starts with that $21 million he gave in 1937 and 1939. the 500 and $5 million to be exact that has been given to the nonprofits in the state of colorado courtesy of his money. courtesy ofenter is his resources. ,he legacy really is a better higher quality of life. >> throughout the weekend, american history tv is featuring colorado springs, colorado. learn about its

rich history. learn more at www.c-span.org. are watching american history tv, all weekend, every week it on c-span 3. >> coming up next on the presidency, a conversation about the world war ii leadership styles a president franco roosevelt and british prime minister winston churchill. -- policy posse institute hosted this event. >> welcome to roosevelt house. , the actingpolsky dean of hunter college. and professor of political science. our program this evening features to visitors, who are deeply knowledgeable about the decisions that led up to be historic moment 70 years ago when allied forces stormed

ashore of normandy to begin the final struggle of the liberation of europe from nazi germany. nigel hamilton is the author of the just published book "the mantle of command." works, allenher packwood is the director of director of churchill archives centre. the leading authority on all things western churchill. in a few moments, i will turn thethe microphone to tina, sponsor of our series on churchill of which at this evening's program is the final installment. following her introduction, each of our guests will speak for about 20 minutes and then they will join me for a conversation. we'll have time for audience questions before we close. over time and

perhaps it is so with the two men who are the subjects of this evening's program. antern churchill exercise influence over the immediate postwar depreciation of allied leadership. he was admire for his determination after the fall of france in 1940 through the battle of britain and for his warning an iron curtain was dissenting after the war. his reputation was helped in those small measure to buy his own magisterial six volume series, the second world war. fictionthe first great that the war generated. fdr's star faded when his political enemies depicted him as the great sellout of the people of eastern europe. more recently though, we have seen a shift in historical perception will stop historians have found more to admire and roosevelt. had lost ofill stashed some of his luster.

-- had lost some of his luster. i am very much in the roosevelt camp. how fitting we should be having this conversation here and roosevelt house. the restored home of franklin and eleanor roosevelt shared with franklin's mother. the president no longer resided here i the time of pearl harbor but he spent important formative time in this space both before and after he was stricken with polio. he interacted here with key political leaders. it is safe to say he developed many of his ideas about the world within a few feet of where i now stand. guideideas would in turn and grand strategy for better and worse. and influence the kind of world order he hoped to develop as part of the victory he expected the allies to achieve. this program is part of a series that is the brainchild of tina flaherty. she gives new meaning to the

label "multitalented." she starred as a radio personality in memphis, tennessee. she began a successful career as a corporate executive. she became the first female vice atsident of colgate and then two other leading corporations. she is an accomplished arthur at the tripping too many journalists and news -- she's accomplished author and journalist. rereleased ineen 2014 and in an expanded edition and would mark here in a special program a month ago. tina has been active in flint three oh such as a generous donor to the writing center which will host its fourth annual conference -- conference. -- team has been an active philanthropist and generous donor to the writing center

which will host its fourth annual conference. >> thank you for that very gracious introduction and all of you for showing up tonight. are glad you chose to be with us. call youshould i andrew. i heard so many good things about you. it and innot take decided to google you. your credentials are very impressive and even more impressive is what your students say about you. they say you are not only brilliant with your words but with your humor. i think we can all expect not only an enlightening discussion but a lively discussion. speaking of enlightenment, i have to say something right now. hunter, this is ruminating series would not have been possible without the

involvement of the whole hunter college which starts with the and also roosevelt, the director of public policy here at the roosevelt house and lewis, who i do not think is here tonight, but he was involved as well. briefly, everybody wants to know -- why are you so hung up on roosevelt? i am home got on here, too. why are you so hung up on churchill? the reason i am so hung up on churchill is i believe everybody needs a hero in life. churchill is my hero for all seasons and for all reasons. that is why i sponsored it. [applause] as a lot of you know, this is the culmination of our churchill series. adly, it was such

blockbuster, what a run and we have had from the very beginning . just to briefly review, i do not know how many of you joined us when churchill's granddaughter spoke about churchill's leadership and what made him a leader for the ages. that was a beautiful lecture and followed by the roberts lecture. he is a renowned churchill and ar and historian best-selling author. his was wonderful, too. and lee olson, who wrote a book that i love, it is so beautifully done. her latest book is "those angry days." she spoke of her book. that was followed by randolph and ginny churchill, the great granddaughter and great grandson of sir winston. they spoke of the influence on western churchill's mother from brooklyn and beyond.

and we filled the playhouse for that. after that, we had paul read. he wrote the book with the late william manchester. anybody who knows me knows by now i am a hands-on person and i like to get involved in all aspects of the project. starting with the vision of this which was wonderful, i had such -- what i was trying to say and it better.team made also, i got very involved with selecting the speakers. what a lineup of the speakers we have had. tonight is the icing on the cake. this it has -- this is really been a splendid series. i think the you are going to meet every body but i will briefly say we have three distinguished individuals. allen packwood, nigel hamilton,

and andrew polsky to moderate. alan. introduce my friend he is the director of the churchill archives center at the university of cambridge in england and a fellow and the executive director of the churchill center in the u.k. allen has worked on sir winston's personal papers since 1995. it is almost one million it now. those papers are alongside the prime minister's margaret thatcher and john major. is a very gifted writer. i am lucky to know him because he did something for me for my book. think everybody can agree that this is a lot of churchill and you have done a lot of things with churchill. you are absolutely the right

