crow south alienated much of the white electorate. despite his efforts, mr. devine says the majority of african-americans decided to vote for president truman. wallace came in fourth in the general election, finishing with fewer votes than the other third-party candidate or i strom thurmond. this is about one hour. >> i don't think i will need these pet thank you. i appreciate the introduction and there's two people i want to thank before i start. and the truman library institute and the kauffman institute that supporting this other want to add my thanks to lisa sullivan who has been so helpful over the last few weeks getting me prepared a together and making sure everything goes off well tonight. i thank her as well. two other people i want to thank -- one unlucky enough to have your tonight -- my friend and

colleague steve birkenau teaches at the army war college in fort leavenworth. he welcomed me to cal state northridge in 2000 and pretty much taught me how to be a professor. i appreciate that. the other person i really appreciate is my ophthalmologist. if you buy the book, you know the book is dedicated to my ophthalmologist. terrible series of eye surgeries a few years ago and he literally saved my vision and my life as i want to live it so a shout out to him. look him up. he is the best there is. i think i will talk specifically tonight not on all of the different aspects of the wallace campaign but to give you a sliver -- in particular on wallace's tour through the south in august and september of 1948. openingways, it was an

for what became the civil rights movement in the 1960's. there's plenty of time for questions at the end and i would any things onwer american communists which is a big part of the book and foreign policy and the cold war. tonight, my focus will be primarily on the southern tour. let me get started. i think i am going to use the glasses. 1940 eight, 9, henry wallace for the plan to norfolk, virginia thereby launching a weeklong, seven states southern tour that would provide his third-party crusade with many of its most dramatic moments. his decision to challenge segregation in the heart of the jim crow south grabbed front-page headlines across the country, winning the progressive rj the most sustained media coverage it would receive throughout the entire campaign. had it not been for president truman's dramatic comeback, the wallace tour the south would

have been the biggest political story of the year. high andve hopes ran many believe that wallace's trip would focus nationwide attention on the injustice of segregation and more importantly, unite southern working-class locks and whites against those who exploited racial divisions to preserve their own special privilege. in the short term, they hoped the courageous tour would win wallace the votes of white liberals and african-americans in the north and inspire major voter registration drive among blacks in the south giving the party the shot in the arm it so badly needed. that the southern masses of both races constituted unnatural alliance, wallace offered his party to the south as a vehicle through which the common man, as he referred to the average person, could challenge and ultimately overcome the dominance of the southern aristocracy that had long prevented the development of genuine democracy in dixie.

especially in the one-party south. that theves argued only realistic strategy to combat the wealthy white reactionaries monopoly on political power was to build a new party to represent the interests of farmers, working people. and building such a political force, they maintained, southerners of both races would come to understand that they needed each other's help to succeed. for years, segregation and the fanning of racial animosities had obstructed the progress of locks and whites alike. of races in barrier the blocked majority rule could be over come, progressives insisted. the wallace party could be the catalyst for sweeping change. wallace's invasion, so-called, of dixie, they hoped, might finally unleash the political progressivism they were convinced existed in the south.

his southern expedition began in virginia where state law prohibited non-secretary did -- non-segregated public meetings. they announce the party's would not address segregated audiences. this was a first for presidential nominees. appearance before crowds in norfolk, suffolk, and richmond, he held true to his pledge and the speaking to integrated assemblies without incident. . encouraged by his successful challenge of segregation, he remarked to reporters afterwards that if what i saw in virginia today is any criteria of what we will get further on, i think i will going to be satisfied. wallace was unaware, however, that the state progressive committee hoping to avoid controversy had issued invitations to these events thus making them private gatherings, not subject to the law.

meeting the progressives happily, the local police departments had agreed not to interfere. spoke to onlyace relatively small and predominantly african-american crowds. the white progressive masses that the party expected to attract were nowhere in sight. by comparison with the noisy cheering that generally reach presidential candidates on tour, one reporter noted that mr. wallace's movement in virginia had something of the eerie quality of an old-fashioned silent movie in a theater without a piano player. [laughter] for traditionally liberal north carolina, the wallaceites assured that the days events spoke well for the vitality of southern progressivism. as they got on the plane, i think they had what amounted to a false sense of security for withwas coming that fused their own preconceptions of what

