in providing nonlethal weaponry support. >> order, order. can i welcome members of the public to the sitting of the foreign affairs select committee. it's our third and final evidence session of our committee into kurdistan and on this testify. so, welcome. and can i also welcome edward oakden who's the director of the middle east and foreign office. i welcome you both. minister, it's now three months since mr. abadi was installed in baghdad. have you made any assessment of how he's getting on? what are the prospect of him having a more inclusive

government? >> first, chairman, i can thank you for the opportunity to appear in front of you and thank you for the work that you are doing in taking an interest in not just the region, the country, but the middle east as well. it helps my work, our work, the government's work, that british parliament is engaging and trying to understand these issues in furthering british influence. i'm very grateful. i understand you've had a very interesting visit yourself. pleased to be here. you asked an important question. it is a short amount of time that he's been in place, but if we look back in june of this year of where things stood with isil moving down the tigris and y eufhrates river, bad dad was under threat and we look today and see maliki is no longer

there. al baddy, as you say, is in place. abadi is in place, he has a more inclusive government than anybody expected to produce. the length of time it took for the cabinet members to be announced, i think we should be pleased with the progress that actually has been made. the coalition itself is now an international coalition that's been formed of over 60 nations, able to hold back and deter isil, allowing the space for the depleted armed forces of iraq to reinvigorate, train and themselves provide a ground capability to take on isil. so, i'm not complacent. i don't think we should be naive. it's going to be a long-term game here. we shouldn't expect results, certainly, overnight but i think considering where we were in june compared to today, i think wernd be pleased with the progress.

>> and i acknowledge this uninquiry is about kurdistan, but have you got a view as to how the sunni communications are in iraq and getting the cohesion between sunnis and shias? >> this is the big challenge that the new prime minister and president actually face. and the appointment of the defense minister, abadi, a sunni himself, and the speaker in the parliament as well, engaging with senior representatives is so important. we have to remember and you i'm sure will witness this on your visit of how disenfranchised the sunnis were under the maliki regime. and this is why it's so important, that we engage not just in anbar province, but the whole of the northwest of iraq. they have been scarred, i think, by recent events of the sunni community, but we also have to remember how diverse that community is. there isn't a single sunni voice that represents everybody in the

northwest of iraq. and that, i think, is the challenge, of bringing people back to the table, recognizing that the baghdad government represents them all. and looks to the future. >> there's a lot of talk about it being their last chance while we were down there. is that how you see it? >> i mean, that is, i think, a little sensationalist to say that. there is no doubt that there is the element of frustration that we saw under maliki. you had demonstrators, sunni demonstrators coming out wanting a better life, better representation. and tpsz every it was the baghd baghdadi government that attacked them. so there's massive distress, there's no doubt about it. and there's the complications of the relationship that i'm pleased to see moving forward with the kurdistan region as well. i don't take away from perhaps the implication, the fact that life is very, very tough and it's good that the international

community is re-engaging with this part of the region in trying to facilitate a solution. >> thank you. moving on to the oil and gas side, while we were down there, we were well aware about the nature of the dispute between irb. lichlt and baghdad, i am very much welcome to the fact that you've been able to reach an interim agreement on this. can you tell us about the agreement and did the uk play any part in brokering or did they manage to do it snemsz. >> well, the agreement is very fresh. i'm very pleased because this has been a major breakthrough. it's worth stepping back and saying that iraq as a country is fortunate to be sitting on such enormous mineral wealth. it provides that vision, the direction of travel of where the country should aspire to spend that wealth wisely.

on thursday an interim deal was signed, so this i hope will be the beginning of further discussions and agreement that will take place between bad dad and erbil. but essentially the agreement was a lump sum of $500 million which was granted to erbil and this was to pay for a number of outstanding debts, legacy debts. in addition to that, there's also a licensing agreement of 150,000 barrels to be sold with essentially the blessing of baghdad and this was perhaps the difficulty that the last couple of months that we have seen in erbil having invested in pipelines, able to secure routes to export the oil, or not being able to do it with the legitimacy that perhaps the rest of the world and, indeed, baghdad wanted to see. >> and on the -- i mean this is an interim agreement, there's a lot more to come. is there any role for the uk in helping them reach a final conclusion on this? >> well, we could be selfish and

say that we have a british interest in this. it's, i think, 50% of the oil production in iraq is actually, thanks to british country, bp and shell mostly, involved in that. so, we to want see the country prosper. we want to see british countries do well in the region. but, yes, i think there is a role. i stood up in foreign office questions, when i was asked this very same question, to say, would britain participate in facilitating discussions. i'm pleased to say that our embassy has been very active with talks on both sides to encourage voices to come together. this is a priority for the country, no matter what the -- where in the region you're in. the oil reliance on har droe carbons is huge. it's in the region of 1% employment, but 93% of the

revenues actually come from hide hydrocarbons, which is 63% of gdp. therefore, the country enormously relies on finding oil and producing it and exporting it. so, i'm pleased that this interim deal, which i hope will be the first, leading to a consolidated deal in the future, not least with the disputed areas of kirkuk and so forth, which still need to be reconciled. but i hope this is the direction of travel we'll be going. >> what sort of deal, final deal, will be in britain's interest? >> well, i think it's simpler to say what would be -- we to want see british companies flourish there. we want to to see a safe environment for all international companies to actually be able to operate. we want to see the oil move to parts of the world and not to have legal question marks over whether or not it can actually, indeed, be purchased. i am pleased to say that's taking place.

so i think we're heading in the right directions. >> as you know, iraq and kurdistan is sitting on a lot of gas, in fact a huge amount of gas. is there any role for britain in facilitating that? >> i think this is something that is worth investigating and worth further discussions and something i think the embassy may have some thoughts on this. but certainly, you're right to say that the potential for -- in northern iraq is absolutely huge. a lot of it is untapped. and i think it will help the country for many, many years to come. edward, do you -- >> i need to say, mr. chairman, that shell are already doing a major gasifiction program in the south, and it will be logical for they or others to look at the north as well. but that obviously will need -- will be easier once there is a resolution of the share of the energy resources. >> getting a final agreement all the more important. >> absolutely. >> perhaps it's not going too

far to say -- to use terminology such as last chance, as it was echoed by the foreign secretary, and i think there is a general acceptance that this is the last chance to advance the politics of the situation. just very briefly, before turning to the iraqi arm. just briefly, yes, we have a new prime minister, we have had elections, but are you at all concerned, minister, that the immediate -- the politicians, the administrators, the bureaucrats, have essentially remained the same? and doesn't that bode ill when it comes to trying to encourage more inclusive form of politics, which we all know is one of the core problems? though you haven't replaced that tier below, and these are very important, given the absence of the bureaucracy and the backup that we would associate, aren't you at all concerned about that? >> well, it depends what you

mean by concern. in one respect, having these voices participate and engage with government, it depends on the authority of the prime minister and the president, of course, and whether they're able to yield that authority. but we're aware, maliki is now -- continues to be involved, but he continues to be inside the tent. there's also the question mark as i alluded to earlier, as to who are the sunni representatives. i was, i think, forthright in saying there was the diverse mix of tribes in the sunni area. they don't speak with one voice, and therefore getting -- requesting those sunni leaders to actually come forward, not least because we have not touched on this yet, but half the country is at war. it's engaging in an incredible battle to -- i'm sure we will touch on it -- in the west. and, therefore, you want to attract absolutely these people to the table. they may not be in the position to come to the table.

