concerns about is this increasingly divided muslim word, and a divided muslim world is not good for iran, and if you represent 10% of the region's muslim, you don't want divided, you want united which you can lead, not divided which you have to dominate. i would also say in terms of shia huh sto historyography, th to be victimized and retain the ideology of being victimized rather than being perceived as the oppressors. they are increasingly dominating the region, but it's not a position in which they are comfortable with. now, let me move on to u.s. and

iran relations, and what isis means for u.s./iran relations. one of the important fault lines between the pragmotist, they have shown themselves willing to work with america against sunni radicals, whereas the hardliners in tehran has shown themselves willing to work with sunni radicals against the united states. going back to 1979, there has been a lot of instances of u.s./iran convergence. they both had a common enemy in the soviet union and president reagan tried to work with iran against the soviet union and he was rebuffed, and in the early months of the revolution, the carter government tried to warn

iran about saddam hussein's impending invasion, and the then-iranian government did not take that threat seriously, and they preferred to see the united states as an adversary. there certainly was a convergence of interest between the united states and iran, vis-a-vis the taliban, and that was a missed opportunity by the united states, and now we have isis which is a mutual adversary. what has been pretty consistent has been whatever iran has been faced with, rather than siding with america against the adversary, they either stayed out of the fight or flirted with the adversary of the adversary, which is the united states. and over the last few days i have been reading a lot of the statements from the senior

revolutionary guard, elite individuals and media and government and military who are hand picked by the supreme leader, and their line has been incredibly consistent, which is that isis is a creation of the united states, and isis is a creation of the uk, the united states, and the zionist. i go back to say the prag mist are willing to work with isis, and when they came to new york during the general assembly, and he mocked those that said isis was created by americas. he dismissed them as conspiracy theorist, and two weeks later the supreme leader came out again and said isis was created by the united states. the reason why i say this is because i think there has been a tendency as of late to conflate

our hopes about iran and analysis, and we hope it will prioritize national interests against idealistic interests. i think we often times dilute ourselves into thinking that the folks that come and that say these things, and the united states have real power and influence over these types of iranian authority. they are consistent about who their adversary is. and let me kind of wrap up with a final point about -- it's related to this point about the nuclear deal, and prospects for a nuclear detaunt between the

united states and iran would alter iran's regional behavior and bring about more cooperation between the united states and iran. on one hand, if you look at it simply from the perspective of iran's national and economic interests, there's tremendous argument to be made for them doing the deal. they are burning -- i want to say they are burning the candle at two ends, but they are burning a candle at three ends, which doesn't make sense. let me explain what i mean by that, they are hemorrhaging hundreds of millions of dollars per month keeping the raw skwraepl in power in israel. this is a country that was exporting 2.5 billion barrels per day, and it has been cut in half, and they are losing a tremendous amount financially. when i say three ends now, the price of oil has dropped fairly and dramatically over the last

four weeks, and that trend line looks to continue. so from a purely economic perspective, there's a strong impetus for iran to do the nuclear deal. but i would argue that in the world view of the supreme leader and the revolutionary guards, if a deal strengthens the hands of the more pragmatic moderate forces in iran, i can see it being inimical to their interests within iran. certainly the statements from the folks who have to sign off on a deal hasn't inspired a lot of confidence. i would also say that since 1979 to the present, there has been tremendous continuity in iran's regional behavior. remember, there was an eight-year government, a reformist government, and we did not see any change in iran's support for hezbollah, and

iran's opposition to israel's existence, and so i think that the hope that a nuclear deal is going to really alter iranian behavior is not really buttressed by the historic record. between 1979 and 2003, there was no nuclear conflict between the united states and iran. it did not exist and we saw tremendous regional rivalries. i end by saying that i think as long as this current supreme leader is alive and he is supreme leader, i think we will continue to see episodes of tactical convergence between the united states and iran, and tactical cooperation between the united states and iran, but i think for his personal interests, we will also continue to see the strategic emtphau tea between the united states and iran, not because it's in the interest of either country or something pushed by the u.s.

government, but it's in the interest of the supreme leader to maintain this strategic entity. >> thank you for the pessimistic but realistic appraisal of where things are headed. we will turn to questions in the interest of time. we will take three questions at a time. please identify yourself and your affiliation, and keep it to a question, please, and very brief. >> thank you. i am a journalist. my question is to anybody who would like to answer. in february 2014, u.s. treasury issued new statement in which they sanctioned two dozen companies, including a couple of

operatives that live in tehran, and the treasury stated that these operatives who have been bringing fighters from gulf and afghanistan to syria to al qaeda groups, and look at it now and it doesn't make sense iran to help al qaeda groups in syria, and most likely include isis affiliated groups. is there any way a panelist can shed light on this iranian role with tehran to help al qaeda-type groups in syria? thank you. >> okay. >> i am a researcher at

georgetown, university. my question is do you think there is a measure of control and balance between the irg regards. to clarify, how much power do you think the revolutionary guard will gain before somebody stops them inside -- from inside the iran, and is there a threat of the revolutionary guard being so powerful that they can shake the fundamental governance of iran and the supreme leader as well, or not, the irgc is free to do whatever they want? >> okay. uh-huh. great. yes. >> if it is suggested the saudis have a hand in -- or at least have an interest in keeping the price of oil down, and there by certain inflict something on the iranians, and the iraqis and

russia russians, what do you think would be the iranian response, and secondly, if there is no deal on the 24th, what should we expect? >> so why don't we take that first question on the alleged iranian support to extremist or al qaeda. >> so i can't speak to the specific alleged support to sunni groups in such as d-a-s-h in syria, but what i can speak to is during the time we were in iraq before 2012, there were clear signs occasionally of

iranian regime out reach, coordination with, and sometimes support of sunni extremists groups inside iraq. even including al qaeda and iraq. certainly including groups like ansar islam. one of the indications was al qaeda in iraq members and larger al qaeda members in pakistan were able to cross iran to go back and forth between iraq and pakistan to exchange messages and so on between zawahiri and the leaders of al qaeda in iraq, which is the role that, for example, ramon had for quite sometime, until he became the ill-faded number three in al qaeda, the guy who always, you know, gets killed. he was the head of the al qaeda

support network inside iran that was sending fighters and money and so on into iraq through -- mainly through iraqi kurdishstan. there was a precedent for the iranians reaching out to groups that it would not appear they would have an interest in promoting in order to try to unleash them against a common enemy. i can only speck yulate if theyd that in syria, it was in order to unleash the more unsavory islamist radical elements against what we in d.c. term as the moderate syrian opposition or the free syrian army. >> this issue of the domestic power of the revolutionary guards, you have written on lot on that? >> my view on that has always been that iran has not

