i think that is true. i think you can take previously separate pieces of information and assemble the mental profile that may give insights to the consumer. all these benefits and you have risk. what do you do then? >> monday night at eight :00 eastern on the communicators on c-span two. >> next on american history tv, author stephen davis discusses the fall of atlanta. he highlights four who had an and unionthe campaign leaders. union -- this to hour and 15 minute event took place at the lovett school in atlanta. >> it is now my privilege to

introduce dr. davis. knows moree anyone about the atlanta campaign than buff,s, a proud civil war as he told our students today. .e earned his undergraduate and his phd at emory, where he focused on civil war. he taught high school history for several years and drew on that this morning. and has been conscientious about communicating to us what he wanted to say. .

his pieces have appeared in a number of scholarly publications. he was the book review editor for 11 years and his 2001 book, atlanta will fall, highly and his most recent book, what the -- excuse me -- what the yankees did to us, sherman's bombardment and wrecking of atlanta, has been described as one expert as the most well-researched and detailed account ever written about the fall of atlanta. in 2013, the georgia writers association recognized dr. davis with its author of the year award in the category of history. at round tables across the country, he is a highly sought-after speaker. we're honored to have this lover of the civil war here with us today. please join me in welcoming dr. stephen davis for his talk entitled four generals and the atlanta campaign. steve, welcome! [applause] >> thank you. i want to thank the head master for that undeservedly kind and complimentary introduction. i also want to thank the lovett school. as billy mentioned, the caliber

of speakers in this series preceding me has been such that i'm honored to have been chosen to be among them. tonight, in keeping with the theme of the lecture series, the forging of character, but mindful as the head master reminds us that this is the very day of the federal capture and occupation of the city. we want to take a look at four generals, who on each side of the war were fighting in atlanta, and then kind of after looking at elements and evidence of their character and personality, what they did, we'll kind of bring the story then to a conclusion, reflecting on their individual roles in the campaign. but first, someone who was not in tra atlanta in '64, i wonder if you all will remember that back in the bicentennial year, nbc took one state of the union and spent its two-hour today show broadcast, highlighting elements of that state. i happened to be teaching at dunwoody and was able to watch the show one friday, when the today show focused on virginia. and in it, george c. scott gave a camera view, a tour of washington and lee university. speaking from a text that he himself had written! afterwards, the university got so many requests for it that it requested from scott permission to print.

i happened to be teaching at dunwoody and was able to watch the show one friday, when the today show focused on virginia. and in it, george c. scott gave a camera view, a tour of washington and lee university. speaking from a text that he himself had written! afterwards, the university got so many requests for it that it requested from scott permission

to print. and i quote from what scott told the nation over the camera. this is bicentennial america. this is the election year america. this is 20th century thermonuclear liberated oligarchy, in order to get mine, i've got to grind you, america. what are you and i supposed to learn from or feel about the world in the character of a man like r. e. lee? he's cold. we're cool. he's passe. we're avant. he's out of it. we're up to here in it. well, scott continued, there are a few qualities this remarkable creature had, if we consider them. i've just colorized some of my favorites. patience, loyalty, love of animals, traveler, courtesy toward the conditional frailty of advanced age. and my personal favorite, ladies and gentlemen, gentleness and the aspiration to achieve gentlemanliness. head master. lee on leadership. but that can be said for a lot of civil war generals.

when is the last time you saw a book on leadership qualities from george b. mcclellan? ha ha! okay. not every civil war general could be like lee obviously, but tonight let's look at four. i've chosen the three army commanders, johnston, hood, sherman. and pat thomas, a fellow virginian, because i believe that as commander of the army of the cumberland, he too had a life and character from which we can learn. first, johnston. craig simons, i think, continues to teach at the u.s. naval academy. his biography of a decade ago is still the source. their fathers served together in the revolution. when is the last time you thought of this? they were born just three weeks and 100 miles apart from each other in virginia. they entered the point together,

formed a lasting friendship, career army officers, sharing disappointment over the slow pace of promotion in the old army. in the mexican war, they both served on general scott's staff, earning comen commendations. in the 50's, they were on the frontier and held identical posts. continued parallels in the early days of the war. scott tried to keep both of them in the united states army. when virginia was seceding. but both left the old army and followed their states out. actually, at the time of the secession, johnston held a higher rank in the old army than lee. he was quarter master general of the army and head brigade.

lee was colonel. but the similarities in there, as you will be able to see in the briefest summaries of their biography, such as bud warren's, generals. as i say, johnston was among early confederate officers the ranking officer in the old army. and by some reading of the confederate law and regulations, he would have been entitled to seniority among the generals. but instead, davis and the war department appointed johnston fourth in seniority, after cooper, sidney johnson and lee. so what did johnston do? he wrote the president a nine-page angry letter of indignation and protest, which the president just dismissed as unbecoming. of course, he didn't alter the seniority ranking. then johnston began to show an unhappy -- he retreated up the peninsula before mcclellan and he let the yankees get within five miles of the capitol.

