security for our citizens. and i thank you all for being on the the front lines of doing that. that is what the department was created for. and that is what the committee is created for as well. so i want to go to a pointed question in the collaboration between state and the department of homeland security in particular, intelligence. and dealing with cbp. is it your thought that the isil actions in syria and iraq and the isil profile could be a threat to the united states? mr. miller? >> yes, ma'am, as you stated over 100 americans to fight with isil and the western europeans,

do believe it could be a short-term and long-term threat to the united states. >> mr. wagner? >> yes, i also agree. and looking at the systems we have and how we look at the information we get with a person's reservation information and looking at itineraries and other characteristics of their travel, do they fit what we know about, you know, what the intelligence reporting are known factors? try to talk to them and determine what their purpose and travel is. we have good systems to help us do that. we have good intelligence reporting to help us build those. we get good information from the department of state and other entities when we do want to take action against known individuals. then we have the systems in place to identify them and

figure out what point in the process we need to intercept them and have that discussion. >> ma'am, we certainly assess that isil presents a long term threat to the country. we know the leader back in january spoke of but they do have a very sophisticated and savvy media campaign. especially a social media campaign. and i think our near-term concern is that that campaign will be appealing to individual who is seek to radicalize. whether other in europe or here in the homeland. they could contact an attack on their own at any time based on that media campaign. so that is a very clear near-term concern that we have.

>> miss johnson. >> -- isil stated threats against the united states. so we look at the protection of the u.s. overseas and the missions and always adjusting our posture accordingly. >> let me ask you a question. as we both know, the two acts of beheading were clearly directed towards the sentiments of the infrastructure values of the united states. and certainly attack on the citizens overseas. to mr. miller and mr. wagner. following on the questioning of chairwoman miller. i'm concerned as to whether or not we do have the kind of coordination that is actually needed. i guess i don't want to use the term intimate. creating hysteria is not the idea of this committee.

i also hesitate to solidly predict isil's threat level in as much as we're reminded of our posture on the day before 9/11, 2001. so let me just -- in the manner in which you can answer the question, feel comfortable about the level of coordination in this climate. and mr. miller, i would like to hear what level, how intense your coordination is, how comfortable you are with the coordination, and what do you need to make it better? and i ask mr. wagner that question. >> our coordination with the intelligence community and the law enforcement community in the u.s. is stronger than ever. we're working this threat daily. whether with the fbi or intelligence community. our foreign counterparts, we're

working with them. with the australians and the uk yesterday, there's stronger and stronger sentiment for information sharing from our european partners as well. and we can explain our classification more fully. >> and we take that information based upon it. and gettinging that information is critical to us making the right decisions on how we operationalize the information. in one of the things we would like to see is a stronger response from our partners overseas and emulating some of the ways we do our border security management, as was referenced earlier. in trying to take advance and not waiting until they show up on your doorstep to try to figure out what to do with them. i think we would encourage our

allies to consider those practices. we work closely to help them build up the capacity. >> we have two questions if we might finish quickly. miss johnson, i understand it's somewhat difficult to track the travel of foreign terrorists. i would like to know what the state department is doing and how you're improving tracking the travels of foreign terrorists. and coordinating with your fellow collaborating nation states about whether you're doing that and lastly, if i can ask you the question of our level of intelligence in this climate of what we're in now, and backtrack it to 9/11. where we were saying quite the contrary. we didn't have an inkling of what would happen in the next day. are we in a better place?

miss johnson? >> obviously it's an ongoing effort. everyone has different legal ideas. we are working with them very closely, as i mentioned. the european is now looking at the passenger name record situation hoping to adopt something by the end of this year. that will help us as the us for the officers to be able to understand who is coming and who is traveling. >> you think the no-fly list can be made more robust? >> the no-fly list? >> yeah, make it more robust. >> i think for the no-fly list we're talking all the time about how to work the no-fly list to make sure it has accurate information, and we do share it with foreign partners so they know who is on the list. they are enhancing their own screening efforts and that helps us prevent people from getting on planes, is including from

other parts of the world. and as i mentioned, our information sharing agreements particularly with visa waiver countries but also additional countries under homeland security directive six. we share biographic information with foreign partners. a lot of that is individuals on the no-fly list and individuals who need to be more screened. we also have the preventing serious crime agreements, which also collects biometric information. mostly fingerprints to exchange that information. so there's a lot of information to enhance the border security screening and track terrorist travel. >> >> she answered her question in writing and the share now recognizes, the ranking member, mr. thompson. >> thank you very much, madame chairman. mr. wagner, from time to time congress has in in ininfts infi

wisdom cut the budget for the agencies tasked to keep us safe. in the present budget, are you comfortable to provide the security and assurance necessary that cbp is doing all it can to keep bad people from getting into the country. >> yes, i believe we can. i think cvp was fortunate enough to be one of the few organizations that did see a very generous budget, including the addition of 2,000 officers this fiscal year, and in the administration's request for 2015, there's also a request for another 2,000 plus officers. which we know are critically important to securing the economy and encountering this

threat. >> i understand the manpower. i'm concerned about technology and other things necessary to support the increase in people along the border. i'm looking at the international side of it. >> well, we use those officers to deploy them in places like preclearance overseas. deploy them in the immigration advisory program. deploy them to the national targeting center. when we collect the information, we collect the intelligence reports and others too. for instance, the officers based on their experience and their knowledge in turns that into actionable operational entities and being able to question them and continue to address that. >> so it's not a matter of resource. are you satisfied with the coordination between the

agencies in terms of identifying these individuals coming to this country? >> yes, i think we've seen that it's been better than ever at this point. as these threats continue to appear, you know, the information sharing and the coordination get stronger and surer. and our systems integration to make sure the data bases are talking to each other. so when state department takes an action against a visa or passport, it appears in our data base so we can take action. >> is that realtime, or is that a lag time? >> it would be a realtime identification that that information appears in the different systems and we try to access it in foreign advance of a person's travel if we can. in order to take the appropriate action or address whatever kind of questions we have. so, yes.

>> miss johnson, there's been some discussion about revoking of passports. for the committee's edification, are the present rules as robust as they need to be give tennessee present isis threat that potentially is expanding? >> thank you, i know our bureau is working with our law enforcement intelligence community partners to review all of our options, and i believe they are looking at that as well. i can take that back to have our lawyers and tto provide more an. >> well, i would, but if if you would, are you comfortable with the present protocols in place that if those individuals are

identified, that the passport cancellation process would fully comply with that cancellation? >> i think that's a question ha the the affairs bureau could answer better. i don't know how many we've done, i believe it's pretty quick. we do it in consultation with the law enforcement and community so they should be working side by side on that, i imagine. >> can anybody else address that question? can you get counselor affairs to address that? i think one of the questions we are contemplating is whether or not when these individuals are identified that we're doing everything we can to keep them getting back here to american soil. if there's some question as to whether or not that is, in fact, taking place, we need to plug in

a potential gap that exists. i yield back. madame chair. >> i thank the gentleman very much. we now recognize the gentleman from texas, chairman mccall. >> thank you for holding this important hearing. very timely. i thank you for your leadership as well. tomorrow we will observe the 13th anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. and while we've made a tremendous amount of progress since the tragic day in 2001, we have to continue to be vigilant, be one step ahead of the adversaries. today isis is the biggest threat to the homeland. these terrorists are brutal, driven and intent on attacking the united states. the job of this committee is to help ensure that that does not happen. the largest concern is isis's recruitment of foreign fighters.

