n fourth in the general election, finishing with fewer votes than the other third-party candidate, dixiecrat strom thurmond. this event, from the kansas city public library in missouri, is about an hour. and i want to thank lisa sullivan who has been so helpful in the past few weeks. i definitely thank her as well. two other people i wanted to thank, one i am lucky to have your tonight, my friend and colleague steve burke, who now teaches at the army war college in fort leavenworth. steve welcomed me to california

state university, northridge in 2000, and taught me how to be a professor. i appreciate that. the other person i really appreciate is my ophthalmologist. if you buy the book, you would know that the book is dedicated to my ophthalmologist. a few years ago, i had a terrible series of eye surgeries, and he literally saved my vision, and as far as i am concerned, my life, as i wanted to live it. so a little shout out to him. if you are ever in the southern california area, and you have eye troubles, look him up. he is pretty much the best there is, as far as i am concerned. i think we are going to talk specifically tonight, not on all of the different aspects of the wallace campaign, but to give you a little sliver, in particular, on wallace's tour of the south in august and september of 1948. which, i think in many ways, was an opening herald of what became the civil rights movement of the 1960's. so at the end, there is plenty of time for questions, i would be glad to answer anything on the involvement of the american

communists, which is a big part of the book on anything about foreign policy, the cold war, i would be happy to answer questions. but tonight my primary focus will be on the southern tour. let me get started. and i think i am going to use the glasses. on august 29th, 1948, henry wallace boarded a plane to norfolk, virginia, thereby launching a week-long, seven-state southern tour that would provide his third-party crusade with many of its most dramatic moments. wallace's decision to challenge segregation in the heart of the jim crow south grabbed front-page headlines across the country. winning the progressive party the most sustained media coverage it would receive throughout the campaign. had it not been for president truman's comeback, one veteran reporter later recalled, the wallace tour of the south would be the biggest political story of the year. expectant progressives's hopes ran high, many believed that wallace's trip would focus nation-wide attention on the

injustice of segregation, and more importantly, unite southern working-class blacks and whites against those exploited racial divisions. in the short-term, they hoped wallace's courageous stance would win him the votes of white liberals and african-americans in the north, and inspire a major voter registration drive for blacks in the south, giving the party the shot in the arm it so badly needed. convinced that the southern masses of both races constituted a natural alliance, wallace offered his party to the south as a vehicle for which the common man, as he always referred to the average person could challenge and ultimately overcome the dominance of the southern aristocracy, that had long prevented the development of genuine democracy in dixie. specially in the one-party south, progressives argued that the only realistic strategy to combat the wealthy white reactionaries' monopolies on political power was to build a new party to represent the

interests of farmers and working people. to build such a political force, they maintain, southerners, of both races, would understand that they needed each other's help in order to succeed. for years, segregation and the fanning of racial animosities had obstructed the progress of blacks and whites alike. but the specious barrier of racism could be overcome progressives insisted. wallace's party, his supporters believed, could be the catalyst for sweeping change. henry wallace's invasion so-called, of dixie, they hoped, might finally unleash the political progressivism that they were convinced existed in the south.

wallace's southern expedition began in virginia, where state law prohibited non-segregated public meetings. progressives had announced at the out set of their campaign, that the party's candidates would not address segregated audiences. this was a first for presidential nominees, at brief appearances before crowds in norfolk, suffolk, and richmond wallace held true to his pledge, speaking to integrated assemblies without incident. encouraged by his successful challenge to segregation, he remarked to reporters afterwards, "if what i saw in virginia today is any criterion of what we will get further on then i think i am going to be satisfied." wallace was unaware, however that the state progressive committee, hoping to avoid controversy, had issued invitations to these events, thus making them private gatherings and not subject to the law. meeting the progressives half away, the local police departments had agreed not to interfere. moreover, wallace spoke to only relatively small and