president davis and general lee were beside themselves. finally, johnston launched an attack at fair oaks, and ladies and gentlemen, thereby rendered his most signal service to the confederacy by getting himself seriously wounded and knocked out of action. it led him to a point, as commander of the army of virginia, which lee never relinquished, as you know, for the rest of the war. in mississippi, spring of '63, johnston was something of a theater commander. and when pemberton found himself locked in, president davis sent johnston to command troops being assembled near jackson as a army of relief. eventually, 25 or 30,000 confederates gathered in the rear, but johnston never attacked. as a result, pemberton surrendered.

despite this predilction, at least two-time record of failure, president davis appointed general johnston to succeed bragg, who had been humiliated in the route. he asked johnston, please, launch an offensive against sherman before he launches an offensive against you and begins to invade georgia. instead -- here he's right. he said, mr. president, i cannot. the yankees have us boxed in, and tennessee is a poor country into which to advance. so he never advanced against sherman. and sherman, of course, held the initiative throughout the campaign.

as sherman prepared to advance, johnston wanted to stay on the defensive. anyone who has read about the atlanta campaign knows this mantra. johnston would hold up in the high ground and ridges and defensive positions, hope to be assaulted, likely had been at fredericksburg. if he's flanked, move back to the next good position, all the while asking that the administration send forrest morgan and cavalry raids against sherman's ever lengthening single track western and atlantic supply line. the campaign took on a familiar pattern. johnston would take position. sherman would approach, would

skirmish with the rebels. meanwhile, he would probe around with the army of tennessee, around usually by the federal right against the rebel left. johnston found that he would be flanked, threatened with his railroad being cut, and he'd have to retreat. here you see a timeline map. sweeney's division with is going all the way down stream, to flank downstream. with this repetitive pattern of flanking against which johnston could figure out no antidote or counter, sherman pushed johnston back from nine successive positions. and look at my hand-drawn map, y'all.

if you can't find a map that illustrates what you want, you draw it yourself. ha ha! you know, my favorite here is allen tate's biography of stonewell jackson. have you seen his maps? they're far more artless than my own. so you see here, from mid-may all the way into mid-july, sherman has pushed johnston back to essentially 80 or 90 miles of north georgia. johnston today is known as having been a master of fabian tactics named for fabus, the roman general. they are marching down the peninsula toward rome.

fabius keeps retreating back, building and strengthening his army, declining to give battle, until finally he can beat hannibal at the gates of rome. these tactics have led him to be then called a nickname, the delayer. in my first work, whose cover you see, i call joe johnston this name. federals crossed the river, as i said, july 8, 9. and johnston had to retreat across the river on the night of the 9th, 10th. after that, president davis spent a full week agonizing over whether to fire joe johnston,

who had given up, as i say, 80 to 90 miles of georgia terrain. july 10, senator ben hill, confederate senator from georgia, arrives in richmond and gives president davis and the secretary a first-person account of his interview, which had been held ten days before. and ben hill told the president and secretary three times, i asked johnston, can you hold sherman north of the river? no, i cannot. you've got to send cavalry. and by that time, when hill is before the administration, july 10, davis holds up a telegram, look, your man has already crossed the chattahoochee. on the 11th, catch this. in terms of building confidence with your boss, you send a telegram asking, hey, maybe we ought to remove the federal prisoners from andersonville.

on july 12, davis asks lee his opinion. should we fire johnston, and who would you name? you know, general lee, who was lee's most trusted adviser, did not serve the president as well as davis had hoped. he, first of all, advised against firing johnston. and he had very tepid comments about general hood. industrious on the battlefield, careless off, if you remember that. then davis called his cabinet together. the meeting goes undated in the records. but by post-war letters and kind of putting the whole sequence together, ladies and gentlemen, i think the cabinet meeting occurred on july 14. and in the postbellum reminisces, they were especially vehement in remembering that they argued that johnston had to go. johnston gave -- was given one last chance to save his job. when davis, on july 16 sent him a wire, i wish to hear from you as to your plan of operations so i can anticipate events. well, what did johnston wire back? i call it the death wish reply.

you wanna get fired? you don't tell the boss what he wants to hear. catch this. my plan of operations must therefore depend upon that of the enemy. and i'm going to let the militia hold the city that the movements of the army may be freer and wider. whoa! what does that mean? it sounded to me that johnston was going to give up atlanta. that's the -- of course the intent, i think, of the death wish. i don't believe that johnston wanted to hold on. and as a result, johnston was relieved. general hood, who was lieutenant general, was given temporary rank of full general. congress was not in session. the president had powers to do that in time of military emergency. johnston left for macon on the night of july 19. mory, confederate general, writes, after the war, in his memoir, recollections of virginia. he tells how after the war he, johnston, and mrs. johnston, were dining on a porch outside when someone heard a little girl screeching and screaming. the family's pet turkey was attacking the little girl. johnston got annoyed and said, why don't you run away? why don't you run away? mory of johnston, after the commented, well, that's fine advice for a general to give. johnston grew angry. well, if she will not fight, sir, it's not -- is it not the best thing for her to do, to run away? to break the tension, mrs. johnston started laughing. joe, that's kind of what you have been doing all the way, all the time, i know! so when johnston's belief is if you can't fight, run away, well, you know, and he's telling little girls that, mmm. you know, when is the last time you read a book on leadership lessons from joe johnston?