many of whom have western passports. they could ease their travel into europe and into the united states to carry out attacks. the fact is you don't know what you don't know. and we only have estimates of how many westerners these foreign fighters are in isis ranks. and potentially thousands that we do not know who they are. one of the biggest worries for a counterterrorism perspective is the unknown terrorists. those with no where will record or intelligence traces, who could use a valid u.s. passport or the visa waiver program to enter and commit the homeland. for example, in may a 22-year-old florida man who joined in syria, an al qaeda affiliate, killed 16 people and himself in a suicide bombing attack against syrian government forces. u.s. officials say he was on their radar screen, but acknowledged that he travelled

back to the united states before turning to syria without detection. also key for the administration to take the real steps to stop the radicalization of our youth so they do not leave for jihad. this week i visited the vcp's national targeting center to observe the hard working mane women who were responsible for preventing travel by terrorism and others we have on various watch lists. the work they do targeting obscure information, connecting the dots to keep dangerous people out of the united states is vital to stopping isis. and when we say i'm very hopeful that tonight, and i talked to the secretary, jay johnson, very hopeful that tonight we'll hear from the president to take the advice of the chairman of joint chiefs, general dempsey, that

the only way you can defeat isis is to attack them wherever they exist. and i'm hopeful the the president will come out strongly on the issue. it's a matter of national security. and it's a matter of homeland security that we do so. that we stop it over there before we can come here. and that's really the whole purpose of the hearing, one flight away. because these individuals are just one flight away. and so i would like to ask the panel, you know, we have seen this gentleman from florida get in and out undetected. we saw tamerlan tsarnaev leave and pull off a terrorist attack in boston. what assurances can you give me that that will not happen in the future? mr. wagner? >> thank you. and so looking at the lessons we

learned with tsarnaev and looking at, you know, we had access to certain pieces of information. and certain pieces of information weren't being followed up in closing those gaps. we learned a real hard lesson with the christmas day bomber. and here was a guy we had in our sights, but not really realizing his intentions at the time. we were waiting for him on the the ground. and taking a look at the procedures and connecting the pieces of information we have and taking action against a person as far as in advance of boarding the plane as possible. whether that's revoking the visa so they check in the with the airline, they're not able to print a boarding pass because it's been revoked or having the preclearance officers question and talk and search a person before they get on the aircraft. and working to question people and talk to them and try to determine a person's intent. with all the systems that we

have and all the data we collect, we can look for patterns and pieces of information. we can connect known pieces of information. determining the person's intent is a really difficult, difficult challenge. one best brought by questioning a person and using our skills to be able to do that. l. >> when i talked to the secretary, we talked about the visa waiver program countries. the ability to get more information and more data from the countries so we do know more about the travelers, would you agree with that? legislatively would that help you? >> yes, as an operational organization we're always looking for organizations to help us or if we can figure out what their intentions are by having access toed a diggal information. but yes, i would agree with

that. >> and lastly, on the intelligence side of the house, my biggest concern is we don't have sufficient intelligence, human intelligence particularly in syria to identify the 100 to 200 americans over there. intelligence on the tens of thousands of foreign fight fighters who could board an airplane and come into the united states. i know we're not in a classified setting, but does that disturb you? and is it possible some of the foreign fighters have actually returned to the united states, like the man from florida and are currently here? mr. miller? >> chairman, yes, sir. it does concern us. and we continue to look at the known terrorists, to look at

travel patterns, to look at who they're connecteded to. to look at the the data elements we may be able to utilize to identify future people. we identify -- we continue to work with the law enforcement and intelligence community to see if there's additional data elements that we can yut lisz to help us identify those folks. and we continue to work with our foreign partners as well. but as you state, we can get more of what we're doing to put the full picture together. >> sir, i would agree with my colleague's comments. we don't have a full picture in all cases. i think thars why our interaction with our foreign counterparts in particular is quite important, so that they have citizens fighting there. we share those identities and that information with each other. and i know in our department and work with state department, both

dhs and state are working very closely to make all that information known and shared. >> and all that sounds great. when i ask the question do we have a high degree of confidence with who the people are, i'm not satisfied with the answer. i think the honest answer is we don't. and the vacuum here now that's developed into what is one of the biggest threats in the homeland and iraq and syria that we regain that intelligence on the ground to determine who is over there so we can stop them from coming back to the united states and killing americans. and with that i yield back. >> thank you chairman for his very insightful questions and comments. chair now recognizes the gentleman from pennsylvania. >> thank you, madame chair.

we spent a lot of time today discussing the threat ofs laumic state terrorists gaining entry into the united states. but i'm also very concerned as the rest of the committee, about those who may already be here. last year the government's nonpartisan fact checker, government account about office reported the homeland department of security has lost track of nearly 1 million foreign visitors. mr. miller, what steps is dhs taking to identify these individuals and ensure the american people that they're not affiliated with the islamic state, and wouldn't the completion of the system help against this threat? >> we have over the last several

years taken several steps. >> along with hsi or immigration and custom enforcement to prioritize them through the targeting system. with respect to the biometric i would yield to mr. wag inner. >> and thank you. we're using biographical data. >> but we're not doing land exits. >> we're doing some of it. >> well my problem with that is if we're not doing everywhere, we really don't know if somebody has left the country. >> absolutely. and those tr the gas we're trying to close. we set up a demo lab with the science and technology branch we opened a few months ago. invite everybody to come up and

visit it in dover, maryland. we have scientists there helping test out what are the right biometrics to collect and record that entry and then exit in the united states and then in realtime sochlt the course of this year and next year we'll be piloting different types of biometrics in this demonstration lab. we're looking to do a few over the course of next year and then have a good pilot in place at the beginning of 2016 at a single airport with what we think will be the right technology that we would expand to additional locations. zble we know they are using the southern border and a broken immigration system to enter the the united states. hezbollah has been setting up terrorist networks for decades now and are working with the the mexican drug cartels to move contraband into the united states. al shabaab has been senting

individuals through central america take advantage of our broken immigration system and claiming asylum upon injury but never showing up for the hearings. what measures are the department of homeland security taking to ensure they do not take similar advantage of our porous borders. and is the problem a concern that now hhs are taking minors and just dispersing them across the united states without governors or states or communities knowing who the individuals are. if you can touch on that. >> sir, certainly we've had a long standing concern in the department about known or suspected terrorists and groups moving in and out of all of our border areas. and so we are continually looking at the information and the intelligence that we

receive. determine credibility of that information. to date we have not had credible reporting that either hezbollah or any other terrorist group has been taking advantage of our borders to move individuals in and out. it's something we are always looking for, but to date we have not seen credible evidence of that. >> just this week identi've introduced a bill to stop the federal government from sending unaccompanied minors around the company into our schools and neighborhoods without any knowledge at all of what's happening. you know, i think we really need to look at what they're looking at as how to get into the united states and kill americans. and so, thank you. >> madame chair, just an inquiry. could you give the gentleman an additional 30 seconds so i can pose a question to the gentleman? >> yes. >> and i thank the gentleman.

we've worked together on a number of issues. do you have documentation that unaccompanied children age 2 years old and 4 years old and 6 years old and 10 years old are known terrorists spread throughout the the nation? you have present documentation. but do you have known documentation? >> i'm not saying that we have known documentation. unaccompanied minors are known terrorists. but shouldn't we consider that a threat that we don't know anything about the individuals and they're being sent around the united states, especially with the threat going on in in iraq with isis, with our known intelligence that they want to come to the united states. don't you think that we are vulnerable without knowing that? >> all right, time has expired.

and the chair will now recognize the senator from texas for his comments. >> thank you, madame chair. appreciate you bringing us together for the hearing today and assembling the panel that we have. i want to clarify the response miss lasley made to mr. barletta's question or comment and seek further clarity from any member of the panel who would wish to offer it. when a member of the congress says we all know they are using the southern border to enter the u.s., i think it's very important for all of us to know whether or not that's a true statement. i have been told by dhs as recently as last month that there's no evidence, nor has there ever been, through the southern border, the border of mexico or terrorist plots were foiled or intercepted at the border or terrorist plots

carried out within the u.s. that have a connection to the southern border. that is what i heard directly from dhs. >> will the gentleman yield? >> i will. >> they tried to cross the southern border, contacted what he believed was a mexican drug cartel. turned out to be a dea undercover operative in mexico. his intent was to cross the southern border and bring nefarious objects with him to assassinate the ambassador of saudi arabia here at a restaurant we may have been attending that night. >> and i'll ask the the experts a the panel to answer the question. sir, i would reiterate what i stated earlier, that we to date don't have credible information that we are aware of of known or

suspected terrorists coming across the border, particularly related to this threat stream. >> mr. miller and mr. wagner, would you like to clarify what we have heard so far. either from members of congress or your copanelists? >> yes, thank you. and building upon that the numbers of known watch listed individuals that we have encountered at the ports is minimal compared to what we see in commercial aviation. you're talking tens versus thousands. it's minimal from what we have seen from watch listed encounters. >> mr. miller? >> i would reiterate what mr. wagner said. in addition, we do have very robust information sharing with the counterparts in central america, in mexico, with the state and local partners.

