in it and less cole in it, there a number of challenges that economies will face. the first is as was mentioned, the fuel price. you can see on the left of these various bars, the coal price across the region. i have representative economies that is lower than both the diesel price and the gas price. the second bar is the price in 2024. the difference between $2 gas and $14 gas in malaysia or $4 and $16 in japan. these are enormous differences. getting away from coal is going to depend on required -- require concerted and long-term actions. another challenge is a really huge increase in electricity demand and all of the

infrastructure cost. you need to build the transmission. you need to build the terminals. there is a lot that needs to be built. despite that huge growth, by the end of the following ten years, we still don't see the same energy access across asia that we see in japan or certainly not in the united states. for example, by 2024, despite the really unfathomable increases in electricity demand, they will have 2/3 for japan today to say nothing of asian or india. huge gaps would remain even after the coming decade of growth. there even more challenges. how will japan replace the nuclear fleet that won't return. in japan there is very high tariffs for wind. wind producers get incentive to

produce, but there is arduous three or four years as opposed to taking a wind plant up. in korea, you have strong wind. china has lots of new policies to discourage or prohibit in some cases the citing new coal plants in the coastal provinces. many of the technologies require an enormous amount of water and pressure from agriculture and general embarrassity with talking about issues. this is something i think people don't quite appreciate. it's hard to power an island if you don't have somewhere from which to move power in. you have to have more plants available to provide reliable power. transmission connections across islands or gas connections is difficult. then in the non-island for

china, it's these vast expanses. huge transmission lines. financing and we talked about how hard it is to build a heavy capex plant. the long-term operation for the plant get worse if you have got and if you have dollars and nominated fuels and local currency is weaker against that dollar, the cost of buying fuel overtime gets harder and harder. okay, so ge is a technology company and the solutions i'm going to present are mainly technology solutions, but so one way forward is more gas and more efficient use of that gas. so the chart i am showing on the left is the increase in the natural gas supply in china over ten years. it's about a three-fold increase and how are they getting there? some is pipeline from places like this and some of that is

increasing likhovtseva wiified natural gas. they purchase from all parts of the world. some of that is conventional gas and their own tight hands. more gas through china and similar, but not as dramatic for asean. there is a technology story which is that in addition to the super critical coal, the gas plants are for those who are using both the gas and the steam turban. twice as efficient as a coal plant. the very latest newest and most efficient is from us. it's called the ha combined cycle. a 61% efficiency that was almost unthinkable. this is a dramatic improvement in how efficiently we can use gas. next slide, please. another way forward, this is

something i think is really going to lead to dramatic changes in asean. they talked about the lack of infrastructure for gas. one of the ways that countries are beginning to get around is a virtual pipeline. what does it mean? instead of the route where you have got an actual pipeline on a huge tanker and humongous regasification facility for your l and g, you have a smaller l and g with compressed natural gas or small l and g. if you can see it, you can put it in a box and in a truck and you can use roads and barges to get it to where you need to get it without building the pipeline. if you are not committed to one pipeline, you have much more flexibility in how to get from origin to destination. it provides a new degree of flexibility. we have an mou to develop

virtual pipelines and we just commissioned the fuelled island power plant and about a 35% savings versus deals. incredible change in how gas is going to be delivered. the scale of course is quicker. it's months instead of years to get these things done. it displaces these with lots and lots of advantages. some of the engines that can use the gas can also use biogas. with all of the biomass resources, we are talking about the remote islands in particular. you can use them and gasify them and put them in the engines. flexible power solutions and modular or small. post the tragedy of fukushima, you can't think of nuclear without questioning how it will be safe. one of the new technologies that

ge has available is the economic simplified boiling water reactor. it's not much less of a mouthful, but it's now the safest reactor and just about a week ago passed another review by the u.s. nuclear regulatory commission. it cools for seven days which is twice as good as the competitor and simpler in that there far fewer components. you don't need the steam generators and you need fewer things that can fail. fewer systems in total. you need 20% fewer staff. all these advantages to nuclear that i think we need to consider rather than writeing it off entirely. lastly, in terms of the solutions, wind designed for

land constrained environment. that's 2.85 mega watts per turbine. that's a big turbine. the idea is that if you have a land constrained environment, you have a lot of power. this is made for japan and it could be transferred with minor modifications and the land constrained environments. thanks very much for your time. >> thanks, michael. as a layman and not an energy expert, one of the questions that emerges when i listen to the different presentations, it suggested that there is a lot of technology that is a lot cleaner than what we are using now.

we can't afford it. my question really for any of you and particularly for jonathan, whether you know of financing for emerging economies that want to buy cleaner and even if it's coal, cleaner burning technology and can't afford it. is there credit out there? >> in the case of japan, japanese investment bank is now supplying support to asian countries to introduce high efficient coal. and also we have many more schemes to help the countries in asia to deploy low-carb on technologies.

>> speaking from the u.s. perspective, this is a tricky landscape in a lot of different ways. first of all, the technology landscape itself is never static. one of the things we spend a great deal of time and focus on with the u.s. department of energy in the technical collaborations we have with international partners and with industry domestically in the united states, it's on technology development and coming down the cost curve. you can see if you look at some of the different technologies across the energy landscape, how dramatic the progress has been. you see massive reductions, for example, in onshore wind and solar pv. the same is starting to happen

in concentrated solar power. the opportunities of today and tomorrow are not and there is a strategy issue that is an important one to grapple with. when it comes to coal technology. the united states understands that coal will be a part of the global energy mix. it is a part of the mix of the united states, although today's share of coal in our total fuel mix is significantly reduced from that which it was as little as years ago. you have seen a drop from where it has been 50% of the fuel mix today and it a couple of years

ago in response to the realtime movement of natural gas prices in the u.s. where a very surprising thing happened where you had coal and natural gas representing roughly equal shares for a short time, about 32% of our fuel mix. so we expect that coal will be a part of the fuel mix going forward both in the united states and elsewhere. but then there is what technologies. this has been certainly true as they have both underscored, that all things being equal, it is preferable to have higher efficiency coal technologies in the market place. there is no question about that. the u.s. perspective is that the use of public finance to support non-carbon capture technologies in the market place is not

something that we feel is appropriate. why? because as the iea's energy technology perspective's document that was just released in the summer, they stated and will quote because it's a very appropriate distillation of the issue, the rise in coal use with the technology is incompatible with the change objectives. this is the dilemma we are trying to find a way to manage. they do not support the broad use of public finance through multilateral or bilateral sources. we do have an exception to that rule which is for the least developed east developed

economies and this is a choice to try to put emphasis on moving that which we are doing in our own market. from that, seeing cost so this technology is being brought forward. opening it up to questions. >> i just would like to have --

less efficient coal power plant. let's say super power country like you and you have an environmental issue. they are going to the power plant for the future. in that regard, back of why they had to subsidize, i fully agree. we had to stick to a reality for that we need to have support to

make sure that and until they have some breakthrough, east asia cannot afford as a state already that this assignment in u.s. about the gas. asia will not enjoy it at all. in terms of energy security and they continue to have in terms of energy mix, coal is more reliable and provides energy as to billions of people. most think they will build as more power plant and stick to the public financing to be more realistic and provide a better environmental issue with a global issue. i do not. thank you. >> please introduce yourself. >> i'm nancy tom for the

endowment for international peace. i have to follow-up on the previous question. they are like the world bank and being more reluctant with coal power plant. i was wondering if others might actually step into public financing like chinese financier or like the newly established breaks and the aiip. i would like to hear your opinions on that. >> our concern is that the japanese concern is that if there is no and the organization with the bank or aiib may have opportunity to find it with the

project. in such a case if those new institutions have the same discipline focusing only on the efficient, it's okay. if they have no discipline, financing every new project. that will be increased. we hope that they are encouraged and the open countries to deploy the carbon green coal technologies.