they continue to be -- >> >> but are you satisfied, minister, that there is enough tangible evidence of an inclusive approach on the new administration? at least attempts? is there an attempt to reach out? >> we have very much encouraged that. >> i know you've encouraged it, but are you seeing evidence of it? >> yes. i have seen a number of posts that have been filled by sunnis that we want to see involved are yet unable to do so because of the geographicical terrain. they are not able to participate, they're out of the country and they're in exile as well. but we need to be careful by wanting to sort of pick selected -- the first 11, if you like, and say, these are actually better people to have. we have done that in other countries. actually keeping alive a person who we might make as a future president of a country or prime minister like that, didn't always turn out the way we wanted it -- >> what one is saying is there's been an absence of inclusive

form of government which has alienated the sunnis in the north and that has been part of the problem. let's part that for the moment. let's turn to the iraqi army. trained by the americans, fully equipped. brought up to numerical strength, very strong, yet fled at the first sign of trouble are we being naive in believing that you can meld different tribes, different cultures, given the 600-year history of the region, into one force and expect them to take on an opposition from which a large part of their own army is recruited? >> well, first, i don't agree with your introduction and description of the iraqi forces. >> you think the iraqi army did well, do you? >> no. i'm saying they're not as strong as you are suggesting they were. this was back in june when they sort of dropped their guns and ran. >> i'm saying when they did drop their gun, they were full strength, well equipped, trained by the americans and equipped

over a period of years, and yet at the first sign of trouble they ran. >> that is to gloss over the leadership that was actually looking over the scale of the iraqi forces. shiite generals were placed in there by maliki himself. he was actually running the show. perhaps because he was concerned about their own power, their own authority. therefore, the good sunni leaders and others, who operated under a structure, which you and i are very familiar with, having both served, that was removed. not only was that removed, but also the support element from the americans was also removed. maliki requested that that end. therefore, in fact, these generals were answering directly to maliki's office. and when it came -- when the attack actually came in, then the orders were not there to coordinate activity. and that is why many of the generals weren't sure of actually what to do to provide that mutual support. not only that, they were serving in a sunni area themselves and

through that, perhaps, that complex environment, led to the forces themselves crumbling much faster than we perhaps would have anticipated. >> you would put this down to an issue more of an issue of leadership rather than trying to meld a united force out of different ethnic mixes, religions, cultures? >> the lesson has been learned from there. and what general allen is now seeking to do is to create a national guard, which actually does work on exactly what you're implying. is that there is a myriad, a complex sort of tapestry of ethnic groupings. and each area will be able to develop its own national guard. but answer to senior authority. that is the direction of travel. that is what the americans are now focusing on. and that, i think, is what is best suited for that particular country. >> okay. and finally, it appears the uk

is offering little or no assistance to the isf. why is that? and is there any plans for that to change? >> well, i wouldn't agree with that at all. we are firstly involved in air strikes, which is assisting the ground forces in iraq, as you'll be aware, there are tornado sortees, over 80 combat missions have taken place. we're also providing important intelligence gaining that's needed. we're also part of the coalition. so, you may want to see the british flag doing x, y or z, but we're doing what's been asked of us. and if there is more to be asked, if the iraqi government wants us to do more, we will certainly consider it. we're part of a 60-strong coalition. and i think we are doing as much as we can do, but we will certainly consider any requests to actually do more. >> okay. thank you.

>> gentlemen, welcome. minister, i can just raise to the committee's attention my members' interest as i have an interest. i have a family business in iraq and kurdistan, an adviser on a number of companies as well as co-chair the party group for krg. >> thank you very much. >> for the record. thank you very much, chairman. minister, one of the first countries to offer help to both the kurdistan regional government and to the baghdad government was iran through the iranian revolutionary guards in the battle against i.s., i think, was on the front line, we were told. across from kirkuk all the way

to maqmor. do you welcome engagement from the revolutionary guard and the gifting of equipment to the kurds, we're told that there was some heavy artillery and some ammunition from ammunition warehouses in baghdad? >> i'm going to invite edward to say in a second a couple of words on the relationship, the long-term relationship, because he's very familiar having served in the region. i would simply say that somtimeses we do look at iran through the british spectrum of events, and more modern events, we perhaps forget that there is a strong historical and geographical relationship between the kurds and indeed a iran. i think the large thirdest ethnic grouping in iran are the kurdish themselves. therefore, there will naturally be a synergy and an interest. we're aware that the revolutionary guards are -- we

have very much kept an eye on what was actually happening here. this was at a time of huge flux, of huge change that was taking place with isil pushing down, as i mentioned, earlier. it obviously is a decision for the iraqi government. but i believe it's best for iraqi, whether southern iraqi or peshmerga forces to actually liberate the country and provide that security. >> and i think the only thing i would add is that the iraqi government made it very clear that they don't want foreign forces of any kind on their soil. and that they think it's better, and we agree with them, for iraqi troops to liberate their country from isil. and, i mean, we all saw the curious way in which the the southern army came sort of on

mobile phones before stopping the flow, the advance of isil. but i think we're pretty clear here that while britain and iran might, if you like, share a common interest, a common challenge, in confronting isil and iraq, too, that that common challenge stops about there. and that the common -- the sort of iraq that iran would want to see is very different from the sort of inclusive iraq which its government would want to see, that the krg would want to see, and that we would want to see. >> and presumably, if you look at the track record from syria, which you end up with a sort of forray of militias forming. >> in fact, what sulmani was

doing in those early days was going around the shia militia and organizing the shia militia in baghdad to fight isil and the way in which the militia has behaved has been pretty patchy, to put it mildly. >> we'll talk more about that peshmerga later. minister, are you satisfied that the current allied military strategy against islamic state in iraq has been working and has momentum? rr on you resigned to sort of a longer term war with all that entails, including, you know, idps, not being able to go home, with respect to many idps who held no prospect of them actually returning to their homes? >> first, let me take it from sort of a kinetic literary context and then talk about the idps. i think we need to be patient.

we need -- we need to be -- see this as a long-term operation, if not least from the state we're fighting but also stabilization, peacekeeping perspective. and we are in the early stages of that. this will take a lot of time in order to defeat isil in the manner we're doing. let's not to say that there are other ways it could be done, but the way this -- the strategy at the moment, which i think is the right one, is to allow the iraqi ground forces to liberate the space in -- particularly in anbar province to push isil back from where they came from, which was from raqqa down the euphrates river. impb deed, it's because they were able to steal, they were able to push back you the and use the same kit and go up to kobani and so ford. so i think we need to recognize that we -- the air campaign that

we're providing at the moment is providing that umbrella of support. the training that the americans are providing and the british as well, not just with istar but also counter variety and others. we are seeing successes, but it is indeed going to take time. the idp is an interesting aspect of it. i spoke about this with the american ambassador and with general allen. i posed the question, who do you have in mipd to be the mayor of mosul when, let's say, falluja, when these cities and towns are liberated? who's going to come in and be running the police? who's going to be the head teacher or run the water facilities and so forth? these are thoughts we need to start thinking about immediately. and i'm afraid nobody thought about them, or at least it seems that way, in 2003, that's why we ended up from liberty rarities to occupiers because life didn't change.

that's very, very important. i mentioned the fact that there were very much sunnis that felt disenfranchised. have you christians, yazidis and others who are worried about retaliation that once isil forces are pushed back. i visited camps in and around erbil very recently. they are very scared about it. we need to make sure that there is that assurance that there is an infrasure capability that will look back at them. assuming an area that is actually liberated is moving that refugee camp straightaway out to the outskirts, so it's not forcing them back into their original homes because they may not trust their neighbor who ransacked their home or pushed them out because the wind of change suggested the sunnis were on aa roll and they felt obliged to support what isil was doing, but basically outside the town so they can go back to work or, indeed, move back in their own time. if they end up staying there, at

least it's a new community, a new conflagration, which is close to where they were before. >> you obviously have a deep knowledge of what's going on on the ground. would you say there's a reconciliation process that needs to take place? if are you going to have these -- >> the reconciliation process was appropriate and was designed. there's been a number of models, not the least in south africa but in rwanda and so forth. there clearly will need to be some method in which communities can come back together and deal with the horrific, you know, hostilities that have taken place with individuals, choosing to take up arms simply because they got caught up in a horrific war. >> thank you very much. >> i think most would agreeshgs i think you alluded to, minister, that an air campaign alone is unlikely, unlikely to

defeat isil. what are needed are troops on the ground and an inclusive form of politics. i can suggest to you, though, that with very little progress on the politics side with very little evident progress on -- with regards to getting the iraqi army up to speed, this is going to be a very long campaign. therein lies a danger, because the air campaign on its own could become counterproductive. evidence has been taken by the committee to suggest that the longer the air campaign goes on, the more, perhaps, the sunnis are going to feel persecuted, perhaps civilian casualties could rise. therein lies the prospect of it being counterproductive. i mean, what is your view on that? and is is there a plan "b" if the politics and army don't kick in fast enough? >> and you're very patient to see, as i think everybody is, to see iraq liberated. but i don't agree with your

premise that somehow there is simply an air campaign. there is an air campaign with which we're involved with, but we're just one small part of a larger jigsaw. and as i say, i went to pains to say that the iraqi army is being retrained. the americans are very much involved with that. we're doing our part as well. if we're asked to do more, then obviously we'll consider that. but it's very important that we don't make mistakes that we have done in the past of actually compounding the problem, of putting ground forces, troops on the ground who then could end up making the situation worse. we have to give the space, and we are seeing evidence of iraqi armed forces successes, but it will take time. yes, that's absolutely right, we could move nato forces in there, but you for one have a track record of being perhaps reticent about that. >> let's be clear, so -- >> so are you advocating? because i would say there's no

appetite in this country to do that. there is -- if i may finish, sir? there is an appetite to support the strategy, which is to give the space to the iraqi forces to develop the skill sets or, rather, reclaim the skill sets because many actually have. one thing they've spent a lot of time doing is fighting. but to coordinate that to make sure they can regain the ground for which the stabilization can continue. >> just to claire -- absolute clarity. one wasn't talking about nato forces. one was talking about the iraqi army, getting the iraqi army up to speed. you still haven't answered the question, minister, are you alive to the danger of air strikes over time becoming counterproductive when it comes to the sunni minorities? >> i don't agree with your premise air strikes alone.

there's ar tilley capability, there's infantry and so forth. i may be misunderstanding the question. but you're only looking through the lens of international, perhaps kinetic contribution here, and that is, i think, a force -- >> until we get the iraqi army actually pushing forward, because we all know -- there's no substitute to boots on the ground, you and i know that particularly. until you get to that point, essentially we are reelying on air strikes. maybe on artillery as well, but essentially air strikes. is the politics on the ground alive to the danger that this could become counter productive over time? we don't want to rush it, but there's a real danger that air strikes without iraqi army on the ground pushing back could become counterproductive? >> i can't go further than say there are successes happening. we are seeing the iraqi army hold ground. they're not being able to push back as fast as we'd like or they will eventually be able to do, but they have thwarted the attack by isil. it will now take time for them to go from the defensive mode into offense, and that will take time. we have to allow and be patient for that to actually happen.