we're imbedded in the texas fusion center. so we continue to look at this, and when and if that surfaced we would take appropriate action. >> i may submit a question for the record. i would like to know once and for all what the facts support in terms of these repeated accusations that the southern border is unsafe. that terrorists are exploiting it into the united states, i want to make sure that we address the i want to make sure i know the truth on that. thgs not new, by the way. i'm going to ask for consent to submit to the record the herald of 1981. border checked for libyan hit squad. we have been projecting our

anxiety -- >> without objection. >> thank you, madame chair. -- about threats to the united states on the u.s./mexican border for as long as i have been alive. it does not mean we should not be vigilant. does not mean we should not take the threats seriously. we should only traffic in the facts and the data and we should only raise these kinds of fears and anxieties when there are facts to support them. so i would ask for my colleagues to do that. there are a number of questions i have. most of them would be more appropriate in a classified hearing. here's a general one and with time permitting, we would love to get everyone's answer. we're at war in iraq. we have service members flying missions over there. we have boots on the ground and advisers. we're about to formalize that war perhaps to some greater degree after the president's speech and with congressional action. what does a greater state of war

in iraq and syria mean to you in the jobs that you do? what additional resources, as the ranking member asked earlier, authorities, and procedures would you need to meet additional threats following a greatest u.s. involvement in those two countries? i don't know if we can just have one of you answer briefly. i'm out of time. so with the chair's permission, would love another 30 seconds to hear from miss lasley. >> sir, i would say that we have an imperative, and that imperative increases as the threat increases to share information. so that we can identify and stop individuals who want to come to the country. whether that's with the foreign partners, cl that's with the intelligence community or whether that's with the state and local law enforcement. so i think we will continue to be very vigilant in making sure

that information is broadly shared. >> thank you very much. and the chair now recognizes the gentleman from florida. >> thank you for the work you do. thanks for coming and being willing to sit in the crossfire a little bit. and for your efforts to keep us as i went through, it felt like the vwp is yesterday's tool for today's world. and so at a 20,000 foot level, the question that kept coming to my mind as i worked it with my team, do we optimize yesterday's tool for today's world? or do we need to go to a new program all together?

maybe that means at one end of the continuum would be visas for everyone. could be less restrictive than that. would be more costly than we currently do. and we would probably hear pushback from the tourism industry and others. i'm not taking a position on that. what i would like is for you to take a position on whether you feel we should optimize yesterday's tool for the world or do we need to break the mold and look for something more current. implied in my question, of course, is bang for buck. how much are we spending? how do we measure what we get for those expenses? >> i understand 300, but i know you have more sophisticated ways of measuring what we are getting for our resources in this effort. so i would leak to hear all four of you answer how you feel

whether we ought to continue this current road. if we can see around corners good enough with in information, or do we need to go to a new level to protect the future? start with mr. miller. thank you. we need to look at the information we're currently connecting. and then take the appropriate action and decide if we need more information to collect. as mr. wagner pointed out earlier, as operators are using the targeting system, generally more information is better as long as we can collect it in the right way given the civil rights, civil liberties, privacy and we're able to operationalize it. >> i would just say it's an

important program. it does get us information sharing agreements and allows our close ally to share very important information with us that we're not getting from countries we don't have a vwp agreement with. it requires them to issue electronic passports, which helps them to report lost and stolen passports to us. like mr. miller mentioned, we're taking a hard look at are we collecting other data elements and what other information could we make use of and how would we collect it? as we are with many of the programs. i think it dusz have value. and a side by side of vwp versus the visa program would offer and what types of benefits. and what is a good study time to take. >> is anybody doing that?

>> sir, we are reviewing the program. we are reviewing a lot of different programs. as we constantly do in life, the different threats that arise. and are there gaps in there. are there gaps in how we connect the system. >> and i would say that's across the department. the department leadership is really looking at all the tools we have in our tool kit and how we can optimize them to make sure we have the data that we need and we're stopping people from coming into the country who shouldn't be here. one of the tools that we have if i could just highlight one is our watch listing effort. so we are making a concerted effort with the department to share as much of the data with the intelligence community to make sure individuals are in fact put on the watch list. we do that for the entire

department, working with the colleagues. and over the last three years, we have significantly increased the number of that we in the department have given to the intelligence community from about 4,000 two years ago to well over 9,000 this year. that's one way we're trying to stop travelers from coming. >> and as i mentioned we have our information sharing agreement with visa waiver program partners. we are increasing those sharing agreements and arrangements, in addition to beyond visa waiver program, we're expanding the number of agreements, and we work closely with the inner agency partners on the watch list to make sure the foreign partners have those as well. i think those are strong tools. >> i urge you and i urge us to look at secondary and incremental and more than incremental efforts in this, in what we're doing here. i'm a user of global entry for my business before i came here.

it makes me nervous that you all interview me but you don't interview people that could be face-to-f face, that could be somewhere in europe that could be wanting to come to our country. to my knowledge, i don't think we do that. am i right about that? >> we get interviewed upon arrival by the cdc. but there is no interview to issue that. unless we have it come through a preclearance location where we would interview them before they got on a plane. or unless our targeting systems and analysis gave us cause for some time of reason to have immigration advisory program officers coming through one of the 11 locations talk to them before boarding and address any types of questions that we have. so the possibility is there. and we are in a lot of the countries. we are in london heathrow. we're inm manchester.

we're in frankfurt. we're in amsterdam. major places of travel. so we have the opportunity if our other systems flag them for scrutiny. >> if you do a face-to-face with me, i would love you to do it with potential bad guys coming from outside our country as well. thank you for your answers. >> thank the gentleman. the chair recognizes south carolina. >> thank you madame chairwoman. thank you to the panel for being here. thank you for your service to the country. in february of 2014 this year the director started out testifying before the senate armed services committee by saying looking back over my now more than half a century in intelligence, aye not experienced a time when we've been beset by more crisis and threats around the globe? two days ago we have a staff meeting on fly-in day. i shared a video with my staff

of an isis produced video. but it showed young iraqi men loaded in the back of pickup trucks and dump trucks taking out into the desert. and murdered. hundreds of iraqis. harken times of the holocaust to watch the images that were disturbing of men shot multiple times to make sure they were dead as they laid in the trench. this is a real threat. and we may not think as americans we may not be interested in islamic extremism and isis and the establishment of calaphate. but i tell you what, isis is interested in america and they're interested in you. in june i traveled to europe.

i couldn't get many members of congress interested in going. we were looking at border security and foreign fighter flow. in june. i was to have that same congressional delegation trip today i would have to turn members away because the plane wouldn't be big enough to travel to europe to meet with our allies about foreign fighter flow. i grew up during the cold war. nation state versus nation state tracking the movement of tanks and large number of troops among borders in mainly eastern europe. we're not tracking troop movement or tank movement today. we're tracking individuals. foreign fighters who lead not only european countries but this country to travel to fight ji d jihad. often times being radicalized and coming back possibly to the united states of america to create and commit heinous crimes. is that a farfetched idea? well, before i left to travel to

br brussels, a young man who travelled to syria through turkey came back through germany. germany tracked its movements but failed to let the allies within europe know about the individual. he entered brussel, is and shot up a jewish museum. at least three or four individuals were killed. have you heard about that? probably not. i know it because i was headed to brussels and it was on our radar screen. this was a jihadist, shot up a jewish museum, killed people. free travel. free travel among those countries. no border crossings. they're visa waiver countries as well.

