was mentioned briefly, they are always looking to cut corners. if you read daniel's excellent book thinking fast and slow, huh an excellent summary of a long line of research. in short, the search for and the maintenance of a single good reason is an awful lot easier to your brain. >> the second reason to suspect is that one resonates more powerfully with the affect of psychology and more complex logical inputs. you probably heard the quote attributed to stalin it's a tragedy, when thousands die it's statistics. research has shown to the images of children in need for example to statistical appeals. people are willing to say all

the rules. it's in the nature to treat the first or the best or the worst or most extreme very differently. with the compelling and personal reason to do so. they point people to one specific reason. identification and moral views and religion and social identity and both to simplify the complex information and environment and the opinion. how much more do people need to know to pick a president? how many people have religious beliefs that explicitly give them a good reason for their opinions because god said so? in many reasons, it requires

that just one do that. good reasons are not created equal. they are bulletproof. some reasons the good reason then can be strengthened and abandoned as it comes to light. as i supported the war in iraq,

they didn't uncover that and effectually it might have lot of the umpf leading me to change my opinion about the oil all together. the fundamental reasons are reasons for the moral views. loyalty. this means that new information is unlikely to have the impact on the folk who is have fundamental reasons. given all of this, we expect several things when we turn to and keep on the topic of iraq there. the first you expect is to see a patch work of good reasons. both for and against the war. thanks to the interplay of predispositions all of which had been mentioned already and

matter a great deal. unlike the discussion where we focused on people talking about terrorism a lot with this topic, my wife and i bought the minivan for two different reasons. she wanted the cup holders and i wanted to make her happy. two very different reasons. the most important reason is iraq's connection to terrorism and opponents didn't mention either of the above. the second thing is that because war is by their nature engaged in emotional and moral and other deeply held values, we expect

that the number of people who will find a fundamental reason to support or oppose a war will be high. given this, we expect to see a lot of consistency as opposed to change. consistency in the opinions that people hold throughout the war. we spend a lot of time with change, but thinking more about consistency. in the case of iraq, we see this very clearly. in two of the questions, the mistake question and the general do you a favor or oppose the question. the lowest level of support the war received is 36%. this is pretty straight forward. they have good reasons to support the war. other side of the spectrum. mostly liberals. many of them in adam's neighborhood. they oppose the war and never

waiver. i come from one of those too. that means when you think about it, as many as 60% of americans never change their mind once. they hold a strong piece. this is really resistant and will grow at times. they pay little attention to the foreign affairs. they will have no reasons whatsoever to support or oppose and they will learn more and they will be exposed to more good reasons. people with more reasons will get them. eventually one of them showed we

will get to any opinion that stopped changing. it doesn't matter what happens or what people are saying. our argument is that this is a function by that point that people have all acquired a good reason strong enough that it's essentially permanent. in the case of iraq, it happened a fairly long time ago. i will conclude. point out that he is making an argument that fits neatly. john's argument is that casualties no matter what your reason was, you will replace that good reason with too many

casualties as the single good reason to oppose the war. in the war support with the casualties, in the early stages those with misgivings is alienating. the only advocates are the hardened supporters who whose conversion proves to be more. this articulates in a nut shell how i see this one good reason operating.

others start off with varying level of goodness. some of those are weak enough that they collapse on first blood for the first sign of trouble. it takes a great deal of information to make clear that initial reason was actually not so good anymore. and in the interest of sticking to roughly 12 minutes, i will put it back out to you. what is your good reason? thank you. >> the audience on c-span, you have done a lit review. you have covered i think what i will ask people to do is take their responses and disputations and shoe horn them into consider

answers from the audience. i know you would like to use them as jumping off points to claw at each other's faces or whatever suits your fancy. we will open it to questions and you can wait for the microphone where you identify yourself and the affiliation and ask a short, pointed question. how about the gentlemen in the blue shirt. >> my name is joe and i'm i retired soldier. i just wonder how the panel considers the impact from the u.s. military from a draftee base to all volunteer base. >> the description on that.

>>s there is a debate on that. >> the fact that volunteers are dying, i don't think that animates people any less than if it were the other way around. no one said well, they asked for it. no one says that. i don't really make very much difference in terms of the public. >> i don't project that well, thanks. >> i'm also a graduate student at the university of texas. i want to follow-up on that question about that. i had the sense that might have

been different in europe in decades past. there is still a handful of countries that can script. do we have the sense that in european countries it is lower. i don't know of any. the swedes die and they are outraged whether he is a draftee or canadian or something like that. >> the gentlemen in the back in the dark blazer who just turned around. >> we have another theory of the

very quick, the red cape theory. every once this a while there is a media event that seems to elicit revenge. there has been other cases. key note stories that appear in the press that seem to provoke anger on the part of the american public. do you feel that there those incidents which trigger a change in public sentiment? >> the rest of the panels are not so much. >> looking at the support for the war in iraq that, caused a huge flurry. there is good news for those

namely elections that same to go to support the war as soon as it backs down. they are not game changers. there 70s like 9-11 and pearl harbor that i think really are anything but. 9/11 continues to resonate strongly. all the way through. >> another person who has wloin is not peter lieberman argued that and punishing people who deserve to be punished for their morally bad acts. that's probably fairly consistent with the big red letters of saddam as a bad guy that trevor had in his life.

>> what do you think of the abu ghraib photos and that affects what i want. >> the antiwar people fit into their argument about the obscenity of the war, etc. in terms of it, i don't know if there is a real study of the revelations that are stunning at the time. we all remember them and they are vivid and had pictures that were horrible, et cetera, etc. the data as i showed seems to be what they are temporarily.

and that continues down from there. they bounce back up. the events like that are horrible ones. the journalists just killed, you can consider that to be a minor effect given the horrificness of the war. one horrible thing happened and it can cause people what they do. it changed your mind in cases. >> the gentlemen down here in the front. >> i'm a probono advocate and i wrestled with the issues for 60 years. it's an excellent panel starting with working with mcnamara and

working with people and getting out of afghanistan. there is discussion about how to regard the wars afterwards. i wanted to ask mr. miller your reaction to the following. i have been at countless they keep emphasizing that they have to explain to congress and they try to explain that people read the same newspapers and know if they do get out and if they do and things go south and opponent can vote in a way that we lot of the war. in terms of your research and how congress reacts to public opinion, i want to know your

thoughts. >> it is not a who lot of syndrome. it's not that they are going to be over this. people are forgetting about this. they were at least forgetting about iraq as fast as they could. i think they are wrong and there will be a big retribution. there is a good reputation. you say okay, the only way to save iraq is to send the troops in. we have 300 million americans who don't want to do that. that's very strong and the administration has been using

this. if you want to get into this, but in terms of damaging the opposition. >> in terms of using this. >> how did politicians and there has been good work done in international realizations and. >>a they don't want to reaction.

he was not worried about politicians and he was worried about the democratic party. the fundamental issues and the politicians worry about reactions be it the mass public to their actions. other people disagree that politicians thinking ahead and how does the public react to the positions. nothing about opinion today, but what is it going to look like in six months a year from now. >> that's one thing.

