notch culturally. it was a center of culture for the city of st. paul and the state of minnesota. so i think people were proud to say hey, we've arrived. you can't call us the backwoods frontier state anymore. our building livals anything can you build in new york or philadelphia or chicago. that was kind of a nice statement for the people of the state to say hey, we have a >> throughout the weekend, "american history tv" is featuring st. paul, minnesota. about st. paul and other stops on c-span poshard city to her, at www.c-span.org, and local content. you are watching5 -- watching "american history tv" which is on all weekend, every weekend. watchingre going to be

the richard nixon and the national security council. they discussed the president poshard policies toward egypt and israel during the yom kippur war. they also encourage diplomatic relations with china during the cold war. by theent was cohosted national archives and the richard nixon foundation is about 90 minutes. to talk, this is going to be the first in a several-part series on how it the nixon administration change the world. kissinger,y, henry --henry kissinger poshard kissinger's national security council. the first middle east peace agreement in probably 2000 years.

this amazingt in series of successes is how president nixon and his very able foreign-policy adviser henry kissinger transformed the national security decision-making structure. on the very first day of the administration, these innovations created the groundwork for all of the successes they were able to achieve in the next and poshard presidency.- nixon and you might say, that is more about good housekeeping is that a brilliant policymaking. the key realized that to a successful foreign-policy was dedication. how they wanted to structure the national security council staff. nixon learned firsthand about a good counsel when he was eisenhower poshard vice president.

--enhower poshard security eisenhower's security council was more like a military-based one. this allowed eisenhower to deal with the day-to-day crisis, as well as to devote to more strategic planning. more so, in his memoirs, richard nixon complained that a lot of eisenhower's time was wasted. personal preference was to do things on paper, he said he to get briefings through memoranda rather than on -- them through meetings. the other shortcomings of the eisenhower system was because it was the military. so when decisions were made on the lower level, and the boss got these decisions, it was a yes or no, or choosing from a, b, or c.

nixon saw first hand of the weakness of their foreign policy decision-making processes. he thought that kennedy and johnson were as -- were also more of an ad hoc crisis decision-making process. at the end of the johnson administration, decisions were made by a few people on a regular tuesday luncheon, because johnson it that point, was afraid of leaks. kissinger and nixon were formed the national security structure. people talk about the national security council, and it is important to make it a station, that the national security council is something that is mandated by law by the national security act of 1947. there are three members, the president, the vice president, and the secretary of state.

national security council staff, which is what more people refer to, is in fact the staffers who prepare the documents for that top level group. in nixon's book, he said that eisenhower made the selection because he wanted dulles to be the chief foreign-policy administrator. but nixon wanted firm policy directive from the white house. described the johnson administration process that i talked about as lacking focus. there was not a lot of preparation in the staff were, and decisions were made, more or less, on-the-fly. the administration became hostage and prisoners to the events of the day, and were not able to formulate how they were strategically able to deal with things. nixon thank you figure did not

do it all alone, despite what their memoirs might have said. -- nixon and kissinger did not do it alone, despite what their memoirs might have said. he is a national recognized scholar at stanford university .hen nixon tapped him once nixon became president, richard allen came the deputy director of the national security council. , sitting next to him, joined the campaign staff in 1968. laymen became the national security council staff head of veryrs, and often had a testy relationship between the white house and congress, particularly during the vietnam war. john lehman personally gave henry kissinger headaches for -- gossip colin

column whispers about kissing her be the most eligible bachelor. kissinger being the most eligible bachelor. now the tillman was they -- now in thentleman was demonstration and joined the staff at the very beginning. he probably became henry kissinger's closest associate throughout the ministration. they worked throughout the vietnam peace negotiations through other foreign-policy issues, and particularly, particularly,na, it was created in that office. they were talking about the opening to china. winston helped to plan and was part of the secret trip -- kissinger cosh -- kissinger's

secret trip. winston accompanied him on every one of his secret trips, he was later made the ambassador to china, i was also kissinger's right-hand man. he was also a close personal confidant. and bud was a vietnam veteran in the marine corps. staff in the kissinger 1971. mcfarlaneinston, but soon expandedne his roles. he was able to do many things. to talkt, i would like to these gentlemen about their ,ecollections and remembrances

and a good point in the bad points, about how to change the world. i would like to start with you dick.- you, nixon had given a lot of thought to these issues. the prompted him to wanted to change -- to want to change the nsc system? >> he was informed as to how he was structure things as president. that heonality was such insisted on planning. hours andours and hours reading, mostly reading, some writing, and lots of travel , before he became president. he had the opportunity to see american foreign-policy in disarray. that all of the

elements of national power should be brought together under the rubric of national security. it was not a particular policy toward a conglomerate of states. wasas military power, it economic power, it is our position in the world, it is even down to, and including, information and how we presented ourselves. a fairly efficient job, although we were highly criticized. nixon was highly critical of and wanted to inform it. comprehensivehe national security strategy, harnessing all of the components. he spentto do that, hours and hours and hours of the time that i knew him, and that was a long time, and that as president, and in the transition. and us withssinger

doing just what he wanted to do. organizing and bringing decision-making back into the white house where properly belong. nixon got elected in november of 1968, and took office in january of 1969. in that. of time, that is when you crafted this whole new system. -- in that. of time, that is when you crafted this whole new system. yes. >> how is a codified? -- werepieces of paper there pieces of paper? it included the state department, the have -- the and i cash the cia, what it other departments think about this? >> i don't think people were particularly fond of this at the beginning.

nixon'sresident bygraphies was so battered the washington establishment during his years in the congress he wassenator because really viewed as an outsider, and particularly going after alger hiss was thought to be an unforgivable sin. so, he was not completely trusting of the bureaucracy. ,o he had a very small group and winston was one of the withrs, along with dick, the lead up to it. they put together the framework. and --n, having more having a more experienced counsel to provide the actual wasework, the agency completely ached.

