congresswoman's question you said it might be weeks or months. i'd like a little more specifics on that. your november 26 letter, there was a response on december 2, a response with which you fundamentally disagree. and i would imagine i disagree as well. what is your next step? >> thank you, vice chairman. our next step -- my team already began once we received that -- the information from takata on monday in response to our special order and yesterday in response to our recall demand, we are did iing into that data. we are evaluating their arguments. we are marshaling our evidence. >> is their argument in the three-page response that they gave you? >> that is the extent of their argument. >> rather weak tea, in my judgement. >> i agree. >> what's the time frame? because the american people need to be assured that their automobiles are safe. what is your next step, when will that occur in. >> our next step after

evaluating all of that information would be to issue an initial determination, initial decision of a defect to takata and the automakers. after that, we would hold a public hearing. >> how soon can you initiate that? >> as soon as humanly possible. the key, because we want to protect the american public, we need to make sure we build the strongest case possible because at the end of the day, if takata and the automakers continue to refuse to act, we are going to have to take them to court. we want to make sure that we have a case prepared that will win in that circumstance. >> you can build a court case over time. can you estimate for the committee and through the committee to the american people when your next step will be taken? >> we have begun our next step of diving into the data. >> that doesn't answer my question. the next legal step. not just diving into the data. when will you next do something officially regarding takata and the automakers?

>> i apologize. but at this point, because there's voluminous data from takata, i can't give you an exact estimate. my team is working furiously and as quickly as possible. as i indicated earlier, it could be weeks, it could be months. but it won't be many months if it is. i could see something -- >> if that occurred by the first of february and i would hope sooner than that, then what happens? >> we will hold the hearing. if they refuse -- >> the hearing has to be held within what time frame? >> the safety act does not establish the specifics. >> does not 45 days or 30 days? >> right. the safety act does not establish that. >> from our perspective, it should be time of the essence. >> i agree. >> what happens after that? >> then after that, we will -- if the evidence still points to the need for a broader recall, we will issue a final determination. that will compel takata and automakers to act. if they fail to act, then we will have to work with the

justice department to bring them to court and force that action. >> it's the justice department that brings takata, potentially, and the manufacturers to court? >> i would have to get back to you on the exact process. but my understanding is, yes, that we would work with the justice department. >> this is a civil action? >> i believe that is the case, yes. >> and then do you refer situations for criminal prosecution? >> under certain circumstances the law does allow us to do that. >> and for example, honda's significant under reporting under the act, is that then referred to a doj for civil action or for criminal action or for both? >> we have the authority and we expect honda, frankly, to come in and agree to a significant penalty associated with that. >> that would be a civil peoplety in. >> yes, that we won't have to move to the justice department

on that specific matter. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i have yield back the balance of my time. >> thank you. the chair recognizes the gentleman from mississippi. >> thank you, mr. chairman. what is a reasonable period of time to notify someone? >> automakers are required by law to notify nitsa within five days of either determining a defect or five days of when they should have known that there was a defect. under regulation, they have no more than 60 days to get a letter like this into the hands of consumers notifying them that this is an important safety recall and that they must take action. that said, even that 60 days to me is longer than i would like to see, which is why we have a vin took that every american can go to at safercar.gov/vinlookup. you will be alerted if there's a recall for your vehicle. you can sign up for added alerts

from our app. >> it's important for the public, the driving public and passengers in those vehicles to know when there's a safety issue, correct? >> it's critically important. any recall is an unreasonable risk to safety, automakers must act quickly to inform consumers. consumers should act quickly to get their vehicles repaired. >> explain how nitsa knew honda under reported y eed yet delayeg anything. >> in 2012 we became aware of a limited number of unreporting -- >> 1,700? >> at the time we were -- >> is that limited? why wasn't something -- if we're talking about time limits being important, nitsa didn't meet your own standard. >> we were only aware of eight. it was only recently that we aware of the 1,700 problems baitbait bases on the eight. we forced honda to update

reports. once we found out that the problem was bigger, we went after honda. we forced them under oath to provide us extensive information. we will hold them accountable for their failings. >> nothing was really done on those eight at that point. those eight were important to the eight incidents that were involved, obviously, were they not? >> they were important. we made sure once we discovered this that honda reported that information to us so that we could act on it. at the end of the day, the safety of the american public is always our top priority. making sure that we have that information was krit tal. >> it sounds good. it doesn't seem that was the case in 2012. i will move on and ask you at the november 20 senate commerce committee hearing, you said nitsa acknowledged a plan authorizing dealers to disable potentially defective passenger side airbags with replacement parts unable, as long as they tell consumers no the to put someone in that passenger seat. is nitsa's acknowledgement an

endorsement? should it be an opinion for all manufacturers of vehicles with passenger side airbags subject to recall. >> if the first and foremost priority should be getting the passenger airbags fixed. >> i understand. but is this an acknowledgement that this is the appropriate plan until you can get a replacement? >> if the parts aren't available and if the vehicle doesn't have an occupant set that would disable the airbags, then, yes, it's an appropriate step to take in the interest of safety. >> can i ask this? as the nation's top highway safety traffic official, can you tell this subcommittee you will put in the policy supporting this? is that in writing? >> this is -- it has been part of our standard process. one, if a part is broken, then an automaker can disable it without facing legal penalties. we made that clear to the

automakers. >> is that a weren't formal policy of nitsa? >> no. >> will it become one? >> we will investigate that. >> let me ask you, you heard -- you were in here for the testimony on the first panel? sfwl yes. >> did you hear when mr. shimzu at takata discussed manufacturing versus design and he classified this as a manufacturing issue? do you believe it's a manufacturing problem or design problem? or do you not know at this point? >> i would argue his testimony was inconsistent. he was clear that the industry is not clear yet on the root cause of the problem, which is why we are pushing to get to the bottom of it. >> i know we don't know yet. but do you view the propellant as the prime suspect right now? >> it's clear the propellant is involved. that said, we know other manufacturers in the '90s used the same propellant. we're looking to determine whether there have been any

ruptures associated with those. we have not found it. if there are no represeuptures those, it's an indication that if you have good design and manufacturing, the propellant may be safe to use. but clearly, no matter what, if you don't have the appropriate design and you don't have the appropriate manufacturing, you failed to live up to your responsibility. >> even some previous takata scientists have indicated early that using an ammonium nitrate protell atlanta was not safe. >> we are asking the exact same questions, which is why we have compelled under oath all information from takata on all the changes that they have made to the propellant and why we are bringing in outside expertise who has had experience with these propellants. >> thank you. my time has expired. >> thank you. >> does dr. burgess wish to is any questions? >> yes. thank you. >> you are recognized for five

minutes. >> i thank the chairman for the courtesy of the recognition. thank you for being here. we have had a chance to interact on other subcommittees in other roles, particularly with ignition problems earlier this year. let me ask you a question. mr. yarmoth of kentucky posed a question to takata and posed to generally to the manufacturers. but his time was running short. he said he would request an answer in writing. his question basically was, how can we be confident the replacement airbags are safe. let me pose that question to you. there's a recall going on. various manufacturers are providing replacement parts. to the extent, can the public be reassured that these replacement parts are safe? >> we believe that the replacement parts, for example, on the passenger side are safer

than the ones that are in the vehicles. the data points to a time of over ten years before the failures have occurred. that said, we are looking into the adequacy of this remedy. if we determine that it is not adequate and that it doesn't ensure safety of the american public, we will push them to take other steps. this ties in part back to the root cause question. getting to the root cause is part of the key of determining the appropriateness and the effectiveness of this remedy. >> i would point out there's more than a issemantic differen between safe and safer. >> i agree. that said, our job is to protect the american public and if the american public can be provided with airbags that are safer, i truly believe that is the right step. because that can save lives. >> let me ask you a question. because you just dealt with the propellant a bit, and that has come up several times this

morning. the fact is that propellant did change from the '90s into the last decade. currently, are there ongoing studies to look the athe type of protell atlanta and are there safer 21st century propellants that ought to be considered? >> certainly, we are aware of the industry looking at a variety of different propellants, different manufacturers use different ones. takata has evolved the formulation of their propellant. that's a reason why as we learn more about that we have compelled them to provide all the information under oath of those changes. we have been reaching out and -- >> can i stop you there? >> yes. >> it's just -- i don't want to project. but in many ways the answers today provided by takata seem less than forthcoming. i don't know whether that's just me that picked up on that. but do you have similar concerns? >> i share your concerns. that's why, one, we have required them to answer questions under oath, because

