because we are running out of time. it's true that we are doing fine in terms of -- we are making progress. but i say to my -- to those willing to listen to me in israel, progress is not a virtue. i'm not impressed with progress. it depends where you start from. if you start from what happened in 2006, progress doesn't impress me at all. okay? we have made progress. we have made some great progress in several things, very tangible, like the iron dome. we made reasonable progress in our resiliency of the population. see the conduct of the population. we have made interesting progress in terms of the discourse between your guys at the home front and the population in general in major ways. but there's still -- let me give you one example. this will be the end. there is no clarity in israel as

to this question, who is responsible for what i call the civilian front. we have to realize in israel, my term of what we call home front is the civilian front. because in israel, we have two fronts. we have the military front, which is nicely orchestrated. we have clarity of hierarchy. everything is clear. how the orders go. but when we come to the issues of the civilian front, which is much more complex, much more complex, nobody knows what -- who is responsible for what? we don't have this whole issue of accountability, authority and responsibility. israel is -- excuse me for using french, primitive. it's primitive. and we cannot come -- and bring ourselves to structure it in accordance with my logics,

politics is a major obstacle, major obstacle in this respect. i don't want to end with grim prospect. but we have several major issues that still have to be dealt with. you know, very basic ones, not just tactical ones. very basic ones. number one, who is responsible for the population in terms of crisis in emergency? who decides whether to open the schools september 1st or not? those guys in the military? i don't think so. the mayor? i'm not sure. the ministry of education, the parents? okay. it is not structured. nobody knows. you know, two days, 48 hours before september 1, before the

first class of this year was open, it was not clear whether we were going to have an opening of the year. it's a major thing. it's not just about the kids. it's a major macro question. what's happening here? we have others. i spoke before -- we spoke about this thing of the evacuation. god forbid that we need the government to take care of that. okay? until they decide and how they decide and how they manage themselves, people know how to evacuate themselves better. again, it's not structured. so it's just one issue. i have more. but i don't have time. so i'm not going to do that. you have to understand, it's an ongoing business. we have not finished the journey. it's a long one. >> i might argue, resilience is not an end state. >> exactly. >> it's a continual journey we

are continually learning from. on that point, you have proven yet again to be the soldier, scholar, diplomat. i want to underscore the future horizons is in everyone's best interests. i really do hope you are right. i often have been told the pessimism is an optimism with experience. i'm an optimism. i hope that -- >> makes two of us. >> thank you. thank you, thank you. >> thanks for coming. [ applause ] campaign 2014 debate coverage continues thursday night at 9:00.

next a look at the future of the european union and the european economy. the energy market and defense policy. experts from the european parliament presented a report on the ramifications of dissolving the eu. the wilson center hosted the event. >> good afternoon. i'm christian ostermann. it's a great pleasure to welcome all of you on this beautiful late august day here in washington. i'm thrilled to see a good number -- a good turnout on such a beautiful day here, a good turnout for the eu and europe. we're delighted to host this event on mapping the cost of non-europe 2014 to 2019 with our

colleagues and friends here at the european parliament liaison office with the u.s. congress and delighted to welcome all of you. for those of you who are -- most of you are probably familiar with the wilson center. for those of you who aren't, especially those of you watching on c-span, let me just remind you that the wilson center chartered by the u.s. congress as the official memorial to president woodrow wilson is the nation's key non-partisan policy forum for tackling global issues through independent research and open dialogue to inform actionable ideas for congress to administer and to broader policy community. the center's global europe program addresses vital issues affecting europe relations, europe's relations with the rest

of the world through our scholars and residents, seminars, international conferences and publications. these program activities covered european energy security, europe's role in setting global standards relating to governance and human rights. i'm delighted to welcome today's panelists to this presentation. claus welle and anthony teasdale. let me introduce both of them. they are behind this important new study that we will talk about today on mapping the cost of non-europe. really, a study showing immense research on the benefits of integration of european integration, trying to put this in very real, specific practical terms.

and with that setting from the european parliament's side, trying to set a policy agenda for europe. let me just say a brief word about our two speakers. then i will turn it over to them to talk about the report. klaus welle has been the secretary-general of the european parliament since 2009. prior to that, he has held a number of positions within the european parliament including the head of the cabinet of the president of the european parliament, director general for international palsies and the secretary-general of the european people's party and the european union of christian democrats. he was also head of the european and foreign policy department of the christian democratic union, union central office in germany. he is a native of germany. and received i agree in

economics from the university in germany as well as grants from the germ -- the foundation of the german people and a foundation which gave me a grant when i was studying in germany. anthony teasdale is the in-house research center and think tank of the european parliament. he was educated at oxford university and has worked as political adviser and civil servant in london and brussels. he has held positions in the foreign and commonwealth office and treasury as well as the general secretary at both the counsel of ministers and the european parliament. he worked for presidents of the parliament. he speaks and has published

widely on european political and institutional issues and is co-author of the penguin companion to the european union published in its 4th edition in september 2012. i'd like to thank jean-luc from the liaison office for working with us on this event here. it has been great. this is not the first event we're doing together. it has been a wonderful partnership that we have with your office. let me also add that if you are using social media, you can use the hashtag on the walls. there it is. yes. now, having said that, i would actually like to ask you to quiet and switch off your

blackberries and iphones. that goes for our speakers as well. it interferes with the microphones here. last but not least, i would like to thank my colleagues emily and christina who really have helped bring this program about and put it into place. with that, i will turn it over to you. klaus and anthony will follow up. we will open it up to you for questions and, you know, any question will be welcome. you have for our two distinguished speakers. >> yes. thank you very much. thank you also for your interest for something which might at first glance appear to be a rather technical issue, mapping

the cost of non-europe. but i can assure you that it's absolutely not. i think you have all received the study. the study can be consumed in different ways. for those which have little time, we are having here page 8. and you have the basic information in one graph on one page. those who are ready to invest a little bit more time can read, of course, the whole study. and it's 60 pages. those of you who after this absolutely are enthusiastic will find references in here which will lead you to 600 pages. those who want to become cost of non-europe nerds have the chance to study about 6,000 pages. so just to say that this is kind

of a kind of tip of the iceberg of work which was conducted over the last 2 1/2 years trying to find out what our potential benefits of european integration. of course, in the european union, maybe in the past years, we have been more discussing about what are the burdens and the costs of european integration. and very often the debate was rather about is it costly? is it very costly or is it terribly costly? so you can see that this is a contribution to something else. given that i start slowly to become a veteran in this business, i, of course, remember the report from the '80s which was the basis for the internal market. and what we tried to revive is the method of that report. because the basic argument at the time was that there might be

