debate goes, by and large. that has to do with national identity. crucially, most scots have always recorded that to some extent they're scottish and to sol extent they're british. most people report national identity combinations.

there are very few people in scotland who say they are more british than scottish. . those only 10%. that's hardly increased. scotland has not become less scottish. some people are saying national identity is very strongly scottish still. however, the group that says here in green that they are equally scottish and british has gone up. the group that says they're only scottish at the bottom in blue has gone down to one-third to only one-quarter. scots are less likely to emphasize their scottish identity over their british identity. but still they are much more scottish than brit you shaish, . that's how this relates to the referendum view, to support for scotland becoming an independent country. there is a correlation. on the left those who say scottish, not british. but even in 2014 only 60% of those who said they are scottish and not british at all indicated that they supported independence. and so this relationship, while there is a correlation, is much

less pronounced than the previous correlations that i have shown you. national identity matters but to much less the extent of evaluations that show what will actually happen to scotland. now, the european union obviously related to those issues. it dominated the media debate. it dominated the political debate in january and february in scotland. very much. the better together side emphasized the issue of the european union affairs very much. there was a statement by commission president barroso at the time saying scotland would have to re-apply. there's been implications about spain and belgium are going to veto scottish membership, although while a lot of spanish politicians have commented that they would not make this an automated process, the spanish foreign minister has also stated there wouldn't be an automatic veto. it would be a particular process. the scottish parliament had had a long hearing process and consultation on this issue with

experts and the key thing is the experts don't really agree, even former judges of the european court of justice. in terms of what the process is. most people agree there wouldn't be an automated opt-in. it wouldn't be that scotland just becomes a member but most people also agree scotland wouldn't probably be out, partially because as we know, decisions in the european union are not just legal decisions but also political decisions. the question is does any country really have an interest of scotland ever being outside of the european union considering the strong movements of students, considering that scotland has the largest fishery grounds within the european union which, for example, the spanish fleets are accessing. so there is a lot of debate around this issue. but what is pretty clear is most -- as much as there is disagreement among academics on this, there seems to be agreement that neither the extreme side on either part of the spectrum is as rigid probably in reality as it is.

so there probably be would be quite lengthy negotiations but there's also a high likelihood that scotland would become part of the european union. however, i'm happy to talk more about this but that takes me away from the discussion of people's views. but that's a very interesting legal debate and political debate. but the question was, well, why didn't the polls go up for the no side when basically this fear of scotland being part of the european union were made. the majority of scots clearly would like an independent scotland to be in the european union. so it's over 70% that say scotland should be -- or just around 70% -- that say scotland should be a part of the european union if it were independent. but it is not a vote decisive issue. therefore, yes supporters and no supporters have virtually the same position on scotland's role in the european union. both groups would want an independent scotland to be in the european union.

and it doesn't move people because scotland, despite being slightly more pro european, more europe friendly than the english, so the proportion that ones for britain to leave the european union is much lower in scotland than it is in england, but there is not the kind of passion about europe and scotland either. as you can see, over 50% of scots -- that's the blue and red over here -- in 2014, over 50% say either scotland should leave -- sorry, britain should leave the eu or it should remain in the eu but the competences of the euro should be reduced. we want to retransfer power back to the member states. that's not europe loving if over 50% want reduction of the eu's powers, what that says for scotland, the majority of scots yes want to be in the european union, yes and no voters both want to stay in the european union by and large but they want to do this for pragmatic reasons.

because they see that's good. it is not because of some inherent passion for europe which sometimes, especially continental media try to portray scotland as. so that's clearly not the case. a similar issue that has gotten a lot of traction, a strategy recently launched in the tv debates was the currency issue. the yes side says scotland would definitely be able to continue to use the pound because that's in the interest of everyone. the no side says we will not negotiate. you will not be able to use the pound. now those two things are basically as far apart from each other as possible. however, for the scottish electorate, when these interventions were made on the currency, the polls didn't shift towards no. why is that the case? well, even amongst those who want independence, 77% would like to keep the pound. so this is again an issue that not divides the voters very,

very much. furthermore, we asked a second question in our survey which was -- what currency do you think scotland would use if it became suoxbndependent? now often about 80% say they would like the pound. only over 50% say they thinknp they would get to use the pound. you'd think those peel who would like it but think they can't get it would be more likely to vote no. but they aren't. now people are not moving on this issue very much and the core reason for that is, they simply don't believe either side. the majority of people thinks that george osbourne and the no side are bluffing to have a stronger position in the negotiations afterwards. but the majority of people also doesn't believe alex simon when he says they're definitely doing this, come on. so people are not acting on things that they think are completely uncertain basically. and that is why this has not moved people when these interventions were made. nuclear weapons. the other big issue that would have to be negotiated with the u

night kingdom, because as you might know, the nuclear weapons of the united kingdom are based at the facility near glasgow in scotland, nuclear submarines base and where self-of them ave are always out. yes campaign has advocated very strongly for the removal of nuclear weapons from scottish soil and waters. it's been hard. some people campaign on that issue in particular. however, public opinion again is not as clearly divided on this. there are around 40% of scots that would be quite comfortable with nuclear weapons staying in scotland if the uk government paid a high fee for it. well, that's not exactly how we asked the question but that's kind of how i feel that they might read this. here's the split by yes and no vote on whether people agree that britain's nuclear weapon submarines should continue to be based in scotland. now amongst the no supporters,

there are more that say those weapons should stay. about 46% compared to 35% on the yes side. but that's far from a perfect relationship. so even amongst the yes voters, there is a substantial group -- if you take those that say i neither agree nor disagree, 50% don't oppose nuclear weapons in scotland. this is far from a perfect relationship. again, it is an issue that matters for certain parts of the electora electorate. some parts of the electorate that really campaign and care about this issue more than anything else, but it is not vote decisive for the majority of the electorate. okay, that's the big overview. i promised two short bits at the end that i think are really important though in terms of also looking at scotland, democracy and political participation beyond the referendum itself. first question is, who is going to vote in this referendum? well, simple answer is -- a lot of people. now voting turnout in the uk is

not particularly high. in the last westminster election, only 64% of scottish electorate took part. in the last scottish parliament elections, it was just over 50%. in our polling -- and even the scottish social attitude survey. we know polls report higher levels but the scottish social attitude survey only predicted 60% voting turnout for this. it wasn't very far off the actual result in the scottish parliament elections. scottish social attitudes pretty good, it's pretty close to these results. in the survey conducted may to july, we had three-quarters that said basically we are certain to vote at 87% that were in the likely to vote group. now that's a lot. there's nothing -- there's no precedent in previous decades in uk politics that would indicate any such high turnout. recent polls indicated up to 80% turnout. that is an all group -- amongst yes, no and also amongst undecided.

