i would like to welcome everybody to lessen 19. we will be focusing on the world war ii in the pacific, the racial nature of the war. the last time i asked you, is it racial baggage? or is it word desensitization? patrick is going to be leading as often the discussion. what have you got? >> the main topic is desensitization. in many ways to define it as a disregard of a prewar, moral or legal norms during war, looking at circumstances or barberry of the enemy, what have you. it is manifested and the pacific war as a firebombing of tokyo, targeting civilian areas. war trophy collecting of the individual soldiers and general transition from the goal of the war to be a military defeat toward racial stigmatization.

-- racial extermination. my first question for the class would then be, what is the purpose of laws of war? >> can we get a philosophy on this? >> whatever you want. laws of war. >> it is to establish a baseline of expectations for your soldiers, practical value. if you follow those laws, they will do the same for you and also be more inclined to surrender and be more merciful to your people when they are captured. what is interesting about them is you do not really see them practice on either side in the pacific war as much as you do in other theaters of world war ii. >> why? >> a good question, sir. >> that is why asked it.

>> largely because we do not see the rise of international institutions that have states adhere to norms of laws until after world war ii. >> you had the league of nations going on. >> and the geneva convention. >> to what degree did we adhere to those at the national -- international institutions? for example, the notion of human rights not until after the holocaust. that was fairly sobering. >> at the same time, don't we, the things that are happening -- the things that are happening -- i mean, i guess this leads to, and i think as a read this, one of the things is the lindbergh example. in the war without mercy, it talks about charles lindbergh basically traveling to the front in new guinea. right? what is his take on what is going on? he has a very clear perception of how the war is being

conducted in the south pacific. what is his views on that? yep? >> pretty much, increasingly, the japanese were viewed as subhuman. there was not that feeling, like in europe, where that these soldiers, they were courageous and just following their duty. foras not the same outlook the japanese. they were just a few to as fanatical. if an american talked about dying for his country, they will be viewed as honorable. whereas, if a japanese was seen as leaving a courageous charge against americans, they would be seen as fanatical and the zealous. >> to draw a dichotomy, the war of the european front put into a political construct. on the pacific front, it was more of a social construct. from the epithets used, right?

members of the united states, whether the masses or the government come a refer to the germans, it was the nazis. the japanese were the japs. the projection onto a whole population versus just a section of the population. >> there was a video i wanted to show. films an indoctrination for the american public to describe who the japanese were. people at the time did not really know much about them. what i found most interesting is it started out describing images of the civilian population. if you are trying to get your military to know who the enemy was, why is the civilian population even in consideration? upthe point you brought about not knowing the japanese as much, we had just fought the germans a couple of decades before in world war i. know the enemy in japan,

it started with a clean slate. the public does not know a lot. they can write whatever they want to get the people fired up. you know there are a lot of japanese atrocities turned the war that were published pretty much immediately. with germans and the holocaust, did we know what was going on? a lot of soldiers did not know until they stumbled across it. when you publish things like that, the first seen the american people had as the japanese as a whole of what they are doing in china or the philippines. >> i want to tie this -- if you 60, i think that the comment is made about -- this is the first full paragraph, the commission also argues that the current conflict in japan was

inseparable from to fundamental development, westward expansion and racial struggles. had been interacting in the pacific since the 1800's. the commodore opened up japan in the 1840's. we may not be as familiar as the japanese as with the germans, but we had interactions for at least 100 years on a national level, cultural level. so i think when you take that into consideration of the next chapter, do we not have notions of the japanese or what they are prior to the beginning of the war? >> let's go to lucas. i was replying to him. then over to chris. >> there are notions, but it is not like the groundwork we have from world war i. world war i, you have what the germans are doing in belgium.

people referring to them as the homs. dehumanizing the germans. we are familiar with their culture, especially on the west where there are a lot of japanese-americans. you do not have a groundwork as establishing them as someone as a subhuman. >> ok. chris? >> with i do see us establishing them as though it is, commodore perry said when he rolled into japan, he did not open up trade really. until theyed them capitulated and said ok we will trade with you. the first interaction we had was with a threat. >> ok. >> we could look at justice almost as farce

as the american people going back to the first question, rules of war and morality. when we start on page 68, the second paragraph says what is overlooked is thousands of japanese perished because they saw no alternative. so i think that's something to look into. we sometimes have a biased perspective. so i do not know if that ties into the original question, but where do we draw the line between what we are justifying? >> ok. >> i was thinking the same thing. when you look at the involvement in the european theater versus the japanese by the americans, i feel like the americans are able to look at the europe situation a little bit more objectively, because it is like outside looking in, not really their fight necessarily, but they will take the side of who they think is right. whereas, in japan, it is a vengeance thing.

