him the courage award, specifically for this act. that was huge symbolism within that gesture. >> do you think that testimony in itself put him on the road and the country on the road to healing? >> i think it did. but again, feelings were raw and do not heal overnight. there are some people who objected to a pardon on any number of grounds, and also who do not believe a came about as innocently as ford said. >> there were people on the judiciary itself -- >> you will see that. elizabeth holtzman was particularly doggedly strong in her questioning. one of the things you watch this testimony is that the committee operates under the clock, and everybody gets five minutes, which is really not enough to

probe this in any great detail, and there is a sense of frustration just beneath the surface. >> well, richard norton smith, thank you for being here with us on american tv. >> you're welcome. >> coming up, president gerald ford in front of the house judiciary committee on his pardon of president nixon. >> the committee will be in order. the committee on criminal justice, the house committee on

judiciary welcomes the president of the united states, gerald r lord. -- gerald r. ford. we appreciate his willingness to answer our questions in this inquiry. and also to except inquiries on the subcommittee and to carry out the response bill is assigned to it by the representatives. this is, perhaps, the first documented appearance of a president of the united states before a committee or a subcommittee of the united states congress. now the chair understands, mr. president, that you have a commitment at noon, as of the house convened at 11:30 a.m. today, and given these to them constraints -- these time to his race will do the best we can. the question he will be done by subcommittee members only, and under the five-minute rule.

president ford's appearance demonstrates his commitment to the open -- to be open and candid to the american people. it is absolutely vital for the restoration of the american trust and for the institution of the political body, and it is support for the future administration. the newspaper le monde in paris recently wrote about the sweeping and irrevocable pardon by a gerald ford. they parted was seen as a way of preventing congress and the law force from conducting an investigation. on september 8, president nixon offered a full and complete -- president ford offered a full

and complete pardon to president nixon read several questions have and raise related to the circumstances of the pardon, and whether a result of the pardon and says with agreement -- and subsequent agreements were related to discussions with the former president. more than 70 members of the house of representatives, republicans and democrats alike, have sponsored bills and revolutions -- resolutions seeking clarification. these bills are currently pending in the subcommittee. among these bills are the two privileged revolution -- resolution bills entered today. bill 1367, and the second is put forth by representing conyers.

these copies were forwarded to the president, following an exchange of correspondence, and the president offered to appear here as he voluntarily does today. the task that we undertake is made easier by our personal friendship and our common background. but to faithfully perform our task, we must lay aside personal relationships and considerations. we are not here to talk about friendship, but to our responsibility to checks and balances and the separation of power placed upon us, and to speak and reveal the truth to the american people about the

workings of their government by cooperation, if possible, by confrontation, if necessary. i hope the american people, as well as the congress, appreciates the importance of president ford's appearance. we will do all we can to resolve the questions relating to the pardon. i am convinced the issue of the party will not be behind us and tell this record is complete. the chair recognizes the opening speech. >> mr. president, as chairman of the committee on the judiciary, i want to welcome you here. not only is the chief executive of this great country, but as a grand person who has served with us for so many years. this historic occasion and your voluntary appearance here only demonstrates once more the great institution that we are both proud to be a part of. i know that your efforts and coming before this committee voluntarily will assist in the subcommittee and this committee within the judiciary, in meeting its responsibility.

and with that mr. president, i am going to relinquish the responsibility to the chairman of the subcommittee and the members of the subcommittee. they give are coming here. >> the chair -- thank you for coming here. >> the chair recognizes the next bigger. >> as ranking minority member, and the members of the subcommittee, have appeared here this morning only in our capacity, sitting at the foot of the subcommittee on our spect inside, whether than in our familiar places. in this arrangement, we do not displace the chairman of the subcommittee, but chairman wrote dino -- rodino and i will leave

the members of the subcommittee responsibility to discuss. ours possibility will be limited to our opening statements. other members of the judiciary committee who are not members of the subcommittee, some of whom are present here today, may watch. the subcommittee has a few resolutions of inquiry which were introduced in the house of representatives. the first was introduced by the chairman, and by a resolution of