he would have been part of the visa waiver program, traveled back to his country unbeknownst to the united states personnel, had a valid travel document could have boarded an aircraft and flown to this country. we need to be concerned about that. we also need to be concerned about americans. we have now identified a number that have traveled over to fight with isis. whether it's in syria or iraq or the islamic state and whatever it looks like going. we should be able to revoke the passports of united states citizens if they do travel to fight for another organization. in fact, u.s. law says that a u.s. citizen shall lose its nationality by volunteering and performing illegal acts. now there is a part of law that says with the intention of relen kwishing united states nationality. maybe we w need to strike that

in future law. but if you go on, committing act of treason or bearing arms against the united states. that's exactly what isis and isil have said. if you go onto other laws, we can revoke a united states passport if the secretary receives certification from a state agency that the individual owes child support in excess of $25. we can revoke their passport because they don't pay child support. you can't tell me we're going to revoke the passports of people going to fight with isis that said we're coming to the wlous. we're going to fly that al qaeda flag over the white house. who have made threats to the united states. who have beheaded two american journalists. but we can revoke the passport if they fail to pay child support? secretary should issue the past port of 19:26 that gives broad power to revoke the passport

when necessary for security purposes. we need to keep them from reentering the united states when we know who they are, and we need to understand, america, the challenges of tracking individual foreign fighters and as they fly around the world through ally countries, where they end up. madame chairman, i hope this isn't the last committee hearing. we have a lot of threating facing our country. and i hope that the president comes out strongly tomorrow night against this threat to the united states of america and the very freedoms that we enjoy. and with that i yield back. >> thank you, gentleman, very much. and i think we are all very interested to hear what the president has to say about this sure. i think it's -- i would guess certainly in my direct and most members when they were home in their districts over the last month we heard about this isis threat over and over and over.

and it has certainly -- i think the nation understands and is looking for the president, he is the commander km chief, to outline to the country how serious of a threat it is, and what we need to be doing as a country to address it. and really the purpose of this hearing -- in a moment. really the purpose of this hearing was to talk about what we can do legislatively to assist all of you, and as i mentioned, i have currently two different bills that we're looking at, and introducing and i would also encourage all of you, for instance, mr. wagner, you mentioned you're looking, you're reviewing, as you always are about what kinds of things would be helpful. please keep us in the information loop. you don't have to wait until we have a hearing to let us know what you're doing. and i know that maybe what

you're looking at doing is better talked about in the skiff, but in a classified in situation, but still, keep us in the information loop. does the ranking >> i do, thank you very much. let me just hope to make sure that ms. lasley responds to my question and to just put on the a looming question of watch list, no-fly list. i think this hearing should leave the american public that we are being vigilant and we're knowledgeable that isil wants to form as an islamic state, but we balance that with our civil liberties and facts. so, i would ask for anyone who may have documentation, i guess it's in different jurisdictions, but i want to put on the record, documentation on the status or the type of unaccompanied children. i would like to get that report from anybody who has access to that. i would like to yield 15 seconds

to -- and thank the witnesses very much, too -- mr. o'rourke, very briefly. >> you don't have to yield to him. i'll recognize him. >> when i asked about a connection to known terrorist plots and the u.s./mexico border, mentioned the iran terror plot to assassinate somebody here in washington, d.c., there is, in fact, from everything that i know about this, absolutely no connection to the border. in fact, the plotter was interdicted at jfk airport where he was arrested due to our coordination with government of mexico. the person he thought he was dealing was actually a dea agent posing as a cartel member. the border was never exploited. while i think this is a serious issue, one which we must remain vigilant, there is no connection to the border. i invite anyone, especially those who have the subject matter expertise to tell me if i

am wrong. my understanding is the border is as secure as it has ever been and we do not have any terror plots tied to the border. doesn't mean there might not be some, shouldn't guard against it, but let's deal with the facts. >> i thank the gentleman for his comments. i recognize the gentleman from south carolina, if you would like to respond. >> i thank the gentleman. i think the iranian threat was to come across the southern border. it was thwarted, so you're right and wrong. we have no idea who's in our country. for us not to recognize that we have open borders and that we have no idea who has entered our country illegally, and what their intentions were -- whether it was the intention to get a job and provide for their family or intention to maybe create a terrorist cell and do something nefarious in the future, we don't know. i met with the security force of the king ranch in your state. 30, 40 miles north of

brownsville. 837,000 acres, as large as the state of rhode island. so they have their own security force. this was two years ago. he said, mr. duncan, we're watching on our property some otms. the term otm is only be applied to unaccompanied children from nick rag ra, el salvador. he said, we're catching folks on our property that are african, that are asian and that are middle eastern. this is 50 miles north of the border. they came across the border illegally. just met with a secret service agent on the sidewalk in washington that was riding a bike. former military guy. served nine tours in afghanistan. that ought to tell you what he did in the military. he said part of his training was

on the southern border watching and they saw thousands of people come across the border and they called cbp and nobody showed up. he said, part of our work was radio and communications intercept, because they were getting ready to go do the same thing in afghanistan. he said, everything we heard was not spanish. wake up, america. with a porous southern border, we have no idea who's in our country. i yield back. >> i thank, the gentleman. i thank everyone for their passion on this issue. obviously, there's a lot of interest in this. and i certainly want to thank all of the witnesses for their testimony today. and i know some of the questions that were asked will be -- answers will be submitted in writing to the committee. we appreciate that. and with that -- >> thank you, madame chair. i want to say thank you. i know you're ending. just want to say that this is a committee of facts. no one knows and has documented that those otms were terrorist. i yield back. >> i appreciate that.

>> thank you. >> we would also mention that pursuant to the committee rule 7-c the hearing record will be held open for ten days. so, without objection, the committee stands adjourned. if you missed any of this morning's hearing, can you see it any time at our video library, c-span.org. the president will be speaking to the nation laying out isis's capabilities. we'll have that live tonight on the c-span networks, including

c-span radio and online at c-span.org. throughout today's hearing we've been asking you, do you think isis is a domestic threat? susie writes on facebook, maybe not as much in the middle east or the way they operate, openly in public, but i'm sure there are isis agents living in our midst right now. from michael, they're only as much as a threat as any other foreign terrorist group. they've said what their goals are. we've never heard invade the u.s. war hawks will say anything. from clarice, i think this is a threat to iraq and other islamic countries. i also think it is another distraction that the government and the media are using to distract from the evil in our own country. the facebook.com/cspan. we've been watching members of congress saying on twitter.

harry reid tweet, i strongly destroying isis. let's destroy them but let's do it the right way. oklahoma congressman james lank ford saying waiting for the rest of the nation to hearing the president's strategy to defeat isis and from tennessee marsha blackburn, it's imperative the president provide the american people with a definitive plan of action to stop isis. again, the president's address tonight at 9:00 eastern on the c-span networks. yesterday in london, british foreign secretary phillip hammod told members of the foreign affair committee that air strikes alone cannot be the only solution in defeating isis but part of a wider strategy. he updated members on developments in you can foreign policy covering the ukraine/russia conflict, re-engaging talks with iran over relations with european union. >> welcome. i welcome members to the foreign

select committee. this is one of our bi-annual meetings with the foreign secretary. the last took place on 20th of march. can i give a warm welcome to our new foreign secretary. foreign secretary, we tried to -- a couple of times to get you while you were secretary of state for defense, done unsuccessfully as you had taken off overseas. we're glad in our new capacity you have come here. on behalf of the committee can i give you a warm welcome and congratulate you on your appointment. >> thank you. >> i hope you've been briefed on the groups we're going to ask you questions on. we'll start with iraq and syria. and perhaps you'd like to talk about the possible air war in syria and whether or not you think it's in our national interest to join in it. >> well, the committee will be aware the united states is already carrying out air strikes in support of the iraqi security

and p oechlt shmerga against isis. we have not ruled anything out, but at this point there's not a specific ask and, therefore, nothing for us to consider. we're clear there has to be a comprehensive response to the challenge posed by isil. it's absolutely clear that air strikes alone, whoever they're delivered by, are not going to be the solution. but it is possible that air activity could be part of a wider package which includes political initiative and, more crucially, which must include a iraqi-led, regionally supported operation on the ground to push back the gains isil have made. >> you used a phrase then, you haven't had a specific ask.

