history with top college professors delving into america's past, and our new series each ring archival government and educational films from the 1930's through 1970's. by the cable tv industry and funded by your local cable or satellite writer. watch us on >> the siege of petersburg was a series of battles around petersburg, virginia lasting more than nine months from june 1864 into the spring of 1865. petersburg was crucial to the supply lines of confederate general robert e lee's army. union forces under ulysses s. grant repeatedly attacked and attempted to outflank the entrenched rebels, finally gaining an advantage that led to a confederate retreat, and days later, lee's surrender. richard somers takes us into the

minds of each commanding general. he argues that the siege was unique in military history and discusses how the conflict brought about the end of the war. this talk is about an hour. >> ladies and gentlemen, on behalf of the director of the u.s. army educational center and the entire staff of the u.s. army heritage and educational center, and the u.s. army war college, welcome to the third lecture of our series. the u.s. army war college sponsors the series to provide an historical dimension to the exercise of generalship, strategic leadership, and war fighting institutions of power. we would like to extend a warm thank you to the army heritage center foundation for their support and everything we do. please be aware that the book for tonight is on sale in the gift shop, and we will have a book signing directly after the lecture.

all proceeds go to the foundation to support the growth of the army -- the army heritage and education center. our speaker is dr. richard somers. he is a native of indiana and obtained his bachelor's degree in history from the carleton college in northfield, minnesota. he earned his doctorate in history at rice university in 1970. him rightrmy employed here at carlisle barracks, making him the last chartered organization -- member of the organization to be hired. 1997ld the position until and served in various capacities until his retirement in 2014. the doctor was a professor of andtary history in 2007 2008 and continues to teach courses at the u.s. army war college. he has made numerous television

appearances, addressed audiences across the nation, and has presented three times prior to tonight. dr. summers has written over 100 books, articles, entries, and reviews primarily on the civil war and is a distinguished member of many historical organizations, including the society of civil war historians and the civil war trust. i present dr. richard somers. [applause] >> thank you, carl. it is a pleasure to be back home . in devoting 43 years of my professional career here, i can never leave. it is always a part of me. i'm so happy to be able to share in our perspectives in military

history presentation tonight. in this 150th anniversary season petersburg, if would like to talk about richmond redeemed enduring lessons in leadership from the siege of petersburg. the siege proved one of the longest operations of the civil war, some nine and a half months from june of 1864 to april of 1865. it pitted two of the greatest generals in american history directly against each other. robert e lee and ulysses s. grant. it was waged by two of the finest armies of americans that have ever been raised, the resilient federal army of the potomac and the hard-hitting confederate army of northern virginia.

those were the antagonists, which had grappled for the entire war, were reinforced with several newer armies that have been created only in 1864. serving in those armies were senior subordinates who had pretty -- figured prominently likether battles gettysburg and antietam, which are so familiar to all of us here tonight. these officers include such prominent northern commanders as george g meade, winfield scott hancock, and david and greg, and such senior southern sword -- soldiers as richard s you will and ap health. -- prelude,ayer you siege summarize the before we assess it.

petersburg, virginia, situated on the right bank of the appomattox river 20 miles due south of richmond, was militarily important in its own right as the 10th largest city of the confederacy. the head of navigation on the appomattox, as the site of the confederate states led works, which manufacture of bullets for lee. the strategic significance of petersburg lay in logistics. how fitting isn't that the u.s. army's center is now situated at and ourst of petersburg new director colonel hardy kate -- came to us from the logistics center at fort lee? throughout the civil war, petersburg functioned as the rail center for richmond.

from northeast, southeast, south and west, railroads ran to the city. railroade, a single continued north to the confederate capital. ff from southside virginia, armaments from the ports along the lower atlantic coast, salt and lead from southwestern virginia, and most vitally, reinforcements all funneled through petersburg to richmond. only one other railroad running southwest through danville and the carolina piedmont connected the capital with the rest of the confederacy. efending petersburg was crucial to defending richmond itself. capturing the city would comparably cripple the capital. .

