economy. broad frame and then you let -- we certainly will see nuclear you let the business move ahead. continuing to be a part of the so i hope that helps. fuel mix in the united states. >> thank you. we have time for one more oublg, other countries need to question if there is one. make their own choices but we do yes, sir. >> thank you. my name is steve hirsh. see a real value, particularly in a world looking for low and no carbon energy solutions. i'm a journalist who writes about asia periodically. we see a real value in the civil i want to ask a question that i think is only tangentially nuclear sector and see this as related to apec but i think is being an area that is full of important to asian architecture, the economic impacts of it, and it's not a 30,000-foot question. full of potential collaborations. one thing i never hear discussed to move the frontier. in washington, discussions of the economic shape of asia right talking about small modular now, is the impact perspective reactors or other new promising of asean political and economic technologies that may just be over the horizon. >> we're almost out of time. integration. and the reason i ask this is they just got back from seven weeks in southeast asia, and the political and economic is your question fairly short? implications of this development we have two or three minutes are at the tip of everybody's standing between us and lunch. tongue. nobody is talking act the kind >> this question is directed of things we talk about here in toward -- washington and paris, trading >> can you introduce yourself.

measures, so forth. they're talking about the >> i work for children's massive implications that they national health system. see happening. and i'm wondering if the panel this question is addressed to has any thoughts on this. dr. fullman. you mentioned population as one of the things you would have to thanks. face eventually down the road, double or tripling. >> thank you for your question. has the institute you work with, as i mentioned in my first has it partnered with any asean department of health agencies, remarks, aec, asean economic regional, national or local level, with the hope to reduce community, the group asean is the number of consumers and the demand for energy consumption? really influential and very relevant to u.s. business economies. and so is for all japanese business communities. and a you know, the japanese companies has made tons of >> thank you very much. it's very hard for me to address investment, foreign direct investment in asean countries for many, many years in the this. beside china have clear policies on population, but asean don't past. but these industries are largely have any population policy in

manufacturing industries whereas u.s. business investing in asean in other areas such as service terms of having to -- actually, we do not have restriction but industries like i.d., financial i'm economics background, industries, and distribution. perhaps i may not fully -- i'm aware of the issue but i think i think both industries and there's a lot of public health program in terms of providing us manufacturing and no more safe and kind of children manufacturing are very important and influenced by the initial and adults but it's not really beginning of economic controlled population growth. integrations. aec economic integration has been progressed well for in itself. so asean -- actually, there's a sector working on those. deduction of tariff. as i mentioned earlier. but when it comes to nontariff barriers, there is a long way to i'm aware there are no policies go. they create the need to do much more to reduce nontariff idea in controlled for population growth in asean itself. acsean countries. >> before i ask you to join me and these issues, you know, relatively more important for in thinking our panelist, i need

probably nonmanufacturing to make an announcement. industries, i would say. right after this panel ends, we're going to break for lunch. so i think the u.s. -- you know, people are requested to go get their food very quickly and come i think u.s. economy should and back. we'll resume the next session. as i see people installing could pay more attention to the cameras up there, i have to make an announcement that the next development of a.e.c., because as i said, next year is a key session, the speech by dr. evan moderos from the national period, key year for -- because security council is going to be off the record. asean will be considering the we will follow chatham house rule which means that what he beyond 2015 region to move further -- to move forward on says can be referred to but he cannot be attributed to a a.e.c. speaker nor attributed to a i'm not quite sure whether i senior u.s. official or to his could answer to your question, but it's my remarks. thanks. institution. so we're going to have to ask you for the next session that's >> that's a great first going to come right after lunch, approximation. thank you for taking the answer that you're going to have to or having that answer. turn off all video and audio we're at an end here, and so recording equipment. before i thank the panel and we really appreciate you following the rules but this is you, the audience, for your attention, let me let you know what we have been requested to do for the next panel.

what happens next. this is the conference equivalent of the fourth inning please join me in thanking our stretch. you now get to basically stretch panel for a very engaging your legs for about five minutes discussion. thank you. while we reset the stage up here and the next panel comes on. but before we do, that pleads join me in thanking our panelists for this morning's contribution. [ applause ] we'll reconvene in five minutes. >> and the center for strategic and international studies hosting this conference on asia taking a short lunch break. we'll rejoin the conference at 1:15 eastern time for a panel on security issues in east asia. in the meantime, he's the scif will be rejoining australia's foreign prime minister kevin rudd's remarks in about five minutes. while this break is under way, from the conference earlier we'll go back to earlier where today. >> thank you for that great exercise in expectation they heard from the honorable management. kevin rudd, who is the prime minister of australia.

i will not produce magic this morning and there will be no song and dance show. >> thank you, john, for that but i do appreciate the great exercise in expectation management. i will not produce magic this hospitality of csis and the work it does not just on behalf of morning and there will be no song-and-dance show, but i do the united states but by all appreciate the hospitality of individuals around the world who csis and i acknowledge the work which it does not just on behalf take the disciplines of foreign policy, international relations of the united states but by all and strategic policy seriously. it is a first class institute individuals around the world who and brings together first class take the disciplines of foreign minds, which i presume is why all you folks are here this morning. policy, international relations, and strategic policy seriously. it is a first-class institute and it brings together secondly you made reference first-class minds, which i to -- during my time at the presume is why all you folks are harvard kennedy school. here this morning. after i came second in the national elections in australia secondly, you made reference, last september, which is a john, to it will harvard kennedy polite way of saying i lost, the school. after i came second in the harvard guys kindly picked up national elections in australia the telephone and asked me to go last september, which is a to the kennedy school to think. polite of saying that i lost, having been in politics for 15 years, that's not my business

for the last 15 years, but to the harvard guys kindly picked up the telephone and asked me to go to the kennedy school to think and to think about "think." having been in politics for 15 alternative futures for year, that's not really been my u.s./china relations. business for the last 15 years, if there is a way through some but to "think," and to think of we who followed this for many about alternative futures for years regard as some of the intractables in that u.s./china relations. relationship. and in particular whether, in fact, there is a way through some of what we who have harvard kennedy has been professionally followed this for many years regarded as some of supportive and i spent years the intractables in that talking to think tanks in relationship. and harvard kennedy school has washington, in tokyo, thank been very supportive of my work on that, and i spent a little tanking in delhi, singapore and time talking to think tanks in moscow on these questions as washington, think tanks in well as officials from those beijing, think tanks in tokyo, and think tanks in delhi and singapore and moscow on these governments as well. given the top heic we have been set this morning, questions questions as well as officials about future regional from those governments as well. architecture, china does not constitute the totality of that picture nor does the china/u.s. of course given the top that i can we have been set this morning which is about questions relationship constitute the of future regional architecture, totality of that picture.

