by saying, this is a particularly troubling case since congress on a bipartisan basis actually addressed this topic, the peace corps and the incidence and management of sexual assaults of volunteers abroad, and to find three years after passing that act that we're still finding problems internally with the peace corps that directly affect the victims because their cases aren't being managed sufficiently and properly and sympathetically and the i.g. has not had until the mou full cooperation from the agency is troubling, indeed. to me, circumvents both the letter as well as the spirit of the law congress passed to try to address a very sensitive but real issue affecting our peace corps volunteers. thank you, mr. chairman. >> your comments.

>> i now turn and recognize the gentleman from utah, mr. chafis. >> i thank the chairman, and thank you, the three of you, for being here. you play a vital role in the checks and balances and just good government, and i thank you for your time and your dedication for you and your staff. i'd ask unanimous consent to enter into the record the letter dated august 25th, 2014. this is a letter to chairman issa, ranking members cummings, senators carper and coburn from the 47 i.g.s. >> hearing no objection, it will be entered. >> i want to read just three sentences from this letter. the undersigned federal inspectors general write regarding the serious limitations on access to records that have recently impeded the work of inspectors general of the peace corps, the environmental protection agency and department of justice. moreover, the issues facing the d.o.j., o.i.g. and the peace

corps o. impt g. are not unique. other inspectors general have faced similar inspector generals on a claim that some other law or principle trumps the i.g. act or by agent the burden and administrative access. the inspectors general have issued this letter but i'd like to ask unanimous consent to enter into the record a letter from the director from the office of management and budget directed october 29th, 2014. >> let me read a sentence here from that response from the director of the o.m.b. and then i'd like each of you to respond to it. they don't think there's a problem. the letter, last sentence says, overall the numbers reported by the i.g.s demonstrate that federal departments and agencies in this administration valued

the work of i.g. offices and are almost uniformly successful in getting them the information they need to perform their responsibilities, end quote. this letter if you were to read this letter, the office of management and budget issuing a letter a full month after 47 i.g.s, they don't think there's a problem. how do you respond to that? start with you. >> i can only speak from experience what i've heard from other i.g.s which is we have faced roadblocks in several of our reviews, untimely access where we have gotten it, it has taken a fair amount of time. i think the other i.g.s have had their experiences and i know from conversations with fellow i.g.s where they haven't had lawyers come forward saying we can't legally give it to you, they've had issues with getting materials in a timely manner. that is a very significant issue for us. >> so when it says almost uniformly successful, how would

you characterize what you're able to access and get right now, particularly from the fbi? >> it has been an extraordinarily difficult issue for us for now several years to get prompt, timely access to materials. >> mr. elkin? >> i think there's a disconnect, and i think that statement that you just read capsulizes the disconnect. on the one hand i think what we have seen here is that we hear from time to time that, well, you know, there is substantial cooperation with the o.i.g. i mean, we've -- you know, 80%, 90% of the time there's no problems. you know, you get what you ask for, but that assumes that the other 10 to 20% of the time that we're not getting what we ask for is okay, and that suggests that it's a moving target, and that's a very slippery slope. and that is exactly, i think, why we're here today in talking

about these issues, because there is this assumption that most of the time we cooperate, and that's where the focus is at, but the real issue here is what about that 10% of the time that there is no cooperation, and that seems to just keep jumping around and jumping around. that's the problem, and i think that message says that it's a broad problem with o.m.b. and a lot of agencies. >> thank you, mr. elkin. ms. bueller. >> i agree with my esteem colleague. from our perspective, we've had an agency issue opinions or issue policies and procedures specifically stating that we can't have access to something, so it's very difficult for me to understand how it's not a problem. and i think the fact that 47 other i.g.s have at one time or another, maybe not all the time, but one time or another had problems should be an indicator

that there is a problem. >> well, thank you. again, i appreciate the great work that we do and look forward to hearing from you further. yield back. >> thanks, gentleman. i recognize the gentleman from pennsylvania, mr. cartwright. >> thank you, mr. their man. thank you for the inspectors appearing today. as the committee has previously highlighted, the offices of inspectors general are essential to the efficiency of our federal government. they help hold agencies accountable identifying misconduct in programs and by personnel. they can highlight the whole amount of waste, fraud and abuse guaranteeing that american taxpayers get the most bang for their buck. the position of i.g. is a difficult position to hold, and i.g.s are tasked with investigating alleged abuses among those with whom they work.

now, of course, however, a balance has to be struck between confidentiality and privacy rights of victims as well as whistle blowers and the needs of the inspectors general. ms. buller, i listened to your testimony closely and also your questioning by representative conl conley. as you noted, the o.i.g. recently reached this memorandum of understanding with the peace corps on how to comply with the volunteer protection act obviously many hesitate to report that out of fear, retribution and out of safety in general. there's an irony, isn't there, in that it was intended to provide tighter oversight to

make sure complainants anonymity was protected. she was murdered by her attacker when the peace corps mishandled her complaint and her identity got out. and i think mr. conley has made that point. but there's this irony that the kay puzzi act was intended to tighten confidentiality and at the same time we hear that the peace corps is saying that because of the need for confidentiality they don't want to cooperate as much with the oig. and i see that and i think probably a good thing to do this morning, ms. buller, will be for you to elaborate. you touched on it briefly in your testimony about how professional your staff is and how careful you are with an n e

anonymity. will you elaborate about procedures in place to protect anonymity? >> sure. all of my staff is required, as is peace corps staff, to comply with all of the lawsd that protect personal identifying information such as the privacy act, hipaa, things of that nature. we are all required by law to comply with those the same way that peace corps staff is. furthermore, my investigators are trained investigators. we must comply with all of the guidelines from the attorney general. we have full law enforcement authority. we participate like any other law enforcement organization, and my evaluators when they go out to a post, they go to the volunteer sight and interview volunteers and tell them they will not use their name. they're trying to find out how well peace corps is reporting volunteers. they do not use names.

they aggregate information and bring it back to issue a report to the agency to tell them that you have these problems in this area, thatç volunteers don't fl supported in another area, things of that nature. we are very professional staff and we do comply with all of the federally mandated laws. >> i thank you for that. you did say in your testimony there's never been an incidence of the office of attorney general being implicated in an disclosure of an improper identity, is that correct? >> yes. >> and there never will be, will there? >> no, there will not. >> i thank you for testimony here today. we take your testimony seriously. >> thank you. >> mr. chairman, i yield back. i thank the gentleman and before i realize myself for five minutes of questioning, i would ask that an additional document that follows up the preceding

documents, a letter addressed to the director of office management and budget on these issues and signed by our chairman and ranking member as well as corresponding and ranking member of the senate be introduced into the record. >> without objection it will be introduced. >> i thank the witnesses for being here as well and carrying on with this continued investigation to make sure that your work is accomplished. mr. horowicz, i still remember our first meeting in my office when you came in after your -- after your appointment and how direct you were about saying my job is to be the job the o.i.g. is supposed to do and to get to the bottom of the issue regardless where we find ourselves and i appreciate that. let me ask you a question relative to a fairly high

profile investigation as well as you. were there restrictions on your ability to investigate into the operation fast and furious? >> that's one of them, the investigations where the issue was first raised back in 2011 to our access. >> did you have to make document requests in writing? >> we did, and we -- the issues came up both in the context of our request for grand jury information, which as you know given the case was a criminal case were many, as well as wire tap information, as you know, from our board, there were many. >> how long did it take for you to get access to those documents? >> it took many months for this issue to be resolved, and it was resolved through an order being issued by the leadership, not through our independent access through the i.g. act. >> collaborate on that last statement a little? >> in our view, we have a right as congress has laid out in the