person for the right time to speak. the title of his topic is "courage, planning, and preparation." to briefly introduce nigel hamilton, our next speaker. nigel hamilton is british-born. there he is right there. he is an american citizen now. he is an award-winning biographer. he divides his time between new orleans and and. -- and boston. he has written more than 20 works of history and biographies which have been translated into 16 languages. i am sure a lot of you are from the u.s. is best-selling work on the young john f. kennedy "jeff youth."jfk: reckless his previous book was -- a

biography on the last 12 president from fdr to george bush. i have heard nigel speak several times. he speaks with passion and he speaks with insight and he speaks with a great grasp of history. as you know, there are going to be books for sale later in that book is called "the mantle of command." it is a key entry in the ongoing debate as to who made the grand strategy in the early war years. was it roosevelt or churchill? talk is how nigel's fdr overruled his generals and laid down the strategy by which the allies would win world war ii. our moderator is sitting right there, andrew polsky, a distinguished scholar of the american presidency. his most recent book is "elusive victories the bank --

victories." , you can direct us from here on. we have changed the order of the speakers. thank you. [applause] >> thank you very much, tina. withyou said nigel speaks -- but i thought you were going to say with a british accent. [laughter] i have lived here with a 20 years. can i not get rid of it? i am delighted to be here. i cannot think of a more appropriate place. i did speak at the fdr presidential library last week on memorial day weekend. this is even better.

thank you very much, everybody for coming out tonight. panelelighted to be on a with allen packwood, who i got to know when researching my new book in cambridge and more recently in new orleans. we share a love of jazz. [laughter] -- i am also not any fortunate and you asked me to speak here in the roosevelt house. i am fortunate to have actually met winston churchill. in fact to have stayed with winston churchill at his country when i was a student at many, many years ago. an incredible weekend and i think we should take a moment to remember churchill's wonderful

daughter, mary, who died on saturday evening a couple of nights ago. and i went to mary and her husband, they had a farmhouse near winston's house. they put on a beautiful birthday party for winston. i have to say that when i think back to that memory am a i do remember mary as a wonderful lady. and i met her in subsequent years. that weekend, i was only 19 years old and i remember the night before at the dinner, which i do not think mary came to. but her sister, sarah, who was an actress came. she came very late. montgomery, who had

to watch is on his wrist. wrist.watches on his sarah came in and said she was sorry but was for her sing. said, darling, you better have a joint. she said, that will be wonderful. -- you better have a drink. she was wearing this very tight, little, black number. i was 19. i was rather knocked out. very low-cut.as [laughter] and the lady churchill had a friend, a houseguest friend called mrs. hanley. she was a rather old-fashioned lady. i think i am right in saying she

had a -- so she takes the te out ofet -- loinet her purse. she sees the voluminous deck ok sees around the tight, black number was a fox stole as a trim. said, "shouldn't that be up there?" anyway, a very unforgettable weekend for a 19-year-old student at cambridge university. unfortunate to spend that weekend with winston. i was incredibly fortunate to spend probably about 10 years or at least many hours over the next 10 years talking about

winston churchill with field marshal montgomery, who absolutely loved churchill, almost actually did him. him.ulated monti was the general of the army's active d-day. he had a pretty close knowledge of winston churchill and would often visit him on the battlefield and in north africa and europe. after monti died, i spent 10 years at the montgomery's of visual biographer and wrote a three volume biography which i am not suggesting any of you undertake to read as each one is 1000 pages. you can imagine i became pretty conversant as a military historian with the story of world war ii and the stories of world war ii.

and by the end of it, i think i had enough of world war ii and i came to the united states. in 20 years, i have been a presidential historian based in the boston. i have written about the young jfk and also to volumes about president clinton and my recent book was "lives of the president from fdr to george w. bush." when i finished that book, finishing five years ago, i was very disappointed -- as tina was ,lluding to to the fact that the memory of fdr has somewhat faded. i cannot believe as a military historian or former military

historian that there was not an united states as commander in chief. by virtue of our constitution, the president is not the chief executive but the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. and to think he had been the commander-in-chief from pearl harbor through world war ii , 1945,ust a few weeks just a few weeks before hitler's suicide, really stunned me. i looked into it. not that there were no books about fdr, there were plenty of books about fdr. he is the father of the new diplomat, fdr is

a stamp collector. about fdr as aok commander of chief during world war ii. , i said i would not go myk to military history, trenches -- here i am and once again in the middle of a work. volumes andrst of 2 i hope to finish the next volume sometime next year. all, why do we think has it not been a really serious account of fdr as commander in chief? one of the reasons is that after every -- every general,

every admiral wrote his own autobiography or had commissioned his biography about how he contributed. winning world war ii. i am thinking of marshall and admiral king and the secretary of war. theirll recounted how achievements in world war ii. president had not survived the war, he actually started writing what he thought would be his biography before the war began. the press responsibility made it impossible. he was looking forward in retirement to doing it. that moment, it even though he , itonly 63 when he died

never came. and so, i think in a sense the story of fdr as commander in chief has gone by default. the portrait we have in our minds of fdr is largely secondhand. it is a reflection bouncing of the memoirs of other people. trying to tell the rooseveltresident wearing the mantle of command from pearl harbor to the end of his life in world war ii. problem --the other of course, the other problem biography of of

fdr and world war ii is that winston churchill who was considerably older did survive the war. not only did he survive it but he wrote a magisterial series of books, six volumes. wongantic enterprise which him the nobel prize of literature and wonderfully written and which has survived wonderfully to this very day. you cannot pick up the book without being entranced by its ability not only as a writer, a brilliant writer, his grasp of history. his ability to see events in a larger context of history of century of previous grand

strategy, of previous character. extent, theome views which we have inherited of colored to a great deal by the way that sir winston churchill or trade in the second world war -- portrayed in the second world war. view,churchill's point of churchill expresses his gratitude, his admiration for the president, for the president's generosity and the president's willingness to help out britain. find fault with sir winston in my new book, it is not

againsti have anything winston churchill or his memory -- i have nothing but admiration and respect for a single-handedly 1940 and that in was one of the things that monti used to say to me again and again, montgomery directed the division and felt that it was not anybody left in britain who could just marshall the morale of the country. i have enormous respect for what winston churchill achieved in 1940 in standing up alone against dictators. i do think that my criticism of winston churchill is more that

his view of the war which is his that of is very much where her, westminster directed military operations. and i have taken on a different project. my task is to tell the story of world war ii for the first time from the point of view of the white house 1600 pennsylvania avenue. studys to say the oval behind fdr's bed room, the oval office downstairs, the rooms he down intheir -- there the ground floor.