>> one point that should be brought up is the situation of syria last summer. they are trying to say are you getting into another stupid war in the mideast. that had a powerful impact. everybody now is no longer willing to talk about boots on the ground. this can have straining effects and in this case both republicans and democrats going against the party. when obama said he was going to bomb them, the party leaders on both sides in the congress said go ahead. that's unanimity among the

elites. that's in the iraq war. this is not that the queues are influencing the people, but the people are influencing the queues. when they tried, there was a huge and out of the democratic party and didn't want to talk about it. john kerry was a horse for an antiwar movement. at least the main activists and the rank and file party were manipulating the leaders that kept going on throughout the

decade. barack obama it turned out that didn't work out so well. they got the only politician for those that opposed the war into the white house. >> to add the response to that, it's my relatives in fly over country that seated barack obama that want to bomb syria. that's enough for them to know that it's a bad idea. right there. yes, you. right there. . >> i find it difficult to believe that public opinion shapes decisions to go to war. simply on the basis that congress has not officially declared war and getting us into

war. the premises of public opinion shaping something like war that should be based on strategy, not on opinion. in my opinion. it's hard to believe. if you could address that and also we have seen one of the speakers mentioned circumstantial reasons. being put forward and used by the public to say yes, i support this or i don't support this. if anyone can comment on the trend, the creation potentially fabrication of circumstantial reasons to get into a conflict nato versus russia. >> i think this raises a couple of points. is there evidence of what the public thinks and when.

i will leave it to you. >> one is that we are seeing it now. we can't have boots on the ground. public opinion won't let us do that. that's what they say. it is the case that the president can do it anyway he could have bombed in syria and see what happened later. they were negatively later. in terms of the arguments, they are trying to come up with arguments that make you like them. they say how about what they polled to do it. the poll is well and they put the argument about jobs. they are trying to manipulate in the sense and trying to come up with the arguments that work best for their side. in other words, to a considerable degree from the public is influencing what they

are doing. they are going up in front of the audience saying i am against immigration. they say they go on it and they have the drug issue. sometimes they get a big reaction and the question is who is manipulating who? they are seeing if anybody buys it. they go on to something else. >> i will say too that having written stuff about how dangerous presidents are in terms of inflating threats by manufacturing reason reasons. how much is it to buy about intelligence. the chart that john showed earlier that charts public opinion before 2003 and 2002, bush tried a lot of stuff to

convince you to go to war. it mean that is the words are not good. a look at the iraq war and a bump in the opinion is not when they said let's go to war. it's when you cent 5,000 troops to the gulf. words are in a constant market place battling back and forth. it's hard for them to say anything to convince the team to do something. then it's very different. >> we will take another question.

>> if he had not been through the iraq war, he would have the impact favorable to him that came up with 9/11. >> let's go here in the aisle. >> thank you. and what your respective studies of public opinion and how they informed your views and how functional it is. i am curious to hear from any and all of you on that. >> why don't you start us off. >> that's a simple question. >> in the three minutes we have left. >> it's true that lots of citizens don't pay super close attention to politics. i don't think anybody on this

panel would dispute that. there some decisions that are particularly bad like the iraq war that democracy is fairly responsible. we don't have lots of bad decisions. lots of wars and most of the worst that we have gotten into have gone well. maybe i'm too pollyanna about the democracy, we should give up on democracy and trust our elite lords. >> you don't miss new coke, do you? >> new coke wins in blind taste

tests. >> that's right. they put it out there. they didn't want it. >> basically i think i learned the democracy is really crappy for the government and it's better than the alternatives. that's what i would like to leave under. it's self correcting as jason said. it's appalling that so many people disagree with me. i learned to live with it. >> you want to take it and pass it down. >> i will say i have a yin yang answer to that. i am not full on ra ra, but i think it works reasonably well

in terms of the opinion and foreign policy connection. the yang side is that i don't think it's because we are very smart or good at reasoning through these things. i think instead we are lucky that we have two parties that enjoy roughly equal support from both sides of the public. when we fight about things, we polarize. we don't come to agreement with anything else important. we compromise. what that does is keeps us from doing extreme stupid stuff often. the people who answer any question you give them on the

survey. where i do disagree with that, if people are given good material to work with, they take use from politicians who have thought hard about an issue and take considered positions. if they use other queues to quite them, they have ethnic politics with the mechanisms that people use about politics, people can do well. the story there is people's decisions are only as good as their politicians that they listen to. >> i think democracy, if we fault it, it's not the mass public. it's politicians that we need to

talk about. >> i like to close on the anti-elite note. thank you for that. this is actually an odd time for a forum course. it's too late for lunch, but i'm irish so it's not too early for a glass of wine. i hope you will join us for wine and cheese and thank the panel for a terrific forum. thank you, guys. >> members of congress weighing in on u.s. air strikes against isis in syria. the house budget committee said speaker boehner should bring members back to vote on the authorization for the use of military force that supports

current mission and ensures no ground troops and no iraq war. senator barbara box sweets i support them taking the fight with a coalition of arab partners and house affairs committee brad sherman said encouraged by the bravery and skill shown by the air forces and the commander in chief in combatting isis. we are looking for your thoughts as well on u.s. and allied air strikes in syria. in gaza, they said the u.s. funded iron dome defense system played a key in saving not only israeli lives, but also palestinians. george washington university hosted this event.