they came to american soil and bombed pearl harbor. so that gives americans more of a personal motive to want to hate and want to defeat the japanese because they want payback. whereas, in europe, with the exception of the jewish population of america, perhaps knowing about the holocaust, that gives them a personal motive to fight against the nazis. other than that, not so much. they are trying to help out european allies. i know it seems simplifying it. when you look at it, it all adds up. you know, there is a difference between stepping in into -- and reacting. >> ok. let's watch a clip and i want to talk about this idea of reciprocity going forward. [video clip] >> would it surprise you to know that conventional weapons could be just as deadly?

this is lessons learned. our topic today is operation meetinghouse. the u.s. firebombing of tokyo on march 9 and 10 of 1945. the japanese attack on pearl harbor in december 1941 left in the pacific. in april 1942, doolittle had an air raid on japan. the tack gave americans a much-needed morale boost. however, his raid did little damage to japan itself. instead of taking the fighting immediately to japan, u.s. forces spent the first three years after pearl harbor island hopping in the pacific, places like saipan. u.s. marines slowly rolled back japanese control. by late 1944, the united states had advanced far enough that the new u.s. bomber could reach tokyo on a regular basis.

the first u.s. bombing raid did minor damage. u.s. bomber pilots developed new tactics. they flew low and at night, and they also began to use incendiary bombs against the japanese attacks. this came to a horrific culmination in operation meetinghouse. 334 b-29's. bombs,ped 2000 tons of reaching -- unleashing a firestorm. temperatures reached an estimated 1800 degrees fahrenheit. 15 square miles of tokyo, equivalent to half of manhattan, was burned down. no one knows for sure how many people died in the firebombing of tokyo. the estimates range from 90,000 to more than 100,000. a death toll equal to, if not higher, than the atomic bombing of hiroshima and nagasaki. a reporter simply wrote -- the heart of tokyo is gone.

the bombings continued for the next five months until japan's surrender in nagasaki. some one million japanese died because of conventional bombing attacks. what is the lesson of the firebombing of tokyo? just this -- the danger of nuclear weapons should not blind us to the destructive power of conventional weapons. the were wanting -- rwandan genocide of 1994 killed more than half a million people. whenever victims died from machete attacks. 100,000 people died in the violence that has rocked iraq. the fighting in the eastern congo has killed an estimated 6 million people. many of the victims died of malnutrition and disease. these are problems that can become rampant when violence

destroys any siblings of law and order. -- any semblance of law and order. the destructive power of conventional weapons is not a reason to never use military force. it is a reason to consider carefully and not to underestimate their consequence. the destructive power of conventional weapons is the reason why countries have a responsibility to protect civilian populations where they can. here's the question to consider -- what more should the international community be doing to prevent conventional warfare? to find out more. it at cfr.org. thank you for watching this installment of lessons learned. >> i want to watch one more clip. it's contemporary to the firebombing. we will see. we will take a look at what,

contemporaneously, is happening. [video clip] >> a task force of b-29's, their noses pointed towards japan. there are bombs for tokyo. pacific for the 1500 miles towards the heart of the enemy, their tokyo 20,000 feet the low. making sure -- the aircraft plan is the main target. and this height, results are difficult to record. you can see some of the bombs landing far below. there was a much closer view. -- the jets had a much closer

view. japan does not take this treatment lying down. b-29's blaze back. is caught spinning from the sky. the japs delta hard blow, but in spite of it, tokyo has a lot more coming to it. alt a hard blow. >> i think there's a lot of things. initially, my thought my -- my thoughts are on this idea of richer prosody. does the attack on pearl harbor -- my thoughts on this are with reciprocity.e

does the attack on pearl harbor allow us to do things differently in the context of the law of war? >> the idea that we can. not necessarily that we can , they talkcause about how they have all these 9's, double digits or something, and they have how many bombs in them? they say the main target is this one factory. i am a history major, not a math genius. [laughter] i would argue you do not need that many planes or that many bombs to take out a military factory. >> what is interesting is that in the propaganda film, they use the phrase that is hard to necessarily know what the damage was because of the clouds, bought -- but they still