now it's not just their word that's at stake. it's more because we with penalize them or they can be held much more broadly responsible if they lie under oath. second, we are not simply trusting takata. we are in conversations with multiple or airbag suppliers and we are bringing in outside expertise on this propellant, because we agree with you. we cannot simply trust the information that takata gives us. we need to make sure we are covering all our bases to get to the bottom of this for the safety of the american public. >> let me go back to something i think others brought this up. many, many years ago when this -- not this subcommittee but our committee in energy and xhergs was doing an investigation into unxhanlded accelerations in vehicles in 2009. ultimately, there was -- in response to mr. waxman, the amount you can fine someone is capped at $35 million. but in that instance, there was

over and above that fine, there was an action by the department of justice. at this point, are you contemplating additional referral to the department of justice on anything that you have uncovered in this investigation? >> we have been working and cooperating with department of justice and helping them in their effort since september. >> so that is on the table as far as a future action would be concerned? >> my understanding is that the department of justice is looking into this matter. i would direct you to them for additional comment. >> i appreciate that. but it certainly when that occurred in response to the uncommanded acceleration issue, while i might agree that your ability to fine is limited, certainly there seems to be a fairly significant legal stick that you had at your disposal and another tool that might be

useful in compelling cooperation. >> fundamentally, it was discovered that toyota lied to us, despite their lies we got to the bottom of that problem, d determined the problems and got those vehicle recalled. we fined them because of their failings. in that case, we worked very closely with the justice department in efforts that led to their fine of more than a billion dollars. we -- >> i did not mention a manufacturer. you did. i want that to be clear. mr. chairman, i appreciate the time. i will yield back. >> thank you. recognize the gentleman from maryland for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i just have a question about your capacity as an agency and whether you feel that you have the resources you need to do the job and what your capacity currently is in terms of reinforcing public disclosure

and encouraging greater transparency and looking at this particular incident that we're investigating or that we're having testimony on today, would enhanced capacity, additional staff dedicated to the office of defect investigations to the early warning reporting and so forth, would that have assisted your agency in this instance and then more broadly if you could speak to your capacity, that would be helpful. >> the simple and state forward answer is, yes. we are a small agency that i would argue punches well above our weight. over the last decade, our efforts have led to the recall of nearly 1 million vehicles. but it's also clear when you have a fleet of over $260 milli -- 260 million vehicles, murlt mre manufacturers and safety issues,

that we need more resources to ensure we can do everything we can to keep the public safe. the president's budget has continued to request additional resources, both for our office of defects investigation but also for the rest of our agency. congressman, 33,561 people died in 2012. 33,561 tragic lives lost because of issues such as drunk driving. people not waring a seat belt. vehicles that could have had more technology on board to keep them safer. there's no doubt in my mind that with more resources, we can do more to address the epidemic that faces americans in terms chz fatalities and injuries every year on our roads. >> i would imagine that those resources would help you both kind of chase information on the front end, that would get you to a place of pushing for solutions as well as not having to maybe

triage or prioritize in ways once you have got the information in, because you have the capacity to address a number of these things simultaneously. i appreciate your providing that testimony. with that, i yield back. >> thank you. having no other members requesting time, that then concludes your testimony and questions. this committee, as you know, we can submit written questions to you. i would expect that. we will try to be timely and request that your office be timely in their providing us the responses to those questions. thank you. you were very informative. we like charts. nice job with the visual aides. now -- have any other closing?

a quick note before we adjourn here is that this subcommittee and full committee bipartisanly have concerns about the role nitsa plays in continuing these continuing large-scale recalls. and i hope that nitsa will fully cooperate with the gao as they carry out of request to look at nitsa's internal procedures and processes. >> mr. chairman, we will cooperate. i look forward to working with the committee on ways that nitsa can get resources, additional people, computer tools so that we can do the best job for the american public. >> very good. >> mr. chairman, could you -- >> the gentleman from maryland. >> wasn'ted edwanted to thank for his service on this committee and in this house. we appreciate his leadership and wish him well.

>> thank you. i appreciate that. we are adjourned. yes. thank you. >> thank you. as the airbag hearing wraps up, we take you live now to the museum in washington, d.c. for a foreign policy conference features former u.s. ambassadors, several high-level politicians and journalists discussing the middle east, russia and u.s. defense policy. it got under way about 20 minutes ago. we join it now in progress. this is james jeffrey, former u.s. ambassador to iraq. live coverage.

>> small numbers of highly trained professionals. but they would be at some risk. they will make all of the difference going out there with iraqi forces, be they peshmerga, sunni triefshal, iraqi army. there's a huge difference between how these people perform and how people in other conflicts such as vietnam perform when you have american advisers with them and how they perform without them. >> we don't have the luxury of having them perform in an inadequate way. i don't understand why the administration is dragging its heels when it hears from dempsey, others that this is something that should be and is being contemplated. that's it. >> ambassador, your recommendations for president obama? >> the first would be within the wreath and itself to prioritize. most everyone would agree that syria and iraq with probably the

two highest priorities because of the islamic state. but also because of the strain that the conflict is putting on other countries that are friendly to us, such as jordan and turkey. so that would be the first. prioritize. second -- jim has laid out a series of military steps. i would say in addition to military steps, there needs to be a regional political effort at a higher level. it is very clear that we and the turks are not on the same page about syria and i don't think we're fully on the same page about iraq. with all due respect to colleagues in the career diplomatic service with whom i shared a career, that is not something that an american ambassador is going to be able to fix. we're not on the same wave with the saudis fully as well. that is not something that the american ambassador in ree ata

is going to fix. that's going to require some high level time, bandwidth is the expression of the day in washington, here working with the leaders in those countries to come to an agreement on not only the islamic state but a whole broader set of issues related to nation states and stability versus reform. we have already sort of worked it cross purposes in places like egypt. that shouldn't happen again. that should not happen again. so there's got to be pry organization. second, higher level engagement, consistently. and then my third bit of advise to the administration would be, don't give up on reform and greater respect for human rights, but understand that you will have to balance it -- you

will have to balance it with security issues. to my mind, looking at the arab spring, you don't have to have a big bang and create democratic governments in six months. you do need to have gradual visible improvement so that this aggrieved sunni arab population i was talking about has a sense that little by little things will get better. whether that be beginning some measures of accountability, even at a low level, for police abuse. whether that be allowing some, not all, some ngos a greater freedom of maneuver. different countries will move at a different speed. that's fine. i think it would be a mistake for the americans to ignore human rights in the rush to

security policy and the fight against the islamic state, because the islamic state in part comes out of grievances, human rights ab s s s s abused y the regime and the previous government in iraq. that's where it came from. y you can't ignore the root causes even as you address very reasonably the counterterrorism policy. the trick is to find a balance and accept gradual improvement on the human rights. it doesn't have to be fast. we don't need bahrain to become a full parliamentary democracy. we do need to see step by step improvement along with counterterrorism efforts. >> thank you, ambassador. i think the two of you have set us up well for questions from the audience. with a number of interesting and provocative statements. so it is my pleasure actually to call on members of the audience. let me ask you to do the

following things. if i call on you, first of all, please wait for microphone so our guests on c-span can listen to your question. secondly, please phrase your question in the form of a question. please make it short so we can hear from our two distinguished ambassadors and get tlir insights into this situation. we will actually start with the gentleman in the back in the brown coat. yes, thank you. please introduce yourself, too. >> sure. my name is jay hallon, part of the fpi alumni leadership network. i served in the coalition provisional authority in iraq ten years ago. spent some time over there. my question is about iraq. why is it still the administration's policy to maintain iraq's territorial integrity, especially given with

regard to the kurds, given everything they done with isis. they have been our best allies. we could open a base there if they were interest pend enter. now they are selling oil to turkey. turkey practically recognizes them as a state. they have a truce with the pkk. why is it a problem with our administration? i heard kerry talking about this recently about iraq's territorial integrity. thank you. >> that's a good question. as someone who always feels more comfortable in irbil than anywhere else in iraq, i have somebody with people who pose that question. i can't think of anything that would be more detrimental than that. if iraq falls apart, we have to have a plan b. but it hasn't fallen apart yet in fact, it gathered up and is holding together. a lot of help from the united states, particularly politically with the new government.