benefit in replacing nowadays we would say 28 sets of national relation by one set of regulation. so the question is, what was true at the time, can it be updated? can it be still informative for what we are doing today? this is, in effect, the attempt to update the report to our necessities today. it's also something which we are considering as impact assessment. those who are interested in better regulation, they might be familiar with the concept of impact assessment. but it has a very important flaw. because normally, you are checking the impact of proposed legislation or regulation. but what you should do as well is checking the impact of not

proposing regulation, of not proposing legislation. in fact, as a former economist, what we are interested in is the opportunity cost of different institutional arrangements. if you want to do it in a balanced way, then we have to have a look at both sides, the cost of regulation but also the cost of non-regulating a certain area. and that non-regulation can be equally expensive, i think we have at the latest learned with the financial crisis where large parts of financial markets were under regulated and the bill of under regulation was quite heavy. so we are insisting that in order to have a balanced process, you need both. like in a good car, you, of course, want to have a brake on the process. because if you don't have a brake, it could be quite dangerous to enter that car.

but no car is working if it doesn't have a gas pedal as well. so every good car has a brake and every good car has a gas pedal. so normal traditional impact assessment has to be complimented by research on the cost of non-europe, the cost of non-regulation and the cost of non-legislation. so what could -- what are, from my point of view, the potential benefits of this exercise? to start with, i think this has the potential to build a renewed pragmatic consensus behind european integration. why is this? because if it is true that there are hundreds of billions of euros out there in potential gains through integration, then it would be very strange to not

use that potential. so whether you come from a more ideological view on european integration, if it can be proven that their enormous benefits out there in integrating certain sectors, then it's much more easy to establish that consensus behind integration in that area. the second argument is something which is maybe even more topi l topical. i think we are currently all of us in the united states but probably more so in europe, we are looking for potentials of growth. but we also are aware that the possibilities to create growth through state spending are increasingly limited, because we have all reached that level which are on the fringes of still being sustainable. so if you cannot create growth

through state spending, you have to use all the other possibilities. so if there are possibilities out there to create growth basically through reform and integration, that should be something where people should be very interested to find about. so our current estimates -- anthony's personal guarantee that these estimates are always prudent, because he doesn't like to exaggerate. our current estimates are that in the area which we have studied all together, there is a potential of growth of all together about 1,000 billion euros a year. that's not an exact figure. it's only 700 billion euro a year. let's take 700 billion and if it's only 400 billion or 200

billion, that's something which can't be neglected. so it is a kind of way to reinvigorate growth through european integration for growth without debt. there's a third argument i would like to make. we are now having the subsidy applicable in the european union for quite some time. the problem with that is that it's very difficult to say when it is in fact being violated. >> explain it. >> it means that you should only deal with issues as a higher level of governance when this cannot be done at a lou elower . you should deal with issues on the local level and if you can't do it there with the best affect, you go to the region and national level and then to the

european level. in fact, we would only like to deal with issues on the european level if that's the appropriate level and it can only achieve the full potential on the european level. how do you decide this? so this approach of cost of non-europe is one possibility to quantify the subsidy principal. because, in fact, here the argument is being made that what currently is being dealt with in 28 national systems would produce importance additional benefit if we wouldn't deal with it in 28 different jurisdictions but together in the european union. so you could argue that if that argument can be successfully made that there is potential benefit in having one set of rules on european level rather than 28, then the principal is

being met. the other way around is, of course, also correct. if that cannot be proven, then the question is, are we still respecting that principal which together with the proportionality principal is one of the importance principals that should guide legislation in the european union level. the fourth reason why i believe such an approach can be very beneficial is that it provides, again, an understandable narrative about why are we integrating in the european union. we had these narratives in the past. we had the internal market. we had the enlargement. we had these kind of stories. we also had a story in last five years. the story was we would like to survive. so we have been able to survive,

which is any how the precondition for everything else. if you don't survive, this is the end of the story. so we have been able to survive. but what is now the positive thing people would like to do? and this is providing a number of positive stories which we could do like digital europe, like energy union, like the internal market, like corporation security and defense and many others. anthony will go into detail on the content of those. for the ordinary citizen for whom it must be sometimes very, very difficult to understand what it's all about, you know, with so many different rules projects being suggested, not only tens but hundreds in the course of a legislature, to understand there are two, three, five major initiatives the european union would like to

achieve is very much increasing the readability and understandability. all of this is based on parliamentary reports. a member has presented a report to the committee. it has been voted in. so all of this has been legitimatized by members. very often in the form of so-called own initiative reports. but, of course, where he not happy just in passing a report. we would like this to become legislation. so one way of doing this is to put a study behind and say, european commission, if you would go there, they are very important benefits. so that's what we are doing with these individual reports. we are also enabling parliament to be an equal partner in

setting the agenda of the european union. because it's not so easy for a parliament to develop a view what should be done in the years to come. so if you take all these different initiatives together, suddenly you see a whole agenda emerging for the next five years. and that's an agaenda which has been elaborated by parliament itself. that is a precondition to enter into dialogue with the member states and with the european commission. so we have to know first what do we want. and we have to define what are the benefits in order to be convincing, in order to be an equal partner with the member states and the european commission in discussing what should be the agenda for the next five years. and that's something, which, of course, right now is very topical. so this study in the first version was published in march. in an updated version in july.

so you might ask yourself, it's not around for some time. is it working? something that has been quite surprising is that the different candidates of european political parties for the post of commission president have been making very active use of this. so a lot of the figures which are presented here have been used by the different candidate s in the debate about the future of the european union during the election campaign. it's also true that preside president-desi president-designate is proposing a lot of activity which is quite, let's say, similar to what european parliament has elaborated.