a great, the chairman rick quest that the president -- the chairman request that the president give certain factual information to assist the house in its legislative functions. since the pardon power is not subject to legislative control, i suppose that a question can be raised as to whether a resolution of inquiry might legitimately lie on this question, since the question itself cannot resolve -- be resolved, by the legislative branch. in any event, the mere introduction of a resolution does not impose a duty on the executive to respond, and neither does committee consideration. either resolution would be expected if the house of representatives would adopt it, and even then submitting factual information would only be called for upon request. the president of united states

before the subcommittee does not violate the separation of power the tween the executive and legislative branches of government. -- between the executive and legislative branches of government. you are meeting with the subcommittee, mr. president, on capitol hill, and it is symbolic of us working together. but you do not,, mr. president, in response to any command of the subcommittee nor in any response to its request, for it made no demand upon you or no request to your presence. your presence is entirely voluntary on your part. your presence should not be construed to mean that you will appear before this or any other committee of congress in the future as president, and no

president in the future will be expected to inquire -- will be expected to respond to any inquiry. mr. president, i cannot adequately express to you my personal feelings of warm friendship, and my sense of a high honor to do this with the committee in meeting with us here today. thank you, mr. president. >> the chair recognizes the gentleman from new york. >> mr. president, i too, join in welcoming you here and your voluntary appearance. you will willingly answer questions regarding the pardon of president nixon, and his questions have been presented by certain members of congress and the people of united's america. they have a right to know as far

as this may be possible. you're a pure is here has been voluntary and on your own motion, and i -- your appearance here has been voluntary and on your own motion, and i commend you. this is an example of a splendid cooperation between the executive and legislative branches of our government, which i hope may be followed many times in the future. mr. president, i have known you for almost 10 years, and in that time, i have always found you to be a man of frankness and candor, and man whose words one would have complicit trust. it is in this spirit that i know you'll answer the questions that have been raised about the pardon of mr. nixon, and i know this committee will receive your answers your it thank you.

-- your answers. thank you. >> mr. president, you have an opening statement, and we welcome you here today. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman and members of the subcommittee. we meet here today to review the facts and the circumstances that were the basis for my pardon of former president nixon on september 8, 1974. i want very much to have those facts and those circumstances known. the american people want to know them. members of congress also want to know them. the two congressional resolutions of inquiry now before the subcommittee serve these purposes. that's why i have volunteered to a peer before you this morning, and i welcome and thank you for this opportunity to speak to the questions raised by the resolutions.

my appearance at this hearing of your distinguished subcommittee on the house judiciary committee, has been looked upon as an unusual historic aback, one that has no firm -- historic event, one that has no firm precedent. yet i am here not to make history, but to report history. the history that you are interested in covers so recent a. that it is not -- so recent a period, that it is not understood. we hope to achieve the purpose that i had for granting the pardon when i did. the purpose was to change our national focus. i wanted to do all that i could to shift our attention from the pursuit of a fallen president to the pursuit of the urgent needs of a rising nation. our nation is under the severest

of challenges now to employ its full energy and efforts in the pursuit of a sound and growing economy at home and a stable and peaceful world around us. we would needlessly he diverted from meeting those challenges if we as a people were to remain sharply divided over whether to indict, bring to trial, punish a former who has already condemned to suffer long a deeply in the shame and disgrace run upon the office that he held. surely we are not a revengeful people. we have often demonstrated a readiness to feel compassion and act out of mercy. as a people, have a long record of forgiving even those who have been our country's most instructive foes.