the first three years of the civil war, danger remained masterful lee's generalship kept the union far from the rail center. ulysses s. grant changed all of that. by the spring of 1864, grant served as general in chief of the entire united states army. as eastern theater commander and as commander of what i like to anl army group grant, admittedly anachronistic term which i will nonetheless use because it so accurately conveys the reality that he commanded a group of armies. capacities,ese grant carried the war from central virginia to the vicinity of richmond. in 30 days of almost incessant fighting, from the battle of the wilderness on may 5 and sixth,

to the battle of cold harbor on he compelled the confederates to concede there forward position and confronted them with the construction of the close and can find coverage of their capital. in a daring southward strike in mid-june, grant crossed the chickahominy river, crossed the andty james river itself, attacked the capitals crucial communication center, petersburg. his leading core overran the outer defenses but did not capture the cockade city i tself. toeral fair on -- failure saved theopportunity city.

a grand assault by the unionists on june 18 was bloodily repulsed. even worse disaster befell the yankees less than a week later in their efforts to cut confederate communication south of the cockade city. those dual defeats on june 18 , 23rd and the mobile warfare of spring that had carried of the armies from the rapid than river to the appomattox. stagnated, operations into the slowness of summer, and the siege of petersburg began. this siege was not tactical. parallels and other facets that type of five european siege warfare.

the infamous battle of the crater on july 30 was an aberration, totally uncharacteristic of the siege, yet petersburg unquestionably was a siege. on the higher planes of operations, strategy, and grand strategy. in essence, grant used the siege to fix the gray coats in place at petersburg and richmond, thus to deny lee the operational and strategic initiative, which the virginian have used to such advantage in 1862 and 1863. camp's great entrenched closed in on petersburg from the east where fort lee now is. with its incessant shelling and

, they created an ongoing threat, which the southerners could not ignore. more dangerous were the attacks, some of them two-pronged, some of them first strike, which grant launched from the security of that camp against undermanned positions north of james river and against vulnerable supply .ines south of petersburg nine such attacks, which i have theed offensive, punctuated nine and a half months of the siege. most were marked by mobile field battles in the open rather than by assaults on well defended positions. the most significant strikes were the fourth offensive in mid-august, which cut the vital weldon railroad linking petersburg to the blockade runners ports on the lower atlantic coasts, the fifth

offensive in late september, the subject of my book "richmond which nearly compels lead to abandon petersburg and made richmond in the greatest danger of capture by a field army the city ever face until she was occupied without resistance in april of 1865. another major one was the eighth offensive in early february, which extended the federal left , and the hatcher's run ninth offensive in late march, which finally netted both petersburg and richmond. overnight, april 2 and third, 1865, lee abandoned petersburg, abandoned his james river defenses, abandoned his capital of health for a last desperate

flight toward north carolina, but north carolina proved too far away. the federal forces were to advantageously positioned. the butternut brigades had been too badly battered throughout the course of the siege. one week to the day after the final fighting at petersburg came appomattox. by the spring of 1865, indeed, ever since late 1864, the siege had assumed strategic dimensions . grant made this clear in his letter on december 18 to his trusted subordinate and friend william t sherman, who had just completed his devastating march to the sea. thewn opinion, wrote to general in chief -- now we are quoting general grant -- my only a penny and is a versatile and

if thevirginia and cause of the south is lost, he wants richmond to be the last place surrendered. it may be such views, well to indulge him until we get everything else in our hands. this siege thus became a strategic tool for fixing the southerners in place in the old dominion while philip h sheridan and george h thomas devoured the rest of the confederacy. hadarch of 1865, sherman shoved the western theater all the way from tennis the -- tennessee deep into north carolina, while in the eastern theater, lee remained pinned at petersburg. that is the essence of a strategic siege.