sometimes i'm asked are the undecideds just people who have no interest in voting. now, even amongst them, a lot of them will take part. there is a slight advantage for yes. so yes has a slightly higher reported likelihood of turnout. if you weighed the responses for this -- that's imperfect -- but you would get an extra two percentage points for yes. now if we are currently looking at a 47%-53% split, you know what that means. that we don't know obviously where the 47%, 53%, is exactly accurate. but this matters obviously. the actual vote result is not just function of the polls but it is a function of views and voter turnout. so it matters but it is not a massive difference. what is really crucial is that this referendum has activated voters that usually do not take part. i use this as an example to illustrate this. this is from the last scottish parliament elections. voting turnout by age. the youngest age group had about 30% turnout only. the oldest age group had 80%

turnout. that's a massive gap. this is what we get from the survey for the likelihood of turning out for the referendum by age group. we hardly have any gradient as all. there is still a little bit but it is much narrower than it was before. we find this for a range of soci social/economic variables. gaps that exist are not completely closed in turnout but they are narrowed substantially. that is people of lower socioeconomic class are more like to turn out. people less politically interested, more unlikely to turn out. people who are not associated with any political party, more likely to turn out. so these gaps don't disappear but a lot of people participate that don't usually participate in an electorate of 4 million, we estimate maybe half a million

to 1 million people who don't vote that suddenly vote. that makes it hard to predict what they are going to do, because if you poll, you have to weight your results obviously. these groups that are traditionally underrepresented in any poll or survey, they are less likely to take part in polls or surveys. you can adjust through weighting but how do you weight through a population whose political behavior you don't really understand. it's difficult. that's why i say it is very hard to say which of the polling institutes are having it right. it's really difficult to assess that side. this is from our survey. in the survey we still had 33% undecided. that sounds like a lot. however, here's a note of caution. it depends how you ask the question. a lot of polls only get 10% to 12% undecided. the reason is, you can ask either what would you do right now? then you only get 10% to 15% undecideds, even back in april, may, because people would say that's my leaning right to you. if you are asked, well, haven't you made your mind up

completely? if you give that opportunity explicitly, you still in the polls get up to 25%. but then about half of those people have a leaning to either yes or no. in the survey a few months ago that was evenly split between yes and no. most recent polls have shown that the movement from undecideds is stronger to yes than to no which is what we have seen just now in those polls. that's how this is complained. many undecideds who have moved to yes over the last one or two months. but even within this we found that there is a group that doesn't indicate any particular leaning. so genuine undecideds or people who don't want to disclose what they're doing. that might be as well in this survey. that's about 12%. some polls find this now to be about 10%. you might say, well maybe that's the group that is not going to vote. again, about 70% of that group indicate that they are certain to vote. so we still have 6% to 7% at least of the electorate of whom we don't know what they will do. so even with all the information, the narrowing of the polls, there is a group --

it is a small group of people, that's normal before every election, but we don't know what they do. if they go back to no, we're back to you know, we're clearly over 50. it's very likely they all go in the same direction, of course. but i'm saying, there's a degree of uncertainty that we cannot get rid of and polls are never predictions. if, in the end, it's 40/60, they weren't wrong. if it's kind of 60, it could be that group went into it. . not very probable. would the polls be wrong if we get 55, yes? it's not very probable on what we have now. this is the outer margins of probability i'm talking about here. but if we narrow that, then we look at a range between 44 and 52, for example, for yes. and which seems quite probable based on the current results. i don't want to make a guess of what happens on the referendum date because there is a degree of uncertainty. we have some indications where it's going, but this is -- there

is a degree of uncertainty that we can't get rid of. and that's normal. it would be strange because we're dealing with people after all. just briefly to say men are slightly more likely to have made up their mind on the referendum, and the group, the party affiliates least likely to have made up their mind is labor and scottish national party identifiers, the liberal democrat group has a huge margin of error. there are very few identifiers at the moment. and obviously people with more political interest who have more knowledge of the referendum and think it influences their own life more are more likely to have made up their mind, as well. obviously only the percentages, people of the percentages undecided. very few people that say this will not affect my life. so while the percentage is quite high for indecision there, there's few people that fall into that group. just to give you a rough profile. what doesn't matter is age occupational class.

the final bit, very quick, four or five minutes and then i will have 40 minutes, so that's good. i want to briefly comment on this issue of the law of voting age. we've been able to do the survey in 2013-14. first of all, the youngest voters are not particularly swayed by the notion of independence. in 2014, we only had 28% yes when the undecideds were taken out in this age group, which was lower than the lowest yes poll. that's a survey of 1003% error margin. i completely acknowledge the error margins. but even e then, at the lower end. in 2014 now, we had 36% yes vote. so it's gone up like for everyone. but still, that is lower than the average population for the youngest voters. their political interest, however, is not lower than the

average political interest for adults. the questions aren't identical, but overall what we can see on the left-hand side, political interest level for young people and on the right-hand side for the adults. and what we pretty much see is the distributions look fairly similar. so young people at least -- as a small group with no interest at all but you have a similar group in adults and always say when people say to me, well, there's some young people that really don't care. and i say, yes, it's a small group, but you have a small group of adults. it's a small group in context. voting turnout. remember the low levels i've shown you earlier for the youngest age group usually. in 2014, amongst those under 18 that are eligible to vote, 72% on the likely to vote group were the 15% that indicate, i don't know yet. so only 12% say they're unlikely to vote. if you had asked this before any previous election, you would have had the majority up here in