predominantly african-american crowds. the white progressive masses at the party expected to attract were nowhere in sight. by comparison, with the noisy cheering that generally greets presidential candidates on tour, one reporter noted, "mr. wallace's movements in virginia had something of the eerie quality of the old-fashioned silent movie in a theater without a piano player." [laughter] still, as their plane departed for traditionally-liberal north carolina, the wallaceites assured themselves that the success of the day's planned events spoke well of the vitality of southern progressivism. so as they got on the plane, i think they had what amounted to, i think, a false sense of security for what was coming that fused, in many ways, with their own preconceptions of what the south was going to be like. what was coming was going to be

a different story. unlike virginia, the tarheel state had no laws forbidding integrated gatherings, again, a source of hope for them. proud of their reputation for tolerance and moderation especially on the race issue white north carolinians were not immune to charges that they looked out their noses at their presumably-more backward neighbors in the rest of dixie. as the day of wallace's arrival approach, progressive party state chair mary price proudly announced that the candidate decided to spend an extra day in north carolina, because he was convinced that the most progressive state in the south could go progressive in november. i think they genuinely believed, many of these progressives, that somehow, the state of north carolina in 1948 would vote for a candidate who was openly against segregation. to my own way of thinking, i find it hard to believe that they convinced themselves of that. but i think it was genuine as they entered north carolina. these high expectations are overstated, but perhaps, at the time, they were understandable. north carolina boasted the south's most active progressive organization, it drew support from a variety of sources.

in the early days of the campaign, college students, in particular, rallied wallace's cause. even before the formation of the progressive party, a group at the university of north carolina had established a wallace presidential committee. i actually had the opportunity to talk with a few of them when i was doing the research, much older now, as i was doing my research at chapel hill. in february, organizers brought together over 130 students from across the state for a two-day rally in chapel hill. on august 3, the party defied expectations, and a good deal of white hostility, by successfully concluding a petition drive that got wallace on the ballot. they collected almost 30,000 signatures. in the process, canvassers registered blacks to vote in at least six counties where no african-american had been on the roles in over 50 years. by doing so, progressives noted, they had taken an initial step toward building the kind of broad, electoral base needed to

overthrow the old political elite, and its dual commitment to segregation and economic deprivation of the workers. one wallace advisor observed "the young black and white volunteers who spark plugged the effort demonstrated that a biracial, grassroots movement had potential to succeed in the south in 1948." most tarheel progressive activist shared this positive outlook as they prepared for the wallace visit, many were still basking in the glow of their hard-found victory. among progressives, morale was high and optimism was the order of the day. in hollywood, they call that "laying pipe." that is the background. but there is another part of the story, i think.

and you have to know that before, i think, we tell the actual events of that three-day period, because a closer look at the north carolina campaign raises doubts as to how broad-based the party was. years later, junius scales, an active participant, and at the time, an open communist party member, agreed that the effort had uncovered, what he called, a "marvelous wealth of radical populists throughout the state." "still," he noted, " a disproportionate amount of the work was done by concealed communists, many of them imported from new york city," where, as we said, most of wallace's support was. all of these men and women were instructed to keep their party affiliation secret. though they were, he said, "a great many other people supporting the campaign, in one way or another," scales did acknowledge that the communists from new york were the shock troops. when canvassers encountered hostility, usually from poor whites, many of the maverick populist would fade away leaving a small cadre of communists and their allies to fill the vacuum.

the presence of native radicals, scales believed, gave the whole campaign, what he called, "a much broader appearance that it really had." nor did the success of the petition drive necessarily indicate widespread support with the progressives. party headquarters in greensboro had advised canvassers to avoid discussion of the issues, and to base their appeals for signatures only on wallace's right to be on the ballot. so, as for the ardent left-wingers from the north, and other local activists recalled they acted somewhat like occupying troops in a foreign country. idealistic, but insufferably arrogant. they posed as deliverers, and expected to be honored as such. "it took a pretty sturdy liberal," junius scales later remarked, " to put up with some of the things that the progressive

party leaders had to take from the communist party." preferring their politics with a sharp, ideological edge, and unwilling to adjust to southern racial customs, these zealous partisans likely did more to alienate prospective political converts than to broaden the party's base. the biracial nature of the progressive coalition, likewise, remained more goal than reality in the campaign. blacks and whites work together in gathering teams in soliciting signatures from both races, but generally they received a cool response from whites. a condescending attitude of many of the more militant volunteers taken towards white textile workers, no doubt contributed to the antagonism that they encountered. "we were like missionaries, with all of the thoughts that missionaries have, it is a wonder that we weren't all lynched," said one observer afterwards. and i think we see this a lot, not just in the wallace campaign, but in many campaigns