there the nine and a half months of the siege have been summarized in just nine and a half minutes, but i'm not done. battlesous mobile field that marched each offensive are fascinating. many in our audience and viewing on c-span have heard me speak on one or another of those battles. here tonight, however, in the army war college community, the focus should not be technical but operational and strategic. it let me then suggest some enduring lessons in strategic leadership derived from the , ane of petersburg operation lasting nine and a half month proclaims perseverance, both its prizes

and its pitfalls. grant's bulldog tenacity in grabbing hold of the army of northern virginia in the wilderness of spotsylvania and never letting go all the way through petersburg to appomattox is one of the greatest hallmarks of his generalship. just what did this tenacity, this perseverance and tail at petersburg? part of it, it seemed, involved fixing the southerners in place tactically, operationally, and strategically. such fixing in place did not come easily. time and again in the mobile field battles south of petersburg and north of james river, grant was defeated tactically. managed to weave

such setbacks into operational and strategic success. he achieved such success. despite those battlefield setbacks because he remained undaunted. his call, quiet confidence in himself gave him the determination to keep up the struggle. o his assurance in his own mind of ultimate federal victory in the siege and in the him the ability to press ahead despite temporary setbacks. together, such self-confidence and such certainty of success produced military peace of mind, which freed him from doubt,

fear, anxiety, and torment that had vexed so many other army commanders and which thus enabled him to focus on succeeding in the siege and on winning the war. within such military peace of mind, grant was neither arrogant nor bullheaded. an even greater hallmark of his strategic leadership than tenacity was his ability to learn and apply the lessons of experience. him a faculty had won victory at vicksburg. it also produced the prize of petersburg. when he perceived that frontal attacks, which had worked so well in the western theater, brought only heavy casualties in the east, culminating in the disastrous repulse of june 18 in

the first battle of petersburg, grant explicitly forbade such ,ssaults against well defended fortified positions. he launched no further such attacks throughout the siege until the final onslaught of april 2. experiencen demonstrated that sequential two-pronged strikes on both sides of james river were not working, he progressively altered the timing of those stripes until, by late october, they became simultaneous. when simultaneous strikes too failed, he again adjusted his tactics to massive first strikes by his left south of the cockade city. such first strikes carried him to hatcher's run in february and

carried him into petersburg and richmond in april. the only was not senior leader to display perseverance at petersburg. his confederate counterpart also showed tenacity in holding that -- thatand richmond city and richmond. lee understood their practical significance to the southern war effort and cause, and he fought to save those cities. thought is the key concept. supinely in his trenches awaiting bluecoat attacks. when they left their defenses of the entrenched camp to attack him, he left his defenses to attack them. although he never again controlled the strategic initiative, which remained in

grants hands, the great confederate commander repeatedly challenged the yankees for control of the operational and tactical initiatives. the ensuing battles were not static, set piece struggles of attack and defense but fluid, mobile field battles that raged up and down the ground in which sperior --onists' superior knowledge of the terrain helped them halted the union advance. counterattacking attackers .ffers obvious advantages it even more significantly, those counterattacks reflect lee's approach to warfare. he did not equate probable disadvantage with certain loss but rather strove to redirect to the military situation to his

advantage by way of contrast. joe johnston in georgia when , andtened with fallback when threatened again, he would fall back, and when threatened again, he still fallback. he did not fall back. leave back -- leave fought back. abandonprepared to petersburg on september 30 if necessary to save richmond, yet he did not yield to such likely danger but battled back and .aved both cities through such biting tenacity, oh the security of his supply lines, his army, and his country for another nine. came, end, he eventually

and all was lost. the greatcoat held onto petersburg for too long. i do not blame leave for this decision or this outcome. he did not become general in chief of all confederate armies until february of 1865. too late to affect the course of the war. the decision to remain in richmond rested with the .overnment as a professional soldier of the confederate republic, lee loyally carried out government policy. there is an aspect of peace are lee may however, where be criticized. unlike grant who learned from experience, the virginian continued fighting in ways that had worked well earlier in the war but were no longer applicable in the mid-1864.

unlike at chancellorsville, his counterattacks at petersburg almost never drove the union strike force from the field. stopped they simply force short subjective. -- short of its objective. counterattacks failed to overcome the confederates. instead, they simply produced mounting confederate casualties with no corresponding conquest. for lee at petersburg, the old ways no longer worked. generalshipks of characterized the exercise of command by lee and grant at petersburg. yet with armies ranging from approximately 50,000 to 60,000 secessionists, and from