my question is on the short-term energies and contingency planning for an oil supply disruption. the questions are the region prepared in terms of strategic oil stocks or oil sharing plans for an oil supply disruption. is the institutional architecture of the region the various international forum such as the iea, asean, asean plus 3, as well as the east asia summit. are they up to the task in terms of the region's institutional framework in dealing with short-term energy crisis such as

an oil supply disruption using tools such as oil stocks or oil sharing plans? if not, what can be done. >> they put in place the tools and institutional and technological that can help us to move forward. i would say from the u.s. perspective, we think that this issue that you raised is a very important one. and one where there has been very, very promising collaborations that have gone on, but i would not for a moment say that it is sufficient.

and the vibration has been under way. you can look at the work that will the international energy agency has done with a number of east asian partners looking at preparedness and what reserves are in place. what one would do. how industry continues to provide for the population. they hosted.

>> china has this enormous stake in the functioning of the global oil markets can provide the kind of transparency that is the necessity for all global participants including china to make informed decisions. we welcome the steps that the chinese administration has taken with the department of energy to deepen collaboration. it's a really, really important thing. institutional framework and good start and much more needed.

>> it's the question and this is the who really understands more on this issue. actually asean, i talk about asean. we are trying to come up with similar iea requirement of 90-day in brazil. asean as you know that not many countries met those requirements. more of the stuff they hold in these company levels. less than 30 days and only some countries like thailand where they commit to 90 days. 60 to 90 days.

except japan. particularly, we understand that building this kind of adversity would cause investment. when they build the structure, it had to be linked to the economy. not holding stuff over 90 days. it's important to look closely into the structure of economy. and that's if there is any disruption within days to two weeks with that particular

country. it did not have the stuff of building the reserve. >> in the case of japan, we see the experience of the creation among asian countries to respond to such kind of crisis. he talked with us under the framework of japan and under the mechanism to how we can tackle this issue. the discussion is still in the

early stages. it takes more time with some kind of more solutions that might be decided or agreed. >> the u.s. state department with university of wyoming. my question concerns nuclear power. we had some comments on that, but would the panelists care to comment further on the futurure of nuclear power in the energy mix, particularly in japan and elsewhere in asia.

>> now it restarts them going and as to the initial two nuclear, the nuclear regulatory authority approved the safetiness of those two we are now in the process of persuading the local people. we will have the restart. they have already presented the

presented them for the nuclear authority. two or three weeks's time. more will be restarted. to what percentage we can read up on the nuclear programs. the very clear direction is that the japanese government decreases the dependency from long-term period. >> they wanted to see the asean perspective so they understand that. we did not deny nuclear power. it's always the option of the energy mix. that requires a lot of capital and it is really expensive.

the construction of the nuclear power plant. the nuclears in asia, it's a very strong thing. the accident worries the concern about nuclear power and in the future, it's an area that i'm looking for and now we are looking at more on the response and preparedness in terms of them. the support in terms of accident. they operated in the daytime information and in that regard, they have the asean members. this nuclear is one of the options, but perhaps it's not really now.

>> thanks for the question. and one of the issues with nuclear is the infrastructure that needed to be added to the grid. you can't put in the grid anywhere. it needs to be robust and hardened. for asean countries in particular, that's one of the challenges. not just the cost of the plant, but the infrastructure that comes with it. elsewhere in asia, the ambitions are startling and on the order of 50 gigawatts over the next 10 or 12 years that they plan on adding. in india, we have been encouraged with the recent news for the prime minister's visit signalling willingness to relook at the nuclear reliability law which is a major obstacle to the development of nuclear there.

i jumped back in to the link which is about energy security. by the title. from our perspective in the u.s., we feel very, very strongly that the energy security derives first and foremost from the high degree of diversification and the systems including institutional systems around the energy economy. we will see nuclear continuing to be a part of the fuel mix in the united states. obviously countries need to make their own choices. particularly in a world looking for low and no carbon energy solutions. we see a real value in the civil nuclear sector and see this as being an area that is full of potential for important collaborations also. to move the frontier, the technology frontier and when

they are talking about small modular things over the horizon. >> we have two or three minutes standing between us and lunch. >> i'm nina and i work for the children's national medical health system. this question is suggested to the doctor. you mentioned population as one of the things that you would have to face eventually down the road. has it partnered with health agencies either regional, local, or national level to address this. with the hope it would reduce the number of consumers and the demand for energy consumption.

>> thank you very much. it's hard for me to address this. besides china, they have clear policies on the population. asean does not have any population policy in terms of the restrictions. i am aware of the issue and think there is a lot of public health programs in terms of providing more safe and in terms of maternal mortalities and children and adults. it's not really controlled public in itself.

ase asean, there is a sector in asia and not really a particular type of the issue. i'm aware that there no policies that is controlled into the population for asean itself. >> the center for strategic conferences was on east asia security issues. the secretary for asian specific security. the ambassador to the u.s. and a foreign policy adviser to senator john mccain. >> they absorb the senior director's speech. i thought that was excellent. we are back on the record by the way.

