we talked a bit about the way that we've extended border insecurity and to this 100-mile barrier inside the united states which includes everyone washington, d.c. because we are within 100 miles of a coast that gives the border he patrol a bit of how would you call it, enhanced capacities for interrogation that i think are a bit worrying. so if none of these are possible and if you're going to sit here and tell me, well, all of these ideas are far outside the realm of what's an reevable given the security crises that we face in the world today, then essentially what you're telling me is that efforts to perhaps redo some of the problems in our own democracy are not possible and if that's being the case, then we're going to have a very

hard time trying to sell the idea of democracy abroad. thank you very much. >> thanks very much. tom? >> well, thanks, will. and thanks for the invitation to join this conversation this morning. in the spirit of in which ambassador basora launched us a little while ago, i've been thinking about making there a really interactive kind of event. so i've been listening intently to each of the three previous speaker nz it may seem at some level that they presented alternative schools of thought or approach to this question. so i'm not sure i'm allowed to say this but i agree with all of them. i agree with in particular with the way nick framed the tradeoffs that we often face in government between our understandings of potential short-term benefit or short-term need versus long-term. that's the world in which i live every day in the u.s. government

as we sit around tables not usually as pretty as this but trying to talk about how we integrate our interests in strengthening democratic governs and respect for human rights into our policies in various parts of the world. policies that are driven increasingly by the security imperatives. you know, we're long past the cold war that framed the international operating environment for us so neatly. but now there's a' actually a hot war under way in this global campaign against extremism, violence and terrorism that is in ascend can answer in key parts of the world. so that frames a lot of our discussions about what will can we do about democracy in egypt or bahrain or you know, ins anner by onor uzbekistan. the principal parts of our relationships with so many countries are driven by a national security imperative

that is not theoretical and abstract in the long-term. it's urgent. it's what gets the president of the united states laying awake staring at the ceiling in the middle of the night is who is going to be killed next in the united states or one of our embassies around the world. i think that that has to be appreciated as we think about how we continue to build out democracy support and democracy assistance. at a moment and here we are 25 years after the velvet revolution, when there is this is loss of confidence and a loss of sense of purpose and i was at the same meeting carl was at in prag last week. organized by a lot of friends of democracy in eastern europe and the world. and this is the -- this was the kind confident framing art. you may recall the czech velvet revolution and the czech transition of 25 years ago was framed by some pretty good art. i loved the various posters that emerged in that period. but last week at the forum towel

conference, there was a lot of the backdrop on the art and this is the cover of the program for the conference. it says this is a tweet from democracy. i miss how loved i was 25 years ago. tweets democracy, forlornly. because nobody thinks democracy is succeeding or doable or worth promoting. i think this cynicism, this gloominess has infested a lot of conference rooms like this. and i'm troubled by that because i don't think that thing are going -- i think that we have to appreciate the immensity of the challenge that we have set for ourselves. those of us who have made the world's challenges our own here in the united states need to appreciate it's not going to be quickly or easily done. carl talked about the illusions of the 1990s when it seemed easy after the fall of the berlin wall and the collapse of apartheid and transitions in other parts of the world.

and we may have gotten too greedy or too somehow thinking this was easy that the transition paradigms were going to implement themselves and that all we had to do was go along for the ride and take credit for it sometimes. but i think what we're finding is that some countries have governments and military establishments and tribal leaders and others who are really much more clearly opposed to this democratization than we has encountered in some periods in the past. so really we are up against a much more determined opponents i think than we saw in the '90s in so many parts of the world. they're doubling down on their opposition to our support for civil society, for fair elections for political pluralism. for independent media. and so i think we need to regird ourselves and be thinking more strategically and more carefully. that means thinking also more

long-term. i don't think we're going to affect a significant transition in any country for two reasons. one is because it's not up to us. it's been said here that the future of other countries will be determined by the people who live in those countries. and i this i we need to acknowledge that in our discussion about democracy assistance that it's not so much about us and what we do or how well we do it or how much money we have, it's about what are the dynamics and who the leaders in other societies to want to bring their countries into a more modern political arrangement, a rights respecting democratic arrangement. they'll do that in their own time in their own way. we can help them but we can't make them do it. we can't make bad governments overthrow themselves. we can't make people become democrats if they are not so inclines. but when we find democrats, they do exist in some of the most unlikely places, we can help them. we can help them with information with assistance, with political protection, with

political pressure, with you know, engaging them in the world integrating them into our societies and our programs in various ways and i think that we are doing that. and i think that we need to be doing it in a strategic patient way that acknowledges that it's not just about us but we need to be prepared for when people have a moment to move their countries in a better direction that we will be supportive of them in the ways we have been whether he there are willing governments in various parts of the world, willing to accept our technical advice or our political assistance and the ways that we continue to do. usaid is robust in its budgets. the millenium corporation is very effective in a certain range of country possibilities. my own office at the state department has had a pretty consistent budget thanks to congress to is support civil society actors in a variety of countries and the national endowment for democracy remains the premier intituition in the world to providing target the an

a siften assistance. so they know they have help from the international community. let me mention a couple things just to wind up this opening scene setter. one is that i think we in the united states need to appreciate the important role that congress plays while we disparage its occasional polarization and inability to resolve certain major things. the congress has been a major contributor to american democracy programming in a lot of ways. not least in the creation of my part of the state department. you know, the bureau for democracy, human rates and labor was created 36 years ago at the insistence of congress over the objections of the state department and the executive brank because it has long been seen in our political culture we need toe have some people minding this part of the store. so we have played a role, increasingly i think prominent

role inside it the u.s. government in being part of the conversations about how we integrate security, prosperity and our support for freedom, as well. and so we do that. and we get increasing support from congress in various ways. one of the ones that's important for this discussion in an age of heightened security consciousness in our foreign policy is something called the leahy law. senator pat leahy 10 or 12 years ago put in the appropriations a provision that says we cannot provide military equipment or training to security forces units that we have credible evidence are involved in gross human rights violations. this opens up a whole other dimension of engagement with foreign governments and societies about how security forces can be be made more rights respecting and law abiding. it works to some extent in key ways to provide a different kind i have pressure on authoritarian

governments particularly those allied to us the kinds that was referred to that are not democratic but are friends of ours so we're willing to provide them certain kinds of security assistance. we do that but now we have a rights dplengs to that, as well in many places. i appreciate the role congress has played in framing our assistance and engagement in the world not the least through the funding for the national endowment for democracy but also these policy discussions about things like the terms on which we provide security assistance. and i'll just end by echoing what several people have already said that one of the most important things we can do in the united states to strengthen democratic systems abroad is to be a better democracy. we feed to be a better democracy just like europe needs to be a better democracies in order for the example to be persuasive and to carry in the wider world. and so i this i we need those of house care about our