energy union, building up the currency union system and also defense. so we can see that between the different institutions, this is also providing the possibility to come to some kind of common idea what should be the most important project over the next five years. between the commission, the parliament and equally the council and the member states. that's still one of the unfulfilled promises, could you say, in the treaty. because in article 17 of the lisbon treaty, you have a sentence which reads the european commission initiates the annual programming of the union. the commission should initiate what should be done in the year to come and in the years to come. but the sentence continues with

the view to reach interinstitutional agreement. so that means we have a treaty obligation between the parliament, the counsel and the european commission to try to come to some common understanding about the legislative agenda. but if we want to do this, in fact, we need to have a legitimate starting position. and that's something where this product could be very helpful. there is a window of opportunity now in the next months to come, because in the next months, the commission will have to define what it wants to do, what should be the major projects in the years to come. also in concert, the interest for joint programming is increasing. for the very simple reason that very often at the beginning of the legislature there is very

little legislative work. but if we have a consensus about what should be done, that we could have a much more meaningful agenda. so it will remain to be seen over the next months whether such a process where the different institutions develop clear views of what should be the key pieces of legislation, whether this will lead to kind of common agenda in the legislative field for the next years to come. if we would make that, i think it would very much increase the possibility for citizens to understand what the european union is about and why is it beneficial for their own personal life. thank you very much. >> thank you very much for this i think extremely use fful contt for the study and its potential impact. now to put some meat on the

bones of this outline, anthony. >> thank you very much. thank you to the wilson center for hosting this event and for giving us the opportunity to express these thoughts to a washington audience. we very much appreciate that. klaus set the scene overall in terms of the backdrop. at one point i would like to add to the picture that he has painted, which is not obvious to a u.s. audience, is that the power to propose legislationyst system. there is a struggle over who controls this. increasingly, the commission has been sharing this right of initiative with other institutions, notably with the heads of government the regular summit meetings of eu political

leaders have been instructing or inviting the european commission over time to come forward with initiatives of very sorts. that can have a positive affect. in terms of the treaty, the treaty offers the opportunity to the european parliament to propose to the commission that it come forward with legislation in certain fields. article 225 states that it can request the commission to submit any appropriate proposal matters on which it considers it a piece of union act, is require d to implement the treaty. he mentioned the new provision for programming, legislatively between the different institutions in which clearly the commission, council, the parliament should and would work together. so the european parliament has over time been becoming more active in suggesting to the european commission ideas for future legislation. and it's important to take that as a starting point for how and

why this particular project was born. because it was not born one day when somebody said, why don't we analyze 25 different policy areas and suggest how additional eu gdp could be generated or where there could be a rationalization of public spending to make more sufficient allocation. that's been the effect, if you like, of this work. it started in a lot of individual committees. we have 22 committees and subcommittees in the european parliament. they were individually doing work where they felt that there was european action that was needed. sometimes this was of a general kind. sometimes it was very specific particular pieces of legislation which they believed should be brought forward. cumulatively, this work has built up into the kind of product which you see here covering these different areas. we decided that it was important

that at theet thehe administratl to do this. it was designed to strengthen and support the committees in their ability to do this kind of work. so routinely now, when a committee in the european parliament decides to do what's called a legislative initiative report, it has something which is an analysis of the potential benefit and cost of such initiative. a cost benefit analysis which enables the committee to understand the implications of the work that it will be doing. there were broader areas, like security and defense policy or development policy where there is a mismatch, if you like, between how resources are allocated between the layers in the system and the effectiveness of getting action. let me give you a concrete example of this. in the european union, we have in effect three different layers

of third world development policy. we have a european union level which is based on funding from the european union budget and is administered by the european commission. we have arrangements for the pooling of national monies in the form of the european development fund which come from 28 different streams and where the european commission is a kind of service provider to coordinate it. and then you have 28 or not in every single case, national development policies. now, calculations vary as to how much misallocation of resources follows from this. we have done our own analysis of this, which suggests that simply a better programming of these three different layers, not necessarily any kind of further pooling of sovereignty, but a better coordination would result in savings of about 800 million euros per year. there are some other calculations in the market that

suggest that if there were to be a pooling of those policies, that we could be talking about towards 10 billion euros. now, this kind of work brought together from the different committees sometimes on specific legislative proposals, sometimes on general areas where there could be an improved allocation of resources, was the origin of mapping the cost of non-europe to bring the figures into one coherent hole. it reflects the debate going on in the think tank and intellectual community in different eu member states about the benefits of eu spending and the potential efficiency gains from a better allegation of resources. a foundation has done a lot of work in there. they published a new paper called 20 years in the single market, where they attempted to calculate the benefit to individual eu member states of

the single market between 1992 and 2012. they did a piece of work about a year ago where they took three policies, the common agricultural policy and tried to analyze what the cost would be if there was a renationalization or if the c.a.p. had never existed. it was 23 billion euros a year. what the potential benefits would be of having a single diplomatic service in the eu. they calculated savings of between 420 and 1.3 billion euros a year. and what the advantages would be in cost terms of having common european land forces which would enable a reduction from 900,000 to 600,000 in the number of troops. they thought it would be between 3 and 9 billion euros. it's also think tanks. three academics wrote a painer

in april of this year. it was featured in an article in april this year. and it calculated that the united kingdom and denmark this benefitted by as much as 20% of gdp from their membership since 1973, spain by 10%. they did it for each of the enlargement countries over the period since 1973. what the european parliament has been doing is not kind of in a vacuum. it's on a rising curve of analysis about the economic benefits of membership of the european union and the economic potential in certain areas with appropriate policies of further deepening european integration. if you take the 25 areas about half of them are areas where the european parliament has been in the driving seat of doing the analysis. we have done out of the 25, we

have done our own research or outsources research in ten of the 25 areas. we are doing research in 17 of the 25 areas in the list on page 5. as you will see from the chart which is on page 8, there are two areas where there are potentially very significant economic gains. single market and the completion of the classical single market. the current figures which we are using which are conservative based on analysis that not only we have commissioned but which is available in the literature is a 340 billion and 300 billion respectively. those are very, very large amounts of money. together around 5% of eu gdp. we have been very cautious in the way we have approached this. because if you go back to the report which klaus alluded to in

the 1980s, if you go back to what preceded it, the so-called ball report which was another commissioned initiative back as far as 1983, the calculation at that time in '88 was that the potential gdp gain from completing the single european market would be somewhere between 4.5 and 6.5% of gdp. the analysis among academics and others who have looked into this suggests that by the time the financial crisis hit in 2006, 2007, the single market added 2.15% to eu gdp. recently another analysis suthsed that the potential gain at the higher end was 2.3% in germany and lower end had been minus 1.3% in greece.