transformed or been transformed -- every country has an army, and i think there's subordination to clerical authority and it works for both sides, the guards require the ideology, and the clerical leadership requires the muscular power of the revolutionary guards, but they share a common ideological influence towards each other, so over the time, of course, the role of the guards have grown in terms of the economic power. that's not particularly unusual in developing countries for the military to be part of the calmers, we saw that in china, because they bring certain skills and attributes, particularly the aftermath of the war, it was the reconstruction of the countries,

the engineering corp. was part of that. now, there are more meaningful acts on the table, and some of the decisions that the islamic republic is about to make, and also if you look at some of the guards' publications, they refer to him to the point of substantial authority. there is a sort of a co co--dependency there. the iranian bank officials, whatever is that worth, estimate for the budgetary balances, and for budgets to function and work effectively, they need to have

oil prices at $70 a barrel, and who knows about the statistics and so on. if it's true that the saudi's are manipulating the petroleum mark market, that's a dangerous game. in the '80s, they distorted their own economy and the soviet economy even more. i think it's a dangerous game to play, and i am not sure if that is happening. there are other reasons oil will decline, and the complexion of the energy markets are changing that the future of the iran and its economy is not good. the market share loss as a result of the sanctions are unlikely to be retrieved, and a million barrels of iranian oil have gone off the market and nobody seems to care that much.

and the economy is less dependance on foreign commerce and less dependance on oil, so he is already signaling from his perspective, and i don't know how much he knows about macro economics, and so they may have to be able to live with that sort of a infrenched economic situation for sometime to come. >> a couple quick points on iranian support for sunni radical groups. i would just say that this is a misperception about the way iran wields power in the region, and it's not a sectarian power, but an ideological power, and if you share its ideology, it doesn't care if you are sunni, you can be hamas, or christian, and you can be hugo chavez and they will

support you. and as joel mentioned, there are instances in the past where they seem to fit to support sunni radical groups as a way of protecting against and provoking the united states, or, you know, they see perhaps these groups accruing power in the case of the taliban, and there was a concern taliban may be coming back in the position of influence, and they want to see if the taliban could have a cooperation with it. on the question about oil prices and its implications with the nuclear deal. first, by historic standards, if you have been ruling for 25 years, oil at $80 a barrel is still pretty high. i mean, there was a time a little more than a decade ago when i will prices were less

than $10 a barrel, and with his historic memory, oil right now is pretty high. second, the economic welfare of the iranian population for the supreme leader has never been first or even a second tier priority, so he is willing to subject the population to pretty severe economic hardship rather than compromise on his ideological aims, and what are the implications for the nuclear deal? i see three potential outcomes. outcome number one is what everybody is hoping for, which is a resolution. i don't see the odds of that being great. i won't quantify them publicly, but i don't think the odds are great between now and november 24th. outcome number two, escalation. return to status quo. i think very few people want that here, and few people want that in tehran, and that doesn't mean that it won't happen. outcome three, managed resolution. we fail to reach an agreement but there is a recognition in both capitals, both washington

and tehran that it doesn't behoove either side to go back to the compromise and muddle through. we will see what happens. >> i want to know, if any of the panelists touch on the iran kurdish balancing act in regards to battling isis with the syrian, iraqi, or iranian kurds stphp thanks. this is a question for all the panelist. it's easy to point to iran's and

iraq's policy and malaky sectarian policies, but how come there is not more on the allege kul root cause of the jihadists, and that's the foundation on which isis relies on, and so my question is how can the u.s. play a more positive role inputting pressure on its gulf allies, especially saudi and qatar to stop funding the extremism that morphs into terrorism in the form of al qaeda or isis? thank you. >> joe? thank you. if we take the third scenario, the ie meddling through, or kicking the count down the road in the negotiation or nonnegotiation, in iran what

does it mean for the power struggle between him and his foes, and by extension, if you project that on the scene that we are touching this morning or today, what to expect in iraq, syria and potentially lebanon in terms of iranian policy, which would it mean that if we call it that way, we will go further, or would it be a more of a crisis management in syria and iraq? >> okay. the iran/kurdish balancing act. >> as we have seen, the kurds have been incredibly grateful about iranian support to protect them against isis. there was some kurdish officials that have been visiting d.c. in recent months, and they would

argue against what i said earlier about the dangers of u.s. partnering with iran to fight isis, saying that with the concern that it could actually fuel the sunni radicalism that we are trying to fight, and they say it's too late for that. this is really an issue right now and they have been tremendously grateful for iranian support. as i said, at the moment there's a tactical convergence as kurdish aspirations for greater independence grow, i think you will start to see -- start to see the tensions come to be given iran's own kurdish population, and perhaps growing sentiment, independent sentiment aphupbg them. what happens to rohony if there is no nuclear deal.

he is like a gambler that has gone to las vegas and put every chip in his hand on one number, which is the deal. he was elected for a variety of reasons, and he was going to improve kind of human rights record, and he was going to be more tolerant to a civil society and improve people's economic lot to help to deliver the nuclear deal, and all of this has been on the nuclear issue, and if a nuclear deal isn't reached, you will have the worst of both worlds, because he will have spent all of his chips on an issue which he hasn't resolv resolved, and then simultaneously he will not have delivered on any of his promises to, you know, to be helpful towards a civil society and the cause of human rights. you know, the one thing i always thought about the supreme leader, he is really brilliant, and he is the second longest

serving man in the middle east, and there's a reason for that, and his modious operation is he needs a president that has accountability without power, and that's precisely what he will become, and he will have accountability, and people will say, what you have done? we came out in droves to elect you and you did not deliver on the nuclear deal or elsewhere, and so kind of popular blame goes to rouhani, and he didn't have the power to deliver the nuclear deal. and then lastly on the question of, you know, why didn't we talk about the nefarious orthodox sunni idea that helped to create isis. that's a valid point. isis has a lot of fathers, and you can point to different factors, and some of it has been the brutality, and iranian

complexity, and the ideology bases is the u.s. invasion of iraq, and it was a factor in the creation of isis. our panel is about iran, so we focused on iran's role in isis, but what was said earlier this morning about the critical role of education and helping to counter this type of radical intolerant sunni ideology is so important. i will touch on sort of the last one, the implications of the nuclear deal or absence on it with the balance of power. if you look at the history of iranian presidency, that's three presidencies, and all of them lose power as their presidency progresses, because all of them

come in with promises they are unlikely to deliver. one came in with a promise of economic rejuvenation, and then a promise of political liberalization, and president mahmoud ahmadinejad, he had an erosion of popularity and the balance of power shifts to the office of the supreme leader which is not a subject to electoral challenge. you are likely to see the symbolism thing happen anyway in the case of rouhani, and he never had any intention regarding civil liberties or emancipation. and i don't disagree with counting him on the projects of the nuclear agreement and the percentages he eluded to, but i think there is perhaps a greater sort of understanding between the parameters of the nuclear

agreement. i think it's more of a consensus government and has been in the past. they have that a degree of an agreement on what they want. to suggest that rouhani is looking for an agreement that requires substantial dismantlement of the iranian nuclear infrastructure, there is no evidence of that, and from his experience as a nuclear negotiator, he invokes the authority of the supreme leader and how it's a consultation and agreement within the system. too often i think in the past when we have looked at the iranian system, we have seen factions and personalities, and i think they exist, but when the iranians talk about their system, and they talk about the iranian system. and there's more of a consensus in the system than in the past.

