essential community providers to make sure that the providers who dealt with low income population will be represented. i would be wary of where it goes. all generalizations are false is a good motto to keep in mind when thinking about these issues. >> robert? >> i would like to follow up maybe with a question for mr. nickel. have the medicare advantage standards created problems? those have like five different levels based on the diversity of a community total population, population density. have those failed or inadequately recognized diversity among states? >> that's not a question i'm

well-versed on. it doesn't occur to me that i have heard much or seen much in terms of complaints on that issue. that one i would have to get back to you on. >> joel, do you have something to say about medicare advantage? you mentioned it before. >> i think, again, the medicare advantage standards are set for a particular population group, the elderly. to import them directly into the broader market place i think would probably not be the best solution. i would certainly look at some of the principles that are there. i think the rubber meets the road for your group where you earn your pay is should there be quantification and if we are going to have it everybody that does it starts with time and distance kinds of rules. that's going to be and there are those in the medicare advantage standards. do we need those or some kind of national forum?

i certainly will be skeptical of doing that at this point. but that is where the rubber will meet the road in the discussion. >> the medicare advantage example has one distinction from a lot of the discussion we are having about the exchanges which is the existence of medicare. so you have this sort of market back drop in the medicare advantage world and most people do opt to stay in the traditional medicare program whereas in the exchanges you don't have that exact same broad plan that you can automatically pick. so i think we are worried in the exchange population in some ways as was mentioned by co-panelists early on, not so much that there is a plan that is narrower than you would like as opposed to a market place where there is a lot of choice of something you would want. in the medicare advantage situation the existence of medicare relieves a lot of pressure on the regulation of plans.

>> related to this loosely, the national committee for quality assurance has recently come out with something of an accreditation of plans. how is that going to work? and is that going to work well? how does that fit in with what all of the other parties are doing? >> i think it is a welcome development in the sense that those kinds of accreditation programs i think can be helpful and that they are sort of a level below regulation. at the federal level you have to worry about once a regulation is put into effect it is hard to change. the states tend to be a lot more nimble about trying something and if it doesn't work doing it. that was not my experience at the federal government. looking at different things through accreditation and approach it softer than a regulation are to be commended.

i think in general i don't know a lot about the standards. when i skim through them they look to be more process oriented and making insurers work through a process of asking the right questions and having answers and not so much on kind of bottom line standards. i could be wrong on some of the details. that was my impression, more of a process oriented set of standards which i think is good. >> i think you need to interpret the ncqa activity as a subset of a an enormous new movement to inform people and help provide information about the plans. there is an enormous amount of venture capital and a range of companies trying to find ways to inform people about the different plans and inform about providers within the plans and inform them when they are choosing a plan and a physician. you will see an enormous amount

of venture capital and private efforts to improve the way these markets work. we are just at the very beginning of understanding how well all of those sort of new tools that take advantage of an enormous amount of big data, information sciences, quality measurement stuff. we don't know how well we will be able to translate that knowledge. many more important decisions in many ways, how well they are able to process that information in the markets. ñ% i think organizations with credibility are certainly important. you will see a lot of stuff being done by different organizations to help improve the markets. >> when people make comments like mickle just did what runs through a lot of minds is i can't handle the amount of information i get on my health plan, how will i handle more? i think the answer to that is

you couldn't have done any of this without the web. when you look at how the web works people will win the race in this venture capital market place create algorithms that get consumers the answers that they end up trusting, not the ones that say let me look through 38 pages of data. so there will be 0.001% of people who do double clicks on the web page to analyze for themselves. most people say will you give me a recommendation based on the information? it is a google search. i start typing and you give me what you think would be my match of a health plan. and then i give a little more information and within a minute or two in the future most people get the answers they want because there is an algorithm. you uploaded all your last year's information. it's not going to be the consumer looking at the data but

the intermediaries figuring outo how to process it. the ones who win get the result i want when i pick google. whoever gets the result like that, how they think about this. >> one thing that may have slipped by is the new information is often personal. it is not which plan is better but which plan is better for me. that requires information. a lot of what they are doing is not just spitting stuff out but cupbining it in ways that would become useful to individuals. because it involves aggregating a lot of information and because all information aggregation requires value judgment it remains to be seen how successful that will be but that is certainly the vision that these folks would have. >> medpage today with apologies

to mr. turner i will ask provider question. there has been reports about providers not finding out which networks they are in or thinking in one network and finding out otherwise. i was wondering if there are efforts being made in the model regs to make sure providers are adequately informed? >> so your question is more about providers not being informed than consumers buying a plan and figuring out that the provider is not there? i don't know that the model is going to spend a lot of time on that aspect. it's more going to be looking at it from the perspective because we are the insurance regulators, looking at it from regulating the insurers and ma)r'g sure

that their plans that they file looking at it from that out to providers and saying you may think you are in this one but you are not. that is probably not a step that we would take. that would be one of the areas where it is just not going to be in our wheelhouse to be going that far. >> in any of the comments that you received from providers, did you hear about this? was this something they were talking about? >> that's not one that i have seen yet. clarify. when i said what i said about providers i didn't mean to imply i am a supporter of being unfair to providers. i believe the system needs to be fair to providers for a variety of reasons not the least of which fairness matters.

information is from their providers. if their providers are not well informed about the networks and where the referal patterns are, if the providers can't figure out what other providers are in the network it is hard to make referrals in a way that you would want. ìqj5ñ important for the well functioning of a market for providers to be informed, to be treated fairly and have the information that consumers have because providersñapart from being the most ymportant part of the care delivery system are a really important portion of the information flow here. and so just as consumers need to know which hospitals are in the network, the providers need to know which hospitals are in the network. issues because the provider system is fragmented to avoid a

system where one is in but another is not. there are real issues that i believe require important attention. what i meant to imply before is that at the end of the day we care about those at least largely because the whole system and everyone's interaction with how consumers work are going to depend on the providers being treated fairly. in and of itself a provider being in versus out of the network isn't the ultimate goal. knowing who is in and out, being treated fairly in that process, not being dropped, those things are really important for providers. i think the regulators will take heed if we see significant abuses in that area and they should. >> in the last two years i had the misfortune of dealing with hospital bills for one of my boys. the customer service around those issues in the health care industry is atrocious.

one reason is the employer-based system where everybody knows i'm not making the choice my employer is. one of the dimensions of the new world certainly within the public exchanges i believe increasingly in the employer-based market through private exchanges the individual will be making choices. when the insurers are responding to the individual to sell the product rather than the employer on a wholesale level, customer service, all of these issues are going to get much, much better. there is no other system in which the supply chain, the doctors and all that are part of the system have as many conflicts with the ultimate payer in the system. claims processing and all of that has grown up in a way that is not customer friendly. as we move to a retail based system the winners are the ones

that treat the individual right. >> i think if you look at what actually makes health care potentially work better it's the ability for all the important components to be well informed and to understand what is happening. if you say who are the important parts, people in that system the consumer, of course, and that transparency, the provider has to be very well informed and they have to understand not just networks but the complexity with which benefit designs are now increasing is really important because the average patient is going to the average doctor these days saying what do i do with this co-insurance? what should i do? who is the better doctor for me to see? historically patients have trusted their doctors more than anyone when it comes to health care. they continue to seek advice. we owe it as an industry to make sure the provider systems are as well informed as they can be

because they are the agents of care. i think it is really critical. >> absolutely. >> a quick comment from the provider perspective. if you are a primary care c r(t% provider for us a big challenge is how to inform the primary care provider about quality and cost across the spectrum? if you are my patient and you come to me and i'm referring you what is the best place to refer you? which systems practice judicious source of resources? how do you do fine parameters behind a good network in your specific geographic area? does it give you access to the types of care that the patient would need? how do you share that information with primary care? most cases we found that pcps are interested in their own performance. how do we share information about the data that we collect through the plan back with the provider so that they can make