okay. how do we assess johnston's character? this is my personal opinion, because i was a teenager in the centennial. and in the centennial, joe johnston was a god. it's only in the last 50 years that hood has been looked at anew by scholars. i've tried to do my part. but this is my opinion. johnston was genuinely a good army administer. the men loved him. but as i say with president davis, he could be petty and quarrelsome. he was excessively concerned with his reputation. he was unaware of the psychological effect of his retreat on the people and the press. here's the essential difference between him and let's say robert e. lee. he was deathly afraid to send his men into death and battle.

as president davis once said, president johnston's focus on protecting his army and not using his army to protect the country. let's turn to another virginian, george henry thomas, born not far from the rebellion site, 1816. his family had to hide in the woods during the rebellion. he went to west point. he fought in the mexican war and was in the second cavalry with lee, johnston and hardee. i like francis mckinney's biography, which you see there. as i think i have mentioned, thomas was determined to fight for the union. he declined the governor's request that he resign from the army to become the chief of ordinance. after the state left the union, he decided that he would uphold his pledge to the united states and fight for the union army. his wife, frances, was a new yorker, but she claimed she never tried to influence his decision on this. but when he decided not to fight for the confederacy, his sisters began to hate him. thomas enjoyed a steady if not rapid rise to prominence, as you see here. brigadier general, august of 1861, defeated the rebels in one of the early western victories for the north, january of '62, promoted to major general in april of '62, fought at shiloh,

corinth. thomas's greatest moment, if you will remember, on the morning of the second day, the union center was attacked, just as the time that woods's division was removed, off to the left, creating a mistaken division length gap in the union line at the center, at the very point where longstreet is leading five infantry divisions across the field. bang! the rebels break the union line. and they start heading north. where, on the north end of the field, thomas holds the left of the line, and holds it long enough against rebel attacks so that rosekrans and the rest of the army can flee back to chattanooga.

he earned his nickname. i think it's a wonderful one. after that, when rosekrans was fired, thomas was promoted to command the army of the cumberland and it was his troops that carried missionary ridge in that surprise and unordered assault up the municipality. and it was in the atlanta campaign that thomas commanded sherman's largest in the three of his army group. more on that later. what did thomas do? generally speaking, because he was the rock, and because he commanded sherman's largest army, thomas and scofield usually engaged the johnston's line while mcpherson, -- mcpherson flanked off by the right. this is resaca.

i like this about pat thomas. after kennesaw mountain and his troops did most of the attacking on june 27, thomas sent sherman a message that afternoon, saying we've already lost heavily today without gaining any material advantage. one or two more such assaults would use up this army. i like a guy who can tell off his superior officer. at peachtree creek, if you remember, on july 20, it was thomas's troops who were attacked by hood. and thomas was personally engaged in the battle, not only directing the fire of his artillery, but at one point, old flow trot was thumping the rears of his artillery sources with the back of his sword to get him to move faster. old slow trot. let's jump ahead.

after atlanta, remember that after the fall of the city, general hood marched the army of tennessee into alabama and tennessee, attacking at franklin, and then holding defensive lines at nashville. grant grew impatient and ordered thomas to attack hood earlier. but old slow trot said no, i'm not going to attack until i have everything ready. and grant was on the verge of firing thomas, when finally on the morning of december 16, thomas launched the attack that routed hood's army back into mississippi. my personal assessment of george thomas, dedicated to principle and willing to stand up to his sisters and family, in honor of it. on the battlefield, dependable and reliable. the rock. you know what, y'all? i would rather be known as dependable and reliable than brilliant. i think we can characterize thomas as that way. as i say, he was unafraid to speak out to superiors like sherman and old slow trot would not attack until everything was ready, a good tactical general. one measure of his character is the fact that in the last decade, there are three biographies, including bryan

will's. that's saying something. and there you have kind of a historiography of thomas's life studies. now to hood. hood was the youngster, born in 1831 in kentucky. he had local schooling. his uncle helped get him into west point. he graduated in the class of 1853. here's his first biography, by o'connor in 1949. like many lieutenants he went out west. he got assigned to the second cavalry and therefore learned about general lee, lieutenant colonel lee. in september of '60, the army is

actually wanting to bring hood east and have him teach cavalry at west point. hood did not like the idea of that. and he declined it. and then when the war started, he offered himself to confederate service and steadily rose through the ranks. remember, he was with the second u.s. cavalry, so his first posting is in the cavalry. major in may of '6 1. shifting over to the infantry. when he signed up for confederate commission, kentucky had not yet seceded. so he put down as his native state texas. that's why sometimes hood is called the texan in let's say mcmurray's biography. during 1862, he was given the texas brigade. here is the cache of recently published photographs of the texas brigade. hood showed himself to be at least modestly capable as a

regimental administer, caring for his men. he came to be called the gallant hood, especially after he personally led, on june 1962, the charge that broke the federal lines at gainesville and gave lee his only tackle victory in the entire seven days. john points this out, in the crushing attack on the lines, on the second day, it's hood that organizes the troops and brings them to maximum impact, rolling up pope's lines. then on september 17, when they attack the first corps, on the morning of the battle, threatening to overrun lee's left, he takes hood's light division and blows back hooker and saves the line.