he converted on the advice of winston churchill into his map room. all of his secret signals went out and came in. interviewn able to the last surviving officers from that map room and many of the diaries relating to fdr's role as commander in chief of world war ii. i can't tell you it is quite different from the one we have come to accept. you see the president of the united states in his role as .ommander-in-chief first of all, you see him stunned and shocked on the day of pearl harbor. exactly as winston churchill was when becoming prime minister

when the germans sliced through the french and british lines and expedition,ritish the same sort of force that had been sent to europe in 1914. and being evacuated. and in the mantle of command, you see in a similar situation on the night of pearl harbor. stunned, and without much idea of what could be done since the entire american fleet had been sunk. then you see him taking the reins of a different kind of power than he had ever had before once congress authorized a declaration of war. first against the japanese, who

started the business, and then hitler who declared war on us on the 11th of december, 1941. it is fascinating for me and i hope it will be fascinating for you to see how the president actually takes over the running of the military. forhow much we owe to him the way he did it. the first thing he does, he decides to ignore largely public opinion. there is panic in washington. across the whole united states, there is a call for the war to be prosecuted against the japanese. after all, is the japanese that has attacked the u.s. hitler has declared war and that it's a piece of paper in berlin. it is the president of the

united states who said, no, germany first. we could defeated japan and hitler would still be in complete control of the whole of europe pretty much. ,here as if we defeat hitler japan will follow within a few months. he was absolutely right. the second thing is, the united states generals in the war department -- i will be very brief because it is in the book and it is a dramatic story. a story i feel very strongly about. my father was evacuated and went back to d-day as the youngest battalion commander in the british army. and my father -- he never went to college, but he rose to great heights. and he like many young officers

felt that the british army had been let down by the people in the war office. and i think there were a lot of american servicemen in world war ii who felt the same about the war department. the secretary of war at that stilson whory served in world war i and with general george marshall was determined that the united states should -- if the president had decided to pursue first, wellgermany then, let's go to berlin. let's cross the english channel, the russians need our help, there must be a second front. we will cross the english channel in 1942 or the latest,

the spring of 1943. it is the president of the united states as commander-in-chief, this is a lesson, a moral that goes through this very day, the president of the united states that has to say to the secretary of war and all the senior generals of the war department, no. attempt togoing to cross the english channel in 1942 or even in 1943. we have not shot a bloody bullet and germany yet, not one. been fighting since 1939. what in the hell do you think you mean by this plan? is,if the crux of the book roosevelt's fight with united states' generals and admirals who at one point, in the summer

of 1942 comes very close to mutiny. this is something that has been really covered up in the years since because of the president wants to do something else. it the president great pet scheme. and that was not to land across the english channel but to land in northwest africa and controlled morocco and algeria where united states forces could be landed and could engage the germans in battle in a safe area where they could learn the skills of modern warfare. command andhting, coalition warfare. and it is roosevelt's greatness as a civilian president, who by

our constitution is given the role of commander-in-chief, i think it is his greatest that he opposed his generals and overrode his generals. and the person who helped him at that time was winston churchill. churchill hadn seen the british empire collapsed in the far east into new that -- and in new that british simply could not go through a cross english lending with partners who -- a landing with partners who were never fired a single shot at germans when there were 25 divisions waiting in france. you, but iow about have read 15 volumes and hitler was waiting for us to cross the

channel in 1942. , whent, you may remember winston churchill was put under great pressure to do something especially by the russians and he authorized a landing a cross channel, a mini version of d-day august in the 19th of a little french seaport. brigade wasan chosen for that task and almost 1000 canadians died in the first two hours on the beaches without ever getting off, without ever getting off of the beaches. president, what the proof of his policy that it was crazy to attempt -- it

would've been a mass suicide for american forces to do a cross channel invasion. , the story of "the mantle of command" is how the president overrode his generals and with the full cooperation and support of winston churchill and how wonderfully successful it was. of you imagine the secretary -- the secretary of war of the united states betting the president of the united states that torchwood -- torch would fail? i wonder how many secretaries of war have ever betted the presidents. it did not feel.

fail. that became the basis of the prosecution of the war and the ultimate defeat of the german army. i thought this might be a nice talk into allen packwood's tonight about d-day itself, the anniversary, the seventh anniversary which will be celebrating next week. thank you very much. th anniversary which we will be celebrating next week. thank you very much. [applause] >> how do you follow that? to first thing that occurred me if it puts me in mind of a churchill quote from the house of commons in 1947 where churchill said, he thought it would be best for all parties to leave the past to history.