i.g. act in section 6a to get the materials we asked for. when we asked for materials, we asked for relevant information, responsive information and in our view we're entitled to that by law. congress has been clear. the fbi, other components in the department have taken the view that the i.g. act perhaps doesn't mean that. indeed, we've been told that that was the office of legal council's preliminary view, that it wasn't sure the i.g. act meant what it said, and as a result it required an order by the attorney general and deputy attorney general to the component that says i find these as the leadership of the department and, therefore, you can give the i.g. those materials. >> how has the requirement that the o.i.g. obtain written permission to access documents related to the fast and fire yous operation affected your office's ability to conduct a completed investigation into the matter? >> it delays -- it frequently has the impact of delaying our

views, not only because we have to being through that process to the leadership of the department but also because, frankly, it encourages other objections by other components of other issues. for example, personally identifiable information that i.g. buller has talked about. that issue was thrown up in front of one of our reviews. the fbi and the d.e.a. that's a frivolous objection and after many months of back and forth was withdrawn by the agencies and we finally got the material. >> how does all of this affect your independence? >> it compromises it in my view entirely. i should not have to go to the people i oversee for approval to get records. congress i don't think intended that. that would undercut in every way our independence. >> we certainly didn't. i appreciate that. let me ask questions of each of the panelists. other than the reason described in the letter from 47 i.g.s,

what tactics do agencies use to deny o.i.g.s access to agency records and documents? ms. buller, i'll start with you. >> in my case, we've had instances where our situation and the issue on the kay puziac has bled into other areas. for example, they redid the case or crime reporting management system for standard reports, and when they did that we were denied access to that for no reason because they were not restricted report. so we had to go back to the general counsel and had to -- i had to go to the director of the agency and make a personal plea to get the information that we had been getting all along reinstated to us. it just -- once you start down the road where they're preventing you from getting information it pops up in different places and unexpected places. >> mr. elkins?

>> in my case what i see is stonewalling, to a large extent parsing out information. you ask for, you know, ten pieces of information and you get two or three pieces of information and then, you know, there wants to be a discussion on the other seven pieces of information. and then there's continually fighting and going back in meetings and at the end of the day a year later you still don't have the information. in the back of my mind what i here is cha ching, cha ching, cha ching.

access. a concrete example of what that means in a review we are doing, we asked one of the subcomponents of the fbi for an organizational chart. they told us they couldn't give it directly to us because of the standing requirement in the fbi. the materials have to go through the office of general counsel first so we were delayed for weeks from even getting an organizational chart to figure out who to talk to in the course of a review. that should not be happening. that is a waste of money as i.g. elkins just said. we have entitlement to the access to the records. i'm not sure what use there is of the resources of the fbi to it to us.

>> thank you. my time has expired. i recognize the gentle lady. >> the inspector general plays a key role in ensuring taxpayer money. i have seen firsthand their work and obstruction of their work is simplw not acceptable. so i take the concerns being aired here today very seriously and hopefully the message that my colleagues and i are sending on this point today is heard loud and clear. i'd like to discuss the concerns i have with e.p.a.'s office of security and mr. elkins, on may 7th of this year the assistant inspector general of the e.p.a. testified before the committee and raised a number of access concerns. specifically mr. sullivan expressed frustrations that the e.p.a.'s office of homeland security, ohs, was denying access to important classified

threats material that was impeding your ability to investigate threats against e.p.a. facilities and its employees. he also testified that ohs refused to share misconduct cases with his office because ohs believed it was, quote, a de facto law enforcement organization in itself. and, finally mr. sullivan raised concerns that ohs did not recognize the i.g.'s statutory authority over intrusion into computer networks, apparently denying access to classified information related to possible cyber intrusion. is that a fair summary of your concerns also with the ohs office under e.p.a.? >> yes, that is a fair characterization. >> thank you. so i understand from your testimony today that you continue to have problems with access to information from ohs, is that correct? >> yes, ma'am, that's correct. >> in june, june 19th of this year e.p.a. administrator mccarthy sent you a memo

entitled, working effectively and cooperatively, is that correct? is that correct? >> i don't recall that exact memo. june 19th? >> working effectively and cooperatively. >> yes. i do recall that, yes. >> my understanding, it attempts to construct a framework for better cooperation between ohs and your office. it lays out a dispute resolution process. hassi inthat process been used your office since receiving the memo? >> i can speak from my own opinion. no. we still have the same issues from the date of that letter. if there was a dispute process that has been used, i haven't been a part of it. >> do you think it could or should be further enhanced, this resolution process. or do you think that's hindering your work in general? >> personally i think, you know,

the i.g. act, all means all. when we ask for information and documents on individuals, that's exactly what it means. entering into a dispute resolution process sends the message that there's some wiggle room, that it can be negotiated, and i'm totally against that process. >> so the committee staff resolved this impact that you're having with e.p.a.'s office of homeland security. my understanding from your testimony, what you just said, we're still hitting roadblocks, is that correct? >> absolutely. >> what steps do you think would be helpful to resolve some of the disputes that you're having and how can this committee be helpful to you in that process? >> well, i think ultimately the administrator needs to send a clear message that the i.g. act requires absolute cooperation with the i.g. if that message is sent, i think everything would change. until we get some clear message from the administrator to that

effect, i think the status quo will continue. >> do you think the inspector is supporting ohs's position that they're a de facto law enforcement agency within the e.p.a.? >> i'm sorry, can you repeat the question? >> do you think administrator mccarthy's position or from what he has said with this -- by supporting this memo, working effectively and cooperatively and not sending out this -- you know, the statement that you should have full access, do you think he supports what ohs believes, that they are a de facto law enforcement organization within e.p.a.? >> well, you know, i don't want to put words in the administrator's mouth, but the end result is that, you know, the status quo continues so i can only infer that the administrator agrees with that. >> thank you. thank you so much, mr. chairman, for having this hearing. to the extent that this committee and its staff can be of assistance to help address

this impact, we certainly should be willing to help. again, mr. elkins, thank you for the work that you do for us and for the american taxpayer. >> thank you, ma'am. >> i yield back, mr. chairman. thank the goechtle lady. i recognize the gentleman from oklahoma, mr. langford. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you all for being here and for your work that you do every single day for the american taxpay taxpayer. we really do appreciate what you do and every one of these agencies is really important. congress established all of these agencies. they didn't appear out of dust and one day have responsibility. corning created these agencies and congress had the oversight of these agencies. what they do is bring transparency to the american taxpayer. what you're doing is vietle. with that, mr. horowitz, if i asked to see all of the pages on your desk, would you assume that's three pages or all. >> i would assume all. >> would you assume you could go back and see counsel and come

back and say, no, we decided all doesn't mean all. >> pursuing to the i.g. act, you could get everything. >> i have an issue when any agency says i know congress has rekw50ird all of these pages to be turned over but we've discussed it as an agency and we're not going to turn it over. i have an issue with any time an agency steps up and says we don't like some of the information that's coming out so we're not going to give it. >> i don't like when i read records from the attorney general when he says i have determined that providing the oig with access to it is helpful to me so i'm going to turn this over because it's helpful to me. that implies to me that he's also reviewing other documents and saying i determined that this is not helpful to me so i'm not turning it over. that is not the responsibility of the attorney general of the united states to be able to conceal documents that are not helpful and to turn over documents that are. so with that i have several questions. the roadblocks that y'all have experienced over the last several years.