international profile need to take an interest in domestic politics in a way i don't think we always do. we figure somebody else is working on that. but i think that those of house travel a lot and are called on to explain the u.s. system i think need to begin to spends more of our time thinking about promoting better government in the united states. >> well, thanks so much, tom. before we open the floor to questions, we're going to give each speaker a chance to give a brief response to what they've heard. two to three minutes. i'll start with carl. >> thanks. maybe the first point to make is one that nicolas concluded on which was that you know, the nehru problem as it were. i mean, i prefer nehru to mao. and i prefer a democratic india to totalitarian china. we don't expect every country when they become democratic somehow to do our business to do

our bidding. but democracies tend to be friendlier than dictatorships which often rely upon needing enemies which whip up extreme nationalism to deal with their legitimacy problems. i prefer south korea to north korea. south korea is not perfect and a lot of people in south korea have had problems with the current government. but i assure you it's better than north korea and not just that it doesn't have a gulag and murder its own people but it's friendlier to us than north korea. those are the choices we face in the world. it's irrelevant that democracies are not perfect and 100% allies. second point, yeah, change sometimes is difficult. first of all, we don't bring all about all that change mubarak was going to be permanently there. the question is how to manage

change. the problem with the mansfield argument that you referred to is that he consider is milosovich to have been a product of democratic change that this was a transitional government. he was not a democrat. it's a false argument. there is instability in the world. the question i think we have to face is you know, as we think about this work, what is the division of labor between the nongovernmental entity like the n.e.d. and the u.s. government and what do we want from the u.s. government? i mean, one thing we do want and i've said this is that the people that we will support could use the help, the diplomatic and political support of the united states. and of the west. a lot of that is being done to a certain degree. they need it more. you cannot view democracy in a vacuum. you need to back it up with the political support that the activists need in order to survive in order to function.

we need a strong voice on these issues. we should not call dictatorships democratic or in the process of a democratic transition as we've basically referred to egypt recently. we may need to work with egypt as a country that shares certain interests with us in the middle east at a time when you have isis. but we don't need to call them democratic. and we need to speak about human rights and it doesn't necessarily conflict with our interests in these countries. finally, i think we underestimate the extent to which democracy and progress for democracy depends upon an orderly international environment. you're much more likely to get democratic progress where there is a certain modicum of world order than you are where there is chaos. and one of of the things i was arguing for is that i don't think it helps to remove the

pole that holds up the tent of world order. and i consider that pole and we can argue about this to be u.s. leadership. u.s. influence. because nothing is going to take its place. it's not all the answers that we have, but a stable world will depend upon that and i think democracy needs that in order to progress. two last quick points. we as a country in thinking about our foreign policy have to find the balance between what my board member steve sis tanovich called maxism and minimalism. we denied to have these swings, sometimes very, very sharply. there is the possibility of a solvent stable middle ground. we have to fight for that, which can take account of the need for power trk the need for deterrence and also the need to support people who are fighting and struggling for democracy and second then related to that something we're thinking about, i think we have to really start thinking very clearly about the relationship to security issues

to democracy issues. these are complex questions. and i think it's important to bring people together to start thinking through these complex questions because it's not necessarily you know, friendlily tyrants are not necessarily the source of stability and friendship in the world. and we have to somehow think about how to balance the tensions that exist. there will always be tensions but we can finds a better way to balance them than we have in the past. >> thanks. >> certainly north korea is a worse case than south korea and i think there's no disagreement there. for the u.s., of course, the india example is that our preference for pakistan when it did not have a democratic government because of the belief that it was closer to u.s. security interests i think is more akin to what i was trying to get at, not that we can always have a clear-cut case of where democracies are always preferable even when they have issues. and then we do have to get i think though and tom i think at this point you were bringing up

is very critical of how we find these balances of what we're willing to give up in terms of our security agenda and with egypt, i think it is a great case. we could have advanced a democratic agenda or been more willing to do so if there were certain elements of our security agenda we were willing to give up. what i'm trying to argue is we can't do both. we have to have these debates. we have to find where the balance is going to be between we would prefer to see a democratic government and therefore, are willing to see on incentive issues recession and then conversely, i think when we have security issues we might feel that transitions might be problematic in the short run and again, having a calculus i think is better than simply flailing out and simply saying well, these issues don't exist or we can do it all. and i think that one of the issues i think we've had in recent years, the criticisms that are out there is we don't seem to be able to strike this

balance. we also then have to strike a balance with our diplomacy. you can't go to a government that is authoritarian that you are now asking for a hole list of security cooperations and then say by the way, we're also, woring to change your form of government if that change of government is being perceived as change of elite, change of regime. and again, it's not that we can't do both or that we should give up one or the other. it's just being able to have these conversations about what we're willing to accept. what half a loaf solutions we're willing to have. i was glad that you mentioned the leahy amendment because if -- we always have more time, we can bring up more things. i think that's a great example of where we can use our condition alt because state is free to reject our security assistance if they don't want to abide by those terms and some countries don't. certainly wla see in the context of the international military education is that it has an impact because when you say that you're going to -- in order to

get security assistance from the utss u.s. you have to meet these standards, our diplomats can go to other countries and say you will have to pass certain smell tests with the u.s. congress in order to get certain things, that can be effective. i think that is one of the ways that we can find, we can search for the condition alt that we need if we want to pursue these things without it having become this either or, we can either pursue security or democracy but not both. he so i there that the leahy amendment and other things liking thatting are important for us and we continue our discussions today, i think we should look at those os as being tools that can serve both sets of interests. >> i want to pick up on the point of instability in the world. i think it's working in africa. and spending a fair amount of time there, i see this. all over the place. i think what we're seeing if it takes somalia as an example,

this is a problem that we've been faced with over two decades now, 1994 is when the u.s. went in the first time there. and did it's still broken and the security threats there r(t&háhp &hc% about what is a way to work more constructively inñr society. israel has been trying to bomb for a long time. the more problems they winda5 ç i'm notu saying we need to go!d bring up terroristt( groups and the government. áiju saying that. ifw3 you think abouti] libya or large parts of the middle east, these are #f$otries that are difficultyñhz challenges. this is much more than a military solution. i hope that tom isñi leadinge1it

more into these challenges.xde1] they require political settlements. on the positive side and i said that i think y8ñt( u.s.fá democ assistance has been effective in taking a brought view. most offáxd africa where i work there elections and vibrantçó elections and really means something. several there problems in almoì% çó countries with corruption and rule of lplaw. they are upset and they take steps to try to make thesejf t( . positive. there might be a lot of countries that areñr just --fá competitive role of politics makes people want to improve the rules of the game. they can increase their chances of winning or more transparency for the government orq stronger

media to be critical. in that sense we have two or would have predicted that ghana wárd be axde1 great democracy o ju zambia. countries started four yearsxdq ago. ago. ould havee1 predictt they have challenging problems. the work weok-" have done there learned from the lessons and apply them to that today.xd >>e united states remains the most important country in the world and provided theqxd morú important leadership on democra demo1r'cy.