we have tried in our analysis always to err on the size of caution in terms of the numbers. what has been striking is that when you build these up, the figures are so high. 7.5% of gdp is a very large number. but 1% of gdp in the eu, which would be 130 billion euros, would be equivalent to half of gdb of denmark or 1.5 times of the size of the gdp of berlin. even the figures by consensus been generated in terms of intellectual analysis of this suggest considerable impact on the european economy. this is an ongoing project. we're going to continue this for the foreseeable future. the literature is getting deeper all the time. our own reason and analysis is getting more sophisticated on it. between the last -- what was the

first addition in march and the second edition which came out in july, we were able to adjust our calculation from 836 billion to 994 billion. that was mainly as a result of further work that had been done on the two aspects of the single market. the specific digital single market and the more again classic single market of free movement goods and services and capital. we have done quite a bit of work. in terms of the financial crisis, what the opportunity cost is like of averting a future financial crisis by existing or future measures that have been taken. we have had a very conservative analysis on this. it builds up, i would say, to over 100 billion in any year. we have done it under different

headings. number three, banking union. number four, completing reform with the financial services sector. five, a common minimum unemployment scheme for the area. six, improved coordination of fiscal policy. seven, a common deposit guarantee scheme. those are ambitious projects that one supports by the majority view by all the others in the european parliament. the potential gain could be considerable. in number nine, we have taken the view expressed in the impact assessment study done for the european commission of 60 billion and then we have a number of other more minor ones but where we continue to do research. the one with the greatest potential is integrated energy markets where the gain could be considerable. that gives you the flavor of the work that has been done. it will be deepened and widened. it's only part of a more general

support which is being given to our committees because each individual committee is not necessarily interested in the global number. they're interested in how it affects their particular area. some of these issues can be relatively minor in terms of the gdp gain but can be very, very important to people concerned. let's take number 13, for example, combating violence against women. we put a figure in terms of potential gdp gain of 7 billion. for the people concerned, the benefit is incalculable. like wise, private international law, the ability of people who might be involved in a cross border divorce to get some kind of effective remedy to their problem is calculated at only 100 million. again, for the people concerned it can be a liefe changing even. not all of what the eu does can

be calculated financially. it is an important part of making the case for why european solutions can bring benefits to people that not only do they often involve the extension of rights but they can also result in the economy in europe becoming more efficient. thank you. >> thank you very much, anthony. we're now -- we will open it up for comments and questions. if you could please in wilson center tradition state your name and affiliation and wait for the microphone. i will call on you. who is first? go to the lady up front here. right there. >> thank you. reporter with reonovo.

this is about european relations with russia currently and the impact that the product bans, the sanctions have had on the european union -- it's tough to say the european union economy because it's all of the different states. so i would like to get your analysis of how that relationship with russia is playing out, how it might play out on the economic field. >> thank you. >> okay. we will work our way towards the back of the room. we will go with a couple -- in the center and then -- >> very enlightening, gentlemen. thank you. i'm vice president of the u.s.

and geo called global peace service usa. i don't need to tell you that the united states, there's a backlash against what is seen as overreaching government regulation. i'm wondering if you could talk a bit about public opinion within the eu to a world where there might be greater coordination and consolidation and how you think your report might be seen by the various publics in the member states. >> pass it. >> i work at the national democratic institute where we work in candidate countries and potential candidate countries. my question is the resources of the parliament on analysis like this is probably limited to the existing member states. has there been an effort undertaken to calculate the benefits of non-europe to potential countries where questions and referendums could

be forthcoming and they might face skeptical publics that could benefit from this type of analysis? >> thank you. you want to start? >> maybe i start with the question on the public opinions -- public opinion on regulation and on legislation. my view is that, in fact, we should be unideological about regulation or legislation. because if you hold a general view that less is better or always more is better, you are probably in the field of ideology. therefore, we try to introduce a mechanism to judge on the individual case and to see whether there is benefit in regulation or legislation or not. so if you hold a general view

that always less regulation is better, you might, in fact, not use important benefits which are out there. but equally, if you believe that always more regulation is better, you might also commit important errors. this is an attempt to make this debate less ideological and have a look case by case whether a proposed set of legislation or regulation is bringing precise benefits. but it is not very useful to hold a view that always legislation or regulation is a burden on the country if you can replace 28 sets of regulation or legislation by one, it might be something very positive. or not. to be seen on the individual case. on the question of did we calculate the effect of the sanctions specifically, unless

anthony corrects me, i'm not aware of that. but nevertheless, you find, for example, a very interesting product not produced by this unit which calculates exactly the effects of no gas from russia. so if the gas delivery would stop and it had to be replaced by other sources, what are exactly the additional costs for the member states or for the european union citizens and what are the losses also for russia? and are these sources available or not? so such a document is available. it's on our website. that's something which can be very interesting and very helpful in such a situation. i was surprised myself that we had produced this. but you will see, for example, the first 20 units could come from norway at relatively little

additional cost. there's additional potential in the netherlands relatively small cost, but with a lot of environmental concerns. then you go to -- these things have been thought through and calculated through, not always by our own services, sometimes by others. independently what is your position on the issue, it laws members to make a more informed choice about their own position on policy. >> specifically in response to the question on sanctions, we have not in the european parliament research service done any analysis yet of the financial implications. i mean, we work in this area in response to requests from committees of the european parliament. the committees have not been meeting for the last three or

four months because we have been having european elections and the european parliament is only just reconvened. if we were requested to do such work, we would do it. in terms of terms of public opii think that the atmosphere in the european union is very mixed at the moment. and there's a very likely debate about the benefits and the costs of integration which are not only financial or economic. they often deal with identity questions, which go much deeper. and we saw quite a lot of that reflected in the tone, if you like, in the european inflections. what we're trying to do with the work that we've been commissioned to undertake is to encourage evidence-based policymaking. it's to find a discussion of the issues to get away from broad brush assertions. to try to drill down into the likely detail. and that's, of course, in some ways, against the grain of the

way the public conversation has been increasingly conducted on both sides of the atlantic. but we consider that an important public service that should be available to our members and our committees. and it's the philosophy that lies behind the creation of the research models very much on the congressional research service. but our plans are essentially members of the european parliament and the committees that they serve on. we do make all of our publications publicly available. and that is different from the crs approach. but we are responsive to our members concerns, and they are the ones who refract and reflect the views of the public. >> there was the question about the new members. would you like to respond to that? >> i can't give you a detailed analysis of that. we will certainly be looking into that. the debate that occurs in each

of the applicant countries about membership does have an economic dimension. and other things being equal, a new member state might expect to share proportionately, depending, obviously, in part on its economic profile from the existing advantages of e.u. membership. that debate is occurring in scotland, for scotland to lead. not guil not only the united kingdom, but a lot of different figures have been bantered around. we tend to be careful about g getting involved in debates, which are national, political debates of that kind as you can imagine. >> thank you. i just want to follow up on the sanctions. did i understand you correctly that parliament has really dealt

with this issue? it's a big debate. >> yes, i think what anthony said was the old parliament, of course, stopped to meet at the beginning of april and then we had elections 234 may. it means the normal work of parliament hasn't really started. it will start now in september for the next five years. therefore, he hasn't received any requests from committees because basically, it has now been reconstituted. but, of course, a lot of the general reflection work in the services have continued. and, therefore, you'll find some interesting pieces, like the piece i've cited on the potential effects of guest delivery or non-guest delivery

from russia. they are starting to work now. >> so you're reacting to committee members rather than proactive proactively looking at issues that might come down the pipeline? >> yeah, there are two differentidifferent i issues. there are two studies commissioned by individual secretaries. they say, look, we would like to have some additional information. so they are the committees asking for it. we are doing this at the request of specific committee secretaries.