the south was like or was going to be like. what was coming was going to be a different story. unlike virginia, the tar heel state had no laws for bidding integrated gatherings which was a source of hope for them. proud of their reputation for tolerance and moderation, especially on the race issue, white north carolinians were not immune to charges that they look down their noses at their presumably more backward neighbors and the rest of dixie. wallace's arrival of roche, it was probably announce the candidate had decided to spend the next day in north carolina because he was convinced that the most progressive state in the south could go progressive in november. they genuinely believed, many of these progressives, that somehow, the state of north carolina in 1948 would vote for a candidate was openly against segregation. to my own way of thinking, i find it hard to believe that

they convinced themselves of that but i anchored was genuine. they have high expectations which are overstated but at the time, they are understandable. north carolina posted the south's most active progressive organization. pitchers support from a variety of sources. in the early days of the campaign, college students in particular rally to the wallace caused. in a the formation of the third party, a group of the university of north carolina had established a wallace for president committee. i have the opportunity to talk with a few of them when i did the research they are much older but i was at chapel hill doing my work. in february, the organizers brought together over 130 students from across the state for a two-day rally in chapel hill. on august 3, the party defied expectations and the good deal of white hostility by successfully concluding a petition drive that got wallace on the ballot.

they collected almost 30,000 signatures. in the process, canvassers registered like to vote in at least six counties were no african-american have been on the roles in over 50 years. by doing so, progressives noted they had taken an initial step toward building the kind of broad, electoral base needed to overthrow the old political delete and its dual commitment to segregation and economic deprivation of the workers. when wallace -- one wallace observer said the students spark plug the effort and die -- and demonstrated a biracial movement have potential to succeed in the south in 1948. most tar heel progressive activists share this positive outlook as they prepared for the wallace visit. many were still basking in the glow of their hard-fought three. among progressives, morale was high and optimism the order of the day. in hollywood, they call that laying pipe.

that is the background. there is another part of the story. iu have to know that before think we tell the actual events of that three-day period. there is a closer look at the time -- of the dynamics of the north carolina campaign which raises doubts about how broad-based the party was. cales anter, junius s open, his party member agreed the effort had uncovered what he called a marvelous wealth of radical populist throughout the state. still, he noted, at this proportion of the amount of work done by concealed communists, many of them imported from new york city. that's where most of the support of wallace was. these men and women were instructed to keep their artsy affiliation secret. -- to keep their party affiliation secret. there were other people supporting the campaign butscales acknowledged that the

communist party was the shock troops. they encountered hostility from poor whites and many of them would fade away leaving a small cadre of communist to fill the vacuum. the initial presence of the native radicals, scales believed, gave the campaign what he called a much broader appearance that really had. the success of the petition drive do not necessarily indicate widespread support of progressives. party headquarters in greensboro had advised canvassers to avoid discussion of the issues and to base their appeal for signatures only on wallace's right to be on the ballot. theor the left-wingers from north, another local activist recalled that they acted somewhat like occupying troops in a foreign country. idealistic but insufferably arrogant. they expected to be honored as deliverers.

it took a pretty sturdy liberal to put up with some of the things the progressive party leaders had to take from the communist party. preferring their politics with a sharp, ideological edge, and unwilling to adjust to southern racial customs, these zealous partisans likely did more to alienate prospective political converts than to broaden the party's base. the biracial nature of the progressive coalition, likewise, remained more goal than reality in the campaign. blacks and whites work together in gathering teams in soliciting signatures from both races, but generally they received a cool response from whites. a condescending attitude of many of the more militant volunteers taken towards white textile workers, no doubt contributed to the antagonism that they encountered. "we were like missionaries, with all of the thoughts that missionaries have, it is a wonder that we weren't all lynched," said one observer

afterwards. and i think we see this a lot, not just in the wallace campaign, but in many campaigns for social justice, where people with great zeal and idealism go into an unfamiliar situation and end up creating a backlash, or they are not met with the response that they hoped they would get. i think it applies not only in domestic politics, but in foreign policies as well, this great crusading mentality can sometimes make people very, i think, committed, but at the same time, undermine their goals. i saw this a lot in the course of 1948 with the wallaceites. in any case, the party leaders emphasize the importance of establishing a presence in the working-class white areas, most volunteers actually preferred working in black neighborhoods, where they ran less risk of having doors slammed in their faces. as a result, by the end of the summer, progressives had become known as "the negro party."