100,000-120,000 bluecoats, the two commanders obviously could not control everything themselves but had to rely on senior subordinates. here too late lessons in leadership. both commanding generals worked with and through their senior subordinates, not around or despite them. they accorded those responsible subordinates latitude to exercise the responsibilities of their office. as theater commander and army group commander, the illinois in focused on strategy and left operations and tactics with core commanders. army of the potomac commander mead retained grants respect, although the two generals never

became close personally. the other yankee army commander was -- benjamin f butler the quintessential political general of the union army. despite butler's many shortcomings as a field commander, grant recognized both the massachusetts man's talents and also understood the necessity of working with such an influential politician. not until butler finally discredited himself with the powder boat fiasco in december of 1864 did the general in chief at last have grounds for removing the insubordinate subordinate. butler's successor was the able professional soldier and were ordered for whom fred would later be named, who had earned grants respect and friendship in the western theater. likede the illinoisan

board, he tolerated the junior officers quaint conceits. such antics by other senior subordinates usually cost them grant's respect and therefore their command. william f smith, william t h brooks, and quincy adams gilmore were all relieved of their core commands when they demanded actions or promotions that grant was unwilling to grant them. john given almost suffered the same fate and much more tragically by the final hours of the siege. have so drained the reservoir of good will that he had earned on little round top that neither need nor grant would save him from the philipble wrath of sheridan. sheridan's practice of summarily removing generals on the field of battle was a typical -- a

typical. 'sre characteristic was grant practice of avoiding wholesale housecleanings of subordinates and instead. orand isntead working with through them before they either succeeded or discredited themselves with either their ineptitude or overweening ambition. command style was similar. earlier in the war to be sure, he had cleansed the army of northern virginia of senior subordinates who had not measured up. i the time petersburg was besieged, however, the terrible attrition of general officers reduced him to working with and through those who remained. by then, the great stonewall jackson and chad stewart were and james long street had

been severely wounded. lee's subordinates was beauregard, but he departed on september 23, and soon thereafter, was put in command of the western theater. a month later, the able long street returned to duty. , wadethe newcomers hampton and john b gordon proved promising, but richard h anderson was disappointed. then richard s you will and ap hill had never lived up to expectations. indeed, just before the army's besieged petersburg, you'll was was eased out of field command and put in charge of the department of richmond. by then, the capital was no backwater. there you will rendered his most

significant contribution by saving the capital from federal attack on december 29. subordinates are able or not, they are the tools with which senior leaders must work. the chain of command, moreover, runs upward as well as downward. one of the greatest strengths of both commanders was they understood the proper relationship between the uniformed general in chief and the constitutional commander-in-chief in a republic at war. they worked with president lincoln and president davis, certainly not against them.

ande great generals burned retained the respect of the chief executives and thus were accorded the latitude to apply their professional abilities in service to their embattled nations. to what their success became a beauregard, joe johnson, george mcclellan, and many other commanders who constantly quarreled with their respective governments and thus reinkept on close lane -- or marginalized. this ability to work with the president comes through clearly in the following correspondence between grant and lincoln in mid july of 1864. in my opinion, wrote the lieutenant general, there ought to be an immediate call for say

300,000 men to be put in the field in the shortest possible time. it grant that specified many benefits from increasing the fighting force. finally, he summarized, the greater number of men we have, the shorter and less sanguinary will be the war. yet he did not stop but went on i give clear that -- this entirely as my views and not in any spirit of dictation. always holding myself in readiness to use material given to me to the best advantage i .now how the following day, the president replied. yours of yesterday about a call for 300,000 is received.