>> the general mayor is a senior official at the institute for national security studies where he runs the homeland security program in israel. he had a distinguished career for military intelligence. i think fair to say is a scholar soldier. he not only brought together some of the military experience with the intelligence background and did so in a way that brought theory with practice. it's also fair to say that inss

is probably the premier think tank now in israel for those of you who don't know them. i suggest you start reading some of their briefs and deliverables. that's the cycle. whenever you start to see an attack on israel, in this case he is here to talk about operations and protected edge and more importantly, the implications from a home front and a homeland security perspective. as well as from a resilience perspective. this is a buzzword thrown around d.c. and lots of places. if there is one place that i think embodies resilience, it's israel. person can put all the good thoughts together to get a sense of what it all really means. >> first of all i would like to

thank you for coming and take the time to listen to what i think might be of interest to you. for the second time, last time i was here. it's great to be here and i am in touch with hbi. it's a great center or institution. and different places and it's important that we work together. why i'm here in the states, right after that is not only because we have a very close relationship in general, but also the resilience community.

that's growing all the time. it happens to have its natural center here in theus. that's called the national is institute for standard and technology. they are also looking for ideas and people here in america. they were clever enough to invite people and they realized that everybody with the collaboration is the name of the game. if we collaborate on things that are common to us and we had to

share interests in security, as we do in so many other things, they think that working together is really beneficial. >> i will say a few words about my understanding over the summer from the security. the implications if you wish. economic implications, et cetera, et cetera to the confrontations we had. do not hesitate to do that. i'm having here on the two sides

my slice and topic is left from the home front in israel. i don't have to say anything else about that because frank was krashs enough to say the nice words words about the institution. let's start with the challenge. i would like to impress upon you that that was quite an episode of 50 days. it should be part of an overall changing situation. so many things are happening all the time. they are all connected one way or another. at least from the prism of the security thinking.

we focus on one issue like the hamas challenge and we have to look at the same time on the other challenges at the same time. one thing leads to another and the impacts for the other. if you don't see the picture and they understand the entire picture, it's very, very difficult to understand the intricacies, we are missing the point. the second thing i want to say here is hamas is all those are meaningful manifestations and it is a major facture as far as the issue is concerned. no doubt about that. it operates not only in about

gaza, but in the west bank. very, very strongly. very, very energetically. i don't know if you heard, but there was a poll in the west bank. in which it was found that if there were an election and nowadays, and it was supposedly the prime minister of the islamic nature of hamas is very, very important trait in its conduct and thinking.

whether it's a state or non-state is questionable. i would look at it as a state, but not something that is in the beginning stages of being a state and more a state with regard to hamas and even lebanon is with regard to hezbollah. even though the proximity of the and they are enough and we have other actors there a& men of thm are hardly controlled. there is a corporation between

them. hamas itself also has quite a strong group. the growth has been and they terrorized the population for exerting pressure on the government to change the policy or a variety of issues. they consider rightfully so that gaza is under and it controlled in a way. both by israel and egypt. together they actually toll them. we and the egypt rans pose a major reinstruction on the capacity of the non-state entity

of gaza to live. and to man test them the goal and that's what we were facing. let's talk about the terrorist aspect of hamas and the military aspects. it's becoming more and more militar military. it's more military and even though i consider it's the population in israel, it's terrorism. the conduct is growing. there a few elements i want to speak of in terms of the military and terrorist build up

of hamas. as you can see here, we have seen that hamas as i would say about 4 or 4 1/2 major components that they have developed in the last few years. the offenses are done. it has a major effect. i would like to draw your attention to the posture which i think has a more meaningful role and has the abilities they have developed. with the offensive capacities, they were quite meaningful that we will talk about in a minute, their defensive posture is a lot

more significant in overall picture it's important and daring. mostly air and an operation when we went out a& not very developed. the thinking is interesting and shows vigor and inertia, if you wish. for me the more important thing here out of the picture is to manage the control system. i want to draw your attention to the fact that they have managed for the 50 or days to manage their forces who are effectively

on the quiet street of the offense from where they were hiding in the underground meeting. they were very, very advanced learning from others. this whole concept is working from the underground meeting. the fact that most of their attacks, particular ly was done semi automatically according to a preplanned program of firing and launching the rocks in a timely orchestrated manner. it's rather small. we are talking about 15,000 out

of 45,000 people. this is the military build up that is quite a well in the operation. that is the first offensive capability. all in all the numbers are here. we don't want to get into that. that would be number one. somewhat less than 100 to end the day. this is a lot. those are not very large numbers. it's much less experienced. back in 2006 from hezbollah,

it's less than we experienced from them. in the last two rounds in 2008 and 2011, it's much vow to make a differentiation between the harassment, the fact they had on the population, which is quite meaningful. but you have to bear in mind that we have to think about qualitatively and quantitatively in the future. this is one thing. the second thing has do with the range. they are quite capable of introducing into the picture a rocket in the range of more than 70 kilometers, reaching, you know, north of tel aviv. and even at one time, hifa and other central population in the

state of israel. so the range issue is very meaningful. and you have to remember that basically now israel is in the -- i mean, in the populated areas of israel is under rocket range fire. in times of conflict. and this is very meaningful because even in this summer, more than a% of the citizens of israel, more than 4 million people are under fire. and under this harassment kind of project. this is very important. of course, as you know, we will speak about it in a minute, they were not very effective in terms of damage. speak about casualties. mostly because, speak about it in a minute, not only because of the iron dome. iron dome is very important. and most important, two other

factors have to be taken into consideration in terms of the containment of the rocket system. one is the suppression of the air force. they could not have produced as many launches as they would like to do. that's why the numbers and also so large, as i said before, and number two of the behavior of the population. the combination of those three factors, iron dome, active defense, the civil defense and offensive capacity of the idea actually made the rockets threat in terms of damages physical damages to people and infrastructure moderate. okay? so this is one thing. the second thing i want to say a few words about mortar. the mortar, even though very short range and even more primitive than the rockets, had

a very, very important fact. not of course on the population at large, but in the areas in direct proximity to the gaza strip and it made a difference. in other words, i can even say that in many ways the mortars were more effective than the rockets. okay it also in terms of casualties. we had -- i mean, in terms of numbers of casualties. both in the military and civilians, hit and killed and wounded by mortars, was relatively high. let's see here, 507 civilians and 34, 35 already military servicemen. you see something very, very interesting and it is important that, i mean, primitive, the more primitive weapons system, okay, is more effective when you use it in the right manner. okay? one of the issues of course is that our capacity to contain, is

less effective than the one that we have which is very effective as for as the rocket are concerned. just one second. okay. here is a slide of numbers of rockets that were launched in different places so you can understand of course, that the high numbers are in the immediate south after -- 60% of over all number directed to the areas within the 22 kilometers range. about 32% to the south in general major -- part of them and the numbers are quite significant. and the center of israel, tel aviv, jerusalem, the area around tel aviv, received almost 350, which is 8%.

