assuming that the administration is able to convince democratic senators that it will do the right thing with iran, what it probably also, i would think should do is say to democrats, look, you have to work with us to kill the bad bills. we will work with you in private to see if there is a good bill that you could come up with afterwards or that you could come up with to pull out of your pocket when you are in floor debate but in some ways to show that we are not adverse to any deal with congress, we are merely adverse to bad deals with congress. so i would think there would be some pressure to talk, to

explore possibilities for useful legislation. as i say, they won't be easy, but it is amazing how if you try you can come up with something. one of the things that has been impressive about u.s. negotiators with iran is how many good ideas they have come up with. and i would simply note to our audience that even david has come up with very interesting ideas that he slips in in the middle of paragraphs in his testimony. for example, when he testified last week before the house he said a sounder strategy involves including disablement steps with the destruction of a limited but carefully selected set of

equipment. for example, the deal could include the destruction of certain key equipment such as vowels and pressure or flow measuring equipment. what he was saying to the house committee was that if you want to reach a deal with iran that lowers the number of functioning centrifuges that doesn't mean that you have to destroy the centrifuges completely, rather you can destroy some critical parts of the centrifuges while leaving the shell and much of the inners still standing. that was a very interesting proposal. it's the kind of thing that i would guess, although i don't

know, our negotiators have been discussing with iranian negotiators. and one of the things i would hope for in the coming months is that if iran does not show more willingness to work out a deal that secretary kerry would relax his determination to keep everything secret and would instead be a little more open about how creative the p 5 plus 1 has been in the offers it has made to iran so that iran will realize that if the negotiations fall apart this spring and summer it won't look good for them. and i think we have to prepare the world for the possibility of

accepting that we are the good guys. >> i agree with that last point. if talks break down there is going to be a blame game and what we have seen over the last year is the current iranian team is very good at public diplomacy. many of them are western educated. they speak very good english. the negotiations are carried out in english these days. and they are going to make a strong case and they have been making a strong case and have been the reasonable party. i don't think they have been the reasonable party but i think much of the world has the impression that it is the p-5 plus one and the u.s. in particular that has been the intransigent party. i really think that is wrong and i think it would behoove the administration to begin getting the word out, especially if the

iranians continue to be rigid. so far the administration has taken the understandable view that we don't want to negotiate in public. so let's not put all of our ideas out there even if they are reasonable ideas that the iranians should have accepted. so this is a problem potentially in the future. and i think the administration will need to develop a good public diplomacy strategy. i think our panelists have put some interesting material before you given you plenty of thoughts for questions. so let's open it up now. please wait for the mic. identify yourself and ask a very concise question. your hand was up first. >> thanks very much.

i write the mitchell report. in one of the suggestions strikes me as parallel to daniel patrick moynihan's view of doing gun control, let them keep guns and stop producing bullets. i wonder if -- there are two very quick questions i would like to pose because i want to make sure i hear the answers. the first is has anyone actually ever seen and read the alleged from the supreme leader. and second, given that the supreme leader has spent the last quarter century creating a foreign policy that is focused on america as satan, is there --

has there ever been consideration given to having negotiations as they get to this point between iran and others that take place without u.s. at the table so that he doesn't have to give in to satan? >> anyone want to have anything to say? >> sure. i mean, my understanding is nobody has seen a written version of it but i'm sure iran will produce one for you at the right time if it is part of the deal. on your second question, the only way this negotiation will succeed if there is a deal between washington and teheran. there is no other possible formulation that will lead to an agreement because those are the principle antagonists on the issue. there is no proxy for the u.s.

to step in and negotiate a deal with iran. i think one of the positive developments since the joint plan of action was agreed is that we see more and more that most of the real negotiations are taking place on a bilateral context with the u.s. representing the p 5 plus 1 and convincing other members to support american initiatives and ideas but you can't negotiate at seven or eight. it is simply impossible to sit around the table with that many parties and do the kind of give and take that is necessary for negotiation. one positive if you are looking for positive signs, one positive sign is that the iranians have finally got over the hurdle of meeting directly with the united states expert to expert and working on text for most of president obama's first term when bob and i were drekly involved the iranians refused to meet with us. we offered many times to sit

down and actually negotiate or discuss the issues and they were under instructions to not meet with us. of course, how many says in public that i'm very skeptical that a deal is possible because i don't think americans will accept the nuclear program. he is right. the united states won't accept the nuclear program. >> i'm told there were even secret bilateral u.s. iranian talks even when he was president. between 2003 and 2005 the so-called e 3 met with iran without the united states. those talks didn't get very far which supports, i think, gary's point that the u.s. needs to be a key player.

i must admit that reading today's posts i'm not as optimistic about the next seven months as people on the panel might be, but given that if during the next seven months nothing happens further than what has happened so far what does the panel think beyond the u.s. -- we have talked about sanctions and so on -- but there is another party mainly israel who could take some sort of action. and what does the panel think would happen if we progressed to the next seven months, have not gone any further and what would the u.s. and what would israel

be doing at the end of that seven months? >> i want to make a general point that applies not only to your question but some of the comments of my fellow panelists. and that is the best answer to a lot of these questions is we don't know. we are operating under conditions of uncertainty and we would be better off accepting that uncertainty than trying to make predictions when frankly we don't have the basis on which to make them. but your question raises an interesting point that we haven't quite covered which is could the joint plan of action

become a steady state that exists into the indetermined future and would that be good or bad? my guess is my more expert colleagues if pressed to the wall will say we are not sure. and it's certainly a better state than we had before the joint plan of action but there is the risk that it will impede progress to a real deal because it's such an easy second best solution. and i think that some of our talk of increased sanctions is looking for a way to force a

decision on teheran's part that will leave us off of this surprisingly comfortable dead center. >> so i would say most of our partners with the possible exception of france are quite comfortable with the status quo because we have succeeded in freezing most elements of iran's nuclear program and preserved the overall sanctions regime. and i hear the same thing from some of our israeli friends. they recognize that the status quo while not solving the problem at least stopped the clock or slowed down the clock on iran's nuclear program. i think there is an argument to be made that an extension of the joint plan of action is at least holding the issue steady. but my sense and ed can speak to this, as well. my sense is in this town there is no patience for an endless extension into the indefinite

future unless you can demonstrate you are really making progress towards tackling some of the issues. i think the obama administration is operating in a political climate where it has to show forward movement. it can't just play out the clock for the rest of the administration keeping the status quo in place. >> as i said i think many israelis would not be that adverse to continuation of the status quo. >> i don't think -- i think one thing that i sensed to reinforce what ed said is i don't think outcomes are inevitable. washington is very polarized and hearing comments that if a deal breaks down it is war. i don't think those are true. i think the deal has some benefits to both sides. both sides have some real incentives not to see the escalation getting out of control. i think it is more likely that things will kind of -- if the deal ends that there will be