that kind of battlefield courage got the eye of longstreet and jackson. and as a result, hood is promoted a month after that to major general. he only slightly fought at fredericksburg. wounded in the army at gettysburg, his division was intended to get the attack as far to the union right as possible. the union left. actually, if you'll remember, hood wanted to go around and completely flank the lines. but longstreet had been in a squabble with lee and did not give hood the tackle discretion to maneuver farther around the union line. and indeed, hood is leading his troops into battle when a shell burst, bang! fragment catches

him in the arm. he's taken from the field, almost before the battle has begun, on the afternoon of july 2nd. the arm is not amputated. but it remains virtually useless for the rest of his life. but still, hood is a fighter. two and a half months later, he demands field service, so with longstreet's two divisions, he sent to help and participated in

the breakthrough of september 20. and in the charge, as they were rolling up the yankee center, with his arm still in the sling, this is the drawing, hood is shot in the leg. this one breaks the bone. so surgeons that night have to amputate the upper third of the leg, in the thigh. he recovers. he has good medical care. after all, he is a major general. he leaves for richmond from atlanta, november 10. and he spends the winter of '63, '64 where the wounded hero is lionized by richmond society. especially how, after being befriended by president davis, who touchingly -- hood is on crutches. hood would attend st. john's with the president, with his pew, and the president would be seen gently helping hood down the steps, on the front of st.

john's. according to mrs. chestnut, hood flattered davis. mr. president, why don't you come and lead us yourself. i would follow you to the death. she said, hood, you used to be a texan. now you're becoming like us, kind of mullifying the brass. here's why i put this cover of cwti. look. he's got an engagement ring! hood always said that he was engaged to buck preston, who studiously and steadfastly, always said, oh, no, sam, i'm not engaged to you. but this, in a companion photograph, hood very prominently shows his engagement ring. and this would have been in the winter of '64, before he leaves richmond. i think it's very telling. president davis worked for and secured hood's promotion to

lieutenant general. the senate confirmed it february 10. johnston had already been asking him to come and take command of an army corps with his army after johnston took over from bragg after missionary ridge. hood arrived in dalton, joined the army in late february. as corps commander, in may, through july, under johnston, his performance was both good and bad. but the important thing is that johnston, in the early months of the campaign, trusted hood more than hardee to carry out key assignments. for example, on the afternoon of the first day at resaca, when the union left flank looks open to attack, it is hood that's given the command to guide those two divisions and try to roll up the enemy left. on the other hand, when johnston gave hood a similar assignment at cassville to lead a flanking attack on the morning of may 19 -- y'all know this story -- hood was taking his troops out into the field when he saw union cavalry coming, and skirmishes actually had to beat him back.

so he sent word to the generals at headquarters, i can't carry on the flanking attack. the federals are on my flank and i've been discovered. to his dying die, joe johnston never believed hood that there were yankees on his flak and that he could not launch the flanking attack. if you'll remember, on the afternoon of the 18th, johnston had issued to his troops a great oratory announcement, we will face the enemy tomorrow! we will earn our victory! and then for johnston to say that the attack was called off caused soldiers and officers to weep. as i say, i was a teenager at northside during the centennial,

and i grew up thinking hood is all wrong. but people like mcmurray and others have done the work. and today, ladies and gentlemen, you'll find that most of the scholarship rests with hood. johnston believed that hood only imagined phantom troops. no. the official records are there as proof positive. some of you may be familiar with the pavilions, during the 30's, 40's. they put up iron tablets, kind of set in stone on stone patios, in little islands all along, 41, from rocky face ridge down through marietta. the one at cassville, while i was looking at it in the 60's, it would have had an illustration, showing hood with no yankees on his flank. that plaque has been taken away. in my recent visit, there's a new georgia historical commission map there that shows in blinding color a blue column coming down hood's flank. the scholarship has changed in 50 years. i'm just glad i'm alive to have seen it. [laughter] did hood connive for a

promotion? after johnston retreated across the chattahoochee and davis was agonizing, because johnston was notoriously uncommunive with the president, hood actually sent his military advisory down, bragg, who arrived in atlanta, began talking with johnston and sending telegrams back, reporting, i find but little, discouraging. then on his second day, bragg spends a long time huddling with hood and probably got from hood what hood knew bragg wanted to hear, and that is that hood was tired of johnston's retreating and would attack. so bragg probably asked hood,

set those thoughts down in writing. and in his letter addressed to bragg, july 14, among other things, hood said, we should not allow the enemy to gain atlanta. we should attack them even if we have to recross the river to do so. now, bragg left atlanta on july 15, and before leaving, put his

own written letter and hood's letter on the train going to richmond. they wouldn't arrive until the 17th or 18th. mcmurray has done the train scheduling here. and as a result, what hood wrote had no effect on the president's decision, who, as i say, had, as early as the 16th, been asking johnston his plan of action. as i say, hood was promoted to temporary rank of general and given command of the army of tennessee. after receiving this word, secretary of war sedin sends hood another telegram and lays out his expectations. it may yet be practicable to cut the communication of the enemy