the unlikely to vote group. oh, gosh, yes. i'll correct this before we upload this. thank you for spotting this. you're absolutely right. it should say at the bottom, very likely. slightly embarrassing, but i'll correct this before it's uploaded. i want to say all record will be destroyed but it won't, obviously. this is on camera now. anyway, yes, we have 72% that say very likely or unlikely. at the bottom it's likely. so thank you. the most decisive factor for the young people, again, however, and i'll sound like a broken record here. it's the economy. nearly all of the young people say, you know, the economy will do better. nearly all who think the economy would do worse vote no. this is, again, the most decisive factor. so how do we then explain they're somewhat less likely than the adults to vote yes? why the noble tie amongst them

if the economic evaluations met fairly similarly. there are two differences. remember, i said, national identity is not the top priority but it does matter to some extent. now, the young people, again, very few favor their britishness over their scottishness below 10%. but the group that says i'm equally british and scottish, they are higher, much larger proportion than for the adults. the young people are less likely to favor their scottish identity over their british identity. doesn't mean they're -- they're less likely to prioritize it. that translates further this kind of outlook beyond borders. this less prioritization translates also to the european union. remember, about 55% of adults that says we should either leave the u or remain in the u but reduce the u's powers. 55% around. the young people, that's only 27%. and they're already different to the 18 to 24-year-olds who have

already a higher likelihood of saying reduce. the under 18-year-olds, i think this makes sense generationally. the under 18-year-olds are the first generation that has -- and i'll talk very -- they are the first generation that has grown up not knowing nonnetwork computers. the first computer they probably remember sitting at had access to the internet. the parents probably ordered things off online retailers. they went on low-budget flights to other european countries. the 20 to 25-year-olds probably still remember. the first time they went to the computer that now was connected to the internet. the first time they opened a web browser and that was something special. so, i think, we're looking at a genuine generational shift here where national identity still matters, it's not gone. but there is less of prioritizing one over the other. they're very comfortable saying

i'm scottish, british and don't have to -- the number of those who actually identify as european has gone up, as well, in this group. a relatively small percentage. but three times nearly as large as the adults. so that's just the overview. and thank you very much for listening for 40 minutes to a lot of figures. but i hope it gives you a lot of starting points for interesting questions and discussion. >> well, you certainly demonstrate that the economy matters let me clarify one thing on methodology. you indicated that the polls of one of your -- i think the scottish social attitudes was a face-to-face. among the other polls were some of them conducted by telephone? >> yes, six main polling institutes, four of them use internet quota sampling.

200,000, 300,000 people and do quarter sampling. we have one institute that does random digit dialing through telephone service. we have still around 80% land line penetration. >> that was my -- >> it's pretty good. it's not perfect. that's why you have to do waiting. we have to do telephone sampling. we waited for parental education as a proxy for social economic status and got a good distribution there. it works relatively well. online polling has strong biases, young people only half as likely to take part and contrary to belief, young people don't like to take part in any services. one uses a method that the other institutes after the 1992 election because many of them got it so long back then with that method. doesn't mean the method is wrong, but it wasn't applied. and that's face-to-face sampling. that's one of them. >> okay. thank you for that.

clarification. well, we can move now to questions, comments. and i'd like to start with kent hughes who is the founder of our scottish and celtic program here at the center. i think he's a bit torn in terms of where he might stand if he had a vote. >> i want to ask a quick question. i want to start by thanking you for really a very stimulating discussion with a look at how you did them and how surprised in some cases where the intentions seemed to be. we're very aware about the collapse of so many empires. yet there's still bits of empire left. they want their own country.

should the eu think about a pan eu policy which would allow greater cultural and political autonomy while still staying within the eu? the second question has to do with the pound. couldn't scotland if unable to use the pound simply decide to dollarize as ecuador and panama have done. and third, this goes back to really a focus on american style politics. and it was a enormous pleasure to hear it polled more than americans used to. get out the vote. is there a sophisticated system? is each party going to get them to the polls and so forth? >> right.

>> the issue, i said earlier, i simplified the european issue. you could do a talk just on the european question, obviously. and the different legal views on it and the political views and so on. obviously, there's strong interest. all the briefings, we do a lot of public briefings in scotland on this. and always there and a lot of groups always there. and surprisingly. i think the eu needs to think about that. and especially if it had a strong emphasis on autonomy and the regions, this catch phrase, never really came to -- people don't feel really the europe of the regions in most places. >> the strong rule of the member states, the summits over the last year is probably the other direction that would give people the feeling you would secure the interest at the moment. you're absolutely right. if you would like to make it relevant in this context, i

think that's where they could be a moderated. but i do also want to say in relation to the scottish context, there is a strong difference between different nationalists or separatist movements. the scottish one has not been emphasized in terms of cultural autonomy. that is not, less important in the referendum. it's about sharing assets and equality issue that's come up, for example. it's much more about this than national identity or language. clearly a language element that comes into it, which is less important. if you polled, you would see a stronger correlation between national identity and, yes, no voting intention. much stronger identity. i do think the scottish case is somewhat different to some of those other cases. and crucially it is one also

that's been where the process has been agreed with the uk government. i do think we have to be careful, also, to not conclude too much to the other context. because there's some differences. the scottish government commissioned an independent commission. in the commission. so would you say, you know that he critiqued uk government policy in previous years. so, anyways, but overall, it was an independent commission that looked at the different option and they suggested currency union is the best option i leave others to comment on that. they also came up with the other options.

evaluated as a higher risk in terms of not having control because of not having a central bank, for example. the question is how would they do on the market? if after independence, the uk government, whichever government that would be at that point didn't negotiate on currency, scotland would have to come up with another option. at the moment, the scottish first minister said they'd considered in that fold, that situation, to simply continue using the pound. but then, wouldn't take a share off the debt of the uk. he said it wouldn't come to this. there's talk about this. but i think this is one of those issues that we'll know if scotland becomes independent afterwards.

one of the respondent's exhibit why a lot of people are voting is because they're not voting for political party. this is one of the reasons why it's easy to mobilize people. it's not just the voting. you can go to town hall meetings every day in villages and towns and that concept died before. the civic debate is tremendous on this. so there will be, i mean there's a strong emphasis. the other thing is schools had a tremendous impact on young people.