in my remarks here this morning, china does not constitute the totality of that picture, nor does the china/u.s. relationship having been invited only to do constitute the totality of that this two days ago, let me step back and look at the trends at work as i see them across the picture. so in my remarks here this morning, having been invited to do this only two days ago, let me seek to stand back and look asia-pacific region. secondly, what's going well. thirdly, what's not going so at the trends that work, as i well. see them, across the asia-pacific region. fourthly, where does the secondly, what's going well. thirdly, what's not going so china/u.s. relation fit for the well. future and final remarks on fourthly, where does the questions of architecture. if you stand back and try to look at the events in the china/u.s. relationship fit within that for the future, and asia-pacific region, we tend to think that we are unique in some final remarks on questions of architecture. terms of those factors which are if you stand back and try and look at the events in the asia-pacific region, we tend to affecting the global business. think that we are unique in we are not unique. terms of those factors which are the work in international affecting the global business of international relations. community are due to deep we are not unique. underlying forces which we in

the policy making business or the factors at work in the international community in my policy-advising business need to view are largely comprised of be conscious of. two deep underlying forces which one is overwhelming dynamic of what we call globalization. we in the policymaking business or the policy advising business need to be conscious of. we use the term a lot. one is this overwhelming dynamic but the sheer manifestation of of what we call globalization. it is profound. we use the term a lot. we often use it glibly hshgs that the sheer manifestation of jenl general turbo charging by it and that which we see and do new technologies are compounding every day and how we perceive and mutating. one another is profound. of course the general turbocharging of globalization as we define it are the new whether it's -- and so the technologies simply compounding varieties we begin talking about and croup lg and mutating, whether it's in financial markets or economic exchanges or a decade ago or so are intensifying in their scope. frankly in the terrorist the overall dynamics at the organizations. so what we talked about a decade or so ago are actually globalization level and cultural intensifying in their scope. level has been over the last 0 and the overall dynamics of years or so since the end of the

cold war, in particular, to draw globalization at the economic level and the social level and to some extent at the cultural people's countries, nations, level has been over the last 20 even governments somewhat closer years or so since the end of the cold war in particular to draw together. people's cultures, countries, simply as a project -- over all, nations, and even governments somewhat closer together. simply as a product of the dynamic. and this is virtually a force for the good. unprecedented phenomenon in global history in terms of its and then pitched against it is a intensity, its density, its second set of forces which simultaneously acts in reaction to it and seeks to pull nations complexity. but overall a force for the good. and then pitched against it of apart either internally or course is a second set of forces between one another. these i could broadly describe which simultaneously acts in as forces of ethno nationalism reaction to it and seeks to pull nations apart either internally or between one another. or just nationalism. these i could broadly describe as the forces of someone who thinks we have -- ethno-nationalism or simply nationalism. anyone who thinks that we have somehow mysteriously you simply have to be a extinguished the forces of

political practitioner gaen ij nationalism a kweps of rational gauged in democratic politics in economic man ruling the world or your own country to know that's not the case. rational economic woman ruling as you travel extensively across the world is deluding themselves. asia, the nationalist agenda in you simply have to be a political practitioner engaged each country is palpable, real, in the business of democratic visible and tangible and it politics in your own country to know that is not the case. but as you travel extensively actually shapes deeply the thinking of most political across asia the nationalist elites. agenda in each country is palpable and real and visible if you dig into that deeper what and tangible, and it actually is the ethno national reaction, shapes deeply the thinking of what we see in europe or in most political elites. of course if you dig into that various extreme forms in the new deeper, what is this phenomenal we observe in the middle east or in some of the ethno-nationalist reaction, whether it's what we see in emerging and intensifying europe or what we see in various security challenges in asia. extreme forms in the new phenomenon we observe in the ethno nationalism is a deep middle east or in some of the reaction to the fa nom nom of emerging and intensifying security challenges in east asia is that ethno-nationalism is a globalization. and what actually happens in response to that is those who deep reaction to the phenomenon don't win from the globalization of globalization and the deep personalizing dimensions of project economically or those who lose their identity globalization. obviously feel threaten.

>> the east asia program here at csis. we're working with the chair of alienated and threatened. scott miller's team to put on today's conference. our next agenda item, our next panel is on energy security in it's palpable, real and doesn't matter which country or which asia. i think we all know that the society you're talking about. energy narrative picture in asia has changed very dramatically national, regional and over the last decade, at least in part because of the rapid international leadership at present is to navigate the economic growth. shoals which are constructed by so we have two great -- four great panelists to join us here those two underpinning, deep today who will give us brief geoeconomic and deep geopolitical forces and they overviews of the situation from their perspective, and then we animate the fundamentals of what i describe as the technical veal a discussion involving the foreign policy debates which we audience. so our first speaker is jonathan have on a day-to-day basis in elkind, who is the acting the foreign policy community. assistant secretary for international affairs at the u.s. department of energy. secondly, when we turn to how this great drama of previously jonathan served as globalization on the one hand principal deputy assistant secretary for the office of pulling countries and cultures policy and international together versus ethno affairs. and before that, he worked at nationalism simultaneously the brookings institution on tearing them apart or

energy security and foreign spoil issues. threatening to tear them apart, jonathan, the floor is yours. thank you very much. the central question for politics of europe, politics of asia and the middle east is who >> thank you very much, murray. will win. the forces of globalization are ladies and gentlemen, it's really a pleasure to be here at the forces of ethno nationalism. how this grand debate is csis today. i see that one of the dilemmas of having a beautiful new building is that the world resolved is of profound outside -- you get reminders significance of the future of that the world outside is out the 21st century. when we look at the european project up until now, we can there and a distraction it only be but in admiration of what they've achieved coming out certainly is. of the ashes of the second world it is in my view very fitting war. mind you, and without giving that we have this discussion about energy security in the unnecessary offense to the european colleagues, the european were slow learners, asian frame at this time and having torn each other apart also in this place, because within three wars. between the developments in they finally concluded there are energy security, the challenges better ways of doing business. the political architecture of ee and opportunities that one sees emerging in asia and those that mejing europe, first the market, the community, and then the one sees emerging in the united union is very much a political

states over the last several years, one could say that the construct seeking to deal with the underlying forces of ethno two are the most dynamic pieces nationalism which destroyed the of the global energy scene at present. the united states and our companies have worked together with countries and companies of asia on energy issues for quite a long time. continent over that time -- the nonetheless, i think it is worth taking a step back and looking at kind of the current state of globalization project in, let's play in terms of context that call, it the asian hemisphere provides the backdrop to our has proceeded remarkably successfully. discussion on this panel. we've had no major conflicts within the hemisphere. in 1977, u.s. crude oil imports we have produced phenomenal economic growth. we have produced extraordinary amounted to 46% of u.s. increases in living standards, consumption. unparalleled in human history in the number of people that have that rose as high as nearly 70% been drawn out of poverty. a few years ago. as a consequence, a dynamism. but dramatically then in the period of this new young century we've seen an important change.