--"baked." >> now we have a distinction between nssms m -- , what was the difference? and all of you can chime in by the way. the national security decision memoranda, number two, was the one that created a different structure that would change the way people were in charge. was thethat complication of everything he wanted. as a result of the discussion of the transition at his own -- that ishat is his exactly what he had written down and what he had approved. in the memorandum, it was approved, you can see it on the

memorandum, it was approved without any other commentary on the side. no penciled notes on the outside, and no modifications. earlierecause he had drafts presented to him before he got the final draft. >> a clean copy and a final analysis. how is this a much different than they had been before? in 1958,t to a hotel and we met and nixon had wanted to get his views on how to get the system to the other -- system together. ck and others also contributed. the key thing about this new system was that who chairs the committee. the person who chairs the committee sets the agenda and --s the show, and i actually and actually make sure what is put into effect.

there was six basic committees. one for general foreign-policy --blems, one for crisis is crises that would arise, one that talked about foreign-policy issues, a verification panel that looked arms control, and to cu intelligence committees -- intelligence committees. all of these richard by henry kissinger. chaired byhese were henry kissinger. all of these agencies had a chance to get their views on these, and he wanted another option. differentinely wanted policy recommendations of which agency supported it, and the pros and the cons, the expenses, and the risks. he used to joke that we would the firstoptions, and

would be unconditional surrender, the second would be nuclear war, and the third would be continued present policy. these were serious options. the other thing that you wanted to make sure was it was a strategy and that you are not just reacting to crisis. the system the dominated foreign-policy in terms of the white house. we had several factors. secondly, it was a distrust of others. bringing a deleted trust to were also imaginative and innovative. thirdly, he had the guts to appoint henry kissinger and not nelson rockefeller. he was a jewish immigrant from harvard. you had a terrific

staff, present company excluded of course, and they all work harder than the state department. then you had issues that we will get into, that let themselves to a close-knit operation and the secretive operation. the three key issues were in vietnam, china, and russia. of the factors that led to the domination by the white house. >> i wanted to focus on us. because it was different than before. who chaired this? there was always the in thegency discussions eisenhower and kennedy and the johnson administration. but who was the chair? >> i don't want to but in here, but even under the nixon era, you had the under secretary, who was essentially a person who would look at issues sometimes before they got to the nsc.

administrations, the key committees were generally chaired by the secretary of state or his deputy, as opposed to the nsc. bud, you are a military guy. talk to us about your perspective from the military. >> this was very welcome to the wereary, these plans always looking over the horizon and look at what could go wrong, what might happen in the middle east, soviet union, or russia now. so the system the resident nixon put in place would put a premium on planning. east-west we approach , or soviet relations? what are the economic military relations and how we can bring together all of the u.s.

resources to focus on their vulnerabilities, and by the way, what is the cost of doing option one, option two, and option three? because financially, there are risk, and politically there are allies, and so forth. so the military welcome to the system. however,r to state, that the cabinet officers are strong-willed people normally, and you would really have to have eight halogen staff. staff.lented when you brought together the exports -- experts from the cia and so forth around the table, they had credentials also. it was only by death of the excellence of people like bill simon, and bill

other practicing diplomats of furred -- who for decades already were trusted, when they went to these interdepartmental meetings, they brought information and they spoke with authority. yes they were backed by the white house am a but they were intellectually up to the job. patsiese not there as listening to ideas that might ,ave been a little bit fringe or whatnot. so it was not the president who was just as keenly well-informed, he was a scholar himself, and it was not just dr. kissinger, but it was also subordinates who were really up to the task of the great work -- grit work. they brought to the president options that made a lot of

sense. he would pick one, and they were the people who cracked the whip after he made a decision about our policy towards the soviet union. if any cabinet agency began to go off the reservation and very a little bit, they would get a someonem sonnenfeld or else. in short, it was a disciplined system. it was a system that studied matters exhaustively and came to decisions, and publish them. it is almost unique in american history's that it -- history that in those years, every american could go to a bookstore and get a copy of the national security policy of the united states. every year. it covered every region. trade, andntrol, and so forth. not a furtive," a secret

operation, except when needed -- ld, secretlose-ho operation, except when needed. it was open. and its successes bear that out. >> no system is perfect. can do for and follow -- do foreign-policy. but get systems can succeed. perfect,st, nothing is especially if that is what the president wants, above all. wantedon and kissinger something that was formal and that everyone was involved, and usually there was only one .ecommendation to the president the compromises were hashed out before they even got to the

president parsed s -- president's desk. difference leaned heavily on dulles, where is nixon lead hat -- heavily on his national security advisor. they would get together every tuesday for lunch because they were worried about leaks and they wanted to look at fast-moving decisions. that had the distance -- that but you did speed, not always have carefully the lunch.endas for it had different interpretations of decisions that were made during lunch, and even different implementation. >> i would add one postscript here. and a second later i will come

back to bud. president nixon had the good recognize theand legislative arm in all of this, and to pick the premier fellow in all of washington and that was bryce harlow. he had originally written, among other things, that part of farewell speech, where he warned of the military-industrial complex. was a lobbyist, heaven for and that was when matt macd -- michael roy -- kleroy had been the secretary of defense. 19 tuesday 9 --