something that replaces it that is neither war nor situation with extreme sanctions. i think israel, you should look deeper into the israeli government than netanyahu to see what they are really thinking. i don't think they want to go to war. and they know that if they strike they can strike once and that's it. and iran can simply build back. so they know the dilemma that if you are going to pursue military strikes it has to be a part of a strategy that ends the program. they can't deliver that. i don't see a great incentive here in this country to back them up. >> and i might as well chime in, too. if talks break down and discontinued what would the israelis do? it will depend on what iran does. if they ratchet up their program

aggressively that will lead to a lot of concern. if they play smart which i think they will they will turn on machines that haven't been fed with gas. maybe they will increase at the margin. i think they will avoid highly provocative actions. if they do i think the israelis will be frustrated but i don't think they will see a compelling need to launch a military attack. yes. >> nuclear intelligence weekly. i have two questions. first, i think for you, bob, how much attention do you think the

united states might take towards working with the russians to try to work out more details of their agreement with the iranians if we are assuming that the goal here is to try to regularize the iranian nuclear program and give them some justification for some sort of commercial enrichment going forward? that's number one. and that i mean both the reactor deal but more importantly i suppose the fuel deal end of that deal which was pretty vague when the announcement was made. and secondly, how much scope is there, in your view, for the united states if the iranians and in my opinion if they were smart they would kind of say we have terrible machines and we need to get better machines so let's focus on rnd. we don't need capacity right now so give them that and look

further into the future. this has become such a point of symbolism that it is hard to do it. let's say they were willing to concede on capacity, how much scope is there for our side to concede on the duration of the agreement? >> i'll take a quick whack at it and the others will try. i was in moscow last weekend so i had an opportunity to speak to the russians about this. i think despite the real difficulties u.s. and russia are having in their bilateral relationship the russians have played a constructive role in the iran negotiations. it's been in their interests to play a constructive role. the russians don't want the iranians to develop an industrial scale enrichment capacity. russia would like to provide

fuel for whatever nuclear power reactors that it sells to iran. in fact, this recent deal a couple of weeks ago the russian strong belief is that for any additional reactors russia should provide the fuel and if that is to be agreed by iran this would seriously under cut the iranian argument that it needs to have a large scale indigenous enrichment capability. you have also seen reports earlier about the shipment from iran to russia of most of iran's low enriched uranium. if that materializes and my understanding is that details have not been worked out, quantities and so forth. if it does work out then this would be very positive because as we discussed the lower the amount of enriched uranium stocks the more leeway you have

to accept a higher number of centrifuges. i think the russians have played a constructive role in their own interest. >> [ inaudible ]. >> this is to tabe worked out. there are costs associated with that. there is a question whether the enriched uranium of iran is technically suitable to be used in the production of fuel. lots of details have yet to be worked out. i think the russians have played a constructive role and will continue to play. in terms of whether -- if everything else works out the u.s. would be more flexible on duration of an agreement i believe the duration is very, very important. and i think that is one of the issues where the u.s. has to remain very firm. the iranians have talked about a pretty short duration, five years or something like that

because they would like all constraints to end so they could ratchet up to an industrial scale enrichment capability but that would drastically reduce their breakout timeline. this would be unacceptable. i think the constraints have to last a long time. my preference would be 15 years or so. this would provide sufficient time for iran to demonstrate a track record of compliance with its obligations and begin to restore confidence in its peaceful intent. i don't know if any of the others want to comment -- >> i think the centrifuges is a separate issue. there is no trade off with the basic number that would remain. the problem posed by centrifuges rnd is if they have break throughs then they have much

more capable machines and they can get by with fewer machines if they did decide to build a covert plan. >> [ inaudible ]. >> but that doesn't mean anything. i mean, funding matters but the iranians try to play out this summer in a very unproductive way. you can lower by lowering the speed of the machine. it is a little like lifting your foot off the accelerator. just as quickly you can put your foot down again. you are forced back to here is the number of machines given the amount you are producing and therefore we can make a conversion. and it's a problem in the -- because they won't reveal what the machines do.

they won't reveal through the pilot plan. >> you can speak to david afterwards on this. >> i wanted to follow up a little bit on the russian deal that you mentioned. clearly by iran signaling a willingness for russia not only to build its additional reactors but for russia to supply fuel for the reactors as well as remove the spent fuel they are weakening the argument for the practical need support large number of centrifuges in the future. my question is given the way the supreme leader has been characterized and his hostility to limiting iranian capabilities, why would the supreme leader approve this deal

with russia? >> i think the narrative in iran that they needed to have an independent capacity that produced fuel for the reactors because they can't rely on the russians or any outside supplier is a very appealing narrative. there is a lot of strong public support for that narrative. i don't see this deal with russia as under cutting iran's argument that it needs to eventually have an industrial scale enrichment capacity to provide fuel. of course, such a capacity would also give them a very strong nuclear weapons option either covert or overt. >> and they want their cake and eat it, too. they want to agree that russia can provide fuel for new reactors but they also want to have the stand by capability in place built and about to operate in case the russians renege and

in case something happens and they don't have the fuel. they want the capability anyway as well as russian commitment to buy fuel. >> yes in the back. >> thank you. >> i have a question concerning the potential three dimensions in the initial presentations. i was wondering if you could tell us something more about what these are because the report of the ieae was pretty much concerning the pre-2003 period but very, very vague. after that the u.s. intelligence services seemed not only to completely share the assumption that some of the military-related activities have actually been going on ever

since. and going back to europe to the mental point that solving the issue is for closing the deal i do follow your logic. i do understand your logic and your argument but will you be willing to really undermine agreements on iran's enrichment capacity on the duration oflt deal on sanctions on the measures just to fully clarify an issue which was certainly substantial before 2003 but perhaps it is no longer so now. >> i think that the resolution is fundamental. it's core. and so i think there is ways to deal with it. i have written things where we have suggested compromises in this. if you don't settle it you are going to end up with an agreement that risks being

unverifiable and hurts the credibility of this very valuable international institution and they have learned in other cases that if you turn your back on the history they will fail. all you have to do is look at iraq in 1991. they also in south africa when south africa wouldn't talk about the history they couldn't verify it. they learned the hard way that history does matter if you are going to build a credible verification regime. on the pmds it is circumvectwhat we have seen is issues about calculations related to nuclear weapons. there was a recent sanctioning of iranian entity by the u.s. government where they said it was started in 2011. it involves work that is related to nuclear weapons. so i think the view is actually appearing to me fairly wide

spread that there is ongoing concerns about what some of the people are doing that were in this pre-2004 program. >> i think that pnd is important largely for its impact on verification in the future. and when amono spoke here a couple of weeks ago he made clear what he wanted to see in a deal which was access to facilities, access to personnel and access to information. access to facilities is something that we have been used to and the kind of verification provisions that people have talked about would essentially guarantee that kind of access.

when you talk about access to personnel then the question is who are you talking about. that's where it gets to be important to know what was done in the past because you want to include in your future personnel list all of the people who were involved with the program in the past so that you know who to talk to on a regular basis, who to watch closely. and when you talk about information you are really talking about all right what was the structure of your program? how were things done? what organizations were there that we want to follow through and make sure we understand? what new ones are you creating with the same old personnel to cause us further worries?