yet to forgive is not to forget the lessons of evil, in whatever ways evil has operated. and certainly the pardon granted to the former president will not cause us to forget the evils of the watergate-type offenses, or to get the lessons that we have learned of a government that deceived its supporters and treat its opponents as enemies, and that was never, ever be tolerated. the power entrusted to the president through the constitution of the united states has a long history, and rest on presidents going back -- precedents is going back centuries. the power has been used some time, as alexander hamilton saw its purpose, in seasons of insurrection, when a well-timed

offer of pardon of insurgents or rebels could ensure tranquility to the commonwealth. it may never be possible afterwards to recall. other times it has been applied to one person in an act of grace. it exempts the individual on who it was bestowed, for a crime that he has committed. when a pardon is granted, it also represents the determination of the ultimate authority that the public welfare will be better served by inflicting less than what the judgment sets. however, the constitution does not limit the pardon power to cases of convicted offenders or even indicted offenders. thus, i am firm in my

convictions that as president, i did have the authority to proclaim a pardon to the former president when i did. yet i can also understand why people are moved to question my actions. some may still question my authority. but i find much of the disagreement on when i should've acted when i did. many people have concluded, as i do, that the pardon was in the best interest of the country, because it came at a time when it would best serve the purposes that i have stated. i came to this hearing, mr. chairman, in the spirit of cooperation, to respond to your inquiries. i do so with the understanding that the subjects to be covered are defined and limited by the questions as they appear in the resolutions before you. but even then, we may not mutually agree on what

information falls within the proper scope of a gory. i feel the response of -- of inquiry. i feel the responsibility of our government that it must preserve a degree of secrecy with internal communications. members may be able to work under conditions of confidentiality. earlier this year the united states senate passed a resolution which reads, in part, as follows: "no evidence under the control or in the possession of the congress of the united states can come in the mandate or process be taken from such control or possession but by its permission." in the united states v. nixon,

the supreme court unanimously recognized confidentiality within the executive branch, which the court determined could only be invaded for overwriting reasons of the fifth and sixth amendments of the constitution. as i have stated before, mr. chairman, my own view is that the right of the executive privilege is to be exercised with caution and with restraint. when i was a member of congress, i did not hesitate to question the right of the executive branch to claim a privilege in supplying information to the congress, even if i thought the claim of privilege was being abused.

yet i did then, and i do now, respect the right of executive privilege when it protects the right given to a president in the expectation that it will not he disposed. otherwise, mr. chairman, no president could any longer count on receiving free and frank information from the people who could help him to reach his official decisions. also, it is certainly not my intention or even within my authority to detract on this occasion or any other instance of the generally recognized right of the president to preserve the confidentiality of the internal discussion or communications whenever it is properly within his constitutional responsibility to do so. these rights are within the authority of any president while he is in office, and i believe may be exercised as well by a past president with the information thought pertain -- sought pertains to when he served in office.

i bring up, mr. chairman, and these important points, before going into the balance of my statement, so there will be no question that i remain mindful of the rights of confidentiality, which a president may want to exercise in copious circumstances. however, i do not regard my answers as i have prepared them for the purposes of this inquiry, to be prejudicial to these rights in the present circumstances or to constitute a precedent for responding to congressional inquiries different in nature or scope under different circumstances. accordingly, mr. chairman, i shall proceed to explain as fully as i can in my present answers, the facts and the circumstances covered by the present resolution of inquiries. i shall start with an excellent

nation of these events which were the first to occur in the. covered by the inquiry before i became president. then i will respond to the separate questions as they are numbered in-house resolution 1367, and as they specifically relate to the period after i became president. resolution 1367 ask about certain conversations that may have occurred over a period that includes during the time when i was vice president. no conversation about a possible pardon occurred until august 1 and second, 1974. you'll recall, mr. chairman, since the beginning of the watergate investigation, i had

consistently made statements and speeches about president nixon's either planning the break-in or either participating in the cover-up, and i sincerely believe he was innocent. even in the closing months before the president resigned, he made public statements that in my opinion made adverse revelations so far that did not constitute an impeachable offense. i was coming under increasing criticism. but i still believe and believed them to be true based on the facts as i knew them. in the early morning of thursday, august 1, 1974, i had a meeting and my vice presidential office with alexander m. hague, jr, chief of staff for president nixon.