if you look at the reformist period, there was a challenge of the institution of the supreme leader and the notions of unaccountable power. that was the essence of the reform movement. and president mahmoud ahmadinejad tried to use authority that he did not have and move forward. rouhani has not touched any of the outlines there. he is a technician of the state, so he -- if you are looking at the soviet model, he is not shaking things up. but as i said, in absence of an agreement, both sides, i think, have an interests in negotiations, and the negotiation table has been in existence for 12 years, since 2003, and the reason why it has been that way because everybody has a utility for the take to continue. iran -- neither power, i think, will suggest that want to go back to mutual escalation.

but i would say at some point if there's an interim agreement, at some point iranians will walk away from it the way they walked away from the agreement between 2003 and 2005. they will walk away from it when they are ready to introduce new technologies, high-speed center tpaoupblgs and what have you, and when that happens, when the restrictions collide with the technological capabilities, i think you will see them walk away from it. >> joel? >> i think the question about the balancing act, the iranian balancing act between the kurds and d-a-s-h is an interesting one. most recently you saw the combined peshmerga and the shia

near -- well, what happened immediately after -- the next thing that happened after d-a-s-h was broken in the vicinity of the town, was the militants got into gun battles and they began clashing and they did that in at least one other town. it's not a perfect marriage between iran's shia militant proxies in iraq, and the kurds, but this is something that you could have predicted for several years, because you could see the tensions not just between sunni and shia along the green line in iraq, or i am sorry, sunni and kurds, so it's not an arab/kurd green line in iraq, but you could see that there were -- whether it was nuri malaky tryinging to push the kurds back from the green line, or whether it was iraqi military, shia

military officers, or the sadr movement, all felt a very strong interest in trying to contain kurds militarily speaking. moving forward, you will see the iranians having to manage or seeing it in their interest to manage a shia/kurdish green line, and it looks to me like the iranians will see it in their interest to have a shia militant arab militant presence along the green line to try and hem the kurds in. and turning why more isn't being done, i agree with karim, there is a lot to say on that subject, but on a panel in iran, the focus should -- need not be on the gulf and it's ideological influence. in addition to that, i would say

that baghdadi was made in samarra and baghdad, not in the gulf. and so these leaders of the iraqi -- d-a-s-h's presence in iraq, these are homegrown iraqi militant leaders, and their revenues need not come from the gulf. i am sure there is -- i am sure it benefits them, but for a multiyear period in iraq when we were fighting there, there were a great many of al qaeda and iraq's revenues came from being able to siphon off the oil sector to extort northern iraqi businesses and to tax the local population, and now that they

hold those territories out right, they are able to draw a great deal of resources and sustain themselves from that. if the gulf money went to zero overnight, they would still be able to fund their militant operations inside iraq, just based on local revenue streams, and being able to exploit local political grievances. >> i had a quick question for karim. he mentioned about the turks option on the negotiation process and this agreement on the agreements thing. how long both sides can keep doing this process, let's say, and that will be a parliamentary election in 2015, next year, and as a result of the election

council will be elected and they will pick the new supreme leader as far as i know, and what is the role of the process in the negotiation, and what should we expect from this one-year period until the parliamentary election in iran from this negotiation process? >> thank you. >> my question is about the impact of any nuclear deal on iran's support for its proxies in the region, hezbollah and everywhere, and every time you ask here in town about the recent issues, what they are going to be on the table, they say now it's only the nuclear negotiation and then later on, the issues would be discussed. what leverage do you think the united states and the west would have after the deal, too? thank you.

>> yes, ma'am, right there. uh-huh. >> thank you. i am with the dod, and i had a question about earlier karim had mentioned that even during the regi regime, not a lot had changed with proxy support to hezbollah, and the other part is what the president made, the public over khurs to the united states, for the dialogue of civilations as he called it, and do you think it was a missed opportunity to change the trajectory of the u.s./iran relationship, and if not why would the supreme leader allow him to send such a message? >> okay. why don't we do this in a bit -- ray, i will ask you about the impact of the nuclear deal for support for the proxies.

>> iran's support for the regional groups creates the nuclear controversy and the discussions, and it will continue. the role of hezbollah in iranian strategic concessions has changed, and it was a long time suggested that hezbollah was an ally of iran but not necessarily a proxy, and he would make his own suggestions, and he understood the balances in lebanon, and that would mitigate his reliance and dependance on iran. hezbollahs is now a auxiliary force that will be deployed in areas that benefit iran but not hezbollah's political forces back in lebanon. that's one thing that has been obvious, certainly in terms of hezbollah's involvement in syria, which i cannot see as

beib being add van taeupblg. you know, iran and saudi arabia and all of those trying to fight it out for influence in a contested region, and therefore use the resources and allies at your dispose annual, and those are going to be with some degree of tactics. i don't see an impact on iran. you can make a case, and perhaps a speculative one, that iran's support for those groups win increase in the aftermath of a nuclear deal because they will try to insist irrespective of the nuclear agreement they will sustain the ideological values and alliance, and one way to do is that to increase support for allies, and conversely, i think you are going to see as a result of a nuclear deal and a more

substantial support for the gulf countries, as a means of suggesting the nuclear deal does not affect america's alliances, and the ae agreement could lead to further polerization, so that's something to keep in mind. the nuclear deal may be good for iran and the international community, but not necessarily mitigating the regional polarization. in terms of whether we missed -- i think in the history of the islamic republic, i think the president has not always been given credit for the things he sought to do. whether he was successful or not, he sought to transform the republic in the government that is representative and still religiously and culturally authentic. it would improve that impossible task, but i think his enterprising affects should

