released and returned to their custody. >> militias came over in the border in the way they had done in ukraine, might that invoke article 5? >> article 5 would allow a member state to call upon the other member states under article 5 if there were a military threat to its territory. as i have indicated in my answer to the last set of questions, there will, of course, be a large number of lawyers pouring over the specific circumstances of any particular threat to identify whether or not it meets the criteria for triggering article 5. >> nato summit last week there was discussions about arming --

providing weaponry to it the ukrainian government. the prime minister's statement yesterday mentioned that some nato partners were providing weaponry to ukraine. and i saw a list of five or six countries. the uk was not amongst them. why not? >> the uk doesn't believe that there can be a military solution to the conflict in the ukraine. ukrainian forces mad s made significant gains over a period of weeks after the incident. but we saw over the last two weeks that russia will not allow those gains to stand and that they were merely met with a response of further illegal incursion by formed russian units. we don't want to encourage the ukrainians to believe that there can be a military solution to this conflict.

>> other nato partners, norway, the united states, france, i think, other countries clearly take a different view. >> this is a bilateral issue. this is not a nato decision. it's a bilateral decision. the uk takes the view that it would not be able to supply military equipment given our own very stringent export controls on military equipment in the current circumstances. it's a conflict. >> other eu member states are taking part in this. >> i'm aware of other eu member states who are certainly talking about the possibility of supplying equipment to the ukrainian armed forces. i think we should distinguish between the supply of equipment immediately during the period of conflict and discussions about supply contracts that would

take -- where delivery would take point at some point in the future. >> why has it taken us so long and proved so difficult to get agreement within the european union on effective sanctions and action against russia over ukraine? >> well, i'm not an experienced hand at eu negotiation, coming new to this. those that are tell me this has been a lightning speed response. the eu particularly galvanized has moved swiftly to impose sanctions stronger and more effective than many were predicting. i think the signals as we read them far stronger and more effective than the kremlin ever expected. >> isn't it the case though that several european countries have

said that they would be shooting themselves in the foot, to quote the hungarian minister, to bring in sanctions against russia because of dependence on gas and oil and trade with russia? and on the other hand, we ourselves have got our people in london with money in the bank accounts. >> of course, you can't impose economic sanctions without inflicting some pain on yourself. we have been up front about that from the beginning, that it will cause some pain. the financial sanctions in particular will impose some cost on the financial markets in london. different eu countries have a different tolerance level for absorbing that pain. but i think you've also put your finger on a very important

strategic point. i think both sides have learned a lesson over the last few weeks. europe has been reminded of how vulnerable it is in certain areas to russia, particularly in terms of energy supply. and there is a lot of talk at the moment about the need as a4ú agenda, not over the next weeks or months or even couple of years but over a decade or more to have a clear and effective program to reduce our dependence on -- our collective dependence on russia as a supplier of energy. but also it is clear that the russians have been taken aback by their dependence on western economic systems, in particular things like our payment cle

clearance systems. they have resolved in the heat of the moment to invest whatever it takes to reduce their dependence on the west -- their economic dependence on the west in the future. i think we have both been reminded of that interdependence. certainly, i would advocate that the eu should as an important strategic agenda seek to reduce dependence of eu countries on russian gas. not because we don't want to buy russian gas but because at the moment we have a dangerous over dependence on a single source of supply that could be disrupted by design but could also be disrupted by technical problems or some other event happening within russia. >> are there any lessons to be learned both by european union and by our own government about the way the issue of the handling of relations with

ukraine over the eu association agreement developed last year and an under estimation of the hostility of the russian putin administration towards not just ukraine signing the association but prior to that his effective scupering. wasn't that a warning we could have taken on board at that time? >> i think it's important that we put this in context. these negotiations started six, seven years ago. russia didn't raise objections to them at the time when yanukovich was in control at ukraine. we got right to the point where he was contemplating signing an agreement with the eu when

events began to spiral. so i think it would be wrong to see this as the west having failed -- europe having failed to read signals. i don't think russia was sending any signals for the first six years. >> isn't it true in 2013, they made enormous efforts by offering lots of money to armenia, so the president would change their position over within weekend in september without even consulting his government or his parliament and did the same pressure and arrangement with ukraine? >> yes. >> wasn't that clearly something that happened with regard to putin's attitude? what was that? >> yes. but i don't know what it was. i'm afraid i don't control or have access to what goes on in mr. putin's mind. >> would you like to speculate as to why the russians took this position? >> what i would say is this. the eu entered in good faith

into negotiations with the ukraine over a long period of time. this wasn't some rushed deal to try and spite the russians. it was a long negotiation. russia did not raise objections while its man was in control in kiev. and i think we have got to be very careful about any suggestion that we would allow russia a veto over the relationships which sovereign independent countries want to negotiate with a block like the eu. >> i was going to add, of course, it came as well a surprise to the president who was very close to moscow e. didn't expect that degree of existence because he was coming and expecting to sign the agreement. >> would you like to tell us why you think the russians took this view?

>> the only logic is that they saw -- the russians expected to be able to control the situation by one means or another when they sensed perhaps that they were losing the lever of control that they thought they had through the regime in kiev, they became more concerned about the agreement being signed. we can only speculate. >> it may also be, of course, that president putin didn't actually think that we were going to get a signature out of ukraine. you may remember at that time there was talk of conditionality of different types on ukraine. part of the question was was the european union prepared to sign the association agreement with ukraine because of the various conditionality. possibly. >> thank you. >> can i bring you back to

nato's response and the nature of it? there's been a lot of talk about defense spending, 2% and so forth. do you think nato needs to address another issue in that it needs to be able to have sort of comprehensive response to sort the tactics we have seen by russia when it comes to militias? i'm not sure nato has thought this through. in answering that question, also if you don't mind, have absolute clarity, if similar tactics were used in astonia by the russians, what we have seen in the ukraine and they tried to revoke article 5, would we stand by that? >> article 5 is very clear. if an armed attack took place -- >> by militias. >> that isn't what's happened in the ukraine. we have seen formed russian units pouring over the border. that's been very clear in the final stage that was campaign.

but article 5 itself is clear. but clearly, there is a question -- i think i've already addressed this. and i've certainly explored it with the defense committee before. there is a question about where you draw that line in international law that permits a military response. we're not just talking about article 5 here. we're talking about a broader question about what kind of attack on a state constitutes armed aggression that entitles the victim to make a military response. that's a debate which is happening here. it's happening in the united states. it's happening in various forms around the world. i would reject the idea that nato isn't thinking about this. i've raised it at least at the last three nato defense ministers meetings that i have

been at. it is increasingly on the radar, driven by cyber, have i to say, because of the awareness that a major cyber attack can have a very destabilizing affect on a nation not dissimilar to a limited air strike. but as yet, we don't have a clear and internationally accepted answer to the question. i suspect that the nations of the world will have to define in the cyber domain what constitutes an armed attack that justifies a military response at some point in the future. >> meeting adjourned until 5:03. we still have a lot of questions to ask. the foreign secretary only has 25 minutes left. we may have to cut out a chunk.

i will actually have a look at that as we get going. if you could be brief with your questions. perhaps, you could be focused in your answer. we'll move to libya. i give the floor to john baron. >> it looks as if we have in libya, most emb embassies are b closed. it's got to the point where the libyan parliament is taking refuge in a greek car ferry. we have had a call from -- very recently, last month from the house of representatives for a new foreigna@÷$ intervention to protect libya's civiliannñ population from militia, casualties going through the roof. do you think libya is at a breaking point? would the west countenance their

request? >> what is the last part of that question? >> is libya at breaking point? would the west countenance the house of representative's request for a further intervention to protect libya's civilian population. >> i don't think i would use the term breaking point. but the situation is very difficult on the ground. if anything, the evidence suggests that positions between the different groups are becoming more entrenched. i'm going to, if i may, invite mr. simon to update the committee on a conversation that he has just had with jonathan powell, the prime minister's special envoy who is just back from libya. that might be helpful. >> jonathan powell and the ambassador to libya visited the country just a very few days ago. really looking to see what the scope was for trying to arrive at some sort of political agreement between the various parties.