for social justice, where people with great zeal and idealism go into an unfamiliar situation and end up creating a backlash, or they are not met with the response that they hoped they would get. i think it applies not only in domestic politics, but in foreign policies as well, this great crusading mentality can sometimes make people very, i think, committed, but at the same time, undermine their goals. i saw this a lot in the course of 1948 with the wallaceites. in any case, the party leaders emphasize the importance of establishing a presence in the working-class white areas, most volunteers actually preferred working in black neighborhoods where they ran less risk of having doors slammed in their faces. as a result, by the end of the summer, progressives had become known as "the negro party." in particular, middle-class leadership in the black community remained wary of wallace's crusade.

the durham committee on negro affairs, one of the state's influential african-american political organizations, endorsed president truman. similarly, the president of the state naacp declared that "voting for wallace was no way to solve the negro problem." they were skittish of the militants that some of the progressives were showing in the south. organized labor also was wary of wallace. in part, because of larger domestic concerns about the taft-hartley law had been passed in 1947. they feared that wallace was taking away votes from the democrats, and that a republican victory in 1948 would be bad for labor. and, accordingly, they felt that any attempt to split democratic

forces was either being orchestrated by republicans, or ill advised. so labor in the south, and throughout the country, was quite skeptical. right at the moment that wallace was arriving, an unexpected bombshell from washington undercut the progressives' popularity. on july 30, elizabeth bentley, who was known colloquially as "the blonde spy queen," testified before the house committee on un-american activities. she charged that during world war ii, mary price, the north carolina chair of the progressive party, had served as a courier for the soviet kgb. she also noted that price had been introduced to her as a member of the american communist party. the cryptic cables released in 1990 corroborate bentley's testimony, and indicate that price continued her underground activities for the soviets until at least mid-1944. in 1948, however, price flatly denied bentley's allegations, dismissing them as "fantastic." such sensational accusations

actually did sound far-fetched to north carolinians, who did know mary price, and the local press expressed skepticism of them as well. nonetheless, bentley's testimony fueled suspicions concerning communist influence in the progressive party, and for some, made a tax on the party, rhetorical and otherwise, seem more justifiable. still, charges and countercharges concerning communist influence proved less detrimental to the party than its confrontational, and at times, disingenuous approach, to opposing segregation. on august 27, mary price abruptly canceled the wallace party's reservations at the washington duke hotel, saying "because it would not accomodate black members of the entourage," as it was a segregated hotel. they hastily arranged a press conference that afternoon, as she announced to reporters that the candidate would stay instead, at the home of a wealthy, well-to-do, black durham businessman.

others in the traveling party would be lodged at the biltmore, a black hotel. this principled refusal to submit to jim crow, was, in itself, admirable, but even some progressive supporters said price's public announcement two days before the candidate's arrival had been calculated to provoke, particularly when it came to light that she had known about the hotel's policy on segregation for some time. southern papers also noted that on previous speaking tours wallace had stayed in numerous northern hotels that impose the same restriction, and again, the whiff of hypocrisy here, the southerners are very sensitive to it. to bring up the issue in the south, one local progressive remarked, "made us carpetbaggers." price's proclivity for dramatic gestures, they feared, seemed calculated to stir resentment at the risk of alienating potential sympathizers. it was an approach that suspicious southerners traditionally associated with the communists. if price was out for publicity

it was not long in coming. the press in durham, and the surrounding region, immediately leapt on this issue of the refusal of wallace to stay in a segregated hotel. the press is always hostile to any attack on segregation, diverse attention away from wallace's larger message of economic empowerment, and focused instead on the divisive and potentially explosive issue of social equality. local papers splashed across their front pages the news that wallace would be staying at the home of a black man. "all good will that white durham might have felt," one observer remarked, "quickly evaporated." durham was being gratuitously offended, and on the one side is being placed on the defiant