>> it's a real pressure for me to introduce our third and last panel today as we talk about asian architecture ahead of the three summits over the apec and g20 summits. we have a terrific panel with us today. we appreciate these gentlemen sharing their time away from very busy schedules to join us. on my right we had the newly ensconced david sheer, the secretary for east asia specific. you know that david had come back from hanoi to do this job. he was the ambassador there. david is an expert on china and

southeast asia. i think for many of us who are in the trenches every day on these issues couldn't think of a better person for the pentagon to put into this role. next to him is one of the top southeast asianists in the united states. he also is singapore's ambassador to the united states. he was most recently ambassador to indonesia who has been the ambassador to australia and kuala lumpur and has a long career in the singapore ministry of foreign affairs working on asia-related affairs and finally, a good friend and a real hero of southeast asia and asian policy in the senate is

chris brose. he works with senator mccain in his office. he was a senior staffer in the armed services committee. he rose through the ranks doing pretty interesting things including writing speeches for and advising people like colin powell and condoleezza rice. he knows what he is doing and spends a lot of time in asia. much more than most senate staffers unfortunately. without further adieu, what we want to talk about on this panel, architecture as it relates to security. i will ask my colleagues to the order they are seated in. it's over to you. >> thank you very much, ernie. it's great to be back at csis and it's a great honor to be

joined with ambassador curry and chris brose. i have been in my job, my new job at dod for almost exactly one month now. i can tell you that from my experience during that one month that secretary of defense hagel has strong personal interests given all of his history. the secretary of defense, the deputy secretary of defense, the under secretary of defense for policy, my chain of commands are deeply committed to the rebalance to east asia. we have seen that most recently in deputy secretary works travel to the region. you will see a flurry of senior level meetings and counters this fall including coming up

securities and chaired on the american side by myself. before bee go to tokyo. you will see a defense consulting talks with the chinese. you will see military meetings and security meetings with our allies and also in november, president obama will be visiting and he will take part in bilateral discussions. the rebalance is among the highest priorities on my agenda as well as on my senior leadership's agenda and you will see me focusing very clearly on rebalance-related issues in my earliest days in my tenure.

i would like to share with you the issues that i will be focusing on, i think. as assistant secretary of defense over the next months and years. the first is modernizing alliances and partnerships. there is a lot on the agenda in this regard. from the review of the events guidelines with japan to the issue with our rok allies to updating the defense framework with india that we mentioned in the joint statement. they are foundational issues with the architecture in the western pacific. all of these will guide the way in which we shape our alliances

over the next 10 to 15 years. we want to finish strong with our successful conclusion and implementation matters. and this certainly will set the stage for closer cooperation between the united states and the important allies in east asia and the pacific. the second very important big issue will be working on is solidifying the military to military relationship with china. secretary hagel had a good meeting the other day here in washington. the foreign minster was here to review u.s. bilateral relations and planning for the president's trip to beijing. as you probably have seen in the

strategic and economic dialogue, both recommitted to working on a set of confidence building measures and we will be working on that set in advance of the president's trip to beijing. a third set of big issues we will be working on is knitting together allied and partner cooperation. evan spoke during his remarks of our trilateral partnerships, particularly u.s.-japan, australia. u.s.-japan-india. we are encouraging greater cooperation among our allies and partners in east asia. we are gratified to see increased cooperation between japan and australia and between japan and india and we are gratified to see greater diplomatic coordination between partners and friends like vietnam and the philippines and

malaysia. this strengthens security and stability in the asia pacific and can contribute to the reduction of tensions, particularly in the south china sea. another area i will be focusing on is strengthening u.s.-asean defense ties and we have seen the establishment over the past few years of the admm plus. we have great progress in building regional defense cooperation. secretary hagel is certainly very interested in his encounters with his counterparts during shangri la dialogue and also recently in april the connection with the u.s.-asian defense ministerial meeting in honolulu. we hope that can be a future

fixture in our defense relations with asean. of course as we work all of these issues with our partners, friends and others in east asia, we will want to be working with them to manage disputes and issues that generate tension. i don't need to mention how important maintaining stability in the south sea is to us. our position on this has been made crystal clear on many occasions. it's going to remain a strong focus for me and for my leadership in dod in the coming months. why don't i stop there and let my other friends comment. >> ambassador? >> thank you.

congratulations again to them for looking at the bigger pictures in the asian architecture and particularly security architecture. how critical it is for interests going forward. i wanted to look both at the big picture and asean's role. as an asean ambassador, much focuses around centrality. for the main reason why the architecture is important, it's that the region has enjoyed a peaceful and secure and stable environment for several decades. something that many of us in fact take for granted. these conditions have enabled growth and process terity. the key thing we want to see. the regional architecture with the economic architecture is designed to preserve this. in this post cold war environment, we are starting to see fairly dramatic shifts.

that's where the conversations with the architecture become important. the environment is shifting and southeast asia in particular is becoming more complicated as a region as we have to reposition ourselves in the context of washington's and beijing's search. the regional dynamics are more washington and beijing. they continue to adjust with each other and with asean. and tensions in the region have risen and there several flash points that have to be managed. that makes the architecture a very important issue for us to look at. asean's role and the term of centrality has in many ways played a very crucial part in maintaining regional peace and security. i don't want to overplay this role in asean's strategic weight. those of you that know the rest

of the region, know that the central role is due to the fact that we are a neutral platform rather than because we carry a strategic heft. in that platform, they offered a space for which all major powers discuss issues of concern and to build trust and promote cooperation. what they have done is to promote an open and inclusive approach and it's a critical part that we are not just an organization, but we are also looking at the organization thatted which ares our dialogue and papers and other major powers with us. this is characteristic in all the mechanisms we have put in place that form a regional architecture that is open, inclusive and out wart looking. we value the contribution of theus to all of the asean led forum. the asean minsters and the east asia summit. for more than 60 years, the

presence has been a stabilizing influence that has underpinned asia's and asean's growth. there are and we will hear this regularly multiple and overlapping structures of the regional architecture that reflect the complex diversity of the asia-pacific region. this overlapping structure makes a regional framework more flexible and resilient. let me go to each one of the structures we have in the security area. the first and the longest running has been the erf which was created in 1994 as a forum for security discussions that will engage not just the major powers and middle and smaller powers to preserve the state in the region's stability in the coast cold war e.r.a. it's the only multilateral framework in the region. yet another structure that we

have is the admm plus. they are forcing in 2006. its establishment of the admm first was the commitment of asean countries to have the establishments to work together to address transnational security issues. we then expanded the admm plus that comprises asean with eight other partners. that has become not just a channel for dialogue, but an action or i don't wanted avenue for defense minsters from the region and to come together to discuss practical solutions to manage peace and they have done exercises that pull together militaries into these operations. the third is the es that looks forward to the next the president will ascend. with 2005 and with it expansion in 2011 to include the u.s. and

russia, it is again brought the major powers together into the leader's ahead forum. the key focus for them is to focus on consolidating for the future. they remain the leader's forum architecture in order to keep the mechanism alive and healthy. it adds balance to the structure and ensures that the eas remains a credible forum for constructive cooperation. various ideas in which the u.s. can play a roll in the functional cooperation areas include disaster management, education, finance, energy, which you spoke about earlier this morning. looking ahead at all these structures, a frequent complaint and almost criticism has been that all these rcn centered regional architecture structures have emergent into a spaghetti