was going to he write that history himself. here in roosevelt house, there's only one way to begin this talk and that is by sharing some of the key personal correspondence which survives in winston churchill's personal papers between these two great leaders. after the war, churchill told his private secretary that no ofer ever studied every whim his mistress as i did resident roosevelt. it was a rather one-sided love affair. roosevelt looked on with alarm as friends collapsed but he could only move public opinion so far and so fast. for churchill, things were moving too fast. by 1940, with the fall of france imminent, he writes to president roosevelt and refers to the

possibility of his own fall of office. he writes, although the present government and i would never fail to send a fleet across the reached, a point may be in the struggle where the present ministers no longer have control of affairs and when easy terms can be to the british islands by becoming a vessel state. and public and it is great speeches and broadcast, churchill remained defiant and resolute. in private, he knows how much depends on america. the psychological effect of the delivery of this letter to churchill. it is hand written by a triumvirate franklin present -- by a triumphant franklin roosevelt on inauguration day. his first day of the third term of his presidency. the fate hangs in the balance.

months in theies future. here at least, we have a clear unambiguous statement of moral support. churchill, -- will give you this. i think this applies to your people asked to us. sail on. humanity with all of his fears and on the hopes of future years is hanging breathless. clearly, on a personal level, he would like the intimacy being shown. the president not only wrote the letter by hand but even the accompanied envelope. it would've appealed to his romantic nature and sense of history. it must've been the political message being sent that would please churchill the most.

it was no accident this letter was entrusted to wilke anne arundel against roosevelt. he actually shared roosevelt views. introduction was a clear statement of bipartisan support at an indication for is deliberate linking of the british cause the roosevelt might do more than offer moral support. it is clear that churchill recognized the importance. he telegraphed back to roosevelt to say i received wilke yesterday and was moved. i shall have it framed as a souvenir of these tremendous our friendlyrk of relations which have been built up telegraphic link but telepathically. he was as good as his word. this document to a sort of brown color is a testament that

churchill framed it a hunger for a long time. churchill was also a statesman of great experience and there is no doubt he recognized not only the long term importance but also the short term importance. it was ammunition he could turn to his advantage in his oral assault on the people of the united states. in 1941, he broadcasted the letter across the atlantic and he quotes by longfellow before going on to ask, what is the answer that i shall give him your name to this great man? here is the answer. put your confidence in us. give us your faith and blessing and all will be well. we should not fail or falter or weaken or tire. neither a shock of battle or

vigilance of exertion will wear us down. give us the too andl we will finish the job. sit was set out in the characteristic blank verse format he used to give him the pauses and evidence. it marks the beginning of what we call the special relationship, unprecedented military and political union of our 2 countries. how did they finish the job? they finish is 70 years ago today with a return to europe in 1944 in the opening up of the long-awaited second front. let me continue with an ending or to paraphrase churchill. the following quote is taken from the penultimate paragraph as his closing volume five of the second world war. he wrote to the immense cross channel enterprise of the

liberation of france has begun. all of the ships were at sea and a mastery of the oceans and air and hitler to redeem was a don't. it seems to me it sums up the problem we had of operation overlord. the luxury of knowing it worked. casualties on omaha beach, there's no doubt it was a great success. it was conducted with hardly a counsel to you. complete mastery of this guys. -- with hardly a casualty. within a week, it was secured in the mission had been fulfilled. when the breakout came, it was faster and more sweeping that most had dared to predict. paris was liberated in 1944. by the end of the year, allied armies were preparing for the crossing and final assault on nazi germany.

it is easy for us to sit here today and say it was the right strategy and brought the war to an end and secured the freedom of western europe from both fascism and communism. inspite all what he wrote 1952, i do not think it was so easy, simple, and predictable for churchill or roosevelt or eisenhower. i want to look at the factors they came together to make d-day successful. i want to pick up on a point that nigel ended on and address the criticism that has been leveled against the allied leadership and perhaps churchill both in his lifetime and cents. the criticism that he obstructed the cross channel invasion and as a result, by crossing the channel in 1944 rather than 1942, he joined anglo american

for duration of the war caused unnecessary death and extending the misery of countless millions. clear from his own writings that churchill was a guilty of the strategy. heard, he was far from alone in this. you can easily make the case in doing so, he was saving more lives than sacrificing. successful? in my mind, a number of key objectives that have to be in place if success were to be guaranteed. i put them up here. he viewed a sophisticated network of cooperation, buildup of materials, development of offices and troops with real experience, mastery of the air, control of the city, superb intelligence and intentions among a greatly weakened enemy, and the right to whether an

title conditions. tidalght weather and conditions. how many were present? first of all, is assisted level -- a sophisticated level. what i would say is that rome was not built in a day, from the top down, the prime minister and president, it took time to forge a close tie and develop the trust and teamwork that underpinned the special relationship. president roosevelt said hopkins to london to discuss planning of the second front in april of 1942. the anglo-american cooperation planning was needed to make an assault against europe was not going to bring be vessels not going to be produced -- was not going to be produced but was tested in operation torch.

beaches of north africa. general eisenhower's winning ramsey andirable bradley and patton was put in ther and tested mediterranean. secondly, a huge buildup of men and materials. the logistics was simply staggering. initial naval operation was supported by 23 cruisers and 100 destroyers and 1000 other fighting ships. to sweeping of the minds has be carefully coordinated. the official assault may have been by five divisions but that was the start of a much longer andaign to liberate france push into germany. by 1940 four, there are 20 americans and three canadians and one polish. they are being protected by 4035 heavy bombers and light to

medium torpedoes and transport planes. the allied armies are consuming 600-700 tons of supplies a day with the delivery from the porch to the front lines of 20,000 times per day. it was larger and had to be more sustained that anything that had been contemplated by the alliance. such materials and a man had to be achieved before the operation could be contemplated. could it be achieved on that scale? figures vary from book to book, the germans was probably 10 times greater than the american army in 1941. by 1941, huge production plans were in place in the united states for all three armed services. it took time to produce

commission, delivery. vendor development of troops with a redaction within the development of troops with more rapid -- then the development of troops with more ralph. -- morale. to restore it after successive defeats in frace and greece. as you just heard, look what happens when the reconnaissance forces [indiscernible] [indiscernible] air.ry of the on -- thisent ofendent on the erosion forces. it may have cleared the skies above britain that the fight had to be taken back into the skies above mainland europe and it took time to build up.