several points. first of all, the united states has to stand for something in this world. we stand for a lot. that's behind almost everything we do. one thing we do stand for is a nation state system. we don't look lightly at nation states that break up because of the legal issues, partially because of the problems that ensue when, for example, yugoslavia breaks up. the first problem is, what -- where would you put the southern border of a you are in kurdistan? that's a question to you. i like questioning. >> that's fine. i know there's a framework for an election on the status of a state. i know there's a group in georgetown that studies that closely. i don't think that's insurmountable. i think they could come to an

agreement on a border or some kind of oil -- they could -- they agreed on some kind of oil sharing. i don't see why they couldn't come to a comparable agreement on the border. >> two reasons. there are many other reasons. i just pick the easiest from my standpoint to rebut your argument. that is the borders. if they could come to some -- with some group from georgetown, that would be the first time in my 40 years of experience -- maybe we can throw in robert's 30 years of experience in conflicts around the world from kashmir to cyprus where somebody fixed a border. the problem is particularly and violent destabilized regions, people identify with their own kind. whether we like it or not. and those are mixed areas with christians, kurds, shia arabs. they have their own agenda.

all of the groups think each other group's presence is illegitimate. i could spend hours talking about from the standpoint of each of them why all the others should go away. they are not going to go away. they will pick up guns and fight and create the bloodiest of borders in the middle east. that's the first problem. second problem is i'm not only a former ambassador to iraq, i'm a former ambassador to turkey. turkey for various reasons that we could get into is very close to this current regional government in oil and gas has to do with that. if there's one thing that the turks will draw a brutal line on, we just saw this, is anything that smacks of kurds getting together on independence. they will never support it. that would bring down the government, however popular it is in a heart beat and whatever our problems with that government, we don't want to destabilize turkey. i would say we certainly should go no further than turkey on

autonomy or independence for kurd sta kurdistan. the turks are on the record on that one. >> the gentleman up front. >> thanks. the topic of this conversation is restoring american leadership. both of you have done a good job, as have other speakers, talking about how we see the world. tell us how you think the middle east sees the united states right now in the role that the united states can be, should be and will be playing in the future. >> who wants that? >> i will start. i hate to be the bearer of bad news. i'm serious. there are opinion polls done by

ve group groups. the public opinion towards the united states fris extremely negative. has something to do with our longstanding positions on the middle east peace process. has a lot to do with iraq and the american war there. it has to do as well with perceptions of the american stance on islam in general. there is real anger in syria, the place that i spent a huge amount of time, that the americans seem to be more concerned with the islamic state, which has killed -- it's a brutal organization. very bloody. probably killed three to 5,000 people. but the asad regime has probably killed 150,000. why are the americans so concerned about the islamic state and not about a regime that has probably killed 30 to 50 times as many people.

that is a problem. and that is not something which mere public diplomacy, to use the state department's lingo, it's not a public diplomacy problem. it's a policy problem. it will require, i think, some fairly -- number one, some fairly serious thinking here about where we are going in the region and are we moving in directions that lead to new opportunities down the road. and then second, it's again going to take some pretty serious engagement, starting at the top, embassies will have their work to do in this as well. explaining our vision, our vision how it is combatable with people there in terms of dignity and how we can help but understanding that these are their countries, their societies and that ultimately they, not

us, are responsible. so we are working to help empower them but ultimately these are their choices for their future. >> do you have anything you wish to add? >> very quickly, having been held accountable for lousy polls in several countries i was in, we never are going to do well in polling. exhibit a for that is, after getting tired of yelling from washington at our below 20% favorable ratings counting the kurds, who are in favor of us, like berliners, i then ask the question, okay, let's see what the polls say about iran. in both countries, iran was down there with us. here is my theory. among populations, no foreign country that's powerful is ever going to be a winner, because it makes people nervous, regardless of what we say or do. our goal should be -- boy, does

this fly in the face of much of what washington puts out these days. the political thinking elite to convince them, that's what we did in europe. i spend nine years in germany. most germans are not loving of us. political elites were and they made the difference. the people followed them. if we have the right policies, as robert said, then we will do a lot better among those people if they feel they can count on us, if we get back to being their -- i hate to say it, their 911 and we are reliable, we will find the people who matter -- that goes beyond government. but it isn't the entire population polled. they will basically be willing to meet us halfway. >> all right. terrific questions. i will go to the woman here in the third row back. please do introduce yourself and ask a great question. >> ann pierce.

i'm an author. i was asked to repeat a question i asked in the first panel. here goes. there's a compelling argument against fighting isis without also forging strong strategy to contain and thwart terror sponsoring proliferating atrocity committing states, syria and iran. without putting an end to the brutal regime, one of the worst the world has seen. my question is, is grand strategy at risk in the fight against isis given the ways that that fight benefits iran and syria? >> that is an interesting question. i tee it up to the ambassadors with some interest. >> to be very blunt, it is impossible to contain the islamic state in even iraq

without also dealing with syria. if nothing else, you the islamic state having deep strategic depth in syria will enable it constantly to be a problem in iraq. let me just give you a little historical context. jim and i were in iraq during the war there. when we were trying to shut down that syrian iraqi border, we never were able do it, never -- let me say this again. never were able to do it without somewhere between three and four american combat brigades in the province, the most western province of iraq, and in the province of mosul to the north. three to four american brigades

plus four loyal iraqi army divisions. a total of roughly 20,000 american soldiers plus 40,000 iraqi soldiers. and even then, it was always a challenge. so now we face, frankly, a group more capable than the syrian military intelligence that was causing us problems, much more capable group, without dealing with the syrian side of that border, i don't see how the strategy in iraq can be a success. it will certainly make some gains as it -- we have had gains in iraq. there's a little bit of good news from iraq on the military side. the islamic state is losing ground northeast of baghdad, south of baghdad. it's actually retreating. that's good. however, it hasn't yet been fighting in the sunni heartland. when it gets to the sunni

heartland, the militias that have been making the progress northeast of baghdad and south of baghdad, when they start interacting with sunni populations in places like mosul, look out. there we wim have a problem. this gets back into what i was saying about the human rights issues. you can't ignore them even as you deal with the counterterrorism issue. on thei syrian side of the border, it's so bad that options that would have, i think, been quite useful three years ago with the passage of three years and two years, it's much more difficult. but i go back to the most fundamental issue about containing the islamic state in syria. it is not something which drone strikes or f-16 strikes is going to contain, because the islamic

state, let's face it, a, it's a state. it drives me crazy that washington won't say that. it is a state. it has an administration. it has an army. it controls territory. it runs schools. it runs hospitals. it runs an energy sector. it's a state. deal with that. that's a bigger threat even. so you do not destroy a state with drone strikes. you require boots on the ground. i sincerely hope myself that we do not have to have american boots on the ground in syria. i spent 4 1/2 years in iraq trying to get an iraqi government stood up so we could get american boots out of iraq. but then we need boots on the ground. there needs to be serious thinking here in washington about whose boots on the ground those are going to be. do you think assad has the boots on the ground or is it the people against assad? there aren't a lot of other options. i would submit to you just the

grim reality of iraq and syria after 3 1/2 years of attrition. the assad regime does not have the manpower to take on the islamic state. that's why it had an indirect truce for the better part of two years. they don't have the manpower. look at the people fighting against assad. this administration idea that the free syrian army is going to fight the islamic state without fighting the assad regime, the word fantasy gets thrown around a lot on syria. that is the biggest fantasy. end of speech. i will get off my soapbox. >> ambassador, expand the comments. talk a little bit about whether in fact the united states is perhaps inadvertently empowering iran through other states in the

region through its counter islamic state policy in iraq and syria. >> i was more worried about that until the 24th of last month than i am now, because i felt that there was a major push for an agreement on almost any terms with the iranians on the nuclear account. fortunately the iranians saved our bacon by refusing on almost any terms an agreement. so now that particular momentum is no longer with us. i think the iranian air strikes in iraq over the last several days are an indication that the iranians sense this and want to cause a little bit more trouble in a way that's a good thing. the iran yaz and assad are not as robert said our allies. on practical terms, they're not going to liberate sunni arab areas. they are going to be massacred or massacre the locals. secondly, we don't have need them.

we and our 60 allies who were up in brussels have enough forces, have enough money, have enough capability if we mobilize ourselves and do it right. again, as the general said with american leadership. i'm normally weary of that team, but in that record we can do this and we don't want to do it with them because to get to your core question, at the end of the day, that's the point i was trying to make in my intere introductory comments, assad and iran and isis are manifestations of the same problem. alternative universes. china -- you will talk about russia later today. they are big problems. because of their power. but they want to modify the west system, tweak it to be regional. but they exist within the same reality word that we do. there are people in the middle east, including iranians and the iranians are driving force behind assad and isis that have

an alternative view. it's a question of prioritizization. priority right now is isis. >> all right. we have a question from the gentleman in the second row. the microphone is coming. >> captain cooper, africa command. something that every region is faced with and you have the perspective -- i'm going to piggyback off the question, accounting for capability of wills of partner states, be it real owe pretend, in looking at you mentioned engagement and opportunity, have you seen as chiefs of mission an increasing aversion to risk? is that potential aversion to risk a risk to implementation on the policy side all the way down to a tactical level? >> yeah.