bar none.xd take the next tenjf most active promoters in the democratic that'slplp not just in the fund and the diplomatic leadership they provide. we areçó trying to overcome a period in which we seem to do that in an arrogance and a diplomatic xdñ(v it may be too subtle for some. rhetoric. some. the united states is at the center of every important conve3%tionñixd with every democratic governance an

managing an effortt( that has strong opposition toxd it. you can see that in theçó world. we are inturing other parts of on our relationship. ourçó advocacy for the activist in russia,q it comes at a cost for the bilateral relationships. we are active in defending the set ofñr values we share. t0 do that pub>i&ly andi] privately we are engaged with noun democratic partner countries in a wide range of ways. it does come at a cost in other security andñiko other matters. you have to sometimes find it. how much of a cost inñi a

relationship can weo[inb incur defense of our values. we wrestle with every day. depending on the circumstance and the>4)áqpá and various things. le others. basis. they mentioned earlier a movement+ forq democracy among what matters more and more for the work. that's true in the united states. part and parcel of#otq)ynb dna appreciate that the democratic character of governmentok that partner with affects their our militarylp establishment an intelligencexdxd increasingly understand that and weave that ìáhp &hc% well. it's not a universally heldñd5t.

i think we willt(t(fát( continu will talk about it inxd the nex 20 or 25 years from now. >> i will open the floor for questions.ñr i do ask that you keep your questions to actual questions. we had very long and det7)sq"ñr ie1 know this is an issue that lot of people have%cár'ions on and i want to restrict the answers. focus on questions. we will tak.áq the person right] there. we will get ae1 microphonet( to( >>e1lp thank you. we runçói] projes(sñ] toe1 hel societies. one of thosexd is w3tevanaçóxd

iranian civil society. my question qis, when does the páic development? it seems like we arelp focused ways@);burá or don't help it, but notxd focuse1 on ways t we can and do sometimes harm it. one case and pointw3 for me and was surprised thatxd people didñ really mention syria. in syria,w3 we hadt( a case and wasn't just for a few days, it wase1 fore1 a answerable amount timejf whenlp there was a peace liberal, democratic opposition president obamatffá the approa was the support that was not really support. the red lines that were not really red lines and the fight that is not really a fight.r what the result has been is emboldened iran and russia.

democraticñr çódevelopments. >> the question please. when does2u,s. policy harm democracy. >> with a focus on syria.xdok >> someone who wants to respond to that question. >> all i can say is that you are basically putting flesh on thet bones of the argumentlpxdxdok i making.ñr you don't understandjf whatw3 i said? i don't think it was wisee1 notó support the secular struggles in syria. i don't thinkxdjf that was wise. i think that wast(ñizv[çq abu. i think it wasñixd a mistake. i don't think it was helpful and it helped produce the problems that we had. thereó@rei a lot ofs7çólp othe

much, much more in ukraine. when we don't, we openxdq the w up. the green light to bad e1acting. people take advantage and3w i think we reallyw3 need toçó loo not juftokñst thezvñikow3 agg notok helping democracy. >> in the back.ñi >> i would like to ask, what's the best way to respondi] to efforts byxd authoritarian governments that if legislation o!q tried to isolate local society groups to say if you so much as accept a dollar from

painting them as lpunpatrioticu( or should weok takeçó a morejf response? >> i saidqok that president oba made a goodok statement last month. he laid all of this out. a lot of it has to do withe1 political support and back up.qr that's the way it goes. the groups in russialp refused they are fighting t(back. for what it's i]worth, our>xgr program in r&t has been

growing over the last number of years. they are not running away. the people running away or a lot of the western donors who were thrown fromlp thefá situation. that was axdt(lpq mistake.w3 it's açó violation of international lawrót consistent with international law for nongovernmental organizations in a transparent way to see work.

that's forxd thee1 internationa arc others. they have notxdjf taken!- our the activityzgñt( it is ourxd policy toe1 continu support society around the world especially from their own government. wexd arexd continuing to dow3xdd working with governmentsjflp to that. other countries that want to ask not just funding, but they can do so.fá they are working to make more and more opportunities. including from thexdçó embassy programs that provide grants to russian groups that want to work with americans and vice-versa.xd

they close tá) method.ñi that doesn't mean that they diminished in any notableway. they suggest there a russian organization who decided to manage their own environment in such a way t8j"ujj$u(uz receive grands from outside or anothe.gz government. choices. they want our support and getw3 our support.ñi3wq >>ok it's difficult not to hear the discussion of democracy and supports for democracy. yous7 hear it simonmuss with countriesçói] who share interes

and security interests. iw3 know you raised theme1 specifically where that'sñiñi n what do youht say to+ countrio are doing well like china oud they are inherently xdt(subvers as attempting to subvert their specific+ nationalb9mok inte one of simplyok u.s. interests.á inb think it was on thec panelt democratic movements and

countries don't always agree with policy. that's the discussion we can have with democrati-ázv governs and society. we doe1 that allc the time.fá governments that may disagree it's not about u.s. in the world, butxd whether people can decide for themselves wholp there is notxd at( discussion a there is no treatment of religiousçóxd(mznorities. and it's a system in large part on political repression. we don't know if they support

allowed to bexd asked ori]lpñr that question.fácçójfw3 >> yout( have chartert( awayc a it's hard forwhqeople to find te charter. overfrd q11,000 people immediat in prison.xd p r(t&háhp &hc% people in the countries that you needñixd tolp recognize.xd they give more dignity and so forth. the only questionznó is whethe they will recognize those people. it doespgu mean they don't have an obligation tox$$spr'tain staó relations with some of these

countries, but what'sc going to happen inlp china is not going be because of what obama said. you have revolutionary forces at work ther.vy we willt( see howt( successfulja is. given the fact that theñi middl fá communications. with a lot oft( problems and[çm he is not bloomy whenjf it come to the prospectst( for china. when you sayq russia is doing well, compared to that, russia is doing great. i really think inçó some ways h

took over 15çóñi years ago. with that takingc over, they fet they were takingxd over from people they considered to be traitors, democrat, people giving upñi russian interests a >> a puerto vallartame4a3!movem where they wanted somethingçó different. protections for human rights. you call it overthrow. i call itñiw3 rights and democracies.i] they were objecting to the fact that putin said i'mxh(áájjt bac. you move aside. it was almost likeñi an arranged -- something arranged