beginning in 1969, 1968 actually, there was congressional understanding and congressional funding and of course, congressional approval of policies. i think the nixon system engendered respect on the part of the legislature. , aaw that he had a plan program, he had things in hand, and he did not waste any time implementing those. that kind of perspective build support, and the legislative support, for the funding of programs that is necessary. back and say the point that winston made, where it was the best. they might not have made national figures, but they were the best in their fields. john, jump in to comment. is important to understand

where the national security council came from. it did not happen and come into it wasoom in 1947, but one of the most bitter and contentious periods that makes today's partisanship look like kindergarten. 8047, andrs of 1946, 1948, there was bitter policy. you have to remember that when franklin roosevelt took office for the first year, and his first term, his white house staff was five people. his was true cabinet government. he wanted to hear directly from each of the service chiefs, from the secretary of the military

department, and so forth. there was no such thing as a national security staff. war went ons the -- the chiefs became more running back and forth every day during the war -- that increased somewhat, but there never really was a national security council. >> they were not running back to the pentagon, the pentagon did not exist at that point. war department, and by the end of the war, it was in that five sided building, and there was the navy department down by the mall, and that is another story about how they got kicked out of their. cabinet werethe the officers and the president's advisors. they met daily during the war. then truman came in. burnedreally kind of

hadt the way that roosevelt such a powerful persona and had terms, andof four was running policy completely. he wasn't included a burned him that way. >> no, he was not included. in his memoirs and gray by re-freeze, he really, really disliked the navy and the navy department. --sevelt always referred when he was talking about this navy -- he always said "we" and "us," and when he talked about the army, he always said, "them guys.""those

he thought that they had much more power than they should. >> you have to be very careful. >> roosevelt was an assistant secretary of the navy. under josephus daniels. was ant that there attempt in the truman white house to seize back control from both the state department and especially the two military department, there was a huge battle over the consolidation and the creation of the sense -- the creation of the department of defense. secretary of the navy, really wrote a lot of the 1947 act.

of creating a national security council was, indeed, his -- he wrote it with his friends on the hill. the wayo get control of that truman was running policy, trying to consolidate things, particularly clark clifford and cabinet,ers, and the particularly the new defense department, and the state department, were frozen out of the policy. forrsc was thought up by estal, who was the first secretary of defense, and dean were tryingnd they to get back in control. the way it was originally organized, it was staffed by serving military officers and foreign service officers.

there was no budget for a national security council staff. truman never used it. he resented it. he just was furious about the whole establishment of it. so he never used it. eisenhower turned it into a military staff. and then after that, it reflected how interested a president was in foreign-policy and national security. lbj was much more interested in civil rights and domestic affairs, so vietnam became the total, but having a concept and a vision as to how the rest of the world should be, he just was not interested. the nsc reverted to a very ad hoc tuesday lunch kind of ad hoc theing, so sometimes cabinet officers had to weigh on

he was not interested in, and they never knew what was going on. change, and then when president nixon came in, huron is this guy who -- here was this guy who, critics of watergate say, was not interested in domestic and social policy, he was really interested in national security he foundnd kissinger his alter ego. , whatevercture process that was used to build it and put in place, was designed to bring all of that back in and and orderly and structured fashion. orderly and structured fashion. none of us want to denigrate

the other agencies. people, very many abled took care of a lot of issues. also, they had to implement what was decided by the nsc. all of us would not deny that the white house dominated a lot of secrecy, as we will get into ater, but they still provided lot of information that was needed by the president. littlee is just one component, the other point that i would like to make, is that all that we find in the memorandum that was submitted by whatresident, including was the united states information agency in the process. surprise, i was walking to my first national security council meeting,

early january or later january, across the street from the eob. shakespeare, i said frank i will see you at the nsc meeting. he said, what nsc meeting? his's when i realize that agency was not in the meeting. they had simply been dismissed. nixon himself did not mind that the exclusion had occurred. henry did not trust them. >> you guys talk about, and -- othersothers will have written about, the national security staff, and yet as somebody has pointed out, you guys were really young. you were very young.

why do you just talk through how you found your way. let's start with bud. i was a parade -- beret officer at the time. my office was next door to henry kissinger. i saw the opportunity to be interviewed for his military adviser position. then over time, i began to focus handlingg on intelligence dimensions of the relationship with china. sharing of sensitive intelligence information that the chinese would tell you was not in the american cards that were being played against the

soviet union. it was trying to gain the chinese confidence. >> it was immensely valuable to both countries. briefings onodic soviet military deployment, what was their strength, their readiness, what about able deployments, what about soviet aid programs to india, but in chineseroviding intelligence that they could count on that was immensely valuable. time, were in moscow the and suddenly this was going on, to keepnly enabled you 45 divisions on the chinese border, now that the americans were allied in supportive, but we do not5 divisions,

have to worry about them in europe treated or at least not as much. -- europe. or at least not as much written -- as much. nixon's policy was adopted part and parcel by the reagan administration in 1982. we are talking about the nixon administration, we were very very strong-willed cabinet there were very, cabinetong-willed officers that disagreed with these policies in the reagan administration. but nixon wanted these disagreements to be aired in the meetings, and decisions made in neck they are so, but, in order