or find or make an opportunity of equal encounter. in other words, one, do two things that joe johnston never had done, attack sherman if you see an opportunity of advantage, and send your cavalry. don't wait on the administration to order forester morgan. how do we assess hood's character? unfortunately, ladies and gentlemen, hindsight reigns. we are always thinking of hood in terms of post-atlanta, subsequent to the fall of the city, the bloody frontal attack on may 30 and the -- allowing -- taking defensive positions south of nashville and allowing thomas to gain strength and rout the army in mid-december. as you see here, here's the cemetery where the confederate dead are buried and the five generals killed in action on november 30, including cleburne. bohannon is only one of the recent rath of historians who points to hood as a good brigade commander, rock-solid as division commander, as i've tried to intimate, so-so as corps commander, but when he reached army command, he had reached his level of -- beyond his competence. actually, if you remember, he's not alone. the north had a couple of these guys. burnside and hooker both rose to army command, got their noses bloodied by bob lee and reverted and sank back to corps command. my final assessment of general hood. brave and audacious. i believe he exploited his friendship with davis during the winter and used it for his advancement and gain.

ambitious to a fault. he didn't recognize his limitations and sought promotion. but i will submit to you, ladies and gentlemen, and i will attempt to show this in the balance of my time, that he probably did more than johnston to hold the city, and i think he also held atlanta longer than joe johnston would have done so. remember freer? later in the tennessee command campaign, as i say, hood showed that he was not the stuff of an army commander. let's go to william sherman, the last of my four generals tonight. born in ohio, his father died when he was nine. all the sherman kids were parceled out to friends and family. he was adopted by senator ewing. west point. served in the mexican war. but didn't like army service so he resigned. he failed as a banker out west. he failed as a lawyer in kansas.

and at the time of the war, he was superintendent of the military academy in baton rouge, which is now lsu. warner gives a nice summary of his war record. brigader general, august of '61, sent to kentucky, second in command to major general robert anderson. lost his nerve! envisioned a hopeless situation that could only be remedied by 200,000 fresh troops being sent. the cincinnati commercial started calling him nuts. they had to send him home for rest and refit. but he returned to the army, became major general, served for a while commanding the district of memphis, became grant's good friend. shiloh, the vicksburg campaign. but sherman was not a good battlefield commander. he never got beyond frontal infantry attacks against defensive enemies. as a result, he attacked the entrenched confederates and was repulsed in december of '62.

as i say, he commanded the 15th corps in grant's campaign at vicksburg. under grant, he commands the army of tennessee at missionary ridge. but his attack against cleburne on the north edge of the ridge fails. and that was intended to be the main attack. if you remember then, it was only the surprise and unordered attack of the federal troops up the western slope that managed to get the confederates off and routed back into georgia. yes, thank you, head master, my work is called what the yankees did to us. and i spent some time on what made sherman tick. and for the life of me -- i own cats. if you own cats, then you know that we cat owners are always

trying to parse the feline. that's a far easier task than trying to parse general sherman's brain. and then to stanton, in the middle of the atlanta campaign, there's a class of people, men, women and children, who must kill or be killed, before you hope for peace and order. whoa! was his bark worse than his bite? he's talking about killing civilians. so with this kind of hard bite and bark, he's put his face on hard war more than any other american general, and that includes phil sheridan. shelby foote views his meridian campaign in february of '64 as a rehearsal for the atlanta campaign. he marches toward it, tore the place up, wrecked the railroad. in march of '64, when grant goes to richmond, goes to virginia as general and chief, he puts sherman in charge of essentially all troops from the appalachians

across the mississippi river. and sherman takes command of three armies. mcpherson's army of the tennessee -- that's 110,000 troops. grant never told sherman to go after atlanta. rather, bloody johnston's army and use up the enemy's resources. others say atlanta's importance was not only factories, railroads, supplies, medical

centers, it was a psychological defensive point. if the confederates could hold atlanta through november, lincoln stood a chance of being defeated in the november u.s. elections. head master peebls has written an excellent monograph in which he asked the cabinet members to sign, sign sight unseen, and which he said it's extremely likely this administration will not be reelected. nevertheless, as i say, johnston was pushed back by sherman, by this combination of clever use of numerical strength. sedin never mentioned atlanta. but the expectation, of course, was hold atlanta as much as you can. send your cavalry, attack where you can. sherman, of course, knew, from spy reports even before he'd gotten across the chattahoochee, that atlanta had been encircled by a strong perimeter of fortifications. captain grant, the property

owner who sold the land southwest city, grant park today, l.p. grant supervised the 10, 12 miles of fortify cases, called too strong to assault, too extensive to invest. so he's not going to attack him. he's going to bombard the city, levy kind of a semi siege on the north and western faces, but cut the railroads. can't find a good map in the book, so i drew my own. the railroads going around atlanta, linking it to savannah, columbia, montgomery -- it would become the lifeline for both aryms. -- armies. and sherman wanted to cut the lines. by mid-july, when johnston gives command over to hood, actually, union cavalry raiding through central and east central alabama have cut the line to montgomery.