dropped the bombs. >> what was most interesting is there were considerations to bomb civilian areas even before pearl harbor happened. obviously, the british side advocated that for a while. u.s. said we would do strategic bombing on industrial capabilities. i cannot find it in the book, but is that right, there was a time americans were considering bombing civilian areas even before pearl harbor? >> >> yeah, the nazi blitz targets london. right? the british are very quick to go towards the bombing of civilian locations in europe. it brings up duality. the united states in the european theater tends to be gun shy about carpet bombing of cities.

however, that consideration seem to enter into the same kind of calculus in the pacific theater, does it? >> i want to go back to lindsay's point about calling the enemies japs versus nazis. different cultural specifications. we all learned it in philosophy. i think the thing that happened was there was a huge stroll man argument that once someone attacked someone and killed someone, they sacrificed the right to life basically. i think the fact that we looked at the entire japanese culture as the enemy versus nazi, gave us a subculture justification -- a subconscious justification for what we do with the bombing. if we do not specify the what -- specify one specific enemy like the japanese government a , i think it makes it ok in your

head. we were allied with european countries and we talked about the lines between different european states being blurred, so we had less racial tensions toward them. >> given that the united states , even more so than our european allies, is bounded by ideology, we typically conduct our foreign affairs very much in the elitist away. -- in an elitist way. we think our ideology supersedes others. given that germany had a fairly stable democracy before world war ii, japan did not. i think we assume that that provided some justification for attacking japan with much more veracity than germany. >> just because it is important to remember that just because we debated a little more with

germany, by the time the war ended in germany, they stopped sending bombers out because they ran out of cities to destroy. just because they debated it -- >> it leads to a good point. i want to go back to lindsay's point about the notion of -- moral or democratic uprightness. >> self-righteousness. >> self-righteousness, maybe. >> the foundation for the ideal government is still there where as in japan -- >> let's be clear. japan in the 1930's had a parliament. they prided themselves on being a modern country. government, cabinets, prime ministers, those things existed. what we see in the 1930's is the

creation of a military state, much in the same manner as we do with the nazi party with a eventually a one-party state. we have to be somewhat careful when we try to characterize the japanese state in the 1930's as less than a modern, i guess. product ofht the a the clash of civilizations argument. our elitism is injected into the asian sphere and not european. i would venture to say most political and social elite in the united states have some european heritage. probably. >> i want to come back to that. >> the japs versus nazi terminology. nazis is political.

nazi was the correct term. the first senate will likely to say was i am not a nazi. jap is not a political grouping every person from japan. just inherent in the language. >> i think you are right. the characterization we're talking about, is it a stretch to see this as an extension of the manifest destiny argument we were talking about last week? this idea of the civilized frontier and what is on the other side of it. jeff, you're making a face. >> kind of a stretch but i see where you are coming from. you know, we ran out of space in america, so now we have to conquer what is even further west in japan. i do not know. i do not necessarily -- i do not buy it. i do not buy it, sir. >> it could be justified with our almost disregard or more so to civilian casualties. i think, in europe, somebody can

correct me if i am wrong, but there was more -- they paid more attention to make sure it was a military, you know axes. the united states as a whole, whereas from the video, just talking about the different bombings in general. the doolittle raid was just supposed to be emotional for them, and the rest were follow-ups, i guess. with the big bombings, not just killing soldiers, not just killing the people who planned the attack on pearl harbor. >> ok. >> i think if you are looking at reasons why that is the case, i think there is a lot of fear that we arety and

used to dealing with conflicts in europe and that kind of balance of power and the interaction between european nations and ourselves. but we are not used to dealing with such a real threat. i think that the threat or the action of pearl harbor had enormous influence on our review of the japanese because, i know, in the book, it talks about the kill or be killed psychology and how that becomes a vicious cycle. and that definitely played into our interactions with the japanese. i think that characteristic of when you feel your ideology and your nation actually attacked, you tend to be, feel more justified in the fact that you are able to kill them. >> ok. interesting is because i had not planned on

talking about the major war today. but -- thank you. when two nations go to war, are they wars of peoples and cultures against each other? about this, and most of us are history majors, but with major lee, he believes his society goes together. that's why we created rules of war. military is subject to society which is at war with the other society. when i was thinking about as we talked about this is our society almost, like, our society basically give the military the ok to bomb civilians in the japanese theater when they create the concentration camps here for the japanese citizens. the internment camps.