to do that, you had to have a strong white house staff they could bring an honest , analyze the merits of each, and the nixon reallyith dr. kissinger established a process. it would get the best from the bureaucracy, including the disagreements, options, make decisions, and then oversee the implementation of policy that brought such excess in the china opening and the middle east diplomacy, and the arms control agreement, and so forth. and similarly, later in the reagan years, successful thecies that accelerated collapse of marxism in the world, and ended the cold war, the reduction of nuclear weapons for the first time in history,

and all it involve enough a model that was very similar to the nixon years. >> go ahead. by the way, everybody feel that you can -- >> we don't comment on these everyday. patterns of what the president wants to delegate, all presidents have to make the most difficult decisions. matterly does not whether we are focusing on domestic or international policy. our delegating the information to kissinger, and he had nixon. these systems are perfect. they all had their advantages and disadvantages. >> i think there is one dimension where, had we all been

able to go back to the creation, we might have asked for more help in the drafting. congress is hardly mentioned in any of these documents. meetings and the agendas and the options were really the finest put together, ever up to that point, it was a 500 pound gorilla in the room that was never considered. >> that was your job, right? yes, and at one point there singleeeting, and the aggression a leader -- the congressional leader said, "god nixon, you got a get

congressional input." thisthink somebody pointed out, but the economic to mentions of foreign policy requires attention. in all fairness, economic power is absolutely crucial. in those days, it was less important. what is more important than being in the system. that, theect to shortcoming became so apparent 1971, that nixon created the council on national economic policy, i know because i was shanghaied to come back to help peter peterson. was to build a council on for the policy,

secretaries on commerce, labor, and agriculture, and all of those were international issues that begin to burn my 1971. dumping japanese television variouspropriation of american properties abroad such there,hile, and worries so that dimension really took off because of nixon. when we speak of president nixon as an architectural president, which is the overarching theme of our discussion today, that bycussion was stimulated pressure from congress and pressure from the secretary of the treasury and who was a very strong voice and who is often thought to be nixon's successor. everybodyson that

seems to who is not on the stage is the assistant to the president. he was part of the inner circle. wave yourur hand -- hand, tom. [laughter] >> crisis. we have not dealt with crisis. set up aand kissinger system where every agency would have a role that would --tribute to the and s s m nssm. byse were given to next and -- these were given to nixon by kissinger and it would reflect

-- >> always an audit number. >> always an odd number. kissinger would also recommend the pros and cons and say however, i recommend option b. votes suddenly getting a that was superior in some ways to the agency. winston, you made a point in your writing that the system was not only unique to nixon and to needed at what it was the time. it centralized the need of suited itself to the power in the white house because of the country and the issues we were dealing with. were dealing with is intellectually stimulating

system. was putting together these briefing books. before you strategy got the specific choices, and that was true of almost every issue. the you are referring to is three most important issues when nixon face when he came into the office. china, that the top of the soviet union, and the ending of the vietnam war -- the détente with the soviet union, and the ending of the vietnam war. there was an economic component, i might add. it was urgent. you did not have to worry about public policies, so all three of these issues lend themselves to delicate negotiations out of the public spotlight, so there is a

lot of sensitivities with these three issues. therefore, it lent itself to the nixon-kissinger approach. we want to get into the secrecy issue at one point. from the outset of the ministration, it lent itself to white house control and secrecy. pluses and minuses. it was part of the reason that they went about diplomacy in this way. openingrespect to the of china, it is also important to recognize that nixon wrote an for thein october october 1967 issue of foreign affairs. he wrote it almost entirely by himself, along with ray price, pat buchanan, and richard whelan , and i participated in this as article really

telegraphed the opening to china. nobody paid attention to it. it is quite cryptic. a afteralled "asi vietnam," and nixon calls for a series of summit meetings and the opening of asia. but nobody picked it up and nobody -- and he did not elaborate on it. people thought that it was nixon referring to his secret plan for vietnam. but he never had a secret plan for vietnam. placenitiative was in during -- place. now, i participated and was walking out with henry, and it don't know -- and i don't know if you are walking out of this

saidng as well, and he find a way to get in touch with china. out ofs the last remark the door from the oval office walking down the hall. and henry muttered, "is he crazy?" well, he himself became the vehicle to get in touch with china. >> it was beyond that. i fit for your first, 1969, 1 1, 1969, onebruary week after the inauguration, henry agreed with the concept as well, by the way, but he certainly agree that the opening to china with helpless with the russians and do a lot of other things, that there is no

question that this was one of nixon's basic impulses from the beginning within one week of his inauguration. by the way, he did not have a secret plan for vietnam. but he wanted to use the russians to squeeze hanoi. he wanted to construct the best possible version of events. >> you both talk about how kissinger got control of the bureaucracy. tell us how to nixon and kissinger would let the world know that the action was in the west wing of the white house and not in any other agency. >> in one of the referendums, there was a reference to an annual statement. those annual statements became very important. you could go to the government printing office and get a copy

of the american principles and for theand it was bound year and beyond. it stated the country's goals for the next year. we would beat out these issues in san clemente every year. the president was only interested in vietnam. for example, in china, those reports gave a lot of indication of what direction we were going to take with china. people sort of overlooked it. -- i thinkthink it it is worth talking about for a little bit longer. this is the first time the administration had said publicly, and not in a boilerplate bureaucratized language, this is where we want to go. and issinger and nixon

know you are part of it winston, fourould take for guys -- guys and go to san clemente and create white papers for the ministration. thise last introduction to , although it did not get attention from the press and from the domestic audience that it should have, the foreign audience understood. if you try to draft a document he alwaysger, rejected the first draft. it was made inherently worthless. i was doing a section on indochina, and it was about 30

pages, this first draft. i did not even read it because i knew he would reject it. put in a sentence that was grammatically correct, but consisted of titles of all of kissinger's books. he caught it. i wanted to chime in there. far, we have- thus talked about the planning and the thoroughness of american policy for every part of the world. that planning was really part of an important part of the nixon administration. there are things that happened it don't anticipate. overseas that involve american interest, so what you do when you have a crisis?