we're expecting what the exact figure is, i don't know, of course, but i think we can be very confident this turnout will be higher. >> the gentleman in the back. can you identify yourself, please. wait for the mike? >> thank you very much, sir. >>. >> i'm chief political corresponde correspondent -- you mentioned possible other breakups that would be in the works and maybe fueled by a vote for independence. is there any evidence vladimir putin is looking closely at the results in scotland and could use it as a justification for

crimea, leaving ukraine or the new state he talks about? second question, what would happen to the members of the house of commons and the house of lords who come from scotland? and would this have any impact on the british elections scheduled for 2015? >> first question, i don't remember if it was putin or some other russian politician that said, look, scotland is doing it. i don't think what scotland does would stop what russia is doing at the moment. but, i, i there is a fundamental difference in that it has under an agreement between the elected

government of scotland and the elected government of the united kingdom. it's a mutually system by democratically elected government. i mean, even if the argument were invoked, i think, it would be fairly easy to say why it's not a parallel that could be used. the second one, it's been discussed since the polls narrowed. this has been discussed more and more in english newspapers. it would be strong for the rest of the uk. the scottish government said it would take about 18 months. 18 months until independence day. that includes negotiating, entering the european union and nato. and the most sympathetic academic commentators that look at kind of public affairs that is very ambitious. again, others can comment on the

feasibility that's not my area of expertise. but in this period, scotland will remain part of the united kingdom. that means there'll be elections that will see scottish members of parliament elected. and they have to as long as scotland's part of the uk, there has to be peace in the house of commons. that causes the first issue. and that would also come up, even if scotland votes no, this would come up. opposition parties have promised further deevolution. now, that brings several people in oakland to say, wait a minute, if they have so many things they can decide themselves about, how about the policies that only affect england that they're voting on in westminster. i think that gets tractions, whether it's a yes vote or a no vote and will have traction over

the next few years. that will become an issue. and the most likely option might be that there would be two types of voting in westminster. and so, that debate will happen over the next few years in england, definitely. the other alternative would be an english parliament, but that is very unlikely. there are a few other possibilities. but that's another aspect that comes into it. it will affect. the other big thing is, obviously, what will happen on independence day. what does that mean if that, for example, results in effect, the government loses the majority. would it have to resign? would there be a new coalition? and would there be new elections? very hard to predict. very, very hard to predict.

in the event of a yes vote, that would be an issue, but we're going to have a lot of debates about constitutional arrangements in the uk that are going to follow. >> i want to call on william hill who will partially deal with the question of mr. putin. >> bill hill here. first to comment, you know, perhaps the scottish referendum could serve as inspiration to vladimir putin and some of his colleagues for similar referend referendum. uk is not the only unit or only state that has experienced similar yearnings by smaller units. as for scotland, i'm curious in

your data. about who votes and whether there are splits in geographical terms. first, you have you're not in scotland, but you're voting. there are a number number that work elsewhere in the uk have a right to vote in oakland. and within scotland, are there geographical divisions? one is the differences in political preferences between glasgow and something like that. i wonder if anything shows up geographically within scotland. >> yep. so, what's quite crucial is that that franchise that is used for the vote is the same franchise used for the scottish parliament. otherwise you'd have many debates about what should be the franchise. it's a franchise that has been agreed built on political culture in scotland for a long time. so therefore it's not too contested, which is good.

and everyone who lives in scotland has permanent residency in scotland, british citizen, or qualifying commonwealth citizen gets a vote. so i'm german and accent never goes away. i'm german, i have residency in scotland, i've been living there for five years, don't have to live there long there. once you get permanent residency, you get to vote. if you're a scot who has moved to england, you don't get a vote. some people don't like that, obviously, but it's not majorly contested because, you know, this is the scottish parliament franchise. it seems that it is an agreed franchise. the idea votes, includes nearly 10% now of people who were born in england, for example. who have residency in scotland. that's the voting franchise.

pretty much, i would say a first party consensus. geographical splits within scotland, and we do see some geographical splits. there was a poll recently in glasgow. slightly higher likelihood of voting yes. but the crucial thing is, most of the agree graphical things in scotland, can be explained by differences in the make-up of the population in those particular areas. so what we know is, for example. people who live who are in most deprived circumstances will have a likelihood of voting yes. they have gapped a little bit. but if you have an area of deprivation, you have more yes voters. if you have a city or council with more socially deprive d. most of the variation we see explained by differences in the make-up of the populations in the regions.

>> what is the general state to the scottish economy as contrasted with the english economy. does one or the other feel that they're being pulled down by the other? a lot more immigration from elsewhere than has reached scotland yet. is that a factor? the changing demographic complexion of england, scotland a factor here. >> obviously, the scottish, so scotland has fewer people who were born outside the united

kingdom than england that's been the case for quite a long time. however, immigration in scotland has increased quite tremendously also over the last decade in particular with immigration from central and eastern europe and eastern europe with the new member states. and largely, and that's one thing we know. especially in a european migration to the uk is largely migration of skilled workers. and we have a lot of traditio l traditional, that had to be filled because there weren't enough people in scotland. but also in several other sectors where migration is important. the other thing, scotland needs migration, even more so than england because scotland is more rapidly aging. predicted to be more rapidly aging over the next few decades. definitely has a demographic problem in terms of prejudice funding. therefore scotland, very clearly states that in independent scotland, they want more immigration policy as the rest

of the uk that currently has started to restrict the immigration more heavily. and so scotland at least if it's -- based on scottish nationalists want open immigration policy, scotland also, although attitudes toward immigration have ended harshly, is more open. in relation to the economy and, well, a lot of people in england will cite to you the figure that spending is higher than in the rest of the uk. and a lot of people in scotland will assign figures to you that show scotland's basically contribution to the assets of the united kingdom is greater than the share of population, as well, though. so it's a quite long standing debate. generally speaking, scotland's economy, most of the analyses, for example, the institute of studies says scotland has a

healthy economy, it's facing certain problems that a lot of other western european countries are facing, as well. if scotland becomes independent, there are lots of scenarios. and the key thing is they depend on, you know, 15, 20 variables, and it's difficult to say how it pans out. the middle of those scenarios effectively say scotland would be able to function as an independent country. it wouldn't by the land of milk and honey. in terms of giving, increasing welfare and reducing certain taxes that probably is not possible. so it's probably somewhere in the middle between those stories. it depends on certain things like the oil price but also depends on, for example, scotland has a very strong sector after the most important financial place has the largest -- is the largest financial center in the uk. much larger than manchester or birmingham, for example.