i could not think of the word. >> concentration camps is the normal term. >> right. when we created that and it was made by congress. in the society elects congress. that is society proving the separation of these specific people for our safety. it is kind of like if they are doing that in america, we have to do whatever we can over there to actually end the fight. >> i have a question. if the society is improving of -- a proving of all the stuff we're doing to the japanese, fault of thet the government-run propaganda? you cannot trust a third or fourth generation japanese guy because once japanese, always japanese, it is said. >> that is a really good point. what is this poster trying to

get you to do? >> it feeds into the view that people are calling for complete annihilation. >> at its core, what is it telling you to do? look at it. >> it is galvanizing. >> stay on the job. do not strike. >> the picture of the cartoon of -- oneese person saying more. i guess it is the same thing. exactly. >> ok. don't waste materials. right? war effort. up early. win so do noto rushthe war. out the door and take your time and clean up after yourself? i mean, somebody when they make

these, they make the conscious effort -- we could just say to help the soldiers out and do not throw away old tools and do things right. do not strike. we are making the effort to go back to the very first one. do not strike because we have to wipe out every murdering jap. >> as opposed to the soldiers because the soldiers lose the war because the people at home are striking and not doing their job well. it was the guilt on the american population, as well. noticed the murdering part, too, sir. it is not like you cannot strike because there are japanese people out there, there are murderers japanese people out there. >> it plays into the fear of the japanese people.

1937, you have the rape and being occupied by germans, the idea is different then by being occupied by japanese. so there is the fear that this asian menace has been conquering asia and they are coming after america next. something like this is playing into that fear. >> all right. lindsay? >> war places drastic demands on populations. populace tod its act outside its own individual self interests. by projecting self interests onto a nation and propagating, whether specious or not, existential threat makes it within individual self interest to act in accordance with the national in place demands. placing this wider threat of

ubiquitous japanese who is threatening to wipe the united states off of the face of the for thet might be individuals to adhere to war after. >> people often respond better to fanatical characters. same reason we have a purple dinosaur telling people to tie their shoes. >> society going to war. i am seeing the government, the way i look at the government in -- society in the 1940's, kids get pulled out of school to work and they do not have a lot of education. you are talking to the masses and you put a cartoon japanese there, what is a group of an educated masses going to think about that? we are going to get attacked by japanese monsters. the government is getting the society to do what they wanted them to do. >> the society elects the

government. the government is a representation of what the society wants. them doing propaganda is more a continuation to help fund the war and no one is just going to donate to the government. -- they usedhat the propaganda to few will them -- to fuel them. it is like a cycle. >> because we let our government -- we elect our governing officials, they are representation of our society. i would say the government , within its locus of control, can completely determine what society thinks by its message in human capital, propaganda, and messages it sends to the lower echelon of masses. an educated or not. >> i want to tack onto that. from the propaganda watch, we have what u.s. and one japanese.

-- one u.s. action and one japanese action. the u.s. bombing through cloud cover in a city. and the japanese lash back at a bomber base. ok, so, that doesn't seem to be -- i do not want to get into a discussion of, you know, japanese heroes can only go this far. that's not what i'm trying to do. those are not reciprocal in nature. we are exploring a lot of things here. the notion of reciprocity and dealing with that. the idea of society going to war. know aboutdo we society in the 1940's from what we read? >> racist. >> heavily charged racially. we have a jim crow south. we talked about domestic servants and labor management.

like, are we bringing that with us to the pacific war? you had your hand up, andrew. go ahead. >> i was going to talk about something else, but yes, we are breaking that. it seems like every country has their own racial theory. japan has their own divine heritage. >> in the book, talks about what the japanese bring to the war. if you read the introduction, there is a clear japanese anti-imperialism, the divinity of the emperor, and the purity of kind of the shintuism. that also has to be considered. i think you're absolutely right. do you want to add onto that? >> not really. >> i was about to say.