that was equally as impressive as the long-term planning, and the way the president nixon organize his team. probably the most salient example was during the presidency, and the yom kippur war of october of 1973. distance -- had been confirmed as secretary of state. i mention this primarily, because it didn't end well. you can read about that. you can see a forum like this one the focuses entirely on the middle east war. i mention of foreign entirely different reason. --was because of the resume the resilience and the strength of president nixon who remembered the circumstances. here was an american ally,

israel, attacked from two sides, syria and egypt, and losing. and it looked like for about a week's time, israel was going to suffer a pretty serious defeat. here,ent nixon, however, seeing the importance of avoiding that catastrophe, was himself besieged by the watergate problem. a challenge that have lasted over a year now. being attacked by members of congress and others and the press. and an ally was about to go under. it required personal composure and vision of where he wanted and -- end, and he got the aid of dr. kissinger and some subordinates and the

department of defense. mind, the pressures of watergate, and his vice president was about to resign. union had its own interest to get back into the middle east, and it was looking for ways to undermine american it evento the point of alerting seven airborne divisions to go back to egypt and to tip the balance in favor of egypt. you had threats by the arab countries to impose an oil broughtwhich could have down not only our economy but the global economy, so this is not your average afternoon walk in the park if you are the president facing these kinds of stresses. but throughout, and indeed the vice president did resign in .hat first two-week

in october, the president was there to make the decision. the things came off american defense production line, the battlefield was turned around so that israel could avoid being defeated. , the evolution of any crisis, in this case the tipping of the balance in favor of israel, which almost brought in airbornet union's division, and it caused an alert al lae american side, in almost, but he stood there like a rock. ensuringcisions and

that the aftermath not only was the security of egypt and the arab states restore to a measure of stability, but, an opening was created for the first time since israel became a state, for a dialogue with an arab leader who had the statesmanship and the character to be willing to engage against the counsel of and engagecountry with israel and lay the foundation for the first peace treaty between israel and an arab state. able to dont was that, notwithstanding all of the pressures he was under, through the system that he ran and managed, regardless of his own personal circumstance, through the excellence of dr. kissinger,

now his secretary of state -- memo tould write a himself because he was also the defense secretary at the same time. >> that's right. >> i want to get back to the president. he did have the guts and the intelligence. they did not let israel wipe out the egyptian army, because that would have made it psychologically difficult for the arab negotiations. so they have a cease-fire. i was involved in that. we went to moscow. had some dignity and self-respect to negotiate, and hubris, solosing its both sides were ready to negotiate. you not only have to manage the crisis, but you had a specific westsag, called the

and that would only work if you had a couple of things intellectually in place. one, a strategy for the region. it is not like a recipe that you're going to pull off, but if you do some contingency planning, and you think about a on,on strategically early so when a crisis breaks out, you at least have some background with which to maneuver and to tailor your tactics. so you needed this committee, which you also need a more formal system of advancement. >> what you talk about that for a moment. john, if you, and could weigh-in, what did congress think of this? congress was crucial, if they did not have the budget, some of these things would not happen. >>

but she would have state defense, cia, joint chiefs present. basic -- just like the other committee meetings, but this was specified for crises. nsa meetings would start out with a briefing by cia to give the intelligence background. henry would give the overview including options involved. each of the agencies would present their views and why they backed a particular option. nixon, like most presidents, would listen and go off and think about and make his decision later. >> was congress brought in? >> let me talk about congress a little later. this five years i don't think has ever been matched. it was due in no small measure

to the concept of the president and henry as to how it should run. that resulted in the recruiting of some truly first-class, unusual people. it was kept small. me, there weres only about 30 professionals on kissinger's staff. only abouta total of 120. that was why it was so effective, because it was very agile. it could move quickly. all the professional staff bybers' calls were answered whomever was being called. whether the cabinet secretary or a senate foreign relations chairman. thingslarly in crisis,

moved very quickly and credibly. that there aree strong things to say on the macon system, -- the reagan system, which was really a version of the nixon system. councilonal security was a structure that functions because it was a very high quality, very small, and very agile. of howlook at the 120 the system should work and today withit to 1700. >> 1700? >> when we were on the national commission twoe years ago, that is what it was. quadrennial defense review,

excuse me. >> i think this is a significant point. staff innal security 1969 was probably 10 people. it may have gotten up to 30 professionals by the time the nixon administration was finished. maybe as many as 80 or 100 people. that counts everybody for me typing the president's daily brief two henry kissinger. you're now saying it is 1700? i am blown away. where are they? >> i will tell you where they are. we were there, we had some people in the basement of the west wing. a few people on the first floor. then we had about 3/4 of one floor in the executive office

building. today, they have taken over what eob. to be called the new that is filled with nsc staff. >> it has become another institution of government. it is very bureaucratic. they still have plenty of good people, that they are embedded in a huge bureaucratic system so it does not function today the way it did in either the reagan carter years. the height of its effectiveness was the nixon administration. it was because it was mean -- lean and agile. >> to us wonder crises. -- to respond to crisis. >> one of the things that drove president nixon craziness leaks -- crazy was leaks.