i suppose you have not seen the call for 500,000 made the day before in which, i suppose, covers the case. [laughter] always grant to have your suggestions. [laughter] so close and so effective for were the bonds that link and not only welcome to grant's suggestions but also engaged in a little harmless humor about them. not that war was a laughing matter, but that the two men were close enough to share a smile as they together strove for success. that exchange not only underscores their effective working relations. it also provides other lessons in strategic leadership. grant recognized the benefit of , anding overwhelming force

he realized that the north possessed such power potentially. lay inat talent understanding how to convert advantages into achievements. get all the while, he did not demand perfection. unlike some senior leaders who insisted on waiting until everything was perfectly arranged and bus often waited grant was willing to give it a try with whatever resources were at hand. those resources often sufficed to produce positive results. liked the results and the attitude of the general who was always willing to act. too was willing to act but

under much different circumstances. he knew that the south had fewer soldiers and fewer resources, and he realized that time was not on his side. he could not wait for perfection of positions, powers, and plans, for they remained unattainable. he instead tried to make his own perfection in outcomes by seizing strategic and operational initiatives or by resting it from the yankees. and 1863, he often managed to achieve such results. by the time that petersburg was thesiege, grant controlled strategic and operational initiative, and lee was reduced to fending off federal offenses. as we consider grant and

lee and their senior subordinates, it is important that we not mistake them for the magnificent monuments that grace our national battlefields and our public places today, the statues of need and hancock, lee and long street, grant looking down the national mall in washington, or wade hampton in columbia, south carolina. those giant sculptures of bronze and marble honor the generals, but they are not the generals. the generals themselves, we must always keep in mind, were real, live human beings with varying degrees of the qualities, noble and a global -- ignoble. honor, and heroism and

to be sure, but also rivalry and jealousy and resentment and bitterness and vindictiveness. by the time that the armies reached petersburg in mid-june of 1864, the soldiers were exhausted physically and over sixically from weeks of incessant fighting and .arching and fighting yet again so were their commanders during the hot, dry, seemingly ceaseless siege. mead flared among need -- and his division commanders, and among federal division commanders, as well. such strife certainly effective command relations and also sometimes affected operations. such personal animosity is not confined to petersburg, to the

civil war, or to all times. -- golden times. it can flare up today and tomorrow. senior strategic leaders need to recognize that reality and to be prepared to deal with it. understanding human dimensions of high command is just one lesson from the siege. , weaving tactical setbacks into strategic success, adapting flexibility of methods to purpose, not yielding to possible threats but fighting back against the odds, displaying strategic vision, converting advantages into achievements, functioning effectively within chains of aboard, downward, and

laterally. all of these are enduring lessons in leadership from the siege of petersburg when richmond was redeemed. i thank you. [applause] >> ladies and gentlemen, we are going to do a few questions now. i will start on this side. if you have a question, please raise your hand. we do have quite a few people, so please limit yourself to one question at a time. start us off. here we go. just a question about lee's strategic division. you commented on the fact he had a strategic division, but could it also not be the case that by

1864, he knew that the south lost? there wasn't an opportunity in 1863.fensives of if he had strategic vision, perhaps as a leader, he should have encouraged his president to pursue peace earlier than april of 1865? any thoughts on that? >> thank you, jeff. that's an excellent question. thatnk it is pretty clear well along into the siege lee the causealize that of the south is lost. i don't think he had reached that decision in the spring or summer or even often of 1864. lee was fighting back and fighting very effectively to maintain his position and to keep up the struggle.

there are so many indications that the confederates themselves did not realize their grand strategic peril. talking about the whole civil war now -- on it was too late. even when sherman had cut loose from atlanta for his march theugh georgia, confederates really didn't know where he was going, whether he was headed east towards charleston, south to tallahassee, southwest to mobile. it turns out he went southeast to savannah, and it is not surprising that the confederates didn't know because even the federal planners did not know, and their logisticians had supplied positions all along the coast that wherever sherman struck at blue water he could be resupplied. once sherman made his march and

captured savannah on december 21, the confederates were still not sure what he was going to do next, and they positioned their forces all around him to include south of savannah to guard against the danger that he might march against thomasville, the railhead in southern georgia, or to liberate andersonville, or perhaps to threaten tallahassee. it really wasn't until he moved north through the carolinas that it became clear to the enrichment how dire was their peril. i don't think lee or anyone else foresaw that danger as early as any point in 1864, and that he is continuing to do his duty to bravely and honorably uphold the struggle.