defensive the other. residents told northern journalists the tabacco town was "seething with turmoil and anticipation of mr. wallace's arrival." "in rome," one durham editor explained, "henry wallace has deliberately outraged the romans." indeed, since the wallaceites staked their fortunes in dixie on winning support for the political and economic program based on biracial working-class unity, exacerbating racial tension should have been the last thing that they wished to do, and yet their tactics often seemed to undercut their strategy. rather than stirring the latent progressivism, so-called of the common people, wallace's widely publicized assault on segregation precipitated a backlash that mobilized the opposition. the first indication of this came at the durham armory on the night of august 29. about a half-hour before wallace's scheduled arrival, 1500 people packed the house to capacity. almost evenly divided racially and completely integrated, the crowd, minus a few hundred hecklers, seemed to be pro-wallace, observers found it

to be a predominantly middle-class audience to be well-dressed and well mannered. they joined the guitarist pete seeger, whose music we were hearing right before the program started, in singing campaign folks songs, a staple at progressive rallies, since the july national convention. several hundred more people, curious but less sympathetic to the progressives, waited outside. among them, 30 or so dixiecrats, supported by north carolina's governor strom thurmond's fourth party, which the nation's robert bendeener noted wryly, "had been founded to oppose the president's tyrannical effort to impose civil rights on people." [laughter] writers came in.

a wallaceites was stabbed five times, left bleeding outside. fist flew wildly for 20 minutes. in the midst of the mayhem, a warning shot rang out. authorities struggled to maintain control. those not in the immediate the city continued to saying. the colored persons, in particular, seemed to be contented to sit back and let the white folks fight amongst themselves. police restored order when the doors open and -- opened and the national guard came in. behind him, was henry wallace. smiling broadly, fairly unfazed by the tumbled, greeted with

equally loud cheers, jeers wallace approached the microphone, and addressed the boisterous a simile. "this," he began "is the most unique introduction i have ever received." [laughter] adding to the catcalls and rebel yells of their avatars, there were cheers. wallace's remarks condemned segregation, but they were barely audible to those in the first few rows -- to those beyond the first few rows.

wallace cried "what do we want to the south -- for the south?" they responded "we want strom thurmond!" mary price rent to wallace's side but he calmly urged the assembly to be seated. inspired by the courage of their leaders, that faithful immediately interrupted into a chant of "we want wallace." this was followed by a short prayer. even after he departed, reports of violence continued. local hooligans beat several progressives with clubs and stones, and durham police looked on without doing anything. it had been a rough night. only hours into a seven-day junket, a reporter stated, "it would not be a leisurely

vermette -- meander through the land of cotton." this incident showed that the national press condemned wallace's treatment in durham, and other papers said that no one in america should be denied to be able to express his views. in contrast, wallace's attack on jim crow elicited little substantive comment. the merit of his views on segregation were beside the point, according to the new york times. in the south, segregation was most definitely the point. local papers did not believe the issue was primarily one of

political disagreement. the durham morning herald maintained that the hecklers "knew nothing about wallace's stands, political theories, or practices. he flaunted social custom." another paper said that the other tormentors had scarcely heard of wallace 24 hours before. and many people did not even know who elizabeth bentley was. some papers said that wallace got what he deserved. ignoring the fact that black's gladly received these progressives into their homes. many papers concluded it was social and not political. the friendly city of durham seemed somewhat short of ready

for the revolution. in hindsight, the southern-born journalist john hoffman said " middle-class people could not believe this would happen, that there life should not be challenged. they were perfectly willing to express themselves in a loud and in strong language." progressive partisans interpreted event very differently. more darkly, and actually more conspiratorially. immediately following the address, wallace told a reporter that their reaction was "a planned attack by big business a reprisal for my long and bitter fight against the tobacco trusts." other people at the scene said that people had been paid to

demonstrate. whispers of fascism circulated amongst the wallace party. in short, progressives interpreted the problems in the south due to ideology rather than white racism, in particular white working-class racism. upon returning through hit -- through returning -- returning from his last trip, he said that segregation was not caused by the hatred of the negro, but hatred of the progressive. it was caused by economic royalists during i think progressives like james t harris -- james d. harris, who was stabbed at the meeting, believed