in particular, middle-class leadership in the black community remained wary of wallace's crusade. the durham committee on negro affairs, one of the state's influential african-american political organizations, endorsed president truman. similarly, the president of the state naacp declared that "voting for wallace was no way to solve the negro problem." they were skittish of the militants that some of the progressives were showing in the south. organized labor also was wary of wallace. in part, because of larger domestic concerns about the taft-hartley law had been passed in 1947. they feared that wallace was taking away votes from the democrats, and that a republican victory in 1948 would be bad for labor. and, accordingly, they felt that any attempt to split democratic forces was either being orchestrated by republicans, or ill advised.

so labor in the south, and throughout the country, was quite skeptical. right at the moment that wallace was arriving, an unexpected bombshell from washington undercut the progressives' popularity. on july 30, elizabeth bentley, who was known colloquially as "the blonde spy queen," testified before the house committee on un-american activities. she charged that during world war ii, mary price, the north carolina chair of the progressive party, had served as a courier for the soviet kgb. she also noted that price had been introduced to her as a member of the american communist party. the cryptic cables released in 1990 corroborate bentley's testimony, and indicate that price continued her underground activities for the soviets until at least mid-1944. in 1948, however, price flatly denied bentley's allegations, dismissing them as "fantastic." such sensational accusations

actually did sound far-fetched to north carolinians, who did know mary price, and the local press expressed skepticism of them as well. nonetheless, bentley's testimony fueled suspicions concerning communist influence in the progressive party, and for some, made a tax on the party, rhetorical and otherwise, seem more justifiable. still, charges and countercharges concerning communist influence proved less detrimental to the party than its confrontational, and at times, disingenuous approach, to opposing segregation. on august 27, mary price abruptly canceled the wallace party's reservations at the washington duke hotel, saying "because it would not accomodate black members of the entourage," as it was a segregated hotel. they hastily arranged a press conference that afternoon, as she announced to reporters that the candidate would stay, instead, at the home of a wealthy, well-to-do, black

durham businessman. others in the traveling party would be lodged at the biltmore, a black hotel. this principled refusal to submit to jim crow, was, in itself, admirable, but even some progressive supporters said price's public announcement two days before the candidate's arrival had been calculated to provoke, particularly when it came to light that she had known about the hotel's policy on segregation for some time.

southern papers also noted that on previous speaking tours, wallace had stayed in numerous northern hotels that impose the same restriction, and again, the whiff of hypocrisy here, the southerners are very sensitive to it. to bring up the issue in the south, one local progressive remarked, "made us carpetbaggers." price's proclivity for dramatic gestures, they feared, seemed calculated to stir resentment at the risk of alienating potential sympathizers. it was an approach that suspicious southerners traditionally associated with the communists. if price was out for publicity, it was not long in coming. the press in durham, and the surrounding region, immediately leapt on this issue of the refusal of wallace to stay in a segregated hotel. the press is always hostile to any attack on segregation, diverse attention away from wallace's larger message of economic empowerment, and focused instead on the divisive and potentially explosive issue of social equality. local papers splashed across their front pages the news that wallace would be staying at the home of a black man. "all good will that white durham might have felt," one observer remarked, "quickly evaporated." durham was being gratuitously offended, and on the one side is being placed on the defiant defensive the other. residents told northern journalists the tabacco town was "seething with turmoil and anticipation of mr. wallace's arrival."

"in rome," one durham editor explained, "henry wallace has deliberately outraged the romans." indeed, since the wallaceites staked their fortunes in dixie on winning support for the political and economic program based on biracial working-class unity, exacerbating racial tension should have been the last thing that they wished to do, and yet their tactics often seemed to undercut their strategy. rather than stirring the latent progressivism, so-called of the common people, wallace's widely publicized assault on segregation precipitated a backlash that mobilized the opposition. the first indication of this came at the durham armory on the night of august 29. about a half-hour before wallace's scheduled arrival, 1500 people packed the house to capacity.

almost evenly divided racially and completely integrated, the crowd, minus a few hundred hecklers, seemed to be pro-wallace, observers found it to be a predominantly middle-class audience to be well-dressed and well mannered. they joined the guitarist pete seeger, whose music we were hearing right before the program started, in singing campaign folks songs, a staple at progressive rallies, since the july national convention. several hundred more people, curious but less sympathetic to the progressives, waited outside. among them, 30 or so dixiecrats, supported by north carolina's governor strom thurmond's fourth party, which the nation's robert bendeener noted wryly, "had been founded to oppose the president's tyrannical effort to impose civil rights on people." [laughter] writers came in. a wallaceite was stabbed five times, left bleeding outside.