now, some of those banks and insurances have strong operations in england. some of them said they might consider moving to england. if they move this, what does that mean? others say they might invest more in scotland. if it becomes independent, it's very, very hard to assess. there are certain risks and there are certain opportunities and it depends on external influences, world market developments, oil price developments. the big debate, how much oil is in the north sea, how much of this taking out, which you have conflicting views, some that put it at the top. if you take, i mean, if you take the average on all of these, you get the image that, you know, it basically would be probably a country that would have the same sort of problems that a lot of others have. if you want to increase welfare, you have to probably either increase taxes or cut something else. so it's -- i sound vague here, i know that. but that is, i think, if you read all the different economic evaluations to it, you have to be somewhat vague because there are substantial risks and substantial opportunities that come into it.

>> the majority of the oil that currently is contributing to the uk. >> yes, gentleman here in the blue shirt. >> is it on? could you tell us data on things you haven't talked about. how many scots live in england? and are they in favor of independence? >> what are they thinking? >> another research group from wales actually just has done a survey off the english. and i'm sure they have a variable in there that looks at this. burr i haven't had the time to. i only looked at the headline figures. i haven't looked at the data yet. sorry about this. i can tell you that the english who live in scotland. about 10% of the population. and you won't be surprised that

the majority, but there was a large group of undecideds in that group, as well. which was quite interesting. but, yeah. i'm sorry i can't talk about the english in more detail. but i can give you later if you want, the reference to the team that has done the research on that group. >> gentleman in the corner in the back. >> perhaps an unfair question. >> can you identify yourself? >> of course. my name is ethan maran. sir, you mentioned unsurprisingly that what happens in scotland is unlikely to have any great influence in russia. what of the reverse? through recent events in russia, syria and iraq. very bad things. is this likely to induce any sort of political conservatism,

or do we really not have good enough data to say? >> it's a really good question. it's -- i think it's genuinely a good question. what i might say, a majority of scots is in favor of either independence or de-evolution. over 60% like the option. and most of the ones who say independence the first option, asking your second favorite option, nearly everyone would -- but, yeah, the majority of scots, if you ask them right now, still say foreign affairs. i think that's a really valid question. what we've seen over the last few weeks, the polls, if anything, have shown a shift to yes. while we've seen an intensification of conflicts in ukraine but also other conflicts that britain has a stake in with iraq, for example.

so that doesn't mean, however, that it doesn't matter for people's evaluation. but it might matter to those people who have decided to vote no because they thought, you know, this is insecure. you know, there is a group of people. that's why i think we have quite a lot of people in the middle basically, sorry, i'll do one more jump here. the people who said undecided right now must have accepted there is a degree of uncertainty. some types of people say everyone undecided will go definitely to no because if you're undecided you go with the status quo. that might be true if it's a quick decision. but if you have two years of thinking about it. i genuinely think most people for whom any uncertainty is a problem, they will have already decided by and large to go no, i think. i think a lot of the people who will say, you know, under no circumstances do i think i want scotland to just defend itself. i want, you know, the quite

powerful uk as my defense. i think the most of them are already -- they might see their views now reaffirmed. this is a lot of things. the currency issue was a similar thing. there were some people who say this may more likely to vote no, or vote yes. people who already indicated they would vote yes or no. i think what it might do is force some people to solidify their views on this. but it doesn't seem to be shifting more people into this. >> i think -- i'm journalist with the television. and the reason why we follow more closely scotland is because similar situation where populated -- the conflict is not yet. so if people vote yes on

september 18, do you think -- and if scotland becomes member of international, independent -- member of international community and u.n. member, pursue a policy more sympathetic towards this type of self-determination movements, you think, elsewhere. i think an exception for ukraine. but how about other similar conflicts. and my quick second question would be about agreement in the independent from the results that we will have on september 18. do you think the agreement and current task to be more gauchabgauch negotiable -- may point at the agreement and you will see in europe, it was more negotiable.

thank you. >> i won't comment on any particular case just because i don't have enough knowledge on other specific cases. but talking about what happened. i think it will be a very difficult situation, potentially, for any independent scottish government afterwards. on the one hand, they will -- they won't want to look hypocritical on the one end, i think, they will want to say self-determination of people is a positive thing. and, you know, that certain voices in some parts of the scottish nationals. at the same time, they will want to join the european union, nato that's at least a policy at the moment. and then, they're also, i said on several occasions, people are pragmatic. i think scottish politicians are fairly pragmatic in some of the valuations. and there might be some conflicts there. and i have a distinct feeling in general rhetoric on support in

uncontentious circumstances, they might be supportive. but if things were to basically hinder their ability to integrate some of those things that might be otherwise. but again,%y? that would partia depend on who the government of an independent[uñ scotland woul be. the political landscape in scotland's going to change. it's very likely you would see a stronger conservative vote. they would probably get more votes because it wouldn't be associated with westminster english conservatism. the potential is there. if you look at public attitudes, there are views that align quite closely, actually, with conservative policies. so if you get a different government in scotland, you might have different policy. that's why it's very, very hard to predict. and i do think, and the agreement is a key thing. i think they use that as an argument in terms because the key thing is that they say if everything works out in the moment, it would look like a peaceful transition, hopefully,

if that's the case. so there's a difference in the term it's not seen as conflict. very for scots have said we are oppressed. and this uk government agreed to that referendum that's one of the key things that comes into it. and i think it's an argument where they might want to differentiate themselves. it would depend on context, external influences and which parties would form the scottish government. i think that's a quite difficult one. >> the lady just here. >> thanks very much. >> it's on. >> i'm joanne thornton with policy connections international. and i wanted to go back to your issue about the economy being number one. mentioned that the vote is