those westerns looking on to the in 2013 domestic crude oil production in the united states phenomenon called asia, a european construct in itself when you think of the term, asia amounted to nearly 10 million meaning the east. east of where? presumably london, paris or barrels a day and it looks like berlin or rome. now for the foreseeable future the imports of crude oil into the united states will be on a if look at what's downward trend, not an upward trend that was true so very recently. in asia, meanwhile, one sees dramatic growth in crude oil consumption and in other energy consumption. according to adb, the asian development bank, net oil to unfold and overwhelming imports in the asia-pacific positive and to the mutual region will rise to more than 25 benefit of all countries in the million barrels a day by 2035, region. that has been, i think, so much the story over the last 35 years. and that's pretty close to the current crude oil output of the again to simply sound the alarm middle east. within that, the international to conclude from that that the energy agency foresees that oil dependency in southeast asia forces of nationalism and ethno will be probably on the order of nationalism or religious 75% by that same time period of nationalism in some cases have

simply evaporated and died is 2035. these statistics i think are simply a false analysis. useful as framing on the oil and the battle royale within the side because they speak to the region and for its future will importance of investment and trade across boundaries and between different regions of the again center around how these two conflicting forces are global energy world. contented with. forces of globalization, one can see similar interesting intensity drawing this region together and forces of changes happening in total demand. if you look at some of the nationalism seeking always to tear the region apart, and data -- historically back to the sometimes tear nation states apart. so, the report card for the last 1970s, in 1977 the united states 35 years has been quite reasonable. accounted for 31% of global oil then in the last several years we begin to scratch our heads consumption. asia was roughly 17% in that and ask what is happening and it same period, and today we find is a complex and variable picture across the region. that those orders of magnitude have roughly reversed with the we often forget the ancient united states consuming around lessons of history that mutually 20% of global production, asia around 33%. agreed territorial boundaries help in the business of so i won't go further into this international relations. this is often seen to be an old context, but i will just

concept of old realisms underscore that whether one belonging to international looks at coal with the dramatic relations and not really relevant to the borderless world rise of coal combustion in of the 21st century to which i china, in other asian countries, respond with the great whether one looks at oil, australian philosophy, pigs whether one looks at natural gas might fly. it's alive, well and a driving factor in the analysis of these with increasing global trade, of questions to this very day in the asia-pacific region. you know the fault lines within lick quefied natural gas, one s the region as well as i do, but very, very dynamic growth all if you go simply on a mental map across asia, and that is an tour of the region, starting important backdrop to our topic today. with korean pen insaw la, a divide of the war which started in 1963 through to the east china sea and sankaku, and you if i look at the u.s. perspective about how we are engaging with our partners in asia, i would call out several look at the unresolved questions different features. one is that the united states is which still remain between china committed to working with our partners, our friends, our and korea and japan and korea, if you look at the complexity of allies from around the globe to enhance energy security for all

what constitutes the south china involved. in may of this year, the g-7 sea and all of the dimensions of the conflicting territorial energy ministers met in rome for claims involving seven different the purpose of a renewed focus entities, before you then flip on energy security as an issue that, again, had kind of receded around and head through the straits of malaka on to the from view for a period of time and then re-emerged into our -- unresolved questions of india, pakistan and kashmir and what is the forefront of our focus. further unfolding in terms of militant islamism not far to the a second piece of the u.s. northwest of there, all of these energy policy that i would emphasize at the outset is a focus on accelerating a factors exist not just in theory transition to a low-carbon on paper but are capable, in economy. in june of last year, president fact, bringing back a obama rolled out his climate conflagration at any point through poor, isu management and action plan which calls for politics and dynamics of important steps that will significantly alter over a long escalation which unfold as a result. so, in the last three years or so, we have seen these horizon the profile of u.s. energy consumption and use. unresolved issues come much more sharply to the surface, which brings me to my fourth point

in addition, the president's climate action plan called for about how, in fact, this is to steps to make our energy systems be dealt with in the future and and our economy more broadly whether or not the u.s./china relationship is central to most significantly more resilient to of it. a changing climate, because this i know enough about the politics of southeast asia to know the is the reality that we already are experiencing. china/u.s. relationship is not central to everything. and third, we are engaging with international partners on this it is an important dynamic but agenda as well. what occurs in southeast asia is let me give just a couple of primarily conducted examples before i close. intraregionally. and to any folks from the aseans one, in the context of apec, the here today, i would commend them united states has worked very on how they've managed their own closely with partners from all around the asia-pacific region, regional evolution over the past 40 years and a lesson to the focusing on energy development, wider rjs. energy security, and energy when we extend the map, it's sustainability. for example, the energy working group under apec is pursuing now dull to escape the dynamic of the china/u.s. relationship in goals of reducing energy the current state and where it may involve in the future which intensity by 45% across that -- is why i've taken a year out of the harvard kennedy school to across all of the economies of look at it more closely.

let's look for a moment at its apec. by 2035 based on 2005 levels, doubling the share of renewable dynamics. if you were to take an objective energy in the apec economies energy mix by 2030. measure about u.s./china and collaborating on the relations in the last 75 years phaseout of inefficient fossil and look at the ebbs and flows fuel subsidies. in the international energy of this relationship since, on agency, which counts as its any objective analysis if you members -- among its members arrive from the moon you would have to conclude the relationship isn't in a bad state. several asian -- important asian there is no immediate palpable sense of crisis in any partners, the membership of the particular element of the relationship however when you look at perceptions within both iaea has been seeking to increase our engagement with the chinese leadership and other nonmember countries across within parts of the american foreign policy establishment, it as asia. one particular example that i would give in this context are the conversations about a new is much less settling than that. form of a nonmember affiliation let me speak about the chinese perceptions first. the best i can describe china's between iea and some key partners including china and current perceptions of the united states at most senior india. this is the idea still under

leadership level is that they have concluded internally that development of an association it is virtually impossible to relationship between those develop a long-term strategic nonmembers and iea. relationship with the united states based on mutual trust, this is motivated by our general sense, again, that the dynamism in the asian energy context is mutual strategic trust. one that calls for significantly and i believe that they increased gaengagements. articulate this in a number of ways. we are also working bilaterally they articulate this by saying with important partners all they believe the united states across asia. i will not, in view of time, go is in the business of isolating china. into details here. the united states is in the i will simply highlight three -- well, let's call it four in view business of containing china. the united states is in the business of diminishing china. of the prime minister's visit this week, four key asian cha the united states is in the relationships that matter deeply to the united states in the business of delegitimizing china energy arena. one is with india, where earlier this week there was a series of and united states is trying to destabilize the chinese announcements about new initiatives in the energy and leadership. these things are never said in climate space. polite conversation, which is a second is with china. presumably why they've asked an australian to speak to you this indeed, when the apec summit morning. we never managered in politeness. occurs in about six weeks' time,

it is reasonable to expect that, but i think at this stage of this very important relationship again, energy will be an important part of that of china and the united states, it's important we have some very conversation. and certainly in the bilateral clear baseline reality checks of meeting that president obama will have with president xi where things actually lie within jinping we expect the same. china's perceptions. let me flip the table and i japan has been for years a very, think this is very important very important partner to the because the level of united states all across the misperception is profound and, i waterfront in terms of different believe, growing i think the technology spaces, in terms of policy collaboration, energy american perception of china, i efficiency, the gamut from one to the other. and last but not least, our don't seem to describe any official, just my observation of collaborations with the republic of korea are i would say also an the foreign policy establishment that china for america and the global interest is important important piece of our bilateral economically. that the chinese political work. so i will stop here and hope system, however, is inherently instable and unsustainable and that i've been able to provide the american perception is that at least a point of departure china is pursuing an assertive from the u.s. perspective. form of nationalism to mask its the core point that i would emphasize is the following -- in own internal political vurer

a time when one sees a great deal of dynamism in the energy context of the united states, we inabilities. firstly by means of the economy, nonetheless are focused very, to economically overwhelm the very closely on the fact that rest of asia and then in time the dynamism in the asian energy economies is the other diplomatically and then military and furthermore, deep american prevailing reality. perceptions which raise this question about whether chinese we applaud this. we want to work closely with asian partners. diplomacy is pitted at buying i'd be happy to take any time while the overall correlation of forces moves more questions that you all may have after the other speakers have finished. thank you very much. in the direction of military and >> great. thanks, jonathan, for the very economically advantages china helpful overview. before china more directly acts. our second speaker is mr mr. takayuki sumita. mr. sumita is the director general of natural resources and again, that's never said in the fuel department in the agency for natural resources and polite society because these are not the business of day to day energy in japan's ministry of economy and trade. diplomacy. but if you get around think tank previous to this job he served land you get up realities and i with meti in brussels where he