fist flew wildly for 20 minutes. in the midst of the mayhem, a warning shot rang out. authorities struggled to maintain control. those not in the immediate the city continued to saying. the colored persons, in particular, seemed to be contented to sit back and let the white folks fight amongst themselves. police restored order when the doors open and -- opened and the national guard came in. behind him, was henry wallace.

smiling broadly, fairly unfazed by the tumbled, greeted with equally loud cheers, jeers, wallace approached the microphone, and addressed the boisterous a simile. -- assembly. "this," he began, "is the most unique introduction i have ever received." [laughter] a chant of we want to thurmond rose to the back that arose from the back. partisans stamp their feet and yelled with a mighty bigger adding to the catcalls , and rebel yells of their -- their adversaries. wallace's remarks condemned segregation, but they were barely audible to those in the first few rows -- to those beyond the first few rows. wallace cried "what do we want

to the south -- for the south?" they responded, "we want strom thurmond!" [laughter] amidst these pleasantries, chain of firecrackers went off terrifying the already nervous crowd who -- to the exits. mary price rent to wallace's side, but he calmly urged the assembly to be seated. inspired by the courage of their leaders, that faithful immediately interrupted into a chant of "we want wallace." this was followed by a short prayer. even after he departed, reports of violence continued. local hooligans beat several progressives with clubs and stones, and durham police looked on without doing anything. it had been a rough night. only hours into a seven-day junket, a reporter stated, "it would not be a leisurely

vermette -- meander through the land of cotton." this incident showed that the national press condemned wallace's treatment in durham, and other papers said that no one in america should be denied to be able to express his views. in contrast, wallace's attack on jim crow elicited little substantive comment. the merit of his views on segregation were beside the point, according to the new york times. in the south, segregation was most definitely the point. local papers did not believe the issue was primarily one of political disagreement.

the durham morning herald maintained that the hecklers "knew nothing about wallace's stands, political theories, or practices. he flaunted social custom." another paper said that the other tormentors had scarcely heard of wallace 24 hours before. and many people did not even know who elizabeth bentley was. some papers said that wallace got what he deserved. are violating accepted racial mores ignoring the fact that black's gladly received these progressives into their homes. many papers concluded it was

social and not political. the friendly city of durham seemed somewhat short of ready for the revolution. in hindsight, the southern-born journalist john hoffman said "middle-class people could not believe this would happen, that there life should not be challenged. they were perfectly willing to express themselves in a loud and in strong language." progressive partisans interpreted event very differently. more darkly, and actually more conspiratorially. immediately following the address, wallace told a reporter that their reaction was "a planned attack by big business, a reprisal for my long and bitter fight against the tobacco trusts." other people at the scene said that people had been paid to demonstrate.

whispers of fascism circulated amongst the wallace party. in short, progressives interpreted the problems in the south due to ideology rather than white racism, in particular, white working-class racism. upon returning through hit -- through returning -- returning from his last trip, he said that segregation was not caused by the hatred of the negro, but hatred of the progressive. to him, the common man remained inherently progressive it was caused by economic royalists during i think progressives like james t harris -- james d. harris, who was stabbed at the meeting, believed that it was the poor that was fighting the upper-class.

he found a paradoxical. liberals have largely accepted the view that racial tensions in the south where product of economic scarcity as the region's standard of living rose before the war and after the war, some question whether prosperity would automatically ameliorate racism. for wallace and those of like mind, this proved a troubling dilemma, since it called into question the apparent progressivism of white landowners. in the wake of the durham

incident, two other progression all candidates withdrew their names from the political race. they both expressed their continued support for wallace and his opposition to the cold war but objected to the parties to find stance on segregation. even within their own ranks, there were some progressives who wonder if his militant confrontation in the south isn't is the right way to go. as rest of the southern tour would amply demonstrate, building a broad-based political movement while directly confronting the race issue, was exceedingly difficult in the south of the 1940's. the second day of wallace's long trek along tobacco road still brought more heckling and further violence. a stop in burlington, a crowd of white textile workers through tomatoes at wallace. young hoodlums hit his car, and frightened passengers.