the obvious one being not putting advisory teams out with trained and competent and capable units. you have to be careful you don't risk people for no reason. we had this effectively in vietnam. i was trained as one. it's the normal way do things. africa is famous for having teams all over the region. why not in iraq where we have huge issues in play? the only thing i will say is because i don't want to be too negative to this administration, which is justly often accused of risk adverse behavior, the risk adverse behavior flows from the mistakes we made from 2001 and 2003, including the obama surge in afghanistan where we thought we could make a huge difference

by putting hundreds of thousands of american troops on the ground in a clear hold build. we did the clear and hold because that's what american troops are good at. we couldn't do the bill. that's the point problem erober making. if we're your exit strategy, you don't have one. it's been a long about painful lesson for the american people. the risk surveys have shown, the lowest level. it has come up because the beleddibeled i -- because of the beheadings. it's not a good environment for presidents to take big risks. >> wonderful. good time for additional questions. in fact, i will ask the gentleman behind the gentleman that i called on please to ask his question. >> this is a broader context. after the u.s. ended its

obligations in '71 to redeem u.s. dollars in gold -- accumulated by foreign governments, we substituted the petro dollar where 40% of the world's oil we require it be sold only in the u.s. dollar, which maybe incurs resentment around the world. to what extend are we committed to staying in the middle east to enforce this, iraq broke with it, began to sold its oil and libya wanted to sell oil for gold. might we restore a new agreement and make step towards a more peaceful world? >> perhaps i could ask the ambassadors, to what extent have you found that u.s. policy that you have had to execute has been primarily about oil politics veer suss the ge versus geopolitical? >> energy is part of it.

first of all -- i'm not a financial economist. i would challenge that we have a formal agreement that oil is in dollars. that's a practice. it's like wide bodied aircraft are sold in dollars. the chinese and russians who are trying to undercut that. there are reasons why the intergs naal financial system, which like euro dollars back 40 years ago is created by american actions but not specific american actions has led to something based upon our economic strength, our role in international financial markets that is not necessarily in our favor but it's out there. but it isn't any sort of plan nor is it a specific agreement. the point is, the united states took a decision after world war ii when communist labor unions egged on by stalin were freezing europe in the winter of i think

'46 or '47 that oil from the middle east was absolutely essential not for us. we were exporting oil at that time. but for our allies in europe and the far east. that has created a part of the entire global geo strategic situation. our allies and friends, korea, japan and such and europe are almost entirely hydro carbon devoid. we are in good shape, particularly now and always have been in fairly good shape. but they aren't. the only place that those hydrocarbons can come from is an unstable part of the world. the middle east. that's part of the entire geostrategic global relationship that we have had for 60 years. it's not to advance interests of american oil companies or to advantage our economy in any way. it's basically to ensure that

our allies remain economically strong, can stay democratic, can provide military forces to defend themselves and alie with us in places like the trying to

introduce american companies to the algerian market. we had some success with a major u.s. industrial company that built a huge water plant that supplies algiers one-third of its drinking water. i wouldn't assume a place like algeria where energy is a huge economic factor in the relationship that it actually sets the tone for the relationship. i don't think it does. if the companies are happy, i think the government's incomplicatiincompl incomplication is to stay out. in the short-term as we see energy prices dropping and the american economy doing relatively well compared to europe and even chinese growth is slowing, i would be surprised if gulf exporters would be

particularly keen to shift oil sales out of dollars and into other currencies. certainly not yen. certainly not chinese right now and not euros. they will be happy keeping it in dollars. i don't see they would have an immediate commercial an vantage. >> i would like to ask the ambassadors for one big take away. if you could predict for us, use your an lettic powers to forecast where you think the crises in iraq and syria will be, let us say six or eight months from now as the foreign

policy initiative is putting together its program for its next conference, where do you think we will have gotten to in these respective struggles? >> my home is we will be no worse off than we are now. i suspect that we will have contained isis pretty well as robert said. we are on the offensive a bit in areas in the sunni belt to the south of baghdad. i don't see mosul being taken. i think we will be at that point really questioning what our policies are. the other unknowable is iran and how iran will react to the situation not only with isis but the fact that they no longer -- they will be under long-term sanctions. i don't think we will get an agreement in seven months. how is it going to react? it's another destabilizing force

and they are growing in intensity in the region. >> terrific. do you have a different prediction? >> i can imagine we might be slightly better off in six months in iraq. there's also been progress on the kurdish baghdad issue. with at least a preliminary agreement about how to manage the oil export question and federal budget. i think things in syria will go from bad to worse. i presume people in the audience know the u.n. relief agencies are running out of money. they are cutting back rations. that will cause further difficulties in those countries. we will have very unhappy refugees.

the region has experience with unhappy refugees in previous places. it is now.

would expect that the so-call >> thank you again so much for joining us. also, before we get started with the next panel, want to take a quick moment to thank the presenting sponsor of this year's forum, raytheon, for everything they have done to make this day possible and to thank the incredible team here at the foreign policy initiative for all their work organizing panel discussions like the one that you have just enjoyed. we will be back in just a second.

thank you as we move into the second panel discussion of the afternoon. looking at the second of the cr face in the world today, putin's challenge to the west to moderate the discussion, a real pleasure to welcome a fellow with the foreign policy initiative, last correspondent for the daily beast. previously, he has reported for the new republic, for radio free europe, radio liberty. jamie has traveled the world and written for multiple locations, but has particular expertise

looking at eastern europe and russia. so, we couldn't have a better moderator for this conversation. jamie is a great colleague and friend and i know that you will answer joy his talents as a moderator. thank you, jamie. >> thank you, chris, we have a really amazing panel today. i want to be very brief in introducing our panelists so we can get right to it. starting on my left, we have david cramer who just stepped out after four years as the director -- president's of freedom house and now at the mccain institute. previous to that he served in the bush administration and the state department. and has particular expertise in moldova, ukraine, europe, central eastern europe. miroslav virginia gongaza, tv reporter and anchor for "voice of america." she has covered ukraine extensively and its two democratic revolutions. she is the widow of georgie gongaza, investigative reporter who was allegedly murdered by government authorities in 2000. after her husband's death, she

formed a foundation in honor of her late husband, which is dedicated to promoting the rights of journalists and free speech. and to my immediate left is peter pomerantzev, an author and television producer who spent many years in moscow doing -- producing reality tv and he has written this amazing new book, which i cannot recommend highly enough, "nothing is true and everything is possible," it is the motto of today's russia. he is also the co-author of a report for the institute of modern russia, the menace of unrate, about kremlin disinformation. also, very worth reading and we have several copies out front. so, the theme of the panel today is putin's threat to the west. and i think it's very important that we understand the topic as the threat that putin poses to the west, not just ukraine, not just as neighbors, but to the -- to the values and to the liberal

international order that the united states has upheld for the past 70 years. each of our speakers has particular expertise in certain parts, certain areas of russia and ukraine and i'm gonna start with david and i wanted to ask you, david, now that you're -- you're out of freedom house, you can say what you want -- >> now that i have my freedom. >> now that you have your freedom, how much -- you have been liberated from freedom house, how much -- the past six years of obama administration foreign policy, how much can we -- can we attribute what's happened with russia, the deterioration in the bilateral relationship, the aggression that we have seen, the gross abuses of human rights within russia invading its neighbors, how much of that can be attributed, do you think, to specific policies of the obama administration, missteps that they have made or how much of it was basically inevitable once vladimir putin came back to power in 2010 or 2012?