should i infer from that you've had an informal ask in which once you got your ducks in a row, you'll get a specific ask? >> no, we haven't had an unspecific ask either. but it's well understood by the group of like-minded nations that the u.s. is looking at developing a policy for dealing with isil but will involve building a very wide coalition. secretary kerry and secretary hagel are in the gulf this week, drumming up regional support, which will be a vitally important part of that coalition. they made it clear at the nato summit meeting last week that they hope for extensive nato support as well. not necessarily support in delivering kinetic military activity. secretary kerry made it very clear he understands different

nations will have different appetites and will want to contribute in different ways to what will be a very broad-based and comprehensive response to the challenge of isil. >> i assume some conversations are going on which would lead to say if asked, this is what you'd like us to do? >> no, we have not had any such conversations. >> sorry. thank you for the clarification. >> i think the united states is very well aware this is a sensitive subject in this country and that we will want to look at what kind of package of action is proposed in order to deal with the challenge of isil. we will want to think carefully about how we can most effectively contribute to that. what other allies are proposing to do and think very carefully about what position we should take. and as the prime minister made clear yesterday, in this situation where we are

clearly -- this would be premeditated involvement if we did decide involvement was appropriate, we would come back to the house of commons for a debate and a vote on that proposition. >> that's very helpful. thank you. if the raf were deployed, would it be because they were going to make a strategic difference to something the united states was doing, or would it be more a political gesture of support and solidarity? >> i think different air forces have different niche capabilities. we do have some niche capabilities that to a nato gr-4 is an extremely capable aircraft for the type of operation that the u.s. is currently carrying out. in iraq. but i think it's probably realistic to say given the scale of united states' assets available, the primary driver would be the importance of

building a political coalition of nations, short of military hardware on the part of the united states. >> i can clarify one point. i've been using the phrase iraq. do you distinguish between kurdistan regional government and a request for help and the iraqi government and a request for help? >> no. the sovereign entity with which we deal is iraq. it's clear that any activity, whether it's supply of weapons and equipment or, indeed, in the future whether a question of military -- direct military activity, this would always have to be something that was done at the request of government of iraq and with the full agreement of the government of iraq. >> so, if the krg in erbil asked you for support, unless it was backed by baghdad, you wouldn't go along with it? >> yes, it would have to be backed by baghdad.

that's the legally responsible entity. >> thank you. >> thank you. i think you quite rightly say that this campaign has to be iraqi led and regionally supported. can you sort of say a little more about the new government that's been announced in baghdad and how committed are the kurds -- can you put a timeline of three months to show goodwill al badi and then sunni regions have joined the government. where are we in terms of the tribes and whether they've at all been involved in bringing the parties together? >> i think it's probably fair to say it's early days, literally early days.

the prime minister designate al abadi set out looks like a sensible program. and all the right noises are being made by all the relevant people. on the other side of the occasion, it's fair to observe that a lot of the names in the government were nams that have been around the) scene for a long time. there's not a lot of fresh blood. so, we will have to wait and see the level of demonstrated commitment to the program that's been set out. if the program is delivered, it will represent, i think, significant progress. and i should also say that the role of president in the krg has been significant. clearly, it's very important the krg are supportive of the formation of this government and

have focused attention on the need to build an inclusive iraqi government to push back isil over and above genders about kurdish separatism, which were perhaps to the fore a few months ago. in terms of tribes, i think there's less sunni tribal buy in than they would like at this stage, but i think we've always recognized that it's going to take more than simply standing up a government in baghdad for the sunni tribes that have aligned themselves with isil to switch back. they're going to need to see a sustained outreach that reflects their long-standing and justified grievances about the way their interests have been ignored by the previous regime. and i think only by doing that over the long term will mr. al abadi succeed in gradually weaning them away from isil.

>> presumably, just on that, our level of support and commitment and that of the u.s. will be conditional on president al abadi demonstrating he can bring people together and move in the right direction, or at least -- >> i don't see this as conditionality in terms of a lever that we're using to try to dictate the behavior of a sovereign government. i see it much more in terms of an analysis by us and certainly by the united states. that this can only work if there's a credible iraqi government, credible iraqi security forces on the ground. if there isn't, much as we might like to intervene, there isn't a sensible intervention that's likely to be effective that we could pursue. >> moving on to the position of iran and assad, clearly iran is a major player in iraq, a major

influence over what happens in terms of government formation in baghdad. with the uk government under any circumstances talk directly to assad or to iran to influence what happens over the operation of isil in syria? >> as you know, we're in the process of re-establishing an embassy in tehran. we hope that over the coming months we will find that we are increasingly able to engage in a wide range of discussions with the iranians. as countries that have diplomatic relations do. the situation with the assad regime is very different. we don't recognize them. they have lost all legitimacy as a result of their treatment -- barbaric treatment of their own

population, which is -- cannot be excused. in my opinion would be inappropriate and counterproductive to talk about engaging with the assad regime. it's partly the brutality of the assad regime that has driven recruits into the arms of isil. >> i'm sure the iranians will hear that message loud and clear from you. my final question, mr. chairman. is it uk policy the islamic state, whether in iraq or syria, must be destroyed totally, or would containment as a strategy be on the table? >> i'm glad you've asked me that question because i heard the u.s. secretary of state saying very clearly on friday, and it's my view as well, that there is no compromise. there is no containment

strategy. there's no co-existence with an ideology like isil. it has to be a strategy to crush the ideology to, to delegitimize it, cut it off from its support and resource and to see it wiped out. >>. >> thank you very much. >> john brown. i apologize to some guests for not welcoming you when you came into the committee. >> following up from your last answer, the logical consequence of that, the pentagon believes this, one has to take on isis in syria if one is going to destroy it. do you accept there's a much higher risk intervening military from the west's point of view in syria than there is in the more limited objective of driving isis out of northern iraq if only because of the syrian air defenses? if only because it's a

fast-moving fluid situation in syria that you're never sure who's going to take extremist's place they've morphed into and they lurk in the shadows. what is your assessment? >> yes, i agree with that. i think whilst the strategy, always talk about the need to talk about this as a single theater because isis sees it as a single theater. the legal military practical, technical, culture differences between iraq and syria are very significant. we're dealing with very differentup÷ situations. >>. >> i can move us on to the coalition of the willing, whinu quite rightly, i think, london and washington's view is that we need a sort of regional coalition to take on isis? the idea that you can just defeat isis from the air, we all accept that. you can't defeat them.

it needs troops on the ground. i think there's the perceived thinking which many of us would support that it shouldn't be western troops. the symbolism of the west taking on and defeating this caliphate would be too strong and the consequences too great. but what exactly should be the military role of this coalition, this regional coalition? fostering a regional coalition is one thing but actually defining the extent to which they intervene is quite another. >> of course, we can sit here in this room and postulate all shapes of coalition. it depends on what they're willing and willing to do. secretaries hagel and kerry aexploring in the region right now this week what people might be willing to do. but i think it's possible to envision a situation where with iraqi forces, including kurdish

peshmerga in the states, there might be countries willing to contribute some level of ground support in support of those iraqi forces. perhaps specialist troops on the ground in country training, specialist advice, which would be more directly engaged than what it was for western countries to looking at being able to do. >> secretary, what about the -- what is the foreign office going to do -- planning to do to address the questions of many of us? many allies in the region have been facilitating the rise of islamic militias in iraq and syria, and perhaps some have been harboring extremists within their own country and perhaps even funding them. what is the foreign office going to do about this? how is that problem going to be addressed when trying to put