i was told in a general way about fears are rising regarding additional taped evidence to be delivered to the judge on monday, august 5, 1974. i was told that there could be evidence, which, when disclosed to the house of representatives, would likely tip the boat in favor of impeachment. however, i was given no indication that this development would lead to any change in president nixon's plan to oppose the impeachment vote. then, shortly afternoon, general hague requested another appointment as quickly as possible. he came to my office at about 3:30 p.m. for a meeting that was to last approximately three quarters of an hour. only then that i learn of the

damaging nature of the conversation on june 23, 1972, in one of the tapes, that was due to go to the judge, and i described his meeting because at one point, it did include references to a possible pardon for mr. next and cop -- mr. nixon, to which these two house resolutions are directed. the entire meeting covered other subjects dealing with a totally new situation resulting from the critical evidence on the tapes of june 23, 1972. general hague told me that he had been told of a new and damaging evidence by lawyers on the white house staff who had first-hand knowledge of what was on the tapes.

the substance of this conversation was that the new disclosure would be devastating, even catastrophic, in so far as president nixon was concerned. based on what he had learned from the conversations on the tape, he wanted to know whether i was prepared to assume the presidency within a very short. of time. and whether -- within a very short period of time, and whether to make recommendations to the president as to what he should now follow. i cannot express adequately in words how shocked and how stunned i was by this unbelievable revelation.

first was the sudden awareness that i was likely to become president under the most troubled circumstances, and secondly, the realization that these new revelations or disclosures ran completely counter to the position that i had taken for months in that i believed the president was not guilty of any impeachable offense. general hague in his conversation in my office went on to tell me of discussions that went on in the white house with those who knew of this evidence. general hague asked for my assessment of the whole situation. he wanted my thoughts about the

timing of the resignation. and if that decision were to be made about how to do it and how to accomplish an orderly change of the administration. we discussed what scheduling problem there might be, and what the early organizational problem would be. general hague outlined for me the situation as he saw it, and the different views in the white house as to the courses of action that might be available and which were being advanced by various people around him on the white house staff. as i recall, there were different course being considered. number one was that one was suggest that we write it out and that the impeachment take its course through the senate, or two, others were urging resignation's sooner or later. i was told that some people backed the first course. other people backed a resignation, but not with the same views as to how and when it should take place. on the resignation issue, there were his -- there was put forth a number of options that general

hague reviewed with me, and i recalled his conversation with very is options being considered, including one, the president temporarily stepping aside under the 25th amendment, number two, the laying of the resigination until further along in the appeasement process, and number three, trying first to settle for a censured vote as a means of avoiding either impeachment or a need to resign, four, the question of whether the president could pardon himself, five, pardoning various watergate defendants, and that himself, following his resignation. the rush of events placed an urgency on what was to be done. it became even more critical in

view of a long impeachment trial which was expected to last possibly four months or longer. the impact of the senate trial on the country, the handling of possible international crises, the economic situations here at home, and the market slowdown in the decision making process in the federal government, were all factors to be considered, and were discussed. general hague wanted my views on the various courses of action, as well as my attitude on the option of resignation. however, he indicated that he was not advocating any of the options. i inquired as to what was the president's pardon power, and he answered that it was his understanding from a white house lawyer that a president did have the authority to grant a pardon,

even before any seminal action had been taken against an individual, but obviously, he was in no position to have any opinion on the matter of law. as i saw it at this point, the question clearly before me was under the circumstances, what course of action could i recommend that would be in the best interest of the country? i told general hague that i had to have some time to think, further, that i wanted to talk to james sinclair, and i also wanted to talk to my wife before giving a response. i had consistently and firmly held the view previously that in no way whatsoever could i recommend it are publicly or privately any steps by the president that might cause eight