>> we haven't daushg -- it has been announced we're using drones out there. without giving away any operational capacity, is that a large part of the operation or a small part, microscopic part? >> it's one element. it's one element. from memory, the -- well, it is smaller -- i'm sorry. it's a smaller van the number of flights that have happened, subsequent to and smaller than the number of tornado flights. and from memory there have been about 18-plus tornado flights and air strikes. and the number of drone strikes is in the single figures at the moment. >> could i say that it's appreciated the style, the tone in which you asked the question. it makes sense not to probe. could i suggest too much into this area because we're always giving information away to the other side. >> i understand. >> thank you. i am chair of the war party group on iraq.

no peculiarly interest. i also have a long association with the kurds. so i would like to ask you, after the i.s. eventually is driven out of the kurdish border areas in northern iraq by the peshmer peshmerga, do you see the need for some international peacekeeping mission to keep order, common reprisals which you touched on earlier? >> i go back, i think, to the point i gave -- firstly, can i pay tribute to the work you've done. you've been very focused on this and supportive. of all the groups in iraqs, not just the kurds themselves. the physical protection that needs to come, you're quite right there needs to be that sense of security. the national guard program that's actually being put in place, which allows the -- from

a tribal perspective, a more connections, a local connection between those who are doing the security capability and those who actually live in that. so, you do not bus in those from another part of the country to another part in order to provide that. because i think that's where we went wrong before. i wouldn't at this stage consider that to -- you know, introducing peacekeepers, international peacekeepers or any form of that, is not something that's being discussed at the moment. >> i'm glad you put the record state about the iraqi army, because i think it's been criticized unnecessarily. and it didn't just run away. there were factors present where there was no clear command. and i think it's important to put that on the record. going back to minority groups displaced from their homes,

traditional homes, yazidis, turkmen, syrians, the mandamans and so forth, i think many of them may not want to return to their homes because of fear of reprisals. everybody wants to go back home but they're not being realistic and they will need some kind of assurances, protection, whatever. i mean, some years ago the prince of the yazidis argued for an enclave just for the yazidis. so, you know, that feeling has been there for some time. they feel unprotected more so now of course. >> you pose such an important question. and it's worth, perhaps, just reflecting on what part of the world we're dealing with. the land between two rivers, as it's called. this is the fertile crescent.

this is the birthplace of so many religions that have actually lived in relative peace for thousands of years. whether christians or a whole variety of religions stem from this corner of the world, alloites, turkmen, they have lived in peace, they have and they can again. but we shouldn't overestimate how vulnerable they will now feel. and when i visited a number of the refugee camps, this is exactly what they were concerned about. this is why the iraqi government must be inclusive in ensuring they are represented politically but also protected physically using the correct makeup of national guard. >> do you think those -- like the yazidis and many of whom were rescued from mt. sinjar, do

they have all the assistance they need at the moment? and is there any attempt at all -- i think i've asked this question several times in the house. what is happening to the yazidi women? we were all shocked when so many of them were kidnapped. the reports of them being sold on the open market. and bazaars and so on. and it appeared it was the peshmerga themselves, and particularly peshmerga involved with syria, who actually helped the yazidis more than anybody else. i don't know whether you can confirm that or not. >> well, indeed it was the peshmerga. a particular wing of the peshmerga that was able to come in on mt. sinjar and provide such important support at their time of need. am have moved away and found refuge in northern iraq. you're right. there is a huge concern about the plight of the women.

this is one of the reason -- i traveled with justin greening to northern iraq. we visited a number of refugee camps and she made a further promise of additional funds. britain is one of the largest donors. i don't know if we have any figures we can provide. in northern iraq to assist in this very area. >> is there any information on the women? i keep asking that question over and over again. what information do we, as the british government, have about those yazidi women? they seem to sort of disappeared without a trace. >> we will -- we'll check and let you know, but i don't think we have very much, to be honest. as the minister said, the peshmerga themselves, i mean, not just were the ones who got them off the -- off sinjar, but then the evidence is that they

were, as one would expect, the most effected people and tracing the 3,000 or so who seem to have disappeared. we're not getting, for what it's worth, an urgent request for further assistance for the -- for the yazidis at the moment. and without at all wanting to underplay what the yazidis have gone through, the pushback we're also getting from quite a lot of kurdish and iraqi groups is don't just concentrate on the yazidi women. there were lots of other women who have been taken hostage and worse by isil, too. and so it's a question of trying to trace them all rather than just sort of concentrating on one. the figure for uk humanitarian aid to the krg at the whole is $23 million, of which some was

dedicated -- $4 million, from memory, was dedicated to specifically help for women -- protection of women and minorities. >> could i say that we've -- i'm conscious we've not adequately answered your question. we will get back and do some investigation. i'm going to iraq very soon and i'll make sure that i will put this on the agenda. and we investigate a bit further and get back to you. >> thank you. i do understand it's the kurdish minister of women's affair whom we met during our visit actually told us that in some cases they were trying to buy. they bought some of the women. >> to liberate them? >> yes, to liberate them. and some of those women were being taken back, contrary to popular opinion, taken back into their own families, despite what had happened to them. and if that is the case, it would be useful to have more information. thank you.

i understand the kurdish government is planning to run local sites in disputed areas held by the peshmerga as soon as the security situation has been stabilized. how and when shall we see these elections being run? >> the keyword there is disputed -- or words, disputed areas. firstly, i think had the peshmerga not done what they did when isil advanced in the summer, there's a possibility, a probability that kirkuk could have fallen and gone the same way as mosul and fallujah. there's also, in the constitution, there is recognition that there should be some form of referendum, i understand, article 140, if memory serves, which allows the

people of kirkuk to determine their future. i think without getting too involved in this, we believe the complexities of this is, you know, where are your district boundaries? when there's been such a churn of people and so forth, how do you actually recognize what the established electoral districts are, for example and who qualifies to actually vote? so i think this needs to be done with -- needs to be a consensual process. it's certainly part of the process. but it needs to be inclusive so people feel involved and it seems fair and, therefore, can last. >> and should it be run by the international body or run internally? >> well, that's a very good question. i think it gets something for the iraqi people, ultimately, to operate. and should they request assistance from the international community, i'm sure that assistance will be

forthcoming. >> thank you. >> minister, the issue of the cities in the summer got a quick headline saying we didn't have a strategy to protect christians in the middle east, but this was ran the time mt. sinjar. can one have a strategy to protect christians abroad? >> i would hope that there is -- edward, you may have thoughts on this. but i hope there would already be a strategy, which is inclusive of christians, which is already incorporated. we have a set of human rights values we believe. we have a set of government values we believe in. and support to ethnic minorities and so forth. if we start being specific about any particular religion, you could ask the next group demand one as well. therefore, threads there needs to be something which is all-encompassing that recognizes

that. in the same way the kurds are actually the largest minority population in the world. without a country themselves. but, therefore, the same question could be posed for them. >> not sure it will be long. >> fought for the peshmerga, the kurdistan regional government was desperate need for further equipment. what's the uk's government response to that? >> can i throw that back to you and ask you, is it elaborate what they requested? >> they had the heavy machine guns type. we saw that. but they went further armored vehicles and things like that to assist them. i believe they were formulating a request to the uk government at that time. >> well, the defense secretary