you have to remember, that they say for example, even tel aviv where -- here, tel aviv, 134. you divide into 50 so it means that everyday we had about close to three rockets that were hit -- that were aimed at tel aviv. by the way, none of them got tel aviv. all of them were effectively intercepted by the iron dome. the second offensive thing of course is the offensive tunnel. we have to remember that the thing about the offensive, what we call terrorist tunnel, those are the tunnels that are going all the way to the israel territory on the other side of the line or border. but it is part of an extensive and underground network that is

used or had been used and still is used, number one, for smuggling of goods and mostly weapons. mostly from cyanide. huge tunnels of actually the bigger ones, an industry. people suggest that the tunnel industry is the number one industry in gaza. and the economy in gaza is centered around the town business. the town construction business. so you have to understand that when they have an issue, it also effects the economy. which is an interesting poll, i think. i thing i want to draw your attention to is that even though it is a limited weapon system. you know that government is quite hesitant to send ground troops to occupy gaza because of the defense capacity mostly of the -- as i was talking about. the fact that we did get into

gaza, we have quite an extensive military composition, was because of the tunnels. we have an impact on the decisions. remember, something that the hamas is looking for. this is one of their -- as we said before, gold to change or to impact or influence of the government. it was considered to be sort after big strategic surprise. even though they knew about the tunnels. it was not in the public disclose. and apparently, not really very high on the agenda of the ideas. because our way of handling the tunnels once we got there was

not very quick. and the casualties are quite high. so it was a major obstacle or major issue, major challenge for us. and it did have an impact on the psychology of people. i would focus on the south of course. there they had a major impact. but also in israel in general. again, you see a very primitive system that manages to impact a population as a whole and makes a difference. so this again is something that i think might be of interest to you. this is a local operation. a strategic challenge. it has brought consequences. okay. so what was the israeli answer to that?

i think it was basically i would say, collaboration or joint project of several component of the overall israeli military capacity. the traditional one is -- excuse me, is of course, the offensive arm. mostly air force and to an extent also army. ground forces. but interestingly enough and this should say something that is an interesting change, i think. in israel overall doctrine for homeland security of how we manage ourselves against the presence asymmetric threat, there are other component and are not necessarily your defensive playing a major role and i was trying to suggest to you here by this chart that the overall contribution of the other nonoffensive elements has been more significant than the offensive capacity. and as you probably know, israel is traditionally basing itself on -- this something like the

military dna. the offensive capacity. but here you see and i think it's interesting the passive defense. very, very organized. very, very, meaningful. i want to draw your attention to one important thing. our early warning plus alarm system is very sophisticated. and it's directly not only towards the defense system, but also the population at large in a way that the more than 200 zones of sirens or zones of alarms in israel and there will be more so that we e know in advance that let's say a rocket

is going -- it has been launched now in gaza to reach a certain location within let's say 70 seconds. but only a certain limited area has to be warned by sirens, e et cetera. which means that all the other people in this particular time are free to do whatever they want to do which is an important contribution. so the early warning element here is, excuse me, is very, very significant. the last thing i want to speak about is the intelligence. intelligence is important for the defense and offense. i think it's quite clear to you. i think that we have reached a very, very high capacity of intelligence gathering and most importantly the distribution of intelligence to the troops both went through the active defense and offensive elements in a very, very precise manner. so this is really -- if we're talking about two perhaps

military revolutions or major advances, one of them would be the active defense. the other would be the capacity of the intelligence. the others mostly incremental advance or progress. let me say a few words about -- everybody speaks about the queen of the battleground of course. it's a remarkable technological operation of success. the important thing is the fusion of technology and operation here. and you have to remember that this whole thing actually started only after the 2006 war in lebanon. so it's a brand new system. it has been developed in a very, very, very short period of time. and the important thing here is the cooperation of very close technological operation and collaboration between the people

of the air force. i must add another thing here. there is another major partner to the success of the iron dome. this is the u.s. and each one of you has been paying his own tax dollars to this success. sometimes we put your money and our money into our projects that are not as successful. this project is an amazingly successful project. let me make one remark. israel military, especially the air force, was objective to the introduction of the iron dome for many years. veementally. . now it's a different story. and this is really a big story. only one person died under its coverage. so the success is really

fantastic. and the yet we have to remember it's not hermatic, even now. and we had rockets falling and hitting areas in israel under the coverage of the iron dome. luckily and because, as i u said before, of the conduct of the population which is an added important element for our own civil defense because people once you look for shelter, you are safe. and this is the success of the home front command, which is also had to be credited with the success, not less than the other factors. so there was damage. there was damage in schools. there was damage in kindergartens, in different areas. but luckily, unfortunately, only one person died. but in terms of numbers it's very impressive.

we have to say it again and again. so we have to look for ways and means to improve the system. it's not the final state of the art. it has advantages, it saves lives, i would like to draw your attention o to perhaps a notion that is being discussed now in israel. it's not only saves israeli lives, it also saves palestinian lives because if we didn't have the iron dome, the reaction of the israeli military would be different. much more severe causing much more damage and fatalities on the other side. so it saves lives, period. it provides a sense of personal security and it's amazing how fast, and we speak a little bit about resilience, how people behave when they have this kind of coverage and protection. and it grants the decision makers with freedom to maneuver

what they think is right. this is a strategic. it has disadvantages. there's no shortchange weapons systems. the mor tors even though ten have been intercepted by iron dome, so we try to do that, but because of the very short range shs there's not enough time. this whole story is of seconds. you understand that, i'm sure. it's very costly. both the systems and the missiles, it's about 50,000 u.s. dollars a piece. i'm talking just about the missile itself. and because of the protection of lives it portrays a picture that

on one side there's practically no problem and everybody is happy. on the other side, there are people who are suffering and a subject to death and fatalitief. so in terms of the communication scene. it is advantage. and the important thing, as i said before, and i want to stress it, this is one of the lessons, we cannot be very pleased or pleased enough with what happened because we have an urgent need for more. both more of the same and mostly improved systems. i'll say a few words about that when i speak about the challenges of the future. so what are the major security lessons that one can learn from what happened in the summer from our point of view. this is my interpretation of the situation. i'd like to hear what you think about it. we have been talking about a hybrid confrontation, but the overall density of impact was

relatively medium. the impact was relatively medium as far as israel is concerned. it could have been much worse and i would suggest in the future it would be worse. still limited military threat poses a complex challenge, very complex challenge, mostly political. there is no clear cut decisive military victory. it's a big issue. who won? biggest issue. like soccer games. is there a winner? and we understand those who are in the field understand when you're talking about hybrid wars, this it question is not relevant. and it's especially not relevant in the short run. it might become relevant in a perspective of, i suggest, years. as has been the case in our lost