talking about japan's future, i know we are not going to read it, but when the restoration took place during world war ii, the people doing that, they were not calling for building japan up or modernizing. their main rallying point was come to us and we will kill the barbarian spirit so basically everyone outside japan was a barbarian. not to say this made a right on our part. but both sides brought that element to the war. >> so nobody is right? >> yes, sir. i was going to show the video, and at the opening, they go into describing what the typical japanese soldier is like. the first characteristic the narrator talked about height and weight.

how does that have any play on the military capabilities? and then you have "life" magazine publishing the picture of the blonde white girl -- >> that is in the book. >> i see elements of phrenology and trying to find scientific yourselfistinguishing from the japanese from another race. >> yet, in the middle portion of the book, there is this great propaganda and cartoons for both sides. i have the blown up color here picture 13.9, as you read chapter four, we barely touched on the gender or sexual nature of some of his propaganda, right? we have this yellow peril taking away naked white women.

there was literally no military campaigns with the japanese came and took connected white women away. -- naked white women away. it becomes a popular motif. if you look at the pictures in the middle of your book, you have -- i love this first one. u.s. sailor, he is by a load can assess war without mercy on a treacherous thug. one of the things we talked about when we watch "birth of a nation," the notion for the movie we must protect women's purity. is this thing wrapped up into all of this? >> with the whole japanese guy running over with naked white

woman over his shoulder kind of deal, the thing i am thinking about is, so king kong, the video, the original movie, it was released in 1933. that's what i am thinking they are trying to get at work. -- get at with this. they other picture, portray japanese soldiers as apes. 1933, now they can clearly relate to this guy that is just a big, brutish ape. he kidnaps women, climbs up, and destroys cities. >> i would make the point that something like this it did happen in china. >> you're absolutely right. >> it is playing on the fear of there is this strange enemy over there and if they take one of our cities, they are going to it. everyone in it is propaganda, that is the whole point of this picture. >> i think that is exactly what this picture is. thisare distinguishing

chinese woman from what it looks like to me, and this japanese guy, and you look at his hand holding onto her leg and there is this color difference. so it is what you define whiteness as. there were not german internment camps. the difference between the european theater and this asian theater. >> on the caution of not to constrain our racial epithets to the pacific, i think they are easily leveraged in the war on the european front, as well. bear in mind, we knew about the atrocities in 1942. we did nothing until two years later. millions of jews died. we sat on our butts and it did -- and did nothing. int about the ms st. louis 1939? we could have saved hundreds of jewish refugees. we did not. anti-semitism both at the

government level and overall masses. >> you are absolutely right. and when we look at the next lesson or two, we look at jim crow going to war. when you take the jim crow to war, you kind of have the ability to create the other. that otherness, in many regards, already existed which you are , absolutely right. but if societies go to war, and societies have their hangups, do you fight the society? the firebombs in tokyo appears to be we are fighting the society, not necessarily the war machine itself. they are trying to bomb a plant. but when we look at some of these other bombings, they are

blatant, just we're going to bomb tokyo. is that ok? >> it depends. it does not really depend. >> but does it. >> there are some states that simply do not care. this would be unjustified. in a democratic state, that said, a democratic state is total war. the government is beholden to its population. you assume that if egregious violation by the population, go against that. >> the strategic bombing survey after world war ii shows the strategic bombing really do not do anything to make anyone capitulate. the reality had the opposite effect to strengthen the resolve, the bombing of britain and germany. what it comes down to is these bombs are not effective and why are we still doing it? we are waging a war against the

enemy society. >> total war. >> total war. major lee had said, if societies -- if we accept this notion that societies are going to war, our wars then against society? if so, is that a slippery slope? >> i think it would be. there is an example right in world war ii. the nazis were going to jewish society. that is a pretty slippery slope if you ask me. it can turn into genocide when you're going against society. >> where do you stop? that's kind of where you are getting at. at what point should be destroyed equity firebombing or destroy them the army and then try to change the society?