not -- his legacy, i think s. larger than many contemporary historians would suggest. i think his as ppirations were real, but the forces of home prevailed, and at that time, today islamic republic is a different state than it was then. today, to be simplistic about it, there was always the left, the reform left, the center, and the right. there is no left anymore. it has been exsized from power and presence and influence. that never has happened in the history of the islamic republic. i think there is a center and a right and they have come to an agreement, which is why he continues that language in prison. so the question was how long can this what i described as managed irresolution, how long

can that sustain itself in the u.s. political context and the iranian political context. in the u.s., the extension of the deal and managed irrevolution, can perhaps sustain itself until january 20th, 2017, and that's what president obama would like to help. he wants to avoid an iranian bomb and avoid bombing iran. if you extend the interim deal somehow, and show some forward progress, that's better. the best is a resolution. if you can't get a resolution, extending a deal is better than a failure of a deal. the iranian political context, i think we often times give too much credit to iranian elections as if we are talking about norway. hominy, as long as he is healthy, there is no signs of

any threat to his position of supreme leader. so in the assembly of experts, i see him getting unanimous support, almost, and as ray was talking about earlier, it's dividing the spoils between various shades of conservatives. it's not that there's going to be a parliament which comes in and really calls for sweeping change in iran. i will just say a couple sentences about the prospect post -- if there is a nuclear deal, what happens to iran's regional policies. the optimistic perspective is the prag ma 'tis, the more pest mystic point of view is that iran is now going to be freed up financially, right?

they will have far more financial resources to continue to support these groups, and as i said, i think we always have to warn against conflating our hopes and analysis. the pessimistic point of view usually prevailed and they are putting ideology before national interests, and then finally on the question of whether there was a missed opportunity with iran during the hotam years. and there was something that was said which i like, and the arab and israeli conflict is not a morality tail between evil and good, and the u.s. and iran conflict, there are certainly times when the u.s. has made mistakes and iran has made mistakes, but the clinton administration desperately wanted to engage that government, and bill clinton himself desperately wanted a deal with iran, and i think the

hardliners in tehran warned then ready for the united states, and the hard liners now are not ready for something with the united states, and whether you are fidel castro or kim jong-un in north korea, i think the hard line groups, when you open up the systems to the forces of globalization to market forces, they can be swept aside with the tide. i think there's a personal parochial interest for them to maintain this imnaty with the united states. so i guess to think that a nuclear deal will lead naturally

to a retraction of iranian support for the militant praubgsies, you would think that the militant proxies are cards to be traded away, and the iranian regime views them as cards to be traded away in favor of pursuit of a nuclear deal. i personally don't think that's true. i think their commitment to what they call the axis of resistance which they built is deep and enduring, and it's not entirely associated with the relationship with the united states, although it plays a central role. i have a lebanese shia analysts once told me, you should think of lebanese hezbollah as forward deployed regiments of the irgc, and then you will understand their role in iranian strategy more clearly. i agree with that. but i also think that groups like hezbollah are also iran's cubans, so the way the soviets used the cubans in order to be

able to project proxy power into central america and angola and ethiopia, for example, that's the way they are able to use lebanese hezbollah to project into iraq or bahrain or syria. and it's not something that they are going to -- that they are going to give up. i think they will continue to see that they will have vital interests that they will need militant proxies to pursue for them in lieu of taking iranian casualties. after the iraq role, they are casualty reversed. they are not going to send iraqis to do the job that the shia are willing to do for them, and that's not going to stop after any sort of nuclear deal. lastly, i think you are also not going to see them reduce any of this sponsorship so long as they remain in a cold war which is a hot proxy war with the saudis. as long as that conflict

remains, then they are going to see a vital interest in keeping these militant proxies, you know, empowered. >> we have got a question from the overflow room via twitter to you, karim, about the role of the u.s. congress if there is no nuclear agreement, their reaction and where we are going with that. >> should i take that? >> yeah, go ahead. >> in the view of congress, it was their sanctions and the economic coercion would force iran to come to the table in a meaningful way, and many members now would argue if we don't reach a nuclear deal by november 24th, then the logical course of action is to increase the pressure against iran to force them to do a deal. i would say that additional sanctions against iran will be insufficient to force iran to

phreufp late, but it will help escalate. on this issue, there's a cognitive distance on some members of congress, and they on one hand are cognizant of the fact that their constituents are not interested in another u.s. military venture in the middle east, and yet the passing of additional legislations could well force us to contemplate another military venture in the region. i would say that there is one way, and a colleague of mine has been thinking about this a lot, and if congress does feel compelled to pass sanctions and legislation come the 24th in the absence of a deal, what they argue is the sanctions legislation should be deterrent

in nature, meaning you can pass legislation that tries to hold the line where it is right now, to tell iran that if you put your foot on the gas again and reconstitute your program, it's going to trigger additional sanctions, if you stay where you are, if you keep the car pulled over to the side of the road, it's not going to trigger additional sanctions. i think that's perhaps a smart way of thinking about it. >> great. >> we have time for two more very brief questions, please. >> hi, syrian american council. thank you for your comments. i was just curious, at what point do you think iran cuts ties with assad, if and when that time comes, and what the kind of regional geopolitical considerations would be for that? thank you. >> okay.

that makes it easy. ray, would you like to? >> when they cut ties with assad when he is opposed, i think that's when it's going to happen. i don't think they are i don't into asaad as a person, per se. but nonetheless, a constituency they've developed in syria. and, as i mentioned, they seem comfortable operating in a murky syria. that sort of suits their lenses. so i'm not sure if those ties will rupture syria as suggested is a fun lying state for them. so i suspected -- and, also, their prophesy on syria has come to fruition. mainly, they didn't think asaad was going to collapse or go. so they're playing a winning hand from their perspective. >> i would agree with that.

if you're an iran official and decorated u.s. diplomat which says that as bad as asaad is, the alternative to asaad is worse, i don't feel like you have to prepare to abandon your critical regional ally. i think you feel like u.s. and the west is gradually accommodating itself to your position rather than vice versa. as ray said, i think if they felt they could preserve their interests in syria they would have cut him loose a long time ago. but the fact that they haven't done that, despite all that's happened and the tremendous repetitional damage abroad, i

think they feel that absent this horse, they could lose all of their interests in syria. >> on that note, i want to thank you all for this very excellent set of presentations. please join me in thanking our panel. [ applause ] >> so we're going to take a break and we'll be back here at 3:00 p.m. thank you. >> now, from the conference, white house deputy national security advisor tony blinken who revealed in a november, 2013 meeting, the president and then iraqi prime minister discussed isis. but the iraqi leader would not act.