that it was the poor that was fighting the upper-class. he found a paradoxical. as the region's standard of living rose before the war and after the war, some question whether prosperity would automatically ameliorate racism. for wallace and those of like mind, this proved a troubling dilemma, since it called into question the apparent progressivism of white landowners. wallace's abrupt treatment in north carolina showed that the candidate was unwilling to speak at other places in the south. in the wake of the durham incident, two other progression all candidates withdrew their

names from the political race. they stood by wallace's points but they would not speak out against segregation. some wondered if this militant expression in the south made this the right way to go. building a broad race of political movement, while directly confronting the race issue, was exceedingly difficult in the south of the 1940's. the second day of wallace's long trek along tobacco road still brought more heckling and further violence. a stop in burlington, a crowd of white textile workers through tomatoes at wallace. young hoodlums hit his car, and frightened passengers.

or were people there that day that thought they were going to die, that the hoodlums were going to overturn the car and set it on fire. that is quite a state. when a fist fight broke out between a progressive party worker and a man who tried to hit wallace with a rock, a few police officers on hand moved to break it up, moving away from wallace, leading him virtually unprotected. visibly shaken, with splattered a pouring down his face, wallace was unable to make his voice heard among shouts of "nigger lover." the crowd quickly broke past the police and the party pulled out of burlington, only 15 minutes after it had arrived. the next two stops were more of

the same. in the textile town of greensboro, wallace climbs of -- lined the courthouse stairs and was prevented from speaking. he shouted over the jeers and catcalls of this crowd but the south was outside the "stooge of northern corporations." he said that most in the south had "not enough to it -- eat." most laughed. he said "i am sure that when i need with the real people of the south, i will be met with a real welcome." "i wish people had listened,"

one african-american had said to another, "i think he is 30 years too soon." a local newspaper said the same, "30 years too soon." the local press quickly picked up on this. is it pop -- possible that people threw things at him? is it true that people in the crowd were truly hungry? wallace seemed unaware that references to "those who had not enough to eat," was not an accurate representation of the south. this would only further alienate his audiences. even admits -- amidst such

turmoil, he did not want to do deal with the real south, that he was convinced was fundamentally liberal. on the outskirts of winston-salem, the last stop of the day, the caravan and enthusiastic african-american supporters greeted the wallace entourage. it was a stark contrast to the earlier crowds they had received. party officials remained hopeful that they would garner the support of southern blacks, many of whom belonged to the tobacco worker's at union. in winston-salem, they were anxious to see firsthand the support. at wallace's appearance at a baseball park, black

unionists turned out in force. african-americans made up about 56% of the crowd. the rally was nonsegregated. blacks and whites voluntarily segregated themselves. blacks shouted "we want wallac e." whites shouted "down with wallace." however, everyone seemed to be about having a good time, rather than rioting. he revisited familiar themes, i agree nothing big businesses, and even finish to a round of applause. but this could not translate into votes for the progressive party movement. although southern black workers

fired by wallace -- were inspired by wallace, they could not vote for him. most of those black voters cast their vote for harry truman. in fact, as the election neared, leaders in winston-salem's black community try to wean away supporters from wallace to truman. and the local union, the president of the locally organized negro club denounced their support of the progressive party. "this led union members to a terrible conclusion." the reaction to all of this, in the press, was extensive.

as i said, it was mostly positive in the north. after the initial excitement, though, in north carolina, this news slipped off the front pages. as he continued on through alabama, louisiana, arkansas and tennessee, there was no further outbreaks of violence. at every step, wallace continued to speak out against segregation . he at times became bogged down in confusion or wishful thinking but the former vice president sounded a clarion call against bigotry and hatred so often camouflaged by the euphemism of southern hospitality. at the end of the tour, the time

had come to take stock of the situation. wallace had estimated that he had been the target of 77 exit 57 tomatoes -- eggs, 57 tomatoes, and a couple of buns. he had encountered corrosive hatred, of a redneck tobacco smoking hillbillies. just as often, though, wallace also meant -- met apathy. a record low attendance of people attended his speeches. no more than 15,000 people across the south heard his remarks. the parties back in new york

reflected on the significance of his tour. what, if anything, had been achieved? i think the courage of henry wallace during this week in the south cannot be understated. what is more interesting is his long-term legacy. what this did for the civil rights movement. i think it is a little bit more complicated than a herald or a triumph. some critics would say that it was a triumph. some said it brought to the forefront the issues of segregation and civil rights. undoubtedly, he put the segregated south in a position where, for better or for worse, it would have to think through its problems once again.