improvements in those areas. it is a really complicated issue for us. >> yes? >> this is a question for professor. when you say we should be fair to the providers, by that do you mean we should shield them from economih distress? if that is what you mean rngs why is that a good idea? >> i do not mean we should shield them from economic distress. i think there are limits as to the amount of fiscal pressure we want on providers because they need to have care. i think much of the discussion is how to instill competition in the provider market which in general is probably -- i mean

you should be transparent in your dealings with them. you should not say you are in the network under these conditions and turns out it was under those conditions or hold them to standards that they simply can't meet in a whole variety of ways. in the end of the day the provider -- i believe in the market place being fair to providers will also be a winning strategy because at the end of the day i believe the provider system, hospitals, physicians and all other health care providers are the ultimate place in which consumers experience the health care system. they need to be able to function in a reasonable way. i do think pressure through competition is something that the networks will generate which will create fiscal stress on providers. there are stories you hear about people believing they were in contracts and then them not being in contracts. people being told one thing and not being told another thing. broad general what i call contract law dealings with

folks. and i think those things are important. and so that is what i meant when i talk about being fair to providers. they need to know what they are getting into when they join a network. i am actually a person who is relatively flexible about the criteria for network participation. once they are set you should know as a provider what you are getting into when you sign the contracts. that is what i meant by being fair. what i said before the goal of the system is not to be fair to providers. the providers shouldn't have some notion that this is what the price for my services are and you have to pay it. i do believe there will be competition and that will lead to lower prices in certain areas and i believe that is probably a good thing. >> so we have been/

to that as with patient protection laws and earlier. it is hard to educate people at the front end about the different eventualities. transparency, transparency, transparency. you need as much information as possible and then you need the brokers to make it work. you are never going to get the average consumer to understand this detail. you need people who are very skilled at creating the algorithms and other kinds of data analysis tools that help people sort these things out and put it in simple terms to them. people who have health conditions a lot of that will be electronic medical records and they can run it through the system and see how that can play out. we are in a world where we have data broker type people. the jury is still out -- all we know so far is people would choose these things on the front end. we don't know as much about what

happens when the rubber really meets the road. >> as i mentioned earlier, we haven't in wisconsin yet seen an uptick in complaints about i bought this thing and i thought i had the right thing and i had to go to the place and get the thing done and i didn't have the thing. we are not hearing much of that yet. and i think part of it is this is all new to many folks. this is the first time there has been a mandate to purchase health insurance. so i think there is probably a certain percentage, i don't know if it is a quarter like your data indicates but a lot of folks said there is a law that says i have to buy the health insurance so they bought something and went to the website and went through an agent or navigator or somewhere and purchased that health insurance hoping that they got what they needed but purchased

potentially just bought it because it was the cheapest thing and they knew they had to have something. there might be some of that there. to joel's point, as -- and, of course, you had the problems and open enrollment that seemed to last forever. hopefully this year things are more squared away. after a year of consumers purchasing health insurance through an exchange maybe they start getting better about it. maybe they start asking questions and start hearing it is not all the same. we need to better understand what benefits are available through that policy or how it is going to treat me if something should happen. i'm optimistic that consumers ultimately will become more informed as they play a greater role in those decisions as we move forward.

>> i agree completely with that. although even in that somewhat optimistic true there is going to be a subset of people that are not able to make good choices. that has been true in every walk of life and every dimension and certainly true in my family. i think part of the challenge for ted and the regulations is to try to figure out how we balance what i think is an obvious good which is having consumers take some responsibility, be engaged and make choices for what is good for them with protection against those that aren't going to do a good job. how do we manage a system in which we try to minimize the chance that some of this ends up in a really bad situation. i think ted and joel mentioned some of the other sort of fall back processes to make sure that the worst case scenario isn't unacceptable and some of the

exceptions are the way you have to deal with this. it is going to be impossible -- how would we feel if 10% of the consumers were making bad choices? 20%? it is not going to be that most people are able to make the perfect choice for them in anything. that is certainly true with health care. we have to try to minimize the down side if they don't make choices that they ultimately want to live with and give an opportunity to learn and change over time and do that in a way that doesn't prevent the other reforms that we care about to manage the system in terms of quality and affordability. consumers will have to learn to take more responsibility. even though it is easy to say standing in front of you all i realize many are not. >> are you a fan of nudge theory? >> absolutely. that's what i think. the question is there is an enormous amount of work on how

to help people make better choices. some of that involves more intervention in the markets than a standard free market economist might advocate. particularly in health care i think there is a lot of limitations to choice. i think there is a lot that can be learned in the new way in which we structure choice. we see this in 401 k. a lot of places where we can help people make choices that are better for themselves while giving them the opportunity to do it. i think there is a lot of evidence that markets don't work as well as an econ 101 model might work. to go into this with sort of an understanding and say competition that people will choose i think will give us an outcome that will have more people in situations they don't like than i would be comfortable

with. >> i don't want to change this into a broader health policy discussion. i want to make -- remind you and folks that for a number of years we experimented with or there was an allowance for medical savings accounts where individuals were in charge of a good portion of their health care spend and then you have the more of a catastrophic plan. and i think the result -- that idea really put consumers in charge and made them make better choices and cause them to perhaps be a little more curious about where the money was going because it was ultimately first dollar coming out of their own pocket. so let's not forget that that is out there, as well.

i do agree there is certainly a certain percentage of the population that jais not going have the information available to them. it is up to us as regulators to step in when those problems occur or promote as much transparency and as much communication as we can to help people make better decisions. >> not just in your state but how much are insurance commissioners stepping in? so far we have anecdotal information. can you give a sense as to how many of your colleagues in other states are already being active here? >> that is classified. we only talk about that in closed sessions. commissioners and regulators in general really do care about their markets. when they see disturbances or

disruptions or see things that they have the authority to step in and do something about they will. and in this very issue of networks and network adequacy particularly in some of the more rural states, rectangular states there are serious differences between you and anything. it's very specifically in those situations you can't just have you have to be within 60 miles. you drive 60 miles to get a loaf of bread in some states or a bag of flour to make the bread. so commissioners will step in and have conversations with insurers saying this is

unreasonable. and let's work through these things. whether it is that situation or an urban situation where there might not be an essential community provider very often commissioners are talking directly with or through lieutenants to get those taken care of. i would say this issue is generally high up on many lists but from day to day over the years it is something that they deal with regularly. >> i would say if you want to look at states where you are seeing more aggressive action on behalf of the commissioners look at the three west coast states.

there was an outcry against it from the exchange and eventually those got in and commissioner had to figure out new regulations. this year the first set were rejected by all parties and eventually settled on a transparency strategy. still not -- too much reporting now and consumers don't think there is enough. that is where he settled out. in oregon there are medicare advantage and talking about taking the medicare advantage standards in that state and an outcry on that from the insurers. and then in california you have the exchange guy very active insurance commissioner and department of managed care all of whom have some stake in this. those are three places if you wanted to look at where some of the more -- those are all people that are active in ted's committee i think in -- that is

the other side to the prairie states where some of the same concepts are not very well received. >> many states are doing a lot more than just this thing. there is a lot more going on and i think one of the issues is to make sure that the strategy related to the topic we are talking about today fits into the broader strategy and that varies. >> let's wrap up. i will give each of you 30 seconds. tell us what is the one thing, the biggest thing you think they ought to be looking for? it can be what you very much hope is going to happen or you are worried about happening. what is the one thing you think everybody in this room should keep their eye on moving forward? >> i think we should be clear to

differentiate value versus the other terminology because narrow does not equate with value. >> can you pull the mic up? >> i think we have to differentiate value and should not stand in the way or create unnecessary burdens from a regulatory point of view that gets in the way of progress and innovation. >> my two things, 15 seconds each is remember the tradeoffs, don't get stuck on one aspect of the story but not the others. it is very easy to do. and understand that anecdotes won't prove the rule there will be bad things that happen no matter what and finding anecdotes doesn't mean the system means complete redesign. >> i will second what you said. again, this is a hugely important issue. it's accelerating at a rate that

we didn't anticipate. and thus the working group that we work on this very issue is taking comments and considerations and letters from all parties to better address and move forward with a better model for states to adopt and implement. >> the issues are complex. there are tradeoffs and so it is an area where i hope we let the states be the laboratories of democracy and experiment and look at the different states and what they are doing. i would be wary of a premature federal intervention that would limit the kind of experimentation that i think we need to have on these issues. >> from my perspective i think that finding ways to report on quality and cost across the spectrum are going to be key.