and that's also very important for the legitimacy issue. the parliament is a parliament and the parliament consists of members. so the members should express where they would like to deepen the interest as a potential pre-condition for legislative initiative. >> great. thank you. we'll take a few more questions. >> hi, thanks. so my first question would be about regional security. so europe is basically a broad area and security varies from country to country. so what do you think can be realistically done on the european level. my second question be you mentioned further integration. so what would be done?

>> i'm sorry. can you just repeat the last part of the question? >> yes, it's about the further integration. so what's your vision and what can actually be done? >> good question. >> my name is analick. i'm an independent business consul tant. many european countries, the last several years, many have successes in total failures. how did you help them recover? a few more specific things. thank you. >> thank you. maybe you'll take one more question. over on the right side? ken hughes? in the back? >> thank you. >> kent hughes of the wilson center. thank you for the report and the very interesting presentation. two quick questions, i noticed

in the common security and defense policy, you have some significant efficiency gains, but there wasn't any mention of nato or the potential for transalantic commonality which might add to those efficiency gains. and, second, as effective as the efficiency games are, you wonder what one wonders in the improved market and the added competition, if this won't dry innovation which, overtime, might even swamp these inefficiency games. >> okay. on nato, the last question, in fact, in the process of preparing the component of this report, special custom on europe report. we went to nato and had a

specific discussion about that. their approach is essentially the same as what the eu calls pooling and sharing. there's a growing convergence between the two on these issues. this is a very short synopsis here. there is a much longer report of about 60 pages that goes into much greater depth. the author of that report is here in the audience. that is something that can be followed up afterwards. there is a rapid review between nato and non-nato members that there has to be some kind of deeper moves towards pooling and sharing. indeed, the speed with which defense budgets are declining, have declined in the european

union, is overtaking, if you like, the potential gains from such pooling and sharing. that goes a little bit to the question that was asked by the gentleman here. if we're going to be in an environment in which our security is more in jeopardy, perhaps we enjoyed it more in recent decades. perhaps we get more bang for the buck is critically important. perhaps they're very much on the same page hereby. the only question is how quickly they can move. in both areas, both in nato and in the european union, you have a course of union imty that makes it difficult to overcome some of these barriers. that raises a more difficult

question in the case where you have majority voting. the progress that's been made in the market over the last 20 years or so has been critically dependent on the fact that it was possible to overcome vetoes in the late '80s and '90s. otherwise, there would almost certainly be regression into the battle blaze of the '70s and single act decision-making. so those are my comments on defense. this raises the question that was posed concern iing terroris is very interesting.

it's one of the founding principles of the european union. and i want's one that the european commission and the european parliament have attached a lot of importance to. bud the balance between free movement on the one hand and security on the other is partly resolved by having an increasingly exterm view. that balance, if you like, is at the core of the decision-making in that field. and, again, the fact that more and more decision-making moved to qualify majority voting in respect of the external frontier has made it easier for the europeanonon to come up with an increasing response in that field.

if we were able to move coher t coherently in this time, the gdp gains would help render the economy more efficient and, hopefully, less prone to the financial crises that we've had in the past. and if some of the particular policies that were taken, which are flanking policies when the military union was adopted, would it specifically help resolve the debt crisis. this is a much more targeted and specific set. >> okay. maybe i could just compliment on security and defense. i think the strengths of the

european union is developing a market. so it is not at all in competition or to the detriment of anybody else. so, surprisingly, these are issues discussed in the industry, rather than in the subcommittee of security and defense. and the question is should we still develop five helicopters in paradigm? could this be done together? and i think increasingly, member states are so much under pressure financially that these kind of inefficiencies have to be tackled if -- let's say if positive outcome should be expected. so there's really no contradiction between the different elements. all the national budgets are so

tight, we cannot take anymore. nobody can take that responsibility anymore. how europe could have countries with special economic difficulties? it's not an exact science, but you would have probably three ways to recreate growth. the one is fiscal stimulus. overall, many countries in the european union have reached their debt limits. so that's very difficult. and then you have two possibilities still available. one i would say is this, which is create additional efficiencies and gross through your population.

if that is true, if there is enormous potential available, at least something which could make that burden more acceptable or could ease the process otherwise to be conducted on the national level. there was also the question of future integration. let's say these are suggestions for european integration. which are benefit driven. the question is is there benefit? is there important benefit? and if there is important benefit? and if that can be proven, then probably that's an area where we should work more close ly

together which, from my point of view, is very important. major steps are only happening in financial services. everyone was with their back to the wall before they agreed to take extra steps. basically looking to the others. so we are not in a face of ideology-driven integration. but it's driven by necessity or by precise benefits. >> thank you. we'll call on a couple of more folks. i wanted to ask you from the next round of answers to break down this staggering number of digital single market benefits of 340 billion euros that you've really dwarfed many of the other

components and looked at here. so i wonder if on that, you could compare your findings in europe as well as here. irene, i think you had another question? >> i'm looking forward to reading your detail. >> introduce yourself, please? >> irene -- >> the 6,000 pages? will you read the 6,000 pages? >> no, the shorter version. >> okay.

we have a need to examine these initiatives from let's say a more -- not democratic, but scientif scientific, maybe, viewpoint. even if we agree technology should not play a role, the european union elections happen every so often. i wanted to ask you if you could comment from your stand point, from what kind of a message, do you think, the economists are 9/1. i apologize. what kind of message did the may election send to the parliament

members who had this very wonderful idea here. but how do you see the peoples of europe? i mean, they voted and they try to send a message. albeit the representatives have very limited powers, but what is your sense? >> so irena is really asking you to be ideological about your project here. we'll go for a couple more questions, yeah?