confrontation with hezbollah in lebanon. if you remember, most israelis would suggest that we were if not defeated, we came out of it very, very miserable. nowadays, eight years later, people are quite happy about that. the deterrence was restored. they do not try. they have other business, et cetera. so when you speak later on about the political issues and political challenges. technologies do save lives and mitigate damage. very important. the emphasis of technology, together with the u.s. again, not only by the way with regard to the iron dome. but also other offensive and defensive systems. one of them is the tank coverage, protective umbrella,

so to speak, of the tanks. we can move our tanks inside urban areas. there was not one tank that was hit under heavy anti-tank missiles of the best. very sophisticated ones. and the tanks -- those tank that had the cover of the new system that was developed in israel it saves lives. it enables you to maneuver in a better way. but, and this is when you think about the future to be expected, and i mostly speak about hezbollah, but also hamas, also hamas in the future, once we have another round, several elements that were not really

apparent didn't make an impact on this last one. number one, cyber attacks. very, very scattered. and those that happened apparently mostly not from hamas. we have some indications. i don't know for sure, but there are some indications that iranians were involved. but the cyber issue was not a major issue in this last one, but it should be taken into consideration for sure. guided precision weapons. most of the -- i would say all of the rockets, they did not have a guided system. next time and already now in lebanon by. hezboll hezbollah, they have a major chunk of precision weapon systems, which make a very, very major difference with regard to our capacities to defend. that's why i said before when i spoke about iron dome, it's one thing to protect yourself when

you have let's say old kind of a system, it's self-made to a large extent. but next time in the future, we have to prepare ourselves for another one. heavier payload. the payloads were relatively low this time. different kinds of quantities. i don't know if you heard about that, but the numbers that you hear in israel about future confrontation quantities in terms of a day of fighting is 700 plus a day. just compare them to the 100 miners that we had in the last one. the range, even though they hit tel aviv, hezbollah can get to them from the north, which is a completely different story. and another thing is longer confrontations. i will speak. about that later on when i speak about the round paradigms, but we see that the confrontations become longer and longer, not necessarily to our advantage.

so in the future, we might expect higher impact density and also risk to the critical infrastructure. in the last round and in most former rounds between us and the palestinians on one hand and the lebanese on other, the critical infrastructure was hardly damaged. this will not knows nestly be the case in the future and israel has to make -- to undertake quite a major shift in its thinking with regard to the issue of critical infrastructure. by the way, we currently conducting a major study on the electric grid in israel facing different kinds of risk like cyber risk, kinetic risk, but also other kind of risks like natural risks and things of that sort. so my final conclusion is physical resistance measures

will not suffice in the future. we'll have to have other means to defend ourselves, which would bring us to the issue of resilience, which is the second part of my presentation. okay? this is going to be shorter, but for me, it's more interesting because i consider myself a resilient sir. it's a family of people who research the issues of resilience and we are a community trying to promote our interests, we're trying to advocate. consider me advocating to you now. what is resilience? it's not what mostly you hear on the news or from politicians in the media, et cetera. mostly you get the impression also in israel, by the way, that the resilience is robustness. it's not. and this it is the definition that i would like to share with

you. it's usually shared, but not always. there's a controversy within the community what exactly would be the right definition of resilience, but mine would be as suggested to you, the capacity of any system and any system can be a corporation, an infrastructure, a community, a business or a nation. any system or a system of systems with interdependencies. so any system to quickly bounce back following a major disruption so as to ensure the earliest recovery and return to basic entity and functions. and to that i would like to add one term. i'm speaking not only about bouncing back, but in addition to that, i'm also talking about bouncing forward. i'll say a few words about that in a minute.

so what is the essence of resilience following this definition? it's always part of a disaster content or a disruption context. when you don't have a disruption of any kind, a major disruption to be sure, there is no meaning to resilience. resilience comes in, circumstances of a major disruption. we speak about different degrees or levels of flexibility. when you encounter a situation, you don't just stand there like ram rambo. but you are flexible enough to bend your capacities to lay low and then not to be broken because robust systems, strong

systems tend to be more breakable than flexible ones. remember this. this is very important. and then the second phase of course, after the degradation of functionality, which is natural to a reaction to a disruption, the system is functionally bouncing back. or as i suggested before, bouncing forward. real resilience systems can bounce forward or should aim to bounce forward. as a collective learning process of the dus rupgs and its consequences. and here you have a chart. this is the regular conduct of the system. here we have, let's say, a disruption. an expectant normal degradation of functionality.

it always happens. if there's no diminish, there's no disruption. always do not expect to stand idle and be happy with what happened. always there is a downfall and then there's the question of bouncing back or bouncing forward. so i'm suggesting here, several models of bouncing back and forward. you have the l shape, in which you go down and then you don't bounce back at all. and sometimes systems collapse because they cannot bounce back. they cannot rejuvenate the functionality. then there is the -- excuse me, there is the u shape in which the bouncing back is slow, usually comes back, hopefully to the normal level of let's say square one. but then the v shape is

representative of number one, swift bouncing back. the angle here represents back and then the range. this is what we call to turn challenges into opportunities. so you have systems that are not resilient. you have systems that are medium resill yebt yent. and there are systems that are very resilient. so let's see what was the situation in israel. beforehand, let me say a few words before i pass to you my verdict of the israeli resilience. what constitute the enablers of society resilience. i have been doing that for some years now. this is not an israeli exclusive

kind of portrait of resilience. you have to prepare for the e eventuality of the disruption. you will never be able to stand up to the challenges of the disruption. some people say preparedness first. the second thing is situational awareness. we have in israel reached a very, very high degree of capacities in terms of this information. we have not ended our journey over there. some things still have to be done. if you ask me later on, i will speak about that. but everyone in israel knows at any moment what the situation is. exactly. if there is a threat, they know

there is a threat, an immediate threat, a belated threat or whatever, it will reach you, it will not reach you. what is the meaning of that and what you have to do about it. very, very, very upgraded kind of a system. but very simple. because it is directed to people, to children, so it has to be very simple. leadership and trust. major element in resilience building. i bould like to suggest that the local leadership in the communities especially in the south during the last summers episode was excellent. and they contributed directly to the resilience of their people. i'm not speaking about the government because this is still questionable and people say different things about that. but it's less important. i would like to suggest to you

that local leadership is more important than national leadership. there's another thing that is called conviction. how do you identify with a situation? conviction of different kinds like political conviction. you think as a nation that whatever your government is doing or your country is doing is right or wrong. it's two different things. the more you are convinced that your country is doing the right thing, then you are more resilient. also ideology in general. different kinds of -- i think of that sort with all the problems that it entails. also religious. we seem quite clear ly that mor religious communities are more e resilient than non. and also political. social activism is paramount.