my view is that much of that could be done, could be set forth in an agreement even without iran satisfying the issues before an agreement is signed. but you would certainly want to have future major sanction relief contingent upon the iaea saying we have solved three of these issues, six of these issues, nine of these issues, whatever. you would want perhaps to keep those solutions secret because iranian personnel have an understandable fear of being assassinated. and so you would want to force iran to come clean with the iaea and maybe with us and our

colleagues but not necessarily with the the associated press. >> we have only a few more minutes to go. we will take a few quick questions. make them very concise and the panelists will give some concluding remarks. this gentleman here first. >> what time is it now? >> from university of maryland. if you may recall back in 2006 president rouhani wrote an article saying the difficulty you are facing is that the west is asking us to take concrete steps in return for promises in which we do not have much confidence. today the critics in iran are basically voicing the same kind of concern. what do you think the united states should do or not do to basically reassure the iranians that it does have the will and

ability to live up to its part of the bargain? thank you. >> right here. >> talked about the issue of the congress and relation with that. i would still like to get the opinion or the view because i'm more skeptic about the role of the new congress. i want to know how possibly if this extension doesn't work by the end of june, in this new congress and the environment in d.c. how the administration can really convince both republicans and democrats that we have to either go or the option is walk

away? >> yes. the one in the back. >> hi. with the center for international policy. would members of the panel support additional sanctions on iran at this time as has been suggested and why or why not? >> thank you for being so concise. >> thank you. my question is, you were talking about the need for more concessions from iranians. the question is, do you think there is any room for more concessions and flexibility on the negotiations from p-5 plus 1

taking into account them. each country overall political situation and, if you will, u.s. politics? thank you. >> the last one over here. >> how close do we think iran got by 2003 to proving the technology needed to produce a nuclear weapon? is it possible that they proved that all they needed was material? >> why don't we just go down the row and deal with these remaining questions and any concluding remarks? >> let me -- several people asked a cluster of questions about sanctions. let me address those. i think one of the big problems for an agreement is exactly as professor said is iran's concern that the u.s. won't be able to deliver on sanctions relief.

and clearly the president is not going to be able to convince congress to repeal all of the sanctions against iran that are in place, but the president does have the authority to waive the sanctions, most of the sanctions, the ones that really count, oil and financial sanctions every six months. now, the protection iran has is that in any agreement if obama can't deliver, for example, if congress overrides the president when he waives the sanctions, then the deal is off and iran is free to resume its nuclear activities. the fact of the matter is iran is at a point in its nuclear program where it is not going to be able to -- it is not being asked and could not permanently give up the ability to resurrect the nuclear program. i think the question of sanctions relief is one that can be addressed in a deal. the more difficult problem as we have talked about is that iran is simply not willing to come

even close to meeting the demands on limiting the nuclear program. now, the gentleman asked about further extensions. my guess and ed will have a view on this, as well, my guess is that congress is unlikely to overturn the current extension, the current seven-month extension mainly because as long as iran continues to comply with the joint plan of action we have frozen the program and so we lose very little by trying to see whether or not it is possible to come to an agreement. i think it is going to be very difficult to get any additional extensions unless there is genuine progress on the critical issues that we have talked about. if there is progress then i think it will be possible to justify an additional extension but under current circumstances unless iran changes its position i think it is probably not possible. >> let me just say on the question of the technology,

there is internal report -- we published parts of it. i know some of the people involved in it. their assessment is that iran knew enough to build a weapon at the end of the 2003 period. it was working on a miniaturized design for the three which was going to be about 0.55 meters across but had a long way to go to finish that. the group if eltthat if they picked up that work again they would succeed. i think they made substantial progress on this question of being able to produce a bomb and that is part of what causes the concern. just as a final comment i think in the technical i think hope is there for a deal. i mean, but there is a lot of parts to it and that can be a curse and a blessing. there is a lot of blas iran has to make concessions and u.s. has to consider its possibly.

there is also tradeoffs. so when you look collectively at all of this i think i remain hopeful that the u.s. can be creative along with iran to be able to construct a deal that both can live with. >> on the question of whether we are for more sanctions, speaking for myself i could imagine being for more sanctions authority but not for more sanctions, per se, at this time. and thus i am wary of sanctions with triggers. i would much rather discuss with the administration what they might need in the future and give them the authority to take steps if they decide they need

it, but congress is not a very effective institution for running foreign policy. and there i betray my past. i used to work for old style republicans who believed in a strong president. now, on the question of whether we have anymore give, we don't know because we haven't been told how much give we have already offered in the negotiations. and so it's very difficult to figure that out. what i do think might interest the iranians is the extent to which under a situation of major sanctions relief they would get real benefits from foreign commerce and from greater international acceptability and

being welcomed back into the international community. to that extent that isn't a matt matter of giving them something in an negotiation. it is a matter of making sure they are aware of how much they have to gain if a deal is reached. and therefore how much they lose by refusing to make compromises that we think are reasonably within their overall objectives. >> final note by me. i don't know, nobody here knows whether we will achieve a deal. i think it is going to be very difficult. i think there is a reasonable prospect that we won't be able to come to terms. if we do it's not going to be a perfect deal. we will not have achieved everything that we wanted to

achieve but that is the nature of negotiation. but i think it is important, two things. one is to look at the deal as a whole as david has said, not to focus on any one particular element of it, the number of centrifuges, the amount of stocks and so forth. look at the overall deal. second point to make, one needs to be realistic about the alternatives to the deal. a deal may not be perfect but look at what the realistic alternatives are. in my view there are two alternatives. one is to try to ratchet up sanctions in the hope that the iranians will have more flexibility eventually. but they have been under pretty harsh sanctions for over a year now and this hasn't moved them sufficiently. so it is going to be hard to do that and the effort of trying to do that is going to raise some real concerns among members of the sanctions coalition that we

need to continue to put pressure on iran. another alternative is the use of military force. military force can succeed temporarily. it can setback the program but it can't prevent iran from eventually succeeding in its objective. indeed it could give iran additional incentives to move more quickly towards actually building nuclear weapons. so my appeal would be not just to our audience but to members of congress in the american public in general is to look realistically at the alternatives and then to make up your minds. i want to thank you. you have been a terrific audience. i especially want to thank gary, david and ed for giving us a very illuminating conversation. so thank you. [ applause ]

on the next washington journal then we hear from congressman jim mcdermott on negotiations to fund the federal government amid tensions over immigration. washington journal is live every morning at 7:00 a.m. eastern on c-span. you can join the conversation on facebook and twitter. an compton on her over 40

years covering the white house and the administrations of gerald ford through barack obama. >> we sat and watched him listen to a group of second graders go through their drill and annie card came in and interrupted the president. i was stunned and wrote it down 9:07 a.m. whispered. the president stood and said he had to go and he went into a side room and then we heard, we discovered that it was two planes down, two plane crashes in new york. we were now in the parking lot outside the school and said the president will come and talk. i said there are live cameras in the cafeteria. the president has to speak there. he didn't want to scare the children. he did go into the cafeteria and said it is an apparent terrorist attack and i must return to washington. we raced to the plane. the door slammed and then the

pentagon was hit. >> sunday night at 8:00 eastern and pacific on c-span's q&a. for the past seven years alex salmon has served in the scottish parliament. he was also a primary figure in this year's failed attempt to declare scotland's independence from the united kingdom. in september he announced he would be stepping down from his leadership position. he recently addressed members of parliament in his final speech as leader. >> thank you. we move directly to the next item of business which is a statement by alex salmond, the first minister of scotland. >> firstly, i have to and not for the first time in this chamber dispoint.