of course, i won't for a moment under estimate the difficulty of this. there was some elements which suggested the situation was grave, clearly. there are possibilities there of the fighting is probably not as bad as it was some while ago. it has died down in most parts of the country for now. it could resurrect itself. and one of the side effects probably of the fighting has been that there has been more or less a coalescing. rather than negotiate with different tribes and groups, there are probably more like two main parties with whom to negotiate, as you say. so it is clearly a very

difficult situation. but there are some prospects by which a political process could be arrived at. >> the uae, courtesy of egypt was a development. do you welcome that development? do you see dangers from it? foreign secretary? >> i think we're always cautious about interventions of this nature. it seems to have been a limited intervention. but it was clearly partisan whereas our approach is to try to bring the different parties together and impress upon them the need for an inclusive about solution that allow the tribes

in libya to coexist peacefully and to share in what could be quite a significant prosperity. >> those of us who oppose the intervention -- >> sorry. >> do you think we have made the same mistakes as we did in iraq in 2003 when we failed to plan for what happens after military intervention? >> well, the intervention in libya was made in response to an immediate pending humanitarian disaster. i think the intervention was right. it saved many lives. we were clear it was going to be limited. it was not going to be boots on the ground, and there were no boots on the ground. it was strictly limited in its scope. we're often urged when we do

things to make sure that the objectives are very clearly defined and there isn't any mission creep. i think the libya campaign is an example of doing just that, defining the limits of what we were prepared to do, doing it and completing it. but, of course, that has meant that the final resolution of the post ghadafi is still a matter of dispute on the ground. >> you wouldn't argue that we have abandoned libya to its fate? >> no. we haven't abandoned it. we're very much engaged with libya. we're training libyan troops -- government troops here in the uk at the moment. we have a prime minister special envoy who as you have heard was in libya last week seeking to broker some kind of agreement

between the principal protagonists in this battle. we haven't abandoned libya. we recognize that libya and libya's stability is quite important to us, not least in terms of libya's role as a route for flowing ofv3]rv+dp migrants southern europe which have an impact on us in the uk. >> thank you. >> can i move the subject on to gaza and israel and palestine? how would you characterize the uk he's ro uk's role in introducing the cease-fire? what steps did we take to facilitate it? >> well, obviously we welcomed the cease-fire. and it wasn't the first one, of course. we have been actively engaged in urging the parties to these

talks to agree a cease-fire as a necessary first step. certainly not in itself sufficient but a necessary first step. we haven't been direct participants in the cease-fire negotiations, but we have been strongly encouraging of the government. i visited egypt very shortly after i was appointed and met with the foreign minister and the president to urge them to leave no stone unturned in bringing the parties to a cease-fire. and we continue to engage with both directly with the parties and indirectly with others who can influence them to try to ensure that out of this cease-fire that has now held for -- what? just over a week -- nearly two

weeks. we get a substantive and meaningful negotiation which leads to measurable, delivered improvements for ordinary gaza people trying to go about their business. an easing of restriction, increase flow of aid, a resolution of fishing rights and payment of civil service salaries and so on. it will lead to the reintroduction of the palestinian authority into gaza which we regard as a crucial next step to allowing matters to develop further. >> as you are very well aware, the policy of the government towards gaza has been very controversial. your former colleague said it was morally indefensible and the

deputy prime minister said the policy -- the uk's response has risked damage to our reputation in the region. what's your response to those comments? >> i mean, i clearly -- deputy prime minister said we risked damage. he was making a statement of the obvious. of course, whenever we take a position we risk our reputation in some sense. but we are very clear that the resolution to the problem in gaza has to be through a cease-fire, noegotiations aroun improving the situation in gaza, the reintroduction of the palestinian authority into gaza and then a resumption of the broader discussion about a two-state solution as a final resolution of this very long running conflict.

>> you don't, therefore, agree that the government could have said more or been more outspoken on the issues? >> i'm not sure what you mean by more outspoken on the issues. we've been very clear from the outset that israel has a right to defend itself. first of all, israel has a right to exist, which hamas still denies. israel has a right to defend itself. but it has an obligation in so doing to comply with the rules of armed conflict and the prince pal -- the principals around the rules of inflicting the minimum amount of damage. >> have they done this? >> this is an area -- of course, there is a lot of noise about. there will need to be a proper examination of the conduct of both sides during this period of

conflict. the one thing that we do know for certain is that hamas launched rockets out of gaza into israel aimed at the civilian population. that much is clear. israel is conducting its own internal inquiries clearly to be credible with the outside world there will have to be independent element in those. there will also be international by the u.n. human rights council has established its own inquiry into the events that took place and we will encourage the parties to engage openly with that inquiry. we will be looking very caref carefully to ensure that that inquiry is itself conducted impartially. >> john stanley. >> foreign secretary, i just want to preface my question by

saying that i have been to target of probably the largest number of hamas rocket attacks. i condemn all use of rocket attacks against israel by hamas, which are clearly indiscriminate. i visited gaza after the 2008 israeli attack on gaza. and there i saw an entire industrialist state flattened. and i saw an entire hospital burnt out. my question to you is, does the british government consider that it is legitimate against a terrorist target to use military force against purely economic and employment targets and against key social service in u

institutions and buildings like hospitals? >> well, the law of armed conflict is clear and the laws around humanitarian protection are clear. it would not be legegitimate to target that kind of infrastructure unless it was being used for the purposes of military activity. clearly, one of the accusations that is made is that hamas during this conflict deliberately and systematically positioned offensive military equipment in areas of sensitive infrastructure like hospitals and schools and in areas of dense population seeking to use members of the civilian population effectively as human shields. now that in itself would be illegal activity. these are allegations.

there are huge numbers of allegations on both sides. they need to be investigated. what happens needs to be -- what happened needs to be properly established. >> going from buildings to people. does the british government consider it is legitimate that if a government like the israeli government believes it has identified a particular hamas terrorist or perhaps one or more terrorist, it is then legitimate to destroy using air to surface missiles, tank shells, artillery shells, entire buildings and neighborhoods resulting in very substantial civilian death of complete innocent men, women and children. can i add? speaking as a former northern

ireland security minister that if a british government had dealt with a terrorist in northern ireland using military force in the same way as has been used by the israelis, then i am confident that the outrage in the house of commons would have been such that the entire government would have been forced to resign. >> well, i think you are probably aware, sir john, of the rules about proportionality in response. so the question that you pose cannot be simply answered. for a military response in pursuit of a military target to be lawful, it has to be proportionate. and it's not possible to make a generic statement about types of attack or types of responses without knowing the full circumstances of each individual incident. it isn't possible to make that

evaluation. people can speculate and people have speculated. what is now needed is a proper analysis of each incident that occurred. this will not be easy. but i think it has to happen. there will be mistakes made in the prosecution of any military campaign. there will be incidents that occur which are not justified. and then the question will arise whether they have occurred -- whether they have occurred as a result of deliberate targets. there are many questions that will have to be answered in analyzing exactly what did happen over that period of time. but i don't think it's helpful to speculate and to seek generic

categorizations of times of incident without knowing the details of the individual incidents in question. >> mark henry. >> foreign secretary, i would totally agree with you if there was one or two incidents. but there were, you know -- to get the death toll between two and 3,000, we're not talking about one or two incidents. we're talking about vast numbers of incidents. tv footage of which was seen. ambulances being fired at. health facilities being attacks by tank shells. i mean, this idea that there's going to be some forensic inquiry at some stage in the future that's going to bring israel to justice -- >> you have prejudged the case. >> pmy point is, there isn't on

case. there's hundred of cases many much which were captured on film, many of which were given by u.n. officials. the government itself said that this death toll in gaza was unacceptable. but the prime minister. >> i said it. my words. >> the prime minister said in the chamber, he used other word other than disproportionate. after repeated questioning, a death toll of two to 3,000 compared to 60-something on the israeli side is by no means a proportionate response to the toll of the attacks. >> i'm afraid that's a mistake in understanding of the proportionality test. first of all, let me say that the level of civilian deaths was horrific. i said so on many occasions. >> it's obvious. >> we want do everything possible to ensure that such a conflict cannot happen again.

but the proportionality test does not require us to look at the number of deaths on each side in the conflict. it requires us to look at the response that was delivered to each individual military action. sgli understa . >> i understand that. the point i'm making is if you look at the outcome as a whole, then statistically at the very least the fact that so many people died leads one to believe that even if a fraction of those attacks were disproportionate, you wouldn't have the results that we have had. the point i'm trying to make as well is that, earlier in your responses to different questions, for example, on russia, you were very eager to say how effective sanctions were in terms of determining the behavio behavior, for example, of russian forces and how they might behave in the future. why hasn't the government talked about eu sanctions and more in

purview of this committee with the arms sales in the way we would have expected it in. >> because the government doesn't think that in this case and sanctions would be appropriate or effective. there has been a conflict. there have been significant numbers of deaths. and we deplore the fact that those deaths occurred. we have been very clear about that throughout. then there are very clear legal constraints on the parties involved in this kind of conflict. and there are accusations on both sides of unlawful conduct. and they need to be investigated. we can't do that here in this committee. we don't have the information. you're talking the gross numbers and you're drawing extrapolation from them.