the nation, a magazine still with us today commended wallace, saying, "a tour with such fanfare can never again be quite as potent." another reporter said that wallace confirmed that he was quite a figure, and noted that wallace may have jolted the company since he of a few citizens. on the other side, however, the legacy of wallace's brief foray into the south was more symbolic than substantive. local supporters stepped up their struggle against segregation, but it did not establish segregation as the nation's most pressing issue. it did also -- it also did not

dismantle it. the consciousness of the nation of segregation did not seem to extend beyond the south. there was no sign that national moral outrage against segregation really existed yet in 1948. in march, a gallup poll surveying individuals said that 40% of whites outside of the south had never even heard of it. african-americans, as well found that wallace's southern tour was not a pivotal moment that progressives thought it would be.

the naacp reminded readers that this was not the first frontal attack against segregation. their organization had been holding on segregated meetings in the south since 1934. wallace did not receive the vote of registered black voters, as it turned out. it made for a lot of bitterness in the years to come when the african-american tallies came out in the election day, and it showed a disappointing turnout for wallace. wallace later said that "he had given that the negroes a chance, but they had disappointed him." wallace's partisans had mistaken fervor for electoral support. c. o. pearson, who ran on the

progressive party ticket in north carolina expressed disappointment that many of his colleagues must have shared, conceding, "i have been completely repudiated at the polls in durham county, at the precinct that are overwhelmingly negro." so this black candidate expressed the frustration and compare -- and despair that came out of this campaign. the stance of racial equality did not entice voters away from harry truman. a party worker in arkansas who tried to convert a group of african-american ministers to the wallace cause, arguing, that truman's commitment to a united america was just a political ploy.

the ministers did not offer a firm commitment. "you may not believe truman, but the dixiecrats believe him and that's enough for me." after the dixiecrat walked out of the democratic convention, there was no question how they will -- how the negroes would vote. no politician would ever defy southern politicians again. personalizing the issue of civil rights by announcing the betrayal of the president further enhanced the political voting blocs of the south. when abe black reporter -- when a black reporter was asked about the difference between truman

and roosevelt, he responded "truman really means it." few african-americans made note of this remark, despite the accusations of truman's insincerity. his actions, particularly the executive order to abolish segregation in the military, and the establishing of equal hiring processes, carry equal weight. henry moon concluded, "as far as the black electorate was concerned, civil rights is of little moment. what is important is the record of performance and the prospect of implementing those promises." wallace loyalists claimed that

the rising tide of communism sacrificed their efforts scaring away otherwise sympathetic voters. this was the height of the red scare, but in the south, it was not as much of a salient issue. the enunciation's of wallace as a red may have added to criticism against him but race, not fear of communism, was the opposition of the other parties. a communist party member in durham, said "there were workers in my mail who did not note the difference between communism and rheumatism. all you would have to do is raise the race issue. around here, and alabama farmer once said that 'communism is

anything that we don't like.'" i think this is really the fundamental issue here. this is the notion that the white south was ready for the civil rights movement in 1948 and it was overstated. i think the wallace campaign gives some evidence of that. nonetheless, wallace continued to talk about the real south, a south that he did not see, a self that was out there somewhere, -- a south that was out there somewhere, if only he could find it. what wallace saw this real south, it was a myth. confronting the social cons struct -- construct confirmed

the progressive's idea about racism. the myth predetermined categories of misperception rendering one blind to things that did not fit a mental image. this is applicable to a lot of things in politics, when we have such a desire for a myth to be true, that it distorts our perception. i think that wallace is a good case that it -- good case study of what is happening in american politics. in conclusion, at a time when such formidable, broad-based forces like the cio and the naacp were struggling to maintain heads above water in dixie, and open integration was underfunded, well to the left of white southerners, and blacks,

it was impossible to launch a successful segregation -- anti-segregation movement. this revealed the strength of the political culture that held them together as a party, but also would show that the progressives would remain isolated from the american mainstream. [applause] >> we are now going to have about 10 minutes of a q&a. so please, nap and ask your questions that you have -- come up and ask your questions. and he will be signing his book, and thank you again for coming.