with the people. important speech for the freedom house a couple of weeks ago and the strategy for the future. thereqxd alternativet( voices t. i don't suggest they are. there alternative voices and we will see where6bsmm% goes. the crisis wille1 deepen.+xd a lotclof peoplec feel that the putinfá regime could collapse. is it possibleó[ for themxd to replaced better. if thatñr does happen, they cou hope that the people who offer a

transitional situation.ñrq >> please identify that. please? >> thecxdqw3 agencies in governr the development in thexd democracy. they talked about the system they are tr99ñ focus on the developmente1 orlp" we implement them at the same time or thexd timeline ofñit(fá countries that will send that >> many people have written about this. i don't think there is any éjá-1

the?; argument that it will pu countries thatfá are rwanda or ethiopia and not democratic, bur there is no reason notjf to support it and give thefálp gro there. the developmentok along a trajectory can be complicated at ( allxd sorts ofñic instability, but africa is theñ fastest growingxd region in ther /9ó=i1 ñ somejfññiç"countries that have levels of instability.okokjf

that doesn't feel too concerned about the instabilityw3 there tt time.çóñiçót( they put their money in overseas bank accounts."-+z think thet( was a trade off there is that has been thwarted in the pastñi and tested andt(t(i] rejected.ñc >> i wantok to use this as an opportunity to a point i madelp briefly. obviouslyçóçó there is a relationship between growth and democracy. we are looking for the international mediaxd assistanc and is the the media. it will be critical for development and more independent and free media and countries

that are seeking to make economic progress. without freew3ko media and the accountability on corrupt government that they can bring, +áu will not get realñi 4v=a5q9ññiw3ñi the operations and the training programs. >> the development "nstrategie. so that thejf instrument of agenciesñi&ñ and nott(ñi for th department. i'm talking about thetglobal it's not e1there.ui] >> the research,t( some of yout

alluded to the adversities and we allqe1 talked about it this world bank arec trying to get others to dofá é@more. it's down for democracy and others and my general question is what are theoke1 prospects f and the message where it helped credible. #é question. just next month, i'm off to korea where we will havebn/rzo6

meeting.t(ñr have been withdrawing and they ñ see thexda%eñr creationí6wutt i] resources that they provide more of a rolepf6ó i-zi xdasia. people thereq from thers deoc= democracylpq t(9svyfund. and the private enterprise. , ime

trading off.]]@ with democraticaál+b.eyñx[1z e throughout the mideast, the yd4çv.5]8 comes to =a;)jxm&vç. ñt]óñ-ryejfuvmñi yourself? çó. university. and you mentioned fromxdóniyae6 point placing thisok economics,

udg-q&loty+ ñifñw thati]xd gentlemen right there.n >> fromggá of you made about the democracy j'sábr policieskohp'd 4.ñ how we run government at home and how we oì abroad and makee2nú ourselves u aroundçó to work for oursjcñçóñe

as well.1gm&ñuññi world t(& thins4c÷ about not only separat rights. .c5bg to be abñ long and difficultq struggle. z democraticñi aspirations and probably mostt(i] dramatic.xdt(ó and according to thee1xdxd the q

rights. that you use to çóempower. when i wasxdokq speaking about problem with thect( democratic >> this is specifically much of the part of the worldxdfá where live andt(lp it( seeçó itc from africa to lpegypt. problems of lack of -- i think we have it right. it's about shared economic severe in egypt and tunisia and

that was about that. i know muchgm1ñ that, you have under the age of 30. they are producing jobsok and ts it has been thefá biggest crisi in south africa forñi this very unstable situation.t(c i think alsot(xd in the mideast. large groups of unemployed smen >> they gave it the talk for the official prospect inñi which he

said, we put freedom first.xdç@% that's the things we cherish. inequality isok a very, very fundamental problem that hasxd be addressed. in terms of managing the issues of ñiinequality. china has grown and developed the middle class. that's only for the political transition if they want to continueçów3 along this road. last point. they have thelp right to organi and defendxd our interest andokt canñi lead to greater protectio for them and greater respect for the economic rights.çó >> i want to giveokw3 themok bao

the conversation snf iw3 want t the role of development in terms of how we createñr long-term.okg and where dos7 you place if yo uá$p'd focusing on the issues do you face theñr backlash when thelp ultimas'ñsì% comes. we are unprepared to deal with the reaction. >> many of the questions it am cans back to a point that the ambassador raised.." that's at what point of the." pyramidko it should fábe. ny.

with syriag mideast. that wasq tied to us because of e threat. when it comes democrati#q1." d with thexd u.s.xdok the people's republic of china, values. i think understanding thoseçó dynamics is important and +árp" afáq growing ties to the united states or ties to the econ!u, and what we

do here, those can smooth over without jeopardufust the security interest and absence of in the absence of those businesd connections, you cani] have thq sudden reversal and a governmenq youc don't havekáñ constituencies to maintain a good relationship withñr the united states. wexd also come back andlp talke about them and perhaps they will get a÷ &tw3 further.ñicçó they want a low cost interventionñi policy. we are happy to support democratic movements and give

aid to a certain point. when the costs are hit, leadership has to make the case to the american people. whyñi this matters and when it backs away and say theçó costs e too high andy woo are not going to do it. they were 1( great question. i don't know that people were interesting to pay the costs an1 and values and wc/xdemocracy. they would like to votejf andxdn they comeokñixdçólpfá into jfco(

kñ notñr saying it's either fco( or. american p >> we wantfá tot( thank all the speakers for an interesting panel. we will take a jf10-minute brea and resume at çó11:00.kow3xdq hopefully. a brief 10 minutes.

>> i am the editoruçw:ñ of demo lab which isñiñi a joint ventur between the policy magazin+mq a we cover transitioning democracies around the world.lp and because that is myt( subjec i have been asked to moderate the second panel. jf thinking about a fewt( weeks ag when i was iné@e1t( rwanda.c i found myself havinge1 drinks an outdoor cafe. aiqezez rwanda who was upset with the slack they have been getting on human rights lately.

rwanda hasxd a tough÷k.3ñis;n a regime,t( butvk÷[j'% they are on corruption issues and the they moderated this manle which

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going to try to focus my remarks on the question of what we have learned about how to do democracy after three decades. it's the university professor and if someone who follows the large and growing body of research on the topic, i'm grateful for other people who are on the channel with me can speak from their rich personal experiences working in the field. from where i stand, the perspective from the research on democracy with the effectiveness.