but, of course, many of the rockets that were launched against israel were intercepted by the dome system, therefore, didn't cause casualties. it doesn't mean they were not unlawful. the launch of them remained an unlawful act, every one of those. >> i condemn those rockets and the actions of hamas. but if this was a boxing match after the first round. >> mr. chairman, we and many others would have loved to have stopped it after the first round. i can assure members of the committee that we spared to effort in seeking to stop it. >> my colleague sir john had made the point had he been a minister in government, the government would have resigned as a result of an action like this. the prime minister and himself -- >> if you don't mind me saying that, sir john was referring to action by the british government. we're not talking here about action by the british government. >> a parallel was drawn between actions that could have been taken in northern ireland and

actions taken by the government here. >> the record will speak for itself. >> finding in the remaining few minutes can we discussion iran? >> we are tight on time. i will ask the one question. a number of issues that we can tackle. one is you are about to respond back to our report. if you could just maybe give us a flavor today of what areas you may disagree with us on. two, do you think a settlement by november with iran on the nuclear program is becoming more or less likely? just the final item is, there was an announcement that our embassy would reopen in tehran. it was made on the 17th of june. nearly three months have passed. why is it taking so long? >> on the first question, the committee's report, the

government's response to the committee's report will be published on the 12th, which i think is friday of this week. is that right? >> yes. >> in general, we're in broad agreement with the report's findings. not surprisingly, there are some differences of emphasis on certain points. one area that i could perhaps mention now is the question of trade with iran. the government's position is that it's important that iran sees agreement on a comprehensive deal, has the means to restoring its trade relations. so we are not encouraging companies to trade with iran. of course, within the existing restrictions, it is for individual companies to decide whether they wish to trade with ir iran. although, it's quite challenging because of the scale and breadth of the restrictions that are in

place. on the question of the nuclear negotiations, these are at a sensitive stage. and i don't want to do anything that makes them more difficult. i think both sides understand the red lines that each other have drawn. and i would hope that over the next few weeks there is going to be a determined effort by both sides to see if more common ground can be found. in particular, during the united nations general assembly in new york, there will be opportunities for bilateral and multi-lateral meeting and positions to be explored. we are very clear that we want to see a deal done. but we do not want to see a bad deal done. this has to be a deal in order to reassure the world, the

international community that iraqi iran is not pursuing a nuclear weapon and it is purely directed at a civil nuclear program. and we're some way awayvinced on yet. on the question of the embassy, it's our intention to reopen the embassy. we have to make sure though this is done in a way which will provide proper protections to our staff, allow them to go about their position and perform effectively. there are technical issues still remaining outstanding to be dealt with with the iranians. they are engaged in those problems with us. we do not expect them -- we do not expect anything in there that's a show stopper. but there are processes that

need to be go through. we are acutely aware of the fact that one of the principal purposes from the iranian point of view of getting embassy reopened is to have a visa service available in tehran. we need to ensure that we can put in place an effective visa service when the embassy is reopened or we run the risk of disappointing people in iran who have been looking forward to the reopening of or embassy as an opportunity to make the obtaining of a visa more straightforward and simple. we want to make sure the two things sh s go properly hand in. >> thank you very much. >> foreign secretary, thank you very much. it's 5:32. we will stick to our side of the bargain. >> thank you very much. >> we have not asked you questions on nigeria, on drones and the future direction of the foreign office generally. if we may, we will write you on

those. on behalf of the committee, thank you very much indeed. >> thank you very much. president obama tonight is said to lay out his plan for dealing with the islamic terrorist group isis. the ap writing about it in a high stakes address to the nation the president planned to outline a broad expansion of the u.s. military role in combating extremists including a call for arming syrian opposition forces and potentially launching air strikes in both countries. obama has told congressional lawmakers that he has the authority to proceed with his plan without their formal approval. however, he is seeking authorization from congress for the train and equip operation

for syrian rebels. we will have the president's address tonight live on the c-span networks and on the radio and online at c-span.org. members of congress tweeting about isis ahead of the address. the president's address tonight 9:00 eastern. also tonight, a debate between south dakota candidates vying for the u.s. senate seat left

vacant by a retiring democratic senator. rick weiland and former senator larry pressler and gore done howie will be debating. live coverage at 8:00 on c-span2. news out of yesterday's massachusetts primary. john tierney lost to seth molton for the u.s. house sixth district seat. he was leading 51% to 40% when the associated press called the race for the challenger. he moved on to face former state senator richard tasay in november in the district, which is located northeast of boston.

a senate committee today examined global cyber terrorism as well as other terrorist threats including those from isis as well as home grown terrorists and their potential impact on the u.s. homeland. witnesses included officials from the homeland security department, the national coun r counterterrorism center and the fbi. good morning, everyone. great to see you. welcome. we thank you for joining us. we look forward to your testimony. most every year, this committee holds a hearing to review a

multitude of threats to our homeland and to examine how our government is working to counter those threats. rehear from the department of homeland security, the fbi, the national counterterrorism center to keep americans safe. we also hear about actors in cyberspace who want to drain our bank accounts, who want to shut down our financial systems, our electric grids, steal our individual identifiable identification and our identities as well as the r and d that will enavailable businesses and our mill tear require to remain preemnant in the world. assessing these broad threats and making sure our government continues to hone its ability to stop them remains a top priority for this committee, particularly as we approach another 9/11 anniversary. this year our hearing takes on an added significance as our nation confronted a threat in iraq and syria.

our military is engaged in limited air strikes in iraq in an effort to dislodge and repel that threat. later this evening, president obama will address our nation. he is expected to share with us and the world the steps he is recommended be taken in iraq and syria to reverse the expansion of islamic state and tone able the people to reclaim their lives. much of the world has been exposed to deeply disturbing images from those regions in recent weeks. brutal executions, human rights atrocities, repression of women and the seamingly endless of militants waving a black flag in celebration of their brutality. effectively addressing the threat from a new islamic state will require multifaceted strate strategy. that will need a military part.

among t amo among the goals is to ensure that isis does not establish a long term safe haven. like we saw al qaeda do. today, we will examine the steps our government has taksen along with the steps that we need to take to prevent this from happening. we will drill down on this threat and its impact on our homeland in this opening as well as in a classified briefing directly following. that's not all we're going to do. in addition to examining the more conventional terrorist threats, we will examine another major threat that affects our homeland, that's daily cyber attacks. every day nation states and their affiliates, criminals, terrorists and hackers launch cyber attacks against our government agencies, our businesses, important parts of

our daily lives such as utilities, financial networks. some want to steal our information to sell it on the black market or gain a competitive edge. others are trying to make a political point. some would like to use it to cause wide scale economic damage or even physical harm. many of them are good at it. they are getting better. we need to stay a step ahead of them. today we will hear in the open portion of this hearing and in the closed portion how we plan to do that. not unlike the steps we take to address the terror threats in the wake of 9/11. congress has a role to play here. actually, several roles. one of them is an oversight role. it's one that we take very seriously. other is a legislative role that involves developing length dags to help enable america to anticipate and repel the cyber attacks that we face on an almost daily 24/7 basis. the last several months this

committee completed action and reported three separate cyber bills unanimously to the full senate. one bill would enhance the capabilities of the department of homeland security cyber work another would better protect federal agencies from cyberattack. and a third would codify the cybercenter that the department uses, department of homeland security uses to monitor and=úú% the attacks, to strengthen its ability to do so. i'm grateful to dr. cope and his staff working closely with us on each of those pieces of legislation. yesterday in an op ed in the hill newspaper, secretary jay johnson recognized the bipartisan efforts of this committee and he talked about the critical need to pass cyberlegislation, this congress. i could not agree more. in closing, as we mark the anniversary of 9/11 tomorrow, let's keep in mind one of the key lessons we learned since that fateful day some 13 years ago. and that is the threat is always evolving. not that long ago, crooks used

to rob a bank to steal our money. now, they click a button on a distant computer and accomplish the same goal. nation states and rival businesses used to employ corporate insiders, retirees to steal company secrets, now they send a spear phishing e-mail. terrorists used to be a distant threat in the mountains in places like afghanistan and pakistan, now, an increasing number of them are home grown, they maybe using european or even american passports. so, as the threat becomes more sophisticated, more elusive and more diffuse, we need to remain ever vigilant to ensure that our government is nimble enough to keep up with tomorrow's threats as they confront us. we've come a long way since 9/11. many respects, we are more secure than we were on this date 13 years ago. but the world in which we live remains a dangerous place. there's always more work to do. when it comes to securing our homeland and anticipating the next threat, we owe it to the