just visited recently. and has been covered by the media, we have given a number of weapon systems, not the least some heavy machine guns, 40 machine guns, which comes with training as well. they're difficult weapons to fire, 50 cal. so i think the regimen has gone out to help with the training. i have a little bit of concern here. and i just express this carefully. this has been their hour of need, no doubt about it. the peshmerga were up against it and the world responded. by providing weapon systems and, indeed, some training to make sure that the line could actually be held. we're now in a situation whereby they are, quite rightly, wanting to bolster their capability. but we are -- we ourselves have been involved in taking munitions from romania and

bulgaria, which we've air lifted, in fact. they used warsaw pact standard rounds, 7.62. and we ended up transferring those across. they now have a regular drum beat of airplane landing providing more weapon systems. my worry is, and i just share this, you know, with the committee that, you know, this is in a tough neighborhood. it's the peshmerga, you're giving it to the peshmerga which itself is made up of -- split into two with a political wing as well. those political wings were at war, civil war in the '90s. and yet there is an awful lot of weapon systems coming into the country itself. as i say, i have no problem with the fact that we are arming that moment of need. what i would encourage, and i've said this and been very frank with the kurdish government, is that it needs to be transparent. they need to make sure their

quartermaster is in place. we see where these weapons are actually going so they're not, somehow, squirreled away or disappear. worst case scenario, let's look at libya. not saying it would end up that way. but it's so flush with weapon systems now, it's actually very, very difficult. everybody feels the need to own -- i don't know how many are in the country compared -- it's about three times the population of actual weapon systems. so i would just say on the arming of the peshmerga, that i would like to see -- is actually upgrading the transparency, the capability and the accountability of the peshmerga to the kurdish government. and i think they understand that as well. and britain stands ready to support in that request. that said, as i say, we have provided a number of weapon systems and most importantly, counter-ie d-training, which is one of the things they have requested to us. we stand ready to answer any other questions that come

britain's way. >> you mentioned the peshmerga. any other conditions put on the support that's been given? for example, the reform of the peshmerga? >> i'm not aware of any conditions as such. but as i say, i've been very, very frank with the peshmerga and, indeed, the government themselves to say this is your hour of need. we recognize that. but also we're -- we've seen all sorts of containers come in from around the world because requests are made right akrols the board. there also -- for their own capability, anybody that served or been near the armed forces or done the armed forces parliamentary scheme are aware you need a standard set of equipment, which your forces then become familiar with rather than ad hoc bits, which come from nato standard or warsaw pact or chinese weapon systems. it can be very confusing. if in the long term you want

capability. >> in terms of the two main factions, the peshmerga, i think there's quite a consensus that needs to reform weapon structure. i think that's why -- >> i beg your pardon. i absolutely agree. that's what we've been encouraging to do. so, you have one -- the peshmerga, the ministry of the peshmerga is simply answering to the government rather than any particular party. you forget there's a third party, the grand party, which is also developing. do they want a wing -- their own military themselves? that's not the direction of travel we would want to see. >> thank you for that. >> sorry, edward. if i could, with sir john stanley sitting here, just say that all of our gifted equipment we asked be used in accordance with international humanitarian law. used to meet urgent operational needs, including the defense of civilian populations, not to be stockpiled, to remain in iraq

and not to be sold or transferred to third parties. then we got assurances back from the kurdish regional government that they would observe those requirements. >> thank you. did you feel that the eu was playing a fifth part in supporting the peshmerga? >> i think this is something the foreign secretary raised last week in brussels. at the foreign affairs council. he's asked for it to come on the agenda for -- is it december's meeting? >> yes. >> december's meeting. so the eu itself will be obliged to address this to say, whether there be more that can actually be done? from the nato requirement, i think the whaales summit came o with a statement, if memory serves. i may have to write with you the details. edward -- >> essentially, nato was looking at how best it could contribute

to the iraqi and syria mission, if you like, overall. particularly in respect of training. but also coming back to earlier parts of the skrugs whether there were ways in which we can use the coordination mechanisms that already exist within nato to ensure a proper sensible division of labor in terms of who supplies what. for example, the germans have supplied a lot of weapons and ammunition to the peshmerga. it would make no sense for us to then provide the same thing. so we're trying to use the capabilities where they would add value but only where that would be the case. >> if i could add. there needs to be synergy between what the iraqi forces are doing as well. i'm pleased to see they have come together, not something they do a lot but a synergy equipment needs to take place. that's also happening in kobani as well. >> it requires a different kind

of training as well. they are, you know, taking the fight to the enemy and such. i'm sure will no doubt lead to further requests of support for equipment and training. >> thank you. that is where i want to go, syria. we seem to be happy that the iraqi kurdish peshmerga are fighting to liberate kobani. we seem to be happy that the americans are bombing the fascist jihadists. but we don't seem to be willing to do anything about it ourselves. can i declare an interest as somebody who tabled an early day motion number 500 last week? it calls for all parties to give solidarity to the kurds in syria as well as in iraq.

also, i went last year with a group to irbil and i want to declare that as well, i guess. can i ask you, is there not some level absurdity in the position whereby we know that the heart of this organization is carrying out beheadings, they are trying to seize the areas which are currently under the control of the pyd, ypg, the syrian kurds? and yet, we have got this self-denying position that somehow britain is not going to be involved in syria. would you agree with me that this is illogical?

>> i wouldn't for a number of reasons. if i could qualify why i think i disagree. firstly, there is -- i think you are following the same chapter john did. >> i don't think the same. >> different traps. >> i think we have different positions. >> very close to each other. just looking through the priz many dgs prism of britain. we should be in iraq and syria. that's a logical conclusion to draw. but you forget that we are part of a coalition. the americans, john allen, general allen, has not requested us to participate in there. they don't -- it's not that they are short of have too many targets and require british airplanes to participate in a campaign. they don't. what they need from us and what we are providing is intelligence

gathering. we're able importantly to provide that. there's also a legal aspect of that which i think the committee will be well familiar with. we are in iraq because of the invitation of the iraqi government. therefore, there is a legal step that we would have to go through. the americans are able to justify it through their attorney general. not only that, but the prime minister made it clear that were we to advance to include syria in the manner in which you describe, it would require a further vote in the house of commons. that takes us into another world as to whether or not that would be successful. >> i can understand the political reasons. i'm not asking you to sort of say that the government would act without consent. but surly if the americans think it's legal to be bombing isil inside syria, what's the inhibition on the uk doing it?

do we have different legal standards than the u.s.? >> you're saying why aren't we bombing? because the americans are bombing. if the americans are able to do the bombing that's required, should we not use our assets to support and focus on areas where, from a coalition perspective, there is a need? >> okay. all right. let's try a different way. we have given support in terms of non-lethal equipment to the free syrian army. the free syrian army, as far as i understand it, is not engaged directly in many areas where it is fighting against isil. it may be fighting against the outside regime, but from what i understand -- you can correct me if i'm wrong -- the people in syria who are actually fighting against isil are syrian kurds. why don't we give assistance to the syrian kurdish forces who are actually engaged in fighting

against isil? >> first let's go back to the free syrian army. you are right. where he providing non-lethal equipment. it's equipment which can be of service to them. they are providing and protecting the space in the north of syria. we're providing support to the police in that area as well. that sits next to the humanitarian support that's not only just provided into that space but also into as many parts of syria as a whole as we can actually get into. the question as i go back to is, what is our contribution to the actual coalition itself? you are wanting us to jump ahead. >> no. >> yes, you are. >> i'm wanting us to take a view with regard to people -- if we are prepared to support some syrians against isil -- i want an explanation as to we are

prepared to support the kurdish peshmerga and the americans are but why aren't we providing support to the kurds in their existential fight which they are engaged in in kobani and elsewhere? >> i go back to the legality. there's no legal case for us to do that. the people that are doing that and are gaining support from us and we have been through this in a previous question is the peshmerga. they are now moving to kobani, moving through turkey. that's been agreed. they are taking on that fight themselves. >> i don't understand the argument about legal case. can you clarify that? >> as i say, when the -- we looked at this. it may be that we return to this when there comes another vote. there has to be legal justification for us to be able to enter syria without their permission. >> i'm not asking for us to enter syria. what is the legal objection for us providing support as we have done to the free syrian army to

the pyd or other kurdish opposition to isil and the asad regime? >> i'm not aware of any request from the pyd to -- >> but you said there were legal problems. i'm not clear what the legal objection would be. if we're prepared to support the free syrian army, why are we not prepared to support kurds? >> the list that i read out involving in low level communication communications, flak jackets, we are able do this. it's not arming in that sense. >> final question. is it our priority to defeat isil in syria or to remove the asad regime in syria? which is more important? >> the international coalition's objective is to militarily