>>. >> very interesting study. my question is for each block of the map on page 8, is there a timeline we're looking at for the specific area of integration to be completed? >> maybe the lady in front of you right there? >> thank you very much for sort of a retrospective. this is sort of picking up something from 25 years ago. my two questions would be 25 years ago, the eu was smaller. how are you going to put this on the table given there are very

vfr different laws in europe with unemployment insurance, welfare states, they really do vary historically. my second comment relates to the one behind. this is all about efficiency gains, which goes back to the point of innovation. but, interestingly, there's nothing here about the losers. 25 years ago, there were structural funds. money spent. >> thanks a lot. europeanists are sitting in the room here. so. >> we'll take those questions. >> okay, i'll try my very best. on the first one, in the outcome of the elections and how do we interpret this, first, i think this was a very clear request for delivery and outcome rather

than process. sometimes we are very good on process and we are not so good on outcomes. this tries not to focus on process. of course, it depends on how it's going to be done. a specific piece of legislation can be done very differently and also in the process of negotiation, a lot of these benefits can get lost. but it tries to put a focus on outcomes, rather than process. for me, an important message of the elections says, and i think that's relevant for this, of course the benefits of integration are sometimes very unevenly distributed in society. whereas some might profit more, others might profit less and others may be of the perception.

i think part of this might be expressed in the new composition of parliament and the strengthening of the more extreme sides of policy. so i think your question of distribution are very relevant. some parts are very relevant with those who are more educated, more mobile and more international. to feel that the competition, globally, is good for them. so i think your question is correct, which is also why we need to say, as outlines here, modernizing the agenda. but there's also a protection for those which are less able to compete. and, for me, this is one part of

the messages of the european elections which could be relevant in policy areas. from immigration to other questions. the average european, of course, does not exist. it's exactly my answer, you see. the average european does not exist. we have very different europeans with very different capacities to compete in such a more open system. how to cope with different traditions. in parliament, we are specialized in coping. we work in 24 languages, we have 28 nationalities. i think we have 160 narnl parties which are working

together in agt different groups. so we can bring these different traditions together. it's going to be more a difficulty in the concert. but i don't have the impression, let's say, that new members are specially adding these difficulties. sometimes the impression is that the word is very easy and sometimes it's 28. especially in the more recent member states, the idea is much more present. i read a figure that 20 years ago, basically, living standards in ukraine and in poland, on average, per person, were the same.

nowadays, average income, according to the figure i read, is five times the ukraine citizen. so obviously, it's a company with very positive experience. they are demonstrating for an association agreement. i mean, have we ever heard of something like this? that's what's been happening in ukraine. the practical defects were extreme

extremely visible. maybe i'll leave the more technical issues on the specific studies. >> thank you very much. in respect to the tea tip, in effect, the analysis is provided on the document itself. if you look at page 32, you will see a listing there of many of the various analyses that have been done about the potential economic games that might flow from a conclusion with various think tanks, consul tan sills and other bodies that have contributed to this. we decided to take the baseline here which is the most comprehensive research that was done at the request of the european commission.

it comes with a figure of $68.2 billion. but, of course, it covers a variety of different opponents, which of which are quite problem le mat kal in different ways. and this is the projection of what a successful outcome would be in a kind of consensus figure as we can see it in the literature. for them, we've been very cautious on this. the figure we would get would come up at 666 billion and we have adjusted that figure down to 3$340 billion.

it brings one to the question of what's the time scale here. he has designed it in either five or ten years. but the actual scale isn't as long as it takes. it might take 20 years to realize it and in other, it might take only two or three. it depends on the difficulty of implementing. as that analysis deepens, we will be able to spell that out over time. as we saw in comparison predicting in the 19d 80s, the benefit from what's now the existing market of 4.5 and 6.5 pnt and the consensus viewed that it was only around 2%, that's one of the reasons why we have tended to multiply down.

but that's a judgment matter. here, i rather agree with what klausse said in respected to the ease or difficulty of legislation. partly, it's also to do with the fact that there is culture in the counscil and people not wanting to seem defeated. there is a reluctant on the part of smaller member states. and one of the results of that is although there's been an

increase in the number of rejections sometimes in the contested votes. and on those contested votes, there's a tendency of some member states to withdraw their projections and commit, 23 possible, adopted by consensus. if you look at the co-decision process, the average time it's taken to adopt the new law is declining rather than extending. partly because more is freely negotiates and partly because i

think the two partners in the process have just got better at the negotiated process. the difficulty, therefore, is not so much in terms of getting laws passed. moegs put forth is adopted with a wide degree of consensus between the major plilt kal groups, over two-thirds. and the time is declining. the problem has to do with implementation and enforcement. that's one of the reasons why we've also wanted to strengthen our administrative support on implementation issues so we can assist in committees and scrutinizing the executive to which the legislation is being effectively applied or applied

at all. and draw attention to weaknesses. however, the reality is the european union is a union of law. and so it's easy from a distance to assume that there will be irreconcilable differences. the reality is most european union law gets adopted and most european union law is effectively applied and part of it is to ensure, for whatever reason, proper attention is drawn to that. >> good, let's take a final round of questions. we're quickly running out of time.

>> i am from jernlny and currently a fellow at johns hopkins. i had the privilege to be in westminister in january and to participate in one of those conferences run by the torreys. now, you briefly mentioned that this was used by members running from parliament. was there a specific request for a larger order? or did you make a special effort with your british colleagues? >> thank you. yeah. >> peter shutley, i'm retired from brookings. a quick, two-part question.

i think it's the only liaison office you have in the world. my first part of the question is what has been the biggest success. second part of the question, what's currently the biggest challenge. >> ork. thank you. last friday, "the long term cohesion of the euro area depends on each country, each country. in the union achieving a sustainablely high level of employment. do you know how each country in

the union can achieve a sustainablely high level of unemployment? if not, don't we have to contemplate the possible break up of the euro zone? >> all right, i think there was one more question right there in the center that we'll take. >> i have two questions, one, the more integrated road for europe costs more, and i'm not talking just about monetary costs. and on the competitive ease, given that the u.s. and china are at the forefront of the digital service. >> good. great questions. let me conclude all of that with a question.