mr. horowitz, you've been at this how many years? >> a little over two years. >> in what you have seen and the folks you have talked to -- mr. elkins, how long have you been at this. >> just a little over four years. >> ms. buller? >> six years. >> the question is this is obviously an old law. this is not new. this is requiring the administration, every administration, any administration to say american tax dollars are at use here. >> what have you seen and other folks that are around, some who have worked in the inspector general's office, some for decades, what are they experiencing now that has changed and has it zmangd is this normal or is something changing? i'm not asking this in a political way. i'm trying to figure out is this normal protocol from every agency? >> i can speak to my situation. i've talked to my predecessors.

it's quite clear, in our circumstances we did fbi oversight after the attacks of 9/11, after the robert hansen scandal. we were given complete access to the materials we needed. we didn't face these issues. frankly we didn't face the issues until 2010. >> are you finding foia request is coming out as fast or at equal speed than what you were getting from the incompetent be specter general's office. >> i haven't compared those so i couldn't speak to that. >> i can tell you in congress we are finding that, that at times we'll make a request of a document and a foia request happens and the foia request gets it the same day that we do, sometimes faster, so that has been an issue. mr. elkins, i have an issue with you. you're dealing with the e.p.a. you said in your oral testimony you're being blocked from the e.p.a., information they have deemed intelligence activity. tell me about that. >> yes, sir.

the e.p.a., office of homeland security has asserted that it is the primary office in e.p.a. to handle any issues related that have intelligence connected to it. unfortunately, they do not have investigation authority. there's only two entities within e.p.a. that has investigative authority. one is oig and the other is cid. it typically results where you have intelligence information where individuals inside the agency is doing something illegal, it's going to be related to employee misconduct. >> can you tell what intelligence activity is within the e.p.a.? they're saying they're withholding this information where you can't look at it because it's intelligence activities. can you tell what it is? >> to the extent they have the intelligence activities information, i don't know because they don't share that

information with us. >> this committee finds that ironic because it wasn't that long ago that we had someone sitting at the same table that pretended to be with the cia and was with the e.p.a. and for years, for years eluded e. pmp a. oversight because he claimed he was secretly working for the cia. i find it ironic that the e.p.a. is telling the o.i.g. that this is protected. i'm going to be interested to hear from the e.p.a. what intelligence activities they're doing related to the environm t environmentenvironmen environmental protection act and why they would say this is so secret that we're not going to allow the american people to see the activities and participate in oversight for that. i think that's a reasonable question to ask any agency that doesn't have investigative intelligence responsibilities, how they have created their own intelligence department. mr. chairman, thank you for

allowing me the extra secretaries and i thank you for your work. >> i thank the gentleman and i recognize the gentleman from nevada. mr. horseford. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i appreciate very much this hearing and we started off saying this will be nonpartisan. it turns into a bit more partisan than it should. the roll that the i.g. has is important and we should be working in a nonpartisan fashion to support that. mr. horowitz, i do want to follow up on your comments. the gentleman from oklahoma and to ask you to clarify a little bit based on your testimony today and your previous testimony in january ime.

i want to ask you about your problems you raised including wire tap and grand jury materials and documents related to the department of justice's use of material witness warrants. mr. horowitz, as i understand it, in specific instances you have had to seek access from the department's leadership, correct? >> that's correct. >> when testifying about this same issue before the committee on january 15th you stated, and i quote, in each instance the attorney general or deputy attorney general provided us with the ability to receive the materials. is that correct? >> that's correct. >> you also wrote in your testimony today that the department has informed you that, quote, it is their intent to grant permission to access records in future audit and reviews, is that correct? >> that's correct. >> so mr. horowitz, as a preliminary matter, has all of the information you have sought

from the department been provided to you? >> we are told that it has been. >> has any information that you have requested from the department ultimately been withheld from you? >> ultimately, no. we've gotten it after many months. >> so during the january hearing you testified that your office's access issues were, quote, not necessarily specific to this attorney general, this deputy attorney general, it is an issue that my predecessors have had to deal with, that is correct? >> it is correct that they've had to deal with timely production of material. >> so when you were asked by my good friend, the gentleman from oklahoma, is this an issue that is unique to this department's leadership, that was not the answer you just gave. >> the issue arose in 2010 when my predecessor was still there and continued beyond that. there were other issues in terms

of0>26ç timeliness, but we have had a legal objection raised by a component until then. >> i appreciate that clarification. it is my understanding that the department recently requested a formal opinion from the office  counsel to resolve a conflict of section 6a of the i.g. act and several statutes that restrict the release of certain types of protected information such as a grand jury and wire tap material. it is also my understanding that the department has told you that it is committed to working with you to provide access to all materials necessary for your office to complete its review until the olc releases its opinion. is this correct? is this a correct understanding? >> as i said in my testimony, leadership has made that clear. the problem is every day this goes on without a decision, we

are not independent. we're not acting independent. >> that is not an issue of the leadership of that department. as i -- as i testified to today. the leadership has made it clear to issue components to get us the records. the issue is whether that's really required by congress's act. >> therefore, chairman, i think to the degree there's some clarification within the sections 6 a and the statute, not as some will like to assert, schou the department's leadership and a lack of providing information that's being made clear for the record. i'm encouraged the department's leadership has been working to provide your office with access to the information it needs to do your job, including grand

jury and wire at that point ngs must be working together. i hope you continue to work together. thank you very much, mr. chairman. i yield back my time. >> i thank the gentleman. i guess i would express my pleasure at this hearing so far up until now that it has been bipartisan, nonpartisan looking for answersç of what is happeng now so that we move forward and do it right. i would state that that is what this committee has developed around, carried over and have a bipartisan fashion and nonpartisan fashion. having said that, let me recognize -- looking at the list here, mr. duncan from tennessee. >> well, thank you, mr. chairman. i'm sorry i had to preside over the house so i couldn't hear all of your -- all of your

testimony, but i introduced the original bill to create an inspector general for the tennessee valley and i've always believed very strongly in the inspector general process. it's been very, very helpful to the work of this committee, but i was really amazed by the number of inspectors general that signed this letter. i'm told it was -- i haven't tried to count them but i'm told it was 47 or something like that. that's pretty amazing. that certainly is not something that we've ever seen before so apparently there's pretty serious concern about people who are in the know so to speak. mr. horowitz, i understand there were several high profile

investigations such as in the new black panther case and the prosecution of the ted stevens and the torture memo case, other matters where your investigation has been hindered or delayed or something by the office of professional responsibility. did you tell me about that and o plain a little bit about what that's done to your work? >> certainly, congressman. the issue there is that when the congress set up the i.g. -- our i.g. office in 1998, we weren't part of the original og act. it provided that unlike with regard to all the other employees in the justin department, we don't have his

permission so as a result matters of those cases go to the office. so we have no authority to investigate those matters. >> well, i understand that. there have been high profile situations and several much lower low profile cases where there has been misconduct by department of justice lawyers. do you think that your office would be capable of investigating this type of misconduct along with the office of professional responsibility? >> i absolutely think we would have. we've demonstrated quite ably our abilities to work in the capacity of the fbi.