other questions or comments? >> thank you very much for a fine presentation. i have a question about leadership, which you just touched upon. late in the civil war, and i don't know exactly then, ulysses grant was given the authority to promote general officers in the field subject to confirmation by the united states senate. i assume that that authority came to him through lincoln and stanton and probably the senate. , know you probably do know but it was by that method that chamberlain achieved brigadier general. were there any other officers so

promoted by grant in the field, and do you know throughout the course of american history if any commanding general was given such authority besides grant? -- general lee in effect had that power. the appointment power rests with the president. the senate's role is to confirm presidential appointments, and that is both the appointment by grade to be of brigadier general or a major general, and also, core command and army and department command were considered presidential appointments. several officers throughout the course of the siege of petersburg, certainly not chamberlain alone, but it's always consistent with the basic government practice of heating

recommendations of officers in the field as to whom they wanted as their senior subordinates. not every officer that grant was provided to him. it is very interesting that at erupted inbilation the shenandoah valley in july and then remained a threat and the lower shenandoah valley gone even burning chambersburg, pennsylvania on july 30, the officer whom grant wanted to put in charge to deal with the threat posed by general early was none other than william b franklin. performanceklin's

at outcomes landing, his performance at cranston's cap, fredericksburg, his performance in the red river campaign, all short of the high expectations accorded to franklin going into the civil war, grant who had never actually served with franklin during the war nonetheless had high confidence in his ability, but there had been a time when they had been together. that was at the u.s. military academy when franklin was the number one graduate in grant's class, and i have to think that cadet sam grant is still looking up to the number one man in his class. washingtont may be, denied him that promotion, and said, franklin just will not do for this position. his next choice was general mead

, to give him a more independent command that he enjoyed as an executive officer within grant's army group, but then something happened. i'm not entirely sure what. it might have been the battle of the crater, which ended the career of general burnside, but did not present mead in a favorable light. mead is no longer in the picture after july, and the command is finally entrusted to philip h sheridan. sheridan was not the first choice for that command. he was the third choice. that was a case where grant did not get his first course -- choice. wherely one of the cases the north was well served by franklin not being put in command.

thank you. to follow-up up on your discussion of the animosities and rivalry that took place just before the siege of petersburg, as i understand it, that happened on both sides. >> very much so. listen toard had lee beauregard in the beginning, rather than doubting him. same thing with the northern advances initially before the siege took place. it was just a total lack of cooperation and even follow up. some of that is attributed to the battle of the crater. everybody was fatigued and what have you. beauregard was still trying to overcome some bad press early on. do you support that? >> to a considerable extent.

not so much bad press, but his bad command relations with richmond, president davis, secretary of war sedin, the nominal general in chief braxton bragg. there had always been a certain healthy rivalry between lee and beauregard as two very bright engineers on winfield scott's staff in the mexican war, as two superintendents of the military wasemy, although beauregard stopped in taking that position by the outbreak of the war. lee washe confederacy, the third ranking general and beauregard was the fifth ranking general, but the real problem was the bad relations -- this underscored another point that i made -- no matter how good beauregard was, and i think he

was the second-best army commander in the confederacy after lee. stonewall jackson might have proved to be a great army commander, but he was never given that chance with a real field army. among the officers entrusted with army command, i would put beauregard close behind lee. thatig difference is beauregard is constantly feuding with richmond and feuding with braxton bragg, and thereby, he is nullifying his ability to bring his great talents to the theice of the confederacy same way that mcclellan and rosencrantz and other union generals by feuding with washington reduced or nullified their ability to serve the united states in the war.