>> andrew and then patrick. >> wars are fighting society against society. and it is a slippery slope. to answer the original question, we have rules of war to mitigate that slippery slope. to try to maybe alleviate any guilt afterwards for the side that wins. you know, we destroyed their society, that maybe we should have, but, hey, we mostly abided by these rules of war. therefore, it is ok. >> ok. patrick? >> maybe it's a possibility. i have not really looked into it that much. the military is a representation of everything that makes up society. your economic ideology, conceptions of warriorness it is -- or whatever, so that is why you place the two militaries

against each other. if you want to go into the moral equivalence of combatants, they both entered this realm of we are both willing to lose our lives against each other. the moral laws of war limit the violence and effect of war. if you take that approach. that is why, yes, it is as slippery slope. i think i am repeating what andrew just said actually. know, at what you point is genocide considered genocide? because if you look at how the nazis were doing it, they were taking military forces and killing civilians. and the americans were taking military forces and killing civilians in japan. i mean, as far as numbers are

concerned, there is a difference, but is that really how we are going to define it? if you kill this many innocent civilians, it is genocide and if you keep it under a certain number, it is not. the is the reason that rules of war, there has to be some kind of a limit to what you are allowed to do in war. because i feel like it gets overlooked. we just bombed out japanese cities. just like the distinction we made earlier between internment camps and concentration camps. similarities,t of but for some reason they are not called the same name. azis,se we are not no we do not call them that it we have higher morals, so what we're doing is not genocide. >> i do not think it could be

comparable to genocide because the ultimate goal of your actions that really relate to the categorization of it. the germans wanted to extinguish ews, so they wanted to get rid of a culture, but we did it for capitulation it we wanted a complete surrender. >> there were suggestions that were many military officials who do not care about surrender and the public. they wanted to eradicate. it did exist. >> every murdering jap is wiped out. is that a strategy? i encourage you to read it, but i recently finished a book land" that was

fascinating. the nazits to take holocaust and put them into a political and strategic place. -- calculus. it takes this notion of nazi death camps and the holocaust outside of the context of they are just killing people. it shows that there is a regression of resettlement, of massive movement, of deportation, of arrests. and when the united states gets involved in the war and there is significant reverses and the german army in making 42, that political creates a narrative of international prevents himat

from winning the war. so to achieve our victory, we must stamp out jewishness. it takes up the idea that we're jews to this is actually a strategic military objective. reconfiguretion what is going on in the pacific? is this just a war gone crisis with -- gone crazy with notions of ethnicity and race? >> we need to bear in mind what our objectives were. within germany, we could say in hindsight, the nazis thoughts -- sought world hegemony. the u.s. did not seek those ends. we have to ask, are we defending democracy? that is far more elusive than achieving any kind of hegemony. in this murder of the japanese

fueled hatred and is it a means to defend democracy? we have to draw the narrative between one and the other. how to construe this as a means to defend democracy and promote? >> the question you brought up, whether it is racial baggage we attention -- decent cetacean, that we're bringing. if you look at what happened after the war, there are no more calls for annihilation or whatever. they started rebuilding japan and in addition, some of the -- >> [indiscernible] >> that is true. with that, the book mentions unpleasant experiments on people from the unit that the soviets captured and not have a good time. the ones we got had a much better time because we needed to

research and after that, a lot of the went on to be leaders in society. it is interesting to look out -- at how once the war is done and you do not need that element of race anymore, how different nations handle it. >> it is a good point. it is society going to war or government going to war? is race political? are we generating these others to accomplish goals? japan is trying to become a regional power. they are defending democracy reciprocity and stop the japanese expansion there. those are very strategic things we could say are colorblind. but the wars executed by both

sides along racially coded lines. how do we deal with that? is race -- what is race? it is something used politically? is this something that is done to engender compliance? erica? >> sir, i think that race can be especiallycapegoat, with the fact that government can mobilize society in terms of painting a specific culture as enemy. if you look at the historical context of world war ii, we were very isolationist prior to pearl harbor. honestly, fdr was smart in moving and mobilizing the population toward invasion and

military involvement. but it was not until pearl harbor that we changed our sentiment and the eating willing to go to war. it took this action by the japanese, and since it was the japanese, we can paint them as this enemy and the government can, i guess, picture or paint their entire society as evil because they were the ones to finally send us over the edge. also,t makes sense, but there has to be a baseline, underlying of racism pervasive in this country and in this case, the united states. if people do not -- any sort of government campaign to paint another enemy like the japanese as an inferior race that could be destroyed in order for us to survive, without the racial predisposition already in place, it is not going to work.

it comes down to there are some very unresolved and underlying race issues in the united states. >> do you have a rebuttal? >> do you think we really were against the japanese until pearl harbor? i think that really energized the feeling of racism. >> there has to be a predisposition to racism. >> exactly. >> that can be tailored to fit the situation. >> >> they projected onto the japanese and then paint their entire culture as evil because of pearl harbor. >> and they were racist toward people from the asian descent before. building the roadway, let's send 10 chinamen. they will be carrying a stick of dynamite and we will blow up the rockies. that was their plan. they had no problems having age -- having asians kill themselves to build our railroad.