your presentation was excellent, thank you again. question and answering will happen for about 10 minutes. >> ok, did anyone in the wallace campaign, any of his advisers advise him of the civil rights strategy in dixie was suicidal, or and advise him instead to push the economic end of it? and to show the poor treatment of white workers? was there any effort on the wallace campaign for that policy? >> no, that is the short answer. no one advised him. can i stay away from the microphone? is that ok? ok. the communists had used him to

star up and agitate the south to win support in the north. wallace became quite cynical afterwards about the way that the communists had manipulated him. i think they might have given him a raw deal there. i think they were genuinely surprised at the reception that they got. it is hard for us to understand that they would not see this coming, and but i audit -- i honestly don't think that they did. that shows you the optimism of the party. but he got really dicey, and the journalist saw that was coming. they warned him, they were on the train with them, but i think he was very much a crusader and he took on something at that time something of a martyr complex. he was going to show the courage and stand up for what he called a moral crusade. i think that is the answer there. no one advised him against it. >> richard j. walton wrote a

subject on this book a couple of decades ago, and talked about the erosion of the support that wallace had at the beginning and the end of his campaign, and contributed it, in part, and said that it was part of the tarring of the progressives as reds. and that paved the way for the red scare the follow. i was wondering what you thought of that view? >> that is a complicated question because a red scare suggest there weren't any reds. and what i found, honestly, was that wallace was surrounded by members of the communist party who concealed their membership from him. the more active group involved

in emphasizing the communist issue was a group called americans for democratic action, and they were working independently of this administration. i think that they thought, wrongly, that there was a showdown in 1948, between those that wanted to ally themselves with the communists, and those who thought the communists were bad. they thought it would be bad for liberalism if this group allied themselves with communism and gained the upper hand. they got a lot of criticism thinking that if that group one, it would be bad for liberalism as a whole. i argue my book that that group the eight -- ada misconstrued this. i believe that the real threat was on the right. despite truman winning, i would say the 48 election was not an

indication of liberalism, it was an indication of truman standing on the new deal, and also his cold war rhetoric, which was also quite popular at the time. i would differ from walton a little bit on some of those issues. >> i appreciate your work, and i'm sure everyone here does. we appreciate the role of history, and the importance of paying attention to it. in that regard, i would just ask you to comment, even if you are -- i would like to know your point of view as to how we should navigate these very politicized and divisive issues. race is still obviously an issue. we have many air -- other matters in this country. without naming anyone specifically, i would ask which

one you have learned from specifically, that we could try to find ways to stoke -- to stop stoking division and partisanship and people may quite reward from that? >> >> i think there is empathy, patience, and humility. today, politics plays to the edges. both to the left and to the right. they see this as a strategy to mobilize their base, and if they can just when their base, they can win an election. they beat that is a good political tactic, but i think it is bad for the country. -- they think that is a good political tactic, that i think it is a bad thing for the country.

wallace wash campaign was filled with report: -- rhetorical statements, and truman's was too. but, i think at some point we have to, as a people, show our willingness to be receptive to ideas. the american people are not extremists. i think that votes tend to be in the middle. it is not as polarized as much as we say it has been. the center is disengaged because it cannot capture a voice because there is no politician out there that represents that voice. and i can name you one to give you as a suggestion to look at.

i think that is an example of our politics today. this book can show the problems that grow out of extremism in our politics. >> thank you sir. quick question. how and why did wallace become a candidate for the progressive party? >> that is a long question. how did he lose favor with roosevelt? some historians say he never lost it. some believe that he kicked wallace out to get truman in. i don't believe that. roosevelt knew he was in bad health. there was some concern if wallace was a safe candidate to be president. i don't think roosevelt thought he was. when wallace came in to see roosevelt in 1944, he said "what can i do to help the ticket?