as to the exhaustion, certainly cold harbor is the culmination, but i would suggest it's really the almost incessant fighting that begins on may 5 in the wilderness and continues through battle of the first the weldon railroad that just wears out the armies physically and psychologically. grant recognizes this, and that is one reason that petersburg becomes the siege and that he doesn't continue always moving by his left flank in the mobile warfare that had carried the armies all the way from culpepper county down to prince george and dinwiddie county's at dinwiddie county at petersburg. andterms fatigue

psychological exhaustion were not known to military medicine in the mid-19th century, but that is not to say the conditions did not exist. they just were not recognized. this is an important part in frame the tempers and leading to be feuding and animosity among commanders. joe, when you get a microphone -- >> your presentations are always stimulating. you did a great job on npr this morning. a question on grant's strategy campaign,he overland and yeah, i understand something about combat stress -- he sat himself down at petersburg for nine and a half months. the army couldn't restore itself within a month or so and just go back. lee was just hanging on by his toenails. changement on grant''s

in strategy besides what you just said earlier? >> good questions, joe. the army of the potomac would restore itself, but it would take much more than a month to do it. ofreally took the winter with the relatively reduced pace of activity -- there were two offensives, one in december, one in february, but really, the armies could rest essentially over that winter and regain their fighting tone. some of the officers and soldiers who had been wounded earlier in the war or even 1864 campaign, and i regard the operations from april of60 -- 1864 to

1865 as a unity campaign. officers returned to duty. also, the new regimens that were being raised under this call for 500,000, which lincoln and grant had their little laugh in mid july -- this began to produce vast numbers of troops. not 500,000 but large numbers of troops started arriving at the petersburg front in mid-september and would continue on through october into early november. here in pennsylvania, we think of the series of troops from the 198 to the 211th that would come .own

we all know about the raw troops at first bull run who fought but could not stand under the pressure of a day's fighting. we so close to antietam, so many of us have visited there, know regiments in the army of the potomac that had only been in uniform for a few weeks when they were thrown into the maelstrom at south mountain and antietam. to july ofreserved 1861 or september of 1862 to have this effect on raw troops. it is a universal truth throughout the entire civil war that raw troops need time to train, and sometimes, the most healthy and tempering training comes by being bullied --

bloodied in battle. in the sixth offensive, a lot of regimens that had just reached the front in early october and were thrown into action in late october broke and ran just like the troops at antietam and first bull run. they needed time. it's not to say that they were cowards or that they were poor material. they just needed time. 1865, they hadf had the time and experience to proved to be effective soldiers. there is also the matter of individual replacements. there is a misunderstanding that is often told about the civil -- shall i use a modern term -- army force generation -- fundamentally different between the union and confederacy.

the south would put individual replacements into existing units, whereas the north would raise entirely new units. there is certainly some truth in those two statements but not entirely. the yankees began putting many individual replacements into existing units starting after gettysburg can be late summer 1863,rly autumn of continuing through the rest of the war. some of these men were called up in response to the national conscription. more were called out in response to the increased bounties that were being offered. there's nothing wrong with an .onest enlistment bonus there is something terribly wrong with bounty jump. much lower caliber of individuals were brought forward

to be put into these regiments in response to these various recruitment efforts that would change the tone of those regiments. a new england yankee regiment received a great influx of german recruits fresh off the boat in september of 1864. who hadre not the 48ers a great commitment to liberty in germany and carried their german liberalism and sense of liberty over to the united states and lived in our country for a dozen years and identified with northern cause, or in a few cases, the southern cause. a were fresh off the boat. they could speak german, but they couldn't speak english. the officers couldn't speak german. it was very difficult to communicate, and the commander

of that regiment in one of the battles we cover in "richman "richmond reading" said, we stood there when the confederates attacked and really could not contribute anything and would have been justified in leaving the field except for the obvious propriety of sharing the casualties with everybody else. well, that is not the way to win a battle, but that is often the consequence of this type of individual replacement. again, another great new england fighting regiment, the fifth new hampshire, the regiment of edward cross, about which of bruce kettner writes so eloquently at the sunken road, the bloody lane at antietam where colonel cross gives his life by charging across the by 1860 four, the

fifth new hampshire had to be stuck inside a readout with a different regiment guarding the gate to make sure that the regiment did not desert en ma sse. so much had been filled up with these replacements lacking commitment to the war effort, in contrast to the original glory on who had won the peninsula and at antietam and gettysburg. to the extent is individual replacements have any merit, they need time to learn soldiering, and it took a good while to create this condition for them. , they toofederates continued to put individual replacements into their ranks.