defeat isil. we then need to create the space in order for sunni engagement to take over that space. that is the objective. now, that will, of course, involve operations on both sides of the border itself. we are participating in one particular aspect of that, which i mentioned earlier. asad -- he is aware of this -- is contributing to the success of isil by creating the space and denying moderate sunnis the ability to have a voice because there is no voice, they have gone and rallied against him. you mention eed an example of that. asad himself is somebody that we believe has caused this. therefore, that's why it isn't a choice because there is -- it's so binary that we need to switch from one to the other. because isil is developed into a

greater threat, we need to support assad. >> let me be clear. you are saying that the priority is to get rid of isil? and we all accept that this is not going to be immediate. this is a long-term process. that presumably means, whereas two years ago the government was talking about the imminent end of the assad regime, where he envisioning assad in some form controlling considerable parts of syrian territory for perhaps years or even longer to come? >> i will return to this in a second. >> i think the answer to that is no, we're not. we do think that, if you like, the first concentration of our intervention should be against isil. but the effect of that mustn't be that we thereby strengthen assad or that while we fight with others isil that the flame

of the syrian opposition is sort of extinguished. and, therefore, we have to be able to do both concurrently. and we have i think always also recognized that in syria, you need -- you can't have simply a military solution. that there needs to be a political process going as well. one of the things we're doing at the moment is trying to react to that political process which sort of comes after the failure of geneva 2 to get a sense of forward movement and to underline, despite all the international discussion around this, that we can't see a future for syria in which assad is a part after everything that's happened. so how do we -- we as part of the international community move

both the military, if you like, intervention forward but also -- the military part of it, but also the political as well? they have to go hand in hand. >> let me add to that, there's no doubt that what is happening in syria is complex and it's multi-faceted. it's also unpredictable to some extent. what is happening is that whi-- from an isis perspective, there's people from around the world who continue to join the forces of isil. the same isn't -- the same cannot be said for assad. his officer class is being deple depleted. therefore, there could be a moment in the future whereby there are big decisions to be made about -- for the people under the assad regime as to whether they still believe they should continue supporting him. that is a very, very important

moment to recognize when it will be and what -- how the international community will respond. if we were to take assad's regime, the space which is -- a lost of warlordism is taking place. if it was a patient, do we want to patient to die completely, for assad to be overrun? and with all the criminality and the vacuum of power which would be filled in by isil, or do we want the patient to remain alive that we can have the infrastructure and the state capability there for whether it be the syrian coalition government or indeed others -- sunnis who are the quiet voices who no longer believe that the future is with assad are able to move forward rather than have the state collapse completely, which i think would be terrible for the entire region. >> thank you.

>> what's the estimated figure of the total number of fighters in syria plus those in iraq? >> the figures vary. do we have some numbers? they are continually being replenished, sadly, because many -- many from around the region are joining forces or being trained in small numbers. so anything between 20 and 30,000. >> you reject the recent reports that have been made that the british government's figures are massively under stastating the number of fight sneakers. >> i'm not sure what you mean. the number of britains who have chosen to leave here and go there? >> the total number of fighterf.

there have been reports that the british government stated figures are massively underestimating the item number. >> i don't -- i don't think we are going to get an exact figure on. there isn't a roll call that we can lean he was directing his ire at the

americans as much as anyone, i think. i think i have to say our effort accident support that in the terms in which he said it. the point he was trying to make is that so-call ed -- they control an area a third of syria or a third of iraq that includes some several million people and how could a -- such a small number of fighters control that? first thing -- i think to analyze the structure of the -- it's got what they call the tip of the speer, which are the people that do the fighting. it's probably thousands. then you have the people who come in afterwards. then you have the great mass who go along with.

the numbers who sustain. the incidental evidence -- it's difficult to get hard facts on all of this. as the number of people who actually, for example, run the i.s. administration in mosul is very small. so by any standards, this figure of 200,000 looks massively inflated. >> thank you. >> i think there are tribes who have chosen to put their hands up and say i support isil. they have come through my neck of the woods and come down the river, i don't want to fight with them, i'm a sunni. i feel better off. i'm happy because they seem to be on the winning side. they seem to be the winning side at the moment. i will support them. do you include those as well as fighters or supporters? there is a gray area when you count the numbers up. >> lastly, does the government

agree that within the i.s. areas in syria and in iraq, the i.s. is trying to carry out effectively and enforce program of additional fighters from men and young adolescent boys? >> i think it is fair to say that's what's happening. there's a sense of fear that the isil uses in order to force individuals who perhaps when they are -- with intent to fight. britains, some of them who have returned or come back to europe have said that they were monitored and if they were seen not to continue to fight with the same level of energy that they went out there, then they would actually be killed or somehow persecuted. you are right. i think there's a massive amount of fear and brutality that isil is using in order to contain the ranks.

>> at the moment, the consulate is running from a seventh floor. is that good enough? does it allow service? >> i visited. when we arrived, i share my surprise that we had arrived at the consulate's location. what is fair to say is that where things were in june, where the country was -- where the kurdish region was going in june is in a very different place as to where we are today. i'm pleased that there are reinforcements coming in that have bolstered the numbers. i will get back to you with more information on the location. i don't want to commit ourselves to a new building. but there is a question as to whether that's the right

location for it, baring in mind the increase involvement and commitment that we are having to northern iraq. >> there is going to be -- there is an undertaking for a new building. it's supposed to open in the second part of next year. is that correct? >> i don't know the time. >> why is it taking so long? >> there is a plot of land. there was and still is an existing plan to build a consulate general that would have been adequate to the circumstances before the isil onslaught. why was that taking so long to get off the ground? because we were having a number of issues with the local kurdish authorities about land use, getting the necessary utilities tied in, getting the necessary permissions to build and so on and so forth.

it became clear after everything that happened in june and july, august that we were going to go into a spike of activity. and what we are trying to judge is where the new normal going to be for 2016, '17, onward. so what sort of building do we need that will be adequate to the requirement snz s? we are sure what we were going to build -- >> does that mean you are telling the committee that there is no agreement to open a new house, new consulate in 2015? because that's what the committee was told. are you saying that's not the case? >> we cannot physically meet the timetable to build -- hold on. if i may. the timetable to complete a new consulate building by the june -- by summer of next year,

was about -- became impractical about seven or eight months ago. that timetable was going to take another, i don't know, six months or nine months. the point is that the building as it would produce now is no longer large enough for what we will need. so what we are trying to do is urgently work out what sort of a new building we would need. are the present facilities adequate? no. we recognize that. that's why we were trying to build a new building. >> so the plan to move by 2015, second part of 2015 has now been stopped? >> well, the timetable to achieve that by the 2015 is no longer practical for the reasons i have explained. but it was never -- from about seven months ago when we couldn't get necessary permissions, it wasn't going to be anyway. >> can you understand the local frustration, for example, the fact that is took so long to

look at the last building, the russian russians -- the building and know they are talking about another extension because when we were there, we were well under the impression that this building was going to open in 2015? can you understand local politician frustration when you look at how they perceive the united kingdom to be dragging their heels on this particular project? >> you make an important point. i hear that loud and clear. i would like to think that local politicians judge britain on our commitment, our investment and our relationship not just on the building itself. if i may, i will investigate further. if i can, i will write to the committee to explain what is actually happening with the plans. bearing in mind that from june to today, there's an increase in the number of -- size of

accommodation has grown from what was needed before, because we have upgraded the number of staff that will work in northern iraq. >> we saw the germans with a new building. >> the promise that it would be set up, which we were told about again when we were there. can you advise us to where this is a case whether the joint committee super and running? >> could you repeat the question. the committee that was supposed to be set up after the visit here by kurdish politicians. where are we on the joint committee? has it been set up?