congress believes it's important over the independent oversight of the fbi should also exist. >> i'll ask the panel as a whole, do you feel that there's been an overclassification of documents by the departments or agencies within which you've worked or other departments that you've read or heard about? >> i have to concur with mr. horowitz, i have heard that. in my particular agency that has not been an issue, but i have heard that raised, yes. >> peace corps doesn't have original classification authority so that's really not an issue at peace corps. >> we have found some issues related to that in one of the reports we did last year and reported out on that. >> all right. thank you very much, mr. chairman. >> i thank the gentleman and the chair recognizes the gentleman

from illinois. mr. davis. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. let me begin by emphasizing how much i value the work of the inspector general's community in helping our government function better and become more efficient. so i want to thank all of you from being here. it is imperative that all inspectors general have a good relationship with the agencies they're overseeing and they have to eliminate waste, fraud and abuse in the federal government. mr. horowitz, i would like to ask about the department's overall level of cooperation with your office. you testified before the committee on january 15th of this year that, and i quote, most of our audits and reviews are conducted with full and timely cooperation from the department's components, end of

quotation. is that a correct -- >> that's correct. most of it we've had full cooperation. >> would it be fair to say that the access concerns you raised in your testimony are limited to specific instances and not representative of a larger scale agency wide problem? >> i would say there are limited reviews where we've had this problem. the problem though is as i.g. elkins and i.g. buller says, it takes on a life of its own. we get what i think are frivolous objections and other instances that don't have to go to the attorney general or deputy attorney general because i'm able to work them out at the d.e.a. or fbi, wherever it is. these problems, once some people see they can object, you get more and more objections. >> october 13 through march 2014

report-in period states that it has closed 184 investigations, issued 35 audit reports and made 137 recommendations for management improvement, is that correct? >> that's correct. >> the report mentions, for example, that your office issued an audit of the department's efforts to address mortgage fraud and the department agreed with all seven of the i.g.'s recommendations, is that correct. >> that's correct. >> they also watched the terrorist watch lists and practices and issued 12 recommendations, all of which the fbi agreed with. is that correct? >> that's correct. >> mr. horowitz, can you then give us an overview of how it

stream lined costs and improved the department's commands. >> we make these to do precisely that. we can advise the agency leadership what steps need to be taken but the congress itself as it does the oversight. the recommendations we make go to the deficiencies we find, either management or waste, fraud, misuse that save the taxpayers every year tens of millions of dollars. >> then it sounds to me like your office is doing a great deal of very valuable work to ensure that the agency maintains high standards of integrity and accountability. i want to commend you for your efforts and i want to thank all of you for clarifying, testifying and given us the insurance that we need to have,

to know that you're doing good work and that the oversight of our government is in good hands. mr. chairman, i thank you and yield back the balance of my time. >> i thank the gentleman and the chair recognizes himself for five minutes. thank you, all of you, for your testimony, mr. elkins in particular. welcome. it's been a real pleasure to work with you in a non-partisan way. i think all of us here would agree that we don't want republicans, democrats or agencies to influence your work. indeed, it needs to be independent. that the american taxpayers depend on your work and so i want to say thank you to each one of you. ms. buller, i want to start with you. if this continued stonewalling of access to documents, what kind of harm -- potential harm

could you see that would come forward with this specifically with your work. >> well, in our daze case we do have the memorandum of understanding so we are somewhat receiving information but the problem with that is it's a temporary measure and we can't rely on it being there because it can be taken away at any time. if we don't receive access to the information that we need, we can't ensure the volunteers who have been victims of sexual assault are receiving the types of care and services that they need and are entitled to in order for them to move on with their lives. >> so is it your testimony today that victims might continually continue to suffer if you don't get the kind of access to documents that is outlined in the memo of understanding, but this they quit providing that, could victims continue to be harmed? >> we'll never be able to tell. that's the big problem.

we won't be able to tell whether it's doing what it's supposed to do or if they're participating in a poorer way than before. we'll only be able to tell like we did in 2010 and complain about their treatment. >> what rationale is out there to preclude you from getting information that could be deemed beneficial to the american people? why should they withhold stuff from you? mr. elkins, we start with you. >> yes, sir, that's a -- i think that's a good question. i scratch my head sometimes trying to figure out the answer to that, but it seems to me sometimes some of these -- some of these defenses are made out of whole cloth. you know, they just kind of pop up. you know, based on the circumstances.

so it's -- it's land come to, and that's part of the problem. >> so there are times when he will very willingly give you the information and other times you have it. >> is that because the boys working for you are somewhat inferior to those of the agencies? >> well, no. no. >> i would hope you would answer that in that manner. what you're saying is the professionalism of your boys would be equal with the agency? >> oh, absolutely. do you think that the level of professionalism within their concerns is equal to that as a hole. >> would you agree with that? mr. horowicz -- >> we have a track record of

potential victim, is that correct? >> that's correct. >> so if we have all of these, then what is the real genesis of this whole problem with why they do not want to share it with really the only independent source to protect the american

people, what is the reason these agencies would do that, mr. elkins? >> it seems to me, there may be a belief that the i.g. act doesn't mean what it says that it means or -- >> so has this been a new revelation, that all of a sudden we have this new revelation in the last couple years that it doesn't mean that or why did they come to this conclusion recently? >> that's a good question and that's probably one that you didn't have to -- >> so we've got new counsel that's interpreting it a little bit differently. so from what you're saying is it's a bipartisan solution. we need to make sure you come together and say, we mean what we say. >> one thing, sir, there is no enforcement in the i.g. act. >> i'm going to close with this. what would be the great enforcement mechanism? if they don't give you 100% of

the documents, you'll cut your budget back? >> sir, i'll certainly yield. >> just one question. you are -- i'm just trying to figure out what you are able to get under the memorandum of understanding. let's say, for example, someone is raped. you -- right now you can get the -- what can you get? >> right now we can get access to the restricted report that's filed in the incident report. we may have more difficulty getting other information concerning that particular incident because we can't -- we don't have a personally identifying number or anything to associate with it. >> so you can get the details of the rape? because i'm -- i'm kind of confused when i looked at what you agreed to.

go ahead. >> with the exception of explicit details, and we've tried to define that mou add anything to our review. >> i see. all right. thank you. >> i think the jat -- the chair is going to recognize the gentleman from oklahoma for four minutes. >> thank you. i need to follow up. one of the documents provided with background information about grand jury investigations. specifically about an oklahoma case that i want to bring up to you. in the 1990s the office of inspector general requested information about related to an fbi agent's testimony and the bureau of prisons around a gentleman who died in the federal bureau of prisons. there was a very controversial case in oklahoma. there was a lot that happened around that case. still a lot of questions still

spin around that death in oklahoma. i want to ask why you're bringing this up. >> so this is now the 1997, 1998 time period. our office was involved in the misconduct review related to that matter. we needed grand jury information. the justice department supported our right of access to grand jury information. and went to court to two different federal judges in oklahoma to confirm that the department's reading of the grand jury statute allowed them to give us those materials. the two judges both said, you justice department are right. and under the law, you ig is entitled to get these grand jury materials. to our mind that should have

resolved this issue that's now 15 years ago. two federal judges have both ruled. they are article 3 judgeless. we are at a loss to understand why non-constitutional officers would be deciding the issue any differently. >> so fast forward to today and what you are dealing with. you are not getting access to grand jury information currently, is that correct. >> we're not entitled as a matter of lawyer. we have to get the approval. >> at that point, you now have to make a request and the attorney general can say, i either want to you have this or i don't want to you have this? it goes back to earlier statements that he has the ability to say this helps or doesn't help me? so i'm going to give it to you not based on i've made the ", a federal judge has ruled on this in oklahoma, this is resolved? is that correct or not correct? >> it's left to the decision of the attorney general of the depp attorney general. >> rather than i make the request, you are entitled to

that? >> correct. ho y >> how many cases are out there like that? hour many cases you are getting delayed or par shtial response some date in the future? you testified you are getting records. you are not getting them in a timely manmanner. >> we have have had the legal objection raised or the timeliness issue come up in the last two years. i could probably make an even longer list if i went through with my staff. >> thank you. i appreciate you allowing me to ask that oklahoma related question. >> i thank the gentleman from oklahoma. the chair recognizes the ranking member. sgli wa >> i want to thank you for being here today. these disputes are very serious because they, without a doubt, impede you from doing your work.