increasing and the most depositive issue is thought the economy would be better after independence. is there anything in particular that has convinced more people to think that way? i noticed that businesses have weighed in on both sides of the debate. there seem to be more companies on the yes list than the no letter. was that a factor? or is there something else that's persuading people that, yes, in fact, the economy could do better. >> this is a really interesting one. there were two letters first. a group of companies that supported better together the no side. so the yes list has more compani companies. and thastz not surprising particularly. not only small countries and doesn't only have big countries. but maybe as different types. what's really interesting, actually, compared to 2013,

overall in the scottish social attitude survey. this year, we had fewer people that thought scotland's economy would be better. so but remember what i showed. there was a much clearer crystallization. i have to quote john kurtis here. i didn't come up with the word crystallization. >> and we're leaving this program to go live to london where david cameron is set to speak before the house of commons. last week's two-day nato summit in wales. after his remarks, he'll take questions from members. this is live coverage on c-span 3. we expect the prime minister in a moment. >> they are already award winning, but i wish them good luck in the great british high street contest in which they have entered. and i also look forward to visiting the sustainable park energy center, which has secured 2.5 million coastal communities funding to bring together green

technology and tourism. >> mr. speaker, under the scheme where they can come together and cluster to provide services and procurement, can we be sure that small local businesses are benefitting from this? >> i can see no reason why not. my own department have looked in terms of the procurement at helping small and medium firms. and i think it's very important that local councils support local businesses. >> reported to be paying 318,500 pounds through a company, a limited company owned by him and his wife. the deputy, 275,000 and has 15 other posts paying over 96,000. at the same time, they say they haven't got the money to run our services. does the secretary of state think that's right? >> well, obviously, the possibility of applying for the job wouldn't rule out. i think that is an absolutely

outrageous use of public money. people should pay their taxes the normal way and this is an abusive process for that to have happened. >> steve reid. >> mr. speaker, is he aware the leader has been forced to resign in disgrace after he was exposed last week for secretly taking 10,000 pounds, and extra allowances before the council elections in may. and will he reassure the house that no other conservative councils have set up allowances schemes that allow them to boast in public while leaving themselves free to claim the increases retrospectively after the polls have closed. >> i don't mind whether somebody is labor, conservative, liberal democrat, independent, if they're on the fiddle, they deserve to have -- and this behavior was completely unacceptable. >> last but not least. >> thank you, mr. speaker. the road is a struggling, though viable shopping parade. would the secretary of state

agree with me that the council's obsession with mobile cctv cameras in the area is simply a demonstration of their wish to raise fines and not support the local businesses. and can he offer assurances to help out? >> well, we now have a huge amount of evidence as to what prevents local gross and overzealous parking restrictions are top of the list. i think the honorable gentleman is absolutely correct in his remarks. we need to be giving support to local traders, listening to them and removing those obstacles to help the high streets thrive. >> order, statement, the prime minister. >> i'd like to make a statement on the nato conference. but before i do so, mr. speaker, i'm sure the whole house would join me in paying tribute to jim dobbin who died suddenly this weekend. jim gave his life to public service. he worked hard for his constituents. he loved this house of commons and contributed hugely to all

its work. with his expertise in microbiology. also did outstanding work in this house championing vaccines. though, we may not have agreed on everything, we did agree about the important contribution about faith in politics. i have to say, i'm not expecting to get a knighthood from the pope. he will be missed by us all and our thoughts are with his family at this time. mr. speaker, we've also heard this morning that the duke and duchess of cambridge are expecting their second baby. and on behalf of the whole country, i'm sure the house will want to join me in wishing them well in the months ahead. mr. speaker, the nato summit in wales saw the successful coming together of this vital alliance. everyone can see its unity, resolve, and determination in meeting and overcoming all of the threats to our security. i want to thank the local

council in newport, the secretary of state, armed services and police and all of those who work so hard to deliver a safe, secure and successful summit. the biggest gathering of world leaders, i think that has ever taken place in our country. but most of all, i want to thank all the people for the incredibly warm welcome. they did our united kingdom proud. mr. speaker, the summit reached important conclusions on ukraine, on defense spending, on the reform of nato, on counter islamic extremism, the future of afghanistan and supporting our military and their families. i want to take each one briefly in turn. first on ukraine.

including by providing financial assistance to improve the command, control and communication capabilities. today's new sanctions from the european union will further ramp up the economic costs to russia. they will make it harder for its banks and energy and defense companies to borrow money. they will widen the ban on selling so-called jewel goods like machinery and computer equipment, which could be used for military as well as civilian purposes. and they will prohibit the provision of services for the exportation. an important agreement on defense spending. one of the problems nato has faced is only a small number of countries have achieved the commitment to spend 2% of their gdp on defense.

as a result, the share by the largest country, united states of america continues upwards and now accounts for around 70% of the total. this is not sustainable. this summit addressed this by agreeing the responsibility for those countries who have not achieved 2%. and the conclusions are very clear about this. through the wales pledge, every nato member spending less than 2% has now agreed to halt any decline in defense spending and aimed to increase it in real terms as gdp grows and move towards 2% in a decade. there was also a second target that a fifth of all defense budgets should be dedicated to major new equipment. because what matters most is having military assets you can actually deploy. no now here in britain, we have the second largest defense budget in nato. we're taking long-term, difficult decisions to put our defense budget on a sustainable footing and the fruits of this are coming through. we are equipping all three of our services with the best

military hardware money can buy. a contract for scout armored vehicles, which is the largest such order in over three decades. it includes new fleets of joint strike fighter and voyager refueling aircraft. transport aircraft. new astute submarines, type 45 destroyers. and the brand new aircraft carrier. nato, you keep saying labor. remember, they left us a 38 billion pound black hole. let me continue. at nato, hms -- it's all very well. you actually have to pay for them. in a nutshell, really. that is the difference between a socialist and a conservative. they dream about having money, we actually raise it and spend it. but he'll be very pleased to hear at nato i announced the

second new carrier will also be brought into service. and this will ensure we always have one carrier available 100% of the time. mr. speaker, this investment in our national security, prosperity and place in the world will transform our ability to project power globally. turning to the wider form of nato. after the end of the cold war, nato stood down. at this summit, we decided to reverse that decision and scale up our readiness to respond to any threat. and at the same time, we also agreed to do more to build the capacity of other nations outside nato to help them with defense capabilities. a new multinational spearhead force will be formed and deployable anywhere in the world within two to five days. this is vital in underlining our article 5 obligations. and the uk will support this by providing a battle group and a brigade headquarters.