as i am could be made, making the case, john will remember from 1969 particularly that ultimately it was this concern and passion about stopping leaks that led to watergate. it was a direct connection. it was mentioned there is going to be a subcommittee on american commitments abroad. i happen to read it. john and i discussed it. thereupon began a long effort that culminated in the fall of 1969 with a 70-page memorandum, the same topic you turned into a doctoral dissertation at cambridge if i'm not mistaken. we presented this memorandum. oddly enough, the memorandum was not acted upon. it went into limbo.

when i was preparing to come back to the white house, haldeman -- bob haldeman, president nixon's chief of staff, called me and said the president remembers your memorandum from 1969 and would like to implement it. he wants you to implement it. i said no way am i going to do that because among the recommendations were reviewing everyone's security clearances. i personally wanted no part of reviewing anybody's security clearances. i did not want to see raw data. the leakage came just as much from inside the white house as from the bureaucracy. it was bureaucracy that nixon distrusted and henry also distrusted.

but in reality, there was just as much leakage coming right out of the nsc. >> back channels and all the rest. >> and major feature of this system was secrecy. there were pluses and minuses. i have already suggested the most urgent issues with themselves to tightly held negotiations. other people out, leave aside the morale and humiliation, you may not get the full expertise of other agencies to get you ready for what you are secretly negotiating. hope to get briefings on chinese even though we were sick really going to china in a few weeks. general still have the request that the president would like to know more about taiwan and so on. the other disadvantage is if you carry out something secretly and then announce an agreement, the

agencies cut out in the first place will be tinted to say we could have done a better job if you had left this out or we had known about this grid so that is the risk you run. the system was awkward, humiliating. but it produced terrific results. one of the problems was where it led. i will give you one example. china, wenature to had a public trip to india and pakistan on a small plane. there were three types of people on the plane. four of us knew we were going secretly to china. was public for other reasons. there were two or three that knew we were going but did not go with desperate they had to stay behind and pakistan to cover the secret journey. there were others that did not know anything about china. i was in charge of briefing folks. i had to keep three different

sets of briefing books. one for four of us. went for a slightly larger group -- one for a slightly larger group. henry would be napping. he would wake up and want all three changed all over again. this was absurd. the advantage on china was if you had a lot of publicity about the opening of china, although we did send signals we discussed. the taiwan lobby, the anti-communist extremists, all other allies would be weighing in and you would be him t restricted. it was a dramatic opening. . the disadvantage was the state department criticized the shanghai communiqué because they were not involved. public meeting, it

was just for the art p.r. we were making offers to in the war from the beginning beyond what the editorials were calling for. we were being moderate. hanoi was intransigent. id a public price because no one knew we were negotiating. negotiated with some help from the arms community salt one, the first big treaty. later that ifzed you involve the bureaucracies, you would not have made some mistakes. i would say the positives outweigh the minuses because look at the results. you did pay the price in human terms and in terms of bureaucratic strife. >> in the case of the arms

control negotiations with the russians, the soviet union, and the vietnam peace agreement, there were public, formal negotiations run by the state department. it you guys were doing this secret back channel trip where you were doing the heart of the negotiation here, but the media and congress could focus there. >> you paid a price. the public once looked meaningless and no one realized we were making a real effort to in the war. you can comment on the arms control part. >> i was going to add to your point about the china negotiations. people to this day apply the policy. they said, did it have to be secret? well, consider this. at the time, china was killing in the cultural revolution literally tens of millions of its own people.

consider the left-wing in our country, every american really would have been revolted by the idea we are going to be engaging in trying to foster relations with a country doing that. the right wing could have said this is a country that is providing the ak-47's to vietnam killing americans right now. this is a country in chaos literarily internally. if you had said let's float that i get in public and see what thate think about it -- idea in public and see what people think about it, it would not have gone over well. if you are going to take the country in a profoundly new direction on any piece of public policy vulnerable to being heavily criticized, as these were, laterones it came to a similar thing but i

won't digress on the reagan years, but had to be in secret or it never would have developed as the success it was. gains we made today are self-evident. it was a good idea. it would have never happened. >> we did pay a price with japan and nato allies. but that was temporary. there could have been leaks. that reinforces your point. >> the other major accomplishment was the middle east diplomacy. everyone knew kissinger was shuttling back and fourth. was the fact he did not go on television to talk about it, it once he became secretary of state he had other responsibilities to be done in the public eye? >> let's come back to that because i never answered your

question about congress which bears directly on secrecy. thing henry's attitude to congress when he first came in -- i think henry's attitude to congress when he first came in with the same as admiral already , put in aternie king the beginning of world war ii. he was known to be a brusque character. officenavy, there is the of legislative affairs. admiral said here's what we have planned for you to brief the committee. he said i am not breaking any committees. what should we tell them? tell them nothing. when the war is over, tell them who won. [laughter] i think that was henry's attitude towards congress. that is why you don't see it in any of the preparatory doctrine, but he is a fast learner. pretty soon he was finding congress intruding and attacking

on every level. luckily he had three of the ,inest tutors ever in the job so he soon realized he had to start dealing with these people. >> not to mention congress approved the nsa budget. >> right. it was an unending crisis and battle from the first day until henry went to state. than it took on another level. naturald out to be a because he learned so quickly that first you cannot tell them nothing, but you have to be careful who you tell what to. to summarize a lot of different