>> so let me welcome you again for our fourth session of the day. it's been a terrific day, but we saved the best for last. and we're honored to have tony blinken, deputy national security advisor to president obama with us. those of you who have been with us all day covered the region pretty well and pretty deeply, but we're now going to focus on the administration's inside view of kind of where we stand in this effort against isis and to bring a greater degree of order to the region.

i think everybody knows mr. blinken's distinguished resume. he was vice president biden's national security advisor before becoming the president's deputy. and, before that, the democratic staff director of the foreign relations committee. really honored to have you and looking forward to hearing from you. he has a tight schedule, wouldn't surprise anybody to know, but would look forward to after hearing from him, getting some good questions in. >> thanks very much. good afternoon. it's wonderful to be here and it's especially wonderful to be here on an extraordinary day for carney. let me just start by saying, first of all, jessica, your leadership of this institution for 18 years has been extraordinary. you've turned carnegie into a

global institution in washington and, indeed, around the world. and it's also hard to mansion finding someone to succeed jessica in this job, but i think carne carnegie has pulled off a brilliant coup to get bill cur rans. those of you who him know him to be an absolutely extraordinary leader. i can only say that carneggie will be transitioning into very, very good hands. i welcome this opportunity to spend a little bit of time walking you through the elements of our cocomp e our comprehensi strategy to defeat the iz lackic state of iraq. indeed, i think it has to be understood, in part, at least, as the product of a number of powerful regional trends.

first, the challenge to domestic order within the states, the questioning of the status quo, the rise of new constituencies, the empowerment of new voices. that, in many ways, is going to welcome the development. it's produced a violent action in syria with its long death spiral of violence. and, it has a dark flip side. the erosion of state authority, the emergence of spaces, the proliferation of technology and the surfacing of sectarianism. the challenge is among states. the growth of sectarian rivalries, the face-off between saudi arabia and iran, the spread of dangerous proxy wars. third, i think we've seen an intra -sunni struggle and a contest for leadership between established powers often by the

muslim brotherhood. fourth, foreign dominion allowing many of these forces to collide head on with the fragile beginnings of a more inclusive and representative gover nans. one of the most inclusive has been the alienation from the respective who live between baghdad and damascus. this is the vast sea in which isil swims. and it must conform to the courtroom nation, patience and humility we bring to the task of defeeting it. so how did we get here? permit me to spend a few minutes on a historic detour. as all of you know, in ne gauche

yating the 2008 forces greemt, president bush committed our forces to leave iraq at the end of 2011. we shared that commitment. we also chose to leave behind a small, residual force and an f-16 squadron to protect iraq's aerospace. as all of you know, the council of representatives would not give us the protection for our troops, the legal immunities that we sought. this was not as a result of a failure to negotiate. it's something we worked very hard. but what it is, and it needs to be understood this way, is really a leading indicator or a proxy for a much larger issue. simply put, after a ten year

occupation, the iraq politic did not want us to stay in iraq. at every step along the way, iraqis did not believe we would actually leave and follow through. they didn't think we would withdraw from the cities. they didn't think we would lead our combat mission, we did. we have to demonstrate to them that we meant it. in effect, we have to leave, in order to find a way back on the security side and gradually build up our engagement. it's a fair question to ask whether this modest residual force would have made a difference. and i think a fair answer to that is, in some ways yes and

some ways no. first, it would have had a combat mission. indeed, i will have been caught in the middle of everything that was going on. iraqis would have faced severe restrictions. >> violent incidents went down from 1600 a week to 100 a week at that point.

that would have better enabled us to deal with iraqis and isil and maybe help us better shape iraqi security policy. that's why we sought to leave a residual force and exactly why we upon the withdraw of our forces, we tried to get our foot back in the door. the iraqis told us they were confident they could handle the problem. we said you're wrong. if you don't constantly and proactively go through aqi, they will rise up again.

>> you need to prove that you're not returning in force. then, the arab league sum mit came around in march of 2012. we thought why not provide the iraqis with drones, intelligence drones, isr, to safeguard the summit. they felt that was a great idea. they had arab leaders coming in from around the region. it represented a real security challenge and they welcomed the possibility. we felt this was a good way to get our foot back in the door. unfortunately, the story leaked to the press and ultimately, they said no. >> at if time that we left,

there were about 5 suicide bomters a month. by early 2015, it was up to 50 a month. by the way, it was not initially predominantly an inding nougs force in iraq. it was mostly, at that point, a foreign force. iraqis suddenly became much more open to and, indeed, desirous of aid and kwooit. this required working with our congress. and there was a certain amount of reluctance because of concerns about the leadership of prime minister malacki. we resumed in very small numbers, isr flights in late 2015. we stood up a targeting cell in 2013. and that helped the iraqis capture about 200 isil fighters. and we put in a small number in

our embassy, a small number of special operators and ct trainers. tlout the year, well into 2013 and the beginning of 2014, we met more than a dozen times to deal with iraq, aqi and then isil. the principle's committee, the national security council met multiple times on the same issue. when president obama met with the prime minister in november, 2013, iisil was at the top of the agenda. the president told the prime minister, you need a comprehensive approach e proech to this problem. there's a military piece to it. it has to be comprehensive. two months later, they streamed

with a siege. >> a renewed sectarianism with politicians on all sides playing to their bases. that brings us to almost the present, to this summary with the fall of mosal and the erase sure of the border between iraq and syria. when that happened, the president acted decisively as well as dlib ratly. our immediate focus was on protecting americans. we rapidly deployed military personnel to further secure our embassy and the international airport. we put in more isr to develop a clearer picture of what was happening on the ground. and we acceptability in small military teams to assess the viability of the iraqi security forces and the status as a threat.

then, as all of you know, we niche yated limited military action to protect personnel. and to break the siege of both of tloez police stations. these actions also had the benefit buying time and spags to put in pillars of a comprehensive strategy to roll back isil.