we'll also contribute 3,500 personnel as part of nato's efforts to ensure a consistent presence. on capacity building, nato has a vital role, as i said, in helping other countries with their capacity to defend themselves against all threats, including terrorist threats. when we consider how many threats nato countries, including here in the uk faced coming from the middle east, north africa, and elsewhere. this capacity building is becoming ever more important. it was a key priority at the uk summit that we made progress. nato will now undertake capacity building missions beginning in georgia and jordan with the offer of a training mission for iraq as soon as the new iraqi government is in place. next, the alliance was clear about the scale of the threat from islamist extremism. and must use all the instruments at our disposal. to squeeze this barbaric terrorist organization out of existence.

we should be clear about what needs to happen. we will continue to support the kurds, including by providing them with arms and training their troops. we will work to support a new and representative iraqi government, which we hope to see in place later this week. the fight against isil must be led by the iraqis themselves. but we will continue to encourage countries in the region to support this effort and engage allies across the world. we will proceed carefully and methodically drawing together the partners we need for a comprehensive plan. a broad-based international effort to confront isil and i'll be working on building that international support when i attend the general assembly later this month. we called on to deliver a peaceful outcome as swiftly as possible. they made a statement during the conference that they would make these endeavors. absolutely vital.

and training the afghan security forces to take control of their security. we reaffirmed our long-term commitment to supporting a peaceful, prosperous and stable afghanistan including through our development conference in london in november. finally, mr. speaker, as our troops return home from afghanistan, it is right we do all we can to support them and their families. mr. speaker, in britain, we have the military covenant, a pledge of commitment between the government and our military. and we made it ever more real by taking a series of measures including doubling the operational allowance, introducing higher education scholarships. increasing the rates of tax relief and signing up every single local counselor in our country in support of the military. now at this summit, we took our

military covenant internationally with every nato member signing up to a new armed forces declaration setting out their commitment to support their military and enabling all of us to learn from each other about how we can best do this. >> we will continue to do everything possible. this, i believe, was a successful nato conference. it proved that this organization is as important to our future security as it has been to the past. and i commend this statement to the house. >> mr. speaker, i join the prime minister first in paying tribute to jim dobbin. a member of parliament who put the people first. he was as the prime minister said, a man of faith, which underpinned everything he did. and he was a lifelong public servant having worked in the nhs for many years before coming to this house. mr. speaker, he was also a proud scot and was, in fact, planning to be in scotland this week to help campaign to keep our united

kingdom together. mr. speaker, he will be sadly missed, not just by his family, his friends, but colleagues from across the house. i also join the prime minister, mr. speaker in congratulating the duke and duchess of cambridge on their news. i also want to congratulate wales on the successful hosting of the summit. and mr. speaker, i believe we should congratulate the enterprising nature for the picture at stone henge with president obama. i thank the prime minister for his statement. this nato summit was the most important for a generation. today nato faces the gravest challenges in europe, the middle east and beyond. since the fall of the berlin wall and the first gulf war. i commend nato leaders for seizing the opportunity to put down firm markers on the key issues. russia and ukraine, isil and defense corporation. mr. speaker, starting with ukraine, the cease-fire and peace plan announced on friday

by the presidents of ukraine and russia. and it will be a grave mistake to ease international pressure on russia. we therefore welcome the rigorous action plan, which is a step towards more nimble and flexible capabilities, sending a signal that if they're in danger, allies will take quick action. can i ask in the discussions the prime minister had with him what assurances were given to ukraine by nato? given also, mr. speaker, the desired aim of agility in this plan, how the nato decision-making process requiring agreement of all 28 countries is being made sufficiently reliable and swift. specifically, on the spearhead force, should i also ask the prime minister what countries will be host to this force? and what situations he expects it to be deployed. turning to the rise of isil in the middle east. the whole world is acutely aware of the barbaric threat.

and it was right to address this. and it was right also to seek to build the widest possible consensus in pursuit of this aim. mr. speaker, there is no long-term solution to isil without a long-term plan. one that is based on widespread partnership in the region, the legitimacy, and one that includes a genuinely multilateral diplomatic alliance. mr. speaker, in that context, can the prime minister tell us what progress he believes is being made in the urgent task of assembling a genuinely inclusive government in iraq. and can i welcome the united position taken yesterday against isil? and can the prime minister update the house on what other progress is being made in the vital work of building regional support. turning, mr. speaker, to nato's clarity of purpose. collective defense, on defense spending, we share the commitment to maintain strong defense and strong nato. and in the light of pressures all countries are facing, does

he agree that part of the task that nato faces is better pooling of alliance resources so we have the kinds of capabilities that are required? finally turning to afghanistan, i commend the commitment of nato members to afghanistan. mr. speaker, our countries made huge sacrifices and serve a number of others. it is right that by the end of 2014, we'll see the draw down of british forces. i pay tribute to our forces for the sacrifices they have made. and i join the prime minister in giving my full support for military covenant, the armed forces declaration and the implementation. we know from the past, the crucial importance of securing the right political settlement. so key to ensuring that the sacrifices that have been made into a better future is, of course, afghan leaders resolving their current post election differences and agreeing to a unified leadership. can the prime minister update the house on progress on this and, indeed, security agreement with the remaining nato forces? and given that the contribution

will be critical, can you also tell the house the number of troops expected to stay past 2014 and the uk contribution to that mission? mr. speaker, this summit demonstrated the nato alliance is strong and is needed by its member states more than ever. as president obama has said, the defense is just as important as berlin, paris and london. the task for nato is to demonstrate this commitment. and an understanding that wherever our interests lie, we need a strategy which combines military regiments. we join the government in supporting a nato that meets that challenge. >> prime minister. >> the opposition for his response. i think he's right to say this was the most important nato conference for a generation because of the multiple challenges that we're facing in europe with ukraine in terms of isil and also the threats around