that means consumers and patients and physicians so that both sides have access to the information they need. >> great. this concludes our session. i thank all of our panelists for being here and thanks for all of the reporters for joining us today. leading up to election day on november 4 c-span brings debates. this portion between candidates running for arkansas governor. >> let me come back to what mr. ross is speaking of.

our ads have been positive. he is taubing abolking about an you had no control over. that's what -- whenever i look at that happening i'm thinking does this encourage an 18 year old to vote and encourage people to participate in the process. we have an obligation as candidates to make sure that we are encouraging people to say public service is good and we encourage that. negative advertising doesn't work that way. i can't control the senate race. i can't control out of state groups. i can control my message. mike is right. it is about our vision for what we are going to do for middle class, our tax cuts, veterans, what we want to do. that is what we are talking about. >> he says he can't control ads that are being run by the republican governor's association attacking me when he

came out with this ad my wife is a pharmacist spent 14 years going to work every day building a successful business. she would go out at midnight and get medicine for sick kids. she sold her business for a profit in america. he attacked her for that. for him to say that is the republican governor's association. that ad began airing when the chairman of the republican governor's association was in arkansas raising money. he could have said this ad is not fair. he kind of wink-wink and let him go after my wife. i think he owes my wife an apology. >> do you control the democratic governor's association? the ads they run attacking me? i have no control over the ads.

i don't know anything about the facts of the sale of your pharmacy. i will let you answer those questions. i have never attacked you on that issue. if you remember me attacking you on that or in any way you tell me right now because i have not. >> c-span campaign 2014 debate coverage continues thursday night at 9:00. nebraska's debate between lee terry and state senator brad ashford. on sunday the iowa u.s. senate debate. c-span campaign 2014. more than 100 debates for the control of congress. foreign policy experts look at the israeli-palestinian conflict focusing on political and humanitarian issues. the middle east institute hosted

this event. these numbers mean 69% of the total killed were civilians. israel challenges the numbers but the tabulation is ongoing. 66 isd soldiers were killed as well as six civilians inside israel. palestinian sources put the cost of gaza's reconstruction at nearly $8 billion. the key question for us today in this panel discussion is what will it take to translate the current truce into an enduring agreement. what is the likelihood that the demands of the respective parties, israel, hamas, palestinians will be addressed in future talks including an end

to israel's blockade to gaza and the disarmament of ha mavs. basically the question, if i can put it in one sentence, is how did we get here, and how can we avoid getting here again. we have an excellent panel of experts here with us. khaled elgindy, founding board member of the egyptian rule of law association. khaled previously served on the board of israel in the negotiations held through 2008. michael koplow is a program director of the young america fellowship program. he also has worked as an attorney, researcher at the council on foreign relations and foreign service officer trainer for the department and publishes an excellent blog. to michael's right is joe stork,

an expert on human rights issues in the middle east region. stork co-founded the information project and served as chief editor of the middle eastern report. just to set up the discussion here. first i'd like to go to khaled and michael to discuss some of the domestic political dynamics, among palestinians and among israelis that have been driving the events of the past few weeks, the reconciliation agreement between the palestinians, obviously some of the challenges that the prime minister netanyahu was dealing with, with parties to his right and his fractious coalition. then i'd like to go to joe for some comment on the international humanitarian law angle, some of the questions that were raised by the conduct of both sides during the gaza war.

so first let me just go to khaled. take it away. >> thank you, matt. and kate. and thank you all for being here. so i was asked to talk a little bit about the impact on palestinian domestic politics. i think on the surface it seems pretty clear that the main -- at least superficially, the main impact we've seen is that hamas has become stronger domestically. if obviously militarily weakened. but politically it has been strengthened. and that has happened at the expense of the palestinian authority, and president mahmoud abbas in particular. who has played a very minimal role in the events in gaza, and was quite -- was seen, i think -- was marginalized through the process and seen as ineffective. some of you may have seen a

recent poll by the palestinian -- you never know the full name -- palestinian center for research and surveys operation, which essentially verified this new picture on the ground. hamas went from being very, very weak, probably the weakest it has ever been before the war, to being quite strong, at least having a very strong show of support, particularly by palestinians in the west bank. but also within gaza, it also holds true. the reality is, that hamas' resistance, whatever we may think of it, has been more effective than mahmoud abbas' approach, which has been essentially focused on diplomatic process.

and he's been ineffective not just in gaza, but you have to look at it in the context of the broader middle east peace process, which is his bread and butter. he is all about his credibility, his legitimacy rests on his ability to negotiate a two-state solution. and obviously, that hasn't gone all that well. the reality also is that neither side, neither hamas nor fatah, has delivered all that much on the ground in terms of services or governance, or even the broader goal of national liberation. but to a certain extent, hamas at least momentarily has been able to restore some sense of palestinian pride, and i think it's important not to underestimate the importance of these intangibles. for both hamas and fatah. the symbolism is very important for a national liberation movement. we have to think of palestinians in that sense, as opposed to a government or a state, which, of course, they are not.

at the end of the day, hamas' new-found popularity might be fleeting, but currently i think it's at least more than what mahmoud abbas has going for him. since his credibility, as i said, rests almost entirely on the negotiations process, and bringing about a two-state solution, which is dependent on the u.s. beneath the surface, i think the picture is a little bit more complicated. if you look at both within hamas and within the p.a.,/plo/fatah, the lines between them have been blurred over the years, if you look inside, you see internal cleavages within both camps, really. and those, i think, have been exacerbated by this conflict. on the hamas side, you have this

division between the leadership inside gaza, and outside, which is classic in palestinian history. you also have the military/political split that i think was exacerbated during the war. it wasn't clear who was calling the shots. there are other ways also to think of it in terms of radicals and pragmatists, all these internal cleavages, i think, have been intensified by the conflict and need to be worked out. the same is true on the side -- the other side of the political equation and palestine the pa and plo are notoriously dysfunctional. feta itself is in disarray.

that has been true for a long time. but also i think more specifically to the gaza conflict, we have seen -- i wouldn't call it isolation, but we have seen he's becoming a little bit more alone, i think -- that is dependent on the united states where others in the inner circle of the pa leadership are beginning to realize that that is a dead end. and so he is sort of the last remaining hold out in terms of the american-led so on the one

hand hamas have grown. stronger or weaker vis-a-vis each other, but at the same time both have been weakened in absolute terms in terms of the broader palestinian political arena. that's problematic because we don't currently have viable alternatives to hamas and we have not yet seen a credible or viable third way or however we want to determine. in that sense, we have to look at palestinian politics in the context of broader air politics and i think the trend within palestinian politics reflect the trend in the broader world. specifically political dysfunction. the same sorts of contradictions and tensions that it led to the -- what we used to call the arab spring or what was the arab

spring also exists in palestinian society. there are legitimacy crises. this is true across the region. there are dysfunctional or nonfunctioning political institutions or state institutions and in the case of the palestinians both the pa and plo you have this generational divide where a new generation of leaders or a new generation has very different set of demands and expectations than their elders have allowed for. so all of this, i think, does not necessarily bode well for palestinian politics. it's one reason why i think we haven't seen a third because we do need political forces to make that -- to be able to sustain. we do need a credible structure