there or were people there that day that thought they were going to die, that the hoodlums were going to overturn the car and set it on fire. that is quite a state. it is quite a fate for someone who had been vice president of the united states. when a fist fight broke out between a progressive party worker and a man who tried to hit wallace with a rock, a few police officers on hand moved to break it up, moving away from wallace, leading him virtually unprotected. visibly shaken, with splattered a pouring down his face, wallace was unable to make his voice heard among shouts of "nigger lover." the crowd quickly broke past the police and the party pulled out of burlington, only 15 minutes

after it had arrived. the next two stops were more of the same. in the textile town of greensboro, wallace climbs of -- lined the courthouse stairs, and was prevented from speaking. he shouted over the jeers and catcalls of this crowd, but the south was outside the "stooge of northern corporations." to those who heckled him, he expressed or found compassion before he said that most in the south had "not enough to it -- eat." most laughed. he said "i am sure that when i need with the real people of the south, i will be met with a real welcome." stepping away from the podium, he hurried back to his car with another volley of eggs and tomatoes. "i wish people had listened,"

one african-american had said to another, "i think he is 30 years too soon." a local newspaper said the same, "30 years too soon." the local press quickly picked up on this. despite the intensity of these experiences. his comments suggest a curious detachment. is it pop -- possible that people threw things at him? is it true that people in the crowd were truly hungry? wallace seemed unaware that references to "those who had not enough to eat," was not an accurate representation of the south. it did not occur to him that such patronizing remarks would

further alienate his audience. even amidst such turmoil, he did not want to do deal with the real south, that he was convinced was fundamentally liberal. on the outskirts of winston-salem, the last stop of the day, the caravan and enthusiastic african-american supporters greeted the wallace entourage. it was a stark contrast to the earlier crowds they had received. party officials remained hopeful that they would garner the support of southern blacks, many of whom belonged to the tobacco worker's at union. in winston-salem, they were anxious to see firsthand the support. at wallace's appearance at a

baseball park, black unionists turned out in force. african-americans made up about 56% of the crowd. the rally was nonsegregated. blacks and whites voluntarily segregated themselves. blacks shouted "we want wallace." whites shouted "down with wallace." however, everyone seemed to be about having a good time, rather than rioting. after arriving in the midst of a driving rainstorm, wallace was able to deliver his address in full without interruption. he revisited familiar themes, i he lustily denounced big businesses, and even finish to a round of applause. but this could not translate into votes for the progressive party movement.

carl karstadt company union organizer explains that although southern black workers fired by wallace -- were inspired by wallace, they could not vote for him. most of those black voters cast their vote for harry truman. in fact, as the election neared, leaders in winston-salem's black community try to wean away supporters from wallace to truman. in an open letter to the leaders of local 22, the president of the locally organized negro club denounced their support of the progressive party. "this led union members to a terrible conclusion." you see this tension among liberals of those more pragmatic and those who are more idealistic.

the reaction to all of this, in the press, was extensive. as i said, it was mostly positive in the north. after the initial excitement, though, in north carolina, this news slipped off the front pages. as he continued on through alabama, louisiana, arkansas, and tennessee, there was no further outbreaks of violence. at every step, wallace continued to speak out against segregation. he denounced injustice. many less courageous politicians would have refrain from tackling in the old confederacy. he at times became bogged down in confusion or wishful thinking, but the former vice president sounded a clarion call against bigotry and hatred so often camouflaged by the euphemism of southern hospitality.

-- of southern tradition. at the end of the tour, the time had come to take stock of the situation. at the most superficial level, i can tell you that the newspaperman accompanying him estimated that he had been the target of 77 exit 57 tomatoes -- eggs, 57 tomatoes, and a couple of buns. [laughter] field reported from the that the stink of garbage can be eradicated but not so the corrosive hatred you encounter, the memory and hard faces of baggy, middle-aged women and of a redneck tobacco smoking hillbillies. just as often, though, wallace met apathy. his audiences totaled 25,000, an average of less than 1000 purse page. a record low attendance of people attended his speeches. of this number no more than , 15,000 people across the south

heard his remarks. the party flew back to new york reflected on the significance of his tour. what, if anything, had been achieved? the progressives themselves took great pride in the trip as they should have and again i think the courage of henry wallace during this week in the south cannot be understated. what is more interesting is his long-term legacy. what this did for the civil rights movement. i think it is a little bit more complicated than a herald or a triumph. some critics would say that it was a triumph. there is no question, said the new york times, that the trip is been a victory for the progressive candidate. he has been able to dramatize the issue of race and segregation better than one million words could've dramatized it.