indeed, we resists more expansive military effort until change was well-entrained. less we proceed with the air force of mr. malachy alienating sunnis in iraq and in the region. instead, we focused our initial diplomacy on completing government formation in record time. now we have a government and so dilute their support for our acquiescence to isil. the second pillar was a broad, regional and international coalition. we were very dlib rat in building that coalition before taking sustained action. we could not make it look like the united states was acting against isil or islam or the

christian west was opposed to the muz limit middle east. that's just what isil would have wanted. instead, we kept it focused on the global challenge on the regional united states which had the most at stake, playing leading roles. now, more than 60 countries around the world have signed onto this coalition. when we took our first air strikes in syria, jordan, berain and cutter flew with us. with these pillars and partners coming into place, we began to implement the comprehensive strategy to go from blunting isil's advances to starting to roll it back. the objective, and the president has been very clear about it, is to disrupt, degrade and ultimately defeet isil so it no longer poses a threat to iraq or syria, to our people, parter ins in the interest or region or ultimately, to the united states itself. the defeat of isil will not happen easily. it will not happen quickly. it will not happen through

exclusively military means or by u.s. efforts alone. to the contrary, to succeed, our strategy have to be comprehensive, broad based and it must be sustained. in four basic ways. first, we're ultimately destroying isil's fighting ability. its ability to mass force and overrun local populations. and we're doing that through a combination of military and count rer terrorism needs. second, we're working to uproot its central nervous system. the financing, the farm fighters and the recruitmented that are its life blood. and we're doing that by bringing to bear sharing and cooperation among enforcement officials, sanctions, counter legitimacy campaigns, enhanced

transportation security within partner countries and, indeed, here in the united states. third, we're working to day lut local support through tribal engagement pressing for the resolution of legitimate grievances, regional diplomacy and squeezing the spags within which it operates. finally, we're working to build capacity so that local forces can take the fact to isil and retake the ground that's been lost. through the provision of weapons, ammunition and equipment and through direct military action to enable partner success. the people we are helping will do the fighting on the ground to retake their countries. the strategy recognizes that the situation we face in southeasterly ya is more complex even than the one we face in iraq.

now we're intensifying that support under a program called hitle 10. he will not prevail militarily creating the conditions for a negotiated settlement. this is not a silver bullet. it's going to take time to produce results. >> the forces are powerful backed by hesbulloah. on the one hand, isil and battle hardened extremist groupings on the other. but the program is critical to

success. the program can do real damage to isil through the air. to hold territory from which isil has been removed, we will not be able to shrink and eventually eliminate the safe haven. meanwhile, we are taking action every day to degrade isil's capacity to project power into iraq, to resource and sustain its forces. we're going at its commander control, its head quarters, its training kreners, its oil refineries. and to site just one example, we're seeing significant results. take for example the oil refineries, pump stations. fuel itsd vehicles and derive revenue from the sale of diesel and gas scene. i spent a week in iraq a couple weeks ago.

isle raxis are dealing with a legacy of grievance. oil prices are down, investment is on the fence. this makes for a very complicated situation. >> a clear willingness to give the other the benefit of the doubt for now. and the reason was simple. virtually every group in iraq has been looking into the abis. they've seen what is before it

if they don't manage to work together to take on isil. we've seen them say and do significant things in terms of reaching out to other communities. he disbanded the officer in chief which was an office that the prime minister has established to have the military report drektly to the prime minister's office. he removed the more difficult and challenging generals. he pushed through am sot political defense, a sunni defense minister, a post that had been vacant for four years. he is now pressing with pretty much the entire body politic for creation of the national guard that offers the best pros pekt of bringing sunnis into the fight. then there's the military piece.

the iraqis face two very significant deaf sits. he deprofessionalized it. when you have the iraq military deployed into a sunni region, despite the fact it was there to help the communities protect themselves against isil, it was working in a community that didn't trust it and it asked itsz what it was doing there. and then it ended up being cut off from the supply lines, isolated without effective leadership.

and that's been going on since january of this year. >> we saw it at the recent border crossing. and, as we speak, we're seeing it in the north where they've retaken the town.

that is planned to take back siet by site, town by town, a territory that has been lost to isil. at the same time, and is this is where you have the plan of 60,000 feet, we didn't assess the iraq security forces. >> iraqis are bought into this concept. it's a way to bring local forces in to protect their own communities, but have them at the timered to the state, which provides the equipment and the salaries.

so what we're working on now is an effective bridge to take 5d vantage now of the increasingly significant number of tribes who want to get in on the fight against isil who recognizes the future is better off with iraq than with isil but who need help. who need supplies. who need equipment. who need support. this has very beneficial impacts. it dem strats that isil is not ten feet tall. one of the reasons is precisely because of this perception. it's the place to be.

in many places, it's taking refuge in cities and buildings and is taking down its infamous blag e black flags. as the campaign begins and the iraqs start to go at them, isil will have to make a choice. it will have to stand and fight and be very visible to the coalition and our air pow r. it will have to flea and hunker down. so, having reviewed what the strategy is, let me conclude with a very brief word about what it is not.

it is not iraq or afghanistan reducks. it will not involve the expenditure of trillions of american dollars. the iraqis don't need and indeed don't want foreign forces in iraq. that would be devisive. it would distract from the mission and probably endanger our own forces. more to the point, we will not fall into the trap of drawing in large numbers and bleeding us. that's what they want and that's exactly what we will not do. while difficult, challenging, time consuming is sustainable and, ultimately, will be successful.

>> if i may, let me just, then, start with the first question, which has to do with administration has managed to put together, as you mentioned, an extraordinarily broad coalition, more than 60 countries, but that encompasses a number of different, even con fliblgting agendas. what do you see as the biggest challenge for maintaining the integrity and the coherence of the coalition.

in the movrnts immediately ahead. that is evidence of the fact that for all of the differences among the coalition countries, there's no doubt that you're right. a number of coalition members would like to see more removing asaad. there are tensions that can arise and what that may touch in different countries. by enlarge, what we're seeing now is rath i recall extraordinary.

what we've done is put in place a structure and a model virtually, everyone knows john was asked to lead the effort on building and sustaining the coalition. one of our most experienced hands in iraq are on the road virtually full time. of course, the president has played a lead role in this as well. he's burning at the phone lines every day.

>> michael gor dan, u.s. times. >> michael. >> tony, the u.s. has used air power to protect the kurdish 307ulation in iraq from the islamic state. but the united states has not used air power to protect sunni arab opponents of the asaad regime against barrel bombs and other attacks. as you know, this is a distinction that has not gone unnoticed by the mod rat syrian opposition. how does the united states hope to recruit and maintain the

support and sustain the morale of the moderate syrian opposition and eventually use it as a ground lmt in the effort to contain the islamic state. as you noted in your speech. while, at the same time, taking the stansz that it's not prepared to protect them against air strikes unlike these other groups. and, under what circumstances would the u.s. be prepared to use air power to protect them? are you going to take the better part of a year, $500 million to train mod rat syrian opposition and then put it in syria. first, we have been using air power. for example, we've taken action in ambar around the strategic siets for the iraqi government and also go to protecting sunnis

who live there. we worked on building a bridge to that guard as it develops. and, in syria, we have focused initially to work on degrading isil's power. we focused on making sure that we're looking at the strategic assets that it had, commander control, arms depots, training centers, et cetera. we've been very deliberate about that.