on the ground and for one reason or another, the two main groups are not necessarily interested and interested in much more narrow ways than would be needed for mass mobilization. i would say that the priority now needs to be on -- not on negotiations and not on resistance, but on fixing the palestinian house, putting the palestinian house back in order. first and foremost because i think gaza depends on it. i think it's impossible to envision any sort of reconstruction much less an improvement in gaza without genuine and practical hamas pa cooperation on the ground. and we see that reflected in the

terms of the cease-fire where it's clear now, it was clear even before the war, that there needs to be a return of the pa to gaza in order to allow the borders to be opened and that requires consent in one form oro be opened. and that requires hamas' consent in one form or another, if not their active participation and support. so, palestinian reconciliation and reconnecting gaza in the west bank, i think, is essential for gaza to be able to survive, much less grow. but it's also, true, i think in the longer term sense because the palestinian national movement itself is in crisis and depends on it. depends on fixing these -- you know, we're not just talking about reforms and elections for institutions like the pa and the plo. and i wouldn't expect -- given the poll results i wouldn't

expect to see elections any time soon. i'm not entirely sure that's a bad thing. i think throwing elections into this mix might actually complicate things. but what's actually needed is sort of a new palestinian national consensus. and i would say that's probably equally true in the region, but since we're focused on -- at least i'm focused on palestinian politics, we need -- palestinians need to rethink their -- i think the basic assumptions of their national aspirations going forward. one interesting thing to point out and i'll end on this note, is the reawakening of two important old/new palestinian constituencies. first exacerbated, i think, or intensified by the gaza conflict. the palestinian diospora, the

refugee camps, but also the elites in the west and in the gulf and elsewhere. and also palestinian citizens of israel. we've seen the new role. we've signed kind of this resurgence of palestinian identity among them a new sense of pan-palestinian solidarity that was reawakened, i think, by the gaza conflict. both of those constituencies will need to be accommodated in one form or another. the diospora has to be included in the rethinking of internal palestinian politics. bearing in mind that gaza is in many ways kind of a cross-section of the palestinian of the global palestinian community in that it is made up

60% of -- or 60% to 70% are descendents of refugees from 1948. you have political trends, so in many ways, it is a microcosm of the national movement. >> thank you. michael, just to set things up a bit, you mentioned the recent poll we saw showing hamas having benefitted by the war. i think we saw some similar things without drawing ee quinn lents on the israeli side. first of all, we saw overwhelming public support for the war amongst the israeli public as it was ongoing, but having stopped the war short of what was once the stated goal of really diminishing if not crushing hamas, which is the word some were using. i think polls were showing netanyahu now shows himself in trouble with competitors to his

right. could you address that? >> sure. thanks to kate for putting this panel together. you know, i think it's useful when thinking about israeli politics in the context of the aftermath of gaza to think about israeli politics before the operation protective age and before the gaza where and to talk about where things are now. so before the war in gaza, the political dynamic was relatively stable. there were no real challenges to the coalition and no real challenges of a serious nature to netanyahu personally. the left in israel is relatively disorganized. herz herzog, the head of the labor party, has in many ways been the invisible man. nobody sees or hears from him. more vocal opponents such as levni are actually in the cabinet.

so bebe was firmly in control. and the collapse of peace talks did not create any type of political crisis for a couple reasons. first, there were low expectations across the political spectrum about the peace talks. not many people expected them to be concluded successfully and netanya netanyahu's base, in fact, many people did not want them to be concluded successfully. so the collapse of the peace talks really did not present much of a challenge to bb domestically. another factor was the sense that the situation for israel despite many warning signs on the horizon from the u.s. and from europe was not quite dire just yet and that israel could afford to wait on the peace process until they were forced to make a move. the focus was on the palestinian authority and what steps would be taken after the collapse of the peace talks much more than there was a focus on hamas.

hamas before the war was at many points at its weakest point and the netanyahu israeli government assumed this was a situation that was going to continue. and so much of the discussion was focused on the pa and focused on hamas and what could be done to work with the pa despite the fact that the peace talks had now collapsed. and hamas was not seen as much of a political factor. then we moved to during the war and during the war, there was a huge outpouring of support for netanyahu and lee lekud. this is not surprising. any time there's fighting in israel, certainly initially, there's lots of rallying around the government. the second still shapes the israeli psyche in ways that has changed it possibly forever.

the vast majority of israelis will not tolerate any type of rocket fire coming into israel irrespective of what the casualty count is like and while rockets are coming in, netanyahu really had blanket support to deal with them. the kidnapping and murder of the three israeli teens only added to what was already overwhelming support for a militaryyvñ camp against hamas and netanyahu really used this to his advantage and he sort of had a free pass initially on the shifting goals. depending on what day it was, the goals were either to eradicate hamas, to restore quiet, to eliminate tunnels. they were shifting as the war went along. at least initially netanyahu was able to do this because of the overwhelming support the government was given during the war. as the war went on and as matt just referred to, benjamin netanyahu's support dropped. in a major went.

it went from a high of about 82% down into the 30s. now, in historical context, that's not so bad. ahud oel met an approval rating of 50% but a drop of 50% is still not something that any israeli leader likes to see. the reasons for this also weren't surprising. if you think back to 2012, the israeli operation was relatively quick. it only lasted, i think, eight days. this went on far longer than most were respecting. it went on longer than netanyahu himself was expecting. and as rocket fire continued and as cease-fire offers were either rejected, broken or lapsed, the israeli public realized pretty quickly that benjamin netanyahu had no long-term strategy and that the airstrikes were not going to be enough and possibly

ground operation in the limited scope was also not going to be enough. so there certainly was a sense towards the end that netanyahu perhaps had not handled things in the ideal way. now that the war is over, netanyahu's position is a bit less stable. the politics are pushing things very much more to the right, and netanyahu has to deal with challenges both within his own party lekud and with challenges from the right more generally. if you look at the polls that have come out over the past few days, it's clear that the right in general has benefitted politically from the fighting in gaza. the latest polls have lekuid anywhere between 29 and 31 sets. at the moment they control 31, but 11 of those seats, are used because they were made a deal

before the election. so it's now in the latest polls up from 20 seats of their own to hue dean, led by neftali bennet, has 12 seats and? the polls they're up between 18 and 20. lapied's party has basically flipped with jewish home. right now they have 18 and the current polls are anywhere from 9 to 12. and labor has stayed the same. so if an election was held today, you'd probably have somewhere around 80 -- 70, 80 seats going to parties on the right. within lekuid there is serious pressure on netanyahu. netanyahu's position within le kuchlt id has never great. there's serious pressure on

netanyahu. his position has never been great. within the context of the politics, he's right winged, but he's not on the far right. as odd as it seems within the context, netanyahu occupies the left flank. the younger members who are asen dent are far more right winged than benjamin netanyahu is and they are upset with the way he has conducted the war because many of the right wing members who are all younger and in a lot of ways it sort of mimics the tea party dynamic in the u.s. the younger members think he did not go far enough and some of them have advocates to reoccupy gaza for however long it takes to stamp it out. which is something netanyahu is not willing to do. which is something netanyahu is not willing to do. something netanyahu himself realizes is not reasonable. but he faces major opposition in

his own part the chair of the central committee and who was the deputy defense minister until netanyahu fired him the first week of the war for criticizing the government's approach is convening likud party congress later this month where no doubt there will be nothing but lots of vocal criticism of netanyahu and his conduct of the war. outside netanyahu's party, as i mentioned, jewish home party s much more popular now than it was. bennett is taking serious strides to capitalize on that. yesterday he announced he would like to make changes to the party's skugs that will make it a more secular party, which is significant because he is looking to appeal to the wider israeli right and for the first time seems to believe that he actually has a shot at being the standard bearer of the right and perhaps even becoming prime minister. so all these things are pushing netanyahu pretty steadily to the right. it leads to things like the