undoubtedly, he put the segregated south in a position where, for better or for worse, it would have to think through its problems once again. the nation, a magazine still with us today, commended wallace, saying, "a tour with such fanfare can never again be quite as potent." in the midst of hostile, angry mobs, james wechsler observed that wallace confirmed that he was quite a figure, and noted that wallace may have jolted the company since he of a few citizens. -- jolted the complacency of a few citizens who had never doubted that the lord preferred them to those born with darker skins. on the other side, however, the legacy of wallace's brief foray into the south was more symbolic than substantive. local supporters stepped up their struggle against segregation, but it did not establish segregation as the

nation's most pressing issue. it also did not dismantle it. among whites, the shift in racial consciousness of the nation of segregation did not seem to extend beyond the south. gallup polls indicate that white americans did seem receptive to certain pacific reform -- certain specific reforms repeal of a poll tax. in march, a gallup poll surveying individuals said that 40% of whites outside of the south had never even heard of it. nationally, only six percent believe the treatment program african-americans, as well, should be passed as a whole. found that wallace's southern tour was not a pivotal moment that progressives thought it would be.

commenting on the wallace southern swing the naacp , reminded readers that this was not the first frontal attack against segregation. their organization had been holding on segregated meetings in the south since 1934. wallace did not receive the vote of registered black voters, as it turned out. it made for a lot of bitterness in the years to come when the african-american tallies came out in the election day, and it showed a disappointing turnout for wallace. wallace later said that "he had given that the negroes a chance, but they had disappointed him." wallace's partisans had mistaken fervor for electoral support.

following the election c. o. , pearson, who ran on the progressive party ticket in north carolina, expressed disappointment that many of his colleagues must have shared, conceding, "i have been completely repudiated at the polls in durham county, at the precinct that are overwhelmingly negro." he was an african-american lawyer. so this black candidate expressed the frustration and compare -- and despair that came out of this campaign. ultimately, the progressives outspoken stance of racial equality did not entice voters away from harry truman. and the democratic party. typical was the experience of a party worker in arkansas who tried to convert a group of african-american ministers to the wallace cause, arguing, that truman's commitment to a united america was just a political ploy.

-- to a civil rights agenda was just a political ploy. the ministers did not offer a firm commitment. "you may not believe truman, but the dixiecrats believe him, and that's enough for me." he and his colleagues would vote for the president. the dixiecrat revolt undoubtedly helps trim and secure the support of blacks around the nation. after the dixiecrat walked out of the democratic convention, there was no question how they will -- how the negroes would vote. negroes felt that they did not support truman no politician , would ever defy southern politicians again. the dixiecrat's insistence on personalizing the issue of civil rights by announcing the betrayal of the president further enhanced the political voting blocs of the south. when a black reporter was asked about the difference between truman and roosevelt, he

responded, "truman really means it." few african-americans made note failed to take notice of this revealing remark despite the accusations of truman's insincerity. the majority of african-americans were willing to take the president at his word. his actions, particularly the executive order to abolish segregation in the military, and the establishing of equal hiring processes, carry equal weight. after concluding extensive interviews with african-american voters during the campaign henry , moon concluded, "as far as the black electorate was concerned, civil rights is of little moment. -- whether the candidates gestures have been motivated by political gestures is of little moment. what is important is the record of performance and the prospect

of implementing those promises." wallace loyalists claimed that the rising tide of communism sacrificed their efforts, scaring away otherwise sympathetic voters. this was the height of the red this was the height of the red scare, but in the south, it was not as much of a salient issue. denunciations of wallace as a red may have added to criticism against him, but race, not fear of communism, was the opposition of the other parties. bill evans a communist party , member in durham, said "there were workers in my mail who did l whomy mail -- my mil did not note the difference

between communism and rheumatism. all you would have to do is raise the race issue. around here, and alabama farmer once said that 'communism is anything that we don't like.'" [laughter] i think this is really the fundamental issue here. this is the notion that the white south was ready for the civil rights movement in 1948, and it was overstated. -- i think has been overstated and i think the wallace campaign gives some evidence of that. nonetheless, wallace continued to talk about the real south, a south that he did not see, a the south that was out there if only he could give his message to the real south. what wallace saw, this real south, it was a myth.