>> why is this report of interest to the european election campaign? >> we didn't receive, as far as i'm aware, to do any particular analysis. i remember our committees of the european parliament to do a particular piece of work on the coastal benefits of u.k. exit from the european union. there is organizations, various think tanks, the cbi has done work on this and tried to influence the debate. so that's the situation as it were in terms of the work that we've been doing on breaks,

which the answer is none so far. why should the work that we're doing be an american influence? many of the issues that we're dealing with here is how far it makes sense to do things on a continental scale. in other words, outside washington about the relati relationship between d.c. and the individual states is mirrored in the debate that we have in the european union about where responsibility should lie. in most of the areas that are listed in these 25 fields lied at the eu level. in some areas, it's shared. in some areas, it's still preserved of the individual member states. it's to take the decision to try to solve a problem.

and this debate here that's set out through these 25 different areas is an analysis where it might make sense to do more of european level. the discussion that's been occurring from eu back to the member states, what this is pointing out, there are certain areas where it makes sense for europe to cooperate more effectively together. in so mume cases, it may be adod by law at union level. >> ork okay, if i could compliment this. i think there's good reason why this document could be

especially also interesting for britain because it's a kind of update of the internal market. a special situation here. industry is maybe 25% of the economy and shrinking. there are new services and digital is definitely a part of this. we are currently in danger of the losing the internal market unless we update it to new areas. therefore, i think it is of special interest for britain. on our parliament liaison office, i think what it has

brought to us was many things, but specially much better understanding and knowledge of regulatory agencies that might come as a surprise. but when you compare the two systems, in many cases when you are legislating in the european par limit, congress is not legislating. that's something, let's say, which was not available to us. i think we have mutually developed over the last years that we are relevant. sometimes, in this system, you only get some attention if you have some nuisance capacity.

and that's even rational. so the votes in par limit, what's on passenger name record? and the international trade has clearly put parliament on the agenda. it's relatively understand because of the role that washington has played on the system. and has to be -- has to be taken care of. i think it's also, maybe, that we have been a little bit ahead of our time of this initiative. when you have a close look, we like to call it, you know, free

trade agreement. but 80% of the benefits are not in lowering duties. so we are finding out and maybe you understood this a little bit earlier, that this relationship, which, in the past, could be run by executives. and you cannot address those issues without congress or the european parliament.

that's what has been successfully and sometimes less successfully been done also in the united states. on if question of every country has to deal with its own unemployment, that's true. redistributions through this is therefore very much limited. we knew this from the very beginning, but we now know it much better.

on the final issue of competitiveness and digital. probably, we have fallen a bit behind. when you look 15 years ago, these were european companies which were dominating the market but the situation has very much moved on. it's important in the digital area, my conviction is we are not speaking about the digital economy. we are speaking about the economy. it is not a separate sector. my local generalist might be disappearing because it's some of the functions going to my wristband.

nobody has to check my blood pressure anymore because it's done automatically and digitally. the economy is becoming digital. >> thank you. with that, we are at the end of our session. i think we are indebted to our speakers for a very thoughtful discussion and a really rich report. it's available on the web siet as a resource. i thank you for staying with us for an hour and a half. now you can go out back and warm up again. it's a little freezing in here. apologies for temperatures.

thank you for joining us. we're adjourned. thank you. [ applause ] well, welcome, everyone. welcome to the foundation for defensive democracies. what we know and how we possibly know it, since we put this panel together, it's occurred to me that it's much more difficult than it used to be in the days when i was a foreign

correspondent to understand what's going on in various places. the difficulties reporting from gaza have been expressed by myself and others. as i've been reading the press out of iran, it seems to me that the correspondents, for the most part, have been very cautious in what they say and how they say it i think it's very difficult of what's ark which youly going on within these countries right now. >> so let me look to my right, dr. nadeen.

he's well known on the workings of the isle rain yan government. he's a highly regarded expert on iran's opposition groups inside iran. he's the author of more than 20 books. robert bernstein was the former head of random house publishing. he's a contributor to the daily beast, wall street journal and many other publy kagszs.

he came to ftd from the american prize institute where he worked as a resident fellow on civil military relations in iran and he's the author of unvailed, how the revolutionary guards is transforming into military dictatorship. i'm going to ask a few questions to kick this off. and then i'll turn to you. just tickle me if you want to. ask a question and i'll try to remember that and get you, as well. if you have a cell phone, turn it off.

we have c-span and others recording. when you do speak, please introduce yourself and your affiliation and do it on the microphone so we get it on tape. do people think that the 2009 uprising are satisfied with what's going on now? i would say a weapons program. what do we know and what's your sense of that? >> first of all, it comes to the source of information. we need to remember that iran is not like north korea. however, if you're an iran specialist, you have the opportunity through different

paid ya, in spite of the fact that media is censored by the government. first thing you do is to read economic newspapers. this is something we do every single day and to take a look at specialist journals in magazines. it expresses the political line.

so there are different sources of information that we can consult. they give us extremely important insights into the thinking of different elite groups within the mafia family of the ruling plans of the islamic republic of iran. think of them as trying to out maneuver other groups. take a look. what you find out is it's nothing to do with democracy. it is absolutely nothing to do with opening up the economy of iran. but it's a lot to do with taking privileges away from the revolution and back to the first generation. >> you might want to discuss a little bit in this regard. it's related.

your confrontation of the foreign minister. >> sure. a few months ago, i attended a lunch with the foreign minister. and after the lunch, i approa approached him and asked him if he thought it was ironic that he posted on facebook when his government fans are in iran to which he replied, ha ha, that's life. >> one of iran's most famous political leaders. and he says i don't know who that is. so i published this in the daily beast. and it got picked up from there. it was picked up by the press, also.

and then when the media pressure died down, he was put right back into prison. what's blessing was my 15 or 20 minute debate/confrontation with the uchlt n. ambassador at the time. whechb i approached him about the same issues, he turned to his aid and said, word-for-word, he said are the facebook and twitter banned in iran. i said when will he be free? i said i don't know who that is. i think he's probably lying about the others.

but it's a testament to the power of the international media to raise these names and to make iran diplomats pay a price. now, during a lunch, he sounded like a cross between mother theresa and gandhi. in his telling, there is no government on the planet more dedicated to peace and freedom and democracy and justice. many of the world's governments and much of the world's media a renowned journalist turned to me and said isn't he just wonderful. this is a situation that i hope to change. i thrill that there's a direct

link to how much pressure we put on this crowded regime and how much they open. after this international out cry, for a week, says the same model to pressure the regime is still effective. one of his lawyers asked gorbachav in 1997, he said everywhere i went, the only thing people would speak with me about is shanansky. and you can ask some of the former negotiators in the room, they'd bring up the names and that had a real effect of policy. it's one we can all be part of

creating over and over so that we don't let the regime get away with their absolutely certain narrative at a time when there's still thousands of people in prisons and lawyers and so on and so forth. even during the holocaust, european countries found that when people wrote letters to concentrate camp priszer ins, sent them presents, wrote them postcards, whatever. that they had a much better survival than people who didn't get to pay attention.