announcement of the 980 acres that were just declared a state land because in the absence of reoccupying gaza, netanyahu knows he has to do something to protect his right flank and the easiest way to do that within the politics of the israeli right is to announcement settle. tenders or long-term settlement processes. in general israelis don't want to risk a hamas takeover in the west bank. and the aftermath of this type of war and this type of fighting generally make israelis more hawkish and more security-conscience than they would otherwise be. and so the right word trend is in my view not going to be a blip. whenever the next elections are, there's been wide speculation they'll be within the next year, whenever the next elections are i have very little doubt the right wing parties are going to increase their share in the government. whether that means a larger share for likud or it means

likud suffers at the hands of that into there is going to be more right wing pressure than this time. and that is going to be impact isra israel's relations with palestinians going forward and the peace process more generally. >> thanks. i want to turn to joe now to address some of the international humanitarian law issues relating to not only the war, although, i mean, i think the conduct of the war, the bombardment by israel, the use of indiscriminate rocket fire and mortars by hamas but also the policy of blockade. one of the key, i think, elements here among hamas' demands was an easing of the blo blockade. it was a condition of the 2012 cease-fire that was not implement implemented. this is going to be one of the most important items for discussion in the talks that i

very much hope will take place in egypt and that everyone -- the guess the plan is they will take place in several weeks. that's a lot on your plate, so just take a crack at that. >> thanks, matt. thanks, kate for holding this event and for inviting me to be a part of it. human rights watch, obviously, as the name would indicate looks at human rights violations by states. by political authorities around the world. but we also monitor compliance with the laws of war, international humanitarian law. one important component is the geneva conventions. does not take position on whether any party to any conflict, you know, should take up arms, should launch an attack or whatever. those are political issues, political questions that we don't address. in part, in order to be able to partially look at how the -- how the fighting, how the armed

conflict is conducted by any of the parties. the two issues we're concerned with here before i got into the details, one is accountability. accountability, that is, for unlawful behavior on noncompliance with the laws of war, war crimes and other serious violations of the loss of war. the other is the humanitarian consequences of the war, in particular, and and of the po policies that sort of set up this conflict to begin with, which matt just mentioned, the blockade which has been in intensively in effect since 2007 since hamas took over as the political power in gaza. and really since 2005 with the withdrawal -- unilateral withdrawal of israeli military forces and settlers under prime minister sharon. the accountability issue i want

to stress because it seems to me, the element that should be part of any kind of looking forward. it's what's been consistently missing in terms of any of the peace talk agendas that we have seen, no matter how unsuccessful they may have been. it's certainly not because accountability was among the issues raised. it's been a consistent issue for us looking at the various phases of war. over many years now i think what we have seen perhaps a dispiritingly is we haven't seen much change looking from one conflict to another. 2009, 2012 and now 2014. in the behavior of the combatants, either hamas's behavior or israel's. let me just say a couple of

words about what international law, international humanitarian law requires. the key principle is that of distinction. you have to distinguish all the all times between combatants and civilians, between military objectives and civilian properties. and that may only target combatants and structures or areas that have immediate military -- represent military gain. so targeting civilians is obviously sort of at the first order of prohibition. but then there are other areas so there might be an attack where there's no objective, either a combatant or group of combatants or a place, a structure, a building, an apartment building, for instance, where maybe arms have been stored or where you they

think arms have been stored making it a legitimate target in itself. but where the harm to civilians, the use of the weapons that are used, the character of the fighting and so forth results in making the attack essentially indiscriminate so many civilians are harmed. humanitarian law, understand sort of from the get-go, that civilians are employing to be hurt. civilians are going to be harmed. civilians are going to be killed. the point is to minimize that harm, minimize those deaths. so the parties to a conflict have to take -- to use the language of the conventions -- all reasonable precautions to avoid harming civilians. on the palestinian side, the hamas and recalling also that the combatants in the gaza are not only hamas, they also involve forces like islamic jihad, for instance, and some of the secular palestinian parties.

obviously the rockets launched into israel were first of all the reason we would say those constitute prima fascia war crime in the sense of targeting civilians is because many of the groups that have launched these attacks have said they are attacking population centers, essentially, and so the aim, they state in many cases, they've stated the aim as such. the types of weapons they are using are -- inherently cannot be guide -- cannot be used in any way that could be distinguished between military targets and civilian areas, civilian structures or civilians. so, there's sort of from the get-go, you have a situation where the kinds of weapons the palestinians were using in the fighting the attacks into israel

itself are at the very least inherently indiscriminate. and then in terms of the fighting of the combat that went on inside gaza once israelis forces moved in and even during the air campaign, the extent to which hamas did or did not take, quote/unquote, all reasonable precautions in terms of carrying out military operations from heavily civilian populated areas. on the side of the israelis, idf, israeli defense forces, the issue, we have documented and i'll go into a little bit of detail here, a couple instances where it appears that civilians, individual civilians were targeted, civilians who were trying to flee a combat zone often at the instruction of the idf. this is also something we saw in the previous conflicts in 2012 and especially in 2009.

but i'd say the issues on the israeli side involve much more issues of whether the attacks were indiscriminate or not. so there was, at least idf alleged that there were military targets in a particular building or near a particular building, for instance, attacks killed large numbers of civilians. but the cases -- a number of cases that we investigated we found there actually was no military objective, there were no come bant ats in the area, as far as we could determine. and the israeli government, the idf in response to our queries to them, did not come up with any explanation as to why they launched those particular hicu attacks. i want to say a little bit about -- oh, first i should say that one of the problems we've had in addressing this particular conflict is a lack of

access. the last time we were able to go into gaza via the crossing, in other words, via israel, well, we asked for permission to go in in the fall of 2009. many weeks before cass-led started, we were refused. up to that point our requests were -- there were delays and so forth, but we would essentially get in. we have not been allowed in through israel since mid-2009. in other instances, we were able to go in after hostility ceased, cease-fire was in place via the crossing between sinai between gaza and egypt. but our relations with the egyptian government currently are about as good as they are with the israeli government and they have not been -- we haven't been able to get in that way either.

that obviously makes it much more difficult to do what he we think is needed in terms of conducting an investigation where you actually get to the site of a possible crime or war crime. where you can evaluate the the damage, the kind of damage, assess what kind of weapons we used, make a judgment as to whether that weapon was appropriate under the circumstances, talk to witnesses, survivors and so forth. our ability to do that is very limited. we have research assistance on the ground in gaza, residents of gaza, but obviously the people who bring in the kind of added expertise we need in assessing an armed conflict situation where issues of all feasible precautions. what does that mean. issues indiscriminate or disproportionate. that depends on not reading the newspapers and saying, well, you know, thousands of palestinians

killed, you know, scores of israelis killed. obviously, you know, disproportionate. no it's not that. one can talk in a sense political disproportion, but in a legal sense, in a sense that has accountability, you have to look at each individual attack and make that assessment. i would invited to you look at our website and see the work we've done regarding this particular -- the last 50 days of war in gaza as well as earlier instances. just on the figures matt mentioned, the u.n. figures about the number of palestinians killed. the idf claims that 616 of those were, as they say, combatant and terrorist operatives. they also say there are -- the idf also says there are some 800 other cases that have not yet been determined and they are

sure that in the end we will see that many or so of those 800 cases were combatants. that remains to be seen. i do want to point out this quef a combatant, that's fairly clear-cut but the phrase that the israelis use, terrorist operatives, is much less clear cut, at least in terms of humanitarian law. so, a person simply belonging to hamas, for instance, is not a legitimate target under the rules of -- under the laws of o.r. but israeli policy in the gaza conflicts has been to treat these people as, you know, legitimate targets. that's one issue we would take -- that's one area we would take strong issue with the israeli understanding. so, a lot of attention has focused or relatively high

profile for the attacks that have involved schools. both israeli talks that -- on schools. there were attacks against six schools, three of which were inhabitated at the time by displaced persons. not students, but displaced persons. and they resulted in a number of civilian deaths. we investigated those three cases in which there were fatalities. and the kind of responses we got from the idf as to why this particular school was targeted, or why it was hit, okay, in one case, they said in the case of july 24th, the school, i think it was ben batenyun, six children were killed, the idf said there was one errant mortar shell. however the witnesses, the survivors to that attack,

separately told us that, in fact, there were at least four shells that landed in or right directly outside the school compound. the israelis, the idf said, there had been a hamas operation firing anti-tank missiles near the school. but again, not indicating what constitutes near in this case. a fairly loose term. they also asserted that the -- when their errant mortar hit the courtyard, it was empty. which is not something that bears -- again, is not something -- that's at variant with what people told us on the scene. august 3rd that didn't involve artillery or mortar, a spike-guided missile. it hit right outside a boys school. ten meters from the entrance.