manage.he was able to people think congress is polarized today? it is nothing compared to those days. the bitterness between the democrats and republicans, particularly on the vietnam war, you could cut it with a knife. people were not talking to each other. >> don't forget on whose watch the vietnam war stareted. half a million people across the street on the mall demonstrating. come intor, we had to work and crawl under the buses that surrounded the old white house. remember that? of the price we paid for secret negotiations which we had to do. i am not saying the demonstrations would have gone

if they had known, but it would have helped. at up on usbe up saying aren't you even negotiating and we would have just come back from a secret trip. >> the foreign relations committee was a sieve. they felt early on they were not getting what was happening. toill was introduced andoena henry to testify make him subject to senate confirmation. basically, we came up with a strategy to give them inside skinny briefings with no staff present and the foreign relations committee. but to in writing, stroke them so they were getting the truth of what was going on,

to appoint. to take carethem of not looking totally out of the picture. over to theke us minority caucus. henry was brilliant and being able to talk about the half-empty part of the glass to those constituents. soon he had to make deals with congress and deal with crises just as important as dealing with the chinese or soviets. he almost single-handedly had to block legislation constantly being proposed and easily getting a majority of signatures.

book in itself. secrecy, as he became more known particularly after the china announcement, we have to watch this guy, it was harder for him to do secret things. he was in middle east the was moreiplomacy public than he would have preferred. winston would know more in detail. there were several layers of what was going on in addition to the public. >> it was essentially a state department operation. he was secretary of state on most of the shuttles. that was under ford as well as nixon.

also not neglect that dimension of washington that is so terribly important, the style section of the "washington post." henry quickly discovered he could be socially active, shall we say. it may be the interview with the italian newswoman. >> very beautiful. >> charming. interview, i recall he spoke about riding into town as john wayne or a cowboy would. once we were in paris with for secret- negotiations with the vietnamese. henry had to camouflage when we were there. negroponteand john

to draft the peace agreement while he went out to dinner with a beautiful blonde so everyone paid attention to that and not why we were in town. he was sacrificing himself. [laughter] >> i did not say it was not useful. it could also be enjoyable. [laughter] one of the reasons he kept such an effective staff was the people he wanted and did not see as a threat he was totally loyal to. to a dinnerff once off the record, how naïve i was with ae days, dinner foreign service officer to talk about how we could improve security because leaks were everyday.

"washington post" front page. i dutifully did that and said we have the same problem with senator fulbright in the foreign relations committee. is an above the fold headline, his and your aid -- attacks fulbright -- -- "kissinger aide attacks fulbright for leaking." which he was doing. , henry call from al haig wants to see you. >> this is not going to be a good meeting, you can tell. >> where am i going to work after this? in.me in and he says go on henry is sitting at his desk.

"lehman, the secretary of state has said you must be fired, that you are poisoning relations which he has been working on for relations withe , so i waslbright called into the president's saide and president nixon i know bill called you, he called me and said you should fire this fellow lehman." said, what do you think, henry? henry said, i was thinking of promoting him. [laughter] one point gets back to the system. image an important point neither

nixon nor kissinger wanted yes-men or women. they wanted honest points of view and debate before a decision was made. that once the decision was made if you were on the losing side, you carry it out loyaltly. if not, you resigned. that is how i got to be a special assistant. the first year i was in the executive office building. we sent memos on contingencies and doubles advocacy --devil's advocacy. i sent a couple but my boss let me soon on my own resizing some of our policies. henry was impressed with the argument even though he disagreed with it, he made me special assistant.

to underline the fact that nixon and kissinger both wanted fierce debate and options, but they wanted loyalty once you made the decision. >> i would love to get everybody's final thoughts on the nsc, the structure, how it ,orked and why it succeeded particularly you who later became national security advisers to president reagan. did the system work only for nixon and kissinger? did it work effectively going forward from that? i will let you think about it. john, do you want to wrap up your final thoughts? >> i believe the national security system has never worked even inbefore or since, the reagan years for different reasons. a combination of the way it operated after

kissinger became secretary of would be a way to improve because the present day the cabinet officers need to be included in the real decision-making. if you keep them totally excluded the way they were, they go off and do independent scheming. his ownd was cutting deals with congress and not telling henry or anybody else about them because he was cut out of the inside game. there would be ways to improve on it. i think win put it perfectly. really good people can make the system work -- make any system work although it can be less cumbersome and efficient. mediocre people, timeservers,

can't make the best system produce good policy. that is what we have to keep in mind as we see every part of the government bloated to the point they do not function. humiliatings it was for secretary rogers and others. to have toard for us keep two or three different sets of memos, secret trips and back channels. we have not talked about telegrams done for the cia in secret meetings and trips. having said that, you have to look at the results which is ultimately what you're looking for. i think several factors made it work. we are retouched on them. with a a president tremendous interest and background in foreign policy, a strong national security advisor , the kind of issues that live themselves to this kind of system. dealing with parliament and

public opinion, it is difficult to deal with the issues. the final thing we have not touched on is the relationship between nixon and kissinger. it was filled with temple the loans -- ambivalence but successful. nixon struck a perfect balance between someone who was mired in details who had good foreign policy successes and the other extreme of delegating all foreign policy. he set the strategy. but he knew in kissinger, he had the guts to appoint him and he was working for his opponent before the election, he had sufficient trust in him as a negotiator in the tactics to carry out the strategy. they would agree on the strategy and henry would carry it out. henry had a view of the world