it removes the anonimty from them. it is much easier for regimes to kill anonymous people than it is to kill people who have real names and real faces and people out there in the world who are calling attention to them. so this has worked over and over and other again. >> i want to press all of you on this in a way. >> it strikes me that letters would not have. at the same time, it's also among organization that is are self identifiably jihadists, where there are common goals,

common themes, ef enif there are different strategies. even if we say the israniranian regime is much different. progress. or should we see all these various jihadists, self-proclaimed jihadist groups, essentially similar, even if their strategies are different, even if our strategies are different, can you see what i'm getting at? >> one of the issues is that the iranian government, one of the things they really want to avoid is diplomatic isolation. this is something they really fear. and what they have been particularly happy about, when it comes to nuclear negotiations, is that they genuinely believe that if they give some tactical concessions in the nuclear issue, nobody would care talking about human rights situations in iran. and this is a policy that they have been pursuing. these are the statements that

mr. hamadi himself is making in public. and it is also some 6 the threats he's making against the u.s. government saying that, if we accept your nuclear terms, you must not come after us with the human rights issues. i think all governments in the world, there is actually a connection between this and the human rights question. how the regime treats its own population at home, also relates to the way it would behave in international political connections. this is the connection we need to make here in the west. and furthermore, saying that sanctions not only apply if you reach with your contractual negotiations. there's also something called human rights. do not forget, the u.s. government and the u.s. president has on many, many occasions, addressed the iranian public. how do you think the iranian

public would feel if they were abandoned by washington, and it only comes down to a nuclear issue. it's an important message that washington needs to send, to the iranian government and to the iranian public. >> it is a strategic issue as well. habal said there can be no peace in a country until there is peace inside its country. it's silly to think that a government like iran, when it's brutalizing and torturing and jailing dissidents and bloggers and journalists, will turn to its historic enemies and treat them with anonymity. i think the issue was used in the soviet context that it was a tool to help bring about the end of the soviet union. and so, too, it can be used in the iranian context. and when you look at the

boldness of someone like senator jackson who confronted the soviet union, and directly linked, you know, most favored nation status, that was a tool which drove the soviets absolutely crazy. if you read the memoirs of gromeko, or any of these guys, you see when carter or reagan brought up the names of the dissidents, they really, really hated it. i think that's one sign that it's the right approach. i think human rights is a real achilles heel of the iranian regime. because they are dependent upon external actors to some degree. their economy is being hit hard. i think if we understand this human rights issue, not just the right thing to do morally, but opening up this closed society is absolutely critical to the peace and security of the region. we'll begin to utilize it in the tool of the war against a dictatorship, which is exactly what it is. >> do you want to add to that?

>> i've been writing on this for 30 years or something. that there is a real identity. i think david put it exactly right. this is an identity between moral imperatives and strategic imperatives. it's rare that you find such a perfect bit of one to the other. and the degree to which the myth of rouhani has been created along the same lines as the myth of gorbachev is a real throwback for me. because i remember back in those days, as one soviet dictator after another emerged, they always had their bohemian aspects. they liked jazz. they were head of the kgb, but they liked dixieland music, so

there was a human element to them and so on. rouhani is a man of the system. he's a pure product of the system. he came of age in it, he worked in it all his life. he's always been a loyal servant of the system itself. and now here he is at the top. and people don't talk much about what he's really all about, and what he really wants. why does he take off in these different positions? because the main game that's being played inside iran right now, among the various factions who are contending among one another, is who is going to succeed khomeini? khomeini is believed to be sick. it's true he should have died long since, if he's anywhere near as sick as the stories say he is. but anyway, people think he's sick. and no one would be surprised, let's put it this way, quietly, carefully, no one would be

surprised if he dropped dead tomorrow. so all these various characters, the rouhanis, yes, the ahmeds, they're all maneuvering for the success. what i've called the war of the person's succession. they're all trying to make sure. rouhani is trying to acquire support everywhere, and that means each and every action has greater autonomy and a greater run at its own enemies. that is why in part rouhani's government is setting records for executions, tortures, censorships, and so forth. it's the line of the nasty, vicioof the hard-liners. and rouhani is much worse.

this tells us, among other things, that there are these fractures inside. i want to make one point about what we know and what we don't know, cliff, since you started with that. about the known and unknowns. in iran, there are a lot of known unknowns. and if you just look at our history in anticipating internal development inside the country, look at the big uprising of 2009, which was bigger than the uprisi uprising that overthrew the shah. i think it's fair to say that no one inside government saw that coming. no one in syria's position. either to make policy or affect policy. they were made. because up until then, the conventional wisdom had been,

there is no opposition of any standing or significance inside iran, and even if it exists, because they don't have leaders, that people are going to follow and so on and so forth, it doesn't matter, forget about it. there isn't going to be insurrection inside iran. and then there was this big insurrection. and people say, you knew it was there all along. you could see it. and then they added, and it's irresistible. if you go back and read the press of 2009, june and onwards, you'll see that the intelligence community and the policy making, they were saying, we don't have to do anything. because these people are irresistible. look at them all. they're going to win. it's sort of a precursor of the assad's going to fall, no, assad's going to win, no, assad's going to win, no, assad's going to fall, no, assad's going to win, the types of conventional wisdoms.

so bottom line, we don't know of the we didn't know in 2009. and we don't know today. what we do know is that the regime acts as if there is something serious to be afraid of. we can say that. this increase in slaughter and mayhem. the increase in censorship, all of that. that bespeaks a regime that doesn't think it has control. and which is worried. plus, whenever more than three people gather on a street corner, they're arrested or broken up or beaten or sent home or whatever. >> a couple more questions. if you want to ask a question, signal me and i'll know to get to you. you talked about record numbers of executions and incarcerations. i guarantee you most people don't know that. people know we're in a period

post ahmadinejad. they have a different understanding. let me start with ali on this. rou haney is doing very well in public relations, and perhaps the media are not doing their job in covering the reality of iran and they're not acknowledging it. >> absolutely. i think that it's very clear, if you compare mr. rouhani to his predecessor, mr. ahmadinejad, mr. rouhani is a sophisticated man. he speaks like a lawyer, he's a trained lawyer. mr. ahmadinejad was an engineer but spoke like a truck driver. rouhani is dressed in silk robes. but ahmadinejad seemed like a man of the people. at the same time his friends in the cabinet were stealing $22 billio