and the children in particular, the displaced people who were taking shelter in the school were out at the gate buying, you know, food and water, sweets and this sort of thing. there were 12 people killed, 8 of them children. the idf responded that they were attacking three islamic jihad militants who were riding by on a motorcycle. now, they are -- assuming that's correct, they are certainly a legitimate target. but why? the spike is a very precise munition. it's the sort of thing the israelis should be using in this kind of conflict, in fact. but why did they hit that

it was more from a consequence of use of artillery, which has a very wide radius rather than precision weapons. but what we have seen is some precision attacks on, for instance, this isn't one that we investigated, but the israeli human rights group did where there was an attack on july 29th on a four-story residential building that killed 35 people. there was no warning, as far as they could determine. no explanation. they did learn that one of the

resident was an operative, political operative, in the senior leadership for the democratic front of palestine. one of the non-islamist long-standing political groups. two questions, at least, one is he, by being a political operative, essentially, no known military engagements, was he a legitimate target? secondly, even if he was a legitimate target, it seems pretty clear that attacking this residence with such devastating consequences certainly at the very least would constitute an indiscriminate attack. let me just say a word quickly about the humanitarian impact. i think, you know, back in 2012 the u.n. put out a report called

gaza 2020 that was taking a forward look that if present trends continue, this is 2012, these are going to be the issues in terms of housing units that are needed, schools that are needed, health care improvements, water, election, sanitation, et cetera, these issues. one has to, when one looks not only at the human casualties but at the destruction of homes, of schools, of the power plant of gaza's one electric power plant, if, you know, 2020 hasn't been telescoped into 2014. we're looking at a society that has been, you know, under siege in the sense of this blockade, this rather strenuous blockade, for many, many years now. now, just to return to very -- i'll end this -- the accountability question. the first principle is that

individual states are responsible for the conduct of their residents, their armed forces, their security forces. so in the first instance, the best justice is the local justice, in this case israel or the palestinian authority/hamas should be undertaking these kind of investigations of the conducts of their forces. up until now, both sides -- even though israel has a very well developed military system have failed that test rather dismally. given that, it seems to me the new element on the ground that may at the very least provide some sort of lever for some sort of improved behavior in this regard in terms of addressing these alleged violations of the laws of war, frankly, is the international criminal court.

unlike -- an institution that's been set up essentially to deal with situations where the states, which have the primary responsibility, either are unable or unwilling to carry out that responsibility. we're in a new situation politically that since the last conflict in 2012, much less the ones that went before that, the, the palestinian authority, could -- could join the -- could sign, could ratify the rome treaty, which would make it a party to the statute and, therefore, eligible to present cases, allegations, for investigation by the international criminal court. that's something they didn't have the capacity until a year or so ago, legally speaking, diplomatically speaking. israel, while it seemed the rome

treaty back in 199 has never ratified it and indicated it has no plans to ratify it. the other way a case gets taken up by international criminal court is if it's reviewed by the international -- in the case of sudan and al basheer. but i think that's the new -- maybe i'll just end on that note. that's one new element to look at as we look ahead. >> thank you, joe. so, what i'm going to do, i'm going to do a round of questions with the panelists here and then after a bit we'll come out to the odd quens for more questions. first, khaled, you talked about the need to establish a consensus and you also said elections could complicate things more. so, i guess my question is, how

then to create that legitimacy, how to generate that consensus, what mechanisms other than elections really exist here. >> it's a good question. and it's a dilemma that i think a lot of countries have confronted over the last several years. do you hold an election first to determine, you know -- how do you decide who gets to write up the rules of the game, of the constitution, for example? should you hold an election first or do you appoint a group that is somehow perceived as representative? and it's kind of a chicken and egg sort of a question. i mean, i think experience, as i interru interpret it has borne out that holding elections to determine who gets to decide the rules of the game is a mistake. we saw that happen in egypt where, you know, unless there is a broad consensus of the main societal and political actors up

front, on the rules of the game, then the outcome of any election or political process, i think, is likely to be contested. we saw that both in the case of morsi's election and his -- after his overthrow. in the case of the palestinians, i think because elections determine -- elections are based on winners and losers. and when you have -- when you're deciding the way forward and the way forward means, you know, hamas and fatah have very different agendas, a very different approach. one is committed to a two-state solution and a peaceful settlement of the conflict is the other is not. it has a very different vision of how to resolve the conflict as well as how to govern palestinians. so, you can't make those enormous questions, i think, subject to an election. because elections are affected

by everything, including the weather, literally. and if you try to hold an election in this environment in palestine, you're going to get a very distorted, skewed outcome that will not be to the advantage of those currently in power, i think. so, on the one hand you need the right conditions for an election, but you also need sort of broad agreement. the way the plo has operated in the past, the plo is not a terribly democratic institution. it's operated on the basis of consensus. and that is a consensus of the main political factions. and that was true for the first half of the plo's existence up until 1988. it hasn't been true since because you have these major political organizations like hamas and islamic jihad and a few secular groups who are outside of the umbrella of the plo. and it's -- palestinians are now paying the price for allowing these groups to operate outside of the agreed upon consensual

national umbrella of the plo. on one hand plo claims to be the sole representative of the palestinian people. on the other hand, it doesn't include these major factions that have, in fact, some of them have won elections. so clearly belong in the big tent of palestinian politics but they're not represented. so, i mean, that's the long answer. the short answer is, i think the way to go about it is a consensus of all -- at least the political groups but also social -- societal constituencies that are not necessarily represented by one faction or another, or one ideological trend or another, and agree on the basic -- basic principles of the palestinian national movement. what is the goal? you know, when you don't have a consensus, some groups are fighting for one state. some factions -- small factions

are working towards two states. some are engaged in arms struggles. others are engaged in nonviolent peaceful existence. peaceful existence. without a national broadg consensus on, you know, not just who leads, but where you're headed, what is the goal and how we get there, then i think elections are meaningless. elections can't determine -- they're not a substitute for a national -- a broader national consensus. so, it's messy and it may even seem undemocratic, but i think in this environment, it's essential to forge a national consensus based sort of almost on an intuitive sense of being representative. and i think it can be done. it's happened in the past. in many contexts. but even in the palestinian context. >> thanks. michael, stepping outside the domestic politics for a minute,

one of the interesting things was the relationship between israel and egypt and the way that was managed over several attempted and failed cease-fires. there was an interesting piece in the wall street journal a few weeks ago that talked about the closeness that's developed such that it almost seemed like the u.s. was being in a sense, cut out of these discussions. what's your view of egypt's role here? was it constructive? and then how is that -- will it impact politics in israel at all? >> well, i think you'd have to say it's constructive if for no other reason egypt was the party that ended up bringing the two sides together and brokering a cease-fire. and in that sense it certainly was constructive. i think that in the beginning, in the first couple of weeks, the fact that egypt had no credibility with hamas and that egypt didn't want much to do with hamas at all was certainly a factor in extending the

fighting. in contrast to 2012 where hamas trusted egypt as a broker. this time around they did not. and so i don't know how constructive a role they played in the beginning. certainly as fighting went on, egypt was able to broker a deal, and so that's -- that's certainly constructive. in terms of -- in terms have how it factors into israeli politics. netanyahu has been using a phrase over the past week. he's been talking about new diplomatic horizons and a lot of people assumed that that meant with the palestinians. i don't think it does. i think he's talking about a much wider regional initiative in which israel is aligned with states such as egypt, jordan, saudi arabia, the uae, in an effort to limit the influence of groups like hamas, other muslim brotherhood groups.