american people to strive for perfection. what does it say in the preamble to the constitution? in order to form a more perfect union, wasn't the idea to form a perfect union but to form a more perfect union. and our intent here is to try to approach perfection, even if we never achieve it, but get as close as we can in this regard. the consequences of failure are simply too high and the costs are too severe. please, we have with us today a panel of witnesses who work together every day to tackle the terrorists and cyberthreats that we face. we are grateful to each of you for what you do with your life and for your service to our country. now, i turn to my partner in all of this, dr. coburn, for any remarks that he might wish to make. dr. coburn. >> well, thank you, mr. chairman, i concur a lot with what you said. i want to thank each of our witnesses today for testimony, one, for what you do. number two, for your vigilance, number three, for the criticism you take that's actually not

informed criticism. the department of homeland security particularly had lots of problems. i'm so thankful jay johnson is their general and i'm thankful you're there and thankful your three, plus the others we put through the committee. we have a long way to go. where i would disagree with senator carper is i don't think we are any safer today. i think the threat to our country's just as great as it was pre- 9/11, based on what's happening in the world, the absolute lack of control of our border, especially our southern border, and the inability and the corruption on both sides in terms of law enforcement on the border. so, i think we have a long ways to go, but i know we have dedicated leadership now in all the areas that are concentrating on the same goal. i think it's a shame that the leader of the senate won't put a

cybersecurity bill on the floor. one that creates true information sharing. let senate debate it so we can actually start to really protect the cyber aspect of our government. and that requires all of us to work together in the cyber realm, to ensure that we are not -- we are vulnerable today. we have seen, both in homeland security and in the private sector, significant breaches. they will continue their -- most of them are on nation state actors, china and russia specifically. we should not fall back from talking about what they are doing and why they are trying to both steal our intellect and damage our economy. it's -- these are real issues. this is an important hearing for the american people to hear in as much detail as possible what's going on and where we need to improve. so, again, i would thank you all

for your efforts, the fbi and nctc, valuable contributions and having the privilege of setting on both intel and homeland security, i get to see as well as anybody what everybody's doing and everybody's working in the right direction, except the u.s. senate. and my hope would be is that we would start helping you rather than hurt you. i yield back. >> i would like to associate myself with the remarks of my colleague from oklahoma, need to move not just three cyberbills reported to you the of this committee, i think unanimously, but also the -- some version of the information sharing bill. i think we can improve the bill that came out of the intel committee. my hope is that we will have a chance to do the whole -- all four of them, at least those four, this year. that's my goal. we can do more, god bless us. on behalf of all the members of our committee, thank you for joining us today. first witness is retired

brigadier general frances taylor. mr. taylor is the undersecretary for intelligence analysis the department of homeland security. how long have you been in that job now general? four months. four months, good. he provides the secretary dhs leadership, components and state and local and tribal and private sector partners with the homeland security intelligence and information they need to keep our country safer, secure and resilient. general taylor came to dhs with 31 years of service in the u.s. air force, four years in the state department as counterterrorism coordinator and as the assistant secretary for diplomatic security and eight years as vice president at general electric. second witness is suzanne pal issing, the undersecretary for national protection and programs director at the department of homeland security. as undersecretary, one of her responsibilities is coordinating and overseeing policy and operation for the department's infrastructure protection activities, including cybersecurity. ms. spalding spent more than 25 years working on national

security issues in congress and the executive branch and the private sector. this includes extensive experience working with many critical infrastructure sectors. welcome. our next witness is nick rasmussen, deputy director of the national counterterrorism center for the office of the director of national intelligence. mr. rasmussen is also served on the national security council where he was responsible for providing staff support to the president, national security adviser and homeland security adviser and counterterrorism policy and strategy. prior to, they served in a variety of key positions for the department of state, where he provided support for the arab israeli peace process and the u.s. north korean agreed framework and persian gulf security issues. nick, welcome this morning. and our final witness is robert anderson, executive assistant director of the criminal cyberresponse and services branch of the federal bureau of the investigation. in this position, mr. anderson oversees all fbi criminal and

cyberinvestigations worldwide. international operations, critical incident response and victim assistance. during 20 years that he has worked at the fbi, mr. anderson served as hostage -- served in the hostage rescue team, counterintelligence division and the intelligence division as well. what did you do before you were a part of the fbi? >> sir, i was a delaware state trooper. >> okay. >> for nine years. >> were you any good? >> i hope so. >> were you ever trooper of the year? >> yes, sir, i was, in 1989. >> okay. th that's pretty good. remember you fondly. >> ever escort the former governor -- >> he pulled me over, he pulled me over a time or two. as i recall, one other time, fired a warning shot. no damage was done. great to see you. and thanks for what you did with -- for us back in delaware and what you're doing for our country now. thank you all for your service. your entire testimonies will be made part of the record. and we'd ask you to try to do it

in about -- in about five minutes, go away with that, we will pull you in. all right, general taylor, feel like leading us off? >> yes, sir. thank you, chairman, carper, ranking member coburn, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss threats to the homeland and the current threat environment. i'm mindful that tomorrow is the 11th of september and i vividly remember where i was on that day 13 years ago, sitting at the state department as the coordinator for counterterrorism. what has changed since 2001? are we any safer now? these are questions that have been repeated countless times since that tragic day and rightfully so. i come before the committee today to outline:kzs the lesso we've learned since 9/11 and how we are now postured to address evolving threats in ways that we were not on september 10th, 2001. the key lesson we've learned from 9/11 is the need to develop

an agile homeland security enterprise that constantly collaborates and shares information and intelligence to identify threats and risks and to adjust operations as necessary to address the range of challenges the nation faces. the partners within the homeland security enterprise, whether they are first responders at the local level or decisionmakers in capital cities across america or here in our nation's capital, require predictive intelligence and analytical products that help them to make informed decisions to protect our citizens. the cornerstone of our mission at dhs has always been and remains protecting the nation against terrorist attacks. in act if a, secretary johnson just yesterday reiterated that counterterrorism is our most important mission at dhs. we are vigilant in detecting and preventing terrorist threats that may seek to penetrate the

homeland from land, sea or air. i will first address the current terrorist environment and then discuss threats to our efforts as they relate to each of the secretary's four priorities. and mr. chairman, mindful of the time limit, i will submit other remarks for the record and summarize just a couple of things. first, on terror imcore al qaeda and affiliates remain a major concern for the department of homeland security, despite senior leadership deaths, the group maintains the intent and capability to conduct attacks against u.s. citizens and facilities and demonstrated the ability to adjust their tactics, techniques and procedures for targeting the west in innovative ways. the islamic state of iraq and the levant is a terrorist group operating as if it were a

military organization and their experience he is and successes on the battlefields of syria and iraq have armed them with capabilities most terrorist groups do not possess. at present, dhs is unaware of any specific credible threat to the u.s. homeland from isil. however, we recognized that isil constitutes an active and serious threat within the region and could attempt attacks on u.s. targets overseas with little or no warning. isil exhibits a very sophisticated propaganda capability, disseminating high-quality media content on multiple online platforms, including social media to enhance its appeal. media counts of the conflict and the propaganda in particular play a role in inspiring u.s. citizens to travel to syria. we are aware that a number of persons, more than 100, have

either made their way or tried to make their way to syria over the past few years to join the international foreign fighters. i will conclude with aqap has attempted three times to attack the u.s. homeland. the airliner plot of december 2009, an attempt against a u.s.-bound cargo planes in october 2010 and an airline plot in may of 2012 demonstrate their efforts to adapt to aviation security procedures and underscore why aviation security is a priority area outlined by secretary johnson. in response to these recent threats, generally from overseas, over the past few months, dhs has taken steps to enhance aviation security at overseas airports with direct flights to the united states. and other nations have followed suit with similar enhancements. mr. chairman, i will conclude my remarks here and if you would,

allow me to submit the rest of them for the record. >> without objection. your entire statement will be made part of the record. thank you, general. ms. spalding, great to see you. please proceed. >> thank you, chairman. ranking member coburn, distinguished members of the committee, it's -- thank you for this opportunity to be here today. and particularly pleased to be here today with my colleague, undersecretary taylor, and with our partners from the federal bureau of investigation and the national counterterrorism center. undersecretary taylor spoke with you about a range of threats that the department is focused on. and i'm going to amplify a bit with regard to the threat to cybersecurity. and to discuss the actions that we are taking with our critical infrastructure partners to understand and address these threats, both physical and cyber, through information sharing and capability building. first, however, i also want to note as we approach this 13th

anniversary of the attacks of 9/11, three efforts that we have under way to heighten public vigilance and public awareness. this month, september is national preparedness month, october is national cybersecurity awareness month, of this nation against cyberthreats, and november is critical infrastructure security and resilience month. all three of these are key mission areas for the department and all require daily collaboration with our stakeholders in the private sector and government at all levels. growing cyberthreats are an increasing risk to critical infrastructure, to our committee and to our national security. dhs uses cybersecurity information to reduce risk, to

detect and block cyberattacks on federal civilian agencies, to help critical infrastructure entities improve their own protection and also to use the information that we developed collaboratively to protect their customers and we maintain a trusted environment for the private sector partner tosco will be a borate on cybersecurity threats and trends. this trust is based in large part on our commitment to privacy, civil rights and civil liberties, across all information sharing programs with a particular emphasis on safeguarding personally identifiable information. so far this year, dhs' 24 by 7 cyberoperations center, the national cybersecurity and communications integration center, has processed over 600,000 cyberincident he is, issued more than 10,000 actionable alerts, detected more

than 55,000 vulnerabilities and dispatched over 78 incident response teams for on-site technical assistance. let me tell you about one recent success. within the last few weeks, the united states secret service shared information on some malware with our cybersecurity ops center for analysis. the results of that analysis formed the basis for an actionable alert that was distributed widely to our critical infrastructure owners and operators. and led u.s. businesses to check their systems for this malware and identify and stop ongoing cyberintrusions, there by protecting their customers' data. while both the cybersecurity threat and the nation's dependence on cyberinfrastructure has grown exponentially, the legal framework, particularly regarding the articulation of the department's authorities, has not kept pace.