worked to improve cooperation don't think those between the eu and japan. generalizations are enormously wide of the mark, that is, and sumita-san is a graduate of represent large departures from reality. georgetown university. please, sumita-san. >> thank you. it is my pleasure to be here in of course, others try to be front of you to explain our view objective about this and -- is on the energy securities in asia. engaged in self-delusion as well and also i'm very happy to come back here after the 22 years -- as we see reality through prisms whether we're conscious of that after the graduating georgetown or not. we australians are no different. university. as you well know, the energy the only difference australians have when we're at our best, not always the case, the west in the security is very important in energy policy in any country. east and the east in the west. that is, we are long standing and deep allies of the united states, which we make absolutely no apology. energy security, economic at the same time, all the growth. and in the case of asia the countries of east asia, asian countries have a very good including the people's republic of china, we've had a deep mixture of supplying -- comprehensive, prefound, supplying consumption. long-standing relationship.

some of asian countries are the supplying kun tris of asia and and if you look at public attitude surveys in australia, some are consumers of energy. the united states is very well liked and china is quite well liked. but at the same time we have so, there's actually a deep faced several challenges, attitudal basis to this in my especially recently. the first one is as mr. elkind country as well. so, we cannot pretend to be objective because we're u.s. mentioned the increase in the allies on the one hand, but at oil import in the future. same time, strong and close and secondly, we are facing friends with our counterparts in beijing on the other. still -- we are always facing a very high price of gas, especially energy. this mean that we have some i've concluded a large trouble, some difficulty in best proportions but not in their utilizing the natural gas. and third one is how we can make entirety don't reflect the objective reality. those two compatible so the to give one example in both directions. on the containment question, if energy environment can implement we define containment as that which is used by the united growth, especially in the case states against the soviet union of coal, how to utilize the during the period of the cold war, what we see in terms of coal. america's current operational

in the current situation, the biggest challenge is how to policy towards the people's republic of china cannot be respond to the energy demand. from the viewpoint of the thankly described as containment. it has none of the primary energy supply, we have a characteristics of classic very good mixture of oil and gas containment. that might be a useful political and coal and so on. rhetorical line to be used in but as to the secondary energy, the debate but in the days of we clearly see a very rapid takenment there was no economic engagement between america and soviet union and any soviet increase of demand on action anywhere in the strategic regions of the world of electricity. relevance to the united states, some predictions say that during which was everywhere, was met this coming two decades that with an equal and opposite reaction in one form or another demand of electricity will by overt or covert means. increase by 100%. that is not the case in the u.s./china relationship. but at the same time, we need to it's of a vastly different character. so, we need a more textured understanding in beijing of what secure the environment or conserve the environment. that's why we need to encourage the nature of u.s. operation policy is but the term containment is not accurate and those countries to utilize known in my judgment can lead to coal or some kind of less coal erroneous policy conclusions in beijing. now, let me flip the tables

again in terms of what i think is erroneous american perceptions of china. options like nuclear or renewable energies. share with the u.s. government to encourage the low-coal options to asian countries. when americans say we as a civilization have never been in the business of establishing but at the same time, if we see overseas colonies when we had the national capacity to do so the economic security or the and therefore we have no such interest again in the future, economic growth still for many other than to engage the world asian countries coal is -- coal has some advantage in those -- commercially, i think that's about right. when you look at china's from those point of view. history, from the ming dynasty that's why, according to the to the present, so many dynamic forces in china's history have iaea's prospect, that the moment been how to deal with profound the portion of coal is 70% of dynamic history. total electricity supply, and it how do you feed a quarter of will still more than half in the humanity? how do you deal with its current year 2013. manifestations in terms of the in other words, total impact of air pollution, water

electricity demand on coal quality and the rest? products will increase by 80% my overall point therefore, during this coming 20 years. being, in the case of the to reduce the dependency on coal perception that our chinese is one of the very common friends are in the business of interests for u.s. and japan in asian countries. but as i mentioned, the initial seeking to create a form of chinese neo:naturalism in parts approach is to encourage them to of the world is wrong. it's not consistent with the tradition and not not consistent utilize nuclear or renewable with the characterization of energy, those kind of low-carbon actual chinese behavior on the ground. options. but at the same time they are so, where do we go from here? facing some concern on financial and i'll conclude on these remarks. security and so on, especially given the centrality of this in the case of gas, facing very relationship, i believe both governments and the region, more high price of natural gas. proodly because of the centrality of the relationship to the region's wider stability that's why the gas is not a very and the rest of the world as good option for east asian countries and also nuclear and well as we move into unfolding renewable costs a lot. decades of the new century, the china/u.s. relationship is in

need of a new narrative. a common narrative. that's why we need to reduce drastically d the den dense on coal is the wst -- best option and here i don't simply speak in some form of policy you toep yichl or some sort of academic seminar. that's not helpful. i think you need a framework in which somehow responds to the for the u.s. and skwa pan. idea of chi jinping. to reduce the production from put forward, and i think why the coal manhattan is mainly president xi put that forward is how do you construct a realized by the improvement of relationship between china and the united states which does not replicate the inevitability of efficiency of electricity conflict as we've seen in great powers before. generation. and in the current situation the beyond that i think president most advanced technology is chi's concept is a headline waiting to be populated. ultra super critical, which has it is an idea. it is a line. it is a sentence. if you go to chinese think tank more than 45% energy efficiency. land, as i do very often, the and it is almost 20% better the actual internal content of this proposition is very fluid, in very traditional coal plants.

it means we can reduce the deed. emissions by 20% by introducing so what could a possible common narrative look like? very high efficient coal power well, this is a very complex plants. question. but i would leave you with two at the same time, such kind of or three thoughts. a common narrative between china high-tech, high-efficient coal and the united states is important for the reasons i've just mentioned, that at present powered plants cost a lot. in the case of ultra super i think both countries have narratives about each other but not a common narrative for both critical coal power plants it takes almost $1.4 billion u.s. of them. the chinese have many narratives about the united states, most of to introduce those kind of them not publicly articulated ultra super critical. and the same in the reverse direction. so, what given all of that is ponl in terms of a common narrative for the future? it is almost 40% more expensive. i think it requires what i have also, if we compare the total described most recently as a cost, for example, by 40 years' time, the total cost is almost the same in the case of concept of constructive realism. and a concept of constructive subcritical and ultra super critical. realism which buildings towards a concept of a common future.