i think that's what he's referring to. and i think he -- he's looking to use the fighting and use the current mood in the region where you certainly have this split -- you certainly have a split among arab states. if you wide it further you can include turkey on the side of qatar. i think they are looking to take advantage of that situation and gettis ral firmly into the camp of what we might call status quo arab states versus revisionist arab states. so, to the extent a closer bond with egypt helps israel get into that group, then i think israel is going to try to play that angle as hard as it can. i'm not sure how feasible it is. to my mind, this is a situation where i think netanyahu, perhaps, thinks he has a stronger hand than he actually does, but between -- between that and the fact that israel has lots of natural gas to sell.

they signed an mou with jordan this week worth, i believe, $15 billion. they're certainly looking to do something similar with the egyptians. and so between energy, between the regional dynamics, between a joint desire between israel and egypt to limit hamas's influence, i think netanyahu and the israeli government are going to try to get as close to egypt as they can. >> thank you. i think, so we've got about 20, 25 minutes left. so, i'd like to go to the audience for questions. a few requests first of all. could you just please identify yourself, your affiliation. try to keep your questions short. finally, ask your question in the form of a question. gentleman right here in the yellow shirt. >> hi. my name is jim vitarilo. i don't know if you read an op-ed piece by obama kurtzer, former u.s. ambassador to israel

during the first bush 2 administration. so his proposal was basically two-fold. one was to bring in an international force with boots on the ground, the way i understood it, in gaza that would, in effect, provide security and maybe even to some extent governance of gaza with the palestinian authority playing a role but a very light role given their, you know, dysfunction. and basically serve as a referee between the plo and hamas. and both of those boots on the ground, from what i understood saying, was that he expected them to be arab boots on the ground and maybe turkish, but certainly not american. but secondly, most interestingly, he then linked that to an international, for lack of a better word, peace conference where these same countries would be negotiating with israel and palestinian authority on a more long-term, you know, permanent solution.

as well. and that he thought israel would be much more prone to do that today, given what's happened in gaza and the need for an international force in gaza, which he thinksing israel would accept. again, this is all him saying that. so my question to the two of you, from a palestinian and israeli point of view, what do you think of his proposal? how do you think that will fly in those respective societies? >> i'll start. i don't know how well the idea of an international force would fly within israeli society. certainly not at this point in time. an international force that includes turkey. you know, i think that in general the thrust of public opinion within israel now is that the best solution would be for the palestinian authority forces to take over security and border crossings in gaza. whatever -- whatever beefs the

israeli government has with the palestinian authority, they have very few with pa security in the west bank. and so i think that there is some sort of level of implicit trust that exists among israeli government and large portions of israeli society for the pa security forces that would not necessarily translate into a wider force comprised of soldiers from other arab countries and from turkey. in general, i think that israelis are wary of internationalizing -- internalizing the conflicts too much. certainly israel's experience with the international community is not great, to say the least. the level of trust is very low and so i don't imagine there would be a huge amount of positivity on the part of the israeli's part for an international force as opposed to a pa force.

>> i just -- quickly, i think you can make the same argument on the palestinian side. i think there's not a lot of incentive by hamas or the pa to have an international force. of course, it depends on the mission. i mean, first of all, i think there would be a lot of disagreement on the mission among regional stakeholders as well as the u.s. and others, not to mention the parties themselves. i can't imagine there would be consensus. hamas has said they won't accept an international presence. the pa, i think, has no incentive to accept an international presence that's involved in governing. that's the role of the pa. that was the whole purpose of creating a sort of palestinian state in waiting, called the palestinian authority. and in a way it's kind of a setback for the idea of a palestinian state. i think the problem with palestinian governance is not that they don't know how to govern. it's that there is this lack of

a basic national consensus. that's what's missing. it's an internal palestinian conversation that isn't being had. the same way the egyptian conversation isn't being had. the syrian conversation isn't being had. obviously, there are different degrees of consequence, but that basic consent needs to be achieved by all -- by various palestinian groups. that's the impediment. i don't think it's the question of a technical know-how. palestinian and fatah have both governed. even in security, both have shown they're able to maintain security. the question about israel security is -- relates to a political goals and political objectives. there's a political question. there's an outstanding conflict between palestinians and israel. there are issues unresolved. there's a blockade, there's an occupation. there are these issues. that is the source of insecurity

and violence. not because -- because of -- not primarily because of a lack of capacity, i would argue. there's a lack of will to maintain israel security because, while one side has an incentive to harm israel security. because of these ongoing issues. and so, you know, unless the political issues can be resolved, i can't imagine, you know, that you're -- it's not simply a question of technical capacity, i think. >> joe, did you want to address -- >> yeah. i mean, i didn't see the editorial, but the way you presented it sounds not very realistic to me either. but i would point out there's one area where i think international -- more shoes on the ground than boots on the ground maybe. but in terms of the security -- the crossings between israel and egypt and gaza, there's a security role in terms of -- this would address the blockade issue, or could address the

blockade issue, if you had not an international arms force but international team of experts who could first of all, be monitoring for the transtive arms or military equipment of military use could be arranging for follow-up monitoring of dual use items and would basically, you know, allow everything else in. and obviously that force, whatever its particular complexion, would have to have the confidence of both israel and whoever you're dealing with on the palestinian side. but that's where i would -- and that was attempted in the past where the eu, the european union, was supposed to provide those elements. and ended up being, as i recall reading it at the time anyway, a lack of israeli cooperation in allowing them to actually move to the -- to the border and carry out their assigned roles. anyway, that would be something worth exploring in any negotiations, i think. >> and the uk, france and

germany all indicated they would be willing to -- first of all, they extended the mandate and they would be willing to restart it as far as the pa coming back in. that's a possibility. can we go to the gentleman in the front here? >> thank you. i'm from washington, d.c. i thank the panel for really illuminating session this afternoon. i have two questions. the first is for mr. elgindy and whoever can answer it. the international diaspora of the palestinians, how do you see that being carried out in practice. my second question is, is there any way to bring netanyahu and his bunch, and hamas, to accountability for what they have done?

>> on the first question, there have been a lot of proposals put out there from the -- emanating from the diaspora or inside palestinian territory how to reintegrate them into the conversation at least if not institutionally in the plo. bear in mind, the plo began as a diospora movement. that's where the palestinian national movement, as we know it today, was essentially forged most of the current leadership in the plo are themselves refugees. mahmoud abbas is not from the west bank. and, you know, it -- first there has to be political will. it's very hard to imagine how an election can be held lebanon and syria for refugees.

i think it's not a question -- the mechanisms are there. it's a question of a political will. and, you know, the same way the plo was convened without any territory, the plo was created without a territorial base. it can be re-invented in a sense without that. so, the mechanisms are out there. what isn't there, i think, is the political will by the current leadership. whether it's hamas or fatah or other factions to reenter great the diaspora institutionally, not on an individual basis. there are individuals, of course, from the diaspora who are involved. but more broadly, and that would take rethinks of the plo as an institution. that conversation is happening among a lot of palestinian intellectuals in the diaspora and inside the west bank in gaza but not -- it hasn't yet

produced an outcome. >> joe, did you want to address the second part? >> well, on the accountability question, i mean, it's a very good question and i tried to suggest in my talk that, you know, perhaps the dimension of these national criminal court, it has a greater viability today. i wouldn't say it's a great viability but it's a bit more today than it had been in the aftermath of any of the previous conflicts. but i think there are steps along these lines that individual states can take, too. particularly states that are close allies of one party or the other. and certainly in the case of israel's close allies, starting with the united states, for instance, there's a law on the books, u.s. law on the books, it's usually referred to as the leahy law after senator leahy, which basically says, you know, units of an armed force or

security forces cannot receive u.s. assistance or arms or funding or anything of the like if they have been credibly shown to be involved in, you know, in war crimes, serious violations of human rights laws of war, et cetera. as i understand it, as i've been told, there's essentially -- and those -- those judgments, those assessments are supposed to be made in the u.s. embassy, coming out of the u.s. embassy in country x or country y and essentially there's nog nobody in israel in the u.s. embassy or consulate in israel that has been tasked with that. that would be worth following up on. that would be worth congressional inquiry, or individual congress people interested in these issues to sort of pursue this. and if it's true, you know, to press to remedy that.