the american air force did not become fully engaged until the second half of 1942. they gradually found himself fighting on several fronts and the mediterranean and russian and their losses were not sustainable. it took time to grind them down and build us up. control of the seas. the royal navy had patrolled around the united kingdom but as churchill made clear, it was only final victory over the u b oats that truly opened the direct routes. intelligence, crucial to the winning of the battle was the breaking of the german naval foes to it was the subsequent cracking between berlin and the commanders in france they gave the huge intelligence advantage of d-day. it was exploited by their elaborate plans, alarmed

churchill -- allowing churchill that in wartime proved to be so precious that should always be attended. perhaps the real turning of the tide was the one in which thathill chose overland, was the smashing of the german military machine in russia. their german losses are staggering. they lost a whole army group cobbled with the collapse of their a tie-in allies. -- of their italian allies. finally, we come to the weather. to cross thets british channel in winter. 1943, thesummer of role of the weather mitigated against an invasion inevitably delay in operation from that point until the spring of 1944.

take all of these factors together and i will argue that an assault in 1944 and not before makes perfect sense. that does not mean the allied commanders could be complacent on the night before d-day, churchill dined along with his wife and told her do you realize by the time you wake up in the may have been men killed. it would be wrong it was a lonely manifestation of churchill, it was not. was shared by almost all of the senior allied commanders. admiral ramsay, the architecture, wrote in his diary, i am under no delusion of the risks involved in this difficult of all operations. further in went even his private journal the same day, writing, it is very hard to

believe that in a few hours the cross channel invasion starts. i am very uneasy about the whole operation. best, it will fall so short of expectations of the people, name and of those who know nothing of it. at the worst, it may be the most ghastly disaster of the whole war. i wish to god it was safely over. even general eisenhower after giving the order to go, wrote a letter in the event of failure accepting personal responsibility of withdrawing the troops. , he concludedook that, the two countries, britain and the united states, replacing all their hopes, expectations, iness and one great effort western europe. failure would carry consequences that would be almost fatal.

such a catastrophe would mean the redeployment of all of the united states forces in the setback to allied morale and determination would be so profound it would be beyond calculation. words, the failure would've marked the failure of everything churchill and roosevelt had worked at. it was a make or break moment. it is not surprising that churchill was worried. in my mind, the fact that we know churchill and eisenhower does not diminish their leadership but enhances it. they did all they could to prepare for victory and stack the odds. in the end, they have to roll the dice. , it is the- courage quality which guarantees all others. winston churchill wrote those words about a king, a roller who

survived a violent assassination attempt. it seems to me it applies equally to all of those who took part in the d-day landings and subsequent military operations. myh a few exceptions, generation has never really seen a war. debt to oure prosperity to generations who came before us and those who sacrifice so much in the first and second wars. it may have taken credible courage. theight your way through hedges and lanes of normandy. there are different forms of courage and it took incredible courage to lead and choose the right moment. courage without planning is not enough. owe is the debt we churchill and roosevelt. i want to end with the worst spokenll spoke of 1944,

without hindsight, he said, it is a most serious time we enter upon, then god we enter upon inch our great allies, all great friendship. thank you very much. [applause] >> ok. thank you. well, before i begin with a few questions.

would either of you like to respond to the other that you heard in the opening? >> can you hear me? >> yes. remarks verylen's moving. my father landed at age 25, commencing 1000 men. by the end of august, he lost 600. 1000 men.ing that says it all. having said that, that's a personal feeling i have. the only thing i we may have airbrushed a little bit. we have talked about the natural fears of many of the individuals involved, churchill, eisenhower,

and allen brooke. i am working on my second volume which follows to roosevelt's death in 1945. i think there is a complicating aspect, and that is the and churchill's strategy, third strategy. >> or obsession. >> you could call it obsession. honest, i am leaving that in volume two in memory of my dad. i think we should stick with the date -- d-day. >> let me respond to that slightly. , think the point you made roosevelt was very much center

stage and involved in the key military and political decisions. often the key accusation against winston churchill is this whole mediterranean theater was an unnecessary british diversion could this was all about saving egypt and propping up the british empire. i don't buy that. i don't believe president andevelt, general marshall, the other american leaders were so naïve and stupid as to be hoodwinked by the reddish policy that was not the right policy for them. i think it was the right policy for them. it was a place where they could take the fight to the enemy in 1942 in a way they could not yet in europe. i think this was a policy that

was just as much in american and british interests. d-day, i we talk about would like to back up. your book begins essentially with pearl harbor. but world war ii begins by most accounts on september 1, 1939. the buildup to world war ii begins in the 1930's and proceeds from unit. -- through munich. when we are evaluating roosevelt, we ought to talk about it before pearl harbor and our assessment of him as president leading up to war. one of the responsibilities of a president is to prepare the groundwork and people for going to war. did roosevelt do that effectively? >> clearly, he did not. i mean, pearl harbor was a catastrophe. us who are historians rather than armchair theorists have to accept the world as it