that was strongly parallel on all the major issues. nixon was willing to be involved in making sure we did what we wanted strategically but letting henry. out --carry it out. i think that balance was a crucial part of the success. >> there being nothing inherently wrong with the structure create at the outset of the nixon i saw no reason to change it by 1980 and 1981. it was a comprehensive system that integrated all the elements of national power and national security in the broadest possible implications. i continued it and unashamedly so. one of the problems that arose haig the very outset al

being appointed secretary of state, reagan did not know al well. there are all sorts of back stories i will not bother to get into, interim meetings arranged .or haig an reagan but al wanted to run everything outside the three-mile limit. the first day of the administration, the very first day after the inauguration, that afternoon presented a memorandum. i had seen earlier drafts and said to al it will not fly with this president whom al did not know either. basically what happened was we had no crisis management until march 23. that is two-and-a-half months, a long time into the first part of

the reagan administration. finally i broke the logjam. >> what happened in march? >> sorry, president reagan was shot at the hilton hotel. i raced back to the white house to implement that which had been just approved on the 23rd of march, seven days before the president was shot. it was crisis management. i had proposed to break the logjam. al wanted to do it and it belongs in the white house to courtney all the elements thank you coordinate -- to coordinate all the elements. that lead to some misunderstandings about whom succeeded home that day. the famous day. the point was the system worked very well. when you had an

organization of the type nixon set up with kissinger and all of us in 1969. hugefunctioned with elements of tension as pointed out by my colleagues, but the system worked. you could try decisions home -- you could drive decisions home. you cannot do that if all the decision making elements are dispatched to the bureaucracy. >> when you became national security adviser, you were one of the architects of winning the cold war. u are being very generous. dependsquestion, it entirely on the president and the degree to which he or she vision of what american interests are and how they can

be advanced in their term of office. in addition to having some knowledge of what you want to do, you have got to have a sense of order, discipline. looking back over the past several generations, resident nick sent's -- president nixon's model has stood the test of time of having good people with knowledge and understanding of foreign cultures, the middle east, the far east, to russia, latin america. system for manage a planning, decision-making, and for overseeing what you decide is the president gets done -- as the president gets done. you need a highly talented group

of people. but the president sets the tone and cracks the whip, hires and fires, and moves us in a constructive direction. president nixon's legacy speaks for itself in all these areas we discussed here from the china opening to ending the vietnam engaging the soviet union in reducing nuclear weapons over time later on and the middle east. relationshipshose without question were better at the end of the nixon presidency than when he arrived clearly. that model stood the test of time through the reagan years. >> everybody talks about the great successes of the golden era of american foreign-policy,

the nixon-kissinger period. what people forget to talk about is the enduring legacy. we know there was the legacy of thepolicy itself, opening of china. arms reductions agreements never would have happened if they had not happened. we have seen the problem of getting into and out of wars, vietnam legacy, certainly in the middle east we are still reaping the peace of the middle east from the 1970's. what gets overlooked is the enduring legacy of the people on the national security staff. everyone has referred to the high quality of it. but when henry kissinger has his reunions every several years and people come back, everyone looks around and is stunned to see how went on from junior staffers under nixon and

besinger who went on to cabinet officers, national security visors -- advisors, more than you can count. it was not just what the policies were, but the people who were trained under that system who went on. we walked with giants. you walked with giants when you're junior members on kissinger's national security staff. but then he became giants of your own. allen who was nixon's first security advisor went on to work for ronald reagan and was the tutor to his strategy in his campaign and went on to be reagan's first national security advisor. the junior guy working for nixon who almost got fired that day, went on to be the secretary of the navy in the

reagan administration. it was the 600-ship navy and naval presence that helped convince the soviet union had no choice. over byut cold war was the tommy got our 600 ships. john went on to do that. winston lord became the main point guard for american chinese relations for 30 years. china,e ambassador to assistant secretary for asian affairs, president of the council on foreign relations. the job started out not knowing a lot about china. when i go to china and mention the name of winston lord, you're up there with the great superheroes. finally, bud mcfarlane, started out as major mcfarlane when i first knew you, went on to become reagan's national security adviser. to reagan star will -- the reagan star wars speech talks about the united states

developing the missile shield. those are for a different forum . but bud mcfarlane was an architect of the ultimate takedown of the soviet union. the people in their 20's and 30's in the nixon administration, in their 40's and 50's became the men who won the cold war. onhink maybe is going to be your speed dial wanting to know how we win the next one. thank you for joining us. i hope you come back for the subsequent forums where we will drill down deeper into china, vietnam, the soviet union, and strategic planning. thanks so much for joining us. >> every sunday at 8:00 and midnight, you can learn from leading historians about presidents and first ladies. to watch any of our programs or check our schedule, visit www.c-span.org/history.

you are watching american history tv on c-span3. baker,ay night, wade security director for verizon on the recent data breaches. >> it is truly all of the above. we have worked with law enforcement agencies who have busted down doors and drag people out of the basement literally. we also have participated in large-scale arrests of multiple individuals highly connected, very well organized. each have individual specialties and roles. someone writes software. the others know how to wash the money and all these things. they are just like physical organized crime. there are others working on behalf of a government. they have an office.

there are pictures of it. hotos and all of that going in and out of work. their job is to steal information on behalf of the government. i have seen photos of eastern where an insane number of people drive lamborghinis and things like this. , the of that is the spam fake pharmaceuticals, the financial fraud, tax fraud, medicare fraud. it is staggering amounts of that are traced back to stored at a corporation or government. on c-span2.ght in september of 1964, the worn commission releasts