so that there would be that kind of, you know, mandated reporting that might have some consequences. and i'm not looking here in terms of, you know, so much cutting off arm supplies as much as giving some incentives, in this case to the israelis, you know, to carry out more serious investigations and to hold their own officers accountable. >> all right. i do apologize in advance if i'm unable to get to you. i just to want get around the room a bit. i will come back up here. but let me go to this lady here in the aisle. >> hi. i'm dr. caroline poplin. i'm a physician. i'm a member of j-street. my question is for mr. koplow. you haven't discussed u.s. -- you didn't mention the u.s. does this right wing and ultraright wing in israel, they

don't care what the u.s. thinks or they assume that the u.s. will back them no matter what? >> i'm not sure that it's so much an issue of not caring what the u.s. think. certainly, there are some -- there are some on the far israeli right who view the u.s. as antagonistic toward israel, as absurd as that is. but within netanyahu, his circle and the government, i don't think it's an issue of not caring what the u.s. thinks. i think it's more of an issue of trying to figure out at what level the u.s. cares. and so, to the extent that the u.s. cares about something very deeply, you will see the israelis hold off. i'll give you an example. before the 2013 election, the israeli government announced tender plans to build an e-1,

which is one of the most contentious areas of the west bank. it's right next to and building an e-1 would cut the northern and southern west bank in half. i wrote at the time that that was a plan that was actually never going to be implemented because that is one of the u.s.'s clear red lines. has been for a while. and, indeed, it was not implemented and i don't expect it to be implemented. on things like that the israeli government certainly cares about what the u.s. government thinks. on other issues, the israeli government, like other governments, if they think that they can get away with something without any -- any real consequences, they'll do it. i don't think that makes israel unique. certainly, you know, israel -- the relationship between israel and the u.s. is -- is a lot more complex, complicated, tight, whatever word you want to use than the u.s.'s relationship with other countries. and so, there's a lot more -- a lot more back and forth and this

red line gets tested far more often. but i certainly wouldn't say that in general netanyahu and other more main stream politicians in israeli right don't care about the u.s. position at all. it's more a matter of testing the boundaries. >> this gentleman here in the blue shirt. wait for the mike, please. >> i'm a retired judge. my main question is, when you talk about two factions among the palestinians. is one faction a plo or fatah or the authority in favor of two states and hamas is not, is opposed to that, you're only talking about the surface here. the fact of the matter is, whether you would agree with me or not on how abbas feels about it, most of the palestinians believe that he is in favor only

of a temporary two states and eventually they will take over the other state. so it's a matter of stages. whether he actually believes that or not, we could argue all day. but the fact is that if the palestinians thought that he really was in favor of a final situation of two states, they wouldn't vote for him. he would get the same percentage of votes that fayad's party got, 3%. he is 79 years old now. the recent polls indicate what they have indicated all along, that a two state solution is not what the bulk of the arabs in israel want in palestine. what benefit is there for israel to go into a negotiation for a two state solution if eventually they're going to end up with the

same thing that they have from hamas now and which goes to the position, who doesn't tell us why the right wing has ascended, especially since the last war, the fact that most people realize that if they give over strategic positions in the west bank, they will end up with the same thing that they have in the southern border with hamas and on the northern border with hezbollah, rockets, tunnels and artillery aimed at the coastal heartland of israel. and the third thing is that everybody in this room i'm sure recognizes that israel did everything it could to spare civilian casualties and that hamas -- you can scoff at that. >> please. all right. ladies and gentlemen, please. >> you can scoff at that.

but everything they did, the calling off of air strikes, everybody knows that. i mean, you know, this stuff here really doesn't belong in this kind of discussion here. but you're picking on little things which -- and to talk about the international court, which would be loaded against israel, is no solution at all. i'd like comments on this. >> okay. let's address that, as you will. >> i will take the first piece of that. i don't know that i would agree with the characterization that most palestinians believe in two states in order to take over israel eventually. the reality is, i think more nuance than that. i think on the israeli side and palestinian side, the two state

solution has always been a very precarious concept. in the mindsets of both sides, if they had their ideal way they would go for one state in their own definition of what that means. for palestinians, it's one historical state of palestine. they are all palestinians. i think the fantasy, the dream for palestinians is to have a state single democratic state from the river to the sea. but there was a moment in which there was a broad political and even popular con ssensus to say- if we as palestinians are going to exercise self-determination, it will be in the context of a two state solution. the two state solution for palestinians has always been the least worst option. it's not the best option. that's why you see sort of the

slim plurality that supports it. over time, of course, support for -- if you measure support for a two state solution if you poll 1990, 1988 and poll it today, i think israel has, there isn't another way for palestinians to have rights, to have citizenship rights equal with other peoples

in the world outside of those two. we have a one state reality, but it's not one based on equality or rights. it's not based on self-determination. if the two state solution, which is a compromise from the standpoint of palestinians, because in their view they have given up 78% of their historic homeland, if that compromise is rejected, which it sounds like you reject, then there will be -- ultimately be no choice for palestinians to pursue if they ever want to have rights. of course, they do. other than to seek them through a one state, one man, one vote and one state, one person, one vote and one state. it can be called israel. it can be called palestinian. it can be called anything you want. but they will seek their rights one way or the other. so it's up to israel to decide, i think, which one it's prepared to accommodate.

i think from the -- from how i understand israeli interests, a two state solution would be far more favorable to them than a one state, which i think would be an inevitability if the two state solution is not possible. >> we just have a few minutes left here. michael and joe, want to address any of that? >> sure. on the question of the strength of the israeli right, i believe i was relatively clear that it is due to security concerns. it's been that way since the second intefadeh. that's the way it's going to remain. israelis have deep security concerns. i think they are rightly held. it makes sense that they are going to be attracted to parties that address those concerns to the extent israeli voters want them addressed. that's not to say though that there is not a big chunk of

israelis who still are in favor of a two state solution. let's not forget in the 2009 elections, the party that won the elections was kadima. they won 40 seats. the reason is because she couldn't put a coalition today. the leading vote getter in 2009 was the party that was running on a platform of the two state solution. i'm not sure that i would paint the situation in as dire tones as you do. security is paramount for many israeli voters. it does explain in the largest way the rise of the israeli right wing. >> joe, final thoughts? >> yeah. hard to know what to say. obviously, we disagree about whether israel did everything possible to spare civilians. i certainly don't think that's the case. i'm not sure what you are thinking of in terms of picky

issues i may have raised to illustrate the contrary. again, my point about the international criminal court is not that that should be the end result. what i'm saying, it's one of the reasons -- one of the purposes it can serve is as leverage for, in this case, the state of israel or any other state where we talk about wrongdoing that needs to be investigated to pressure them to do what they should be doing in the first place. >> again, apologize if i did not get to your question. i want to thank our panelists and thank you all for being with us today. [ applause ] next, former virginia

democratic senator jim webb. he speaks about the economy, foreign policy and the relationship between congress and the president. mr. webb is a former navy secretary. he is considered a possible 2016 presidential candidate. this is from the national press club live coverage here on c-span3. a former international bureau chief with the associated press and the 107th president of the national press club. the national press club is the world's leading professional organization for journalists committed to our profession's future through our programming with events such as this while fostering a free press worldwide. for more information about the national press club, please visit our website at press.org. on behalf of our members worldwide, i would like to welcome our speaker. those of you attending today's event also. our head table includes guests ofou