new confederate units were being raised late in the war, and there weren't a whole lot of them in backwater areas to be brought to the front either. upre's actually a large call of individual replacements that come to the confederates in to aer of 1864 in response bill and order from the war department that would use slaves and reservists, these reservists being >> they would use these to take over con description and con scription. able-bodied men, who

were performing these important rear to free them up to join the forces at the front. so, if you look at the roles of lee's army, it is actually october,at the end of despite all of its casualties in battles, stronger than it is at the end of september, because these individuals have joined it. but some men, who were perfectly guardingbe the soldier enforcingle prison or scripton weren't at all happy trenches of thersburg, richmond, where cannonballs were exploding and the sharpshooter's were flying.

the first dark night they mitt t hills,ly head for the the hill country of appalachia great haven for people who had escaped from -- fled from military service, deserters. and until such time as they made ther getaway, they spread cancer of their lack of anditment among the good faithful soldiers who remained. on the subject of desertion, in summer, early autumn of dynamicere is almost a equilibrium of confederates deserting to the union army and thenists deserting to confederate army. the confederates would put out in many languages, inviting these new individual theacements to come over to

confederacy. all of that begins to change in 1864.vember of on november 8, president lincoln is overwhelmingly reelected. peace democrats, the copperheads, are completely repudiated by the northern people. it becomes unmistakenly clear that there will be four more unrelenting war. and one week to the day, after reelection of lincoln, general sherman cuts loose from thenta for his march to sea, which devastates much of the interior of georgia. these two fundamental of theo the psyche confederate war effort, gray coatsy the greatly increases over defections from the union lines. joe, thank you for that question.

please. please. >> we have time for one more. >> i'll promise a -- i won't though.a quick answer, [laughter] >> good evening. you talked about the -- can you about the nature of the presidentsetween the of the union and their military officers? lee and davis and lincoln and grant. thank you. >> thank you, chuck. extremely important, these relations. constitutional prescription -- we all know it's in the u.s. constitution. verbatime same wording vary in the confederate's constitution. be commander shall in chief of the army, navy, of the united states, and of the states.of the

by constitutional prescription, the president has the right to involve himself in the war effort. not evenesident, george washington, who certainly during thedibility whiskey rebellion, wants to theme field command of army. the presidents want to work through the generals and admirals in charge of our armed forces. understanding the proper relationships, striking some of thelance, great war presidents we've had franklin d. roosevelt very good balance. other presidents, like polk or johnson, don't strike such a good balance but they have the right to involve themselves. good generals understand that and work with their

presidents. and both grant and lee understood this. and it was one of their greatest one of thend principal reasons why the presidents accorded those the latitude to apply behalf oft ability in their respective nations, whereas you can go all the way and lookinfield scott at joe johnston and mcclellan many civil war generals, to and mccrystal,n in our own time, to see what happens to able professional men who set themselves against their own government. there's only going to be one outcome, a situation like that. there should be only one outcome. and the professional military in the army here war college community, the future strategy leaders of our

forces, understand that of thenship and it's one greatest insights that military to our affords professional military education today, which is one of the ofsons why history is one the enduring themes here at the army war college. and so that i might not be an enduring theme here all night -- [laughter] >> -- i'll thank you for this opportunity to have spoken to you. [applause] watching american history tv. holidayso featured on hoil and during congressional recesses. historian discusses george washington's relationship arnold.edict

he looks at how washington's response to the failed plan to to britisht point offers insights into washington's leadership and character. that's today here on c-span 3. a new magnaer 6, carta exhibit opened at the library of congress in where a 1215.c. copy of the magna carta went on 800thy for the anniversary of the document's creation. king john originally signed the from hisunder pressure barons at runnymede, england. american revolutionaries look to the rights guaranteed by the magna carta as they rebelled against the english crown. princess anne was part of the ceremony. this program runs about 45 minutes. >> good morning. 13th librarian of congress. it's