on the other hand, of course, you have the agencies, such as, i guess in all these cases who site laws that conflict with your duties and your -- the rules and regulations that you operate under. it seems like we ought to be able to resolve this. i have two concerns. one is if we were to pass legislation and sharing your viewpoint and if we -- if it does not prevail, that makes your present position weaker. the other thing i'm concerned about is that if we were to do a

un v un v universal thing, i don't know what that is. considering what the chairman talked about in executive order, i think the president would face the same kind of problem with regard to what that universe is. but there's got to be a way to deal with this. the reason why i keep coming back to you is because -- i mean, when we have an agency that -- when you have an ig office whose duty it is to get information and protect these victims and not be trusted with the information, you know, it

seems like there's something missing there that we ought to be able to get to the bottom line is, how do we protect victim i victims? we're going to put our heads together and see what we can do to try to resolve these issues. but they are -- they are serious issues. i would imagine that if the agencies came in, they probably would say, you know, we really do believe in what we're doing. we're trying to obey the law, too. it's going to take a little bit of effort. a lot of effort. but i do believe that we should be able to resolve this. do you all -- my last question. do you all believe in executive order is the answer? >> i think anything that sends a very strong message to agencies that the ig is there to perform

oversight and in order to provide that they need access to agency records. anything that is very clear and states that without exception i think would help. >> i agree that executive order would be helpful. you know, also, i would like to remind the panel here that administrative law cases, there's a very rock solid case that agencies rely on to determine whether or not de deference should be played to an agency that has jurisdiction. there should be a certain amount of deference to our interpretation as to what our access should be. that deference is not given to us. agencies would use that all the time. when we try to assert a chevron

argument, it's ignored. >> i would agree with you, congressman, that a clarification is critical. an executive order, a prompt olc decision. we have been waiting for a few months that would say what does the law mean. that's the objection we're getting at some level, which is congress didn't mean in 6a what we all think it means. the fbi is reinterpreting statu statutes. others in my agency, other inspectors general have said the same thing. they are trying to interpret what congress meant. so it's really all your issue here that you have the executive branch, in my case olc which speaks for the executive branch, trying to divine what it means is we think has always been the case at least until 2010 when the fbi general council race e an objection. we need clarity on that issue.

an executive order go t. would . congress can decide whether to fix 6a. that's what we need. >> thank you all very much. >> i thank each of you for your testimony. i think today highlights really in a bipartisan way the need for full discloser to the oig not just to the agencies that you oversee but across the board. some of the testimony that you have given us gives us great pause, because sometimes we look at these things as just administrative. and yet, the victims that you have discussed are real. i don't believe that we can tolerate the lack of cooperation.

ultimately, the information that these agencies have belong to the american taxpayers. they are not proprietary to an agency. they are not proprietary to congress or to you. they belong to the american taxpayers. what we must do is have full and complete disclosure. to give the best example, if the irs comes in and does an audit, i don't know the universe of which they may be asking for when they say they want the documents. they mean they want all the documents. i would suggest that that simple test be one that the agencies hear loud and clear. that when you request it, they are to provide it. and then we are going to hold you accountable to make sure that those disclosures and the integrity and professionalism that each one of you have assured me that you have, that

gets abided by. because a fracture there really does irreparable harm. we have a lot of great federal workers. for many of the american taxpayers, that is the only thing though can believe in to hold the agencies accountable of the you know many i particular district, i have an issue going on for 25 years with the epa. they have not confidence. the democrats, republicans, unaffiliated, none of thechl have con -- none of them have confidence. truly their last hope is your office. and your involvement with the independence of that and the full discloser is what they are counting on. so i think that that can be e o echoed across all of oigs. i thank you for your testimony. i thank the ranking member for his closing comments.

i look forward to you providing to this company three recommendations on how we can help with the enforcement component, the sticker, the care that we need to have. i need to know three suggestions that you might have that we can encourage these agencies to deserve. with that, i adjourn this áxk3çó

on our next washington journal, we will get your ro action to president obama's speech laying out a strategy to combat the terrorist grew isis. we will take your phone calls and you can join the conversation on facebook and twitter. we will talk to "new york times" national security correspondence david sanger about the anniversary of the september 11th attacks. washington journal live each morning at 7:00 eastern on c-span. thursday we bring you live coverage of the a ceremony marking the 13th anniversary of the september 11th attacks from new york city. you can see the event from the world trade center's national

memorial plaza at 8:30 a.m. here on c-span3. >> here with a few of the comments we have recently reviewed from our viewers. >> i want to say what -- i thought mark was on c-span today the 10th of august, i thought he was really balanced and getting really good insight into some of the things that have been posted over the last few weeks. so i just thank you for a brilliant show this morning. >> a lot of people, a lot of customers don't get access to c-span3. cable companies they have so many channels available. so going forward, you will have all three access channels available to all cable customers. i hope c-span radio is expanded

more. and i hope c-span kcontinues. >> i have been watching c-span3 this weekend. it's one show after the other. the berlin wall, trying to think of the panama canal. i'm missing many of them. they are just very enjoyable to watch. very informative, very entert n entertaining. for those of us who find this historical information very interesting, it's really the place to be. i mean, i certainly watch other c c-spans as well.

but the c-span3 this weekend has been so wonderful. >> let us know what you think about t about the programs you are watching. next, a discussion on the current state of affairs between russia and the united states. armed control and security policy. george washington university in washington, d.c. hosted this 90-minute event. >> good afternoon, everyone. welcome to gw's elliott school of international affairs.

we at institute are delighted to host this event on the us/russian nuclear relationship. today's panel is a rollout of of a new working paper produced under the auspices of the workiwor working group which i happen to be a part of. you should have gotten a copy of over on the table there. towa now, we all know that over the last several months, u.s. russian sharelations have been dominated about the ukraine crisis. it's not entirely to blame or even really pamainly to blame i the nuclear relationship. but it has sharpened them. for now the united states and russia continue to implement the

new start treaty that they concluded four years. it should come as no surprise that we have hit a large roadblock in our efforts to found a path to nuclear arms reduction and in addressing other issues. some fear that advances in arms control that we have obtained can be rolled back including are regard to the nuclear treaty that the u.s. government declared russia in violation of. they were tasked with finding a solution. and i'm happy to say, they have found a solution. it's one of many. it's worth debating. it may have its detractors. but i would say that it's a approximate promising one. the fact this we can have

scholars to devise something is something we can appreciate. before i introduce our speakers, i want to give the floor to my colleague who is the professor of government and russian studies. he is the co-chair on the future of u.s. russian relations. >> thanks. very briefly, some of you think i have been to other presentations of papers. i don't see as many familiar faces as the last time. i'm going to give you a compressed version. our project has been around now for several years. we got started in the reset period. the obama reset. i don't think we were primarily stimulated by that. but it didn't hurt. our objective was really pretty simp

simple. it was to bring together a modestly-sized group, roughly a dozen on both sides, of specialists from the two countries, equal in measure, funded by sources on either side of the border, so to say. in our case, the support at least in the last year or two has come almost entirely from the carnegie corporation of new york for which we are grateful. the davis center at harvard is the organizational pin for this. on the russian side, our main partner is the higher school of economics, which is one of russia's leading research universities. and in terms of putting this together, i guess what we aspired to with as toss moving beyond headline drive an analys, moving beyond rekrim nation about failures in the past.