change in my status of vice president. i could become president if a vacancy occurred, and as vice president, i would not do or say anything that might affect the president's tenure in office. therefore, i certainly would not be ready under these new circumstances to make any recommendations about resignation without having adequate time to consider further what i should properly do. shortly after 8:00 the next morning, james saint clair came to my office. although he did not spell of the details, there was no question in my mind, that he consider these revelations to be so damaging the impeachment in the house was a certainty, and that conviction in the senate was a high probability. when i asked mr. st. clair if he knew of any other new or

damaging evidence besides that the june 23, 1972 tape, he said no. he told me he had not been the source of any opinion about the presidential pardon powers. after thoughts on the matter, i was determined not to make any recommendations for president nixon on his resignation. i had not given any advice or recommendations in my conversations with his aid. but i also did not want anyone who might talk to the president to suggest that i had come with intentions to do so. for that reason, mr. chairman, i decided i should call general

hague on the afternoon of august 2. i did make the call late that afternoon and told him i wanted him to understand that i had no intention of recommending what president nixon should do about resigning or not resigning, and that nothing that we had talked about in the previous afternoon could be given any consideration in what ever decision the president might make. general hague told me he was in full agreement with this position. my travel schedule called for me to make an appearance in mississippi and louisiana over saturday, sunday, and part of monday on august 3, four, and five. in the previous eight months, i had repeatedly stated my opinion that the president not be found guilty of any impeachable offense. any change of my stated views or even refusal to comment further,

i feared, would lead the press the conclusion that i now wanted to see the president resign. to avoid an impeachment vote in the house, and probable conviction in the senate, so for those reasons, i remained firm in my answers to press questions during that trip and repeated by belief in the president's innocence of impeachable offense. not until i return to washington, did i learn that president nixon was to release the new evidence late on monday, august 5, 1974. at about the same time, i was notified of the president that he had called a cabinet meeting on tuesday morning, august 6, 1974. at that meeting in the cabinet

room, i announced that i was making no recommendations to the president as to what he should do in light of the new evidence. i paid no recommendations to him either at that meeting or any time after that. in summary, mr. chairman, i assure you that there was never at any time any agreement whatsoever concerning a pardon to mr. and if he were to nash mr. nixon if he were to resign and i were to become president. mr. chairman, i am turning out to house resolution 1367, and house resolution 1367 asks whether i or my representatives had any knowledge of formal criminal charges against richard m. nixon, and the answer is no. i had no idea that the grand

jury investigating the watergate break-in and cover-up had wanted to charge mr. and send as a co-conspirator -- mr. nixon as a co-conspirator. i believe that it serve the staff and the members of the committee in the development of its report on the proposed articles of impeachment. beyond what was disclosed in the publications of the judiciary committee on the subject, and additional evidence released by president nixon on it august 5, 1974, i saw after september 6, 9074, a copy -- 1974, a copy of

a memorandum. this was furnished to my counsel and later made public during a press briefing at the white house on september 10, 1974. i have supplied the subcommittee with a copy of this memorandum. the memorandum lists matters still under investigation, which, i quote,, "may have some direct connection to activities under which mr. nixon was personally involved." the watergate cover-up was not included in this list, and the alleged cover-up is only listed as being the subject of a separate memorandum not furnished to me. of those matters which are

listed in the memorandum, it is stated that none of them at the moment, rises to the level of our ability to prove even a probable criminal violation i mr. nixon -- by mr. nixon. this was related to the possibility of criminal charges by mr. nixon while he had been in office. the second question in the resolution asks whether alexander haig referred to or discussed a pardon with mr. nixon or his representatives at any time during the week of august 4, 1974, or any subsequent time. my answer to that question is not to my knowledge. if any such discussions did occur, they could not have been a factor in my decisions to grant a pardon when i did, because i was not aware of them.

question three and four of house resolution 1367 deal with the first and all subsequent references to or discussions of a pardon for richard m. nixon and him and any of his representatives or aids. i have already described at length what discussions took place on august 1 and 2, 1974, and how these discussions brought no recommendations or commitment on my part. these were the only discussions related to questions three and four before i became president. question four relates also to subsequent discussions. i was in the discussion of the subject of a pardon of former president nixon and anyone representing him.