this regional coalition together? >> i think we are very clear with our allies, whatever attitude people have taken to different groups, different stages of their evolution in the past, there is no tolerance now for any support for isil or any of the organizations associated with it. we sponsored the u.n. security council resolution directed at trying to cut off financial and other support to isil. and i'm comfortable that the countries that we're in dialogue with are now clear about their official position. that is not to say that some of them won't still harbor individuals -- private individuals who may have different sympathies. we will look to them to work with us in implementing the

usncr to make sure financial flows to isil are cut off. having said that, isil is now an organization with significant wealth of its own and sources of income from kidnapping, extortion, taxation, oil revenues, which make it far less vulnerable to interruption of donations. >> if i may. if one looks at the name of the sta sta stage, the skaud islamic stage, the road to that would lie through most of the arab capitals. so, they have the biggest interest of anybody, in a sense, of ensuring the islamic state does not achieve what it says on the tin. for example, saudi arabia has made it illegal with some very heavy penalties, not just to be

a member of isis, but to fund them. that's one of the issues in the past. i think there may be a distinction between governments in the past where they have been clear and individuals in the past who have got nothing to do with governments. and that one of the main concerns of governments now is to ensure all of their citizens are very clearly targeted at -- >> do you think there is a general reawakening about the threat -- the threat and the need to respond to it? we saw egypt and the uae conduct strikes in libya against extremists. how far is this going to go? any thoughts about ensuring it's for good rather than, perhaps, potentially bad? >> i think saudi arabia last week arrested nearly 90 members

of a cell. they wound up a couple of other cells. they're very clearly taking action. equally that we understand that there is addition that not every organization in the region which has an islamist tendency is charged with being isil. >> thank you. >> i was very unclear over the last few weeks exactly who was doing what. now, it seemed a lot of responsibility was being put on the peshmerga. i think the size of the peshmerga is very relevant. the state of its forces, the armaments they have, and yet we're continually talking about their peshmerga as if they were going to solve the whole problem. have you made a fresh assessment

of their capability? >> i don't think we've ever thought the peshmerga could solve it. they're holding the line, doing it with compassion and conviction, as you would expect. but isil has many other targets where the peshmerga will not be the answer, clearly as they were advancing south to the baghdad. the burden fell on the formal iraqi security forces in syria. they're in conflict with other groups. so, the peshmerga happened to be in the front line at the point where this conflict came to the attention of the world. and it was the kurds who were holding the line against isil. they will remain an important part of that line. certainly not the whole solution.

>> you talked about arming peshmerga. the arms have gone to baghdad first. are they then distributed to peshmerga? is there equal distribution between the various parties? >> as i understand it, the shipments made so far have gone into baghdad for inspection. recognizing sovereign control of the government in baghdad and then have moved on in -- the shipments we made have moved on in an aircraft where they've been unloaded. and we are attempting to ensure the distribution of the supplies we've made is broadly spread among the different groups to avoid any suggestion that there's any favoritism between groups because there clearly isn't, as far as we're concerned.

>> can i say you to mt. sinjar because there was a lot of publicity surrounding mt. sinjar. there was a report in "the guardian" a few weeks ago -- >> i don't read it. >> -- which suggested the crisis in mt. sinjar clearlyv@vú8@v0 over. we have taken for granted that the civilians by the u.s. suddenly withdrew, it seemed to me, from mt. sinjar because they said there were only a small number left. was that accurate? do we know exactly what the state of play is now? are people still not able to get off the mountain without assistance? >> i think it was accurate. these situations are difficult to assess in the heat of the moment.

and the humanitarian organizations were preparing for, quite rightly, large numbers of people trapped on the mountain. i think a combination of overestimate of the number of people there originally. the fact that people are intrinsically resourceful, night after night numbers of people were getting themselves off the mountain and the involvement of peshmerga forces in rescuing groups of people to syrian kurdish forces in rescuing people from the mountain, it became clear later on in the process they were a far smaller number than we thought and the best way of getting them off was to reinforce the land routes that had already become established. we are confident now that there is nobody stranded on mt. sinjar

who is trapped there. that isn't to say it's a perfectly peaceful situation there. there are isil forces still around the mountain. but we're confident that people who want to move off the mountain can do. we should remember there are significant numbers of people in that region who are displaced from the period of the exodus from mt. sinjar and before it and they remain displaced. so, still a major humanitarian problem in the area. >> now, the groups of peshmerga, syria from turkey, also assisted in the relief of some of those people trapped on mt. sinjar, they include the pkk, which is

still a prescribed terrorist organization in this country. and they're obviously key to continuing the fight against isis. are we going to deprescribe them, or whatever the word is, or can they count as no longer a terrorist organization? >> well, that, of course, will be a matter for the home secretary to consider. and she will do so on the basis of the evidence about their engagement in terrorist activities. it is not the case that simply because a terrorist organization carries out an act of humanitarian kindness, it will be -- it ceases to be a terrorist organization. i make no comment about the particular case but the process the home secretary will follow will be to look at the evidence of any given organizations,

continued linked with terrorist activities, regardless of what else they're doing. >> will you make a recommendation or leave it completely to the home secretary without recommendation? >> that's a matter for the home secretary. she hasn't yet asked me for a view. if she does, i will give her one. >> what do you think the international community should do to protect iraqi minorities? clearly, the persecution of christians, turkimen and so on in iraq continues. what do you think the international community should do? should there be a safe haven in the north or -- >> and women, of course. not just ethnic minorities, but gender discrimination as well. clearly, the first thing we should do is collaborate together to develop a coherent and credible strategy to push back isil and then to defeat

it's abhor rent ideology which is the root cause of this problem in a land where arabs, christians, jews have lived together in relative harmony for hundreds and hundreds if not thousands of years. of course we must support the humanitarian effort for the displaced people. 400,000 in kirkuk alone, estimated. that's the short term. it's not the long-term solution. the long-term solution is inclusive government in iraq with a constitution that respects in letter the rights of minorities across the country. >> can i ask you about the yazidi women. i have raised it on the floor of

house. we had the conference in london where the foreign secretary hosted. international conference. it talked about the way that women are very often treated in war conditions. and then we have the yazidi women. many of them were captured. i don't know the numbers now. i think around 3,000. suddenly we are reports, they were sold into slavery. and into the brothels of the middle east. i just wonder, are we trying to find them, trying to help the nigerian school girls, 700 of them? we're talking about 3,000 adult women. what has happened to those. >> i can't answer the question what has happened to them.

the way they were reported as treated is shocking. this is idea logically planned abuse of women. it's part of the ideology of isil, what is being done here. that's what makes it particularly shocking. i don't know if either of my colleagues know anything specific about -- i'm not aware of any operation that's currently going on to track and seek to identify the location of these women. that would probably be very difficult to do, given the circumstances prevailing on the ground. but bear in mind, there are hundreds of thousands probably in total a million or more displaced people moving around the region. it would be very difficult to track individuals, i suspect. >> is this not something our

special forces could do? >> i think i repeat what i just said. it would probably be very, very difficult to do. these -- i suspect will not be a group of people held as a group. they'll be dispersed. it isn't dish this isn't a law enforcement task, which requires specialist skills. and it's not skills that would particularly be held in special forces either in the uk or elsewhere. >> let's return us briefly to practical measures of combating isil on the ground. first of all, we've thrown our weight behind the kurds on the front line in iraq. has the foreign office given any consideration to assisting the kurds in syria? >> i don't think we're doing

anything directly with the kurds. >> we will be talking to the -- to their political representatives, in fact, tomorrow to follow up, in fact, on the role they had on mt. sinjar and helping to get so many people off. i make a very clear distinction between the political wing of the syrian kurds and the military wing. but the main focus of our attention has clearly been on the iraqi kurds to this point. >> i return to the narrow objective of removing isis from iraq. a number of measures have been introduced, but isn't not the elephant in the room the iraqi army itself?