so from what i see, american democracy works on average at aiding countries to democratize. about ten years ago, they funded an academic study conducted by highly respected scholars led by students from university of pittsburgh to investigate the subject of the programmed effectiveness. they found both in the report that they were commissioned to write as well as in a study that was published by a journal based in princeton university that on average the democracy do have a causal impact on democracy. they also noticed a lot of challenges to identify in this kind of thing. one of the challenges they noted is that they get targeted to receive democracy aid are not receiving aid and that makes it

hard to gauge the effectiveness of the program. it can be hard to agree on how to define and measure democracy. although we have a number of indicators from freedom house and from the project among others, they give us excellent measures of democracy. we worry that the indicators may be at a high level of agrigation that it's difficult to assess the programs in the way that we need to do. to know under what conditions they are effective. another problem noted is that some of our historical records on the governance is before. there a lot of challenges to identifying them, but no matter how they sliced and diced the data, they found a good positive relationship between democracy aid. i think the news gets better because it was not this group of

people that found this relationship. numerous other scholars rep replicated this. they found that democracy aid should be positively associated, but they found that democracy seems to help countries that are erngs merging from conflict, although there is good news and from where i sit, the studies demonstrate that the promotion works on average. we don't have a fully compelling understands of why it works. under what conditions it works. that's pretty tricky. without that knowledge, they can figure out how to avoid some of the headline-grabbing worst case

scenarios of the past. how to design programs better in the future. i wanted to offer tentative inside here about the conditions under which the promotion seems more likely to succeed and others on the panel and maybe some of you disagree with and that's fine. the first is donor interest. this is already something that we have talked about in the previous panel. donor's interest matter a lot. one of the findings is that conditionality between and the word for demand for democratic conduct. a book has been published on the subject of democracy promotion in elections. i'm quoting from her and saying

that she fount it's rare that they can influence the leader with the track record. and although this is an obvious point, it is worth repeating here and the much more uphill battle where the united states doesn't want democracy. from my point of view, for the agencies to concentrate their time and money and other resources. and ended up playing into the hands of undemocratic leaders. you want it to be challenging.

the second is delivering. to have a shot at supporting democratic change in countries where the u.s. has competing interests, initiatives like the national endowment for democracy has to be part of the formula. i'm sure many people in the room have experience with this that receive$mwz government funning work on that in the developing world. it's really important to use strategies that that's often the best. being tie and prevents it from otherwise returning to my first

donor interests. it's too easy to have those intentions. the other aspects of delivery that are important for democracy and i will just mention once here. we can go on. in my own research is how difficult it can be for donors to keep track of results overseas and sometimes this can lead organizations to focus a lot of energy on programs that seem likely to produce quantitative outcomes. they may not be the same programs for these countries. i think it's important for them to be delivered in ways that help donors that help overseas. they don't end up having to encourage the organizations in what they put to the test and

innovate. they have written about the role that competition can play in helping the people overseas. my third is design. this is the reason i'm interested as well as other reasons in the world. sometimes whether for conditions at home or conditions in the country where the programs are taking place. they are simply not in a position to support activities that are likely to support the democracies. they are not very confrontational towards the status quo. they may take on issues like promoting women's inclusion or government and that's a

fundamentally undemocratic environment. they may be good and right and my own research in florida an, i find that these programs can have these these are democrat e democratizing. it may be the case that they plant the seeds, the jury is still out. the genuine movement. i think i'm running out of time. and i think one of the things that make me optimistic about the future of the promotion is the recent push towards

transparency. there a number of initiatives this this realm and that i will highlight is the aid data gathering and geocoating and microlevel data on the government aid data along with other innish 2iitiatives and fo systems, many of which are modelled on the award winning economist who is conducted trials out of the mit. >> i think movement fors looking at the mike level and trying to have more transparency and allocation and design of foreign aid and looking at the details of how programs work, it's not for any of the problems identified. however, is this what we need to

understand the questions of how the questions would work. until we are finished looking through the case studies, i will review with my own interests and delivery. >> thanks very much for that. >> i guess there was time. my own work is on the promotion efforts of the countries. members of the union. those would be checking in the baltic countries. and that was unintended, but i

see valuable and unique perspectives. what i would like to do is give a sense of how they are promoting democracy. then i will move on to get the effectiveness of the eastern europeans themselves. what are the opportunities i see with the u.s. in the field of democracy. what i have learned about the european promotion is that in some countries that started immediately after their own democratic placement. given the regime change in eastern europe, they had an

important and driving promotion both as implemented with such support abroad and advocates for the state to invest in supporting that abroad. as well as to support them abroad and they have also leveraged membership in the area. they have started providing democracy assistance and that's more on the side. and with the diplomacy, the efforts are limited in terms of

the number of the countries. they came back later in my presentation. i see two types of impacts. the first was in a number of conversations that you see activists and from eastern europe, i kept and we have a debt to be repaid. they see a number of countries in the west and from the u.s.

they are active domestically. they are working in eastern europe. secondly the assistance and promotion more broadly promoted and it had multiplier effects. and the assistance are now providing their own assistance for the east and southeast. >> that is in the specific communities that are undertaken by the europeans. they have a fairly flit cal approach to supporting that abroad. they seek to often times in general seek to build a reservoir of democratic acts and

state institutions. they would push their country in a more democratic direction and opportune moment. in other words, they approach very much like the u.s. approach except with less emphasis on the election. to the extent that they build on eastern europe and have a number of petitioners, they have indeed done that. it would seem they have succeeded. they have themselves in power by the u.s. in part and who are now seeking to share some of best practices of their own. including best parts that were developed by the u.s. >> to the conversations they had with a number, they shared that

it was external with the u.s. support that helped development a sector of political access in eastern europe. those are actions that would probably have been under developed or missing because of the nature of their work and they have powerful political and economic actions. stepping back, what that tells me is that=zr u.s. democracy h the activity for which it has been implemented produced enduring and empowering domestic accessories. they had the withdrawal of the u.s. support to become somewhat dependent on the findings, but none the less, they are active

and an important part of the domestic debate in those countries. at this point i want to talk a little bit and say i trust these findings primarily because i did not ask them about the u.s. in supporting democracy in eastern europe. they did not give them an opportunity to give them a line. it's evidence that i collected indirectly and came up in conversations about the european democracy. again, my conclusions are not to dispute or waive problem promoting unintent the consequences, but to highlight and that it's an investment who goes up and down with the long-term, but it's an important investment. in conclusion, allowing me to

return to the mayors and invitations with the europeans and democracy promoters and again, to discover those i talked to the recipients in their neighborhood. they their neighborhood. the recipients highlighted three important merits. the first is the demauck californiaization that the eastern europeans have. the individuals involved in this were the okayed break. and they come with what i call recipes or sets of steps to implement certain reforms that could be, again, sets of steps that could be taken, to be tailored to needs of recipient, given the recipient

dedemorning californiaization which give the europeans about kregs to democratization and allow them to approach the issues as peers, rather than accomplishments and centuries of democratic experience. and the last that was very important to recipients was the sustainability of central and eastern european efforts. as i said, the number of those countries have been active for the same number of recipients for more than two decades and however small their efforts might have been their impact has accumulated over time. so, the limitations. i think the most important limitation that those democracy promoters have had is their limited capacity.