>> when the prime minister was here in may and we agreed then that we would set up this committee it not surprisingly the kurdish government have had other things to focus on since then. when we have seen him in the krg since, when the foreign secretary was there, we agreed that it is something we needed to press ahead with. >> so just to clarify, it's not been set up and started yet? >> it hasn't met for first time yet. >> it's not -- yeah. okay. >> sounds like the consulate building. okay. we will try something else. can you update as to whether there are any plans to update

kurdi kurdistan government on local delivery? there are a -- not just security that we are trying to endeavor to strengthen relationships. this is something britain does very well. indeed, i think there is training taking place. you can ask me have they started? i'm not sure. >> i think we get the drift here. >> i got the flavor of it. but we are training civil servants in various ministries and working with them in order to improve government's transparency and accountability. >> locally? >> yes. >> do you think the uk's business footprint is as large as it could be? >> it's worth mentioning the vision 2020 document in relation to that last question. it's related to this one as well. can i ask why you asked the question? >> why do i ask the question? because it's the job of this committee to exercise foreign

office policy. >> that is no doubt. britain, i think, has the largest number of businesses that actually are operating in northern iraq than any other country. that's why i ask. we are in a very, very strong. but, obviously, we want to do more. >> let me give you more detail. we picked up the vibes that the uk's presence was not as strong as it could be and other companies -- country's corporations were more active. there's our travel advice. there's the uk irbil airport and the lack of direct link to the uk. >> there already exists a huge footprint. britain is very well established

both in northern iraq but also in with carbons. there has been on -- staying with the oil and gas industry, there has been difficulties because of the licensing agreements and the approval of baghdad, which is why some companies have chosen to focus on the oil refineries and not bothered or near irbil because of the differences. that i hope is advancing and with the oil agreement we have got we can see companies being able to do both and not feeling they have been shunted away. there's more work that we can do. we are looking to put more businesses out. ukti is soon to be established. we will bring more businesses to irbil in order to introduce them to the opportunities that are there. in particular sectors we want to invest in or did invest in is healthcare, education, infrastructure, legal and

financial services. >> director links? >> sorry? >> direct air links? >> something that needs to happen. there's more frustration than stopping off at vienna along the way and so forth. there's a note on this i remember reading. there are some issues to do with british -- the british being able to check on the air side of the irbil terminal. if we can get these sorted, then from a british perspective we are very keen for direct flights to happen. but it then requires an airline to pick this up. but there are just some issues to deal with, certification of standard of security from a british perspective, which are very high as you would appreciate. once there's a confirm, then i hope any airline, but british airlines in particular, will pick up and have a direct flight from irbil.

i appreciate as much as everybody the important of direct flights. >> are there any plans to review the travel advise? >> it's constantly under review. it's something havei have to si off myself. i'm aware of that. will look at it. i think we looked at it recently. but i will look at it from this committee. we have to bear in mind the environment that we're dealing with. but i very much -- i hope it has been proved to the extent that i am very keen for british business to flourish in iraq and in northern iraq and certainly for kurdistan to do as well as possible and for britain to participate in that. if there is a possibility of reducing the threats and the travel advice, i will engage there that. >> getting back to the question about regional government, i and i think other colleagues rather

pick up the vibe that once the financial differences between irbil and baghdad were sorted out and you -- they have made good progress on this, there's the possibility there may be an independence referendum in kurdistan. do you think that's possible? >> i think there's a lot of work to be done in other areas. i'm aware that this is something the people want to approach. i think it's also in the constitution as well to be considered. i believe this is a difficult neighborhood. i believe the government believes that the -- the country is stronger by having the influence of the kurds in baghdad. i think the integrity, security, economic prosperity is better pursued with the country

remaining as it is. >> i just pinched the question on that. apologies. do you want to come back on it now? >> yes. thank you. minister, the nation of iraq was an artificial construction. the reality is that the people of kurdistan would like to have independence at some point. there's no doubt about that. is it not time for the uk to think about how in the long-term the region can be changed, the boundaries of the nations can be changed and recreated to ensure that there is more stability and that there is more ability to create stronger nations longer term than the instability which i don't think can ever be resolved on the current boundaries? >> i think i can only repeat

just what i just said. it's our view that the country is far stronger, the kurds have a pragmatic approach with the other two major players here, the shiites and sunnis in providing collective transparent integrated government in baghdad. that's why i believe the country itself, but not only that but the region itself is from a security perspective, economic prosperity and so forth is better met by the country staying as one. >> i understand that point. it's a very valid point. but as time goes on, is it fair to expect the kurds to tie themselves to an artificial construction of which they don't feel part of when they have proved themselves to be able to run a successful state independently of that?

surely, we should give the people of kurdistan the right to have self-determination as we would with anywhere else in the world. >> you answered your own question there in the sense that anywhere else in the world can follow our example that we had not long ago here in scotland. that was done with the consent of the entire country. it was done in a manner which had a result and then we honored. that's important that anywhere in the world who wishes to pursue testing, whether or not a part of the country should go down the independence route, should honor. >> i'm not 100% certain it was with the consent of the rest of the united kingdom that scotland was going to be independent potentially. >> are you saying if there was a vote in england to keep scotland, there might have been a different end. >> we announced scotland to make

its own choice. my point is -- >> rather dangerous one. >> indeed. my point being very simply, the people of kurdistan or the kurdish region of iraq, what criteria if the uk government were to support them to become independent, what criteria would there need to be laid down before such a decision was made? >> i think we're moving into a hypothesis here. it would be dangerous for any government to build myrrh param to do with what might or might not take part if a particular part of a country wanted to seek independence. i cannot stress that this is a tough neighborhood. the kurds are a powerful influencing force, a power fbl stabilizing force in iraq as a hole. the strong is stronger for it. >> are we against any possibilities in principal that

iraq must stay together, or is there circumstances that you could see in the future where maybe not only in kurds' interests but in the uk interests to allow separate states to evolve from the ashes of what we see in the middle east at the moment? >> i invite you to ask the same question as many times. i'm afraid it's the same answer. i feel the country is far stronger as one integral solid iraq. >> thank you. >> thank you very much. minister, in february 2013 on a motion from myself, the house resolved without division that this house recognizes the genocide against the people of iraq, kurdistan and encourages the people -- the minister did not oppose the motion and said we could have further meetings to look at this.

although the government's position remained the same. it is not for the government to decide whether genocide has been committed in this case. we have heard some evidence in our inquiry that the uk's policy of non-recognition, the government's policy may damage the standing of the uk in kurdistan. what would be your response to that? >> firstly, i think that this monstrosity should never be forgotten. i'm grateful to the london higher representative who took a delegation to the memorial. it is moving, as it always is, to go to any of the locations and learn about the history. it's important that we do not forget, we learn from it. what happened in 1988, it is for

the criminal courts. it's a judicial matter. rather than any government -- the criminal court made that clear. there's a statute which actually means that i understand anything predating 2002 from when the criminal court was established, you can't go back in retrospect and use that judicial term itself. they have their reasons for coming out with that line of only looking to events that happen once the court was established. with that said, i think it's important that we mark the day. my predecessor attended the event last april. i would hope to do so next year. it's important we do not forget what happened back in 1988.

>> further to your early aside about asking questions in a -- your confusion about traps. our job is to actually scrutinize our own government. having said that, we frame the questions as broadly as possible taking into account regional alliances. in that vein, when it cop comes the defense of kuthe people of kurdistan against isil, we haven't touched upon our regional allies of what more could we do to encourage a broader approach, a greater support. what is the british government doing? what is the west doing in order to encourage more regional support to achieve our overall objectives given we all accept air strikes will not achieve the

task and we don't want to put western troops on the ground? >> firstly, to answer mill tear require aspect, i repeat what i said before, we are part of a wider equation. the offering that we provide is what has been requested of us. if there are further requests, for example, to participate in syria, then they will be taken on board. if requiring a vote in parliament, so will be. we have to remember that we have to take the nation with us on this and have the support of the nation, which is why the prime minister brought this to parliament in the first case. you ask a very important question, which i don't think is asked enough. it's easy to defeat militarily any insurgency. but you won't defeat the idea. you won't defeat that vacuum can be quickly refilled unless another ideology -- accepted ideology that everybody else accepts comes in.

i think not enough is done to discredit isil or delegitimize the ideology. i think it's for the region itself, it's the moderate sunni voices to offer and say that islam is a peaceful religion. this isn't what we stand for. this isn't who we are. this is not the calling that you should be listening to. pursue a different ideology, a different one which will see peace in iraq and syria. >> i think that's a fair point. you have to take on the ideology as well as the force on the ground. but the immediate threat when it c comes to kurdistan is the isil threat in front of them. now, you have sidetracked the question. coming back to military support,

coming back to any other support, one accepts the point about ideology. but is there more our regional allies could do to help in taking on isil on the ground? >> i would say that the strategy at the moment, which is allowing the space for both the peshmerga and the iraqi national forces is working. i would say that the air campaign is providing the attrition we need to hold back isil in iraq itself. i think syria, as has been exposed, is a bigger challenge. there's no doubt about it. but i think in what we're seeing there, we are -- the strategy is working. >> they are not needed? >> i'm sorry? >> they are not needed? regional ally support is not needed? >> i didn't say that. i think that the strategy is working. what then can be -- what we don't want to -- iraq doesn't want to see any other country

with -- other countries bringing in and putting boots on the ground. that would compound the matter. they must answer and take over of the space, push back the ideology and provide that security environment for the country to move forward peacefully. having said that, there is more support that can be done militarily to the peshmerga. from the north itself. there's more military capability, more training. that can come from a variety of sources. germany has brought in some more equipment. milan -- anti-tank weapon systems. regionally i would like to see more done as well. >> minister, you mentioned whatever happens that the idea is is still around as far as i.s. is concerned, the ideology would still be there. isn't it also helped by the fact