i took it frault question last thursday that he was making a subtle last ditch attempt to persuade me to stay in post. i have given his suggestion great thought but i have decided to resign anyway at the start of parliamentary business tomorrow. this notice should allow ample time to secure his nominations to have a tilt at the job. i assure him if he so decides then i will weigh up his candidacy with great care before casting my vote for my friend and colleague. there are not only members who attended the opening ceremony of the reconvened parliament in 1999. it was a great day. and wellington signed the entire

chamber joined in the final verse. when they entered the general assembly building we cheered by the public. i have never seen that level of public engagement in politics before and until this last summer i have never seen it since. the public enthusiasm on that first day was an inspiration but also a challenge. eddie morgan captured the move five years later on this parliament building. we give your consent to govern. we give you our dearest wish to govern well. don't say we have no mandate to be so bold. my view is that on the whole this parliament has fulfilled the public wishes and damned their consent. we accepted the mandate to be

bold. a core position reflects much of the diversity. we have become the chief hub of debate, the chamber of which people expect to reflect priorities, values and their hopes. that's not because of any one political party. it's because of the commitment of so many of the members of the last 15 years. i think some of the ones who are no longer with us. unless parliament's proceedings are not perfect -- we are not actually 15 years old but 15 years old. a new officer impt lmted

significant improvements. this parliament has great strengths and we should never under play them. the last speech i made in this chamber was at the business in parliament conference where 100 businesses representatives were sitting in the chamber here along side six ministers and people from the wider public sector. last year more than 400 different organizations held events in this building. in 15 years we have welcomed more than 4 million visitors. that degree of accessibility is not unique in the democratic world but it is rare and impressive. i tried to reflect that. last week they made exactly that point at regular meetings between government and general

counsel. minority government requires negotiation and to recognize honest disagreement and then compromise in the public's interest. i i have no idea if my experience in global government will everybody come in hand did in another place. when the minority government, the snp was on the site of the majority for 80% of the votes in this chamber. there were hardly any occasions where the other parties were lined up against us. perhaps the better, more important point to reflect on today is so many occasions in both minority government and in majority government that have been cross party support for social and economic change. . i think when the liberal

democrats and the greens voted with us to restore the principle of free higher education in scotland. in june 2009 when he passed the most ambitious climate change election of every country in the world, we had the support of every party in the chamber. nobody need face eviction from their home as a consequence of the bedroom tax. but most of us, i think about the consistent and often joint endeavor against the head winds of economic circumstance and au au austerity, i have heard it said that the national pursuit of inspection -- little interest to

scotland. that has not been experienced on to the verdict of the people. we have all just lived through one of the most invigorating and extraordinary debates of any country, anywhere at any time. it's argued that people everywhere have become disengaged from politics, not in scott land in 2014. it is sad that they no lodger care about the business of governments, no in scotland in 2014. and in the last few months, we have watched an electorate passionately engaged in the business of fashioning their own future. i see little ed that the people of scotland saw that the people of the government were working with them and for them. in the u newspaper there was a consistent bulwark of this government over the last seven years to provide a full today showing 50% snp support on the

very day i am leaving. mind you, it might be the cause i'm leaving. but it's a wise -- it's a wise newspaper that listens to the verdict of its readers. and more important realization is this, we're on a political journey, and each staff along the way has been dictated by the impact of the constitution on issues which mean the most to ordina ordinary scots. this parliament was reborn out of the realization that we could no longer afford to have our domestic policy dictated by -- people became impatient with politicians that wanted toed e a administer rather than govern.

the last 12 months have been an extraordinary example of this nation's talents and capabilities. it's been a year of astounding economic year in scotland. a figure shows investment at a 17-year high. organized the greatest every -- hailed around the world as a model of truly participative democracy. scott land has a new sense of economic confidence. wherever we're traveling together as a nation, they are transforming this country for the better. confidence of evngagement is th

point at which i wish to end. i mentioned the enthusiasm that was generated by the reestablishment of this party in 1999 when america msps were applauded. that has evolved into something much more meaningful, sustaininged critical, constructive engagement, involving people in every part of the country. scott land now has the most energized empowered and informed electorate of any country in europe. we have a new generation of citizens who understand that their opinion matters. who believe that their voice will be had to shape society. it will be a point of pride, a source of challenge, for me the sense of generational change has been a factor in deciding that the time is right from being first minister. from this parliament, it should

spur us on to become even more accessible. to salve the new expectations of the people. it should inspire us to involve, include and empower the electorate as we continue to quest to create a more prosperous and more equal scotla scotland, i wish each and every one of you -- it's been the privilege of my life to serve as first minister for the last 7 1/2 years. in this case it's vastly outweighed by a sense of optimism and confidence, confidence that we will have an outstanding first minister, confidence in the standing and the capability of this chamber, and most of us confidence in the wisdom, the talent, the potential for the people of

scotland. i'm happy to say with every degree of certainty, that more change and better days lie ahead for this parliament and for scotland. >> some live hearings to tell

you about. and in the afternoon, to the senate commerce committee holds a hearing to examine domestic violence policies in professional sports. witnesses include representatives from the nfl, the nba, the nhl and others. >> on cspan 3, we show you the most relevant congressional hearings and public affairs events. then on weekends, cspan 3 is the home of american history tv. visiting battle field and key events, american artifacts, touring museums and historic sites to discover what art facts

reveal about america's past. the presidency, looking at the policies and legacies of our nation's commanders in chief. lectures in history w top college professors delving into america's past. cspan 3, created by the cable tv industry and funded by your local cable or satellite provider. watch us in hd, like us on facebook and follow us on twitter. >> tonight on cspan 3, a discussion on radical extremism in the middle east, then a look at recent efforts in china to prevent government corruption. and later kennedy center president deborah rudder discusses issues relevant to the performing arts. the carnegie endowment for international peace recently hosted a discussion on radical

extremism. speakers looked at specific events in the middle east and how they are led to escalating violence in places like afghanistan, syria ander remark. this is an hour and a half. welcome it is my particulare to afternoon to say that this event is co-sponsors by the middle east program as well. in that regard, i'm happy that we have our dear colleague fred with us. the question is entirely in the title, jihadist movement in afghanistan, syria and iraq. i mean what are the reason for

what we see today and where does it lead and where do we go. to what extent these are social phenomenon, or it's the result of perhaps not so smart policy for the past decade or even longer. this is not totally ann er rei irrelevant question, it's the question we will try to address this afternoon. to do so, we have three speakers, or four speakers. gilles doronsoro serves as professor of political science and has authored numerous reports on afghanistan and syria.