we've also seen humanitari tear take action. but here's the challenge. and i think this is important. as i said earlier, there is a very methodical campaign plan that is in development and, i believe e indeed, we're starting to roll out on. we have to stick to the plan. unfortunately, every day, there is going to be in some part of iraq or some part of syria a community that is under siege, under attack. and is looking for help. we can't be every place, every time. we have to stick to the methodical plan to start to roll back isil in a very deliberate way. that's what we're doing. if we get moved off of that plan by something popping up in one place or another, we're not going to succeed. we're trying to be disciplined about this. but the bottom line is this. isil represents a threat first

and foremost to the sunni community. we have to support them more in terms of allowing them to get more fully into the fight with training equipment, et cetera. all of that is happening. again, the coalition is, what? five or six weeks old? so we have to have a little bit of strategic patience as we build the strategy. >> fred? >> thank you very much. if i could follow up on this national guard plan, there's a lot of details that remain

unclear. how strong is that at the timer. how do we strike a balance and not encouraging fragmentation, war lordism and militia rule. it's a great question and it's a challenge. empowering local communities to, in effect, defend themselves, is, i think, a very powerful potential mechanism. the national guard, its members would be drawn from local communities. but, unlike the awakening, it would be drektly at the timered to the iraqi state, as well.

that gives you, i think, the west of both worlds. it creates an entity that answers to and is supported by the state. but its membership is from the local communities and people feel a lot better about having their own protect them. closer in, you're likely to have local police forces. think of it in a sense as local circles. the local police force closest in at the local level, at the town level, at the city level. the guard at the provincial level and then the iraqsecurity forces, the national army at the national level. but unlike any national guard, this gard could be federalized in an emergency situation. now, you're right. they're consultations. one is what do you do with the shed militia. will they be folded in to the iraqi security forces.

we saw early on that these militia were probably critical to having them hold on in the early days. but they also e also represent a real challenge because they're got exactly popular in the sunni communities. so those militia have to be drawn back and disup and downed or their members need to be integrated. all of these things, we're working on. it has to be legislated. that's going to take a little bit of time. in the meantime, what we're trying to do, as i said before, is take advantage of the fact that we're already seeing tribes starting to move from being either with isil or on the fence

to being with the government but they need assistance now. so bridging to the point when we get to a guard is what we're working on. >> i had a quick question as a follow up. in terms of the coalition building with different priorities and especially with the role of turkey. there are major differences between the two sides. after air drops, especially, the president criticizes the u.s. government larjtsly in terms of this pyd and government but it's

not the case for u.s., for example. isis is a priority for u.s. we don't know what washington is expecting from us. gld sure. turkey is an absolutely critical and essential part of this coalition. it's already playing a very significant role. as i eluded to earlier, it's offered to host a training site from this training program. that's a critical contribution. it is playing a critical role. same thing to the foreign traversety extent.

the turks have taken a significant role on trying to crack down on that. as we speak, right now, thanks to turkey, there are forces moving into chobani, again, bringing the iraqi region and bringing in free syrian forces. the rebulletings the premise. as a result, the reinforcements that are needed to help khobani hold on are coming into place. again, turkey is a close, close ally and we see it aefr day.

some of the arab mope beryls have different definitions of terrorism. there's some positive aspects to stop foreign fighters from going to iraq and syria. but then there are other aspects to which they would be criminalizing and, in some cases, even counting as terrorism, things that the united states would normally consider to be free expression, peaceful expression of decent, peaceful demonstrations, things like that. are you concerned that this can lead to radicalization in those counsel e countries, either for isil or for other extremist groups. and is this an issue that the united states is raising with the coalition partners? >> the short answer is it's a constant part of our dialogue with a number of countries.

it's important in answering those that may be critical of the government and actually incentivizing them to use violence as a means of advancing their agendas. itsd's a fairly regular part of our dialogue as we go forward, there will be differences of approach, difference of emphasis. the one you alluded to is there and we talk about on a regular basis.

>>. >> thank you. i'm a journalist in town and i spent some time in iraq so i got to know it a little it be. my question to you, in iraq, with a national guard, is it, like, awakening 201? or is it going to encompass all kinds of different communities? on syria, right-hand turn you doing the same thing because you and your allies are training and arming another opposition? perhaps you've got to reconsider the people who are fighting. in reality. i mean, we can talk about slogans all we want.

>> you spoke about how u.s. administration leveraged its power to promote intrusive government at all. do you encourage the gulf countries to go for plurism? what skiend of leverage, specifically about berain, as you see the crack down on human rights activist activists and political right parties. what can you leverage? >> thaing. >> let me take the lags question first.

it's a challenge to break out of it. and that is as countries that are facing very legitimate threats from extremist groups, take action that is much more engaged in the threat. it's exactly what they're trying to prevent, which is more extremism. as i said earlier, we're in a constant dialogue with many of our parter ins in the region about dealing with the real threats that they face and also trying to to it in a smart way. but to turn to violence.

with regard to the first question, first, the national guard awakening in 2.0, as i said, i think it can be an improvement in that if the iraqis get it right, it's clearly at the timered to the state in a sustained way. both need each other and want us to stay in the relationship. if they get it right, it can be a powerful thing that can actually be more effective and more sustainable than the awakening proved to be. finally, with regard to syria, look. the problem that we face is that asaad has been a magnet for the

very extremism we're fieging. its's hard to see how syria can be stable. including finding ways to preserve the basic military structures, the institutions of the state. that vacuum is filled by bad things. i think one of the things that's going to be critical is getting to a political transition that preserves all the different actors that their equities can be protected in a syrian state. that's ofly a big challenge.

i think we now have a u.n. envoy that is focused and starting to make the rounds of the critical regional states. as people look out, i think all the sides can see that ultimately, this is going to exhaust them. and there's no military victory for anyone in the civil war. there should be a growing incentive to deal with the civil war. but part of that is the moderate opposition. building up, making it a counter weight.

and, in effect, further underscoring the fact that the asaad regime cannot win this militarily. >> we have time for just one last, krigs p question. >> i was reading the book of the dean of fletcher. i don't know if united states did that at the very gining of the war. either really to strengthen the moderate position because we'll face frustration. and the arab world is 70% the

muslim world. they are persecuted in syria since 50 years in iraq in the beginning of the war. so how do you see things? [ laughter ] >> well, you know, one of the things that's so important to do is fine, which is put this into a larger context. at the out set of my remark, i was trying to put the rise of isil into a larger part of that context.