bowl that people find difficult to unravel. from rcn's point of view, the mechanisms each play a unique role. they reinforce each other to serve the common interests of maintaining regional stability and growth. the prospective of trying to rationalization the security architecture into a single arrangement or to try to impose a hierarchy among them will be very difficult. if not impossible. instead, our view is that these regional structures and architecture should be allowed to evolve at their own pace as we improve ways to get better coordination and develop synergy among the mechanisms. in this regard, we have actually welcomed dialogue partners to give ideas for the future of this architecture and taking on

proposals and how to improve the existing frameworks. what is critical is that we must ensure that the regional architecture for all the reasons they have been successful is that rcn remains at the core. keeps a neutral platform and continues to reflect the diversity of the region and remain open and inclusive. indonesia has proposed a treaty. next week, the eas workshop and security framework will meet to discuss this further. these are some of the ideas of we are looking at how we can make this better. let me say a few words about the u.s. engagement. the u.s. has played a role in the regional architecture and remains a critical and unique component in the future. it's important for the u.s. to stay engaged. this must be broad-base and multi-pronged. the region appreciates the u.s.'s support and has come across in the comments and speeches that have been made by u.s. leaders about how important the neutrality is. rnc and the u.s. share many strategic perspectives. we should work together to

continue to build up the existing institutions and keep the architecture open. we also welcome the u.s. support for key principals like peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with international law, the right of freedom of navigation and the right of over flight. in conclusion, let me summarize the three principals that rcn looks at regional architecture. first rcn should be at the core in order to maintain rcn unity and cooperation. second, it should reflect the diversity of the region. it should remain open and inclusive. as there are overlapping structures, from our point of view they make the regional ar i can -- the architecture should follow the agenda rather than vice versa. thank you very much. >> excellent. thank you very much. chris? you want to give the ambassador

a round of applause? i don't want to deny that for you. it was coming your way. chris, over to you. >> thank you. thanks csis for having me here today. i'm extremely flattered to be among the company that i'm in. clearly, you can tell one of these things is not like the other. my first name is not ambassador. by way the making the point further i was telling dave earlier that i my my signature accomplishment on asia this year has been playing some small role in the confirmation of david shear. you can sort of see clearly what you are getting here. congress is not a participant in asia's architecture. maybe you can be thankful for

that. what i would like to try to do is give you a sense of how the hill is looking at some of these security challenges. we can back into the asia architecture question. what i would like to try to do is frame it in terms of two questions, both of which appeared on the cover of the economist this year. i think these are the kind of -- the two questions that are kind of overhanging. this was a couple weeks back, very plainly, what does china want. this is something -- as members of congress are looking at the region, they are traveling through the region. i would stress it's a small group. it's not extensive to the entire body. this say question that i think members of congress are confronting. they want the united states to have and believe the united states can have and should have a very constructive relationship with china. they see all of the benefits and all of the common areas of cooperation between the countries. they recognize that -- there's a

lot of up side there for both countries together. and yet, they look at a pattern of behavior that is concerning to them. the pattern of behavior is something like this. it's a series of actions that are not sort of purely diplomatic. neither are they purely military. they occur in a gray area. there appears to be a strategy of incremental creation of facts on the ground or in the air or at the sea. there's a concern, i think, that this is what we are seeing is sort of a long game, an attempt to incrementally move by move change the status quo unilaterally, never in a way that's fundamentally trips a

wire and triggers a response on behalf of the united states or others, but nonetheless continues to move the needle such that five to ten years from now we're all looking back and it's a very different region that we're looking at. and i think there's the prevailing view in the congress is, china thinks about its foreign policy. when people say, well, china surely, you know that you are causing other countries to gang up against you, to criticize you, you are driving them closer to the united states, i think these prevailing view on the hill is, there's intent there, even if we have to infer it from action. that intent is perhaps unsettling, which is this to some extent does reflect conscious action. it's about more than the particular territorial claims that we can discuss today further. it's about a conscious attempt

to challenge the balance of power and change it, about changing key elements or challenging key elements of the international order, particularly the peaceful resolution of disputes. and most fundamentally as american is concerns, it's a challenge to the american presence and historical role in asia and commitments to countries that we have either formal treaty commitments or otherwise. so i think the question that i think many members of congress and the prevailing view in the congress comes back to is, again, what does china want. the second sort of security challenge that i would point out may be somewhat provocatively also appeared on the cover of the economist. what would america fight for? fight is not necessarily to be used literally. but i think the point is, what does america ultimately seeking to do. what are we committed to doing? what are our red lines? and i think as members of congress, congressional staff travel through asia,

particularly ones who are maybe less experienced there, they are struck by a prevailing sense and pervasive sense of doubt and question about the united states. this isn't so much a question of questioning america's capability. there's a lot of capability economically, militarily. although, i think increasingly people are questioning that as we see the effects of sequestration and declining budgets. i think it's more a sense -- this is what people sense traveling through the region. it's a question of america's resolve, commitment, judgment. what it's ultimately seeking to do here. there are different reasons for this. obviously, i think there's the sense of people looking at our opinion polls. obviously, they can discern that americans aren't too into foreign policy at the moment. that may be changing. but there's a question of sort of national distraction to what extent americans are focused on this. there's also sort of the question of national dysfunction. the question of, look, america can't even fix its own fiscal problems. how much are they going to help us when we need them? there's that doubt that lingers out there. look, i would say when it comes to asia and security policy,

there's a lot of bipartisan cooperation. and it really is an area that is somewhat unique from other aspects of our foreign policy where i think there's broad consensus on the rebalance. that being said, i think there's a real question about whether the rebalance is sort of coming into being. that say sense that we hear as we travel throughout the region as well. is this more rhetoric than reality? i think part of this, too, is it's a question about the u.s. response to asia. i heard most of evan's speech. most of it i would agree with. i think the question is not is america doing something. clearly, america is. the question is, is what america is doing adding up to a set of actions unilaterally, bilaterally, that is you

fundamentally impacting china's calculus as it presses out in the east china sea, south china sea. there's the other piece, which is that it isn't just about asia. our sense -- something that many members of congress have been struck about, how much in their conversations on secury issues with asian partners, the topic comes back to ukraine and how the u.s. is responding. or last year the response to syria. the crossing of the purported red line and the lack of oh follow-through. many people in asia asking what are the implications of this for us. maybe it's an unfair question. maybe it's oubds, but it's real. that's something that i think, again, many mongs are very sensitive to. so i would just say in conclusion the architectural issues we are discussing are important.

there is a lot of potential for them to resolve these challenges, to clarify views and thinking. but age old problem. geo politics determines the capacity and ability of architecture to function. when it comes to the geo politics now the questions i try to lay out today are really concerning. there are questions and i think hear in this town we are seeking answers on, trying to come up with better answers on. it will overhang diplomacy and what we are seeing as the region comes together in november. >> thank you very much for those remarks, chris. thank you for the panel, for your excellent insights. i would like to start with a question and open the floor.