'12? >> jamie, thanks, and thanks to fpi for inviting me to be on this panel with miroslav virginia, a very dear friend and peter, it's great to be here. i don't think the obama team learned from the mistakes we made, in particular, with did he not, despite claims that the bush administration took a finger wagging, legging sure, patronizing approach to russia on human rights, we stopped raising those issues for the most part. and we went silent. i wish we were guilty of the charge we took a finger wagging, lecturing approach to russia on human rights. we did and we also didn't do much after russia invaded georgia and that was, i think, also a mistake. so the obama administration came in, wanted to wipe the slate clean, start over. i think that idea wasn't

necessarily wrong in concept, you the execution of it was. and i wand, as others did, that there were some concerns that we had about the recent approach, that the administration would go silent on democracy and human rights issues, continuing essentially the silence from the bush administration, but a major difference that they would throw the neighbors under the bus. there would be a russian-centric approach and the other countries in the region, including ukraine, would be neglected. the third thing i warned about in 2009 was the missile defense decision. and unfortunately, i would say all three of those concerns came to be true, but more fundamentally, i would say the administration lacked real understanding of what was happening in moscow. and it didn't fully appreciate the nature of the putin regime, which is a thoroughly corrupt, front, authoritarian regime, where putin is hellbent on staying in power, no matter what, including if it requires jailing, killing opponents,

critics, invading neighbors. putin in his kremlin circle are determined to stay in power in order to protect the ill-gotten gains they have gotten over the years in power and it becomes a vicious circle. so the bulk of the problem, i would argue, isn't moscow. the problem here in this city has been a lack of understanding that the problem is in moscow in the inability to develop a serious relationship with the regime that goes in such an antithetical direction that we aspire to. >> miroslava it has been seven months since russia invaded ukraine and i use that word very specifically because so many people in this town and other capitals don't want to use that word, be very clear that russia has invaded ukraine and the invasion happened in march. you saw senator mccain here earlier, he told us that the ukrainian people basically lost hope in the united statesful i was in ukraine last month

monitoring the election, two months ago. i got a similar message from him. would you agree? do you think that the ukrainian people are in it for themselves at this point? >> that is how they probably feel. unfortunately, they -- the one thing they remember, in 1994, they signed the buddha pest agreement. they always repeating that. we signed that agreement and united states, great britain and russia guarantee, i mean, take the responsibility to guarantee our sovereignty, territorial integrity. it didn't happen. we signed the agreement, but it was a simple piece of paper. the agreement doesn't have particular responsibility. what has -- what has to be done if something like an invasion happened? so they do feel betrayed by

western powers and they are asking for help. they -- they are fighting this war, i mean, i'm impressed how in two or three months, ukrainian army become a real force because i think putin goal is to destroy the ukrainian military and economic capabilities. they were able to actually fight back. and at this point, putin controls only 10% of one area. it is not a big territory. i mean -- >> plus crimea. >> crimea, right. but they are the most pro-russian regions in the ukraine. there are eight russian-speaking

regions in ukraine, but crimea and don bass are most pro-russian, i would say. i think putin actually failed in understanding that. he thought that he would be much more successful stirring up that pro-russian feelings in those territories. but he mixed up russian-speaking with russians. and it's not the same. and that's why i think what thank what we have, the situation we have right now that's trying to -- he failed to stir up the that there was no uprising, pro-russian uprising in the east of ukraine and now he is using every possible force to take over. i don't think we can hope he give up. >> peter had the previous two speakers talk about real hard

power, considerations, invasions of countries and whatnot. can you tell us about the threat that the russians disinformation apparatus poses to the west? i think is there a difference between disinformation and propaganda that you have written about quite perceptively. can you tell us how that represents a threat to us? >> michael weiss, we started researching what we thought would be the subject of russian prop begaganda and realized qui we needed a whole new vocabulary for what the russians were doing. since the mid-2,000s, the they have been developing a different theory of war, which is total and permanent war which doesn't necessarily involve kinetic caption and the information on psychological operations. we used to have syops here, a small department in a much bigger military apparatus, the

brits got rid of at the end of the cold war. in russia, everything is syops. military moved away and everything is now syops. the way they talk about it has nothing to do with public diplomacy, messaging, spin, all the stuff we are obsessed. they talk about information, using information for subversion, demoralization, essentially as a weapon. it's a whole different way in what they can do they watch russian tv, there they have full control over the media, or at least partial control of the russian-language media. so, latvia and estone ya in a complicated situation because essentially, the russian concept of information, psychological war, everything is a weapon, not just media, also ngos, the church, everything, so, basically, society becomes the sort of endless military guise called phase one operation,

before the soldiers come in, phase one operations sort about shaping opinions and sort of blackmailing and creating the context for a military invasion, but now we have phase one operations all the time in latvia and estone ya so latvia and estone ya, what do we do? start banning the tv channels, we stop being a democrat circumstance a very insidious threat a way of attacking liberal democracies from inside the very fabric rather than from outside. so, yeah i can go on and on. >> is this -- this is up for all of you just to jump in, is there something that's actually more pernicious and even more frightening about this conflict that we have with russia now. if you look at the cold war, very predictable, soviet communists, they had an ideology, it was in a book, you can read it, marxism, leninism, various communist parties and groups. today, it's completely a different story, very hard to deciph decipher. the kremlin has allies ranging from hungarian fascists to

german ex-communists and it's an incredibly adaptable ideology, if they even have an ideology. many ways, less predictable. would you say this current crisis if we have now, call it a new cold war, whatnot, how is it different from the old and is it, in fact, more threatening? that's for all -- that's for all of you. >> um, i think these comparisons to cold war are incredibly unhelpful. i think the problem -- the danger is just throw away also by the cold war, it gets in the way, and throw away the great game. look, the danger for me is russia is pioneering this now, this new form of third generation non-kinetic whatever. the question for me is does this then become the new paradigm, so we mentioned isis in the previous session. something very, very similar with information. didn't get bottom up, the russians don't get top down. what if this is the future and

we have -- we are about to face a deluge of disinformation and we have none of the capacities to deal with it? that's what frightens me. russia's ages, yes, you're quite right, what's interesting about them, very, very different and very, very, sort of like adapted to various circumstances, they want one thing in serbia and do an operation there very operational about you there is of course, a grand merit and we have got to understand in its own weird way, russia is at war with only one country, this one. they don't care about -- >> estone ya. >> right. they don't really care. a couple of people do but most people don't care. the whole point is if they can find a narrative trick, a little informational provocation to, you know, undermine article five, to show that 1991 transition was a joke that america is a paper tiger, then america's reputation is undermined. it is interesting, we are in a space of pure information, but the consequences could be really quite, you know, bad, if, you know, american credibility is undermined the way the russias want.

>> unfortunately, for a long time and you ask david the first question, do we have -- is it result of our -- our -- that we didn't do anything, seeing what was going on in russia, i think, yes, we are bearing fruits from our policy and the policy of previous bush administration. unfortunately, we are -- we were closing eyes on everything with what russia did in the last 15, 20 years. the first proxy war happened in -- then georgia and now we have ukraine. but we didn't do -- we didn't do anything back then because we saw, okay, something going on in that part of the world. it's just -- the soviet union just broke up. nobody understood really what's really going on. and russia, back then, were

already trying to take territory and destabilize the regions around them to control them. talking about the -- >> our eyes to -- >> yeah, we are, yes. and we are still, i think we are still in denial a little bit. and the western society kind of played a part because look how russia developed. it's all corrupt activities. they used foreign banks. they used foreign governments. they used european banks to wash their money and now they have become so powerful, it's hard to find a way to fight with them and i think that the decision to actually put sanctions on russia, it's a very good decision because first, we have to destroy them economically and then see what we can do else. >> the price of oil may be

helping. >> if i could just pick up on what myroslava said. i have argued for sanctions since day one. i support the legislation that was passed in 2012 over the objections of the obama administration. but sanctions alone aren't going to do the trick. and this is where i think not helping ukraine defend itself against russia's invasion, russia's aggression is an enormous mistake. ukraine is not a member of nato so we don't have article five responsibilities with ukraine. but nevertheless, ukraine is a critically important country in the heart of europe that is essential to fulfilling the vision enunciated by george h. w. bush years ago of a europe whole, friend at peace. and if russia doesn't stop with ukraine, it's ukraine today it will be moldova tomorrow, estone ya, not necessarily tanks crossing the border, though that is happening. >> just need five guys in the government building. >> but also stirring up locals, buying local ast, if they can. the other point i would just

make is what distinct wishes i would say makes russia a bigger threat to us than china is china tends to be regime neutral, which is to say china's willing to work with other governments around the world, whether the democracy or authoritarian regimes, they don't particularly care, they don't necessarily view the advance of democracy and other countries, even in asia, as a threat to china itself. russia views the progression of democrat circumstance liberalization, efforts to integrate into europe as a threat to russia. putin views a threat because if it could happen in ukraine it could happen in russia. that's what spooked him about the events starting last november. it's what spooked him in 2003 in georgia, 2004 in ukraine, and so, what he does is he says the u.s. state department is responsible for that, because he refuses to believe that indigenous populations on their own could demand democracy, rule of law, end of corruption and having worked in the state department and no disrespect to my colleagues there, they couldn't organize a parade on c