that i.s. got considerable financial resources made available to them now, but they've got so much oil on the black market that's being sold and obviously they have taken over banks and the like to get currency as well. isn't that part of the equation in terms of winning over a population and making sure even though they might not like the ideology, they are prepared to live under it? >> i think you raise an important point. there are many that are tolerating it because they feel that they have no other choice. this goes back to the situation that developed under assad where the sunnis were not given the free space. therefore, they ended up rallying around a flag which ended up being extremist. that complicates the challenge that we face. >> do you think that challenge is insurmountable? do you think we can win this from the air with help on the

ground? >> sir, i think you oversimplify what is happening on the ground as opposed to what we are actually doing to contribute. it isn't simply an air campaign. there is an awful lot of multi-facetted approach to take on the capability, not the least in supporting indigenous ground troops to take on the fight themselves. >> how long do you think it will last? >> i wouldn't like to speculate. i should perhaps cause in expecting anything in months or years. i think this is going to take a number of years in the same way that al qaeda as an ideology remains with us. in fact, there are this competition that we see between isil and aq at the moment. it remains with us even though the leader itself was killed in pakistan a number of years ago. >> forgive me for not being present when you began your

evidence, minister. president obama, when asked to say how long he thought it would take, said something like two or three years. there's corroboration from what you just said from across the atlantic. >> glad to know he is in agreement with me. >> i'm sure he is quite relieved as well. the question i want to ask is this. h how far do you think success would be easier if there could be serious disruption of the black market in oil in which isis is profiting? >> we are aware oil is being bought by assad himself. and there's a lot that are going through in other courses on the black market itself, enormous borders with jordan and turkey and so forth, it's difficult to ensure that they are policed. there's hostage taking as well. we are aware we have our own

hostage situation. isil is -- has many lebanese hostages. from much lower levels of payments which keeps the money coming in as well. these are -- they are paid off because they are smaller amounts. there's also, sadly, many individual donors from around the world that continue to fund this ideology and fund isil. one of the reasons why u.n. security council resolution -- 182170 took place is because -- to prevent individuals from any country breaking the law that you can stop individuals rather than countries, can continue to fund terrorism in this manner. >> i understand all of that. really, i should have asked a more direct question. is there any action being taken to try and disrupt the black

market in oil? >> there's a number of sites, without giving too much away, but there are -- >> i understand. >> i think you said on an earlier committee which looks into this as well, there are operationally we are trying to disturb the oil patterns. >> i'm content to leave it at that. thank you very much. >> thank you very much. it's really helpful to have these sessions like this where we can speak quite openly and freely and get the evidence that we need. it's been very helpful. >> as long as we keep it to ourselves. >> i'm afraid i can't assure you on that. order, order. >> thank you. >> from the british parliament, prime minister's questions from the house of comments. live wednesday morning at 7:00 a.m. eastern. it reairs on c-span sunday night

at 9:00 and midnight eastern time. view our website for previous question times going as far back as 1989. coming up live today on c-span3 at 2:00, a confirmation on the nomination of anthony blinken to be deppsy secretary of state. he is currently the deputy national security adviser. that hearing gets under way in about 20 minutes or so. c-span2 is live tonight at 8:50 from the 65th annual national book awards in new york city with announcements of the winners for non-fiction, fiction, poetry and young people's literature. you can see it sunday at 10:00 p.m. eastern on book tv. yesterday house republicans elected their committee chairs for the 114th congress which begins in january. more now from a capitol hill

reporter. the house leadership decided who would chair their committees. what's the headline? >> well, what's most remarkable about this is that once again there's only one female house committee chair woman in this congress and the next. every single new house committee chairman that was announced yesterday by the house steering committee is a white male. also, every single one of the committee's chairs for next yea. will be white.nd the that reflectres issues with diversity that the republican to partyr has been having. c >> there wasom -- most of these contests, if you will, for the w top spotsas on the committees we not surprises. however, there was a contest for the oversight and government reform committee. term limited to chair the committee stepping down. who will take the position?

>> jason shurfa will be the oversight and government reform chairman. he was inlor a four-way race. >> he comes out on top. why? alo who was backing him? >> he was considering the frontg runner along with mike turner. he has been very active on the oversight committee for a long time now.as, that he has made his interest in thec chairmanship clear. his argumenthe p to the committ was he would be this aggressive watchdog of the obama ats administration. but at the same time, he argued he would be better able to work with democrats than the current chairman has been, who had e created headlines for clashing >> >> then what was the reaction from democrats?k >> of course, last night they

were -- they just put out nice e statements saying theyry look forward to working with the newl chairman. you can be sure that the bipartisanship won't last very long. some democrats fear that he won't be so unlike darryl as hei wants people to think. he also, like i said, he is very aggressive in investigating. >> all right. who else is note worthy here? ca buck mckeyon is no longer armed services chairman. he is stepping down from that congress. he is retiring. mean mac thornberry, republican of texas will take this over. what does that mean for the ond military and defense policy? >> thornberry has been second highest ranking republican on the committee for the past four years. he had the implicit endorsement

ever since he announced he woulh retire at the end of the year. d he had been working on some of d the biggest issues it faced. like the acquisition program and a variety of other things.hat >> then also, noteworthy is judiciary committee, bob goodlat, he will retain that ly post. what does thatg meanto for chi immigration? >> it's probably going t o be more of the same, frankly. you have the same chairman. the committee did approve some immigration related bills regarding visas and that sort of thing in this congress. but it never played it to the floor. it remains a question of does he the republican conference want to deal with the issue? >> bob, we should let our hat c viewers know, republican of virginia. in the opinion pages that congress will fight obama's

power grab. the president's plan for million flz unlawful immigrants violates the constitution is what he writes. any other takeaways from the posts? >> another chairmanship that wae surprising was for the house intelligence committee, which is appointed just by speaker boehner. m out of three competitors, the most senior was jeff miller of florida. he is chairman of the veterans affairs committee.th nu nu n bo nu nunez is a friend of boehner.inh that helped him in the selection process. >> for more information about these chairmanships, go to the hill's website. thehill.com. thank you very much for your time. appreciate it. >> thanks for having me. earlier today, nancy pelosi announced the lead democrats on

several committees in the house. the white house said the president will make an announcement on immigration tomorrow. "the washington post" reporting on that today. president obama will announce thursday that he will use his executive authority to expand temporary protections to millions of undocumented immigrants, according to several individuals who have been briefed on the decision. obama will travel to las vegas on the heels of that announcement to rally support for his initiative friday.

congress will receive official details on the move thursday according to senior -- to a senior democratic party official. that from a "washington post" story. we will carry the president's remarks on immigration tomorrow night on the c-span networks. the senate foreign relations committee holding a confirmation hearing for anthony brinken to be deputy secretary of state. set to be started in 15 minutes from now, live coverage coming up on c-span3. until then, here is a portion of today's washington journal. in our last hour of the washington journal here on wednesdays, we focus on recent magazine articles as part of our spotlight. we continue that today with a recent piece in politico. the headline is, team of bumblers. look at president obama's national security, are susan

rice and chuck hagel equal to today's security challenges? why write this piece? >> well, there were a lot of questions around -- some of it the usual rumor, political buzz. some of it substantive in terms of -- i think two big questions. one is susan rice's national security council consultative enough with the rest of the government, particularly the defense department? there have been cases in recent months on very important issues like the battle against isis where they have not done a good job of coordinating. i needed to report on that. the second question was about chuck hagel as defense secretary. he was picked at a time in 2012 when the president clearly wanted to reduce the profile of the pentagon and u.s. military force around the world. he said so quite plainly. chuck hagel is a vietnam warrior turned dove who opposed the surge in iraq and afghanistan.