is or was. the world as it was in 1939 in the united states and in 1940 and even in 1941 was overwhelmingly isolationist. we see it today with our president. there is a limit to what the president can do. the greatness of roosevelt was behind the scenes he began to build up america's manufacturing industry to a point where it out-produceoduce -- all the axis countries combined. he brought to washington a number of men on a $1 a year salary to make that possible, already a year before the war began. you have to look at roosevelt's strategy in the far east in sending the fleet out to pearl

harbor as a holding action. he just hoped he could hold the japanese off long enough so american industry could produce the airplanes, the tanks, the ships we needed. it it was not effective. but a president fighting -- well, you will remember in the 1940 election, he had to go around the country claiming he would never send american boys into war. that was the only way he could get reelected. >> let's step back from the sequence of events for a moment. i would like to hear each of you say something more generally about churchill and roosevelt. house putf roosevelt it to me very nicely. he said leaders are a package, you have to take them that way. when you look at roosevelt and

churchill as packages, what are their strengths and weaknesses? as wartime leaders in democracy? >> shall i go first on this one? i think if you look at churchill , i think his strengths as a war leader are clear. he is a war leader who leads very much in the front and visibly. there he is with dv for victory salute. he is there with the cigar. he very much puts himself center stage. i think linked to that what he does is inject the creaking british war machine and corridors of whitehall with a sense of urgency, which had been cking up until that point. he combines that were underpins that with his wonderful oratory of those fantastic speeches. to my mind the great

strength of those beaches as they are carefully crafted to appeal to several audiences at once. yes, they are about raising british domestic tomorrow -- moral, but they are also about sending a clear call for support to the united states. almost all have a passage aimed at the united states. they are about sending a message of defiance to hitler and a call to arms to the occupied countries of europe. i think his great strength is leading from the front. or thekness of churchill other side of that coin is he could be massively overenthusiastic and over-ambitious. you see this in the diaries of the people around him. when he comes in, he has the backing of british public opinion after munich when it swings behind him. but many of his own party, the

conservative party, many of the mandarins in whitehall are skeptical of him as a leader. they think he may lead the country into rash exploits. it is the other side of that. that has to be carefully managed by people like general allen thate and the whole team worked with him to win the war. >> do you want to say anything about roosevelt? roosevelt, i know less about. i would defer to nigel. looking at it from the outside, i think roosevelt's great strength surely has to be his and the fact he is able to see the interests of democracy, the interests of the united states, and the alliance are better stick -- best served by tackling germany and steering

the country in that direction. if you'reider, talking about the weaknesses of roosevelt, and i hesitate to say this in roosevelt house, he has always seemed to me a slightly machiavellian figure. machiavelli isg not always bad. [laughter] >> machiavellian? no, it was often said about him. they or two completely different characters. in many ways probably the two greatest leaders and characters of the 20th century. if you think of fdr not only in terms of his domestic condition but also as commander-in-chief,

commander-in-chief not only of the united states armed forces, but he really became the commander-in-chief of the western allies. two days afterll the success of the torch invasion in north africa gave a great speech in london saying i am the president. we have achieved this great landing, the future is ours. president's ardent left-hand." it is a telling phrase. it is not something he invented in a speech. it is something i see again and again in the papers of the people around roosevelt quoting it. diaryeven in the goebbels in german.

go through the diaries, there may be as much as eight or 10 pages per day. goebbels is often staying with the fuehrer in his quarters. is as obsessed as hitler is with winston churchill. every time winston gives one of these speeches it really cuts goebbels up. i mean, he got under their skin. i think that speaks to something very moving, that churchill was always talking to a moral imperative in waging the war. the moral imperative of democracies, not simply self-defense of the british empire. the machiavellian aspect of

roosevelt served him very well because the united states, i am sure we have forgotten it, but it is pretty true today and i think it was true in those days, the united states was a very politically polarized country. it was not only isolationist and interventionist. it was republicans and democrats and people who hated roosevelt and people who loved him and felt he had saved the country in the great depression. now between could meet -- now the twain could meet. the president needed to be elected. had to be elected again in 1944.

churchill came to the united states in 1943 and could not understand why everybody was talking about the next election. all knowcan knows, we we are already talking about the next election and hillary clinton even while the president has several years to go. those are the political realities that roosevelt was up against, which winston churchill was not really. there were times winston churchill's majority in the house of commons was possibly , especially after the surrender where 30,000 british soldiers surrendered without even fighting in the summer of 1942. at that point, churchill's prime ministership did look if fy because he had never had a victory. it started with norway, went through france, dunkirk, crete, greece, north africa, the far

east, etc. he did not have a very good military record in terms of success. the president was very aware of that. i think one of the most moving passages in the book is when inrchill comes to washington june of 1942, and he comes to the white house. he actually comes to washington, and the president is at hyde park. churchill goes up to him at hyde park and they both come back from hyde park to washington. they come up on the overnight plane. they come to union station and then up to the white house. it is breakfast time. i have only just come across -- i wish i had been able to put it

in the book. i have just come across a new diary. they go up to the white house. they go into the president's oval study on the second floor. justvelt's naval aide pops his head in the map room and says are there any new cables? the duty officer hanson this pink piece of paper and he takes it up. roosevelt is trying to be as says,ng self and "winston, what do you want for breakfast?" he looks at the naval aide and says, what do we have here? the naval aide says i am an afraid it is bad news, mr. president.