it has been proven again and again and not only in israel. if i lon tlo pi is important. what the kids in school are doing or not doing is very, very important. are they involved? what do they do? how do they act? and also the social economic status. communities with higher social economic status are more resilient than the others. so what's the verdict? what i suggest is and this is still under discussion, it's still being examined by us because we are not -- we have not yet finished studying this issue of the rate of resilience.

you can behave at the same time as if you are under threat and conduct your business simultaneously. very strong in the resilience of a society. returning to normal behavior immediately after disruptive events. there is a siren. people are looking for shelter. the siren is off. you wait ten minutes, usually you wait less even though you're not supposed to. then you go out and go to the movies. you bo to the movies. you look for shelter. you come back. you eat your popcorn. this is resilience. in direct proximity in gaza because of the motors and the tunnels and things we were talking about beforehand.

there was a flexible response, you remember what i said about flexibility. there was a very massive self-evacuation, but there was also a rapid return home once the cease-fire arrived. we had 11 cease-fires. so people would just go back and forth 11 times. it's true that after the fifth time they started being hesitant about it. once the last one took place, 95% of them. 80% of them left. 95 of them returned within two days after the cease-fire that still holds today. strategically, rapid bouncing back on the national scale with minor exceptions in the south, as i said before. let me just suggest to you that the most striking example is the smooth opening of the school

year on september 1st. three days after, all the systems including those directly hit by rockets, they all opened. people said, i don't know, i'm not going to send my kids. the bussing is awkward. natural things. everybody came back. which is a great indication of bouncing back. by the way, same thing happened in 2006. if you remember, at that time we had two weeks after the very, very heavy fighting. worst thing we had here, it ended two weeks before the school year started. september 1st, all schools including those that were hit directly by rockets from lebanon, everything was open. then one week later, the holidays, all the bed and breakfasts, in the domestic

attraction of tourism, everything was open. this is, to me, a clear manifestation of -- okay, what are the lessons. i want to impress upon you that resilience is not a given state. even though they say the jewish people are more resilient than others. it can and should be enhanced continuously in advance. you cannot count on your resilience in any circumstance. you have to work on it. you remember what i said about preparations. part i would say the most important part of preparations is in the realm of resilience. civilian resilience is more complex and challenging than infrastructure resilience naturally. people are different. it should be attended to in accordance with relevant threats

and specific environments and circumstances. you have to when you speak about resilience, you have to direct or focus on the population. different population needs different resilience enhancement programs. and this is my understanding, my belief, maybe you won't agree with me, it's a primary leverage for countering terrorism. it's more important than the iron dome. it's more important than any resistant mechanism because what the other side is trying to do and this is something that is common to all terrorist organizations around the world. what they are trying to do is to demoralize us. if it we are not demoralized, and if we show it by our high rate of resilience, they fade. we don't want to fade. so it helps decrease the

effectiveness of terror. i can say from my experience in israel again and again, resilience is the story. that's my advocacy. thank you very much. >> thank you. [ applause ] >> thank you for a real tour deforce on the issues not only in recent history in terms of some of the activity, but also the context by which it needs to be examined. >> thank you. >> i also want to ask very specifically based on your definition, it would lead me to believe that israel didn't just bounce back, it did bounce forward. i would be curious how you define what those success metrics look like. to one extent or the other, the iron dome, let's go to some of the tactics, it basically deters adversaries to seek other tactics. this is always a cat and mouse.

we come up with a mouse trap, they come up with a new way to try to circumvent that mouse trap. in a weird way, you'll see more rudimentary types of attacks, or you'll see cyber, et cetera. but do you feel -- can you feel confident enough to feel you bounced forward or you think it's too early? >> i think it's too early. and we're doing quite a major study to measure the resiliency mostly of the people. in the south. this is really the population that is interesting to us. not only because they are the ones who faced the more severe threat, but mostly because, and this is another element, they constitute the weakest point of the link. and the resilience, the national resilience depends on the resiliency of the weakest or the more challenged link of the

overall chain. right? so we have to focus our attention very, very carefully on what's happening over there. number one, and i'll tell you i wrote an article in the israeli -- one of the most economic papers in israel, together with my colleague who is the responsible for the program of economy and national security in insa. we wrote together a piece and looking at the economic situation in the south. we suggested that the government that now adays, the most primary priority of the government is first to attend to the needs of the people in the south. but the idea is not just to give them a hug, which is important, but. also to introduce to them engines of growth, which brings

me to the question of yours. the most important benchmark that i am going to look into, as far as the people in the south is how they grow in the next 24 months. and i can tell you that they have a capacity of growth both in terms of number of product -- numbers of cultural events over there. and i want to look into it and see to what extent the number of shows would not be hired by at least 150% compared to the number of shows let's say before the operation started. i would bet, by the way, if you

press me, i would say that we will be there. because, and i have a reason, it's not just a matter of guesswork. because this was not the first time that the south has been challenged by hamas. it's been the third time in six years. quite frequently. but still we have seen that the number of the population in direct proximity to gaza has been growing and growing significantly. lots of people are coming back. they are coming there because it's beautiful. they call it a paradise. a paradise that has been threatened again and again. but it's a paradise. so this is my answer to you. we have a very distinct way of benchmarking, bouncing back and bouncing forward. >> that they invest in ballet companies? >> yeah, yeah.

i did a study. four years of consecutive terrorist vicious, cruel attacks against the population. more than 1,000 people killed during this time. i can tell you exactly that the number of movie goers following disruptions, following suicide bombings increased constantly. so this is a metric. >> so this is number one. what was about the weapons system? >> do you see it going and obviously it's a hybrid of both. they could try to circumvent. we're talking about displacing risk, right? and ultimately you're going to

force the hand of the adversary to look to either lower mortars you saw unfortunately the efficacy that that had or higher tech. when you get to the higher tech, you're talking about a capability leap that is not insignificant and obviously you bring in proxies and state sponsors and everything else. so i mean if you have to project forward, where do you see that going and who's work iing in th background taking advantage of the situation? >> well, if they listen to me, i think that i would at least -- and they have proven themselves to be quite sophisticated. let's not underestimate. they would go both ways. low end and high end. in other words, more tunnels, more very not sophisticated