next we'll have the fellow at the french institute which located in three places, and which is proud of a larger network of some 27 research institutes across the world. of next we have the number of young french researchers to get accustomed to the field, and i insist on a field for the countries in residents in the field going from one year to three years most of the time. the older conflict and violence fellow at the university. he is a student in political science in paris.

to counter this french commando, we needed no less than the u.s. air force reserve, i'm naming of course my colleague frederic who is the associate at the middle east program, and was previously as you all know, a fellow at the rand corporation and has done two of a number of field research. he focuses on gulf political situational affairs, libya and u.s. policy in the middle east and we could dream of no better discussant for him this afternoon. with no further adieu, i'll leave the floor to gilles and we'll move on to the other speakers and as usual, we'll have a q & a at the earned of

it. >> thank you for the kind word. so what's the question, we were in filed work, the three of us, in field work in iran, afghanistan, syria. and the u.s. policy is some kind of an enigma, it's something you have to understand from the field, from outside. the question we're going to try is to understand if the u.s. policy is at least partially responsible of the chaos we're seeing now in afghanistan, iraq and syria. and trying to understand this question, i would like first to say that in the three crises, we have the same moments in the

u.s. policy. first, intervention. and most of the time, too much money, too many men or too much something. the second time is always, withdrawal. but not kind of slow and controlled withdrawal, because something or somebody in washington decided to withdraw from this crisis. and the third is that because the situation is totally out of control, we are going to -- we are obligeded to be back in the crisis. and more it is describing the crisis, the u.s. policy and the crisis. first we have a failure to build allies. most of the time we're speaking with statements. but i would like to speak about allies building. allies building has been a favorite in these countries for a different reason.

then the withdrawal was not done in very reasonable condition because it was tainted by april work. then the conduct is dilemma, why? because the u.s. is coming back without allies on the ground. and what we are seeing now in iraq and syria, what we are going to see the next few years in afghanistan is this problem. how can you intervene in a country when you don't have anymore allies. so first i'm going to speak about building allies, and afterwards we'll speak about withdrawal and consequences and

then we'll finish with the dilemma of being back. so the first one is building allies. so here we have mostly two problems. the first problem, and it took me a few years to understand, what was exactly this problem, is the perception of the local society by the u.s. administration. and more than that, inside the u.s. diplomacy, you have a perception, a very politically significant of mideastern. the first very wrong idea is almost without exception, it's overplaying the local, the ethnic, the tribe. all that is about fragmentation in this society.

it exists, it was tried in afghanistan, or iraq or in syria. but at the same time, the way to -- as if the tribes were the basis of the political society in these countries. this is a very -- it will explain at least partially that the state building in these countries was extremely ambiguous, on the one hand, you have plenty of money to build a state institution in iraq and afghanistan. at the same time, you have plenty of practices from the military, whatever, that are destroying the very idea of a state in these countries. and the reason for that is a situation where of course state building was failed.

the second point i will make is about sectarianism. the u.s. policy beyond the question of the local, plan to put -- on sectarianism and the difference is between -- and it's a self-fulfilling prophecy to a certain extent. especially in iraq, where in 2003-04, you remember that the country was not divided between shiia, sunni and so on. this is also on the demand of the perception of these societies. the second problem is about resources. one of the most fascinating aspects of the u.s. policy in iraq and in afghanistan has been the fact that there was a lot of attention to the input and

output on the you're putting in the crisis, how many men you're sending to the country, but not much about the outcomes. so in fact all american strategy isn't a question is about what shall we do? do we need more men? do we need more money, do we need to be more in this crisis, but never what are we going to do with it? the most perfect example of this is the surge in afghanistan. the surge in afghanistan is a moment where the sheer amount of minute sent in this country was on brbliged to create totally dysfunctional processes. corruption, for example, it is a logical consequence of sending too much money in the country that has no infrastructure to use it. it's absolutely, i mean

corruptation is the logical result of this. there is also and this is part of the corruption process, the fact that the state, when you are -- in this country, the state cannot be neutral. the state actually is a state for the political parties, the local groups, whatever. i it means you cannot build consensus among elites, to the political -- what we are skiing in both iraq and afghanistan, the whole process actually stopped the minute the u.s. went in there to be sure that you had some kind of respect for the legal opposition. and this is a key element. election in iraq went directly to a very sectarian movement, election in afghanistan, led to

a totally policies of the state, as far as i know, i didn't check this morning. but there's still no government in afghanistan. while there it was perfectly okay, there was a huge amount of enthusiasm in the political diplomatic community, and more than sick months later, it's still -- all this has led me to conclude for the first point, is the way iran is using it's -- the way to destroy the country, to destroy the allies that are supposed to be built with these resources. and this is something we have to think about for probably for the

future. >> quickly after the arrival of u.s. forces, i would say, the institutions led by the american institutions, were not about to ruin the country, for tourism, that say, first there's a huge gap between the elites, the regime and the public. people are elected in this country with the support of international community, removes any legitimacy on what should be a democratic election process. the money, the resources put inside the police security forces in iraq and in afghanistan is totally amazing. you cannot find a solution, you cannot discuss, negotiate the

problem if you only have security forces as a trustable institutions to deal with the population. then the local elites must be -- considers was made by u.s. forces in iraq, was not working too well because of the support of malikis element. many people lose representation by choosing american elected during the elections that make them not able to rule the country on specially to negotiate with the people. to control the territory where they have to deal with or to go around. the second point, the failure is the -- the politic of u.s. in afghanistan and mostly in iraq was to deal with the different

mineral riches, the -- to find a way to stabilize the situations and to decrease the -- that was working, in 2011 when the u.s. withdraw from iraq, for example, the group maliki were virtually destroyed. if you don't have any more resources to fight, a lot of people left, insurgent groups to try to get a job, try to get -- but the sec tarization just after the withdrawal of u.s. forces, maliki, the day after try to arrest the most popular political elite, sucnni elite,

that started a big crisis, two or three years in the country of sunni demonstration, the come back of al qaeda and isis. in afghanistan, we are now fronting to the deal between the different network of one side and there was the side of abdullah abdullah who tried to take more and more position and that's very dangerous because of the role may be to start inside of the afghani institutions. the second point that i want to point out is the arrival of u.s.

forces, which was the failure of the afghan army and mostly iraqi's army, as we saw the last, 10 june 2014 when mosul fell into the evidence of the iraqi insure negligents and isis. the problem was saying that there is too much resources put in the different institutions and the different regime. but there is no coercion inside, the unit that we tried to create in iraq or afghanistan. the sectarian dynamic inside iraq was used to be on the field with the iraqi army at different points, it was amazing to see how much iraqi soldiers were not able to deal with each other, because the commander maybe will be shiia and no one can trust each other.