>> we are ready giving stuff to china. there is racism. the government is not being racist or creating anti-chinese racism. by 1941 and giving stuff to china. the racism is specific to japan. >> it comes off as a little bit racist. they look alike, right? do you think it was easier for us to paint a japanese person as an enemy when everybody thought the chinese and japanese looked the same? >> it comes up in a book. the united states makes clear divisions between the japanese and chinese. through the conduct of the war, they are very separate entities. the united states has a much longer history with the chinese fan with the japanese.

we will expand that i want to go . to andrew and maybe where about out of time. >> to jump off of that point. the book talks about how the chinese and the filipinos were considered good asian, whereas the japanese were considered bad asians. they draw a scene of different pictures of japanese, chinese, and other asians. the differences of how you could tell the difference between a chinese person and a japanese person, completely stereotypical, just looking at their face. you need to be able to tell the difference because a japanese man is bad where a chinese man is good. >> i think you are right. as we get ready to meet next time, i want you to think about this notion of society going to war. can we make assessments of cultures and people? ones that are brought-ranging? i encourage you, the recent bill

er, i encourage you to watch it. it is longer. if you get to the chance, read r/ben affleckl mahe debate on islam. i look forward to that and we'll see you next week. [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] c-span2 cities toward traveling to learn about the history and literary life. next week in, we partner with charter to medications to visit madison, wisconsin. >> there is work for everyone. it is a glorious service. this service for the country. --comes to every serious citizen. it is an unending struggle to keep government representing. >> it is probably the most

important political figure in wisconsin history, and one of the most important in the history of the 20th century and united states. .e was a reforming governor he defined what progressivism is. he was one of the first to use the term to self-identified. he was a united states senator. he was recognized by his peers in the 1950's is one of the five greatest senators in american history. he was an opponent of world war i, stood his ground, advocated for free speech. above all, he was about the people. after the civil war, america changed radically from a nation of small farmers, small producers, and small manufacturers. throughate 1870's 1890's, we had concentrations of

wealth. we had growing inequality. we had concern about the influence of money in government or to we spent the later part of 's giving speeches all over wisconsin. if you wanted a speaker for your club or group, bob would give a speech he went to county fairs. he had been to every kind of event you could imagine and built a reputation for himself. , he was ready to run for governor, advocating on behalf of the people. he had two issues. one, the direct primer -- no more electing candidates in convention. two, stop the interest, specifically the railroads. >> watch all of our events from madison next saturday starting at noon eastern on c-span2's book tv. and next sunday on c-span3's

american history tv. >> join us next saturday for all-day live coverage of the world war i centennial symposium from the macarthur them are norfolk, virginia. aboutl hear from scholars the war that in our great at the 20th century and will welcome your calls, facebook posts, and tweets. we will talk about the u.s. navy's wartime role. author.ill have an that is next saturday starting here ona.m. eastern american history tv. >> monday night on the communicators, the professor at the university of pennsylvania law school and director of the technology innovation -- >> the people who oppose prioritization should look at the internet header. the magic that makes the internet work. there is something called the

type of service flags. high bandwidth services, low latency services, different forms. people say that is an old artifact. well, when we designed the fieldet, they cut that but included a label field to do another form of prioritization quality. if you look at the engineering design to see that prioritization was never intended to be allowed, that knowledge does a long way. it was designed from the beginning. today toe using it deliver, for example, voice services. the true completely ip-based voice service to your phone uses prioritization.

there are a lot of video and other things. >> monday night at 8:00 eastern on the communicators on c-span2. former member of the student nonviolent coordinating committee shares her experiences from the civil right movement in the 1960's and explains how she became involved in the challenges she faced during the freedom summer project. this is a keynote address from his oppose him at the library, about one hour. >> before i turned the speaker over, i want to express profound gratitude for the men and women who engaged in the struggle as over half anick century ago, and continue to keep fires burning in the present day. we have the privilege of interviewing several of these remarkable