weapons. at the same time, also the high end. cyber has to be in, no doubt about that. and we are -- i mean israel is on one hand an excellent target for cyber attacks, for cyber warfare because all of our systems are based on -- right? i mean, on the other hand, i think we're quite advanced in protecting our systems, so it's not very simple. so i do think cyber is going to be much more prevalent and noticeable in the next one. and weapons of precision, with high prosigs, this is very important element. it's a game changer. it's definitely a game changer because i said here and i wanted to raise it again. i am today somewhat more concerned about the challenge to the infrastructure than i am to the challenge to the civilian

population. here you are talking about people that can be cured. but the idea is that we are not as ready with the regard to the protection of the resilience o of our infrastructure. meaning its capacity to bounce back as the civilians are. and you have to remember that infrastructure, it's more difficult to enhance the flexibility of infrastructure than it is to dole with the flexibility of human beings. >> i might note, i recently chaired a big grid security study here. and i think you're right to focus not all critical infrastructures are equal. some are more critical than others and clearly given the interdependency of other systems, that's at the very heart. >> absolutely. >> of these issues. and i might know when you look

at the sicyber threat, and we recently hosted other colleagues of yours, but it's not only. computer network attack and computer network exploit, but how cyber can be an enabler to kinetic attacks. to me that's one of the dilemmas here since attribution is a bit of a challenge and you touched on the government of iran and no surprise that they have been investing very heavily in their computer network attack. they are advertising it. and i think something that will be a factor in any form of conflict going forward but significantly there. let me flip it the other way around. because the united states right now a lot of attention understandably on the threat posed by isis in iraq and syria. but i want to talk to a particular point that you raised. and that's the role of social

media and terrorism is terror. it's intended to erode trust, undermine governments, policiep, institutions, people, but it's a psychological weapon on top of everything else it may be. you were discussing, and i think in a very good way in terms of your ability to inform your population. you talked about the alarms and the sirens. you have the ability to localize that. so not everyone has to find shelter at the same time, which i think is important. not only do you have alarms, but you have social media. i think that has huge implications for disaster preparedness and other needs domestically. let's flip it from the adversary's perspective. their use of social media. if you look at isis, it seems obsessed with its image and the selfie equivalent of really bad

people with some of the most gro tisk tesk and abhorrent types of video. but they are using it for e three purposes. to recruit and radicalize people from the west. they are trying to impact and facilitate their own trade craft. but social media didn't play in so much in directly from a hamas perfective in operation protective edge, did it? >> no, it didn't. >> what should we think about going forward? >> it's very interesting because you're right. we have not yet completed our study on the usage of social media by hamas. so what i'm going to say now is not really -- exactly. please bear with me. i hate to speak about things that i'm not really confident about. but i was personally exposed to the hamas social media

propaganda because they were very active. let me give them a very low grade in their performance in terms of the content and visualization. if you get a text or you get a a youtube which is, how shall i say it, insulting in its grotesque. it doesn't have any effect. on o the contrary. and they have a long way to go. the intention is there. the action is there. . and consistency. but in terms of achievements, i wouldn't be very happy if i were

them. so there's another line for them. it's not the case with regard to their own people. and again i want to impress upon you. we're looking constantly the question to what extent the people in gaza are alienated by what's happening. and we want them actually to understand that hamas is actually inflicting very heavy damage on them. well, that's not the situation. that's not the situation. even if you distract from fear, it's a vicious dictatorship and had to exert massive executing people in the streets, et cetera, after our attempt to target some of the guys, i would say that if there were today free elections in gaza, hamas

would have the upper hand. hamas would have the upper hand. maybe not 80%. so what i'm suggesting that as far as their own people, their propaganda, it is working. this is what's more important to them after all. >> and even i recently did an interview when i compared it to spamers. you on the need a few people clicking and it's effective from their perspective. so when you're looking at recruiting and radicalizing, you don't need 100% success rate. it plays to the adversary. i want to open it up to the audience here. we have a little bit of time. you covered so much territory. and i think in addition to providing the specificity in terms of where we are, the context is important. we need to be advocating for

resilience, not just u.s., but everywhere. at the end of the day, it is the ability to bounce back, bounce forward, and that includes the psychological dimension and also includes the engineering. our systems are brittle. if they are both on quick sands, we have problems. please identify yourself before you ask. >> my craft former state department counterterrorism office. i have been working with a group here. you seem to focus more on the after action bouncing back, but a lot of us consider the important part of resiliency is dealing with the ongoing situation say whether it's a major hurricane or terrorist attack. part of this as you suggest involves preparations. but to what extent have you been focusing on making sure the citizens have adequate supplies

of food, water, medical supplies, et cetera, especially in the south and elsewhere. and also there's a question that comes up with the psychology. you mention self-evacuation. and i guess that's part of evacuation -- i'm sorry, resiliency when they come back. but hamas portrays this as a psychological victory. good part of the south being closed down, the economy being hurt, low dpo you deal with these kind of contradictory goals? you can't force people to stay in place, but how do you resolve to encourage them to stay? >> e let me refer to the second question because the first one is very interesting, but it's theoretic kind of thing. i mean, what resilience is. i'll say a few words about that. but if i may, speak a little bit about the second question of this whole issue. i mean, it's a controversial

issue all over the place and also in israel. because there are people who think in israel, i'm not talking about hamas the way it tries to get some benefits. some people say if you're afraid, you show that you're afraid and it's not good for the country. i do not buy that personally. i think it's wrong attitude. people know exactly what they should do. as much as credit as you want to give them to coming back, you have also given the credit of deciding what's good for them and for their kids. i mean this notion that the country should tell people what to do in terms of danger is a kind of an approach. and i don't accept it, with all due respect. on the contrary, okay, the fact

that people were waiting to return to their damaged and threatened homes, so they were waiting for the moment to come back. this is for me heroism. i don't judge them for leaving. of course, there are others who say, wait a minute, et cetera, you don't leave. it's a sensitive issue because of what's happening. it's a big thing. think about the settlers in the west bank. although history and heritage of settlements. it's a big thing in israel. i'm sure that 50 years ago, most of the people in israel would say stick, do not run, cowards run away. but we are a different country now, we're a much more open

country. and people have to be responsible for themselves. and my point is if you are responsible to your own life, you take your own life and throughout your own judgment perspectives and responsibility you are more resilient. if you wait to tell you what to do, where to go, this whole consent of evacuation i prefer the notion of self-evacuation to the notion, to the planning of organized evacuation. we have plans for organized evacuation in israel. because even a title to it, everything in israel has a title. you probably would have an acronym for that. >> we have ak nisms for everything. >> exactly. and it was not enforced. you probably know about those plans. thousand take them, where to