this lack of leadership cannot explain the fragmentations when isis attacked in the army, even if they are huge resources, especially in mosul was the main base in the north of iraq, the army was not able to confront a small radical group coming back into iraq. in afghanistan, the fall of the army is clear. of course after one, two years the cities in the different afghanistan cities can be traced really quickly. the situation in afghanistan went from hundreds of men to thousands of men. there is no more road in afghanistan that you can take, no more safe roads that you can take to move from one city, from one point to another. that's making extremely

difficult the situation for the new regime. the response with syria--was magistrate for the insurgents in syria. the lack of response from the international community, the failure of international community to find the solutions and put the regime in front of -- make a huge gap between the insurgents, syrian insure jenlts. right now the game in syria is going through dwimpt -- gulf countries, turkey, iraq ander ran. to create some new states, institutions, and achieve to the

bashar regime. that's also a huge problem that we -- we are not able to even in syria where we have allies, where we have people fighting, a credible institution inside to deal with, even with this allies, we are not able to do anything to disrupt any strategy on the field, or the legitimacy of the u.s. administration, very weak. >> thank you. so now that the u.s. having falls back in any of these three countries, they have tried to avoid getting stuck in afghanistan, iraq and syria. one can remember a year and a half ago, when there was an

op-ed in the "new york times," it was a brilliant title, let them bleed to death. he has proved that cynicism is not a proven intelligence here. in a sense when we see today, the u.s. army and -- when asked to come back in iraq and syria, the main problems that have been plaguing the united states in the past show time consideration, internal consideration, are still here. in iraq and syria, the bombing campaign was a clear will to have no troops on the ground and looking for allies when none exist anymore. in afghanistan, though we do not speak about it anymore, drones attacks had become very important. they're daily in the south in

helmand. there is american ad campaign going around. there's many signals of pressure on the united states to come back. think of the simple fact that the report on the economy has been classified. it's already something very telling. so so why coming back to three conflicts in which the obama administration has been promising that it would avoid, that it would avoid from. his vision is very washingtonian, it's not related to what happened in the region. the -- a huge role in the decision to intervene. much more than structural factors. think of the role played by the decapitation of hostages by the islamic state, which is a tragic moment, u but certainly not a strategic issue. how much terrorism play a bigger role in discussion than the

strategy factors in the middle east, despite the fact that the middle east is going through one of the biggest crises since the end of the empire. the way we have tended westerners to be very selective with might have been norths. the choice of bombing -- when the campaign started in syria is very revealing. there is a rationale to nusra, the organization was suspected of planning terrorist attacks in europe. but by doing so, america has alienated one of its central al rye in syria, which is the free syrian army, which was needed at the moment which it was -- needed to avoid anything else the fact that -- the fear that the u.s. would start building the free syrian army against the syrian state.

the situation is simple today, it is the main province of the free syrian army, using the fact that the fighting is already in the islamic state and the regime at the same time. the choice to intervene on the yasidi front is a sprorimportan thing to do. why do we decide that the yasidis are so important and the sunni iraqis are not? or when you get big problems around shiia villages, it's not the same problem, right? we're being very selective. the choice to rely on air force is also telling, right? when you decide to bomb in helmand and kunar, you are alienating populations. it's also the islamic state

territories when the s air force bombs mosul, and targeting within the city military targets, which also affect the lack of infrastructures, lack of electricity, again affecting the population, you can't explain or you can't make people understand in those two countries that there is an aerial campaign that will at some point give them freedom from the islamic state. but when you have a campaign that's clearly and expolilicitl saying that there's no plan to go on and retake those territories. but to have their electricity stop and have bombs falling every day. this strategy is opening the space for nonstate actors of various types. this is not a convince dense

here, in afghanistan when it's a core element of the strategy of washington to withdraw from afghanistan has been to support militias all over the country, which increases the risks of confrontati confrontation. it's actually one of the factors that supports the taliban, discourses are shifting to if you want order, you need to support another action. in syria, the united states is doing what it expected never to do, support the pkk wils a group on the terrorist list, or it ended up being supported to support the basra militias in iraq, the kdp and the pkk was asking for more autonomy and having big tensions with turkey.

so what was the implication of such a strategy? the implication of several -- the iraqi state which has become more and more important. despite the genuine attempt to train for example, sunni iraqi army units in an bar province, which the iraqi states do not want to really use, you end up having an iraqi state which is more and more closing itself on one of the sectarian groups. in syria, the free syrian army is still not supported. we are in a situation which strategically a victory over the islamic state builds daily, every time the islamic state won

a territory--but now we say in iraq, every time iraqi state lose -- the dpe feet of the islamic state can have dire consequences, and when you have two bad possibilities, it means there is really a problem. in afghanistan, the militarization strategy and the fact that the election ended up in a deal where the tension went out from the political -- inside of the state institution, it did effectively manage to slow down the taliban advance but the risk is a pandora's box.

what happened in the 1990s, in which you always have deals, more or less. so you don't have a country like in pakistan, or syria, which is on sectarian land, opening an ethnic box and opening an ethnic strategy could one day outweigh that risk. to conclude, what we're trying to explaining, what we have been trying to do, looking at the fact of the american policy on the ground is that the u.s. has gone from high investment to its role in coming back. we argue that in evidence which seems to be not bad evidence, structure factors are -- the use of resources has followed u.s. internal logic, the withdrawal has been on the agenda following u.s. -- and the coming back

today follows largely the u.s. domestic agenda, with afghanistan, iraq and syria, there is a will today to forget the lessons of two wars and a decision not to engage in supporting an insurgency. i think that's very porvet. if you think of the situation we have today in those three country, if you'll allow me just to conclude on that, there's a couple of things that could be interesting to think of. one is in afghanistan, if in any case, there was a will to advance a political agenda, stabilization will only make sense if it has a noti-- being several movements does not hold anymore, you've got a tax in

every province, by thousands. and in so much uch a context, i is a will to find a settlement, it will go through negotiations with that movement. in iraq and syria, there -- islamic state. if that would happen, because the islamic state doesn't have the resources to replace every weapon it is losing, because momentum might dissipate quitely, there's a plan for what might happen in sunni iraq and sira. in iraq, there is a need to engage in -- and to be prepared for more and more slaughter, as much as the iraqi army and the shiia militia advance on the front. and syria, the risk of the falling of the islamic state in the east of the country, at some point, this actor which has been

major in transforming a water into a regional war, if we want to calm down that issue, we need to engage again with the revolutionary elite, the people that build that syrian institutions, to give them a possibility to build an alternative solution. >> we have covered a lot of ground, we're probably opening a few controversies. >> thank you again for inge viting me and i'm delighted, i would like to host our colleagues from across the atlantic. i'm sensing a lot of common threads throughout these three presentations. and when i reflect on them, i'm struck by the title of a very well known book on america's foreign policy in the middle east by lawrence friedman called a choice of enemies. and what i'm struck by is the