the question is many have argued that the foundation of long-term security in asia is economics. i didn't hear any of you talking about that. i wonder would you agree or do you think it's sort of a separate channel that security thinking is linked to, but it's not related to. how do you think about it? >> i snuck in one word that said economic. and economists throughout. you know how the whole thing. but, you know, they go together. because we have the morning discussion on the economic architecture. i didn't want to get into all of that. the key thing that obviously is

there is tpp. it's top of the mind of every asia-pacific leader, whether or not they are in tpp. even those who are out wonder what it means for them and how can they get into it. those who are in obviously are in the throes of difficult negotiations to get it done. particularly for the u.s., the constant conversation that comes up is when are we going to get this thing done? it really is a key not just about the economic future of u.s. interests but the strategic engagement of the u.s. in the region. it's a test of how people see the u.s. engage nmt the region. look ahead that's what we want to see get done. we have rcep that doesn't include the u.s. the community comes into force

next year. it is a critical thing. >> i want to address your question from a slightly different angle by drawing on my experiences in vietnam. some people said the rebalance is primarily a military strategy. i want to try and counter that impression. in vietnam the rebalance and throughout the region actually certainly brings all of the tools together to pursue our interests in the region. in vietnam, we were pursuing, using the diplomatic tool the by using the core diplomatic particularly on regional issues within the multilateral context. on the economic side we are negotiating with vietnam as a member of -- as a tpp partner. both americans and vietnamese, i

believe, recognize that tpp is not just -- will not just benefit us economically, but it is strategic in many ways. finally, we very strongly promoted defense cooperation with vietnam. we see the fruition of our efforts in that regard with the partial lifting of the ban on lethal weapons sales to vietnam yesterday. so our implementation of the rebalance in vietnam certainly was multi pronged. again it relied on all the tools of state to pursue our interests. that's what we are doing throughout the region. the if there is uncertainty in the region it shouldn't be uncertainty about the u.s.

commitment to continued peace, security and prosperity there. >> thank you. >> just a brief point. i agree completely with what both dave and the ambassador said. tpp is critical to get done. without it, it will be a real problem the u.s. faces. it cannot be one dimensional. the challenge is if you look at it, it is a positive trend. i think the concern is the security trend may be headed if not in the opposite direction, not in the same direction. maybe not fragmentation but rising tension. this is something that was pointed out. can you continue to have economic integration when you have rising challenges. is that something sustainable or not? >> thank you. the floor is open. start here. this is a gentleman in the front. again, please tell us your name and affiliation if you have one. i have a question for the secretary. you mentioned one of the -- related to the alliances. as you know, b united states and korea plan to announce an agreement when they hold the annual defensive ministers meeting this month.

can you tell us about how close the two countries are to agreement at this point? thank you. >> we agree with you. we are discussing conditions based approach to op-con with our counterpartses. this will be an issue i focus on during my presence next week in seoul. >> right here, the gentleman in the front. >> thank you. great presentation. my name is ema skodin. i just would like to ask the other two panelists to answer to the extent they can the questions that chris posed. ambassador, in your opinion, what does china want and what would america fight for, in your

opinion? >> well, unlike members of congress, we don't know what china wants. they have become the number one trading partner for all the countries. we value the relationship being built economically. tour is, traffic, trade, investment how to link the areas closer together.

the question that keeps coming up obviously can you have economic integration when you have ongoing security tensions. is there something that southeast asia discusses with the chinese. talking about the code of conduct in the south china sea, moving it forward. what we want to do again to use the asean platform to manage these tensions. tensions do arise. how can they work together as a group in the maritimes security space. not all of us are claimants. to work with china, work on the framework where there are certain rules that we all respect and move forward towards. >> i strongly agree with the ambassador on this. it's clear i think one of

china's highest priorities is to maintain an atmosphere and a situation in east asia that allows them to continue growing economically. i think that's probably among their highest priorities. the chinese want to the question is how you do it. that takes us to the second part of the question. among our highest priorities in the region is to maintain and increase respect for the international rule of law. this has been an issue in the south china sea and an issue in the east china sea as well. we will look to our partners and china to work with us to strengthen the rule of international law in our interactions with the chinese throughout the rest of the year and in the future.

>> thank you. i have a question. you have made an interesting comparison between eastern europe and east asia. i want the u.s. to adopt something like the attitude to the regional emergency in these regions. at least to watch carefully. public opinion or decided by any other factors? look, from where i sit, no. i think the policy that the u.s. is trying to follow in both places is consistent in the the

sense that we are objecting to what russia is doing in krain because they are violating the sovereignty of an independent country. there are different challenges but in some sense, similar. >> gentleman right here. >> you mentioned what would be on proeb's agenda when he visited china in terms of strengthening the relationship with china. also the u.s. just lifted the long-time ban providing lethal weapons to vietnam yesterday.

will that create more stability or more unstability in the region? thank you. >> as i mentioned in my remarks, we want to create a strong stable military to military relationship between the united states and china. road, rules of behavior.

we are discussing these we hope to have something positive to we thought it was only appropriate as part of the partnership we look at lifting the given the growth of the relationship with vietnam. we believe this will help vietnam contribute to regional piece and stability. it will help vietnam in disaster

relief and humanitarian assistance, for example. we thought the current progress was sufficient for us to partly lift the ban relating to items

relating to maritime security. >> i just wanted to follow up on that and ask chris. you guys worked on the vietnam issue on the hill. was there bipartisan support for that? >> yeah, there absolutely was. this was something we had been working on previous to the decision. this was a lethal arms em bar go is maintained under authority. it didn't require an act of congress to ease it.

the administration i think rightly wanted there to be political support for this. wanted the congress's reaction to be favorable and i think what we were able to do, senator mccain introduced a resolution back two weeks ago and had on it as co-sponsors senator pat l leahy, senator corker. so very key leaders in the senate when it comes to asian issues. so, yes, there was a very, very good degree of bipartisan support for it. it's just a question now of building further upon them. >> the lady here. >> my name is nadia with the liberty times. first of all, i would first like to ask, taiwan is asking for the u.s. to build submarines.

first of all, i would like to know has any decision been made from the d.o.d.'s point of view? do you think this is contributed to the stability or the security of this region. thank you. >> of course, the u.s. remains committed to providing taiwan with the defense articles it needs to maintain its security. i have been strongly committed to this throughout my career. particularly during my stint as the director or as the deputy assistant secretary of state for chinese affairs in the state department. i continue to be strongly committed. no decisions have been made yet. as parts of our overall

interacti interactions with the region will be in close koupt parts on this and a range of defense-related issues. >> thank you. i'm david carl, a business consultant. i'd like to get back to the question of what does china w t want. that presumes that china is a unified actor and capable of acting in a deliberative, rational way. another way to look at this is that china's foreign policy actions are actually reflective of factional struggles within the leadership. robust bureaucratic actors that are resistant to party leadership. i have a colleague in beijing who sent me a message last week that he heard rumors of an assassination attempt against president xi.