the second most important limitation is that their democracy proposmotion efforts e had a certain geopolitical proponent which has undermined their impartiality. with that, i believe it's helped some democratization for eastern europe. it's helped opportunity, but unfortunately, their efforts have not been enough to ensure or help the countries with sustainable impact. so i conclude here in sort of the second round of comments, i'll return to talk about the opportunities i see for cooperation between the u.s. and some of the new democracies that have developed around the globe in the last two decades. >> great. thanks very much. michael. >> thank you very much. >> first of all, many thanks to

organizing this and kindly inviting me here it's a great honor. i'd like to say a few words about the united states when it comes to democracy and offer an opinion on that issue and i'm afraid i will differ from what tsvehisveta has just said. and that europe has been changing greatly. the united states the most point of reference for anyone striving for freedom under communist rule in eastern europe and the americans were the first to come after transition in 1989. even though in terms of quantity, the u.s. funding was quickly and by far exceeded by the european for transformation

assistance. the u.s. protocol leadership and commitment greatly contributed to the information processes. many even felt kind of a special ki kinship had developed but after president obama, a certain bitterness appeared. certain prominent political figures from central and eastern europe responded in alarming mode to the changes of the administration. what we call a new approach to central european democracies, with vice president joe biden saying on the promise of your revolution, you're now in the position to help others to do the same. exercise your leadership. as we just heard, i think the europeans mostly accepted the challenge. and started working on that.

and however, what we could see, on the one hand, we could see the eastern european unions struggling with their own power in the past few years. on the other hand, we could see that there was -- despite what we heard in the morning, there was a lack of political accomplishment of the united states towards eastern europe since 2009. and as a result, the entire region became more susceptible to force, they do not voice democracy well. we looked at political development in hungary and also a look at the czech government which might be a surprise for people in the future. the government works on changes its support of transformation in a way that way that might

undermine the root concept of democracy in the regime. for example, the concept of the czech transformation policy will likely include a provision that any future assistance will be based on a conference of the official government, that it will seek the support, moderate of the set regime. and all i know all references to the term "democracy" are likely to be removed. there are popular emerging and despite the current high standing in europe. stittmatic possible political opposition which is never good for democracy. i could go on and on with this, but i won't. but what i want to say, we're facing a very treacherous mix. and it was confirmed by the main speaker here today. the u.s. with the democracy in the eyes of the central

europeans seem unwielding or unable to provide any political leadership, the europeans will comply with win over governance problems and the transitional difficulties. the west increasingly doubts that ideas of democracy can penetrate hearts and minds of people universally. under the ideologies that have been gaining ground around the world and in europe. at the same time, you might find this quite desirable, we have the confronting view that liberal democracy does not have any serious contender in the global market of ideologies. as a consequence of these trends, democracy promotions became central in nonpolitical projects. these projects aim enormously to bolster civil societies and

institutions and so on. these projects cannot realize the crucial issue and that is the level of thinking at the level of politics. working democracy requires a mind of practicing and aspiring politicians and we do not have that issue. therefore, any solution to these challenges must be a political one. but the very first step towards democracy must include the rise of singing hearts of effectiveness in the west. by singing hearts, i think the experts. i challenge the politicians to do the thinking. we need to make this political. we have to start at home. even i agree that the u.s. is a leader democratization in third

countries, i also you that we would like to see more engagement. that's where we're losing confidence. we have to find a joint way for national, comprehensive and political way in democracy. i'm afraid this cannot take place without a firm commitment and co-leadership of the united states. it's here where i see the central european region can contribute. despite the marked view that i offered moments ago there are elements of ideologies in central europe. ideologies that have a realistic understanding of what's at stake. but there were times, for example, the west largely accepted division of europe for the sake of european establishment. and this was time when the

central europeans had nothing but ideologies left. and leaders and others tirelessly argued that stability only aids to the first mapping of central europe. and now europe is undivided, and no major war. and no stability is cured. so they're probably right in their assessment. so there's plenty of people sensitive to trading democracy for that. what may be one surprising element of central european society that might be worth engaging say dialogue with -- with small and medium enterprise owners. these are people whose fate is most linked with democracy. these are the people most endangered by making it an open society, not so much open anymore. to conclude, with suggestions regarding new approaches and

instruments for democratization this morning. and i'm very happy i was able to be here. my contribution to business, instruments might work only if we're confident about our roles. and i do not see this confidence lately. we somehow see the 1990s as an illusion while we see the current as areality. at the same time, a free and undivided europe with illusions in the 1980s. and they became a reality in the 1990s. my pragmatic american philosophy of science if we believe there is nothing like an illusion or reality, therefore, i'm more afraid about the lack of confidence than disillusion. thank you. >> thanks very much. melinda, over to you. i'm also very grateful for the opportunity to be here this morning and delighted that we're having a serious conversation about demauck demock

crazy. i prettily tied to understand the program. the program was meant to empower youth and women and these are two powerfulless constituencies. the thinking was if we were to empower these youth and women they might empower their friends to pick up trash and start computer center it's. sounds good but hardly the stuff of great change. we would have been far better off by putting those funds in journalism authored jon, it's shown there's a serious problem with elite corruption and his 12-year-old son at the time owns nine water front mansions in dubai worth approximately $44

million. these are the kind of stories that will break the fear factor and inprior people to change their own society. i'm very critical of the democracy and bureaucracy. let me be clear, democracy promotion is too important an instrument of u.s. foreign policy to do badly. there are many programs we see discontinued today. and nothing will change. we can do better. so today, i'd like to offer three recommendations and i'm not claiming these are perfect solutions. i want to start a conversation about how to reform u.s. assistance. i'd like to make a point on structure, strategy and transparency. i'm going to start with structure. like sarah said, not many scholars focus on the actual deliver riff u.s. assistance but it's very crucial. there are two main institutional models for delivering assistance in the united states. we have a field-based model and an independent grant-making model. the field-based model is primary

headquartered -- it has a headquarters in washington and has field offices around the world. the independent grant-making model typically has a headquarters office but it works primarily through grants and local partners. the u.s. government overwhelmingly distributes its democracy assistance dollars to a field-based model. a couple names familiar to everyone, the international republican institute. the national democratic institute. counterpart unusual. there are dozens of others. and they all operate roughly along the same kind of lines. they have a large office in washington that sets the strategy while field offices are scattered throughout the world in cairo and everywhere else. but field offices have two main disadvantages, and i'd like to get thinking about this and talking about this today. number one, field-based organizations are vulnerable to strong tactics by repressive regimes.