as the chairman and the ranking member have noted, legislative action is vital. both the house and the senate have made real progress on cybersecurity legislation. i would like to personally thank this committee for all of the hard work that has ensured progress on this front on a bipartisan basis. but we are not over the finish line yet. as secretary johnson wrote today, there are areas of legislation with strong consens consensus, codifying the cybersecurity responsibilities of the department of homeland security, making it easier for dhs and the private sector to work together to mitigate cyber-related vulnerabilities and enhancing the department's ability to recruit and retain that essential cybersecurity workforce. these authorities are vital to ensuring that the department has the tools it needs to carry out its mission on behalf of the nation. while deliberations continue on

other elements of cybersecurity legislation, we should not wait to pass bipartisan and broadly supported bills. you have come so far. and the threat is so great. i urge congress to pass what it can now, even as we continue to work hard on remaining provisions. let me close by emphasizing that dhs' mission to strengthen the security and resilience of critical infrastructure requires us to focus on physical risks to that infrastructure as well as cyberrisks, because the majority of the nation's critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector, dhs works with those partners, primarily on a voluntary basis, to understand the range of threats and hazards, share information and promote training and other capability building. dhs and the department of energy, along with other interagency partners, for example, provided classified and unclassified threat briefings. we do this on a regular basis to

energy, ceos and industry executive on physical and cyberthreats. in the wake of the terrorist attack on the shopping mall in nairobi, kenya, dhs and the fbi engaged in more than -- engage modder than 400 major malls across the united states to facilitate table top exercises based on a similar attack involving active shooters and the use of impro-advised explosive devices. working collaboratively with our partners in the private sector, we are advancing our core mission of strengthening the security and resilience of our nation's critical infrastructure against cyber and physical threats. chairman carper, ranking member coburn, thank you for this opportunity to testify today and i look forward to taking your questions. >> thank you, thank you very much, suzanne. we look forward to asking a few of them, too. mr. rasmussen, welcome aboard. please proceed. >> thank you, chairman carper -- >> make sure your microphone is on, please. >> is that better?

thank you, chairman carper, thank you, ranking member coburn and the members of the committee for the opportunity to testify here today. nctc director matt olson and i don't often testify in open session in open hearings and so today is an important opportunity, we believe, to share our understanding of what we see as an evolving dynamic terrorist threat and to share that understanding with the committee and the american public. indeed, earlier in the summer, the 9/11 commissioners challenged national security leaders to communicate more regularly with the american public about the threat and we hope to do just that. as i begin this morning, i'd like to frame this evolving threat in broad terms that are generally aapplicable across the broad sweep of groups of individual groups and terrorist networks. the threat from terrorist groups that we see today is geographically diffuse from a diverse array of actors and it's proving over time to be both resilient and adaptive to the counterterrorism pressure we are putting on it the global jihadist movement continues to increasingly decentralize itself, both in terms of geography and in terms of command and control.

geographically speaking, it's no longer generally confined to the afghanistan, pakistan, south asia region it now covers a broad swath of territory from the indian subcontinent acres cross the whole entire middle east and the levant and throughout northern africa and western africa as well. of greatest concern with the terrorist groups such as isil that have taken a foothold in areas were governance is lax, where governments are unable to govern and where lax security has allowed group tosco aless, train and plot. in terms of command and control, we also see a trend of decentralization, with the amir of an al qaeda affiliate, aqap, in the peninsula serving as the general deputy to amman al zawahri. that core is encouraging groups and individuals to act independently in support of the global movement, with no longer holding an expectation that regional affiliates will no longer discuss or clear their plans with al qaeda senior leadership prior to execution. in evolution is the result of an

adaptive enemy. our counterterrorism operations continue to degrade al qaeda's core ability to lead the global terrorist movement and to plan sophisticated attacks from its place in the fatah. but as a result of leak he is and disclosures, including those attributable to edward snowden, terrorists now understand the scope and scale of western collection capabilities, and they are changing the way they communicate. they are adopting encryption technologies, they are shifting accounts or avoiding all together the use of electronic communications, all of which frustrate our counterterrorism efforts. in short, we cannot connect the dots if we cannot collect -- we cannot connect the dot it is we can't collect the dots that matter the most. and our collection is challenged in this new environment. in the remaining time, mr. chairman, i would like to focus on three specific areas, the threat from isil, the threat from aqap and the threat we face from home grown violent extremists. starting with isil. the greatest threat from isil to the united states and its interests is inside iraq right now, which combined with syria

constitutes isil's power center. as we move further from that base of strength, isil's ability at present to develop and execute significant large-scale, sophisticated attacks diminishes. this is not to say it does not pose a threat outside the region. it certainly does. indeed, the arrest in france of an individual and the subsequent discovery of explosive devices in his possession and the killing of four individuals at a jewish museum in belgium provide clear evidence and indication of isil's ambition to operate outside the middle east. most of the responsible individuals apprehended in europe who are in custody, reportedly fought alongside isil elements in the middle east. however, these examples also demonstrate that right now, isil's ability to carry out complex large-scale attacks in the west is currently limited. left unchecked, however that capability is likely to grow and present a much more direct threat to the homeland. and with over 2,000 westerners now believed to be fighting in syria and iraq, we assess that the threat to europe is perhaps

even more immediate. but nevertheless, the united states is not immune, as both the chairman and the ranking member noted. over 100 persons from a variety of backgrounds and from all across the country have traveled or attempted to travel or somehow indicated intent to travel to the region, including you some who have looked to engauge with isil. most of these individuals are known or believed to have concern travel documents that would ease their reentry into the united states or into other countries, which is why identifying them a is a top priority for the united states and our partners. that's why it's so important that the international community challenge isil's regional ambitions now, degrade their capabilities and over time, would, together to defeat and destroy isil. left unchecked, isil poses an increasing threat to all governments it considers apostate, not just to the united states or european nations but also middle eastern, and african nations as well. let me turn to al qaeda and the arabian peninsula. we assess that aqap remains the al qaeda affiliate most likely

to attempt transnational attacks against the united states. the group's repeated efforts to conceal explosive devices to destroy aircraft demonstrate its continued pursuit of high-profile attacks against the west. its increasing awareness of western security procedures and their efforts to adapt to those procedures that we adopt. the group also continues to present a high threat to u.s. personnel and facilities inside yemen and saudi arabia and at any one time, we are trackingself plots to our interests inside yemen and inside the arabian peninsula hatched by al qaeda and the arabian peninsula. the group also continues, as the committee well knows, its efforts to radicalize and mobilize individuals outside yemen through the use of inspire magazine, their english language publication. the most recent issue, its 12th issue of "inspire" was released back in march and continue to encourage lone wolf or lone offender attacks in the west citing specific target necessary the united states, the uk and france. let me also say a few words with

home grown violent extremists, the boundless online virtual environment we see today, combined with terrorists increasingly sophisticated use of social media makes it increasingly difficult for us to protect our youth from messaging that is designed to radicalize and motivate to action home grown violent extremists. we at nctc are working very closely with our partners at dhs, at fbi, and the department of justice to inform and equip families, communities, local governments and local institutions, all of whom provide the best defense and have the greatest ability to counter the narrative of violent extremism in their communities. despite our efforts, however, hves remain the most likely immediate threat to the homeland, individual action by individual hves. we expect that the overall level of hve activity of remain about the same as what we have seen in recent years over the course of the next year. and by that, i mean we would expect to see a handful of uncoordinated and mostly unsophisticated plots emanating from a pool of hves that amounts to up to a few hundred