clearly is very leery about sending u.s. troops abroad. now in this year we are dealing with very tough challenges. you have putin in ukraine and particularly you have the takeover of parts of iraq and syria by isis. this question, are we going to put u.s. boots on the ground? the question about hagel is, do you want a defense secretary for all those qualities who is vested is as hagel is in not sending troops abroad? is there a bias there that is not appropriate for the time snz. >> interesting, because last week when he was up before the house armed services committee, walter jones, a republican from north carolina, who we had on the show yesterday, was comparing defense secretary hagel to donald rums rum sfeld . >> it's an interesting comparison. he was biased toward minimizing

the number of troops abroad. to be fair, is what would you want in any senior government official. we don't want warmongers. he was also the guy who actively advocating the iraq war. there he is very different from hagel. hagel wins praise from people, even republicans, on a lot of other things in terms of outreach to the hill, in terms of his -- the way he deals with allies, his strategic vision for the dod going into the future. there are a lot of people who think he has proved to be a better defense secretary than expected. on this issue of troops, he has remained very quiet. you have this sort of struggle playing out between the president and joint chiefs chairman martin dempsey with hagel sitting it out. it's odd because the defense secretary is supposed to be somehow weighing in on this. we have the sense that perhaps dempsey and some of the other senior military leaders over at

the pentagon seeing we are kind of not winning or losing against isis right now are pushing for more boots on ground. we have seen that step up in terms of the numbers of troops. again, hagel sitting in out. we don't have a sense he's a strong voice at the table. that's why these questions continue to linger. >> do you have, i guess, sources or knowledge that secretary hagel when he is at the table is actively sitting it out or arguing the other side, let's wait, we don't need to put boots on the ground? >> i know that he has been a strong voice on a couple of issues, particularly a few weeks ago there was a relief operation conducted in kobani, the syrian border town where the kurdish rebels were under huge duress from isis. hagel actually advocated that mission. but, again, that was a rescue

mission and not a mission where you are sending in -- not huge numbers of troops. that's not what we are talking about here. what we are talking about sending additional troops that would be used in a combat advisory capacity where where they would become or advise spotters on the ground to direct in air strikes much more accurately than we are doing now. somewhat the way it was done in the very early stages of the afghan operation in the fall of 2001, which was devastatingly effective against the taliban at that time. that's the kind of thing people are talking about as opposed to sort of large-scale, you know, 50,000, 100,000 troops. no. and here's where we feel, you know, where it seems anyway that there's a little bit of drift here and, a lot of it probably reflects the president's views. the president picked hagel for an are 'cause hagel reflected the president's own views of sort of a minimalist approach to sending force abroad. >> you wrote in the peace, white house's approach to national

security does not instill confidence and seems more questionable than ever in the face of the muscular new challenges on the scene. are they up for the job, the national security team? are there folks out there that are questioning it? >> i think the questions do surround susan rice much more than they do chuck hagel. we were speaking about this particular aspect of hagel's views, but in the case of susan rice, look, she was not someone who was seen as a natural national security adviser. it was kind of a consolation prize. the president want herd to be secretary of state because of her performance during the whole pen ghazi saga, where what she said on tv. was questioned again and again and again. a number of senators came out against the process of her being secretary of state and so the president decided to make her national security adviser, i would not require confirmation, but that doesn't mean she was necessarily ideally suited for it. there's some questions about her

temperament, certain irracibilit why. you hear from house services chairman buck mckinnon, couldn't get a meeting with her after he spent time abroad meeting with foreign leaders in the middle east. so, there's a sense that the coordination job, the job of outreach so close to the hill and to other agencies like the dod and in terms of consulting on policy, whether it's, for example, the decision on what to do about the authorization for the use of military force in iraq, which is still sort of middremid dre stream right now. one of the things i told and reported in that piece is that susan rice wrote a letter to john boehner, saying that the administration wanted to repeople the iraq aumf that had been its policy, before isis that letter was sent after isis took overs mosul. even in the dod people saying we don't want to do this anymore, we need authorization in iraq now. there is a sense that things have not been working smoothly on very, very important issues

that need to be decided in a decisive way. so the question is, is president obama going to shake up his team for the remainder of these two years? >> every indication is that, to the extent there will be any shakeup, it will be at lower levels, i don't think we are going to see chuck hagel replaced. i don't think we're going to see susan rice replaced. you know, tony lincoln who is the deputy national security adviser is going over to become deputy secretary of state. um, but -- but obama has proved to be a president who does not like to fire people at all. i mean, really even less than other previous presidents. so, no, i don't expect that we will see that. but there have been, you know, calls around town, if you will, columnists like david ignatius, the "washington post," suggesting there's going to be some fresh blood. we don't know it hasn't played out yet. still only a few weeks away from the election loss. but i think obama probably feels

since then that he has done pretty well and he immediately went off to china, he signed this climate deal with the chinese. there is a sense that isis at least is being contained now, they are not doing as well in terms of their military advances they were and it may well be the president saying to himself, the criticism was way over the top. i think my team's doing okay now. we may not see those changes. >> we will go to erin first in fort drum, new york. hi, aaron. >> caller: thank you for having me. my question is how is it that president obama does not want to send boots to the ground while isis seems to be rapidly spreading throughout the middle east? i mean, to me, it seems like we should be sending troops over there to confront them rather than confront them from 10,000 feet in the air? thank you. >> well, i mean, in some respects, this is a fake debate, because there are already about 3,000 u.s. troops there on the

ground. the president is saying many are not "combat troops," many in a advisory capacity. in reality, many of them are in dangerous way there. you know, it depends on how you want to define combat. it gets a little silly. but clearly, this represents a bias, if you will, it represents a view of the president and his defense secretary that to the extent we are going to have troops over there it's going to be the absolute minimum. now, martin determine circumstance the joint chiefs chairman, just went over there on a surprise visit this past weekend to assess the situation a i haven't done the reporting on this yet, but there's reason to think that there's a real sort of tug-of-war going on between the pentagon, between dempsey and the white house, do we need more? how many more, where should they go? you know and i think that there's bound to be at some point, a combat casualty an then the debate will really pick up. >> general dempsey sort of

alluding to that last week when he was up on the hill with secretary hagel and his testimony that, you know, there might be a sort of a different advisement to the president about this strategy, come from him and others. >> right. dempsey has been hinting at this for weeks, saying, almost immediately after the white house said, you know, we are not sending troops, we are not putting boots on the ground, dempsey saying i might advise him that we have to do that. so you have seen this play out now over several week and i expect it to continue. >> talking about national security challenges for the president. phone lines are open. democrat, 202-585-3880. republican, 202-580-3881. end pep dent, 202-585-3882. let go to james in lexington, kentucky, independent. hi, james. >> caller: hi, how are you doing today? >> morning. >> caller: my question is concerning the security of the

outbreak of ebola. it seems much talk about it in this country but i have family in zimbabwe and the congo and it seems there that their magazines are more inept trying to convince people that ebola is real. they have songs about it they have a song for the youth. they have a song for the adults. yet, here, they are telling us that people are dying by the thousands and if the message to us, by the thousands, and they are actually living where they're dying by the thousands, why are the messages so different? and is it -- >> michael hirsch, if you have got some thoughts on that. >> yeah, i think that obviously, it still is a terrible tragedy that is under way in africa. i think that sort of the fear and focus here has been reduced in the last faw weeks because, in fact, it hasn't spread. the couple of people that did contract it here, those nurses,

have been cured, as was the doctor in new york who contracted it. for the most part, after a somewhat rocky beginning, it seems as if these containment procedures, you know, have been effective. i agree with the caller though this is not gonna go away. remember, we still have a large contingent of u.s. troops that are over there that are helping to contain the disease. we hope that their containment procedures when they get back here are effective, you know, so there are still questions about it. and, you know, obviously, this policy is ongoing in terms of trying to treat it there in africa. dr. tom freiden on capitol hill just yesterday talking about the ebola here and abroad. it is seem like an issue by this administration and others. why? >> i think it goes back to the issues of how disease can undermine readiness. goes back to, you know, the anthrax attacks right after 9/11. the question of biological weapons. i mean, not that this is a weapon, but could it potentially

be used as one at some point if it fell in the wrong hands and since we have the department of homeland security kind of covering, you know, umbrella-like, all of those issues, including this one, it's thrown in the same basket. >> morehead, minnesota, mel, democratic caller. hi, mel. >> caller: i would like to -- i'm 80 years old, almost 86. i served in korea and i served in vietnam and i can't understand how people can get on there. i worked on a g 2 and s 1. i can't understand how anyone can undermine the government for trying to weed out all these wheezeles to come here to cut their cotton picking heads off. people get on there and talk about hagel. he served in vietnam. people get on here and talk about they don't do this and they don't that. i can't understand how anyone can knock their own country, subliminal messages coming out like snowden, he is a traitor, is my opinion. >> so the lack of unity around a

president when it comes to threats from terrorists or other countries. i'm not sure if the caller was referring to people in the media who question him or -- but, yeah, i think that, look, these are the kind of questions that arise in the media, we are obligated to report it. you know, for example -- hagel -- >> those questions themselves though. you know, some people say we need to get around -- behind our president, you know, we have don't behind other presidents who have taken on these challenges. >> i think in the immediate aftermath of the isis takeover, then particularly the horrific beheadings of those two american journalists, there was unity around the president. there was a, you know, expression out of the republican house, refused the president almost everything else they were gonna back and they did back, you know, his mission to supply and arm the iraqi army and kurdish reb