street. [ laughter ] >> plan to go back there? >> maybe not. not after that comment. state department does great work. i worked there for eight years, but the state department doesn't spawn a revolution. >> nonsense. >> right. a different agency. [ laughter ] >> langly. >> but it is part -- gets a peer's point, which is we are viewed as being responsible and behind all these movements around the world. we wake up every day, in putin's mind, thinking about russia, when, in fact, most of the mistakes we make are we don't think about russia. missile defense, having worked in the bush administration when it was first launched, we had nothing to do with russia and then we did try to bring russia in on missile defense with the rice/gates meetings with the russian counterparts in the end of 2007/2008. you had the reset policy which could not be more accommodating to russia in trying to extend a hand and restore relations and

putin just slapped the hand away and views us as a threat. >> maybe mitt romney had a point when he said that russia was our greatest global adversary years ago. i think we are going to open it up to questions because we have such a short amount of time here. so, who in the audience would like to ask -- the lady over there. >> [ inaudible ] my name is charisse, i'm a member of the alexander hamilton society of the mason chapter. i just had a question based on putin's obsession with security and the fact that he, you know, stipulation that he might want to try to create a buffer zone around russia again. do you think that if he does try anything like this that our baltic allies might secede to him based on the fact -- out of the fear that they think we

might not come to help based on what's happened historically? >> i actually -- i want to give credit to the president for his trip to estone ya in september, where i think he did give reassurances to the baltic states. that said, two days after the president was there, russian forces kidnapped annest steen onsecurity force from estonian territory, which was a huge signal not just to estone ya but to us, but i was in estone ya recently and am in touch with people in the baltics, i think they're nervous and they should be nervous, but i do think that they feel that article five does mean something and i think nato deserves some credit for doing what it's done to beef up the security of neighbors of russia, but that said, we have to think not in the old-school terms of thousands of troops and tanks crossing the border. it's stirring up local populations along the russian --

astonia and russian border even with kaliningrad and lithuania, that's where i think the problem can become. and peter, you said latvia in particular is vulnerable because of the banking influence of russia and the russian money and chris walker is here, he knows latvia much better than i do. so, i think there should be reason for concern, but i don't think for alarm. >> i think one of the great unreported stories the past year really has been the real -- maybe not surprising but very disain the toing reactions from the governments in central and eastern europe. >> yep. >> in particular, czech republic, slovakia, hungary. the defense minister of the czech republic recently and the president -- sorry the prime minister of slovakia both said that stationing nato troops on their territory would be akin or remind them of the warsaw pact's invasion of 1968. this is a remarkable thing to say. both of these countries are nato members. both of those men are old enough to what the actual warsaw pact

invasion was like. you have hungary, which is a complete separate story, you could have a whole day's panel worth about that country. but these are, you know, who would have -- i think that in general, the american foreign policy community, we figure, this part of the world was done. we dish know, they were liberated from communism, they have liberal democracies now, they are set, they are finished, let move on to sexiersexier top asia and the middle east and i think what the ukraine crisis has exposed is just how real shallow those assumptions were. >> but i would like to emphasis the issue of propaganda and actually, russian-speaking population, off a lot of russian-speaking population in baltic states. and riga considered the most pro-russian towns in baltic states. russia is very, very successful and we here have to be very

careful and actually alarmed to that propaganda. look at rt, what they are doing. recently, i was in ukraine, a little story, i was in ukraine with vice president biden. and we were trying to go with president poroshenko to put flowers to the fallen and there was a lot of victims of people who died and they were upset with poroshenko, he didn't do enough for them so they were just upset, right? so poroshenko lay flower and they start screaming so biden decided not to go. it was -- like -- it was very kind of simple story, happened, there's nothing to do with biden at all. and the people were there just the poor people who lost their loved ones, right? so, first story coming from washington, i see is from

politico. mitco put russia today story on their website and wrote an article and said, vice president biden dodged mobs in -- angry mobs in ukraine. where did they get it from? did they at least research what really happened? spent five minutes checking the information? no. the's easy to take something from russia today abruptly, put it on their website and we are reading it. and repeating, repeating the lies. i thought maybe 10 or 20 articles -- similar articles around in western media. we have to be very, very careful what we are here putting on and not be -- >> peter, this is what you address in your report. could you maybe distill for us, give us the "reader's digest"

version, how do we, on the one hand, maintain our traditions of free speech, first amendment, while on the other hand, needing to respond to these lies and disinformation and propaganda? there are many people who say that rt should be shut down it is an fsb front it is not a legitimate news service and they should be kicked out of the country and the british government is maybe fining them for breaking the broadcasting standard. how do we balance these concerns? >> it's the regulators. but it's a very good question, because it is -- it's a subtle question because let's say the british situation. see, the key idea in russian information war is something called reflexive control, which is very, very big in the '60s and '70s much the big difference, we think about information, to the extent we think about it, it is usually about making people like us. we will go to afghanistan, play some pop music and suddenly, they will be dancing and they will buy some t-shirts or something and wow, there will be

democracy, which works really well. the russian thing is a bit different. so the idea behind reflexive control is that you get inside the other side's information processing system, intellectual system and then you spin it from inside. so, they say that the americans started this, most famously, the americans' claim building up up "star wars" and the union was bankrupt, the russians always start with the idea the americans did it to us, we have to do it back. so is russia today actually a reflexive control operation? is the point of russia today to get the british to ban it? much more pr -- posters immediately, if we get taken off air -- hasn't started yet, almost as that pushing off comment, come on, come on, ban us, doing this bizarre dance, look at the way they are trying to regulate them, like you have to be more impartial.

rt are like, we are an alternative news site. with where is the alternative? being very one sided. and it's bizarre watching them sniff around each other, 'cause i think the british are incredibly aware of what the russians are up to. so, in america, of course this suspect possible, because you have the first amendment and hallelujah and thank god for that but there is a sort of dark side to the first amendment, sort of like the rights to lie basically. >> on c-span. >> okay. so what does one do? i think nice to look at ideas to regulate the system from inside. much more about us than russia. russia is exploiting something that exist. so i'd like to see a kind of a transparency international information, an internationally recognized ratings system which would not rate propaganda, just rate disinformation and misinformation, somebody somebody like rt or maybe american channels, a one out of ten while the about bc a seven out of ten. immediately, we can just start regulating ourselves a little bit 'cause, again, my fear is what rt is doing now, everyone's

going to be doing more. and this is much more sort of pernicious than sort of like, you know, sort of fox news doing, you know, being obsessed with birth certificates. >> right. even though there are similarities. >> yes, in the back right there >> thanks very much, jay allen, part of the fpi leadership network. i'm not a russia expert but something i have always thought about is with regards to ukraine, i mean, it's been a tug-of-war if you leave ukraine as is, it seems it will be a tug-of-war going into the future, putin will always have his tentacles in there. is there anything to the idea of a strategic concession? concede crimea and maybe some of the other eastern parts so that the electoral balance is now fully tipped toward the western parties so that, you know, as a smaller ukraine a more united ukraine one that can be more

confident member of the west, is there anything to that idea or would that be, you know, the first pin falling and then the other countries? >> a very good question. i will leave that to david and myroslava. >> maybe you can calm down. the short answer is no. it would be appease., not concession. wouldn't be -- putin would view it as weakenness, an opening and his appetite would only be whetted, not sated. u ukraine was a peaceful country before all this ukraine was not a divided country. crimea wasn't looking to breakaway from ukraine. crimea was part of ukraine since 1954 and putin wants to revisit all the international agreements and understandings, particularly in the postcold war period, which opens up an enormous pandora's box. we shouldn't facilitate that we should take the same approach

toward crimea that we did toward the baltic states after they were absorbed by the soviet union where we never recognized their annexation and we should maintain that position and keep the sanctions in place until crimea returns to ukraine. the first sanctions were imposed in march of this year because of russia's annexation of ukraine and until that's undone, i don't see any reason to lift those sanctions. i don't see any reason to recognize crimea as part of ukraine. you can't even pretend -- part of raunch you can't even pretend that the referendum was serious. no one can organize a referendum in two weeks. and given that there were troops on the ground, even if they weren't wearing identifying insignia, people are intimidated by that very kind of environment and so, it was a farce of a referendum. the west was absolutely right not to recognize it what's also notable is no other country in the former soviet union has recognized it. so, they are nervous, they are