a word about each of those that's why the initial cost words. should be financed by some ways. realism, if you spend enough that's why we need tone courage time in this town and you look the asian countries to introduce at u.s. foreign policy in its as high as possible technology 20th century history, this is a deeply realist foreign policy concerning coal power plants. establishment and for entirely understandable reasons. when you look at the school as it's evolved here at a by doing so, we can avoid some theoretical value, it's rich and introduction or deployment of it's deep and reflected in the behavior of practitioners. low efficient coal power plants which may be supported by and in china realism called by various different things is equally apparent. disciplined fips taken by equally part of the chinese countries, we can very effectively encourage them to tradition of understanding introduce the high coal power plants, then the total emission foreign policy engagement every will be reduced by 20% at most. morganthou there are probably ten chinese equivalents. and in this situation, the very has all sorts of potential difficulties arising from that important function for japan is of itself in terms of the

expiration of mutual trust. before a chance is even given in falling. first of all, we have a very the first place. high efficient coal power plants but given this is such a in operation, especially the profound reality in both conceptual hems spheres in ultra super critical, with very big strengths of operational washington and beijing. technique and also the there are real, conflicting maintenance technique, which interests and conflicting values enables to maintain the high of china and the united states of which the territorial issues efficiency, high efficiency rate i just mentioned in the east and for a long time. south china sea about one it is very important point. manifestation. these need to be accepted, and also we are now investing a recognized and critically lot to the next generation managed in a manner which technology like igcc or igsc. concludes that allowing any one of these matters to escalate in addition to that, we have made a lot of effort in into conflict of war is mutually cooperation with the u.s. unacceptable. that's the realist part. what's the constructive part? governments or u.s. partners in the area of carbon capture the constructive part is this. if you look at the possibility of constructing genuine public goods between china and the u.s., both bilaterally, neutralization. to share these recognition is

regionally and regionally, the scope is quite wide. very important, and at the end if you look at it bilaterally i'm a strong promoter of the of august or in the end of last bilateral investment treaty but for simple reason. that is, the more the two month, japan has a ministers economies become enmeshed meeting or east asian summit through investment, rather than energy has a meeting issued some just through trade, then frankly the more inseparable they become joint statement related to the and more mutual interest in each introduction of creating coal other's advance becomes an technology. indelible imprint within each so in sum, we see that in the country. so, causing that investment future in the asian area, the treat ary to come into being is demand on energy will increase, a genuine public good. in the long term it will but we need to have a very transform many elements of the relationship. strong concern on the environmental resources. regionally, and i will touch on that's why we need to have some solution to make both challenges this in my concluding remarks, there is, i think, a value to be come pat blg by introducing had in both governments settled measures including the beginning to evolve further the region's existing architecture. encourage me the existing architecture served encouragement the chemical technology. the region well but it's thin. thank you very much. >> thank you very much, apeculiar has performed a

valuable role in opening economies internally and to one sumita-san. that was very helpful. our third speaker is dr. han another across the region. if you look at the tentative phoumin, who is an energy moves in terms of a more economist at eria. geopolitical and/or national they have a very long name. security related discussions, there's been some contribution economic research institute for by the asean regional forum, asean in east asia and it's based in jakarta. contribution by east asia summit, but frankly, this needs to be taken further. dr. han does work here on energy why would both countries be security, energy efficiency, interested in that? coal technology, power i don't think either beijing or infrastructure connections, the united states want to trip et cetera. dr. han is a graduate of casually by accident or poor ins don't management into crisis conflict or war. so, therefore, what you need is economic development and an institution such as those we policies from kobe universities have seen evolve in europe over in japan. a long period of time. i emphasize evolve over time. dr. han, please. >> thank you very much, murray. which begin to create basic ladies and gentlemen, very good morning. so i'm delighted to be here, confidence and security building having the opportunity to speak measures between not just those to you about asia energy two countries but the other regional participants. security. i would like to start off by and over time to begin to evolve through that sort of head of saying several challenges so government level regional that -- so give you a clear discourse, a sense of common picture of why i derive

security rather than divided conclusion in terms of energy security, this does not replace security. perhaps the way asia thinking and u.s. and america has the alliance structure. slightly different perspective. models offered those by the that's why i want to start off european union are not by challenges what we are facing applicable. the achievements which we can so that the conclusion will be understood by many participant attribute to the europeans here. as you see, asia is growing in should be in mind. this would constitute a public good. finally, a global public good. terms of economic growth, that exciting, that given economic the extraordinary turn around on growth. but that growth also comes with climate change is one of the great unwritten positive stories many challenges. of the last few years. that including the rising of energy demand. the rising of energy demand is vlg be not good news that we have to having been a participant on curb those energy demand by climate change in 2009 and having not slept for two days various measure. and also with the growing and seen that particular attempt to get a global climate change population, as east asia alone treaty advanced in the face of have 3.3 billion population, much intransigence from the asean has 600 million governments i mentioned, was, i population, and imagine how many believe, a tragedy. population united in terms of but what's changed since then is

energy access but clearly for 180-degree shift in chinese electricities. so in term of energy demand in policy. the ability there therefore for the region, actually by today, president obama to advance the by now, until 2035, for east global good by making new national commitments on climate asia as a whole, that energy change i believe is a real element in the trust building demand grow by double from 400 exercise. which brings me to the final million ton of oil crudup to element to the equation. first the foundation is realist. the second, if you like if you 8,500 million ton of oil crude. and in term of energy like the super structures constructive. what can we do together in areas where the interests are perspective, it's an enormous issue that how we secure sufficiently overlapping or values are are sufficiently reliable energy at a more overlapping. affordable price to keep up the the third element is over time, having a concept that you can harness the political and growth by seeing how many more population provide access to diplomatic capital from the modern commercial energies. areas of common cooperation to so to say that i think these deal with the underlying issue we are facing is one is fundamental objective realist providing energy access, energy problems that i referred to at the outset which constitute the constant source of friction. securities, and also the issue there's not a lot of diplomatic and political capital to draw to keep economic growth. upon in terms of dealing with so another point is we are at the cross road that we also the hard issues. but by virtue of a process which

strive on environmental issue. deals with things like so how actually has asia investment treaty, things like a perspective and issue in terms new evolution of the of energy security? architecture, things like global i think it depend on how you advances on climate change look at -- that expert on energy driven by these two largest emitters in the world, but in securities and but depend on how you look at it. time also on intractable and in the energy mix in asia, questions like north korea and cyber security and also the rise of militant islamism. you see that among energy you there's a basis to construct a have fuel, you have coal, you have renewable and others. new element evolving strategic trust between the two which but coal have play very provides a platform for dealing significant and important role with the unresolved deep challenges of the future. in economic growth in asean and asia. to say you as america have not i conclude my remashrks with wh i said two night ago. really enjoying coal in the past what dung said -- this is back six decade by now until you have in the late '70s. if you want to reform this thing a gas that could pose another scenario of issue, but we are called china and the great not really enjoying the same opening of new policy, economic north america has enjoyed

because the price four or five reform, domestically opening to times, and we do not have the outside world infrastructure and internationally, then it's going connectivities like pipeline to be a long process. so he used this analogy. connectivity. which is you cross the river lng is by import. our production is very low feeling the stones step by step. i think we also need to have mostly 31% import for energy. that concept alive in our minds but as you look at coal, coal about how you can possibly engineer that incremental trust has a great say in energy mix, building exercise between china and the united states as well. more than 50%, and 50% in energy step by step but knowing in fact that there is a destination called a common future. mix by 2035. for our chinese friends here in the audience today, if you talk so security perspective that one about realism, it means something in the chinese need to have a reliable delivery and affordable price, so coal in contemcontex term of supply stability for context. asian is very good. so by australia having very dry [ speaking chinese ] and supplying the region, in international or public goods it means something in the chinese that gap, coal remain a very