i'm wondering if instead of thinking of china like a strong state capable of foreign policy. that what we're seeing is actually reflective of internal pieces. >> i have no doubt the domestic political considerations contribute to the chinese foreign policy decision-making. i have no doubt that strong bureaucratic interests also contend for influence within the chinese governmental firmament as they do here. as they do everywhere. part of our challenge is the chinese aren't transparent about the decision-making. defense relations.

part of the effort at engaging the chinese in this area is to help them increase their transparency. in the defense area. that will be part of the goal in pursuing these confidence-building measures. >> this is a wonderful panel. my question is this. the wonderful speaker from the president's executive office, dr. evan medeiros. he sounded positive about the ability to get tpp done. i wish i felt as confidence as he does. what's your prognosis i mean probability. what's the prognosis? what are the biggest obstacles to getting them done?

domestic policy here in the united states? >> no country is more in the game on trade than singapore. ambassador? take a swing at this one. >> i heard a tpp will be cone by november. they never specified a year. we have been hearing it every time we come together for an apec meeting. i wouldn't hazard a guess of when we are going to get it. how long it's going to take. very different type of economies.

one large. the world's largest economy and a small island state. it took a long time to get a bilateral free trade agreement just between two countries. can you imagine the complexity of 12 countries including the world's third largest economy. including countries like vietnam that had to make significant economic changes. canada, mexico. covering 40% of the world gdp and not just trying to get an agreement among that u be bilateral agreements among each one as well. you look at the complexity of that. you can understand why it's taking some time to make sure we get a good agreement. when you want to have a 21st century agreement that's what the expectation is. we have to make sure what we get is something that is useful for

everybody that makes sense. you need to give the negotiators a bit of room rather than deadline after deadline, november after november. they are working to get it done. the leaders have given directions of what they would like to see done. we are hopeful that as soon as it's ready, there is no reason to keep it away. just trying to understand and appreciate the complexity that goes into putting this thing together. as i look at the process, i'm sympathetic to them. given what they are trying to achieve. >> i can say a word on the domestic politics piece. part of the challenge is it's regrettable that the senate

didn't give the administration trade promotion authority. an added challenge to the complex negotiation that's ongoing is that if you are a trading partner of the united states are you putting your best offer on the table if you don't have to negotiate with congress afterward? i still think it can get done. it's too big to fail. when it gets done, not clear. what i would simply say i think politically speaking whether this happens there is a window of time to do this in the beginning of next year. if there is the will the agreement to do it, once you slip past that the challenges you get into american domestic politics, where you get into the primary cycle for presidential politics, that tends to play to the extremes.

you don't want this to drag into next year so it gets wound up into american political cycles spinning up again. >> my name is matt field with nhk japan. this is for assistant secretary sheer. you mentioned you will be going to tokyo and they are unveiling a set of guidelines. i was hoping you would share details with that. particularly if you could touch on that it would be great. thank you. >> we certainly welcomed the japanese cabinet's decision to review the collective self-defense issue. we welcome any opportunity to strengthen the alliance and for japan to play a stronger roll in the alliance. i will be going to tokyo with danny russell. we will there hold a session we'll chair for the u.s. side a session of the ssc as well as the sdc.

it's our expectation we'll release the interim report on the guidelines. not the revised guidelines themselves but an interim to map the way forward for the ultimate revision of the 1996 guidelines. >> for those who don't, those who don't ssc and sdc? >> securities subcommittee. sdc is the security defense committee. >> i didn't mean to put you -- that's not fair. >> you should see the book he got when he went to the pentagon. it was probably two encyclopedias. the gentleman in the back here. i'm sorry to put you on the spot. >> this is a question that from your perspective what is the most important aspect of this

process? and what's the most important aspect or issue from the united states perspective in this whole defense review process. how do you think this review will contribute to the regional security? >> i'm going to answer the second part of your question first by saying a strong u.s. alliance is a foundation, a keystone for overall regional security. that's been the case for decades. i expect it will be the case for decades in the future. to keep the alliance strong, vibrant and up to date, we

review the guidelines. that's our aim in doing so on this round. >> right. the gentleman back here in the blue shirt. >> i have a question. deploying a third missile defense into south korea now is controversial. so would you clarify the stance on this issue? additionally our asia pacific commander, admiral locklaer's last week that he endorsed the military taking steps to fuel an rcbm that could be a threat to the u.s. and washington based this week that north korea has completed a major upgrade of its main rocket site. so would you evaluate is this an

imminent threat actually? thanks. >> we are always concerned about developments and the expansion of a north korean threat to stability on the korean peninsula and we are always discussing that very closely with our counterparts including their developments in the missile area. we have made no decision on the korean peninsula. we have not discussed thad deployment with our rok counterparts, but we discuss generally the issue of the

missile threat to south korea and we look forward to working with our rok ally to meet any potential missile threat to korea or to the region. >> i want to inject a question. i was involved in a couple of the meetings while prime minister modi was here from india. i have to say the energy around the visit was incredible. we really haven't talked much about india. i wondered if -- you know, a lot of us who work on these issues think the new power shot is looking coming over the south pole over australia and looking at both oceans, the indian and the pacific. what are the prospects for india to be a player now under modi and this new emerging security architecture across the indo-pacific?

anybody care to take a swing. >> i think prime minister modi's visit to washington was very successful. those of you who read the joint statement noticed there was a very strong defense component. the two sides agreed to renew the now 10-year-old defense framework and we will be addressing ourselves to that issue with our indian colleagues soon. at senior levels. we held the first round of the defense trade and technology initiative just before prime minister modi arrived. this is an effort to increase our defense technology cooperation with the indians under secretary of defense for acquisitions and technology. frank kendall is very interested in pursuing this with the indian side. i think he will be visiting india in the near term. i think this is an important aspect of the relationship.

we are ready to move forward on it. we also discussed the desirability of increasing our overall military operation including in exercises. i would look to for a stronger u.s. india malobar exercise in the future. perhaps with japanese participation as well. these are all positive developments in u.s., india defense relations. we'll be looking to carry forward on the momentum of the very successful visit here by prime minister modi. prime minister modi will have his first outing next month in myanmar. india plays an important role. we bring them in economically, politically, strategic discussions. even before prime minister modi took office for some time, each one of the structures has them

as a key player. it's how i think the general expectation is while they will play a role in the region, the prime minister will focus on domestic, economic issues as all political leaders do. we encourage them to play an active role throughout the region. >> i will say briefly, senator mccain and i had the opportunity to meet with him after he came into office. we were struck that there is a lot of opportunity for the u.s. and india to gain altitude in a partnership that over the past few years has lost quite a bit of it. hopefully the meeting here is a good first step in that regard. i think our hope and the hope that's shared in the congress is that we'll be really ambitious. that we'll have the genuine