our very dangerous world. let me try and take the questions he had in turn. in terms of ukraine, the meeting, the mood of the meeting both the nato meeting, there should be no easing of the pressure on russia. in terms of what nato is doing for ukraine. there is some important defense capability building being done on things like command and control and making sure that the ukrainian army is properly managed. there's also support in terms of nonlethal equipment like a body armor and other facilities that countries are giving. but i think it's important, we shouldn't measure the nato commitment to ukraine through military support of sort of war fighting capabilities. the real measure of support is the eu and u.s. operation on sanctions, which saw a further ratchet up. and it's important that we keep the pressure on in that regard

above all. in terms of the new spearhead, different countries will be contributing. britain has got out ahead by making clear the nature of our commitment in terms of our commitment in terms of the brigade headquarters and the battalion. i'm sure others will be coming forward with the contribution. in terms of combatting isil. that is supposed to be being put in place this week. it is already taking time. it is absolutely vital. i would argue that without that it is very difficult to take the further steps that need to be taken. it is absolutely vital this is put in place. he asked about the regional support. jordan is a partner nation of nato. he asked about whether nato countries are properly pooling

the resources. i think this is why the 20% pledge on new equipment is so vital. it should be properly interoperable between nato nations. on afghanistan i think he is right to say that the way to secure our legacy in afghanistan is to make sure there is a proper political to bury differences and form a government together. we need to see that happen. he asked about the contribution that britain will make to nato forces. our principle contribution post the end of 2014 will be the officer training academy that president karzai specifically asks for and we are providing. that should put our contribution of troops for that facility into the low hundreds. some other countries united

states and germany and some others will be having more nato troops as it were on the ground. asked about the agreement -- what is required in this situation of afghanistan as in iraq is a combination of using all the assets we have at our disposal including on occasion military assets but the importance of politics cannot be under estimated. the future of iraq will be delivered if that is an inclusive iraqi government. >> mr. speaker, never has there been a time when decision makers are being faced with so many key decisions. i congratulate the prime minister and his colleagues for an excellent summit in wales. as they were meeting yet another front was opening up with reports of militia activity on

the russia/astonia border. does the prime minister agree it is a red line? if there are incursions will the uk and nato treat this -- >> thank my friend for his remarks. i can absolutely give assurance. it is important that nato one of the first things is for nato to be clear about the article 5 commitments that all members of nato are subject to that collective defense, astonia included. i think it is important that message goes out. that is why not only is the action plan important in this new spear head force but also starting to see more nato exercises so that russians can see when they look at astonia or lithuania they can see different nationalities involved in the defense. absolutely vital. yes, it is a red line. >> may i begin by thanking the

prime minister for the generous tributes have paid to our northwest colleague and friend. when you ask the prime minister about the syrian divisions opening up inside the gulf council with allegations by some states in the gcc that other states including kuwait and to a lesser degree and qatar and kuwait are harboring people sometimes quite senior who in turn are helping to finance and support to islamic extremists. the prime minister says what representations he and others are making to the governments of these states to ensure that to the extent the activities are taking place there is high suspicion that they stop.

>> i think there is an important point which is that on occasions there are concerns that some gulf states supported players whether in syria or libya or elsewhere that harbor and take extremist views. we have repeatedly said how unwise we think that is. . britain is very clear as i have said many times with respect to our domestic arrangements. we need to oppose the extremist narrative, as well. >> a tribute paid to tim donovan. he was proud to be a scott. these are not mutually inconsistent in spite of observations made elsewhere in the kingdom. may i make this comment to my friend. the attempt to obtain a 2% level

of expenditure within ten years can only be regarded as a rather gentle target. is he satisfied that it is strong enough. the real issue will be in the minds of many memorable arms as this. where do they stand in relation to action with regard to isis? will my friend agree that it is right to recognize that the best that is able to be done in relation to an ideology like isis is to degrade it so far as we possibly can but it would be entirely unrealist to believe that political, economic or military means would have the effect of destroying it? >> well, first i agree with everything he said about him. you can be all three of those things and replace that word label with conservative, liberal

or democrat and say the same thing. what is different about this time is that the 2% pledge has never been included in the leaders declaration in the same way as this time. there has never been a time scale on it. what i particularly pick out is that it puts on its sight those that are below 2%. i think that is a powerful statement. with regards to isil you have to degrade an ideology. i think when it comes to terrorists that have taken control of the institutions of a state, say they have land, they have oil, money, weapons, we should be more ambitious and say actually the right people to run the state of iraq is the iraqi government. the right people to run syria is an inclusive syrian government and there should be no place in those states for extreme terrorists.

>> the taking of those countries who are below 2% not to let it fall lower presumably by implication those countries above 2% or at 2% have undertaken not to allow their contribution to fall below 2%, united kingdom in particular? >> i would refer the lady to the text. all allies in the nato guideline were aimed to continue to do so. i think it is important and makes the 20% point about the equipment which is as important, absolutely right. then it singles out allies whose current portion will halt any decline in defense spending and aim to decrease and aim to move towards the 2% guideline within a decade. i think it is important for the first time that all 28 countries signed up for that specificity.

>> on isil my right honorable friend is clearly right to have been very cautious and to assort the widest possible support for international action including going through the united nations and working closely with the arab league. will my right honorable friend continue to make clear this will be a long and pain staking problem which will not be solved only by smart weapons delivered from 12,000 feet but will need long-term engagement on very many fronts? >> i think he is absolutely right. this is long and painstaking work. you do need to have a comprehensive plan. it will need to include everything. above all it needs an inclusive iraqi government. president obama and i very much agreed that a military action can't only be one part of a plan. it is not in itself a plan. i think it is important for people to understand that.

>> speaker, i would like to associate myself with the comments of the prime minister about the sad news about jim doban. there is very particular concern about the hostage. what more can the prime minister say about the support for david's family in scotland and croatia? >> it is obviously a tragic situation. one only has to think for a few moments of what it would be like to be in his position or his family's position to understand what they are going through. what i tried to make sure in all of these situations is that the family gets support from a police liaison officer and from the foreign office and always offered that ministers speak directly to the hostage's family to tel