that had been held in check for decades as a result of dictatorship, as a result of war x as a result of foreign intervention. you could arg pucks is as well if not better in certain neighboring countries. but the challenge of trying to build something like that, when the lid has been taken off and you have all of these other trends in the region that i've described is immense. it's a huge challenge. it's a long strubl. tony, i know you're on a tight schedule. you've been candid, inform fif and gracious.

we thank you so much for joining us. [ applause ] >> thank you. thank you very much. thank you. >> this weekend on c-span. >> i arrived at my home in los angeles and arrived to seeing the secondary plane hitting the twin tower. live. i was traumatized. that is when i knew this is terrorism. it's note one airplane accident.

so i ran to the phone and called many people in e just a minute. i wanted them to comforted me. i heard that the leader was from cairo. the same city i came from. i called around agt people. and they all said the same thing. even though some of them don't know the other. they told me how dare you say this was done by arabs or muslims? don't you know this is a jewish conspiracy? the jews did it. and i hung up the phone and wept. i suddenly felt i cannot relate to my culture of origin anymore. and this is a very hard feeling

when you can't relate to the people that you love and were braught up with for many, many years of your life. >> on book tv, we're featuring new releases. best-selling author, karen armstrong on religion and conflict. president george w. bush on the big ra fill of his father. and president george mccain on authors. our all-day live coverage of the world war i centennial symposium. find our complete television schedule at c-span.org and let us know what you think about the programs you're watching.

>> next, college and yooumpblt add nimpb stray stores talk about post-secondary education investments and federal and state partnership. the center for american progress hosted this discussion. >> good morning. welcome to the center for american progress. i'm happy to soo e see this many people here this early on a monday morning after a delightful fall weekend in our nation's capitol.

we are here today to release a report, issue brief an e and interactive web site of a significant body of work done over the last several months will the by the post secondary education team. we call that body of work a great recession, a great retreat. public investment in higher education is vital to the performance of our economy. colleges, universities, offer citizens a path toward economic opportunity. and a substantial return on public investment. force is needed for an economic experience through sustained employment, higher earnings, new and continued business development and ultimately higher tax revenues.

but there are troubling signs. after the great recession, states have withdrawn public investment in higher education. and many students from low and middle income families have been pushed out of publish colleges and universities. for this reason, we call for a new federal state partnership to ensure that high quality programs remain affordable in a central tenant of the american dream. thought the last quart ert of the 20th century the share of low-income family have increased. despite significant investments by the federal government and

programs like pell grants and the american opportunity task credit. the additional investments in pell grants total more than $50 billion. but the federal investment has not been sufficient. during the same period, states were investing in higher edge gags. since the onset of the great recession, 38 states in blue decreased the amount of direct funding to public colleges. eight states in gray on the slide had neutral changes in funding. just four states in orange increased the amount of direct funding to public colleges. i found it interesting that the four states that increased the amount of direct funding for public higher education were states like north dakota, wyoming, illinois and west virginia. we know that what has been happening in north dakota, additional tax revenues through energy exploitation.

but they didn't have to reinvest in higher education, but they did anyway. all 50 states decreased the share of revenue from state government reflected in blue on the chart. 47 states increased their reliance on tuition revenues from students and families in orange. so despite the increase in funding, the share of revenue from state governments declined in all but three states, north dakota again, connecticut and maine. increasing the reliance on tuition and fees. at all income levels and at both two-year and four-year

institutions, the states that cut the most in orange charged the highest net price. and higher net price means greater borrowering and higher levels of debt which diminish education access. and the cuts were focused on community colleges, which saw enrollment increases by 20% while enrollment at public four-year colleges increased by only 10.6%. suspending per student has been cut in 45 states compared to 39 for public four-year colleges. so we have called for a new compact between the state and federal government to revitalize state funding in public colleges. the public college quality compact calls for states implement four key elements. create reliable funding sources for public higher education,

make college affordable, particularly for low income students, improve performance, remove barriers. states that qualify and wish to participate in the compact will receive funding based on a formula that takes into consider the number of veterans and pell grant recipients that participate that graduate and do so without debt. now, it's my great pleasure to introduce carmel martin. carmel is the executive vice president for policy at the center for american progress. carmel will be moderating the panel today. carmel manages the policy across all of the issue areas and is a key member of the executive team. before coming here, we worked together at the u.s. department of education where she was assistant secretary for planning, evaluation and policy development. in that position, she led the department's policy and budget development activities, served at senior adviser to the

secretary. prior to coming to the department of education, carmel served as the general council and deputy staff direct he for the late senator edward kennedy, as chairman of the health, education and labor and pensions committee. she also previously worked at the center for american progress as the associate director of domestic policy and in the senate as chief counsel and senior policy adviser to former bingaham and special counsel to tom daschle. she holds a j.d. and a master's degree in public affairs. carmel and the panel, please come up. thank you. >> i'm going to start by introducing our very prestigious panel.

and dive right into discussion. on my right, we have ted mitchell, the under secretary of the u.s. department of education. he has served since his confirmation earlier this year. in this role, he oversees policy programs and activities related to post secondary education, career and technical education, adult and federal student aid. ted is charged with planning and policy to have the u.s. have the most competitive work force in the world by the year 2020. next we have david baime who serves as senior vice president for government relations and policy analysis at the american association of community

colleges. in this role he directs the efforts for the nation's close to 1,200 community colleges and their students. we're happy to have david here today to speak about the association's strategic plan to boost as much as 50% the number of degrees and credentials awarded at institutions by 2020. next we have sarah audelo. sarah's work focuses on ensuring that the next generation of americans have access to an affordable and high quality education. she will discuss how these policy proposals have the potential to lift millennials toward great economic prosperity. prior to joining generation progress, sarah was director of domestic policy at advocates for

youth. and finally, we have ralph wilcox. the university of south florida is the ninth largest university in the united states, serving more than 45,000 students. the university of south florida has made significant strides on student completion through its student success task force it has closed graduation gaps across demographic groups while racing the percentage ever low income students enrolled achieving access and degree completion. he formerly held leadership at the university of houston, the university of memphis and hofstra university. maybe i will start with ted and ask to you talk to us about how the department of education is thinking about the issue of

accessing completion but specifically how to create stronger partnerships with states so they continue to invest in public post secondary education. >> thanks for having all of us. it's great to be here. the report is a fabulous start to a conversation that we need to have. as you noted, david, there has been systematic disinvestment by states throughout the great recession in higher education. i think it's critically important as states' economies and the national economy improves for us to remind our partners at the state level that where he this are is not okay. that taking what was a fairly balanced three party compact between states and families and the federal government and unbalancing that in a way that as you have shown really does