fact that u.s. policy in all of these cases is really a series of tradeoffs, we're dealing with compromised allies. we're dealing with imperfect partners, we're searching for new allies. in many cases, those allies are drawing us into very localized power strugglesa we don't fully understand, and here i want to reference the misreading of the map where we tend to see things in terms of a patch work of tribes or sects, we get drawn into very localized power struggles. i wanting want to caveat some of these presentations with a limit on the u.s. policy. the u.s. was not responsible for the sectarianization of iraq or the rise of militia politics or tribes in iraq. i think you can -- saddam regime, he began tribalizing iraqi society, he began hauling

out the military, evolving power to militias, the same thing in a country that i work on, in libya, a lot of talk about the nato convention, and what it did. but many of the after effects of that, the genesis of it was really under gadhafi. so we're fronted with a number of fractured states in the region. i raek, syria, yemen, where we have the hollowing out of security structures, we don't have sufficient partners, we don't know how to operate in those environments so it's natural that we're trying to deal with nonstate actors, tribes, militias and the question is what are the future contours of these states going to look like? i think it's a fractured security environment, where you have very hollow, state institutions, working longside paramilitary. how does the u.s. as a state power that is used to dealing

with ministries of defense, ministries of the interior, how does it assert itself into those very fractured states? i completely agree with much of what was said here about the sli, the corruption of many of our allies and the fact that we're working through centralized regimes that are in fact fuelling the extremism that they purport to be fighting and this is a problem that's not going to go away. we often hear in u.s. circles, this talk of regionalizing the -- the regionals are just as capable of messing things up as we are. in fact in many cases they're more partisan, i certainly think see this in a place like libya, again in the absense of sort of on the ground u.s. presence as we have heard, the regionals are stepping in. i didn't hear very much in the

presentation about the enablers of jihadism. meaning the funding from gulf states, foreign volunteers from tunisia, arguably one of the successors of the arab spring, why is this state is providing so many of the foot soldiers for jihadie movements in syria and iraq. i think question have to dial back the policy failures perhaps even further to look at the role of prisons. i really think much of this is about judiciary systems in the arab world. we can go back to zarqawi is the jordanian prison system. how much le raj -- so i think we're in a very difficult bind on a number of countries, i completely agree with what was

said about airpower, the question, though, is, you know, what would be a better strategy? i mean when i hear u.s. officials justify the national guard program in iraq, and you're absolutely right to warn about the dangers of that program increasing fragmentation, increasing militia rule, what is the opportunity? they're framing it in terms of a provincial defense force, they're aware of the fact that this force needs to be tethered to the central government. and i would argue that it's not something that the iraqi government does not want. abadi is trying to work out the command and control issues. so again, i guess in terms of the theme of this panel, you know, is it a policy failure or an inevitable rise? i mean let's go back to, say, january of 2014, and we start hearing the first intelligence briefings about the rise of isis and it's movement toward iraq.

if you were advising president obama, what would you tell him to do at that point differently? and it wasn't an intelligence failure. at that poifblt could we have stopped in it and i want to press you, a little bit more, you said a lack of support for the fsa paved the way for radical actors. and again its goes back to this notion of allies. if only we had backed the right allies in this fight. we know from history that our allies are often imperfect, they tend to use our aid in is certain ways, it perhaps imparts too much credibility of the fsa in terms of their combat capability. if you could just explain that a little bit more in terms of the time frame, from what i understand the amount of training that would be required to make this entity into a fighting force. there is a lot . >> i expect some debate to be

debate. >> thank you for your nice comment. i cannot insert your question, so maybe we'll focus on syria right now. what actually after our first -- insurgency control in syria in december, january 2013, we were to report and we were trained to do exactly this, we were trained to edadvise the people in washington, please, i prefer field work. and what was the argument? the argument was that we were actually seeing in syria and that was -- there was a strong movement of institutionalization, means that many policies were working and

aleppo was much more pleasant to live. we wrote that there was two, one was the pkk, which was in the north. we were very clear that the way to manage these two interests was to tip-off the free syrian army. we're very clear that the free syrian army wasn't p efficient and would never be very efficient. that's why there was a key point, was that it was all about the strategy of bashar al assad. bashar al assad what a very clear strategy of producing refugees, bombarding sere yachb areas to empty the north of syria and then to be able

marginalize is insurgents. most of them were led by people coming from bashar al assad's jails. the key thing, actually, at the point was to say, okay, we have to have enough reason or to give enough anti-aircraft weapon, to the insure ends. these people could have stayed in the northern part of syria, it means it was possible to rebuild an alternative interstate and would have been extremely difficult for marginal

and radical groups that have no -- it would have been much more difficult for them to do something. and the dynamic would have been totally different. and the same question was asked in the summer, in september actually of 2013, when the -- the attack on the syrian population was very clear, we are not going to intervene, we are not arming the insure jepts. and again, i remember it's important point, the beginning of 2011, there was a huge clash and all the groups united against the islamic state. and to the islamic state lost not only it's position suddenly, but a lot of its position in syria. at this time the logical move would be to say, okay, guys, we did a very good job, we don't have almost -- except in some parts of the west of syria, but

basically, the north is clean of the islamic state, so at this time we're going to give you some kind of support. we did not do that. and when the islamic state came from the outside, in the summer of 2014, so your free moments were the united states were dpe siding, okay , these guys are not perfect, they are not very good fighters, they are brave but not very well organized fighters, but at the same time, you can strategyize 1 million or 2 million in the north. if we protect them again bashar als a sat sad. the game in iraq is much more korp indicated because actually we lost almost all leverage. here we are in this situation, and afghanistan is the same, when you're doing a mistake in

2004, 2005, 2006, you're going to pay for your mistake ten years later. there is no good solution right now in iraq. we're stuck in this situation for the foreseeable future. >> maybe we have to come back to about the de-baathification of iraq. i think it was the u.s. and the administration was leading this movement just when you say that u.s. don't have to deal with c sectarianizati sectarianization, that's why the u.s. don't have all the power to do anything, that's true. but when you talk about, you know, the perfect ---in 2007,

when the u.s. created the tribal leaders, that was working, people were going with the u.s. army or were doing a good job against isis in 2011. it was totally destroyed in iraq. but in the which is come of america, and the lack of support for the militia, made the system very weak. i know that olt of them joined isis and they explained to me why and how and that it is perfectly logical for them. why? because in january 2013, when falluja fell into isis in iraq, the u.s. sought to remove the shiia militimilitia. you have a lot h a lot of shiia militia in the fight against

sunni insurgents. while maliki sought to sec t-- what should happen if the arab sunni in iraq was moving. at this time it was exactly the time the months where isis in syria was launching a huge attack against isis. and isis was expelled from all the west territory in syria. so at this critical time, we called it, i mean the u.s. and our country called out and tried to stop maliki, to push on maliki to not open the way to a sectarian strategy. of course rise the power of isis in iraq. >> again, a lot of ground has been covered. let's now turn to the audience, please introduce yourself and