itsevelt reads it and hands to winston and says, winston, it is for you. brookehe cable saying to has surrendered with over 30,000 troops without fighting. churchill is completely stunned. that saypeople that nothing in the world came as great a shock. he was sitting with a man whose friendship and cooperation is crucial for the survival of britain. it is just so upsetting and embarrassing and shameful for him. if ever there was a moment at which these two men are so close and wonderful together, it is when the president leans over -- he does not say have

you fouled up again? he says, winston, what can we do? they talk about it and they called general marshall up. the president says we have a u.s. armored division almost ready. it will go to britain to prepare for eventual cross channel invasion. can we send it out to help you in egypt? churchill is bowled over. that is not just generosity. that is a decision at a terrible moment in war which it up allies -- where two allies work together. it was soon, because critical that moment in june of that at may surprise you

united states senator was out in the desert at tobruk. fortunately, he was not captured. he was with an american armored unit testing out american infantry tanks. any ideas? senator henry cabot lodge. he escaped rommel and wrote a devastating report on the british. [laughter] that was the moment that summer when my great childhood hero field marshall montgomery was finally summoned by churchill and sent out to the desert and took a big stiff brush and swept s and re-created the british army in battle. >> bring us back to the d-day

story toward the end. you make the compelling argument and i don't think anyone would seriously disagree with it that a cross channel invasion in 1942 of the kind general marshall was contemplating would have been a disaster. you made a strong argument that certain conditions had to be present in order for an invasion to be successful. but we have left out what happened in between. that is important story because it is not just the case that everyone had reservations about the d-day invasion and saw the risk of until it happened. but in fact churchill and the british resisted the idea of invading even in the spring of 1944 and continue to want to postpone it because they felt still the conditions were not it was roosevelt who in the fall of 1943 put his foot down and said now we are going, the time has come. to say churchill was right in

1942, of course that is true. but i think we also have to recognize churchill still wanted to pursue the peripheral strategy beyond 1943 and 1944. it was roosevelt who was the one and said this is the moment. >> i think that is undoubtedly correct in the sense that i do believe churchill continued to favor a peripheral strategy. part of that strategy would have included an attack eventually. to what i goes back was saying in my presentation that he did not want to put all of the eggs into one basket, so he favored continuing to engage favored and would have engaging in the balkans. part of it is protecting the british empire and securing the british position in the postwar world.

i think if churchill were here today, he would not be an apologist for that. this was a man who was a lifelong proponent of the british empire and famously said the speech i have not become the king's first minister to preside over the liquidation of the british empire. he is going to do everything he can to say that british division. there is undoubtedly an element in that as well. takenason the decision is to go against france comes down to the meeting. i agree it is partly roosevelt. but you can argue it is equally as much stall and -- stalin an stalin's doing because he is determined the second front will not be delayed and will happen now. pushes roosevelt and

churchill for that commitment there. >> i prefer to think of the triumph the d-day. account ofing my what happened in 1943 for the second volume. churchill's say in thence for going mediterranean, i don't know quite how to put this kindly. [laughter] you know, there were times in roosevelt's presidency, ,articularly towards the end because you did not ask me what fdr's failings were. me, id say if you asked

would say his great strengths his his self-confidence, that he in himself could lead his nation and gather around him 1 thank you ---- gather around him a team that would be supportive of his prosecution of the war. that probably is machiavelli in -- his problem probably is machiavelli in. at times, he felt he was the only man in the world who could do his job. that is seen in terms of his choice of vice president until the very end. in 1943i would say winston churchill does come again to the united states. in fact, this time does not, on a plane.

withmes on the queen mary 160 staffers he had the staff rooms reinstated on the ship, absolutely determined in late spring and early summer of 1943 to dissuade the president from going [indiscernible] in 1944. who i president roosevelt think brilliantly dealt with him and said to various aides whose diaries i have, "i may have to sit on winston. i may have to read them the riot act." the difference is churchill sees the mediterranean primarily as a and ane to the empire

peripheral strategy. the president sees the cz invasion and the mediterranean as a place -- sees the invasion and the mediterranean is a place where the united states can practice modern war. i have a personal connection with that because that was my father's great beef in the british army, but not until monti took over the british army did the higher generals really understand the nature of modern was to just how tough it face the german where mark in battle. one of the generals said we needed a place to be bad in. that was very much what they learned their.

re. i would like to open it for questions. do we have a microphone in the audience? wait for the microphone. the session we have had about two of the greek or readers tonight, you may be tempted to give a speech. but let's just have questions if we may. >> was there anything in the -- >> can you hear them? >> hello? was there anything in the views of churchill and roosevelt in deciding strategy cross channel or peripheral based on their seeing the russians and germans bleeding each other before the end of the war? did roosevelt--

feel more kindly toward the russians at that point then churchill did? our guests answer that question, i know the view of the americans at the time was churchill was willing to fight to the lsast russian. [laughter] why gohat was the case, in 1944? let them continue to fight it out. i think there are much bigger things at play. from 1942 onwards, from 1941 onwards, churchill is doing everything he can to support stalin and keep the russians in the war because they want their involvement. if you remember when the germy arm is -- german armies invade churchill, according to

his private secretary, makes a wonderful remark. aople are saying you're long-term anti-bolshevik, how can you be allying yourself with them? he said, let me get this right. i wouldr invaded hell, at least make a favorable reference to the devil in the house of commons. [laughter] it is churchill who in to travel to see stalin 1942 to explain why there cannot be a second front in 1942. churchill has to take the difficult decisions to relieve the pressure on the eastern front. churchill is sending the convoys through the north sea to keep the russian supplied and engaged. the real allied fear in all of this is there may come a point where stalin concludes this is not worth anymore russian blood,

that he has gone so far but no further and will include an alliance with hitler. that is the nightmare scenario and one of the pressures driving them towards a second front. i think churchill and roosevelt are also worried by the time you get to 1944 of how the war will play out as the russians start to move forward. how much of europe are they going to dominate? turn thoughts do start to to that postwar scenario and ensuring you don't have a complete russian domination of the whole of the european continent. >> i think that is well put. the only thing i would add is it was not simply a fear the russians might make these with hitler. after all, they had made peace with hitler in 1939. as the war progressed, the