we called it the working group open the future. we didn't know what the near to future held. it's not fulfilled all of our hopes. we haven't given up yet. the group, as i said, is from the two countries in equal proportions. we wanted to give priority to younger scholars, was to draw the younger experts in russian s and our country into this conversation. most of the participants are from younger cohorts. we also wanted to do something to bridge what is a certain grab, i think, sometimes in perspectives between university-base academics and think tank types, especially on the american side. this is of some relevance on the russian side.

we do this a couple of times a year. we have an extended meeting in moscow or in washington or in massachusetts. and we address a single large theme, which we a -- which we select through consensus. sam, from iiss sitting here here put this in an interesting way. we should try to do is untie some of the knots in this relationship. so fixing the u.s. russian relationship is not a new challenge. we have been try doing this for decades. now post 1991 and there are recurrent problems that never seem to go away. in addition to our discussions that we do produce work are papers -- that's why we are here today. that's an unusual characteristic of the project.

at our last meeting here, somebody said -- i think it was cliff from brookings, that we're all familiar, most of us are familiar at least with cross national or bi-national groups that discuss things or that brainstorm about things. but sitting down and writing something together, especially when your countries are not close politically is a challenging thing. a rather rare endeavor, we have managed to do it not without some difficulty at times. it has been a challenge. but we have met the challenge. we produced a series of these papers. they are available at the project website if anybody is interested. i can tell you. t we have papers that will come out in the coming months. all of them will have presentations somewhere in washington. most likely here. one of the them is on afghanistan post 2014.

one is on intervention and conflict resolution. then that is going to be a very difficult one to write. we will see. there's one forthcoming on arctic. so we are very happy to have this to share with you. without any further adieu, i will turn it over to cory to introduce our speakers today. thanks. >> thank you. first i would like to welcome here our colleague timofei bordachev. timofei is director of the center for comprehensive europe yand affairs, which is a national

research university. at the higher school, he directs the masters degree program. he has authored several books in russia and several scores of articles on matters of internal at yale. so with all of those introductions du s done, we wil

begin with timofei. >> thank you very much, cory. first i must say that i'm grateful for george washington university for hosting this event. especially because in my view this is very important. to speak for the russian and american scholars about the issues which are of vital importance for both countries. as i believe, only considering the issues of vital not secondary, third importance for both countries, we can find sustainable long-term solutions for aour relationship and to understand how to provide with the concrete diplomacy of the future. secondly, i must say that i do believe that we are entering --

we entered the new stage of the international relations. of course, we should not rely on the historic examples. but the most opportunistic historical comparison would be the 19th century when diplomacy did not mean finding solution but diplomacy meant avoiding the conflict. and keeping the peace. so i think that with our paper, the intention of which has been developed already about two years ago, we are trying to understand how both russia and the united states can, while keeping their own national interests, develop their sustainable relationship in the

future. the relationship which are not going to be friendly. the relationship which are going to be mutually respectful. why do we believe that it is possible? because despite of the recent grievance of the relationship, the cold war in its classic sense has a systemic confrontation is over, it's not going to be back. but yet, cold war thinking and the international system forced during cold war remains and accepted reference port for con temporary writing on security relationship. even those now -- even those colleagues who propose new models of international security

refer to the cold war because the nuclear weapons and political legal parameters were created during this period of nuclear confrontation. but we believe that the period of cold war and the institutions, norms and methods of interaction developed during that period was not abnormality. was exclusion from the history of humanity. and now we are going back to the normality of the international relationship. this normality requires to develop much more flexible techniques of interester action. the cold war rivalry between the soviet union and the unit had characteristics which made

it very discontinuitinctivcontt. first, the competition between super powers was base on enmitty. both sides had the ability and willingness to destroy the other. third, the ussr and the u.s. had symmetrical power and force. the rivals faced a limited number of other forces. neither has been in place between the great powers before 1948 or is going to be in the future. now all our -- both our countries face the multiple security frets. there is no emmity.

there is anonymity between them. there is an ability to destroy them and the willingness is not in place. last but not least, the power and force of russia and the unit are in no way symmetrical. proceeding from these four major presumptions, we suggest the new approach to the strategic not s symmetry but combatabilitcombat. >> thank you. thank you, tim for the kind introduction and to gw for

hosting us today. to f to follow along with what timofei was introducing, the end of arms control. arms controlled emerged in a cold war context. in particular in the 1950s where the primary threat as perceived by soeviet un r uioned ath ed a states was the surprise. there is limited monitoring. we don't have a lot of information about either side. as timofei pointed out, there's a period of -- the desire to annihilate the other side. there was considerable fear that one side would initiate a launch and try to wipe out the nuclear forces of the other side.

the solution that arms control analysts, particularly those in the united states, great minds, came up with was that we needed to preserve a secure second strike capability. there had to be mutually assured destruction. and that meant that each side had to be able to withstand that initial strike and respond after that strike was experienced with a lethal blow in return. this would provide conditioned in which in the moment of crisis you could be patient. if you knew you could strike back the dead hand could launch missiles to the other side it would provide no incentive to use nuclear weapons. no one to have an incentive to strike first because the answer was taken for granted. in the con testimony te-- we do

not assume that the united states and russia have friendly relations. in fact, we work from the assumption that the relationship will continue to be bad. that trust will not be a defining feature of the this relationship for the foreseeable future. but nonetheless, the idea that we will wake up one day and experience a full-scale nuclear conflict is unlikely. the idea we would use that as a basis for planning is ludicrous. not just just, but there's better monitoring. we're not in the 1950s. we have ways of looking into the other side to see whether preparations for launch are taking place. there's no longer a risk of surprise, even if there were a risk of initial strike. with the improved relations and

transpa transpa tra tra transpa transparency, we no long ver ha to be surprised. the tried ahaving aircraft, land-based icbms, the combination which required an enormous arsenal on both sides is an expense that neeither sid needs to foot. what we advocate sis a mentally effective offensive. the logic behind this is that we would have time in a crisis and an awareness of what the other side was doing so that we would only have to strike the other side with one nuclear strike. we wouldn't have to withstand a strike in order to be able to respond. that is sufficient deterrence. that most of the cold war we did not have a secure second strike capability. even the darkest days in the

early cold war, no one had this capability. but a nuclear deterrence was sufficient to sharpen minds. we think that in the contemporary period when relations are marginally better that that can continue to hold. we place ourselves between the past of the cold war, the mutually assured destruction and calls for a nuclear zero, the elimination of nuclear weapons. we don't think that's a good idea. it plays an important role. it plays an important role for russia because the conventional capabilities of russia and the unit are to longer comparable. the united states has a greater superiority in conventional weaponry and war fighting ability. and that removing nuclear

weapons would leave a very insecure russia. they are not likely to do it. an insecure russia is not good for the stability of the relationship. second, many of the things that we thought were destabilizing during cold war are not destabilizing. missile defenses. if you want to ensure that a second strike is effective, a missile defense system say bad thing. the few weapons that remain might be able to be culled by missile defenses. you are not concerned about that, if you are only concerned with having an offensive capability, a first strike capability and both sides have the capability of penetrating each other's missile defenses, which is going to be the case for the future with the united states and russia, then missile defenses are not destabilizing. they can be stabilizing with

dealing with third parties that don't have the same speed or accuracy or mult men multiple r vehicles. so even if the united states were to develop missing defenses unilaterally, so long as russia preserved its offensive capabilities, this is not a threat. it is not destabilizing. two country can deter one other. third, in keeping with this, the arsenals do not need to be the same. parody was very important in a cold war context. the balance needed to be preserved. that if one arsenal got too large, it raised the prospect that that strike would be so effective that a second strike could not be launched. if we're not concerned about that, if all we need to do is maintain an effective first