discourse. to frame a common vision, to important strategy for energy frame a common concept but not to leave it at a level of security for acsean and east political theory but to then asia. have an operational dimension i think when we are coming to which can be put into practice by regular summit try between stride between how we are the two countries. concerning the way that coal has that i think provides us a way been burning currently and the practice actually asean and east to navigate through. if we don't, then i fear that the tendency will be towards asia but for emerging economy and poor countries, they are inertia, drift and drift becoming current and perhaps in burning coal because of the a direction which none of us current coal power plants have would want to see for the future. i thank you. very low efficiency in terms of [ applause ] thermal plant. but the variety of options there including these clean coal technologies, by introducing clean coal technologies you can >> thank you very much, mr. burn coal more efficiently. and at the same time saving fuel rudd. i would like to open the floor and minimize operation and to some questions -- if i could, maintenance costs. but the key issue is the maybe i could start with one. the question is this. up-front costs investment are higher compared to low-efficient do you think that american or chinese economic strategy is coal power plants. and there's a variety of

sufficient given the broad scope technology there, currently that japan having that of the region that you described high-efficiency coal power to us? plants, and though china is what advice would you have for both countries in that area? emerging, but i think there's some strubl in term of how >> well, the wisdom of foreign reliable those power plant. policy is never provide public so in that regard, it's asean advice to any government. it's likely to be unwelcome. actually also express interest private advice is of a different in using high-efficiency coal nature. power plant. let me make some broad but we're not able to afford observations. that's looking from the region that because-up-front cost. out rather than from america or so with that regard, where i china in. there's some basic metrics here. come from we conduct these metrics while boring are comparison of the economic return in term of different type important. of clean coal technologies and china as of -- the last couple we found that by using ultra of years has become the world's largest trading power, the world's largest exporter, second super critical power plant it largest importer. if you were to put together provide very good economic simply on trade metrics china environment just within 25 time frame period. and in term of provide today is the number one trading electricity cost and cheaper in term of cost of electricity. partner, about 127 countries around the world, the united so with that we provide that. states about 73.

depending on who you believe, the world bank, imf or whichever journalist just wrote an interesting story -- again the measures of the relative size of the current technology and the chinese and american commercial line but why is it economies, pricing or market not able to access those exchange rates calculations and technology because of up front what the price assumptions are cost. with that context, i will say of ppp, the chinese economy is that this deployment of clean protected by combination of the coal technologies are urgent to bank, the imf and/or the oecd to be larger in size than the support if the asean cannot afford that, they can afford lower, cheaper technologies that american economy, somewhere between 2015 and 2025. could give so many years before it can change any scenario. the metrics are really important so there must be international here. framework in that regard to if you were looking at it from support asean to afford clean the region out, the economic significance of china in terms coal technology, but particularly would be public financing because those up-front of trade, fdi and perspectively costs -- any company i think it depending who happens with the difficult to accept loan or whatever created by itself without support, public financial support on clean coal libberalization, capital flows

become a more factor in the technologies. wnd with that regard, i think it's very crucial support that in the absent of the public econom financing on clean coal economic reality in east asia technology imagine that -- than america. i don't think people think that through where that leads. particularly emerging chinese if you take as your assumption company, they are ready to that from economic power other invest in the lower i mean cost powers proceed, there is a shift occurring across the asian and also efficient. so more asean need to afford hemisphere. that in turn, of course, in those from chinese technology. terms of its trajectory going to questions like the sustainable we are not able to afford it. of champion ease growth over time, to the questions of will so in that regard i think i the growth rate be 7.5, 6.5 or would like to stress that any the most negative projections in terms of averaging down to these public financial support will make asean close in that something just north of 3 or early 4. so there are a series of regard. otherwise we'll find a brown assumptions which go to how you project. economy in the future. the projections by the bank and with that,ly stop and take the fund and the oecd do not question later on. thank you very much. >> great. assume linear protections. thanks, dr. han. all i'm saying is as a question our fourth speaker, batting of basic economic metrics, china cleanup, to quote dorothy is now more relevant to the

economies of east asia than the united states. and that's a very thin margin at print. but as you see the investment dwoskin, is michael leifman. flows unfold and you see the prior to working for ge, michael led the modeling efforts at the capital flows unfold, that u.s. department of energies equation will change more office of energy efficiency and renewable energy. profoundly. it's up to the united states to michael, thank you very much. respond to that as they so i think michael wants to use a choose. power point. but that is an unfolding reality daniel? >> yeah. in our part of the world. thank you, murray, and thank you, csis, for hosting and if you took the china trade out convening this really of the australian gdp, i presume interesting and important day. while the power point's being the china trade would represent opened, i should say i noted imports exports about 7% of with some dismay that i was the australian gdp. odd man out and the only one that's quite a lot of cash for bringing slides and that even any economy. we're a $1.6 trillion economy. the representative from microsoft didn't bring a power point. so i don't know what that says. replicate that across the economies -- smaller economies i'm going to apologize in of asia and we are the fourth advance to the folks on my left because i'm going to have to look a little bit at my slides largest economy in asia after china, japan and india. over here. i'm going to echo some of the this equation is unfolding. remarks that dr. han and part of the american response is

sumita-san said about energy mix. the transpacific partnership and i might have a few different the diplomacy associated with conclusions, but i'm going to talk a little bit about energy security through energy that. and for which there is a chinese diversity and focus really only on the power sector. counter narrative as well. i won't go into the i'm not going to talk about probabilities of both proposals. transportation oil. this is power sector. the first thing i'm showing is >> let me open it up for one or two questions. that this is the mix of capacity across asia, so this includes straight here in the middle, china, india, asean, korea, please. et cetera, australia, and you thank you. can see the brown there, the big wedge on the right has increased >> i'm the chief representative in vietnam for the interstate by a substantial percentage. looks like my percentages are traveller company. not totally visible, but you can it was a wonderful address. see that the percentage thank you so much. so comprehensive. currently at the end of 2013 is slightly more than 50% coal. i just -- taking notes from your remarks. the only thing i have a question the sort of green box in the middle there at 5%, that's the is in working toward the renewables. 2% in red, that's nuclear. you can see that our projections for the following ten years show constructive -- it seems like a fly in the ointment. beginning of a reversal of the >> what? trend for the last ten years. >> the main obstacle to working so, again, a lot of this is towards constructive engagement because china, right so, this

great run-up in coal in china with all the variables is that of all the parties to equation, influences the entire asian energy picture. and over the next ten years some only china -- only chi na of that begins to reverse. there's more nuclear, there's more wind, there's more solar, continues to violate using violence to intrude into the and gas kind of holds its own. economic zones of the next slide, please. now, across the different economies in asia the growth varies and there are different reasons for that, right, different priorities, for example, priorities nuclear in japan, which i think is still figuring out to what will happen to all the plants now offsign versus om of the asean economies seriously considering nuclear as part of their phi chur. you can see huge increases in the rates of solar and wind, for example, and of course the asean economies over 700% growth in those -- in capacity over the next decade, whereas coal, you know, still growing, but not nearly as quickly a some of the other options.