numbering something to 250,000 men. which has been poorly, perhaps, led and structured but needs drastic improvement, but that's the answer when it comes to ground forces in northern iraq, isn't it? can you give us your view on that, perhaps a time scale as to when you would expect the army to be in shape and be able to take these extremists on? sflooing the peshmerga is led and lacking in weapons. iraqi security is demoralized, very badly led, badly structured, but are well equipped with american weaponry. that's why there hasn't been a discussion about equipping the iraqi security forces. i think we see this, and i think the like-minded group of countries share this view, as a

process that has to be taken step by step. step one is the creation of an inclusive and credible iraqi government in baghdad, which begins immediately to reach out to kurdish and sunni communities within iraq with a program that recognizes the long-standing tensions about sharing of resource and levels of autonomy. as soon as that is in place, we need to see a program of support for the restructuring, reconfiguration better to reflect the ethnic balance within the country of the iraqi security forces and i suspect a element of retraining and technical advice and support will be required. now, one of the issues i'm sure secretary hagel and secretary

kerry will be discussing in the gulf this week is appetite among countries in the region to provide in the short term some of that hands-on training and technical advice. >> very briefly, you're absolutely right. it's got to be a political solution in the end. but the way you word it, it sounds to me as though the politics -- the timetable is the politics first and the army second. >> politics first. >> one can understand that to a certain extent but that time scale may be months before we actually even, you know, get the iraqi army to address this -- these extremists. am i right? >>, no i don't think so. the announcement an iraqi government has been formed means we can move quickly to begin to put together a package of support for the institutions of the legitimate iraqi government, including the iraqi security

forces. clearly there's an implicit pardon here that countries in the region, countries in the west put packages of support for this government together, they will be doing it on the basis of the program the government has publicly set out. and if that proves not to be delivered, that would be a major setback because that program of outreach to sunnis in particular is essential if any of this is to work. simply retraining, restructuring iraqi security forces while leaving the grievances of the sunni population unaddressed, is not formula for successful pushing back of isil. >> thank you. >> a number of commentators have spoke about a more decentralized

federal iraq. do you envision that happening at all? is it plan "b"? >> i thought you were asking if it was plan "a"? i think as i read mr. al abadi's program is has a significant degree of decentralization within the territory of iraq. and i sharing of revenues in a way that addresses some of those underlying grievances. but i think it's very important that we are clear that it is not for us to define the internal structures of government in iraq. that has to be something the people of iraq have to do. our advice to the iraqi government would be that unless they are able to do that with broad-based buy-in with communities across iraq, it will be much more difficult for

regional countries of the west to support the iraqi government and, thus, much more difficult for it to overcome the insurgency it's facing from isil. >> thank you. can i -- i beg your pardon. >> thank you. secretary, a few minutes ago you referred to shipments we have made to the kurdistan region vi÷ baghdad. presumably that was of weaponry supplied by other countries. >> that -- >> so far, we've made nonlethal shipments of our own equipment and we've also made shipments of ammunition supplied by albania. >> yesterday, the prime minister told me during his statement that the government was now prepared to directly supply weaponry itself as opposed to from other countries. can you tell us when that is going to start ask what kind of weaponry that is likely to number.

>> i can tell you that the defense secretary has today laid a departmental minute gifting to government of iraq, including kurdish regional government. the initial package is scheduled to arrive in iraq tomorrow and will consist of heavy machine guns and ammunition with a value of about -- just over 2 million pounds delivered, value. >> that's going to the kurdistan region, is it? >> that is going to go to the kurdistan region. >> thank you. >> foreign secretary, can we move on now to russia and ukraine. you said last week that russia had, and i quote you, chosen the role of pariah rather than partner and rejected efforts to draw themselves into the rules-based international system. does that have any impact on our diplomatic approach to russia?

>> i don't personally believe in dissemeling. it's very clear russia has had the option of being in a partnership relationship with the west. indeed, that's been our strong preference and desire for the last 20 -- nearly 25 years, since the end of the cold war. to draw russia into the community of nations, to have a partnership with russia recognizing that we won't agree on anything and we have strategic differences of outlook. but we -- in a sincere belief, we are able to work constructively together as partners. russia has shown by its actions it rejects that notion. rejects that notion of partnership. and i chose the word pariah quite deliberately. we have a long established taboo in europe on changing the

boundaries of nation states by force of arms. that's not the way we do things. and russia has shown itself completely oblivious to that established convention/rule, and willing to use force to pursue what it sees as its immediate short-term interest in a way that is rejected by, i believe, every other state in europe. >> foreign secretary, the chronology of russian territory as we know is that it carried out de facto in moldova, followed by georgia, followed by the annexation of crimea in ukraine. >> do you agree that's the territorial objective of

mr. putin now, to carry out a further territorial annexation de facto of the eastern part of ukraine? >> i don't think we know that. i don't think there's any evidence that that is the plan. there's plenty of speculation about this, but i think it is probably the case that mr. putin will have expected a stronger, popular rising in support of the separatist movement than actually occurred in the dombask region. when these events began to unfold. and i don't think we know enough to say whether his current strategy is on annexation or not. certainly the words of the most recent agreement would point

strongly away from that outcome. >> leaving aside for the moment as to how you judge what is the territorial objective now of the russian government in ukraine, how do you respond to the criticism that has been made that the british government has done nothing enough and, indeed, the american government, and, indeed, other governments have done nothing like enough to bring home to mr. putin that the continuation of military de facto annexation violating the boundaries of sovereign states is both unacceptable and also retilent of the most extreme dangers and to bring home to mr. putin that if he thinks he can carry out a similar policy

of de facto annexation of parts or possibly the whole of the territories of one or more of the baltic states, he could precipitate the horrors of world war iii. >> i don't have to respond to criticism of the united states or any other country, but i'll respond to criticism of the uk government. i think we have responded in a measured and sensible way to an outrageous provocation. we've stood by the people of the ukraine. we have been at the forefront of the implementation of measures within the european union, within nato to provide reassurance, to eastern states of nato and to impose economic

sanctions on russia. i think these measures are more effective for having been imposed by the whole of the european union and in the case of the reassurance measures, having been delivered and supported by the whole of nato than they would have been if we had taken within europe a series of bilateral actions, but acting 28 means we have to be pragmatic about how fast and how far we can go. we have to take everybody with us. my judgment is that the level of response that we've delivered, deliver 28 in both nato and eu, is sending an effective message and is delivering a far more effective message than would have been delivered by, perhaps, a stronger response but delivered only bilaterally.

>> foreign secretary, can i ask your assessment as to whether we have the right -- or have had the right balance in our dealings with russia? i think we agree it's important to stand up to the bully on the playground. and i think belatedly some of our neighbors and allies are waking up to that fact. but we could also argue we ourselves are sometimes traded cheaply when coming to -- when dealing with russia. for example, perhaps not leaning on them enough when it came to russia's intimidation on georgia in hopes we could secure their allegiance or certainly help when it came to iraq. what's your take on that going forward? what lessons do you think we can learn? >> well, the first and most obvious lesson is hindsight is a wonderful thing. we can all now ask whether we

were, perhaps, being naive about the type of relationship that we could have with putin's russia. i do think we need to distinguish different things here. there are areas where self-interest means that russia will continue to work cooperatively with the west, where we have an alignment of interests in relation to third countries or problems in other parts of the world where i would expect that work the difficulties we have, we will continue to pursue a course of action, which is in our mutual best interest. with the benefit of hindsight, of course it's possible to say perhaps we should have woken up to what's going on -- what now appears to be going on earlier in the process. perhaps we should have paid more attention to mr. putin's

rhetoric around the collapse of the soviet union, being the greatest disaster of 20th century history. perhaps, we should have all read his doctoral thesis a little more closely where he sets out his view that energy politics can be a lever of state power. but all of these are, with the benefit of hindsight. what we've spent much of the last 25 years doing is genuinely and sincerely trying to draw russia by stages into the international community. and i think one stage we all felt that was being pretty successful. that russia was becoming normalized, if you like, learning to play by the rules, becoming increasingly engaged in the international economy, and increasingly a country we could do business with. now, i think we should also emphasize that we have no dispute with the russian people.