consultation about how we view the world, what we want the world order to look like and really sort of bring it back to those kinds of questions. obviously, the sort of domestic priorities that the ambassador mentioned will be very important for india. the u.s. can make a huge contribution on that and really be sort of a partner of choice for india. but i think when it comes to the issues we're talking about here, one of the things that we're also very pleased to see is the extent to which india is

building its relationships with other countries in the region. the india-japan relationship is obviously the one that's got a lot of focus. we see that as hugely valuable, and the u.s., japan, india, they can really build that tri lateral out, put strategic content into it and p put content into it. i think that would be an enormous positive thing. >> one of the real advocates and practitioners of developing modern asian architecture, former foreign minister rudd talked about constructive realism, in a sense that the keel for him in all of this discussion of regionalism, and

regional architecture is really the need for countries to find a common narrative that focuses on public goods, that he could use to build confidence. i found throughout the day whether we're talking about economics or energy or security issues, that the panelists in general agreed with kevin that that's where you -- that's where the progress is going to be made. and i think -- i hope you'll join me in thanking this panel, and thanking everyone who put the program together. [ applause ] thank you all for coming. and have a good afternoon. c-span has coverage of hundreds debates this fall. coverage continues with the dick durbin as he debates jim osama bin ladener wise woois. and live at 8:00, the

massachusetts governors race between martha coke lee and charlie baker. we'll be looking for your reaction via facebook and twitter. at 9:00 eastern from georgia, david purdue with michelle nunu. after that we head to minnesota for al franken and mike mcfadden. again, we'll be looking for your reaction via facebook and twitter and at 11:00 eastern a debate from hawaii. tonight on the communicators -- >> i was -- this is repurpose ing from the department of defense. this process, the lessons learned have really been learned. it's going wonderfully.

and there are three spectrum is paired, it's internationally harmonized, it's 65 mega. hurts. we are excited and we're going to turn around and have the broadcast incentive option. that discussion is really going well too. i think we have a green. hill report, which the scc put out. the numbers have turned the discussion from a policy discussion to a business decision. so we're excited about both options. i'm certain our carriers are going to come to them and it's going to be a win-win for everyone. >> tonight at 8:00 eastern on the communicators on c-span 2. last weekend in new hampshire, a senate debate was held between jeanne shaheen and her challenger and former massachusetts r senator scott brown. here's part of their debate. >> when the president does

something great, i'll support him. when he did you want do something great, i will make sure i let him know that. i voted with my party and the other side 50% in my entire career. that being said, as an independent senator i can do that. so when we work together with the president on an insider trading bill, my bill work for, you got it done. i worked with democrats to bring it over and we were at the signing ceremony. the higher hero veterans bill, the ability to give veterans jobs and ability to get a tax credit. the arlington cemetery bill worked to make sure our heroes. three people, body parts, i think senator shaheen even voted for that. we were able to get it done so there are times certainly. if you want gridlock, send senator shaheen. if you want an independent problem solver, the most

bipartisan senator in the united states senate. i'm your guy. >> your response? >> yes, my opponent, again, talks a lot about that survey. what he won't tell you is why the koch brothers are spending $2.6 million in new hampshire to support his campaign. i don't think they think he's going to support small business. s. they know he's going to go to washington, he's going to continue to support subsidies to the big oil companies. the five biggest made over $90 million. he wants to give them over $20 billion in subsidies. i don't think that's good for new hampshire. >> she's distorting a bill that democrats voted against. if you want to talk about money, we're both raising money the same way. she has her groups, we have our groups. i'm scott brown and i approve those messages. i have no control over any other

messages. we have an opportunity because the people of new hampshire are smarter. they are sophisticated being the first in the country presidential. they understand that senator shaheen has not held town hills. . when she went to washington she changed. she has a zero rating. with respect, i have been down there fighting for small businesses. that's why i have an a rating with the national federation and also the united states chamber of commerce. >> again, the national federation of independent businesses has some members here. i appreciate what those members do. but the fact is like his support in so many other ways in this campaign, they are funded by the koch brothers. we need somebody in washington who is going to really support our small businesses. that's what i have done my whole career. that's what i'll continue to do. >> recent polls list this it race as leaning democratic. you can watch the entire debate and several others any time online at c-span.org.

what's being done from the private sector. this is an hour. >> is the wire covering my tie? good morning, everyone. it's great to see you here today. scott did a good job on acknowledging a number of folks we want to thank. i'm going to do a quick repeat of that. but again u or changs to the center of national policy. it's hopefully the first of many more to come.

also a great thanks to our sponsor, who really makes this event possible and intelligent conversations move forward. scott mentioned our speakers. we're delighted to have michael daniel, jeff moss, peter singer and frank. they are going to be part of a panel discussion that's going to be quite remarkable and informative. ha a little bit of promotion. they have a big announcement today. we are pleased to announce the debut of an initiative called pass code that we call it the modern field guide to security and privacy. it relies on a global network of monitor reporters from around the world led by our editor and our deputy editor. both of them are here today and they'd be happy to talk to you more about the monitors new initiative. we tend to provide deeply reported solution-oriented, nonfear mongering coverage that

moves your understanding of the discussion forward. you can find us at csmpasscode.com. this is the debut so stay tuned between now and january when we do our formal launch. so we're here today to talk about cyber security, an important topic. one that the monitor's office is investing resources in and why is that? well, primarily, it's a big story. it's a big, complex story that touches a lot of lives. more people than ever impacted and concerned about privacy and digital security. much of the discussion often times to a degree focuses on fear, uncertainty and doubt. so what are the monitored values we're trying to bring to this discussion? 107 years of journalism that's deeply reported and global and will admit to our biases. we're constructive,

progress-minded and solution-oriented. these days all media companies have to decide where to invest and what to cover most particularly and one of the areas we're investing in is cyber security. pass code is how we're doing it and remember csmpasscode.com. it's now my pleasure to introduce verne voil and one of his colleagues gave me a headline describing him as a rare breed that is a deep technologyist that can speak english. i immediately tried to hire him. he is the director of tech molg for the cyber division and his team leads an advanced cyber technology team responsible for understanding emerging problems and solving those problems in

advance for customers worldwide. . verne will introduce a vision for a new paradigm for cyber security thinking with the goal of making our systems more resilient. after verne funishes, we'll take some q&a and with that, verne, the floor is yours. >> thank you, thank you. good morning, thank you for having me. so i'm here today to start a new conversation. a conversation about looking at cyber security a little differently with the goal of making our systems more resilient. my hope is that this conversation can move us past the age of the high profile breach. many of the breaches are very well known, they are very personal. like the home depot breach, the target breach, the jpmorgan chase breach was in the news front and center. these are very personal because they are criminal in nature.