look no further than moscow and baku. almost everyone has been pushed out of moscow and baku that were operated with field-based organizations. donor organizations without field offices are less vulnerable to pressure because they don't have local offices to shut down. the second obvious disadvantage i see that the field-based model is really inefficient. overhead costs including salaries, rent, and expatriate participation with field offices can reach up to 70%. while everhead of an independent grant making organization like the national endowment for democracy is 16%. 70% versus 16%. when pressed on why we need an in-country presence and not free countries, organizations with field offices will argue their presence will enable them to seize opportunities when there's great political space. if political change comes to a

place for uzbekistan where it has ruled for two decades without a wisp of democratization, with an authoritarian leader only tarnishes credentials. if it occurs in a place like uzbekistan is refuses to work in an organization. having relationship with a civil society like this not in field offices puts organizations in the best position to take advantage of newly open space. i want to give you examples so you know -- i want to point to a couple examples. usaid spent $5.6 million from 2007 to 2011 to enhance the overall effectiveness of azerbaijan's parliament. i'm probably one of two

azerbaijan experts. i'm going to cut to the chase and tell you that the parliament has never been elected. yet, you as taxpayers paid for an orientation program for these new parliamentarians, all of whom won elections. that the agency in baku described as not meeting international standards. it gets worse. the u.s. government rejected these elections and then they trained the winners. usaid even paid for a new website to make this illegitimate parliament more efficient. this is not farce. this is all publicly available in usaida's reports. a final assessment carried out by two outside experts funded this parliamentary program, $5.6 million program did not change how parliament functions or how ordinary people in azerbaijan relate to or understand the parliament. since azerbaijan's independence,

to make the country more democratic. it's becoming more and more auth authoritari authoritarian. the u.s. government presses on with multimillion-dollars programs in azerbaijan. in 2012, usaid -- i want you to listen to this to enable key society organizations to better respond to the president's vision and calls for more meaningful and state civil society partnership fulfilling the government's commitments to various international human rights instruments, end quote. the idea of u.s. taxpayer dollars going to implement the supposed democratic vision of azerbaijan's authoritarian presence of foreign aid is a scam. i'll give you an example from

kazakhstan. my examples from the region, usaid worked with the $1.5 million to increase the capacities of kazakhstan's leading organizations. well, there's a problem here, that presumes that kazakhstan -- that we were going to pump up the capacity of civil society organizations so that they could better represent the interests and reflect those of the government. the problem is kazakhstan has a parliament that does not derive its legitimacy from constituents. so the program makes absolutely no sense why does usaid continue to fund these misguided programs in authoritarian countries with no interest in reform? it's simple, bureaucratic interests and the assumption that more is always better. leaking in this waste with an emphasis on triage allocating

more money where there's a chance for change. the model, a well-known model, does things very differently, it's from small grants directly around the world and it selects the most promising ideas from indigenous organizations. russians are trying to fix russian societies. there's a lot of wisdom in this model. in my opinion, it's an absolutely unique model and one that should be commended and bolstered. practically speaking the rule that i've come up with when speaking of division of labor, only operating in country where is freedom is not free where usa i d should complement their skills. >> get to the conclusion. >> sure. my two other points i'm going to summarize them on strategy. on strategy, we ought to deploy our shrinking resources in

places where democratic outcome is likely. so that means no multimillion-dollar programs in afghanistan, azerbaijan, uzbekistan or kazakhstan. these countries are not in transition. and we shouldn't fool ourselves thinking that they are. my final point is on competition. competition needs to be encouraged. there are noncompetitive mechanisms in the field and those need to be eased out. so in conclusion, i think that democracy assistance communities needs to have a tough conversation about the meaningfulness of the program. as a program officer i was appalled when i went through old files and saw that we've been implementing the same tired strategies for more than ten years. this needs to change. taxpayers deserve better as do aspiring democrats. thank you. >> thanks very much. let's have a round of applause, first of all, for our panel. they did the hard work up here.

and now i would like to ask you all to very quickly sum up your conclusions of what we said so far. you each have three minutes. which is not very much. but let's keep it crisp. thank you. >> okay. there's a lot of interesting things that were just said. so i guess, i would just pick up on a few points that the other panelists made that really rez s resonated with me. and i'm learning a lat from them. i think one point that i'd like to hit on, i think some of the -- some of the structure problems that melinda identified with the field-based model, i think occasionally, some of the donors' interest concerns that i tried toa@aaqnhemphasize and my

presentation can be lurking in the background. i think that i have observed pretty similar legislative assistance programs -- large legislative assistance programs in countries like jordan, where, you know, there can be magnificent attempts to build the parliament's capacities. and while their parliament no longer exists because it's been dismissed by the monarchy, i think they originate from the same dynamics that melinda is talking about. but the most strategic are at play. so i would just emphasize the continuing role of donors's interests. and i think the comments the idea that some actors have -- there's a debt to be repaid. a real ardent commitment.

i think these are the donors that are willing to make the hard tradeoff against exceeding interests and financial pressure to promote democracy, and most likely to make change. i'm sure that is under my time but let me give it to my fellow panelists to finish their remarks. >> so, i'd like to return to this idea of forming u.s. democracy promotion by encouraging its cooperation with actors, democracy promoters from other democracies around the world. again, i will speak for central eastern europe but i think there are important comparables. i think a democratic innovator, as well as its capacity are a good match for the first hand

experience with democratization well knowledge and ties of a lot of those new democracies. some such cooperation has already begun, but i think there is room for improvement so allow me to put forward four such ways in which i think this cooperation can be more fruitful which in part responds to some of the criticism that we're seeing about the democracy promotion efforts of new democracies. the first one is that a lot of u.s. engagement with those actors have been talked down. and it's mostly in the form my colleague talked about of u.s. flow t diplomats putting pressure on those governments to do democracy work pis. and hungary is a great example a lot of investment from western europe in getting hungary to

support democracy in its neighborhood, and that did not work. and we see that now for the balance of the neighborhood. but i think what is more important here is that what the u.s. can do instead is invest in organic bottom-up civic border cooperation. and political corresponding cooperation and local government solidarity and cooperation. that brings me to my second point which i think part of the reason we talk is we have a different vision what democracy promotion should be like. for me democracy promotion is about solidarity, among actors who are interested in making this countries more democratic ones. oftentimes, that kind of solidarity is possible and especially important when both sides of the donor recipient are

struggling with challenges to democracy at home. so to have that in central and eastern europe, at the moment, with a moment of disillusionment is not the moment to discourage democracy promotion. in fact, we've seen the efforts be activists or politicians who are pro-democratic sitting together and what is it they can learn about each other. >> i'm terribly sorry -- >> okay, finishing up what we've seen from central and eastern dpauk crazy promotion, oftentimes, it's not about what the countries have done at home what they have done didn't work. >> great. thank you very much. what's your take-away, what stands out for you? >> well, one thing is i definitely agree that there's a

lot to be done with the central european as they are -- they're relatively cheap to run, they are not corrupt too much. so there's definitely a lot. the problem is, there's a growing gap between those who would work for the ngos and the frustrated society at large. frustrated and apathetic. and there's a lot of losers but there are those who are attempting to use this frustration and to change it into over the society. one question, i don't think you really -- that was the way you were heading but there was something about kind of pulling back money in the regimes. i completely agree with the logic.