russo cut it near auburn, destroying 26 miles of track that the confederates never repaired. that's too late to help hood's army. so the west point line was knocked out of service. the situation july 19, the second night that hood is in command, look, thomas's divisions are across peachtree creek. mcpherson has already cut the georgia railroad leading to augusta and six miles through atlanta, and scofffield is marching down briarcliff road these days, closing in from the northeast. i commissioned this map, atlanta will fall, my first work. by the 19th, sherman's artillery had gotten close enough to atlanta to begin the bombardment. and what i mean, of the 250-odd canons that sherman had, he had

three-inch rifled guns. it's the rifled guns that have the necessary range, two, two and a half miles, to throw shell into atlanta. the twelve-pounders did not have that range and were used to soften up the rebel earthworks. it is important to note that on the night of july 19, sherman tells his commanders, if your artillery gets within range, open fire. don't even send in word to the people. we were talking about this, tim, before -- while we were walking in. growing up, i believed that the first shell killed a little girl on the afternoon of july 20. the great book, last train from atlanta, is dedicated to the memory of the middle girl who is killed at the east ellis and ivy

street. but you know, when is the first newspaper account of this little girl's death? it's the constitution in 1889, a quarter century after the war. some old atlantans got together, talking about, yeah, i remember that first shell. killed a little girl. wallace reed was working for the constitution at the time. he put it into his history, and since that time, reed's claim has been repeated by every local author and secondary authors, even including, i think, castill. my professional judgment, this little girl wasn't killed. i maintain, if you've seen my work, atlanta -- i mean "what the yankees did to us," i spend a third of the time on the bombardment, looking at confederate newspapers, and to quote martin, from the 60's, you can bet your bippy that if a little girl had been killed on the afternoon of july 20, the confederate press would have mentioned it.

the first account is 25 years later. hood thought he saw an opportunity to attack at peach tree creek. the yankees weren't firmly across. hood had arranged his troops so that actually his plan of battle was the same as lee's on the second day of gettysburg. attack from the right, by division. he had moved so far to the right -- he's the far right attacking division -- that he actually overlapped the union left in the battle. nevertheless, the confederates are repulsed, even though they managed to break the union lines, at a couple of different places. and the confederates withdrew from their outer line, which i demonstrate there in that red line up above the city's fortify -- fortifications. last month, during the commemoration of the battle of peachtree creek, july 20, dr. jones and i conducted some tours.

and we stopped at the park, which is, you know, on the -- beside collier road. in 1964, the georgia civil war commission placed some markers there that had been -- the text had been written by colonel jillian. and jillian's text is very, very verbose. but if you can strike in, it's got some jarring, particular errors. he says that sherman lost at peachtree creek, 750 troops, but he says that hood at peachtree creek lost sherman lost at peachtree 4,796 troops. where did he get that 4796? you know where jillian got it? from sherman's memoirs. he accepted sherman's body

count. ladies and gentlemen, i'm old enough to say that from my vietnam war studies, there's one thing you learn from vietnam history, you don't accept the united states' army's body count for the enemy. fortunately, we've recounted the confederate casualties. there were about 2500. not too far off the federal. mcpherson was approaching from the east. sherman sent girard's cavalry to do more damage on the augusta line. hood therefore saw that mcpherson's flank was in the air. planned a flank attack by sending hardee's corps marching southeast out of the city, then heading north, to hit mcpherson in the flank and rear.

by the time it's noon on july 22, hardy is only flank but not gotten in the rear of mcpherson and attacks. in the end, we -- the confederates manage to drive back. the federals may be a division length of work. they managed to kill general mcpherson, the only u.s. army commander killed in battle, but also wheeler, who had a part of the battle, failed to capture mcpherson's wagon trains in decatur. you can see that hardee had a 15-mile march during the night. it's hot. of course the soldiers fell behind and so did the attack. gary has done a good book on the battle. as you see, cleburne attacked, overran initially the feral -- federal line but were halted. it's named after a union general. i think that that is a

disservice to the confederates, so i always call it cleburne, y'all. but nevertheless, though repulsed and bloodily repulsed, hood actually -- this was the closest hood claimed. and the confederate press, and even soldiers in hood's army, held it as a victory, because they bloodied mcpherson, they halted the federals' progress east of the city.