>> but that aren't always as well known. so you have the attack some time ago. this was an attack on a critical infrastructure provider. and you have the issue with the french and british navy back in 2009 with a virus. these attacks were aim ed at disabling those organizations' ability to conduct their primary mission. you can imagine the military unable to perform its mission as a result of a computer virus. this is a very real potential problem. then you have the insider threat, we're all familiar with the edward snowden case and you have the cyber vigilantes. conducting espionage, disrupting systems for a wide variety of

purposes. so this is a global, borderless problem and it's not going away any time soon. so the real question is why is it so easy for the attacker and march in and out of these systems as if nobody's watching. and you'll get a lot of different opinions on that. people spend their careers trying to figure that out. but when you blow away all the smoke, i think it comes down really to two root problems. the first is that the cyber systems that we rely on are inherently vulnerable. so the commercial operating systems, the commercial software packages, the commercial hardware platforms, these are all designed primarily to address profit motives. they're easily obtained by the attacker. they can exploit and find the vulnerabilities in those systems, and that's largely what they take advantage of. that's probably not going to

change anytime soon. and then the second problem is that you have machines against people in a high-speed battle. now, what do i mean by that? well, you have hundreds of thousands of malware samples being generated every month. that's not people writing that malware, those are machines. they are machines circumventing all of our defensive systems. that malware operates inside an infrastructure that is automatically controlled by machines. the command and control modes, the hot points, the channels that connect these different adversary systems together are typically set up, used one time, or for a very limited period of time, and then they're torn down and they're never seen again. now, let's contrast that with the way we defend our systems. we have fixed infrastructures. monitored by thousands of

people. climbing up mountains of data trying to sort through what's happening. patching software, writing signatures, reacting and chasing, and trying to find this machine-driven, fast-moving target. so you have a static human controlled system battling with an automated machine-driven system. and at the end of the day, the machines are going to win that battle every time. it doesn't matter how many people you try to put up against those machines. and so how do we fix that? how do we overcome that? how do we develop a protective strategy that makes the systems inherently resilient? one way that i'd like to introduce into this conversation is by making our cyber systems disposab disposable. i don't mean disposable in the sense that you throw them away like a paper cup. i'm talking disposable in the sense that they are single use.

because if you think about it, that is exactly what the adversary is doing. their malware, their command and control channels, single use. we can do the very same thing with our own cyber systems. this would make it far more difficult for an adversary to gain access and persist into the system, if what they saw on tuesday was no longer there on wednesday, and it was different yet again on thursday. so this would shift the battle from us chasing them to them chasing us. and that would move the advantage in favor of the defender. there's six technologies that make this concept possible. you're going to recognize them because they're already out there, and they're in varying degrees of maturity. so three of them are sort of the biggies, and then there's three smaller enablers underneath that. so the first is the cloud computing paradigm. so this is a technology that is designed to be flexible,

reconfigureable, you can establish, compute and store devices anywhere, anytime. it's essentially a disposable technology. the second big pillar is software defined networking. think of this as cloud for communications. so, again, rather than a static communication channel, software defined networking allows you to do ad hoc networking, unconventional devices to behave as routers, and really provide a lot more of that flexible, refig aurable disposable technology. and while many people think that the mobile end points are more vulnerable when you look at the security architecture, it's actually moving in a direction of being more secure. and again, it enables a very flexible, reconfigureable, disposable approach. when you bring those three pieces together, the software

defined networking, the cloud and increasingly mobile end point, you have the opportunity to create an entirely disposable system. so rather than fix static gateways, static routes, static end points that never move, we would have virtualized moving gateways, ad hoc networks, and single-use private end points. this system would be controlled by our network defenders. rather than spending their time reacting and chasing and climbing up that mountain of data, they would spend their time proactively recon figuring these systems so that they are very hard to understand, and breach. underneath of those three big building blocks, there are three other critical enablers. they are root of trust, identity, and always on encryption. part of the operations is to configure, operate, dispose and restore.

that restoration piece comes from the root of trust. identity is a very important thing within this paradigm. being able to understand the identity of the machines and the people, and permitting them into the system, permitting them the access to information based on their identity, and their role is a key to keeping unauthorized people out of the system. and the always on encryption is a no-brainer. all right? you don't open the door and let somebody come in and walk all over your network. you need to lock down zones and lock down different information based on always on encryption. so when those six technologies are brought together, it creates the opportunity for us to enable a disposable system concept of operations. let me talk about a couple of scenarios of how that might be used and illustrate the application of this system. for the first one i'd like to talk about is an operation

center scenario, more of a strategic network. so imagine operators coming in to perform their job, and rather than carrying their device with them, or finding the device on their desk, they walk into the building and they pull it off of a rack, or out of a bin. that device would have been established to a known good state by a name of people, network defenders that know how to do that from the root of trust. when he turns the machine on, it has an identity, it turns on the encrypted channel. that machine authenticates itself into a central system. the operator then uses his fingerprint, his voice print, his card to authenticate himself into the system. and his personal configuration is loaded onto this device. when he walks into the operations floor, his other analyst friends are there with him. and they form up a private ad hoc network among the team. fully encrypted, only the people

permitted to participate in that mission are allowed inside. those people can be outside the building. they can be around the world. they can be anywhere. so those operators can function throughout the day within this private trusted environment. and at the end of their shift, they turn the machine off. they toss it back in the bin. and they leave. that machine is then wiped clean. it's given a new identity. and the next shift of operators can come in and do the same thing. so that system is essentially disposed of. never used again. the routes, the modes, the identities. if somebody were able to see and understand it when they came in the next day, it wouldn't be there anymore. now, let's take that into a more tactical environment. because tablets and laptops are not the only kind of end points that we need to be concerned about. we need to think about unmanned vehicles, uavs. we need to think about sensors on uavs. we need to think about fire

control systems. all of these can function within the same disposable concept of operations. so imagine, if you will, a special forces team has been asked to go perform a rescue mission. they need to have overhead surveillance to help them out. and we're going to use some uavs for that support. so once again, the uavs should not be sitting there with untrusted software on them, with untrusted operating systems. they should be loaded for that specific mission at the time of the mission, from a strong root of trust. the people flying the uavs and controlling them should have their identity authenticated into that system so that they can move the uavs over to the areas of interest. then the ground forces will have some device that is also built from a strong root of trust. so that they can receive the realtime video they need to conduct their mission. and in the end, all of those systems will come back, they'll get wiped clean, they'll be

given new identities, and once again, that system is essentially disposed of. never used again. so this is a concept that would be very frustrating to an adversary. imagine them spending their time mapping, trying to find holes. maybe they actually identified some. but the next time they come back to take advantage of that, that system's no longer there. so how do we get there? how do we move from the react and chase model to this proactive disposable concept of operation? one thing you don't do is take the current security architecture and implement it onto the flexible reconfigureable infrastructure. for example, you wouldn't want to take today's monitoring application and put them into the cloud. all you're doing is implementing the same paradigm and you're still going to be reacting and chasing. what we need to do is take