what can i do to help the whole team together?" roosevelt suggested that he take a trip to siberia. that is roosevelt. and he did what the boss said. by the time that he got back, the knife was already in, and truman was a candidate. had he become a candidate in 1948, i don't want to go on for too long, but the short and simplified answer is that he originally wanted to challenge truman in the primaries. he never thought he could be him, but he thought he might be able to move his cold policies that wallace found acceptable. the other answer, though, is that the communist party really pushed him quite hard for their own reasons which i won't go into, but not for wallace's reasons.

wallace's correspondence in the 50's show a lot of resentment. it played on a lot of his need to crusade, and to tell the people his views, and i do not think that, unprovoked by the communist party, wallace would have necessarily gone through with it. there is no way to say that with great certainty. but most people who knew him well outside of the party were urging him not to run. and he just would not listen. he had a pre-made cheering session. >> thank you. i like your take on this. it has been implied in the library calendar that wallace finishing in fourth place, was due to his inability to shake

his repetition. consider this: wallace was originally a republican. >> he voted for eisenhower twice. >> and then he voted for roosevelt. so now you have a republican- democratic nominee. in 1946, wallace was asked to redesign as secretary of commerce. could these skeletons also play a part in his political portfolio? >> by 46, do you mean he was pushed by jealousy by truman? >> whether he was pushed out or left because it would keep the peace, the point being is that he was asked to resign if someone asked you to get out well -- >> he was asked to resign, it

was not his decision. he really bore a lot of personal animosity towards harry truman because of that. that comes out in a lot of documents. but what is interesting to me about wallace, in later years he was at a dinner party in 96 e2, he died in 65, so he was quite old, and he -- in 1962, and he died in 1965, said he was quite old, and he went up to truman and said that he was glad he got rid of him. he grew. he thought things through. he realized that he could make mistakes. he looked back on the 48 campaign and never said that he's was bad, but he realized the way he went about it -- that the peace was bad, but he

realized the way he went about it was wrong. >> were any city bosses trying to get rid of them? >> yes. but roosevelt had ari made his decision to get rid of him. -- roosevelt had already made his decision to get rid of them. >> did wallace wright -- write about himself, a biography about how he felt about that? >> nothing for publication. he has a wonderful diary, but it only goes through the war years. but it does not go up past 1948.

in fact, it does not even go to 1948. i got most of this information from his correspondences. a were very sad correspondences. it was a lot of regret. -- they were very sad correspondences. there was a lot of regret. it showed the political price he paid but also the personal price he paid. it hurt him personally, and it not only hurt him politically, but a killed him politically. after the 1948 campaign, he never ran in politics. >> i would like to thank you for coming, first of all. secondly, i was wondering how the vice president may have felt

about the socioeconomic structure. such as kansas with its old communist farming community. >> what was his views on economic structures? >> how did that turn out for him, as they had stronger working-class structures than they did in the south. >> his boats usually came from intellectuals. among the working class -- >> -- more popular candidates. >> he was a farmer. he knew about farming. he did not talk about that during the campaign. but wallace did not do well among the working-class voters. he did well among small slivers here and there usually those

associated with left-wing leadership. it was usually through individuals that were associated with communist leadership. it was a very small sliver. most of wallace's votes came from los angeles and new york city are amongst middle-class professionals. >> thank you. [applause] >> you are watching american history tv. 48 hours of history on television. follow us on twitter for information on our schedule, information on programs, and to keep up with history news. this year, c-span is touring

cities across the country. next, a recent visit from shannon -- cheyenne, wyoming. >> while in cheyenne, we spoke with republican governor matt mead. >> describe who lives in way of owning -- who lives in wyoming. >> we think of ourselves as a cowboy state. and we are. but we have high-tech people here. we have innovators. we are diverse in terms of our interest, and in terms of things that in the visuals are working on -- that individuals are working on. so, while we are small in terms of a population, we are take i