-- construct confirmed the a social-- construct confirmed the progressive's idea about racism. when this becomes grounds for belief, there arises a danger in reordering one's vision of reality the myth predetermined , categories of misperception, rendering one blind to things that did not fit a mental image. this is applicable to a lot of things in politics, when we have such a desire for a myth to be true, that it distorts our perception. i think that wallace is a good case that it -- good case study of what is happening in american politics. in conclusion, at a time when such formidable, broad-based forces like the cio and the naacp were struggling to maintain heads above water in dixie, and open integration was underfunded, well to the left of white southerners, and blacks,

it was impossible to launch a successful segregation -- anti-segregation movement. as the campaign headed into its final weeks, wallace and his associates prefer to see their experiences in the south as an affirmation of the basic assumptions rather than a challenge to them, revealing the strength of the political culture that held them together as a party, but also would show that the progressives would remain isolated from the american mainstream. thanks. [applause] >> we are now going to have about 10 minutes of a q&a. so please, nap and ask your questions that you have -- come up and ask your questions. after the short queue and day,

there will be a book sale out here as usual and he will be signing his book, and thank you again for coming. your presentation was excellent, thank you again. question and answering will happen for about 10 minutes. >> ok, did anyone in the wallace campaign, any of his advisers, advise him of the civil rights strategy in dixie was suicidal, and advise him instead to push the economic end of it? and to show the poor treatment of white workers? was there any effort on the wallace campaign for that policy? >> no, that is the short answer. no one advised him. afterwards -- can i stay away from the microphone? is that ok? ok.

afterwards, wallace suspected -- i don't know if i agreed with him -- he suspected that the communists had used him to star up and agitate the south to win support in the north. wallace became quite cynical afterwards about the way that the communists had manipulated him. i think they might have given him a raw deal there. i think they were genuinely surprised at the reception that they got. it is hard for us to understand that they would not see this coming, and but i audit -- i honestly don't think that they did. that shows you the optimism of the party. -- the idealism of the party. there were people that said this could get really dicey, and the journalists saw that was coming. they warned him, they were on the train with them, but i think he was very much a crusader and he took on something at that time something of a martyr complex. he was going to show the courage and stand up for what he called a moral crusade. i think that is the answer there.

no one advised him against it. >> richard j. walton wrote a subject on this book a couple of decades ago, and talked about the erosion of the support that wallace had at the beginning and the end of his campaign, and contributed it, in part, and -- and attributed it in part to truman's strategy of tarring of the progressives as reds. he argues that that was the beginning -- it paved the way for the red scare the follow. -- that followed. i was wondering what you thought of that view? >> that is a complicated question, because a red scare suggest there weren't any reds. and what i found, honestly, was that wallace was surrounded by members of the communist party who concealed their membership from him.

the more active group involved in emphasizing the communist issue was a group called americans for democratic action, and they were working independently of this administration. -- in the truman administration. i think that they thought, wrongly, that there was a showdown in 1948, between those that wanted to ally themselves with the communists, and those who thought the communists were bad. they thought it would be bad for liberalism if this group allied themselves with communism and gained the upper hand. they got a lot of criticism, thinking that if that group one, it would be bad for liberalism as a whole. i argue my book that that group, ada misconstrued this. the popular group was so small and insignificant and growing smaller that the real threat was on the right.

and the liberalism was shrinking in popularity during this peiord.despite truman winning, i would say the 48 election was not an indication of liberalism, it was an indication of truman standing on the new deal, and also his cold war rhetoric, which was also quite popular at the time. i would differ from walton a little bit on some of those issues. >> i appreciate your work, and i'm sure everyone here does. we appreciate the role of history, and the importance of paying attention to it. in that regard, i would just ask you to comment, even if you are -- i would like to know your point of view as to how we should navigate these very politicized and divisive issues. race is still obviously an issue. we have many air -- other matters in this country.

without naming anyone specifically, i would ask which one you have learned from specifically, that we could try to find ways to stoke -- to stop stoking division and partisanship, and people may quite reward from that? -- reap quite every word from that? >> i think there is empathy, patience, and humility. today, politics plays to the edges. both to the left and to the right. they see this as a strategy to mobilize their base, and if they can just when their base, they can win an election. they beat that is a good -- that is a good political tactic, but i think it is bad for the country.

wallace wash campaign was filled with report: -- rhetorical statements, and truman's was too. but, i think at some point, we have to, as a people, show our willingness to be receptive to ideas. the american people are not extremists. i think that votes tend to be in the middle. what's happened today is the center has disengaged. it is not as polarized as much as we say it has been. the center is disengaged because it cannot capture a voice because there is no politician out there that represents that voice. and i can name you one to give