but how do make sure that, i mean, the societies are not monolithic, so how do you make sure that shows who are trying for democracy in those regimes, that these are alive? you know, or they have some money to distribute, whatever they have to distribute, how to make sure is it to make sure it's going to happen? and one last remark, maybe coming back to the first panel, who did not address the fact that -- i mean, we use poland in central europe as a reference point for a good transition. but we didn't say that this happened when pro-democratic promotion was the highest priority of both the european and united states. there are structural elements in the society in the region and so that might help it. but we should realize that this is not the case anymore. i mean, the democracy promotion

is not that close to our hearts as it it was in the 1990s. so we should not put everything on the society, but we somehow kind of scale back our own ambitions. >> melinda, maybe you can respond to that a little bit. >> absolutely. i'm going to do my take-away. on sarah's points, with the conditionality. the democracy promotion much more difficult because we have a lot less conditionality. maybe we need to think more creatively to create more conditionality. i hear you on delivery. there's a tendency to focus on programs -- you want to give implementers enough room -- this is difficult work. it often takes years and year, i

think there is attend to delivery. and thsvetatsveta, you didn't g example today, i think it was a usaid-funded program. was trying to take that to ukraine, and it didn't fit in the context. and she said it would have been much better served if we took the polish model and applied in in ukrainian content. and michael made good points. and carl set this morning, the political part of this is extremely important. and i as like michael's take on looking at small and medium-sized business owners. to answer your question, i see a division of labor. i don't think we should cut it off all to even very hopeless countries. we should continue to use the

national endowment for democracy. to keep the flame alive, they now to work in authoritarian regimes better than anybody else. ambassadors also have small funds that they can give to that. >> we have a small amount of time, but let's open it up. this woman it up. >> melinda, thank you so much for bringing up azerbaijan. i think is an interesting case study for a lost the themes that have come up here. first of all for the pole of europe, the europeans being such a great model. the idea that europe is not only a model, but the idea that membership can promote better democracy in the applicant countries. azerbaijan has carried out the worst crackdown ever. it has arrested dozens of activists. the best human rights people. the best journalists are in jail

and this has happened while azerbaijan was the chairman of the council of ministers, council of europe. so it only works, europe, as a magnet, as a prize, can only work if europe is true to its values. if it enforces -- >> question? >> yes, so what do you think of that? is that a counterexample? and for you melinda, also on azerbaijan, with these people in jail, some of them have received funding from usaid from european donors. donors are already announced grant competitions. with top people in jail there's an opportunity for government to bring up a whole bunch right now. what should usaid and europeans do with this? all the best are in jail. the commissioner announced a new $3 million competition. how should people handle it?

>> melinda, i think that one's for you. >> i think the second part's for me. >> why don't you tackle it. >> i'll jump right in. i really share your concern, miriam. i can't believe that many of the people i've worked with in azerbaijan are behind bars. and tom was on this point that we need to use our political leadership to stand up to this. carl made this point, too. democracy isn't just a program. it's also using our moral leadership to say you that can't get away with this. and holding a state to the commitments that they'd made. so i've seen azerbaijan and donors have more money. and i've seen a horrific program -- i think mostly aid-funded programs in uzbekistan and azerbaijan agon

gongos. and you can't quote one to be taken seriously as a democratic reform. >> for those of you who don't speak the language. agongo is a fake ngo. >> and we have to do our due diligence. when there's no one to fund, put the money in countries where there's no openness, ukraine, moldova and georgia. does that cover it it -- >> i'm sorry, i think we'll have to move along. yes, this gentleman in the middle here. >> thanks. ira strauss i'm ahead of something called democracy international which is a legacy organization from the cold war

era democracy promotion. i have a question with the connection of this with the first panel. they've been wonderful on the specifics of the democracy promotion efforts but there's been a question about multiple standards, double standards, multiple considerations in life. that said, it's a weakness of central european democracy promotion has strategic purposes, i would say that's a strength. the first wave of democracy promotion has a clear concept in the '80s when communism collapsed. >> socie the question? >> and the question is have we gone from doing more good than harm, we were controversial, have we gone from doing more harm than good because we forgot the constraints that could make us sometimes do more harm or good? >> who would like to tackle it. >> well, i would have elaborated

on that point. the way i see the geo strategic take here is a double-edged sword. on the one hand if there's a clear rationale that backs democracy promotion it makes a country provide that they're resolved. and on the other hand the rationale serves to make it resistant because the countries are attempted to back the pro guys, instead of watching out to improve the democratic process. to me, there's a tradeoff there, just as discussed in the first panel, it's something that the country has to educate the public about, and decide where on the continuum it's willing to sit. >> i actually some a question i'm going to ask very quickly. it's a question for michael.

so we talked about hungary, but we sort of danced around it. the prime minister gave a speech where he said, we want a liberal democracy. we're tired of this liberal democracy stuff. so it would seem that western democracy efforts in hungary have failed, let's just say that. how did it fail? what did we do wrong? i realize the answer may be a long one but let's try that. >> well, first of all, we should also be clear about when the prime minister was announced liberal democracy. he kind of took parts of liberalism here and there, but what he was attacking was democracy. i think that it was basically the stuff of my presentation, but i will say one more thing -- >> sum it up for us. one sentence. >> well -- >> he's an academic.

>> my two sentences. i will say one more thing about the presentation, a famous historian said that history is like a pendulum. and we look up to the west and we are kind of hurt by never getting to those standards so we try to denounce. and this is the dynamic thing going on for ages, i'm afraid hungary is getting the pendulum back now. >> so it's really not our fault? >> well, it is our fault. because we thought that the pendulum was never going to go back. so we set everything on autopilot. >> how about the gentleman in the second row from the end there. yes, thank you. >> hello.

i'm probably one of the only africans in here. i come from zimbabwe, where all institutions as you know, and i see the community, including the united, supporting same progress. i think you talk about same progress. and being cast tig gaited for big too political. and we know that institutions will never reform but my question is on the role of the neighboring countries, impeding democracy. particularly south africa, in the case of zimbabwe. on the one hand, south africa is supporting the political retribution by taking them in but it is aiding the regime. what do you think should be the role of the neigor