and again, you know, sort of a strong push for increasing role of gas across many asian economies. now, to get to this point, to get to an energy system or power system that ha more diversity in it, less coal in it, there a number of challenges that economies will face. and the first is, as was mentioned by dr. han and sumita-san, the fuel price, right? so you can see on the left of these various bars the coal price across the region. i've got some just representative economies here. it's significantly lower than both the diesel price and the gas price. the second bar there is the price in 2024. so the difference between $2 gas and $14 gas in malaysia or $4 and $16 in japan, these are enormous differences. so getting away from coal is going to depend on some

required -- you know, is going to require concerted and long-term actions. another challenge, again, as referred to by dr. han is the really huge increases in electricity demand and all of the attendant infrastructure costs that come with that. you don't just have to build a power plant. you need to build a transmission, the lng term nams. there's a lot that needs to be built. despite that huge growth, by the end of the following ten years, we still don't see the same energy access across asia that we see in japan or certainly not in the united states. so, for example, 2024, despite the really kind of unfathomable almost increases in electricity demand that we've seen in china and that we expect to see in china, they will still have, you know, two-third of the electricity per capita than japan today, to say nothing of asean or india. so huge gaps will remain even after the coming decade of growth. but there are even more

challenges, right? so, for example, what will japan -- how will japan replace the nuclear fleet -- the portion of the nuclear fleet that won't return? in japan there are some very high tariffs for wind, producers get an incentive to produce, but there's very arduous permitting. it takes three or four years as opposed to one, which is what it takes here to get a wind plant up. in korea, it's very, very difficult to siphon any plants really strong. china has lots of new policies to discourage or almost prohibit in some cases the siting of new coal plants in many of the coastal provinces. water technologies, pressure from agriculture and general scarcity and talking a little bit about issues about that. something people don't quite appreciate, it's vartd to power an island.

first of all, if you don't have somewhere from which to move power in, you have to have more plants available to provide reliable power. then, of course, transmission connections across islands or gas connections across islands is enormously difficult. and then in the nonisland countries of china, you have these vast expansions so huge transmission lines. financing, we talked a little bit about how hard it is to bill a very heavy cap ex plant. the long-term operation of the plants get worse if you have foreign exchange issues, right so, dollar-demom nanominated fud your local currency is weaker against the dollar, the cost of buying fuel over time just gets harder and harder. okay. so ge is a technology company so, some of the solutions i'm going to present are mainly technology solutions. but so, one way forward is more gas and more efficient use of that gas. so the chart i'm showing on the

left is the projected increase in the natural gas supply in china over the next ten years, and it's about a three-fold increase by 2025. and how are they getting there? some of it is pipeline from places like turkmenistan. some is liquefying natural gas, lng purchases from all parts of the world. some of that is unconventional gas, their own shale gas resources and their own pipe sands. so more gas available through china, similar kind of story, not as dramatic, excuse me, for asean. but there's also a technology story which is that, you know, in addition to the super critical or ultra super critical coal, their new combine cycle gas plants, for those who aren't familiar with the technology, a combined cycle gas plant uses both a gas turbine and a steam turbine. it's about twice as efficient as a coal plant. and the very latest, newest, most efficient is from us. it's called ha combined cycle

and we're talking 61% efficiency, which just a few years ago was really almost unthinkable. so this is a dramatic improvement in how efficiently we can use gas. next slide, please. next slide, please. this is something i think is really going to lead to dramatic changes in asean. we talked about the lack of infrastructure for gas. one of the ways up with thes there are beginning to get around this is something called a virtual pipeline. what does this mean? instead of the traditional route where you have an actual pipeline brought in on a huge tank other a humongous regasifiction facility. so, if you can have c&g, can you put it in a box, in a truck and use roads and barges to get it

where you get it. if you're not committed to one pipeline, you have much more flexibility getting from origin to destination. we have an mou to develop virtual pipelines and we commissioned recently cng fueled island power plant. it's a 35% savings versus deal. incredible change in how gas is going to be delivered. the scale is quicker, instead of months to get it done. displaces diesel. lots and lots of advantages. can also use biogas. you can use woody biomasses,

gasify them, so flexible power solutions, modular, small. post the tragedy of fukushima, you cannot first question how it's going to be safe. one of the newer technologies that ge has available is the economic simplified bouling reactor. it's now the safest reactor design available. actually just about a week ago, i think, passed another review by the nuclear regulatory commission, nrc. passively cools for seven days, twice as good as our competitor. it's simpler in that there are far fewer components. you don't need steam generators so there are fewer things that can go wrong. fewer systems. you need fewer staff to operate it.

there are all these advantages to nuclear we need to consider rather than writing it off entirely. lastly in terms of the solutions we're offering wind plants designed specifically for land con trained environment. our 285, 103, that's 2.85 mega watts per turbine. if you have a loand constrained environment, you need a turbine, so made specifically for japan but obviously it could be transferred with just minor modifications to other land con strained environments. i think that's it for the wind slide. that's it. thanks very much for your time. >> excellent. thanks, michael. i guess as a layman, not an

energy expert, one of the questions that emerges almost immediately when i listen to these different presentations is michael has suggested there's a lot of pretty nifty technology out there that's a lot cleaner than what we're using now. dr. hahn says we would like that clean technology but we can't afford it. my question for any of you, particularly for jonathan or samita, whether you know of financing that is available for emerging economies in asia to buy -- even if it's coal, but cleaner burning technology, even if they can't afford it? is there credit out there? >> yes, in the case of japan, japanese investment bank is now supplying some financial support to asian countries to introduce

high-efficient coal and also we have many more schemes to help countries in asia to deploy low carbon technologies. >> speaking from the u.s. perspective, this is a tricky landscape in lots of different ways. first of all, the -- the technology of the landscape itself is never static. one of the things that we spend a great deal of time and focus on at u.s. department of energy, in some of the technical collaborations we have with international partners and with industry domestically in the united states, is on technology development and coming down the cost curve. you can see if you look at some of the different suites of

technology across the industry landscape how dramatic the progress has been. so, you see massive reductions, for example, in on-shore wind, in solar pv, the same is starting to happen in concentrated solar power. so, the opportunities of today and of tomorrow are not identical. point one. point two, there is a strategy issue that is an important one to grapple with. when it comes to coal technology, the united states understands that coal will be a part of the global energy mix. it certainly is a part of the energy mix of the united states, although today's share of coal

in our total fuel mix is significantly reduced from that which it was ten years ago. you've seen a drop from where coal has been 50% of the u.s. fuel mix. today it is just under 40. there was a point a:héq couple s ago and this in response to the real time movement of national gas prices in the u.s. where a very surprising thing happened where you had coal and natural gas representing roughly equal shares for a short time, roughly 32% of our fuel mix. so, we expect that coal will be a part of the fuel mix going forward. both in the united states and elsewhere. but then there's what technologies? and so this has been -- it is certainly true as they have both underscored, that all things being equal, it is preferable to

have higher efficiency coal technologies in the marketplace. there's no question about that. the u.s. perspective, though, is that the use of public finance to support noncarbon capture technologies in the marketplace is not something we feel is appropriate. why? because as the iea's energy technology perspective that was just released in the summer stated, and i'll quote, because it's a very appropriatelags of this issue, the without ccs, is fundamentally incompatible with our client change objectives. this is the dilemma we are trying to find a way to manage. so, the united states does not support the broad use of public

finance through multilateral or bilateral (qsources. we do have an exception to that rule, which is for the least developed economies. but otherwise this is a conscious choice to help us put our emphasis in moving that technology frontier, insenting the emergence of carbon capture into the marketplace, as we are doing in our own market, and from that seeing costs change so that this technology is broadly affordable. >> opening it to the questions -- sorry. dr. hon, please. i would just like to have idea, actually. i respect the gentleman's idea in how public finance, why we