individuals. last year's boston bombing certainly underscored the threat from hves who are motivated, of the within little or no warning to act violently by themselves or in small groups as as we have discussed with this committee, those lone actors who act autonomously are the most difficult to detect or disrupt. mr. chairman, during your april 30 hearing, you noted that identifying and deterring terrorist plots by lone wolves was extremely challenging to the counterterrorism and homeland security committee community. i think everybody here would agree with that assessment. lastly, let me take one moment to talk about the effort at nctc about the threats, and that is identifying it more precisely, putting a face and name to that threat whenever possible. as you know, under the law, nctc is charged with maintaining you the united states' government's central and shared knowledge bank of known and suspected terrorists as well as their contacts and their support networks. nctc's tie, the terrorist identities data mart environment is the database of known and

suspected terrorist and helps us ensure all relevant information collected by the government about identified individuals, including sides will we have identified as syrian foreign fighters, all that information is shared with appropriate intelligence, law enforcement and screening agencies. we are absolutely relentless in the efforts to ensure that the data and tie is as accurates a possible, entered accurately and our records are as comprehensive as they can possibly be and mindful of privacy and civil liberties concerns, particularly with respect to u.s. persons. in the case of u.s. persons, any nomination to tied goes through at least four lay others of review, including a legal level of review, to ensure that the underlying derogatory information is sufficient and meets established legal standards. our management at nctc of this unique consolidation of terrorist identities has created a valuable forum for identifying and sharing information with our partners in the community and better integrated our collective efforts to identify, enhance and expedite the nomination of

individual wes suspect to be syrian foreign fighters and get their names and identities into the screening system. this work greatly increases the chances we will be able to disrupt potential terrorist activity buice i individuals as they seek to return from syria. in closing, mr. chairman, and members of the committee, we face an evolving, decentral litzed threat from a defuse set of actors adapting constantly to our counter measures why upxikh and partners within the intelligence community must to adapt to this threat operating within the pounds of our existing authoritieses and resources. we certainly appreciate the committee's continued strong support in these efforts and the i would encourage senators to visit nctc to see firsthand the breadth of the work we are doing with our counterterrorism partners. mr. chairman, we had the honor of hosting you and you several committee staff in recent weeks at nctc to talk in great detail about some of those threats and very gratifying to see your interest in the work we are doing along with fbi and dhs. thank you again for this opportunity. >> thank you. and dr. coburn, and i not only enjoyed being with you and

having a chance to personally meet many of the folks that work there but thank them for their service. )0n á dramatically over the recent years. we truly expect them to continue to climb and grow. i could break down the threats to our country in four broad categories from cyber. spies, transnational organized criminals, terrorists and activist groups. the bottom line is we are losing

a lot of data, money, ideas and innovation to a wide range of cyberadversari cyberadversaries. fbi director are comey has recognized this and the severity of the threat has made cyberone of the top pry or hits in the fbi. under his leadership, the fbi is continuing to strengthen our cyber capabilities a in the same which we enhanced our intelligence and national security capabilities in the wake of 9/11. today's fbi and national security organization responds to all types of threats. we seek to understand the threats with he if as i in each of our offices here and abroad. what's out there, what we see and what we might be missing. we know that to effectively combat the cyberthreat, we must continue to expand our partnerships, both in government and in the private sector. in fact, we expect director comey and dhs secretary johnson

will soon sign a new cyberunified message for state and local law enforcement. this message makes clear that federal agencies are working together to ensure that a call to one is a call to all. when law enforcement partners report information on cyberattack or incident. also for a law enforcement partners, we launched the cyber shield alliance, an online one stop shop that provides cyber training as well as the ability to report cyberincidents to the fbi. earlier this month, we deployed a malware repository and analysis system known as malware investigator. our intelligence and law enforcement partners it allows them to submit malware directly to the fbi and we share with our partners for triage and analysis of what's going on in cyber. we are also significantly enhancing our collaboration with the private sector. in the past, city has provided us information about attacks, we have investigated them, but we really didn't share or provide

that information back. now we are. as part of our enhanced outreach, we have provided nearly 40 classified sector-specific threat briefings to private companies over the past year alone. over the past several months, the fbi and the department of justice, along with many partners, both at this table and abroad, have announced a series of indictments on cybercriminals, just to name a few, encore performance, which was obviously the indictment of the five three poa chinese hackers. black shades, a remote access computer software that could steal and infect hundreds and thousands of computers around the world. we are calling these indictments the new normal, because we expect them to continue on a regular basis. while the cyberthreat is one of the fbi's highest priorities, combining terrorism:/ continueso be the number one priority in the fbi. as conflict zones continue to emerge throughout many parts of our world, we expect terrorist

groups to use this instability to recruit and incite acts of violence. syria remains a major concern as the ongoing conflict shows no sign of subsiding. due to the prolonged nature and the high visibility of the syrian conflict, we are concerned that u.s. persons who have an interest in committing jihad will be drawn to that region of the world. we can address these issues much more fulsomly in the closed session that follows it session and we look forward to doing that. in conclusion, mr. chairman, to counter the threats we face, we areñr engaging in an unprecedend level of collaboration, within the united states government and with our private sectors around the world and with the international law enforcement organizations that we each at this table talk to each and every day. we look forward to expand these partnerships and work with the committee to continue to defeat our cyber and terrorist adversaries. thank you again very much for the opportunity to be here today. i would be happy to answer any questions you or the committee

has. thank you. >> mr. anderson, thanks so much. great to see you. thanks so much for joining us today. first question from me would be for perhaps mr. rasmussen or general taylor. one of the recurring themes in my life is find out what works, do more of that and i just want to play off of that for a moment. go back about seven years ago, iraq, sunni awakening, and the -- to isis was rolling along pretty well and then not so much and then under the enlightened leadership of i think general petraeus, i think the good work done by the fellow who has just become the new prime minister of iraq, working with the sunni tribal leaders, isis -- al qaeda and iraq, their progress just stopped and was greatly diminished, pushed back. what can we gain from that lesson? is there anything there that can

inform what we do today? >> mr. chairman, one of the things we've tried to do is we've tried to think about the problem and the theret posed by isil is to think of potential vulnerabilities that the group has and to think of ways in which the progress that they've made can be addressed. and you point to some of the lessons that we may be able to learn from previous efforts against al qaeda in iraq and there, i think we did learn that the group very much struggled to gain legitimacy across the broader population of iraq when they saw -- when that population in iraq saw in baghdad a representative government that was responsive to their needs. and so the ongoing transition in baghdad that you're seeing right now that you just alluded to i think is an important step in potentially giving the sunni population in iraq a signal that they do not have to turn or align or ally with isil in order to have their issues addressed, to feel that they are

represented, that their interests are protected inside -- inside iraq. so, that's an important lesson learned. i think it's one we have seen progress in the last few weeks, but only over time will we see if that kind of political transition actually has that effect that we are working to see. i don't know that we can say yet how quickly that will happen. but it's something that i think was a necessary precondition to any strategy against isil. >> thanks very much. general taylor and maybe for you, nick, one or both of you mentioned that the ability of -- for isis to mount an effective attack against our homeland is limited. but not time for us to sit back and just -- assume it's not going to come, for us to prepare and be ready for it. what are some ways that we can do --, are doing, should be doing to prepare for that eventuality, be better prepared for it, should it come. that would be for -- general,

why don't you lead it off and then give nick some time as well, please. >> certainly, sir. excuse me. as i mentioned, we assess the threat from isil primarily to be in the region. nonetheless, with the number of european and americans that have gone to fight in syria, that threat can manifest itself back in the -- either in europe or the u.s. i think we have begun with the aviation security changes that we've made since july to make it more difficult for people to try to get explosives onto aircraft, that -- to bring those aircraft down that could be traveling to the u.s. we have increased our intelligence cooperation with our partners across the world and attempting to identify people who have gone to serve in -- or to fight in syria, because intelligence is the one thing that helps us identify

these individuals before they are able to act and using our intelligence systems to learn who they are make us much more effective in interdicting them. and third, i think the focus on cbe -- getting our communities aware -- >> not everyone know what is cbe is? >> home grown violent extremists i. >> thank you. >> as nick mentioned, probably the most immediate threat comes from a home grown violent ex-trialist who listens to the prop ghana, reads it and decides he or she are going to answer the call and take up arms here in the u.s. and so community awareness, resilience around these issues with our law enforcement partners in the field they can

understand what the elements are to look for as they encounter folks in communities i this si a big step toward helping communities learn about this early so we can respond. >> okay, thanks, nick. >> the only thing aid add, mr. chairman are two things, one related to offense and one related to defense. i think if you're going to get ahead of isil's effort to over time develop a homeland threat capability, we have to, over time, shah inc. are the safe haven and attack the safe haven inside iraq and that's something i know the president and the secretary of state have already spoken to in talking to our foreign partners overseas, bas absent that, the ability to additional western potential operatives into iraq or syria into that safe haven and potentially train, equip and deploy them back out to europe and the united states will remain a threat. the more defensive piece of business that i think we are engaged in right now already and i think we are making good progress on is just, aggressive information sharing with all of our foreign partners who face a similar problem. this is an issue we have been