and look! they captured three batteries of union canon. after mid-july, with the georgia railroad and the montgomery line

cut, the only rail link is the one to macon by way of east point. sherman moves mcpherson's army. now around west of the city. hood hopes to attack there. and even asks f.d. lee to position himself so that the next day stewart's corps could come and hit the yankees in flank. as we were talking about right before tonight's program, lee found that the yankees already held the intersection, the junction, and made the mistake without orders of launching frontal attacks to drive them away. these were repulsed with a heavy loss with the result that the confederates lost 3,000 men against a fifth of that at lee. but let's remember, hood intended it to be a flanking attack. lee botched the plan. after church, sherman extended his right. this is the map of 1938. on it you'll see that he overlays the union extension, south and west of the city, and how the confederates dug, from essentially the au campus out towards the southwest, a line of

earthworks, to protect the macon road all the way to east point. sherman grew impatient and during august 5, 6 and 7 ordered frontal attacks on that part of the railway defense line, held by bait. they were repulsed. about that time, sherman was actually at his -- he had tried already a failed cavalry effort. and with the cavalry not able to cut the line, and with hood able to extend his lines farther to guard the railroad, sherman believed that he could not extend farther than hood, leaving some union officers to think that hood actually out-generalled sherman during those first several weeks of august. out of frustration, sherman orders heavier cannon. 30-pounders from chattanooga. and catch this. when they didn't arrive in time on august 9, he still ordered every rifled gun to fire 50 rounds into the city. we want to make the inside of atlanta too hot to be endured. he's not talking about killing people. but for sherman, in that feline

brain of his, the city of atlanta and its buildings loomed as an enemy, something sinister to be damaged and destroyed. as we know, the decisive event of the campaign was when the yankees cut the railroad. and they did so in a map from my first work, above jonesboro, in the vicinity of rough and ready, on the afternoon of august 31. here's, again, another great instance of being long of tooth. when i was growing up in the centennial, we atlantans believed that hood lost jonesboro, the battle fought august 31, september 1, so he had to give up the city. ladies and gentlemen, i've gone through the or like castell. the yankees had cut the line by 4 p.m., two hours or so before lee and hardee launched their attack on the evening of jonesboro. so the -- i will submit to you that the battle of jonesboro is inconsequential. that's kind of -- let's revise our thinking, 50 years after the centennial. that night, hardee withdraws after withstanding federal attacks on september 1. by that time, hood, of course, knows that he has to abandon the city and the confederates evacuate on the night of september 1, 2. here's the famous fire from gone with the wind. if you'll remember, they blew up buildings that had been on the set of king kong. and he wanted his fire. and he wanted the fires on the night of the confederate evacuation. wilbur was technical advisor for the film.

he would have been saying the city was not burned on the night of the confederate abandonment. they were burned by the yankees. the confederates didn't have time to set the kinds of fires that you want to depict. didn't matter. if you remember the chronology of the film, he filmed the fires even before he settled on lee as actress to play scarlet. mayor calhoun surrendered the city the next day, as i was telling the head master. students this morning are speaking okay. it's 25 of 12. by god! colonel coburn has already taken possession of city hall and started ordering, bringing in the troops, and trying to put down the looters. atlanta is occupied.

today, 150 years ago. and as a result, today this night, sherman wired washington "atlanta is ours and fairly won. lincoln was reelected. now we knew that he was being beaten up at cedar creek and elsewhere in the valley. we know that farogat hemmed in the bay. but it is the fall of atlanta that sealed lincoln's reelection and deprives the confederacy of its last hope to secure peace and with it confederate independence. kind of like hood is judged in his legacy by events after atlanta, so too is sherman, by his march to the city, and

through the carolinas. when, if you'll remember, he wanted to make georgia howl and he trembled at the fate of south carolina. he destroyed military targets as well as a lot of people's crops, barns, cotton. longacre estimates $100 million in damage to property in georgia alone. how do we assess general sherman? again, the 65-year-old gets to reflect on the centennial. back then, john walters was writing his dissertation and putting it into a book, claiming that sherman was the inventor of total war. now, thanks to professor grimsly, who has taught at ohio state, we now know it's hard war. that's the phrase. let's differentiate in our terminology, ladies and gentlemen. total war is the deliberate military targeting of civilian'' lives. hiroshima, nagasaki, nurmburg, we were out to kill the people. hard war, as practiced by as practiced by sherman and others in the civil war, is the

deliberate targeting of civilians' property. so sherman neither invented total war, did not even invent hard war, as practiced by sherman and others in the civil war, is the deliberate targeting of civilians' property. sherman sherman did not invent hard war. corecame the face of hard in american civil war studies. my personal assessment of sherman, eccentric, quirky. as a battlefield technician, mediocre at best. far better when he had numerical strength to flank the enemy.

proclaim the indebtedness -- vindictiveness and seemed to revel in this. he chose to ignore the fact that whoe were 4000 civilians try to live through the bombardment. here's my conclusion. which of these four officers would i choose as having possessed the right character. --t i want to be remembered would i want to be remembered.