afraid. if we conceded crimea, all of those countries would be terrified. >> kazakhstan, where there's a large -- >> where putin recently said he didn't think it was a real state, nazabayev is responsible for it. >> he said that bulgaria doesn't have a national sovereignty, cannot make their own decision. so, he would never stop, unfortunately. >> that said, when i was in ukraine, i'm sure you can back me up on this, there are ukrainians who would agree with us, particularly in the west, who say enough of this donbass stuff, we don't want our sons dying for these people and never really considered them ukrainians. that's minority. >> i think myroslava knows more than i, think the reason poroshenko's party came in second on the parliamentary elections on the 26th is that many ukrainians think poroshenko made too many concessions to putin. i i have some empathy for his position because i think the

west isn't leaving him much choice, but i think he has been engaging with opportunity too much, because putin isn't interested in a compromise. putin's goal in ukraine is destabilization. he wants to ukraine ugly and unappealing to the west so that the west loses interest in u ukraine. wants to do that to all of his neighbors. would you think what a stupid idea to create instability a long your borders but instability to putin is much better than having moldova and georgia and ukraine move closer to europe, democratize, liberalize, because that becomes a threat to him. >> i cannot say anything better than david said. >> oh, i bet you could. say it in ukrainian. >> oh, yeah. >> do you have anything or should guy on to other -- the lady right here in the second row. i think we have a microphone for you. just one moment. >> um, my name is asta and i'm with the lithuanian american

communities, for many, many years on their public affairs council now. you're all preaching to the choir, as far as i'm concerned. but i do want to ask, we heard senator mccain's comments this morning, he talked about leadership and standing up to the russians and not buying into the argument of brett skoal cro -- brent scowcroft and others that the russians will escalate and we can't be part of that's school lation. our organization has been part of the coalition lobbying the administration and congress to make sure that we get military assistance to ukraine. the only argument out of the national security council, no other part of the government does it but only the people at the national security council, do your own mathematics there, there aren't enough u.s. public support, yet the german marshall funds that came out in september

show 43% of americans believe that there should be a military assistance to ukraine. now, that's more than a plurality. i realize it hasn't gotten to 51%, but what would you say to those nsc staffers right now? >> first of all, i'm not even sure that is the real reason why this administration doesn't want to give arms to ukraine. i think the reason they don't want to give arms to ukraine is because they don't want to anger moscow and still think there is perhaps -- >> provocative. it is provocative and view unfortunately these little baltic countries as nuisances in the way of a larger grand bargain to be made and i think we have seen this throughout the administration's foreign policy with iran, with other adversaries, basically let's sweep all these other pesky concerns aside, whether it's human rights, whether it's our traditional allies so that we can make a grand par gain with our adversaries, my read on the administration. >> i think there's a lot of things going on under cover. aid chance to talk to nsc

staffers on the interest into ukraine recently. and one thing they are trying to do, they are trying to -- i don't want to be their advocate, no watch i think ukraine should get much more than they are getting now and military support for sure. but there's a lot of -- first what they are trying to do to keep the coalition to together.

that means he doesn't recognize russia as a serious threat and that's very unfortunate that what i see. i think russia is one of the first threats to europe and the world, supporting everywhere, starting from syria, ending for a moment in europe, we have to take it seriously. have to have proactive policy. unfortunately, at this point, we don't. the american foreign policy machine is such a -- so difficult to turn around and kind of plan and think, it's kind of changing all the time, but i don't think there is

enough understanding in washington what's really going on. >> i know i was ragging on our czech and slovak and hungarian friends early, but i think really a lot of this problem comes from the motto of our -- the need for american leadership f you are a small central european country and you feel listless and you see no leadership from washington, you see no help for you, know, someone might say all right, we got to make our deal with the big guy to the east, because we can't count on washington. and i think that, to some extent is driving a lot of these negative rah trends that you're seeing in the countries that we have assumed after the cold war would be some of our strongest allies and supporters of the transatlantic relationship and haven't been. . one of the goal of brahm began da is induce that feeling of betrayal. >> helplessness. >> helplessness. >> two quick points. one is the push for providing lethal assistance to ukraine, as

you snow, bipartisan. it passed the committee september 18th 18-0. nothing passes 18-0 these days. that is a strong of strong bipartisan support for providing ukrainians the mean to defend themselves. i support the sanctions approach but i think the public and repeated rejection of ukrainian requests for military assistance is an enormous mistake. it telegraphs to putin what u.s. limitations r the "washington post" coined a phrase, gratuitous clarity, a wonderful phrase. we are far too clear on what we won't do >> the opposite of strategic ambiguity. >> exactly.

i want put ton wonder that guy at 1600 pennsylvania is a little untree tickable, a little uncrazy, i don't know what he might do instead work go out of our way to say what we won't do and see lengthsessentially openo putin and let him walk in. #instead work go out of our way to say what we won't do and essentially open the door to putin and let him walk in. they want the united states to take a leadership role and we are not doing it >> more questions? this gentleman right here. >> tim francis, i'm from africa come always interested in europe. one country that hasn't come up in conversation yet and the one that is probably the most firm against russia is poland. just wonderinged if you comments on sort of the polish take on ukraine and their sort of feel

of dealing with russia overall? >> i think we got a pretty good indication of the polish take when former foreign minister sikorsky's private conversation was leaked where he said that his country's alliance with the united states was worthless. not something he will say publically. >> the same as ukrainian. able to go ahead so far economically and being effective as a state that has to rely on the european union for support. in europe now, he is leading the council of ukraine yans, very, very hopeful that europe would be much more on the side of ukraine at this time. >> just add that freedom house,

by the way, i was kidding about gaining my freedom after leaving, it is a wonderful organization. freedom house issued a report on ten countries promote democracy beyond their borders. poland same came in second after sweden. poland deserves a a lot of credit for what it has done and a difficult position because of geeing of graph find the exposed flank fortunate.ography and the fortunate. baltic states given credit, they have been victims of food cutoffs, cyber attack, 2007 in estone ya. they are the front line. i wish more countries in the rest of europe would follow their lead.

time for one more question? >> this gentleman here. >> i understand the information warfare and the new front opened there, the harsh reality is that you have a country that has the largest strategic and tactical nuclear forces in the world. how do you feel, given the modernization that's going on within the strategic forces in russia that -- how do you feel that putin views his nuclear forces and how they will play out in the world in the mid to long range? >> a few years ago, you had general mccar who was the former chairman of their arounded forces threaten to use nuclear weapons preemptively if nato continued to enlarge, the reaction in this city was, oh, we have heard that before, let's just brush it off. remember in 2008, the night that barack obama won the u.s. election, then russian president dimitried meed very yev

threatened to put his missiles in kaliningrad, in part because he thought, and this shows how poor lit kremlin understands the united states that john mccain was gonna win. he wouldn't have done it with barack obama if he thought he was going to win. the russians have become rather reckless, one in talking about the use of nuclear weapons, including there's been concern about deployments of some missiles to crimea. they become incredibly reckless and dangerous with use of military aircraft buzzing nato allies, eu states and others flying lining the mediterranean coast of portugal and turn their transponders off, greatly increases the risk there is going to be a terrible accident, where one of these planes is going to crash into a civilian airliner, just like russian forces, russian-supported forces shut down the malaysia airliner, which by the way, none of us has mentioned during this 45 minutes. amazing how quickly people

forget the 298 people were murdered by a russian missile so the russian military is much better shape than it was in 2008. it struggled against georgia. it struggled against ukraine, but because ukraine is not georgia, ukraine is a much bigger entity to take on, i think it's a mistake to continue as we have in the past to sweep these threats and talks under the recalling rug and say that's russia being russia, it has to be taken much more seriously, particularly when putin says to poroshenko or barroso, i could be in kiev or riga, or warsaw in two hours. >> let's divide ukraine in half. >> or his defense of the moltov ribbon pact with it secret protocols dividing europe. with response to the questions about the baltic, that's what would make me nervous is putin's talk like that. again, we tend to just say, oh, that's putin being putin. well, putin's a liar.

denying the russian forces in crimea and then he admitted he lied. but there are certain things we should pay serious attention to and attention to of people under him. maccar raf is no longer the chair of the