engaged in with them for going on 18 months now, engaging with our european partners, many of whom face this problem even more acutely than we do in terms of their citizens having an easier route and certainly easier path to travel to syria and iraq. unlike a lot of situations where it's difficult to talk with partners about information sharing, about individuals, this is a case where we're actually getting very little push back, they share the same sense of threat and so the information that we are able to share about sides will have traveled to syria or iraq can be used potentially add to our watch listing you and screening systems and give us one -- a significant leg up in our effort to disrupt travel when those individuals seem to leave syria and iraq. that's not a fail safe, it is by no means the only pillar of a defensive effort, but it's an important pillar and one that isn't always very easy to get our partners to work with us on, in this case, that sense of shared threat is so -- is so widely shared at all levels in the governments that we typically work with in europe

that it's making that level of interchange much more robust than it often s >> thanks very much. my time has expired. when we come back, either for next round or maybe in our closed session, ms. spaulding, want to visit the issue of information sharing and the sequencing of fisa reauthorization information sharing, either in the open session or closed session. dr. coburn. >> well, thank you. i hope the media that's here today actually listened to what you had to say, nick. a very cogent, open assessment of where we are, not on the basis to scare people, but on the basis to inform them of where we really are. i think the other thing that i would comment on is i'm really happy to see the fbi being, aggressive on deterrence, because for so long, we thought we can build a higher and higher wall that people can't climb over. they are gonna climb over every wall on cyber that we have. and we have to have both efforts, we have to have the

wall, but we also have to have the prosecutorial deter reps that says you come mess, it's gonna be painful. and so i'm very thankful for that attitude coming from the fbi. i hope to see more and more and more, both domestically and internationally, because of the costs. general taylor, let me just ask you a couple of questions. has ina produced any intelligence product examining the vulnerability his isis student exchange and visitors program, the visa program, and whether it poses a threat to national security? >> yes, sir, we have. we have published several threat pieces to support the student visa program and the risk that comes from that particular program, working with i.c.e. and with cbp. >> and are those public or are those classified?

>> i believe they are classified, senator co-burp, but i will check. >> i will ask more questions about them then in the closed hearing. >> yes, sir. >> it's reported that millions of people living here on visa overstays, gl was found that dhs is really struggling to track this population. we understand that. hassism na prepared any assessment of the threat from the population of the visa overstays? do you have anything that you've done on that? >> we have, sir. we have helped i.c.e. to prioritize its focus on the reese is sa overstays, from a threat perspective and certainly can share that with you in the closed session. >> yeah? all right. from the -- my staff and cpb has been very cooperative, by the way. when we review the documents, what we see today is approximately 700 miles of our southern border that are not secure. that's looking at the documents

that you-all give us. can you-all prepare a current assessment of the coverage of the border and the threat to national security posed by adversaries that potentially might transcend that border? >> sir, if i understand your question, are you asking can we or have we? >> i'm asking can you, given the basis of where we stand? >> absolute d#ie&háhp &hc% yes, sir. pi would also add, sir, that t secretary's directed a comprehensive southern border security strategy, which will have an intelligence annex to it that will address what you've just described, the risks to the border and how we can better focus our efforts at securing those gaps that we identify are existing you. >> do you have a timeline on that? >> he just approved it. at least the concept. and we are beginning to put meat

on the bones. i can't give you an exact date, but i will certainly have the staff check and get back with you. >> all right. all right. thank you. mr. anderson, does the fbi monitor cyberattack against tsce federal government >> [ inaudible ] around the world with the federal government but also the private sector.

>> okay. can you -- can you tell me which departments, major departments of the federal government that haven't been hacked? >> i don't know if i could tell you that off the top of my head, sir, i would probably have to go back and look. i would say, and i think i agree with our current director that if they haven't been hacked york know if they haven't been hacked or haven't realized. >> they have all been hacked. yeah. if you -- if you would, would you go back and give us a list of what your records show. >> of course. >> you can do that either in the secured setting or in an open session. i'd like to see what you-all see on that. i mentioned the deterrence. i'm really pleased with that 'cause i think you have to have both -- both sides of the sword working. the rest of my questions, i think, mr. chairman, are for classified setting, so i will -- i will wait and ask those of nick and suzanne and others in the classified setting.

>> thank you. and the order of joining us the hearing, senator johnson, senator mccain, senator baldwin, senator portman and senator ayotte. senator johnson, you are recognized. >> thank you, mr. chairman, i would like to associate myself with senator coburn's comments about the need for us to face this reality. the need that the american people need to be informhood, it's not about scaring people, it's about facing reality. and general taylor, you -- we started the hearing asking are we safer? i want to break that question down to two parts, 'cause i think there are two parts to it. one is do we have greater defensive capability to keep us safe? but then, has the threat grown? i want your assessment of both of those. what is your assessment over the last 13 years in terms of our defensive capabilities and by the way, what is hampering our efforts, you know, and then really, your assessment of the growing threat? >> thank you, senator. as i mentioned, i was state

department coordinator counterterrorism on 9/11. and was party to our efforts then and have watched the government change its approach to this. indeed, i think our capacity to share information, to work together, is as good as it's ever been in the history of our country. we work every day with the fbi, with the nctc, in gathering information and sharing data. so, in that sense, i think our capacity is much more effective than it was 13 years ago. there's always room for improvement and change, but i think the leadership of the ct community of our government understand it is we don't cooperate, bad things will happen. i think the nature of the threat, i think nick probably characterized it best, 9/11, 2001, we were focused on al

qaeda and afghanistan and pakistan. today, al qaeda, al qaeda adherence and other jihadists, essentially global. they are operating in north africa, they are operating in the middle east, they are operating in south asia. so much more diverse, nonetheless, they still see us as the enemy and therefore, a threat to the united states and our operations around the world. >> mr. rasmussen, i believe the threat's growing, i think it's more grave. you had mentioned the effect of edward snowden's disclosures, i mean, has that degladed our ability to protect ourselves? has that degraded our intelligence gathering capabilities? >> i would argue yes. i can talk in greater detail in a closed session about some of the specific information, or indicators we have seen that would lead me to that conclusion, but i think it's

inarguable that the collection environment we are in we rely on collection to be able to get ahead of terrorist plots, it's inarguable that that collection environment is more challenging today than it was if we had not been dealing with these disclosures. >> in a foreign relations committee hearing, we had deputy assistant secretary of state, brett mccgurk, i asked him directly what threat does isis pose to the united states and he talked about the 30 to -- funneling into iraq. that week, australian and other suicide bombers. i am concerned the talk coming out of this administration this may take three years. first, let me ask you, do you believe eyes is is something that can be contained or managed versus destroyed? it i think of this in phases. i think in the near-term, in the immediate term, you can take steps to degrade and disrupt their ability to carry out

attacks. but to prevent yourself from having to deal with that in perpetuity, you have to go beyond that and look to destroy or defeat the organization, that is what the admin strain, the president, the secretary of state have talked about over a longer period of time that objective is not as easy to put a specific time who are rise unto >> i understand, but i'm concerned, kind of like having a hornet's nest in your backyard, you know, you identify the threat, you want to get rid of it, as quickly as possible, you don't want to poke it with a stick for three years. and so, again, what i want to see is a clearly articulated goal of destroying isis as quickly as possible so that we can then maintain our defenses against the other threats that are metastasizing around the world. would you basically agreetéus w that assessment? >> i certainly shareç that goa i think the talk about the phasing is just simply a recognition that in order to build the intelligence basis necessary to attack and pull apart an organization and defeat it takes time. >> okay. i understand. >> but while you're doing that

you try to put great pressure on thing or so long as that it can't punch you in the process while you're going through that longer process. >> think one thing we always have to guard against is always fighting the last war, only concentrating on past threats. to what extent is the intelligence community using our imagination in terms of looking what the other possibilities just might be out there? >> we certainly are devoting time and attention to that. again, pressures of the day often lead to you focus on what is the wolf closest to the door, and yet we also challenge our analysts and our intelligence community partners to look around the corner and see not only where the next groups might come from, where the next theaters of concern might be, but also, what tactics and techniques and opportunities for innovation might exist in the terrorism community as well. that's harder and you're not often relying on much intelligence in that setting, you're often, as you say, using your imagination, but it's important work and it helps us

over time to target our collection to try to get ahead of those particular threats. signer is one of those areas where we have not seen terrorists necessarily develop great capability to date but they certainly understand the economic impact that intervention and the cyberworld causes. and so we assess that over time that is a capability terrorist groups v >> i want to cover that in the secured briefing a little bit. secretary spalding, you talked about critical infrastructure, you talked about what is our physical and cyberthreats to that. i want to talk about something that i've been now briefed on, the threat of enp. you know, both in terms of a high-altitude nuclear blast which is kind of what i always knew existed out there and i guess kind of hoping that nobody has the capability or wouldn't be stupid enough to do it, but now also aware of the fact that a massive solar flare also represents a real threat. is that something that you're certainly aware of.