also indicate to whom you're directing your question. thank y >> thank you very much for the opportunity to participate in such lively discussion. on the preview that we want to get rid of the weapons of mass destruction. and then they changed the agenda and said we want to bring democracy to the country and want to get rid of the tyrant of the country. and it took them so many years. so again, in the stated policy and the intentions, they become questionable to the people. so there was a perception change and a gap between perception and

reality, and look what happened subsequently, the man is gone, and the nation is still paying a price through the nose. and on the other hand, in the case of afghanistan, they had asked them to hand over osama bin laden otherwise we are coming. the taliban didn't believe it, they said they are coming anyway, so why should we release osama bin laden to them. my question is, do you think usa needs to review after so many years, to the policy toward the middle east in particular, or in general that can help. and if they do need to review their policy and revamp their policy, what recommendations does this distinguished panel

give them? thank you. >> who would like to answer first? >> you want to take three questions at a time? is so we have time to think about these? thanks for putting me on the spot. >> please, sir, i apologize to my colleague. >> i think to answer the question whether the jihadist movements are a policy failure, we would have to consider what our policymakers considered success in those three countries. and i think it's obvious that success would have been to british compliant regimes that saw the world the way we see it, so the sort of regimes we have in -- the modern history centered on resisting the intrusion of imperialists? so what's second best?

the second best may be failed states, proxy armies, what we're seeing in the middle east today, consider that syria was the one arab country left that was de defying israel'sleft. it's severely weakened today. i don't think we care whether that becomes a failed state. prior to the second -- right before the second world war, after germany invaded russia and the soviet union rather and before we got harry truman who was a senator at the time suggested we should support the germans so they would kill as many of each other as possible. right now the muslims are doing a good job of killing other muslims which maybe distracts them from bothering us. am i right? >> well, that's -- well, there is a short and longer version of the answer. any way, who would like to start? >> we have one more question.

we're taking three at a time. >> go for it. >> okay. i'm taking the easy one about should we kill or just wait for them to kill each other? so of course the answer is no. i think your question, just the way you ask your question means that you know it's not first not possible and it would be very un-american. and there is one thing here, syria is a very good example. you know first you think that it's a local crisis and then you let the thing become more and more complex, complicated. and then you understand that when you are 5 million refugees, who is paying for the refugees? basically it's us. us means also turkey. so the idea that you can have a local crisis that stays local is

going against everything we know about civil wars that last 30, 40 years, at least. there is no civil war that is strictly local. 90% of the civil wars have regional dmingss. and when it has regional dimensions, one, you have to pay for the refugees, you have to pay in terms of security. you're in the crisis any way. so the idea is maybe not to wait the last minute to intervene and when you intervene, you're probably obliged to send planes or troops on the ground but maybe to do something bigger. so, to answer the question about the review of the u.s. policy, too ambitious agenda just to speak about in five minutes. but my point would be to stop thinking that you can ignore

crisis and exactly what you're doing in afghanistan right now. i think i wrote a paper in 2009 say i saying -- the idea five years ago was that it was going to fail so at some point we will be obliged to withdraw, but the idea that it was that, you should not withdraw too quickly because that would destabilize all of afghanistan. and instead -- and it was not very -- i mean, it was reasonable strategy. but it was a reasonable strategy. and instead of doing that, what we do a search, too much money and then we withdraw. and if there is one advice would be stop playing this game. try to deal with the crisis when

they're small, local crisis. and think about all that's possible in afghanistan, for example, or in syria would have changed totally the game. >> sure. >> well, i mean, on the u.s. policy question, i mean, look, the u.s. -- i mean, has inherited i think the mantle as an imperial power since the '70s. we're tied to a network of authoritarian arab regimes. our history of involvement in that region has been a succession of broader it theres. i think now it's trance national terrorism and i think these strategies of confrontation and containment have blinded us to things that are creating additional threats down the road. so, you know, what i'm arguing -- and there's a policy paper that i've coauthored with a colleague now that -- in the

rush to solicit arab support against isis, we're ignoring some very dangerous trends under the surface inside these states that could lead to greater extremism, the creation of new threats. you talk about a preemptive strategy, i would argue for just greater scrutiny of what's happening inside the states that we call our allies. i'm not talking about a return to the very vocal demockization agenda that defined the bush eras, but perhaps a greater focus on rule of law, on reforms as an insurance policy down the road, looking at the prison systems in these countries, that it's not all about an external containment strategy. i'm very worried about the fact that we have these allies in the gulf that have signed up for this campaign against isis and you have, for instance, a state like bahrain that we've got a major strategic presence there and sunnis are going to join isis, there's a radicalization threat. so this is an age-old problem

and just strikes me as i mention with the title of this book from lawrence freedman the choice of enemie enemies. do we deal with the near-term threat. how long do we manage long-term threats looming on the horizon? in an era of absolute exhaustion, i think, we can't underestimate this in the u.s. domestic sphere, exhaustion from the middle east, financial, moral, psychological, it's going to be very hard to see a real coherent constructive policy emerge. >> thank you very much. i think you have mentioned the key factor in the whole thing, exhaustion. let's go back to the audience and who wants to -- not all at the same time, please. yes, please, jessica. >> thank you. jessica matthews from carnegie.

[ laughter ]. >> you know, it is -- we could sit here until tomorrow at this time and discuss all the mistakes that were made in these wars, but setting aside the initial decision to go into iraq and setting aside the catastrophe over the red line in syria over the chemical weapons red line, one can ask the question whether the logical end result of the arguments that you're making just simply arrives at a bottom line of the u.s. should never have gotten near it because it seems to me that gilles, you started by talking about the failure to find allies and then a few minutes later about policies

that actively destroyed the states we were trying to create and those policies were generally policies to create allies among various tribal entities and leaders. at the same time, you know, the president's initial conviction about syria was an attempt -- i think, to learn the lesson of iraq that you don't go in unless you can see at least the outline of a political solution. and neither kofi annen nor us, nobody could find such an outline. on the other hand, the world has hated the u.s. attempt to wait for such an outline.

it's called, you know, withdrawal. the u.s. -- i mean, the world feels naked without the u.s. providing the security that it has provided since the end of world war ii that allows everybody else to live and grow in relative peace. so, i'm sympathetic to the arguments being made but i must say i cannot see a logical conclusion to them other than that we should never have gotten in and that doesn't seem like a good -- or at least it seems like a very highly risky strategy or recommendation in and of itself. so i wonder whether you can really take on the -- at least what seemed to me to be some

significant contradictions in your criticisms of u.s. policy. >> hello, jessica. i feel obliged to answer to my former boss. well, actually it all depends on how you define jumping a crisis. my point that the u.s. should never sent troops into iran and syria should be absolutely clear. but this is really what we think, never, just never. at the same time, if you remember what happened in iraq in '91, it was a real way to stabilize this area. so instead of comparing syria and iraq 2003 the g

the sense of political