-- i can't name you want to give you as a suggestion to look at. i think that is an example of our politics today. -- i think that is a problem of our politics today. i hope this book can show the problems that grow out of extremism in our politics. >> thank you sir. quick question. how and why did wallace become a candidate for the progressive party? how did he lose favor with fdr and the democrats? >> that is a long question. how did he lose favor with roosevelt? some historians say he never lost it. some believe that he kicked wallace out to get truman in. i don't believe that. roosevelt knew he was in bad health. roosevelt knew wallace was a problem. there was some concern if wallace was a safe candidate to be president. i don't think roosevelt thought he was. when wallace came in to see

roosevelt in 1944, he said "what can i do to help the ticket? what can i do to help the whole team together?" roosevelt suggested that he take a trip to siberia. [laughter] that is roosevelt. and wallace went. he did with the boss said. by the time that he got back, the knife was already in, and truman was a candidate. that's the first part of your question. how did he become a candidate in 1948, i don't want to go on for too long, but the short and simplified answer is that he originally wanted to challenge truman in the primaries. he never thought he could be -- eat ham but he thought he might be able to move his cold policies that wallace found acceptable. the other answer, though, is that the communist party really pushed him quite hard, for their own reasons which i won't go into, but not for wallace's reasons.

wallace's correspondence in the 50's show a lot of resentment. at what the party did to him. it played on a lot of his need to crusade, and to tell the people his views, and i do not think that, unprovoked by the communist party, wallace would have necessarily gone through with it. there is no way to say that with great certainty. but most people who knew him well outside of the party were urging him not to run. and he just would not listen. he had a pre-made cheering session. among communists who got him to really consider this independent run. >> thank you. i like your take on this. it has been implied in the library calendar that wallace, finishing in fourth place, was due to his inability to shake his repetition. -- his reputation.

dope.ommunist consider this: wallace was originally a republican. >> he voted for eisenhower twice. >> and then he voted for roosevelt. in so now you have a 1932. republican-democratic nominee. in 1946, wallace was asked to redesign as secretary of commerce. -- to resign as secretary of commerce. couldn't these skeletons also play a part in his political portfolio? >> by 46, do you mean he was pushed by jealousy by truman? >> he was asked to resign in 1946 so whether he was pushed out or left because it would keep the peace, the point being is that he was asked to resign

if someone asked you to get out, well -- >> he was asked to resign, it was not his decision. he really bore a lot of personal animosity towards harry truman because of that. that comes out in a lot of documents. he got over it. what is interesting to me about wallace, in later years he was at a dinner party, in 96 e2, he died in 65, so he was quite old, and he -- in 1962, and he died in 1965, said he was quite old, and he went up to truman and said that he was glad he got rid of him. [laughter] unlike many politicians, wallace was not a good knowledge vision but he had other qualities but he grew. he thought things through. he realized that he could make mistakes. he looked back on the 48 campaign and never said that he's was bad, but he realized -- that the crusade was bad but

the way he went about it was wrong. >> were any city bosses trying to get rid of them? >> yes. roosevelttrying but had already made his decision to get rid of him. >> you more or less answered my question. i have not done a lot of reading on wallace after 1948. did he write about himself, a biography, about how he felt about that? >> nothing for publication. he has a wonderful diary, but it only goes through the war years. but it does not go up past 1948.

it has been published. in fact, it does not even go to 1948. i got most of this information from his correspondences. a were very sad correspondences. it was a lot of regret. -- they were very sad correspondences. there was a lot of regret. even bitterness. one letter, he had kind words to say about joseph mccarthy going after these people because they were deceitful. i think that showed the political price he paid, but also the personal price he paid. these folks for manipulating him and i think it hurt him personally, and it not only hurt him politically, but a killed him politically. after the 1948 campaign, he never ran in politics. he voted for eisenhower twice not because he had become conservative but he thought eisenhower was a better candidate to keep the peace. those were his political views in the >> i would like to thank

50's. you for coming, first of all. secondly, i was wondering how the vice president may have felt about the socioeconomic structure. such as kansas with its old communist farming community. and also maybe in the north and the industrial area of the country? >> what was his views on economic structures? >> how did that turn out for him, as they had stronger working-class structures than they did in the south. >> his of votes usually came from intellectuals. middle-class college professors and that type. among the working class -- >> -- more popular candidates. -- populist candidates. >> he was a farmer. he knew about farming. he did not talk about that during the campaign. he was focused on the peace issue and civil rights. but wallace did not do well among the working-class voters. he did well among small slivers here and there, usually those

associated with left-wing leadership. it was usually through individuals that were associated with communist leadership. it was a very small sliver. most of wallace's votes came from los angeles and new york city are amongst middle-class professionals. >> thank you. [applause]

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