president became more aware of the casualties american forces were sustaining in the pacific. navy, army and the air force were doing and a credible job in the pacific. were not.h there were australians but there was not a british contribution there. differently --d fdr worked differently from churchill. churchill liked to have everything on paper through proper channels. youloved everything -- know, he had a healthy skepticism of barack received -- of bureaucracy, a paperwork. he loved sending personal

emissaries, even when the will wilke. even wendell can you imagine sending the person you have just beaten in an election to london? the president is using these personal emissaries. he is a paraplegic. he is in a wheelchair. he could not get in a bomber and go to moscow, which he courageously does. for the president, it is a different matter. when fdr went to casablanca, which is the first chapter of my new book, everyone around him is saying don't go. no president has ever flown in an airplane, much less go abroad and go thousands of miles to africa. roosevelt is receiving information from his informants. wacky,es they are a bit but often they are very much

people not afraid to tell him the truth. you know, lyndon johnson goes out not just on behalf of congress. he goes out and reports for the president of the united states. what they are telling him is we like macarthur, "i shall return." but the casualties that will be required are just colossal, and we have to keep stalin not only fighting the germans on the eastern front, we have to get stalin to sign up to join with us in the war against japan once germany is beaten. people always forget that when they consider tehran and yalta. >> another question. let me go to the back over there. .> thank you

i am not sure how germane this is, but two thoughts i had. did gallipoli in any way influence churchill in his caution with the date -- with d-day? my second question because many of my friends are worried about this, was there any contemplation of honoring the train tracks to auschwitz and other? >> can i deal with the second question first? i am still working on volume two but i can tell you after 10 years as a world war ii military if we had bombed the railroads into auschwitz, the germans would simply have made those jews walk. heartfelt because

it is too awful to think we in britain and in this country new what the nazis were doing. but to imagine we could miraculously find a bomb that would stop jews from being sent to auschwitz is simple innocence. it reminds me a bit of those people who say surely there was another shooter on the grassy knoll. after all, you know, it is not that difficult for two or three people to shoot and hit a moving target at the same time. well, i have to tell you it is impossible. just is not possible. allen, do gallipoli, you want to take that? >> i would be happy to. i do think a little he did prey on churchill's mind.

it was the setback that nearly destroyed him in 1915. it is what commenting said she thought he was going to die from grief -- it is why clementine said she thought he was going to die from grief. about half of his book as a defense for the gallipoli campaign. the campaign foundered because there was no real coordination between the army, navy, and national forces, all the things you needed to have in place to make d-day a success. i think it goes wider than just gallipoli. it is not just gallipoli. it is the memories of that whole generation, churchill included, but also the other commanders of what happened in europe between 1914 and 1918 and the horrors and their fear in sending forces across to confront hitler directly in northwestern europe that we might be about to have another battle of the som.

i think you can see that in the memoirs and some of the quotes. on the bombing of auschwitz, i think martin gilbert has addressed that fully. churchill was shown a memo. could something be done? it gets referred to various commanders who conclude strategically it cannot be done at that point. i think nigel's point overall is right. i think both churchill and roosevelt saw the bigger picture. the bigger picture am of course, is if you're going to stop the horror and genocide in europe, asn you need to win the war quickly and decisively as possible. think.more question, i on this side. i saw a hand. >> hi.

say,e heard revisionists you talk about roosevelt being machiavellian. rooseveltny evidence somehow backed the japanese into a corner a cousin in the back of his mind he thought this would start the war after he had promised not to send american troops to war in 1940? >> no evidence at all. i have in the second chapter tried to tell the story as dramatically as i can using evidence of people who were around the president in the white house that day. in fact, in the days before pearl harbor. i was giving a talk in the fdr library last weekend. somebody came up and said my father was in the fbi and he

that there were these , and the president knew that the japanese were going to bomb pearl harbor but of course it had to be covered up. i was on a radio program the other day. actually, hyde park. i said, can i say bullshit on the radio? [laughter] and on television? >> that is what they said. it just is not true. what is interesting is the president was receiving the decoded diplomatic signals being sent from tokyo to the ambassador and assistant

ambassador just a few hundred yards away on massachusetts avenue. it is an extraordinary moment in history when you know the official ambassadors of the with which you are not at war are receiving signals telling them to break off negotiations, to start burning your codebooks and even destroying your code machines. so you know war is coming. you know that. harry hopkins, white house adviser, says mr. president, can we take some preemptive action? the president says no, we have never done that. we don't do that. morally in the right. we know they're going to attack.

we have done our best to prepare our defense is. you know, this will have to play itself out. i think he was absolutely right about that. but knowing in advance the japanese were only 300 miles from pearl harbor is just ridiculous. >> we have a letter in the churchill archive from president roosevelt to winston churchill from october of 1931. in the letter, he writes japanese moving northwards. in spite of this, i think you and i have two months of respite in the far east he gets it almost exactly right. do i think that means he was predicting pearl harbor and knew about pearl harbor? absolutely not. but what it does show, i think, is as you have alluded to, there was a growing awareness in american government circles, in roosevelt's circles, that there was an escalating tension and

they were starting to prepare for that. >> thank you. i would like to thank our two guests this evening. [applause] nigel hamilton's book is available upstairs, and i highly recommend it. every sunday at 8:00 and midnight, you can learn from leading historians about presidents and first ladies. to watch any of our programs or check our schedule, visit www.c-span.org/history. you are watching american history tv on c-span3. 2015 competition is underway. open to all middle and high school students to ce