have to subsidize on coal kind of things. but i think perhaps we have to stick to the reality in the foreseeable future that in our prediction that in terms of coal powered plant, it continues to rise. i think in that regard, climate change we have the same concern and interest but let's analyze this reality and say carefully, the lack of public finance on the cct, they'll find their financing system but that financing system will link to less efficient coal power plant. so, i think which one you are actually going to say? let's say super power like u.s. concern on environmental issue, i think carefully analyze, because as they go to power plant foreseeable future, in

that regard they are seeking for the current available best technologies for better environment but -- i fuelly agree, but we have to stick to reality for that we need to have support to make sure that until they have something breakthrough in technology, like lng, asia cannot afford. as i state already that this excitement in u.s. about cell gas, asia does not enjoy at all. but in terms of energy mix, coal is more reliable and provides energy to billions of people that do not have access to electricity. coal is the most thing to build up power plant. in that regard i still stick to public financing to be more more realistic and provide a better

environment to the issue because it's a global issue anyway. i do not -- i want to say my concern only. thank you. >> wool-h we'll open it up to the floor. pleats wait for a microphone. and introduce yourself. >> i just want to follow up on the previous question. like -- like the world bank be more reluctant to finance coal power plant. if i wondered if other financiers might step in like japanese financier, like the new established -- the development bank or aaib. i would like to hear your opinions on that. thank you. >> anybody have an answer? >> our concern is -- the japanese concern is like that.

if there's no public support from world bank or adb or something like that, or aaib may have opportunity to finance those projects. in such a case, if those new institution have the same discipline, like focusing only on the high efficient coal power plant, then it's okay. but if they have no discipline, just financing every new project, then it is quite miserable situation where the co2 emissions will be increased. that's why we hope developed countries should encourage the developing countries to deploy

the carbon -- green coal technologies. >> tom? >> my name is tom cutler. i want to first compliment the panel for their presentation on what i would say are the long-term aspects of the changing calculus of asia's energy security. my question is on the short term aspects of energy security in the region. let's say, contingency planning for an oil supply disruption. so, the questions are, is the region prepared in terms of strategic oil stocks or oil-sharing plans for an oil supply disruption, is the institutional architecture of the region the various

international forums such as the iaa, asean, apeculiar, as well as the east asia summit are they up to the task in dealing with short-term energy crises such as an oil supply disruption usinging tools like strategic oil stocks or international oil-sharing plans? and if not, what can be done? >> thank you, tom. that's a great question. and it brings out the reality that simultaneously we all together have to do two things. one is manage the situation and which one exists now and the other is put in place the tools and both institutional and technological that can help us to move forward. from the u.s. perspective we

think this issue you raised is a very important one. and one where there has been some very, very promising collaborations that have gone on. but i would not for a moment say that it is sufficient. in some regards -- to highlight a couple examples of collaboration that has already been under way, you could look at the work that the international energy agency has done with a number of east asian partners looking at preparedness, responses, what strategic reserves are in place. what one would do, how industry could meet its requirements and continue to provide for the population. thailand has been a very active participant iae, done a couple

of emergency response exercises, has hosted a regionwide engagement. china, of course, is another east asian partner in this regard as now the world's largest oil importer there i would say, to be candidate, we would hope to find deeper collaboration going forward with china. china is building its own strategic reserves which is an important step to happen. we think there is a great deal of scope for technical and technical and other interactions so china which has this enormous stake in global functioning oil markets can provide the transparency that is the necessity for all global participants, including china, to make informed decisions.

we welcome the steps the chinese national energy agency has -- administration has taken together with the department of energy to deepen collaboration in this area. we think it's a really, really important thing. so, institutional framework, good start, much more needed. >> thanks so much for question. actually you yourself is the one who really understands more on this issue. we tried to come up with similar iea in terms of stockpilings, of course, gas could be included but this originally. as you know, not many countries have the 90-day requirement.

in less than 30 days. and then currently and thailand commit to 60 days to 90 days. i think except japan is having almost 200 days, i guess, and china does not recall clearly about china. and i think in that regard, we understand that building this kind of facility would cost investment. and one time i provide -- with support from iae. you build this structure it have to be linked closely to market economy. sometimes it's not necessary. there are many practices in the

region you can swop kind of thing. the reserve itself, just to prevent if there's any disruption within seven days or to weeks it could hit that country. some countries in terms of structure of country, it does not have to build up to that kind of reserve. regional cooperation in terms of trust, it becomes more important. we'll look at the requirement but also how cost effectively we can implement this strategic reserve in asean countries. thank you. >> in the case of japan we see the importance of the collaboration among asian countries to respond to such

crisis. that's why recent years they have talked with us under the framework of a mechanism to how we can tackle this issue in cooperative manner. but a discussion is still in very early stage. in a sense, it would take more time until some kind of more concrete solution might be decided or agreed. >> other questions, please? gentleman here. >> i'm mark wall, former u.s. state department, most recently university of wyoming. my question concerns nuclear power. we had some comments on that, but would the panelist care to comment further on energy mix, particularly in japan, but also

elsewhere in asia. >> as to japan, at this moment, as you know, there's no nuclear power plants among the 48 nuclear provinces in japan. three years ago the portion of the nuclear power plants and total power supply with 32%. but at this moment there is zero. now, it's some kind of -- if nuclear power plant isn't going and as to the two initial power plants, the nuclear regulatory authority approved the safetiness of those two nuclear power plants. that's why we are now in the process of persuading the local people, and i hope that in the early next year -- by early next year we will have the restart of

those two nuclear power plants and only 20 nuclear power plants have already presented the brand to ask for their approval to the nuclear regulatory authority. so, one by one those applications will be examined during this two or three years time some more nuclear power plants will be started. at this time it's very difficult to expect to what percentage we can look at the nuclear power plants. the japanese government needs to decrease the dependency on nuclear power plants for long-term period. >> thanks for the question.

in perspective, so that you can understand we don't deny nuclear power. capital costs itself. it's very expensive. currently vietnam is under construction of nuclear power plant. but malaysia also -- but i think they're public opponent to nuclear in asia. it's very strong. after fukushima accident, i think we are concerned about nuclear power in the future in asean itself. astute area where i'm working for, now we are working on more on emergency response and preparedness. to prevent international

accident how country in selling information in a faster manner. in that regard we can build a working group. again, this nuclear is one of the option but perhaps it's not really now. and also four or five times higher than current coal plant. thank you. >> thanks for the question one of the issues with nuclear is also the infrastructure that needs to be added to the grid so you can't just put in a nuclear plant anywhere. the transmission system itself needs to be robust and heartened. so for as see yan countries in particular that's one of the challenges. elsewhere in asia, the chinese ambitions for nuclear are sort of startling. i think it's 50 giga watts or the next 10 or 12 years they're planning on adding.

in india we've been encouraging with prime minister modi's visit signaling some willingness to relook at the nuclear liability law, which is a major obstacle to the development of nuclear there. i just jump into take advantage of this question and link back about energy security, by its title. from our perspective in the u.s. we feel very, very strongly that energy security derives first and foremost from a high degree of diversification and good systems around the energy oundh