also, no one on my staff brought up the subject until the day before my first press conference on august 28, 1974. at that time, i was advised that questions on the subject might be raised by media reporters at the press conference. as the press conference proceeded -- or proceeded, the first question asked about the pardon, as did other later questions. my answer to those questions, i took the position that while i was the final authority on this matter, i expected to make no commitment, one way or the other, depending on what the special prosecutor and the court would do. however, i also stated that i

believed that the general view of the american people was despair. -- was to spare the former president of a criminal trial. afterwards i became greatly concerned that if mr. nixon prosecution and trial were prolonged, the passions of generated over a long. of time with serious -- long period of time would seriously prevent our country from healing from the wounds of our past. it would not be effective if it had to operate in the atmosphere of having a former president under prosecution and criminal trial. each step along the way, i was deeply concerned of what would become a public spectacle and the topic of wide public debate

and controversy. as i have before stated publicly, these concerns led me to ask for my own legal counsel as to what my full write of pardon would be in this situation. and i at the special prosecutor what criminal actions, if any, would be brought against the former president? i also asked how long his trial would take. as soon as i have been given this information, mr. chairman, i authorize my counsel to tell herbert j. miller, the attorney of richard m. nixon, that i would grant a pardon to the former president.

when on september 4, 1974, mr. becker had been asked, with my concurrence, to take on a temporary special assignment to assist at a time when no one else of my selection had yet been appointed to the legal staff of the white house. the fourth question, mr. chairman, in the resolution, also asks about negotiations with mr. nixon and his representatives on the subject of a pardon of the former president. this was not, so far as i'm since her, a matter of negotiation. i realized that unless mr. nixon accepted the pardon that i was for. grant, it would not be effective, so i certainly had no intention to proceed without knowing if it would be accepted. otherwise, i put no condition by

granting of a pardon which required any negotiations. although negotiations had been started earlier and were conducted through september 6 concerning white house records of the prior administration, i did not make any agreements on that subject regarding a condition of a pardon. the circumstances leading to an initial agreement on the presidential record are not covered by the resolution for the subcommittee. therefore, i have mentioned discussions on that subject with mr. nixon's attorney, only to show that they were related in kind to the pardon discussion, but were not a basis for my decision to grant a pardon to the former president. the fifth, sixth, and seventh

questions of house resolution 1367, asked whether i consulted with certain persons before making my pardon decisions. i did not consult at all with attorney general saxby on the subject of a pardon for mr. nixon. my only conversation on the subject was vice presidential nominee nelson rockefeller, and to report to him on september 6, 1974, and that i was planning to grant the pardon. special prosecutor jorosky was contacted on my behalf to rid the discussion -- on my behalf. the discussion was about what potential criminal charges would be brought against mr. nixon. there was a copy of the memorandum that i have already referred to and have furnished to the subcommittee. the opinion of the special prosecutor was how long a delay

would follow in the event of mr. nixon's indictments. on september 8 from 1974, the principal portions of mr. jorosky opinion were given. he wrote regarding the delay of a. from nine months to a year and perhaps even longer. this was on the question of how long it would take to conduct a trial. he noted that the complexity of

the jury selection made it difficult to estimate the time. the copy of the full text of his opinion dated september 4, 1974, i have now furnished to the subcommittee. i did consult with my counsel, with benton becker, and with my counselors, and they are also attorneys, outside of these men, serving at the time in my immediate staff, i consulted with no other attorneys or professors of law, or facts or legal authorities there he done my decision to grant a pardon to the former president. questions eight and nine of house resolution 1367 deal with the circumstances of my

statement or any statement received from mr. nixon. i asked for no confession or statement of guilt, only a statement of acceptance of a pardon when it was granted. no language was suggested or requested by anyone acting for me, to my knowledge. my counsel advised me that he had told the attorney or mr. nixon, that he believed the statement to be one expressing contrition, and in this fact, i was told it mr. miller concurred.