strike capability, then the size of the arsenal that one has depends on your other capabilities. the united states could maintain a smaller nuclear arsenal because of our extensive conventional capabilities. all we need is to be able to deal with a first strike against multiple threats. not just russia but china and other countries. russia, to counteract u.s. defense es might need to mainta a larger nuclear arsenal because they would have to counteract u.s. missile defense edefenses. russia could have more weapons. it would the not be alarming to the united states. if fact, each country should reduce to the level at which they feel secure. we do not need international agreements to achieve this. we don't need the arms control

paradigm. each country can achieve the equilibrium. now i say that -- we say that this does not require treaties. that's true. it could be done un lotteriry. just as the united states about gated the abm treaty, russia may need to qualify its treaty vfcmó obligations, for example, with intermediate nuclear forces to deal with threats like chi"xdch. we should acknowledge that what we need to do to provide for a secure russia doesn't hurt our interests. we should accept that. so the long and unlikely to be

successful noel successful negotiation that treaty negotiations entail is not likely to be necessary and we should dispense with it. in many ways it leads to disappointment and friction between the two countries. fourth and finally, there was something good about the cold war treaties. that we may not need to do things bthing s bilaterally anymore. but those treat yiies provide verification and observation, particularly the later treaties in the cold war that we think are important. transparency is important where countries develop their own security strategies. capabilities and ideally intere interest as well, to maintain a system without treaties and agreements, it will require

considerablebly more contact, a lot more information passing between the two sides. ideally we could have something like closed circuit cameras in launch sites so that we could observe immediately if there were preparations for launch which would make the launch on warning system that we're discussing much more stable. you could see quite clearly whether the other side was preparing an attack or not. ultimately, we're entering a world where cooperation is not likely but coordination and x compatability is attainable. something we're aware of each other's vital interests. where our force structures are such that provide for our own security and we provide for a stable deterrence against one another so that war between the united states and russia is very unlikely. but that is also allows us to deal with third party threats like china or non-state actors.

in fact, it's even conceivable that we could cooperate in the not distant future or dealing with those threats. thank you and we will leave it at that. >> thank you very much, timofei and keith. i would be happy to open up for discussion. i have a few questions of my own. will hold them back for now. >> i was a student in the soviet union during the cold war. one difference now that disturbs me. the soviet students i met really did not believe in the etiology. you could see, you could tell from talking to them. when the cold war began to melt,

you could see it was like pushing on an open door. the cold war was a struggle elites. i didn't have the sense that it was in the emotions of the people themselves, neither here nor there. now i'm concerned that's changing. that there is a sense of bet betrayal felt by the people in russia who thought the united states and west would accept them and who feel that wasn't done. that something changed in the emotions of the people. that is directed to mr. bordachev. either one of you can address this. i don't see this discussed much. it does concern me. that would be harder to correct. sg >> i must agree. it will sound very undemocratic,

but i am advocating in my country the view that ordinary people should be much less engaged into discussion. and development and advocating of the international affairs. so i'm very conservative, if you want, very orthodox. i'm afraid the public into the discussion of international affairs is -- is over reaching the acceptable limits and needs to be reduced. coming back to our paper, i must say it might be considered as one of the breaks which will

help to -- which can potentially help to build the relationship which are not touching the hearts of the people but keep the important issues of national survival on the level of interest and intergovernmental dialogue. i'm sorry. my english is not enough to say something on this. >> your english is excellent. i would say that part of what we're advocating -- you speak of a deep das poiisappointment. the reset that we are talking about is not a reset towards the fantasy of warmth in the relationship between the united states and russia. it's a reset towards a realism about the coldness of that relationship which will row duce

those expectations in many ways but normalize a relationship based on strategic interests. so that it doesn't lead to that kind of resentment, hostility. that in many ways, that's a product of the new thinking end of the cold war expectation that the united states is going to come in and we're going to live happily together in one european happy family. that is not the way international politics works. that's not the way it has turned out in the post cold war period. a much more realistic set of expectations might ameal juror rate that. >> i thank you for the presentation. i want to ask both speakers

something about the military doctrine of russia being in the process of being reformulated. we are told in december the new doctrine will be made public. they also give actually signals about the intentions of countries. judging by articles and other newspapers close to the military industrial complex in russia, it seems that this new doctrine will be formulated in more aggressive terms in the sense nuclear and tactical strikes are not just a method of, let's say, a last resort but they will actually be used in a very aggressive and very forward moving fashion as soon as a certain level of threat is perceived do you see in i chance this this kind of sober approach that you are proposing here will actually make its entry into

this new doctrine? is this based on your ideas on your developments that you are are yourselves have worked on or does this reflect also maybe a more technical approach in -- among russian military circles that is kind of above or below the current media hysteria that surrounds this question? >> i will start. one of the interesting things about this project in doing the rv research was going into the different strategies that existed in the cold war which don't follow in nice clear statements like -- you can get in the u.s. national security archives. this doctrine is not a significant change from the soviet position on nuclear weapons.

they were always just weapons. usab usable, in event -- they have retained an enormous arsenal of nuclear artillery, short-range nuclear weapons. precisely because this was always part of their war fighting doctrine. i think it's telling that they have not been used. and i think it's likely that they would continue to not to be used. but an awareness that nuclear weapons are weapons, that they are not there for some abstract notion of preserves destruction. they are there for use and they have a deterrence function is not unreasonable. i think that could have the benefit of instilling caution. i this it has had the benefit of instilling caution in the crisis in ukraine.

that the level of engagement we have not pursued military engage innocent in ukraine because russia is a nuclear power. i don't think that this is a huges# departure from russian soviet positions in past. i don't think it's terribly out of line with our own thinking.a u.s. thinking on nuclear weapons. i think doesn't have to be destabilizing. >> i agree. though i do not belong to the russian security military community. neither he belongs. though i don't belong to russian military community, i think that the reflection is going on and the new doctrine is going to be one of the products of this reflection. the security community adapts much more flexible approach to

security planning, taking into consideration that the new threats can emerge on the borders suddenly. consider i considering the middle east r h russian chinese relations are friendly, though it does not prevent both sides from taking it a certain security measures and we're not -- we don't flow what is going to happen on the asian pacific in decades to come. i would agree with keith that this approach is not very much different from what has been developed in the soviet russian military thinking after the second world war, after the emerge ens of nuclear warms. in our paper on the basis of the documents we started, we write

that the nuclear weapons have been considered as another but strong weapon, not as a weapon of the last judgment day but as another instrument. >> thanks. congratulations to both of you on having seen the paper developed. it's quite an impressive document as it turned out in the end. i have a couple of questions first to pick up on keith's last point. in anying about how either american or russian officials would react to the change that you are proposing, it strikes me that current, not soviet era but current russian officials would be far harder to sell on this and that they have somehow become more -- better students than their american

counterparts. and more, in fact, interested in concepts like a secure second strike and focused on the utility of nuclear weapons in this -- as timofei put it this judgment day moment. what happened? how do we understand how we went from war fighting approach to nuclear weapons to what we have today? were they reading shelling in the 1990s and something happened in the last ten years? that's the first question. the second on this question about arms control and transparen transparency. it's worth thinking about how we achieve transparency without arms control agreements. they have been the only means historically of providing for it. the data exchange and

inspections and even the commitment not to mess with the other side's national technical means only are legally binding in the context of arms control. those are all part of the new treaty. verifying compliant with arms control treaty is the only way we figured out to do this kind of transparency you described. we could, theoretically, i suppose have a legally binding mechanism for that. but we never have had that before. finally, i guess, the question about whether you are talking about all nuclear weapons or just strategic nuclear weapons. does the same principals you are talking about the report apply to non-strategic weapons?