i would like to have it like gravesite that somebody calls me a rock. i like that. as i said, i would rather be eccentric and brilliant. that is thomases gravesite in new york. here, i'm a southerner. i am choosing a yankee general. we don't see things as what they are. we see things is who we are. that me speak you and closing is a southerner. the words of a man, abram ryan. knees gazing at a

picture of jesus. he asked her, child, do you know who was crucified our savior? yes, she said. it was the yankees. [no audio] [laughter] [applause] thank you. thanks, billy. thanks, tom. it was the yankees. >> dr. davis will take some questions. who will get us started? yes, sir. [indiscernible] i can't say that. >> repeat the question. was it an effort by grant or ,herman to stall the career

prevent his promotion? ,, if you remember, had been promoted to the army of of 63.and in october that is before grant takes over at chattanooga. it did not matter if grant had disliked to the virginian, but he had a rocksolid record. he was promoted to the army of the cumberland big never he was promoted after that. he is leader of the largest army in the western theater. i think that answers a question. at least to my satisfaction. [laughter] >> other questions. >> are? >> react to -- he thought one of the biggest mistakes the confederacy made was replacing johnson. johnson are you -- understood

are you had to do was -- [indiscernible] the question has to do with -- let's remember what we learned since his since then -- centennial to johnson claims that after he was removed that he could've held atlanta for another two and a half months. i just don't see how, even his own soldiers, before he was fired, were complaining about his retreats. dr. jones knows this but some of them were saying, i guess we and throw atreating pontoon boat over to cuba. [laughter] , his refusal to fight, his refusal to send discovery, i just don't believe

that johnson can claim that he could have held atlanta. saturday, andel one of my presenters said, not only did he give johnson credit for the battle plan, he also said that he planned to attack, but the attack was planned on july 5. really. come on. we can speak of ours. good question, sir. sir? was there a better candidate? >> good point. guy tore a better replace johnston than hood. ?

he had read his take army command after bragg he told the president he was not to take it permanent. but secretary sutton and secretary benjamin remember this. remember of this thing that is happening? a both remember that we were adamant against him. he refused to take the command. that, you have other corps commanders, no you don't? . lee and stuart are two new. i think it is woodworth, and even simon's who says what the charm of pat claiborne's reputation is that he cap do his level of competence. he kept her division commander. there were times when he i believea small core

that davis was about choice. thank you for your question. >> one idea that you would have -- you have to guard the entire state of georgia. what would you have done if you are in his place question mark >> first of all, what could johnson have done to save .tlanta he started out with 50,000 troops. he had been reinforced by 20,000 troops. secretary sutton, remember pope's court came from his city, the garrisons of john since savannah are drained. early june, johnston has the largest field army in the

.ountry look what lee has done question mark has bloodied grant and reviews to give up territory. you have given up 80 miles of territory. the question is could johnson have done anything different or smart know. he was joe johnson. thank you for your good question, sir. [laughter] >> a couple of other questions. >> let me ask one more. sermon --us was sherman when you surrender north carolina. attributeu softness's office --

to johnson's surrender. >> why was sherman so kind to johnson at the bennett house? if you remember, sherman wrote up a contract for honesty with johnston that was so lean it that washington rejected it and told sherman to write it over. the problem was that sherman was actually getting into political issues of how the rebels would fit back into the citizenship, and sherman and stanton and said, no. that is for us in the congress to decide. don't go there. action, sherman did have a very benevolent side to his concord enemy. -- it is of the story in the confederate reader -- that after sherman ordered the , septembertlanta

5-seven, to leave, a lady came to sherman and personally appealed that you be up to stay in her home with her child. she brought her little baby. madam, it isined, the hardship of war. i am without option. i am so sorry. i regret it beyond measure. then he took the little child in his arms come total and said, my poor little exile. call that kindness, if you will. quoteying to remember a of a union general describing sherman's brain. a brilliant piece of machinery with all the moving parts, just a little loose. [laughter] have your that when? the upper level with the question?

>> first of all, let's remember that it is a static position on the river. even sherman's memoirs, generous to johnson, says i can understand what he's doing it. if also your remember that johnson was contemplating crossing the river when the chief of artillery says, no, let these you some time to urban forts i have designed it out build them on the northern bank. at that time johnson was eager for anything that would buy him a few more days than to have to retreat across the river. as you know, johnson held the river line for a couple days predict with could like it. surprised. --it true that after the war

[indiscernible] >> caught a cold and die? [indiscernible] >> let's also remember that johnson was born in 1807. sherman died in 1891 did you can catch cold in the rain. if you're 80 years old, it will have consequences. their story of being a pallbearer for sherman is genuinely tender. that is nice. that's as an element of his character that i'm glad you point out, sir. thank you very much. >> one more question. >> yes. we will repeat the question this time, thanks request we have one more? [indiscernible] >> thank you very much. the question is cash of these in the bombardment -- is casualties in the bombardment and we will

never know with certainty for a couple of different reasons. the sexton at the city cemetery failed to keep records be on the summer of 64. we don't have a record. confederate surgeons were busy caring for show victims, but cap the records. kept no records. sam richards in his diary, no post by georgia press -- now published by georgia press, said that i'm guessing what i hear from the streets, maybe 20 lies for you know to work, you had to that a couple of others that we thedocument, plus the fact show carnage did not end when the bombardment ended on august 25. a lot of sherman's shells were unexploded and little boys would take the shells and peck at them

to get hotter. they would detonate and you have more mutilations. is 25 debt, times two or three wounded, given that was ,uch a small number, i believe having looked at the bombardments of charleston, vicksburg, petersburg, i believe they died in greater number than died in charleston, petersburg, and richmond. with that, i want to thank you for coming here. headmaster, thank you. [applause] >> thank you. >> tonight, at 6:30 p.m. eastern, a conversation about the book