is that something we are looking to harden our electrical grid against? >> excuse me, absolutely, senator and thank you for the question. it is certainly something that we have been focused on and working with our colleagues in the electric sector to find ways to address. i was recently in the uk at an international conference, energy infrastructure security summit, where enps was a clear focus of those discussions. and this is something very much on our radar screen and that we are working with them to address. >> okay. we will cover more of that just real quick, in terms of the -- for mr. anderson, the attack at the metcalf pg&e substation, do we have any further information you can share in open session in terms of have we tracked down the perpetrators? have we come one theories in terms of what that was all about? >> we are heavily engaged in that investigation, senator, it

would be easier to describe to you everything that we are doing inside the closed session. >> okay. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you. senator mccain. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i thank the witnesses. mr. taylor or mr. rasmussen, haven't there been recent reports on twitter around facebook of messages that would urge infiltration into the united states across our southwestern border? >> yes, sir, there have been twitter, social media exchanges among isil adherents across the globe, speaking about that as a possibility. >> would you view it as a threat? >> certainly, any infiltration across our border would be a threat, but in the course of our border security -- >> are you satisfied that we have sufficient border security

to prevent that? >> sir, i'm satisfied that we are trying to build a border security capability that would -- >> are you satisfied that we now have the capability to prevent that? >> i'm satisfied that we have the intelligence and the capability at our border that would prevent that activity. >> well, you know, it's interesting, because an american reporter named james o'keefe dressed as osama bin laden walked across the border, the rio grand river undetected. something like that concern you. >> actually, sir, he was not undetected. he was known to the border security agencies who walked -- >> then why didn't they stop him when he came across? >> sir, i can't answer that question. >> no, you can't anticipate it because they weren't there to stop him and that's just -- that's matter of being on

record. the fact is that there are thousands of people who are coming across our border undetected, who are not identified and for you to sit there and tell me that we have the capability or now have the proper protections of our south we were bored per, particularly in light of the urgings over facebook and twitter for people to come across our southwestern border is a great concern to the steps of my sta citizens of my state. i would like to hear your response to that >> sir, the security of the southwest border is of great concern to the department and certainly, understand the concerns of the citizens of your state. i didn't -- if i gave you the impression that i thought the border security was what it

needed to be to protect against all the risks coming across the state, that's not what i intended to say. >> could you give us, to the committee for the record, what required to achieve 90% effective control of the border and prevent this threat from materializing? because i don't think there's any doubt. i don't see when you look at isis and the growth and the influence of isis that it would be logical, as they were saying on facebook and on twitter to come across ourál[ southwest bor because they can get across. and the flow of drugs across our southwest border has not been decreased by any significant measure. would you agree to that? >> the flow of drugs continues to be significant, yes, sir. well, those of us who strongly

supported comprehensive immigration reform are deeply disappointed in our lack of devotion of assets and funds and capabilities to secure our southwestern border, which was then created a credibility problem.e in our states and across this country. that we can guarantee people if immigration reform that there would not be another flow of refugees. and i ask(i, or illegal immigration into this country. now we have this phenomena or, i guess, occurrence of thousands of young children.

isn't this diverting the assets and the capabilities of our border patrol by having to handle this incredible influx of children from diverting them from other duties like trying to interdict drug smugglers and others. isn't it true, i could say to you and it's really astonishing to me how our friends on the left and those who are pro, quote pro immigration ignore the fact that the brutalities that are inflicted on these young people, particularly young women as they are brought across by these coyotes is absolutely abhorrent and unspeakable. would you agree with that? >> absolutely, senator. i would agree with it. and, to your earlier question,

we not only assess, we believe the border patrol has done a remarkable job in handling the uac crisis. >> but they have been diverted? right? >> it's a priority given the number of people at our border to focus on that issue and certainly with resources as they are, resources have shifted to priorities. >> so it's always been a national security issue. but i believe that in light of the growth of isis and the aggressiveness of isis and the information that they've been able to recruit in the united states of america, we know that because of americans who have been killed over there that it seems to me it dramatically heightens our requirement to have a secure southern and northern border. would you agree with that? >> absolutely agree with it, senator. >> thank you. and finally, mr. rassmussen.

another woof at the door. we've known about isis for four years. people like me and lindsey graham and many others have known about it and warned about it and talked about it while we've done nothing to really stem the tide and the growth of isis and the chaos we now see pervading iraq and syria. some of us are hopeful that the president of the united states will finally recognize that threat and outline to the american people some actions that need to be taken. but, many of us predicted this, many of us saw it coming, and it comes as no surprise. i thank you, mr. chairman. >> you're welcome. we thank you, as well. senator baldwin and senator portman. >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. taylor and mr. rassmussen, i want to talk a little bit more about the estimated, more than 100 u.s. persons who have left

to join the fight in syria. i think that's sort of how it was phrased. i just want to get a sense of, is this an estimate, or do we have a sense of actually who this 100-plus people are, names, where they're from, et cetera. how much detail do we have? are we basically just estimating it's about 100? >> i'll take a stab at that, senator. that number is actually meant to capture a number of categories of individuals. individuals who have shown an intent to travel and that travel has not happened. individuals who have traveled, individuals who have traveled and come back. individuals who have traveled and perhaps been killed in the fighting over there. that number is somewhat all encompassing and does not reflect an estimate of who is exactly there right now today. there's more we can say with greater precision in the closed session. but i think i can reassure you that we have, there's some significant detail behind that broad number.

>> great. i'm going to try to ask a couple more questions. an open session on this topic. we'll see how far we can get. with regard to that number, is there differentiation very specific differentiation between those who are actually joining isil and those, for example, i travel to turkey now over a year ago. but there were certainly american citizens of syrian descent trying to provide humanitarian relief in the fight or trying to do what they could to help the moderate rebels, the moderate elements try to participate in battle there. are we differentiating between those when we talk about these rough numbers? >> yes, we are. as i said, we are, and in some cases, we know of individuals who have indicated intent or traveled to syria.

they look to join the fight from an extremist or jihadist perspective and where they actually end up affiliating plays out over time. we may or may not have intelligence on that. you're right. the number of individuals who have traveled to syria can capture to people who engage in a wide variety of activities there. >> that 100 or whatever we're tossing around is over 100, you believe, are engaged in the battle with the isil extremists. >> with extremist elements. i want to be careful and not pin it to isil. there are a number of organizations over there. >> and i'm getting there, too. before i get to that second point, do we have a sense that our in particular our european allies have as granular information on their citizens who have traveled to syria as we do on ours?

>> i think it's not a constant picture across the whole of europe. i think in some cases with some of our partners with whom we work the most closely the answer is absolutely yes. they have a very detailed understanding of individuals, and they've done a great deal of work talking to in many cases individuals who have come back from syria. the experience those individuals had and how they may play, what contribution to the threat picture back in their homes they may present. and i know that a significant amount of law enforcement effort in the united kingdom, for example, is devoted to just that effort. in many of the particularly southern and eastern european partners, which are closer to the front line of travel to turkey and syria, their capabilities just simply are not as well developed. they're not as well resourced to handle a large national security

challenge like this in the way that some of the -- more traditional partners are. but as i pointed out in my statement, there is a bit of a good news story in that the willingness to at least lock arms with us and share information is something we've seen pretty constantly across the board. >> just for a second. senator coburn, just as member of the intel committee just shared with me a cautionary note. y'all have a good feeling for what is appropriate to say in an open setting and what is more appropriate to say in a closed setting. again, if you ask questions you think maybe should be deferred to the next part of our hearing, please do that. go right ahead. >> so do we have a sense of how many u.s. nationals are engaged with al qaeda -- greater fragmentation, even in particular, al qaeda and the

arabian peninsula. do we have that same sort of granular information there? >> again, i think it varies depending on which al qaeda affiliate group you're talking about. and we can talk about specific cases involving specific known individuals in another setting. >> and then, can you describe in open session for the committee, what we know, what our intelligence has said about the relationship between isil and al qaeda. is it rivals? cooperative? what do we know at this point about their relationship? >> well, one of the things i think has been a -- a development that we've spent a great deal of time trying to understand and assess is the degree of conflict intention between isil and core al qaeda leadership, as i said resident.