host them, how to provide them with food, people know how to do it best. and again, it's a free country. free country gives e freedom to its people. this is all about resilience. so i think i wanted to be clear about my position on that. i hope i was. >> one thing i'd note, there is a special needs community, the elderly, the hospitals, those that are struggling getting food on the table every day. >> those who cannot be responsible for themselves. but again, there are families. >> you're absolutely right. people with special needs is a very, very important issue. very important. you're absolutely right, frank. and here, plans and government involvement is very important. but when you speak about the public at large, freedom, that's what it is. >> i agree with that fully. we had a question here and a

question there. then we're probably going to have to -- >> thank you so much for joining us this morning. really appreciate it. by name is joey. i'm a senior here at the school, vice president of the politically for israel. you mentioned in the future it will be worse. my question to is, what are the steps that israel is taking now or that will take to counter the greater growing threat? and how do you see the united states playing a larger role within that context? >> well, it's so wonderful that you are asking that. i would have thought -- we spoke before and i asked you to ask me this kind of question. so it's invited question as we say in israel. but it's not. i see you for the first time. >> you asked for a softball. >> by the way, i'm going to speak in the washington institute. there i'm not speaking about homeland security. i'm talking about politics. i'm prepared for your question.

it's a political question. and what i'm going -- i'm going to make a promo to what i'm going to say there. i think that israel is not gaining from the paradigm of rounds. it's not good for us. even though we can manage, we can manage and we have managed so far. we will manage also in the future. but it's not healthy for us. i'm speaking very personally here. that's my own -- don't present anybody but myself. it's time to exert ourselves from the silo of rounds. as i said before, the rounds are becoming more frequent and longer. not very good for us. it's sort of a war of attrition. okay? it's not -- we are not -- let's face it, we are not in the

business of fighting all the time. we are in the business of prospering, of enhancing the world economy and society. that's what we are for. it's like any other country. and the fact that we have to go back to fighting again and again, developing references to being very proud of -- forgive me. we have other business on our agenda. so, again, my thinking, it's time to look for new horizons. i'm quoting my prime minister. okay? if he stands up to what he says that there are new horizons, we should exhaust them and look for solutions to solve the palestinian problem. okay? i think it can be done. i have here friends in this room who are not so sure as i am. okay? many do not think that i am right. but i am hopeful. i this i it's possible and possible now and i think it's not good for us to keep on

fighting. we have to -- then, all those issues of more cyber -- it will be less important. it will not be about sew leobso. it will take a long time. it will not be as significant as it is now. >> i would argue if you are moving toward success, those issues become more significant because it threatens other sides as well. right? >> okay. >> you can't do it without demilitarizing, can you? the hamas or some -- >> all our arrangements with the arabs throughout the years have been based on demilitarization. the golan heights has been demilitarized. the syrians agreed to demilitarize, the palestinians agreed. the notion is not a new thing. palestinians have -- who would have believed that a plo -- the

vicious plo, not to be spoken to, would be -- agree to be demilitarized. they have agreed to be demilitarized. hamas will agree. they understand they have other issues. one of the other issues is the isis-type kind of guise that are ch ch chasing them from behind. also hamas -- not the entire hamas, it will take time, it depends on us. but if you ask me, i would look for the new horizon. okay? and make it happen. >> we have time for two very quick questions. rich and then up -- please identify yourself. if we can make them quick questions. >> rich cooper with the u.s. chamber of commerce. one of the big points you offered is it is more importance to have resilient leadership on

a local level than a national level. how are you developing that talent so that that can continue to be reinforced going forward? >> politicians understand exactly where the bottle is spread. the local politicians in israel have realized that if they do not attend to the needs of their own people, they will not be re-elected. it's a matter of practical common sense. we have seen it -- a major transformation in the last ten years from traditional leadership locally in the south of people who were whining constantly and looking for the central government to help them. okay? without getting it, by the way. okay? who were thrown away, replaced by others that say, we are responsible for ourselves. it's like the people i was talking about before. same thing. same principal. okay? so if you look now -- the

chairman of the local council they call it -- he is responsible for 14,000 people in direct proximity to the line of gaza. he handled -- i'm telling you. his troops, his constituency, not less effectively than israeli military chief of staff. more complicated, more sensitive. and he did it because he took responsibility upon himself. he came to the -- after it was all done, he came to the government on record and he said, i was not pleased with your conduct. he said that. in harsh words, by the way, harsher than i can use now. >> not on tv. >> but yeah, thanks for reminding me.

so that's -- that would be my answer for you. >> actually, it sounds like there's a thing called a federalist system. it sounds very u.s. >> this is the essence of democracy. >> absolutely. there is a different between the science of command and control and the art of persuasion. this is one of the dilemmas federal, state, local in terms of emergency preparedness and spot on. you have the last word. please identify yourself. >> israeli home front liaison. thank you for your presentation. that's part of the idea as an israeli to be stationed here. it's interesting. i learned new things. you mentioned the second lebanon war and can remember earlier conflict, desert storm in '91 when the mayor of tel aviv called people that were evacuated themselves from tel aviv that was under fire

deserters, for example. but we can see the change, we can see the change in resiliency. we can see the change in the local leadership that was mentioned here earlier. what we did in israel different? what was the main reason that made this change to happen? because there is no doubt that during this -- it was even longer than other conflicts and more rockets that was shot on israel. there was a difference regarding resilience. >> okay. tough question. >> good one. >> sorry about that. listen. let me say the following. number one, if you think that i'm pleased with our rate of resilienc resiliency, i didn't send the right message. i'm not. we were quite resilient. it was okay. but i mention i want to stress

to you, the density of impact was moderate measures. i don't know what would have been the rate of our resiliency if it were the rate of density of impact would be as the home front command puts in its scenario predictions. we have to work a lot on promotion of our resilience. it's a project. it has to be a national project. and, ladies and gentlemen, it is not. what we do in israel in terms of promoting resilience is not sufficient. it's not consistent enough. it's not over arching enough. it's not calibrated enough. and i can say more things which i don't want to say right now

because we are running out of time. it's true that we are doing fine in terms of -- we are making progress. but i say to my -- to those willing to listen to me in israel, progress is not a virtue. i'm not impressed with progress. it depends where you start from. if you start from what happened in 2006, progress doesn't impress me at all. okay? we have made progress. we have made some great progress in several things, very tangible, like the iron dome. we made reasonable progress in our resiliency of the population. see the conduct of the population. we have made interesting progress in terms of the discourse between your guys at the home front and the population in general in major ways. but there's still -- let me give you one example. this will be the end. there is no clarity i