for -- tactical nukes? >> thank you. this paper is about to change how we think about it. how we think about the issue. how we look at the issue. and this is for the lawyers how to -- what legal framework can be found to assure that transparency. and i do believe that both russia and the united states have very good lawyers to take care about this. we do care about political issues. but maybe keith will add something on this as well. i think that the issue -- the issue as such has been neglected by the russians have strategic theorists. now the situation -- debate was

predominant by the classic american approach. so now the situation is changes. as we could see it in moscow, we have more and more intensive debate inside russia which incorporateds not only what we inherited from the 1990, but also the just weapon soviet traditional approach. we had how many -- seven generals present during our -- the launch of the painer in mpe. we had seven retired agains -- russian -- >> neither side was approving of the idea of reducing --

>> here we have five future generals, i think. so we think that the debate is now developing more and more in russia on this issue. >> i think that it's not necessarily an argument of principal. on the russian side. the adoption of second strike capability strategic stability and the shelling cold war sense. i think it justifies larger military budgets. i think this is a time in the soviet union they didn't need to worry about that. in the contemporary context, they need to worry about it. it's a way of articulating strategic concept that justifies much more military spending. particularly on the rocket forces. and the topgenerals were in moscow. they were aggressive about how

this was an insane proposal. but the argument, i think, continues to hold, which is that what we be the harm in unilaterally reducing your nuclear arsenal to the level at which you could simply destroy the other country? it's a powerful deterrence in and of itself. i think that's a very subversive concept for defense complexed that have relied on significant military spending and all that goes with it. you raise a very good point about transparency and how do we achieve it? it was an accident of the arms control agreements. it turns tout be the best feature of them. i think we should be focusing on agreements that simply provide transparency. without the incentive of arms control agreement which we are

unlikely to achieve. we would be likely to achieve the transparency component, the verification. because both sides have an interest in that. i think, you know, russia would be very interested in making sure that we are not mobilizing to attack. we're very interested in making sure that russia does not mobilize to attack in response to these crises. and we're facing a lot of crises these days. i think we will all sleep better if we have those verification and transparency. >> whether we are talking about strategic nuclear weapons, in many ways, we are advocating classic deterrents. deterrents that aren't base owned a particular obstruction but just straight out deterrents. the ability to deter the enemy from fighting because you have capability. to the extent that those capabilities involve

intermediate range cruise missiles or nuclear artillery might enhance deterrents as well. the problem is with respect to interested third parties that we have an interest in and extended deterrents. so if we're concerned about the baltics or concerned about ukraine, then limiting those, the battlefield nuclear weapons, and removing them from a strategic doctrine that would advocate their use, might be a way of limiting conflicts in the future. but the conflict remained relatively limited. even though that is part of the doctrine and the weapons have been there the entire time. i think it can be managed with a much more inclusive and broad notion of weaponry. not just nuclear weaponry and that we are moving towards a classic detrancedeterants model.

>> so i was in on the discussion from the very beginning and the question didn't seem that pertinent when we got started, when you got started, down this road. and it's about the implications -- well, the intersection between your paper and recent events. and thinking especially about ukraine. so if keith is right, in saying that russia in possession of nukes has moderated what might have been an excessive american or unrealistic american reaction of some kind, let's say that's true and ukrainians make note of this, so the lord knows we've had enough difficulties in recent months. but there's one issue on which russia would make more sense if russian policy shifts. that is on the question of nato enlargement. so, what if a ukrainian leadership takes the lesson from recent events that either it has

to nuclearize ukraine and ukraine of course is a denuclearized state in a very specific sense, that it has physical custody over weapons that it actually couldn't fire, but nonetheless sort of had them. it gave them up and now is in this very difficult situation with its neighbor. or alternatively, if it's nukes that buy you safety or that build a stability, if you can't build your own, and ukrainians could do this only against the, i'm sure, very, very stiff resistance of the united states and nato who would want them do that. but of course, the alternative would be to join them under the nuclear umbrella. so, is this possible? is it possible that this is an unintended side consequence of what you're proposing and is there a nonproliferation and alliance building side story here that might be interesting?

>> i think that's a false choice. nuclearize ornato to provide your own security. ukraine completely neglected its conventional capabilities or 25 years. that's why ukraine is in the situation it is in now. in addition to the fact that a social movement overthrew the government, and that the government lacks legitimacy in part of the country that created the conditions in which it would grow. there is no question that separatism was by russia. i'm not denying that. but the real problem is that ukraine lack estate capacity, its own functioning conventional military. nuclear weapons, i don't think, would solve this particular problem. would ukraine fire nuclear weapons at moscow because of what's going on? i think so, if they had them.

we had us is session in chechnya. i think this is a different type of problem. these weapons play a different role in relation answers achieving deterrents with great powers like the united states. they don't play a very important role in dealing with internal challenges like the ones that out cranian government is facing now. and that russia is indeed exacerbating. so i don't think that they -- i think that ukraine's choice is not nuclearize ornato. but it is build a state or die. and effectively achieve legitimacy. and that's a hard task for them but it can be done. [ inaudible ] >> it is a political problem. yeah. it is not a military problem at its core. it is a political problem. >> -- creating institutions, removing from the power, removing private military companies, removing the private

military formations and, by the way, if ukraine could have been a nuclear state, with such a big amount of the private and nationalistic troops, who could absolutely assure that nuclear weapons won't get to the wrong hands for those who can employ them even regardless of the intentions of the ukrainian or american government. i have a quick question about the role of conflicting strategies in other countries, for example, in syria, between the united states and russia and how those -- the conflicting

strategies that both countries will effect the strategic combatbility of the two countries. so how will dealing with the situation specifically if syria affect the compatibility of the two nations? >> i think that strategic combatbility gives us reasonably sustainable framework of the relationship and limit beyond which we cannot grow. i think combatbility will give our -- are these correct words -- selfish words in our diplomatic action and it makes the diplomatic action more solid on the both sides and from the russian side and i think that the strategic combatbility when it deals with the problems like

syria problem is more about bilateral relations. but not about the dealing with the complete issues, but -- >> i think in cases like syria, but if there were circumstances in which both countries perceived a vital interest with what's at stake, those are are the ones that are a real risk. so if there is a lack of a common interest in areas of vital interest, where there's equal resolve on both sides, that could escalate into a much broader conflict and would undermine the stability of the relationship. but the u.s. and russia can have very different views and pursue very different policies on a variety of different conflicts throughout the world. but not fundamentally destabilizing their relationship with one another. and i think that that is the historic norm in international politics. and i think that the key is, you

know, to have -- i would like to avoid armed confrontation between the united states and russia. but beyond that, the deterrent capability of the relative powers is not going to play a very important role. so we have limited ambitions for this model. >> i also agree and think that we enjoy the situation when vital interest, vital interests of america and russia are not contradicting. and this is one of the arguments which is in the basis of our paper. that the vital interest are not contradicting and that gives us the luxury to develop the entire conflict. >> with regard to missile defense, the country has missile defense capabilities, it will make the use of nuclear weapons

more likely because they can defend themselves against a counter strike. so i would ask that you guys would counter with comments on that. and also, you mentioned, mr. garden, that countries could unilaterally reduce missiles. and although that is not necessarily feasible in the current kind of military climate, if missile defense did become the norm between the to countries, what would that have on quantities necessary? >> missile defense is never going to be effective, or very unlikely to be effective, against a sophisticated country that can penetrate the systems. both the united states and russia have technological sophistication in weaponry that he