[ applause[ applause ] we are live at the newseum in washington, d.c., today, this event hosted by the foreign policy initiative, their annual forum, a group of u.s. ambassadors, several high-level politician and journalists discussing the middle east, russia and u.s. defense policy today. in about a 15-minute break now, coming up at 3 eastern time, a look the a u.s. foreign policy, we will hear remarks by senator ted cruz. until then, we will show you a portion from the first discussion from this afternoon's

event here at the newseum, as former u.s. ambassadors to iraq and syria focused on the middle east. >> this is a continuing crisis and we need to know why it's a long-term problem. my second point that contradicts that is this situation with isis is a particularly new and dangerous situation and let me talk about the latter first, and why i think it has to be stopped it has to be defeated, it has to be destroyed. those are the official words and policy of the u.s. administration. see whether they can achieve that the reason is first of all, unlike other movements that a lot of similarity to, and i will get to that in just a sec, it has seized a huge amount of terrain, somewhere between 7 and 9 million people. it has large military forces, a lot of equipment. it has control over economic

things like despite our bombing and other actions, a fair amount of oil. it is threatening the very fiber and fabric the center of the middle east, endangering what president obama has repeatedly and correctly said are our four main interests in the region, our allies, stopping weapon of mass destruction spread, fighting terrorism and taking care of allies, fighting terrorism, weapon of mass destruction, i always forget the fourth one. i will come back to the fourth one. >> you got the good ones. >> those are the good ones. we have really -- how could i forget it, the free flow of oil. we have really important issues in the middle east these guys are going to threaten if they are not destroyed. how do they come about and what is the underlying problem in the

region? here, i would quote as much as i can the recent work by henry kissinger. "world order," describes the middle east unique in the world, you have from pakistan to morocco a set of very weak nation states, without most of the roots in their population and in history that nation states elsewhere, however weak they are in the balkans, central america, appear to be. the rest of them don't have the anchors that nation states have. furthermore that region is faced with a traditional, millennial approach to world history, alternative way of organizing society, politics, state and religion in these messianic caliphate movements that we keep seeing emerging from the islamic

world. this isn't accepted in any serious way by most muslims but it is accepted by enough and supported by a few to lead to continuing problems. we have a version of that with iran and versions of this with the muslim brothers, obviously with al qaeda and on steroids with isis. so, it's a tremendous reoccurring problem that we have had to deal with and has led to crisis after crisis, american and western intervention after intervention, since, again, the 1970s and i don't see any quick end to that. the reason that isis is now so different, however, the elements that have fueled its rise, first of all, the arab spring, which laid bare the lack of legitimacy of most of the states in the region and their inability to take almost any action that made sense to their population, they either reverted back to dictatorship, violence, violence most extreme in the syrian case

or again, basically shut down everywhere but tunisia. and that builds up a tremendous amount of pressure. the second thing is the united states. for many years, rather like the roman empire, woe go would go intervene, try to do it with the minimum force, push back the manifestations of this dysfunctionalty without trying to deal with the underlying dysfunctionalty. well, in the past 13 years, we've had two experiences, two experiments, if you will, in american foreign policy under the bush administration, we decided no more of that, we don't do base runs. we're going to go in and fix the underlying problems. we know where that has wound up in afghanistan, iraq and gaza. then, the obama administration reacting to that overextension of american power has decided we're pivoting to asia, bye-bye middle east. again, those four interests that are absolutely permanent and absolutely vital to us have drawn us back and led to us

belatedly to deal with isis. we can get into more detail in a discussion on the strategy, the tactics, the operations. there's a lot of this on the news today because of the nato meeting. the administration has a plan, whether that plan will get us from where we're at now to destroying isis is a different question. there's a lot about the whole syrian side of it. but even on the iraqi side, there are issues of where we're going to find the ground troops to actually take territory back from force that has somewhere between 20 and 50,000 armed people under its control. and there's also a very troubling term of reference that we need to really consider and look at. and that is the administration's constant hopping on, this is going to be a long-term problem, we have to deal with it. we've got to mobilize 60 countries. they have, you know, they have agendas and schedules, it's hard to get them altogether and all of that.

this is both a truism and it's treacherous. it's a truism, because obviously things take time. even the first gulf war took us a good number of months to mobilize the international community and our own forces. but nonetheless, time is not on our side with isis. given the situation in the region over the past 15 years, these three new elements, underlying problem of legitimacy that now is much more manifest with the arab spring, the grave questions about americans -- america's willingness to sustain its security role in the middle east, which is still out there is a problem. and, isis' threat to everything. i'm not so sure we have a whole lot of time. i'm not so sure it wouldn't be better to take risks, roll the dice and stop pushing harder against these guys now rather than waiting and seeing what happens in a couple of years ago. a few years ago when robert was in syria, the administration essentially did that. but let's wait and see what happens. well, what happened? isis. i'll rest my case right there.

>> well, thank you very much, ambassador. ambassador ford, let me turn it over to you, and there are many themes i know you can pick up from here. >> yeah. well, first, kim, thank you very much. and my thanks to the foreign policy institute for the invitation to talk with people today about the middle east. i, after 30 years have to say to you that the middle east surprises me every day. i don't think there's such a thing as an expert on the middle east. let me share my ignorance with you. first, the situation is difficult, and some ways unprecedented. i don't know i would call it total chaos. we do have three states nation states that in a sense are in meltdown. yemen, libya, and syria. and iraq sort of teeters in an exciting way. it's always fun to watch. but it's -- i don't think iraq's

doom is forordained. as i think about this, i ask myself what is the context in which these difficulties with these three states is occurring? a demand by populations from the atlantic to the persian gulf. if you carry that forward, there are two questions, two issues would be a better way to put it. prisms through which i, myself, assess these three states. the first is within this issue of dignity. the first is an aggrieved sunni/arab population that feels

its dignity is been either tread upon or threatened. attached to that then is a strong impulse towards islamist parties, which, by the way, are not unbeatable. they just lost a free and fair election in tunisia. and so, i don't think islamism is forordained as the future of the middle east any more than secular democratic governments. i think it'll be case by case and it'll be specific. we talk about that. the role of religion in the state. the whole competition, which is being played out big time in places like syria, places like

ir iraq, bahrain, and lebanon. we may be able to influence on the margins in some ways. but because they involve fundamental issues of how a nation individual nation governs itself, we get into nation building, and having spent, including time with jim, some 4 1/2 years in iraq working on nation building, i can tell you from the shoes of a practitioner, it is very difficult and we should treat that with great caution. not to say we do nothing, but we tread cautiously and we have realistic expectations about what any group of foreigners, whether they be americans or iranians or anybody else. what they can do to address that. so jim spoke eloquently about

the threat of the islamic state. and i certainly think it is a threat both to american national security and it is a threat to some of the wobbly nation states in the region now. and there are additional pressures on those nation states. i'm sure many of you are watching the price of oil on international markets. that is going to matter a great deal. it's in some ways a double-edged sword. countries that import oil like jordan or morocco may benefit, but there will be harder, it'll be harder for their patrons, such as the saudis to finance them in the way they have done. i'm not sure how that's going to cut out. really important change, which was vividly demonstrated in 2011 is citizens in these countries have greater access to information than say in the

1990s or even in the 2000s. social media is huge and growing in this part of the world. access to satellite information, to the internet more broadly. these are populations which now deal with a great deal more information that can be positive and it can be negative, if we're talking about islamic state, youtube, recruiting videos, and i don't know how many of you have watched them. but let me tell you, they're very slick. they are on a whole other level from what osama bin laden was doing ten years ago. and so, the region itself is changing, there are new pressures on it. and we need to address it. but also, we need to understand our limitations and we will need, understanding those limitatio limitations, we'll need to find allies both in the region and within the countries themselves because rather than it be an

american advocated reform or military step, it needs above all to have buy-in from the local population. let me stop there, cameron. >> well, thank you very much. i actually would love to tee up the discussion by asking both of you, given the extraordinary historical overview that you have given in your own ways, if you could sit down with president obama today and give him three recommendations about what to do in the middle east. what recommendations would you give him? you get to go first. >> okay. one concerning syria, do whatever robert ford tells you. two -- >> very wise. >> on the iraq front, we're somewhere between a "c" and "b," so far, but it's still early,

time isn't on our side. reconsider the no u.s. combat formations on the ground decision. because you may have to either renege on that or you may have to fall off of our very important mission of destroying isis. i think there's a gap between the two. three, while you're doing that, and that's hard, and i have some sympathy for the administration on that. here's what i don't have sympathy for the administration. if we're going to do this seven-point program and you heard another iteration of this at nato cut off lower funding, cut off, do something about the ideological appeal. cut off people are traveling there, take care of the refugees, air strikes, build up forces, go on the offensive. if you're going to do that, without u.s. ground troops, but rather, we're going to do this from the air with other people's boots on the ground, we better put like we've done in every other conflict