when you and i were growing up, the russian people were a mystery to us. now, everybody knows plenty of russian people that live in london and across europe, people visit russia, do business in russia. it's no longer the great mystery it was. we have no dispute with the russian people. but we do have a disagreement with mr. putin's view of the world. more particularly, with his ideas about what is acceptable in going about achieving his objectiv objectives. >> one more moment that you should be reading the doctora s doctorates, but perhaps those in your department should be reading them. that leads me to my next question. what has contributed to us underestimating the risk here? tony bratton, quote, british diplomacy toward russia and elsewhere has suffered because of a loss of language skills, particularly in the foreign

office. now, we know we've reopened the language school. that's been good. but the sort of general feeling we're not committing or have not committed enough resource to eastern europe and russia, is that your take on things? do we need to invest now more on the issue in front of us? >> i think we are reenvesting in russia and eastern europe as our gaze refocuses there. but there is no doubt this is well ready to well-trodden ground. russia disengaged from large parts of the world. my predecessor spent a lot of time and energy rebuilding that engagement with the world. that is included, making investment, for example, in language capacity. i just checked this figure before i came in here.

we have 156 fc-0 personnel who are registered as having russian language skills. that's probably fewer than we would like, but a lot more than we would have at the bottom of the curve. >> can i suggest to you, i'm sure you're not just saying this, it's not about language skills. >> of course not. >> it's about a fundamental understanding of the region, the peoples, so forth. what many of us on the committee are concerned about is over the recent decades there's been a sort of promotion of skills favored by management consultants at the expense of more traditional skills. when about, for example, understanding regions, their peoples, et cetera, which help us to increase our understanding of the problems at large. i mean, would you accept that? and can you be more specific as to what extra resource you're putting into this? it's all right saying, we're putting extra resource but that's a vague statement.

>> with the benefit of hindsight, of course, we would like to have more russia and east europe focused resource. but i think if you look at how we have managed diplomatic footprints over the last decade or so and look at how some of our other major allies have done it, we have degraded our russia capability rather less than some of our allies have done. i'm going to ask mr. simon to comment on this. >> i would just like to add, i think we can sort of overemphasize that. if you look at our ambassador in moscow, for example, ambassador in kazakhstan or ambassador in ukraine and a number of other places, they're absolutely steeped in soviet union. they have experts. they speak russian, ambassador in ukraine, our ambassador in kazakhstan. that's the thought process. i don't resist the notion that our expertise in this area is

not what it was in 1990 but, of course, the fact that you mention eastern europe along with russia tells part of the story. in that in the 1980s we had a much bigger pool. if pull. had you to think soft soft black. if you were in european countries, that is what you would spend a lot of time thinking about. >> briefly. i accept that expertise is there.j but the fact is, we fundamentally misunderstood, did not read the intention behind president putin's stated objections. why did we get it wrong? >> i think to be fair, british governments have been more transactional with russia than the idea we believed in a community of value. they were playing a different role on the world stage where in cases of our interests collided. there was a pretty clear indication of the way in which

these things can evolve and the measures which the then government took in response to that. i would resist the notion that we have been completely naive about russia. i don't think that is accurate. >> i think this is a comparative game. if you look across europe at how different countries have handled their relationship with russia, i think with the benefit of hindsight, we have done rather better than some. >> thank you very much. >> how is the founding gap on mutual cooperation and security between nato and the russian federation lost its relevance? should it be repealed? should restraints on the location of nato troops be listed? >> first of all, the russians have clearly breached the founding act. in our judgment, the reassurance measures that we wish to take

can be delivered without breeching the restrictions in the founding act on the permanent basing of substantial troop formations in the new member countries. >> is there any reason why we shouldn't-ssso#oxgrñyñiçó reach? >> the first is that from a purelyj0çyom>h#x[j[f]rçe3ç=-d looking at what we want to do, the efficient utilization of military forces, it is to rotate relatively small numbers of troops through for training purposes to create preposition stocks of equipment for deployment hubs that we would deploy to in an emergency. all of these things can be done within the restrictions of the founding act and the judgment that we have made is that if there is no practical need to breach the restrictions in the founding act, there is value in

maintaining the moral high ground and continuing to observe the rules-based system that the founding act put in place and to continue to remind the russians that they have breached it. >> speaking about the reaction force and what was discussed at the nato summit. >> the reassurance measures including the rapid reaction force, spearhead forces and the way they will operate in eastern europe. there are no nato members, certainly not the uk, not the united states who wish to position significant number of troops on a static basis in eastern europe. that wouldn't fit with the model we have of the way we train and use our forces to be highly mobile, highly flexible forces. it's a cold war type model. it doesn't fit the way we do things anymore.

>> okay. there is some sentiment among fellow states as to whether article 5 could have been inv e invoked with crimea. as a result of russian involvement, if ukraine had been a nato member, things like cyber attack, economic destabilization, psychological warfare, use of volunteers, use of retired troops and soldiers suddenly getting lost in eastern ukraine. i mean, a lot of what russia has done couldn't be pinned down to article 5. and had ukraine been latvia, it could have been a different situation. >> ukraine is not, of course, a nato member. therefore, article 5 does not apply and never at any time has come into the equation. the baltic states are nato

members. they benefit from the collective security guarantee that article 5 offers. you are, of course, right and i have sat in discussing the challenges that emerge i emerging technologies like cyber present to the definition -- the various legal definitions involved around war fighting and military operations. and in many countries, including the uk, there is an active debate going on about how to address cyber in particular but also the other areas you mentioned in the context of where the boundary lines are drown in it the international legal system which governs permission responded to aggression. >> we need a bit more than

debate. if president putin can say over the phone, i can be in kiev in two weeks, i'm sure he could be in latvia within four or five, even six weeks. now, some of these techniques may be used prior to an entry into latvia or lithuania. don't we need a reappraisal of article 5 to stop what we have seen in ukraine? >> we don't need any reappraisal of article 5 at all. what we do have to do though -- this won't be the first time we have done it. as military technology, the technology of war changes, we need to keep our thinking up to date. this is true in any field, any legal field. the legal thinking has to keep pace with the reality of the technology. we have a whole new domain of warfare now called cyber which didn't exist a decade, perhaps

even half a decade ago. there is a process that is under way of thinking through how these different legal doctrines apply in the domain of cyber. >> you speak about the domain of cyber, which i think is considerably more clearcut. but i mention psychological, economic, use of volunteers, you know, retired soldiers. these are gray areas -- >> they are gray area. this kind of what the russians call hybrid warfare is a challenge to us. and one -- again, i'm rehashing territory that i covered in my former role. one of the challenges for the west, nato, is that we are a grouping of democratic and open societies. we can't do deniable warfare

proxy wars, veterans fighting campaigns. we cannot do that kind of thing. we have to find a different way to respond to the tools that russia is using. russia is using its relative advantages. one of the advantages it has is that it can do non-transparent stuff. we have to use -- >> that's what i'm saying. what are we going to do about it? >> we have to use the strengths we have. we have demonstrated them in respect of the ukraine. our big comparative strength is the resilience of our collective economy in the west, which is far stronger, far bigger, far more resilient than the russian economy, which suffers from significant structural weaknesses. >> will it stop the annexation of ukraine. >> we don't have enough evidence

of whether that is an objective of the kremlin or not. but i can confidently say that we have an asymmetric capability in the application of economic and particularly financial sanctions where russia is not able to respond in a symmetrical way because of the different in structural strength and size of our economies. >> while we're talking about article 5, could you give us an update what is going on in astonia? >> we are in touch with our colleagues. there is little more to tell than what has already been published on the news media. an astonian official remains in custody in russia. they are continuing to negotiate, discuss with the

russians to seek to get him released and returned to their custody. >> militias came over in the border in the way they had done in ukraine, might that invoke article 5? >> article 5 would allow a member state to call upon the other member states under article 5 if there were a military threat to its territory. as i have indicated in my answer to the last set of questions, there will, of course, be a large number of lawyers pouring over the specific circumstances of any particular threat to identify whether or not it meets the criteria for triggering article 5. >> nato summit last week there was discussions about